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MARSILIO FICINO

Platonic Theology

On the Immortality of Souls

VOLUME II

Books V-VIII

Latin reading text with an independent English translation

DIOTIMOS EDITION PROJECT

Florence 1482 base witness | Paris 1559 collating witness

Production text organized by stable comparison units

Edition and source statement

This volume contains Books V-VIII of Marsilio Ficino's Platonic Theology. The Latin source work is in the public domain. No modern copyrighted edition, translation, apparatus, or paragraphing is used as production text.

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559). The Paris 1641 Opera printing is used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, routine orthography and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus. The English translation is independently worded in the Diotimos Volume I voice.

The English preserves Ficino's argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications while smoothing syntax only where clear modern English requires it. Stable comparison anchors are editorial and appear on both sides of every synchronized spread.

DIGITAL SOURCE RECORDS

M1482 https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00066894-9

G1559 https://patrimoniodigital.ucm.es/s/patrimonio/item/645358

P1641 https://archive.org/details/BIUSante_01177x01

Volume II contents

Book V 7

V.1 Every rational soul is immortal. First argument: because it moves itself and moves in a circle. 8

V.2 Second argument: because it stands firm in its substance. 12

V.3 Third argument: because it cleaves to divine things. 14

V.4 Fourth argument: because it rules over matter. 16

V.5 Fifth argument: because it is free from matter. 26

V.6 Sixth argument: because it is indivisible. 32

V.7 Seventh argument: because it has its being in its own essence. 34

V.8 Eighth argument: because it has a being of its own and never departs from its form. 38

V.9 Ninth argument: because being belongs to it in its own right. 46

V.10 Tenth argument: because by its own nature it is related to God. 54

V.11 Eleventh argument: because it is not composed of any potency into which it could be resolved. 60

V.12 Twelfth argument: because it has within itself no potency toward non-being. 68

V.13 Thirteenth argument: because it receives its being from God without an intermediary. 78

V.14 Fourteenth argument: because it is life in itself. 94

V.15 Fifteenth argument: because life is more excellent than body. 104

Book VI 127

VI.1 The views concerning the soul are reduced to five principal positions. 128

VI.2 Philosophers of the common sort, persuaded by no argument but misled by corrupt habit, held that the soul was corporeal. 134

VI.3 The soul is neither a body nor a form divided within a body, as its natural power shows. 168

VI.4 First argument: because the soul is the principle of nourishment and of every other mode of action. 170

VI.5 Second argument: the soul is neither an animate body nor an inanimate one. 174

VI.6 Third argument: the soul is neither a gross body nor a subtle one. 178

VI.7 Fourth argument: a body is composed of matter and form. 182

VI.8 Fifth argument: a body is by nature dispersed. 186

VI.9 Sixth argument: two bodies do not occupy the same place. 190

VI.10 Seventh argument: a body is not wholly present in several places at once. 196

VI.11 Eighth argument: the soul is life or the source of life. 198

VI.12 Ninth argument: a body does not move itself. 202

VI.13 Tenth argument: the soul does not increase with the growth of this body. 222

Volume II contents continued

Book VII 231

VII.1 First argument. A body does not receive images suited to sensation. 232

VII.2 Second argument. The five senses must be brought together at a single center. 238

VII.3 Third argument. The more confined the sense, the keener it is. 242

VII.4 Fourth argument. If the faculty of sensation is divisible, the sensible image within it will be divided. 244

VII.5 Fifth argument. The soul as a whole senses everywhere. 248

VII.6 Sixth argument. The soul is not necessarily acted upon in sensing. 256

VII.7 Seventh argument. Arguments drawn specifically from the soul's natural and sensitive power show that the soul is not a divisible form, since a quality has a single operation. 262

VII.8 Eighth argument. A bodily constitution acts through the power of its qualities. 264

VII.9 Ninth argument. A bodily constitution is an accidental form. 266

VII.10 Tenth argument. The harmony of a bodily constitution produces no effect upon the body. 270

VII.11 Eleventh argument. There is harmony in every composite body. 272

VII.12 Twelfth argument. Harmony is understood either as the composition of the parts itself or as some proportion within that composition. 274

VII.13 Thirteenth argument. A harmony of the humors receives nothing apart from matter. 276

VII.14 Fourteenth argument. The greater a thing's concord, the more fully it is a harmony. 278

VII.15 Fifteenth argument. Harmony admits nothing discordant. 280

Book VIII 283

VIII.1 The soul ascends through four stages to spirit. First argument. 284

VIII.2 The soul is nourished by truth. Second argument. 294

VIII.3 Third argument. Because the soul's virtue is indivisible, it cannot be a quality of a body. 306

VIII.4 Fourth argument. Neither an intelligible form nor an intelligible conception can be received by a body. 316

