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Gorgias
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Outline
Gorgias: Outline
p. 237Outline
The divisions follow the dialogue’s own joints: the three conversations, with Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, and the stages of the argument within each. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.
I. The arrival, and Gorgias names his craft (447a–449c)
447a–c Callicles: “Of war and battle, Socrates, this is how they say one should take one’s share.” Socrates and Chaerephon have come “after the feast”; Gorgias’ display is over. Socrates wants to learn “what the power of the man’s craft is, and what it is that he professes and teaches”.
447c–448c Chaerephon is to ask Gorgias “Who he is”, as one would ask a shoemaker. Gorgias: “no one has asked me anything new for many years.” Polus answers for him, in a jingle: “routine makes our life journey by craft, and lack of routine by chance”; Gorgias’ craft is “the most beautiful of the crafts”.
448d–449c Socrates: Polus “has practised what is called rhetoric more than conversing”. Gorgias: his craft is rhetoric, and he is an orator, “And a good one”. He agrees to answer briefly: “no one could say the same things more briefly than I.”
II. What rhetoric is about (449c–453a)
449c–450c Rhetoric is about speeches; but so are medicine and gymnastics. Gorgias: the other crafts are “about handiwork”, while all the action of rhetoric “is through speeches”.
450c–451d Arithmetic, calculation and astronomy also accomplish everything by speech; “of those about what?”
451d–452e “The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.” The drinking-song: health, beauty, wealth; the doctor, the trainer and the money-maker each claim the greatest good. Gorgias: “To be able, I say, to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, and councillors in a council-chamber, and assemblymen in an assembly”; “you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave”.
III. What persuasion, and about what (453a–455d)
453a–454b “rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion”; but arithmetic persuades too. Of what persuasion? “the one in the law courts and in the other crowds, … and about those things that are just and unjust.”
454b–455a “having learned” and “having been convinced”: there is a false conviction, but no false knowledge. “two forms of persuasion, the one providing conviction without knowing, the other knowledge”; rhetoric “is a craftsman of persuasion that convinces, not of persuasion that teaches, about the just and the unjust”.
455a–d Then the orator does not advise about doctors, ships, walls or generals. “What will we get, Gorgias, if we are with you?”
IV. The power of rhetoric (455d–457c)
455d–456a Gorgias: the dockyards and walls of the Athenians came from the advice of Themistocles and Pericles, “not from the craftsmen”.
456a–c “it gathers together, so to speak, all the powers and holds them under itself”: Gorgias has persuaded his brother’s patients where the doctor could not; before the assembly “the doctor would appear nowhere”.
456c–457c Rhetoric must be used justly, as boxing must; if a pupil misuses it, “it is not the one who taught him that one must hate and throw out of the cities”.
V. On refutation (457c–458e)
457c–458b Arguments end in quarrels. Socrates is one of those “who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone says anything not true”; “nothing is so great a bad thing for a person as false opinion about the things our argument is in fact about now.”
458b–e Gorgias fears for the company; Chaerephon and Callicles want the talk to go on: “even if you are willing to converse the whole day, you will gratify me, at any rate.”
VI. Gorgias refuted (458e–461b)
458e–459c The orator is “more persuasive than the doctor” in a crowd, that is, “among those who do not know”; “the one who does not know will be more persuasive than the one who knows, among those who do not know”.
459c–460a Must the pupil know the just and the unjust beforehand? Gorgias: “if he in fact does not know, he will learn these things too from me.”
460a–c “the one who has learned the just things is just too”; so “the rhetorician will never want to do injustice.”
460d–461b But Gorgias said that a pupil might use rhetoric unjustly. The things said “did not sing together”.
VII. Polus: rhetoric a routine, a part of flattery (461b–466a)
461b–462b Polus: Gorgias was ashamed; “to lead the arguments to such things is great boorishness.” Socrates asks him to keep “The long-speech” shut in, and to ask or answer.
