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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 15 · §§ 21–22

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Facing Pages · Branch 62 of 191

Book V · Chapter 15 · §§ 21–22

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Latin

p. 118

Non igitur esse corpus volet; neque ullum huius rei certius argumentum est quam cum se ipsum hoc interrogat animus. Ita enim facile comperit appetitum se non habere nisi agendi aliquid aut sciendi aut sentiendi aut vel tantummodo vivendi, quantum sua illi potestas est. Si autem cogitur corpus esse, a quo tandem cogitur? Num a quolibet? Certe a potentiore. Non igitur a corpore potest. Nullo enim modo ullo animo ullum potentius corpus. Potentior autem animus non cogit in aliquid nisi quod suae potestati subditum est; nec ullo modo animus potestati alterius animi nisi suis cupiditatibus subditur. Cogit ergo ille animus non magis quam quantum eius cupiditates sinunt quem cogit. Dictum est autem cupiditatem non posse animum habere ut corpus sit. Illud etiam manifestum est, ad nullam suae cupiditatis expletionem pervenire dum amittit omnem cupiditatem; et amittit dum corpus fit. Non ergo potest ab eo cogi ut fiat, qui potestatem cogendi nisi per subditas cupiditates non habet.

Deinde quisquis animus alterum animum habet in potestate magis eum necesse est velit in potestate habere quam corpus, et ei vel bonitate consulere vel malitia imperare. Non ergo volet ut corpus sit. Postremo iste animus cogens aut animal est aut caret corpore. Sed si caret corpore, in hoc mundo non est; sed si ita est, summe bonus est, nec potest velle alteri tam turpem commutationem. Si autem animal est, aut animal etiam est ille quem cogit aut non est. Sed si non est, nihil cogi ab alio potest. Non enim habet potentiorem qui in summo est, id est non cogitur qui est solutus. Si autem in corpore est, ab eo rursus qui in corpore est per corpus cogitur ad quodcumque cogitur. Quis autem dubitet nullo modo per corpus fieri tantam commutationem animo? Fieret enim si esset illo corpus potentius. Quamvis quicquid illud est ad quod per corpus cogitur prorsus non per corpus sed per cupiditates suas cogitur, de quibus satis est dictum. Quod autem rationali anima melius est, omnibus consentientibus divinum est, quod profecto consulit animae, et ideo non ab eo cogi anima potest ut convertatur in corpus. Si igitur nec propria voluntate nec alio cogente id anima patitur, unde id pati potest?

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 119

The mind will therefore never will to be body, and there is no surer proof of this than the mind’s asking itself the question. It then readily discovers that every desire it has is for acting, knowing, sensing, or at the very least living, insofar as these lie within its power. If it is instead compelled to be body, by whom is it compelled? By just anyone? Surely only by something more powerful. It cannot be compelled by body, for no body is in any way more powerful than any mind. But a more powerful mind compels another only in matters subject to its power; and one mind is subject to the power of another only through its own desires. The compelling mind therefore has power only to the extent that the desires of the mind it compels permit. Yet we have said that the mind can have no desire to become body. It is also plain that it reaches the fulfillment of none of its desires by losing every desire, which it would do on becoming body. Therefore it cannot be forced to become body by another mind, whose power to compel extends only through the desires subjected to it.

Next, any mind that has another mind in its power must wish to possess it as mind rather than as body, whether it cares for it through goodness or rules it through malice. It will therefore not wish the other to become body. Finally, the compelling mind either is an embodied living being or is without body. If it is without body, it is not in this world; and if so, it is supremely good and cannot wish so degrading a transformation upon another. If it is embodied, then the mind it compels is either embodied too or is not. If the other is not embodied, nothing can compel it, for what stands at the summit has nothing more powerful than itself: what is free is not compelled. But if it is in a body, then whatever compulsion it suffers from another embodied mind is exercised through body. Who can doubt that no body could work so great a transformation upon a mind? It could do so only if body were more powerful than mind. In fact, whatever an embodied mind seems to compel another to do through body, it compels not through body at all but through the other mind’s own desires, of which enough has been said. By universal agreement, whatever is superior to the rational soul is divine; and the divine assuredly cares for the soul, so it cannot compel the soul to be converted into body. If the soul undergoes this change neither by its own will nor under another’s compulsion, from what source could it undergo it?

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.