462b–463a What craft is rhetoric? “None, I think, Polus”; “A certain routine”, “Of the production of a certain gratification and pleasure”; “a part of the same pursuit” as cookery.
463a–e The pursuit is “not masterly, but of a soul good at aiming, and courageous, and formidable by nature at consorting with human beings”; its sum is “flattery”, with four parts: cookery, rhetoric, cosmetics, sophistry. Rhetoric is “an image of a part of politics”. Polus “is young and keen”.
464a–465e Two crafts tend the body, gymnastics and medicine, and two the soul, legislation and justice; flattery “having divided itself into four” slips in under each. “what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice”; rhetoric is “the counterpart of cookery in the soul”.
VIII. Polus: the power of orators and tyrants (466a–468e)
466a–c Polus: do not orators, like tyrants, “put to death whomever they want, and take away money and throw out of the cities whomever they think fit?” Socrates: “I think the orators have the least power of those in the city.”
466c–467c “they do nothing of what they want, so to speak; they do, however, whatever they think best.” Polus: “Shocking things you do say, and prodigious, Socrates.”
467c–468e We want not what we do but “that for the sake of which” we do it, the good; one who kills or banishes “thinking it better for himself, while it is in fact worse” does what he thinks fit, not what he wants, and has not great power.
IX. Polus: whom to envy (468e–471d)
468e–469c “As if you, Socrates, would not accept being allowed to do what you think fit in the city”. “Speak words of good omen, Polus.” “doing injustice is in fact the greatest of bad things”; “I would choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice.”
469c–470c The dagger in the crowded market-place; such power is good only if it is used beneficially, that is, justly.
470c–471d Polus: “even a child” could refute him; Archelaus of Macedonia, who murdered his way to the throne, is happy. Socrates does not know whether even the Great King is happy, “for I do not know how he stands in education and justice.”
X. Two kinds of refutation (471d–474b)
471d–472d Socrates: “you are attempting to refute me rhetorically, like those in the law courts”; witnesses can be had for anything, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of Pericles; Socrates wants one witness, “you yourself, being one”.
472d–473e The two theses: the one who does injustice is wretched, and “more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty”. Polus: “Outlandish things indeed, Socrates, you attempt to say.” The racked and impaled tyrant: “Again you are frightening me with bogeys, noble Polus”.
473e–474b Polus laughs; Socrates on the Council “provided a laugh and did not know how to put it to the vote”; “I know how to put the question to the vote of one”.
XI. Doing injustice is worse than suffering it (474b–476a)
474b–d Polus: suffering injustice is worse; asked which is “more shameful”, he answers “Doing injustice”.
474d–475b The beautiful in bodies, colours, shapes, voices, laws, pursuits and studies is beautiful by pleasure or benefit or both; the shameful “by pain and bad”.
475b–e Doing injustice does not exceed in pain, so it exceeds in bad, and is worse. “neither I nor you nor anyone else among human beings would accept doing injustice rather than suffering injustice; for it is in fact worse.”
475e–476a “for me you are enough, being one, alone, both agreeing and bearing witness”.
XII. Paying the penalty (476a–479e)
476a–d “such as the doer does, such is what the sufferer suffers.”
476d–477a The one punished justly suffers just things, beautiful things, good things; he is “benefited”.
477a–478b Of money, body and soul, the three basenesses are poverty, disease and injustice; injustice is the most shameful and the worst; money-making rids of poverty, medicine of disease, “and penalty of licentiousness and injustice”.
478b–479c Happiest is the one who has no vice in his soul; second, the one rid of it; “Worst, then, lives the one who has it and is not rid of it”. Archelaus is like a sick man afraid “of being burned and being cut”.
479c–e “not paying the penalty when doing injustice is naturally the greatest and first of all bad things.”
XIII. The use of rhetoric (480a–481b)
480a–d One must go willingly to the judge “as to the doctor”, and use rhetoric to accuse oneself and one’s own, “so that, as the acts of injustice become plain, they may be rid of the greatest bad thing, injustice.”
480e–481b Against an enemy, one must contrive “that he not die, most of all never, but be immortal, being base”.
XIV. Callicles enters (481b–482c)
481b–c Callicles: “is Socrates in earnest in this, or is he playing?” If he is in earnest, “our life, the life of human beings, would be overturned”.
481c–482c Two lovers in love with two: Socrates with Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles with “the people of the Athenians and the son of Pyrilampes”. “stop philosophy, my darling, from saying them”; Socrates would rather be out of tune with the many than “with myself”.
XV. Callicles: nature and law (482c–484c)
482c–483a Polus “was muzzled, being ashamed to say what he had in mind”; “for the most part these are contrary to each other, nature and law”.
483a–d The laws are laid down by “the feeble human beings and the many”; “nature itself … sets it forth, that it is just for the superior to have more than the inferior”.
483d–484c Xerxes and Darius acted “according to law, at any rate, the law of nature”. The lion-cubs charmed with talk of equal shares; “the slave has come to light as our master”. Pindar’s “Law, the king of all”, and Heracles with the cattle of Geryon.
XVI. Callicles: philosophy for lads (484c–486d)
484c–485a Philosophy is “a charming thing … if one touches it moderately at the right time of life”; too much of it makes a man “unversed” in laws, contracts, pleasures and characters. Euripides: “where he is in fact himself at his own best”.
485a–e Lisping and playing become a child; philosophizing a lad; an older man still at it “needs blows”.
485e–486d Callicles speaks to Socrates as Zethus to Amphion; led off to prison, “you would be dizzy and gape, not having anything to say”; such a man “one is allowed to strike on the jaw and not pay the penalty”. “cease refuting”.
XVII. The touchstone (486d–488b)
486d–487b Socrates has found “a godsend”: Callicles has “knowledge and goodwill and frankness”.
487b–488b Callicles’ partners in wisdom; “what sort the man must be, and what he must make his pursuit”. “Take it up again for me from the beginning”.
XVIII. Who are the stronger? (488b–491d)
488b–489b “is the stronger and the better and the mightier the same or different?” The many are stronger than the one; so their law, equal shares, is just “by nature too”.
489b–490a Callicles: “This man here will not stop talking nonsense”; not “a rabble of slaves”. Then “the more intelligent”.
490a–491a Should the doctor have most food, the weaver the biggest cloak, the shoemaker the most shoes, the farmer the most seed? “How you always say the same things, Socrates!” “Not only so, at any rate, Callicles, but also about the same things.”
491a–d “those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city … and courageous”; “this is the just: that these have more than the others, the rulers than the ruled.”
XIX. Ruler of oneself, and the desires (491d–492e)
491d–e “each one himself ruler of himself”? Callicles: “By the temperate you mean the simpletons.”
491e–492c “the one who is going to live rightly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not punish them”; “luxury and licentiousness and freedom, if it has aid, this is virtue and happiness”.
492d–e “Then those who need nothing are not rightly said to be happy.” “For thus, at any rate, the stones and the corpses would be most happy.”
XX. The jars and the sieve (492e–494a)
492e–493c Euripides: “who knows if to live is to die”. The body a grave; the jar of the desires, perforated; the sieve of the soul of the senseless.
493d–494a The two men with many jars, one whose jars are sound and full, the other whose vessels are “perforated and unsound”. Callicles: the one who has filled them lives “like a stone”.
XXI. The stone-curlew and the itch (494a–495c)
494a–b “living pleasantly lies in this: in as much as possible flowing in”; “some stone-curlew’s life”.
494c–e The itch: “one who has the itch and has an urge to scratch”; “the life of catamites”.
494e–495c Callicles: “I claim they are the same.” Socrates: “observe whether it may be that the good is not this, rejoicing in every way”.
XXII. The pleasant is not the good (495c–499b)
495c–497a Knowledge, courage and pleasure are other than each other. One cannot fare well and badly at once, but one in pain can rejoice: “the pleasant comes to be other than the good”.
497a–d Callicles balks: “he questions and refutes things small and worth little.” Gorgias: “submit to Socrates’ refuting you”. “you have been initiated into the great before the small”.
497d–499b The good are good “by the presence of good things”; the foolish and cowardly rejoice and are in pain as much as the intelligent and courageous; so the bad would be as good as the good, “or even more good”.
XXIII. Good and bad pleasures; flattery reviewed (499b–503d)
499b–500a Callicles: “some pleasures are better and others inferior.” “you use me like a child”. The good is “the end of all actions”; choosing pleasures needs “a master of the craft”.
500a–501c “in what way one ought to live”; cookery a routine, medicine a craft; the flatteries of the soul.
501d–502d Pipe-playing, the lyre, the dithyramb (Cinesias and his father Meles) and tragedy aim at pleasure; poetry is “a kind of addressing the people”, “a rhetorical addressing of the people”.
502d–503d Do the orators speak “with a view to the best”? Callicles: Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles.
XXIV. Order in the soul (503d–505c)
503d–504a The craftsman puts his work into “a certain arrangement” until “the whole is put together, a thing arranged and ordered”.
504a–d In the body, health and might; in the soul, “the lawful and law, … and these are justice and temperance”.
504d–505c The good orator will apply his speeches so that “justice may come to be in the souls of his citizens”; to shut a base soul out from its desires is to punish it, and “Being punished, then, is better for the soul than licentiousness”.
XXV. Socrates answers himself (505c–507c)
505c–506c Callicles: “ask someone else”; “I gave you these answers for Gorgias’ sake.” A tale must have a head. Epicharmus: “two men were saying before”. Gorgias: “you ought to go through the argument in full”.
506c–507c Socrates asks and answers: the pleasant is not the good; virtue comes by “arrangement and rightness and craft”; the orderly soul is temperate, and the temperate soul good; the temperate man is just, holy and courageous, “a perfectly good man”.
XXVI. The conclusions (507c–509c)
507c–e “the one who does well is blessed and happy”; one must “flee licentiousness as fast as each of us has feet”; the licentious man can be friend to no one, “living a robber’s life”.
507e–508c “partnership and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justness hold together heaven and earth”; “geometrical equality has great power”; so Polus and Gorgias granted rightly.
508c–509c Callicles’ reproach answered: being struck on the jaw unjustly is not the most shameful thing; doing it is. These things are bound “by arguments of iron and adamant”; “I do not know how these things are”.
XXVII. The craft for not suffering injustice (509c–511a)
509c–510a “Power or wanting?”; “no one does injustice wanting to”.
510a–d To suffer no injustice one must rule, or be “a companion of the existing regime”; “like to like”; the young man who makes himself like the tyrant.
510d–511a “in this way the preparation will be his for being able to do as much injustice as possible”, “the greatest bad thing”.
XXVIII. Swimming, piloting, the engine-maker (511a–513c)
511a–c Callicles: the imitator will put to death the one who does not imitate. Socrates: “as a base man putting to death one who is beautiful and good.”
511c–512b Swimming and piloting keep safe and do not boast; the pilot “has landed them not at all better than they were when they embarked”.
512b–d The engine-maker, whose son Callicles would not let marry his daughter; “see whether the noble and the good are not something other than keeping safe and being kept safe.”
512d–513c One “must not love his life”; must one become like the people? “at the cost of what we love most”; “love of the people, Callicles, being in your soul, stands against me”.
XXIX. Tending the city (513c–515b)
513c–514a Two preparations, one “with a view to pleasure”, the other “with a view to the best”; the second is the way to tend the city.
514a–515b As builders and doctors would be examined before public work; “to learn pottery on the jar”. “has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better?”
XXX. The great men of Athens (515b–517a)
515b–e Socrates hears that Pericles made the Athenians “idle and cowardly and talkative and lovers of silver”.
515e–516d “A caretaker of asses and horses and oxen” who turns his animals out more savage is bad; “the just, at any rate, are tame”.
516d–517a Cimon ostracized, Themistocles exiled, Miltiades voted into the pit; good charioteers do not “fall out”. They “used neither the true rhetoric … nor the flattering one”.
XXXI. Serving and tending (517a–519d)
517a–c They were “more serving than those now”, but did not redirect the city’s desires.
517c–518c The serving crafts and their mistresses, gymnastics and medicine; Thearion the baker, Mithaecus, Sarambus. “Man, you are expert in nothing about gymnastics”.
518c–519b The feasters praised, the advisers present blamed; “harbours and dockyards and walls and tributes and such nonsense”; a warning for Callicles and Alcibiades.
519b–d No head of a city perishes unjustly at its hands; the sophists who say their pupils cheat them.
XXXII. Sophist and orator (519d–521a)
519d–520b “In truth you have compelled me to address the people”; “A sophist and an orator are the same thing, you blessed man, or something near and about equal”.
520b–521a The benefaction of virtue alone could be given without pay; “it is held shameful to claim one will not advise, unless someone gives him silver.”
XXXIII. Which tending? (521a–522e)
521a–c “To which tending of the city, then, are you summoning me?” Callicles: “as one who will act as servant”, or “call yourself a Mysian”.
521c–522c “I attempt the craft that is in truth political”; “I shall be tried as a doctor would be tried among little children, with a cook accusing him.” “Children, this man has worked many bad things on you”.
522c–e The one help that counts: “having neither said nor worked anything unjust concerning either human beings or gods”; “to arrive in Hades with the soul laden with many acts of injustice is the last of all bad things.”
XXXIV. The judgment of the dead (522e–524a)
522e–523a “Listen, then, as they say, to a very beautiful account, which you will believe a tale, I think, but I an account”.
523a–c The law of Cronus’ time; the Islands of the Blessed and Tartarus; the living judged the living, and the cases were tried badly.
523c–524a Zeus: “those on trial … are tried clothed”; men must not know their death beforehand; they must be tried naked and dead by dead judges, Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus, “in the meadow, at the place where three roads meet”.
XXXV. The marks of the soul, and retribution (524a–526d)
524a–d Death “the separation of two things, the soul and the body”; the corpse keeps the marks of the body, and the soul those of its life.
524d–525a Rhadamanthys finds the Great King’s soul “whipped all over and full of scars from perjuries and injustice”.
525a–d The curable are benefited “through pains and agonies”; the incurable become “examples, spectacles and admonitions”; Archelaus among them.
525d–526d Homer’s kings in Hades, and Thersites; “Aristides son of Lysimachus”; the philosopher’s soul sent to the Islands of the Blessed; Minos “holding a golden sceptre, dealing right to the dead.”
XXXVI. The summons (526d–527e)
526d–527a Socrates will set forth his soul “as healthy as possible”, and summons Callicles; “you will gape and be dizzy there no less than I here”.
527a–c “said as a tale, like an old woman’s”; “this argument alone stands unmoved: that one must beware of doing injustice more than of suffering injustice”.
527c–e “let him strike you that dishonouring blow”; “to such a pitch of lack of education have we come”; “for it is worth nothing, Callicles.”
Socrates
Reading Gorgias · Outline · Outline
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus and Callicles about rhetoric, power, pleasure and justice, and asks what it means to live well. This complete edition presents 447a–527e across 117 Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, later readings of Callicles and the judgment myth, a glossary, critical apparatus, and 208 translator’s notes.
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The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford, 1903), in the corrected second impression of January 1909, printed by Horace Hart. The supplied Editorial Note reports checking the Perseus Digital Library transcription against photographs of the printed pages. Burnet’s readings, speaker labels, verse quotations, editorial signs and critical apparatus are retained. The unchanged PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
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