VIII.5 Fifth argument. If the mind is a body, it understands by touching things and by traversing them. 338

VIII.6 Sixth argument. Whatever the intellect receives, it receives with its whole self; it would not do so if it were bodily. 342

VIII.7 Seventh argument. In receiving the forms of things, the intellect does not lose its own form; bodies do. 344

VIII.8 Eighth argument. A form in the mind is universal; such a form cannot exist in a body. 346

VIII.9 Ninth argument. Minds embrace one another; bodies do no such thing. 348

VIII.10 Tenth argument. The mind acts through all bodies and beyond them. 350

VIII.11 Eleventh argument. The mind advances through stillness, the body through motion. 354

VIII.12 Twelfth argument. Things contrary in matter are not contrary in the mind. 356

VIII.13 Thirteenth argument. The mind is not changed when it receives forms. 358

VIII.14 Fourteenth argument. A body's activity tends toward a composite thing; the mind's activity, toward simple things. 362

VIII.15 Fifteenth argument. The mind's action has its end in action; a body's action, in a body. 364

VIII.16 Sixteenth argument. A bodily form does not possess infinite power; the mind does. 370

Text translation and anchors

Facing pages

Latin appears on the verso and the corresponding English on the facing recto. Matching anchors identify the same comparison units across each spread.

Editorial divisions

Units ordinarily follow paragraph signs in the 1482 base witness. A source paragraph is divided only at a genuine logical joint when necessary for accurate comparison, and every such division is disclosed in the locator register.

Translation

The English follows the voice established in Diotimos Volume I: dignified and readable, faithful to the full logical sequence, imagery, technical vocabulary, qualifications, and rhetoric of the Latin.

Apparatus

The closing pages record consequential witness readings, interpretive notes, and a source locator for every comparison unit.

LIBER V

Book V

Quintus liber tractat de immortalitate animae per rationes communes.

The fifth book treats the immortality of the soul through general arguments.

Caput 1

Omnis rationalis anima est immortalis. Prima ratio: quia per se movetur et in circulum.

V.1.1

Nos omnes animas in ordine essentiae tertiae collocamus atque hac ratione communi esse volumus immortales, quod primo moventur, et quia moventur primo, moventur in circulum. Quia igitur primo moventur, moventur et semper. Ibi enim perpetuus motus est, ubi primus. Nam si fons motus aruerit, nihil ultra movebitur in natura. Item quod primo movetur sibi ipsi praebet motum internum atque externum. Internus motus vita est. Itaque sibimet vitam suppeditat. Et quia numquam deserit se ipsum, cum in qualibet natura insit amor sui ipsius perpetuus, numquam desinit vivere. Si enim quod movetur ab alio, quamdiu adhaeret motori, tamdiu movetur, multo magis quod a se ipso movetur, quia idem est atque motor, numquam a motore desertum, moveri desinit numquam. Praeterea, si fingatur interire quandoque, aut prius esse desinet quam moveri, aut contra, aut simul. Non datur primum, quia motus non potest seorsum ab essentia remanere; non secundum, quia spontaneus motus assiduus comes est eius quod motum sibimet exorditur; non tertium.

V.1.2

Quoniam perniciosa mutatio non potest ipsi ab intrinseco umquam erumpere, ex quo motus vitalis vivificusque exoritur. Sed neque continget extrinsecus. Non enim fons motionis aliunde movetur. Haec est utique essentiae tertiae proprietas, in qua cum sint animae omnes rationales ex communi quadam definitione, illis quoque omnibus eadem convenit proprietas.

V.1.3

Sunt etiam ex eo immortales, quia per naturam essentiae tertiae primique motus circulo agitantur.

Chapter 1

Every rational soul is immortal. First argument: because it moves itself and moves in a circle.

V.1.1

We place all souls in the order of the third essence and maintain by this general argument that they are immortal: their motion is primary, and because it is primary, it takes a circular course. Since, then, their motion is primary, it is also perpetual, for wherever motion is primary, it is perpetual. If the fountain of motion were to run dry, nothing further would move in nature. Again, whatever has primary motion supplies itself with both inward and outward motion. Inward motion is life; thus it supplies itself with life. And because it never abandons itself—since every nature has within it a perpetual love of itself—it never ceases to live. For if what is moved by another remains in motion so long as it cleaves to its mover, then still more must whatever moves itself remain in motion. Since it is identical with its mover and is never deserted by that mover, it never ceases to move. Moreover, suppose it were to perish at some time. Either it would cease to exist before it ceased to move, cease to move before it ceased to exist, or cease both to exist and to move at the same instant. The first is impossible, because motion cannot remain apart from essence; so is the second, because self-motion is the constant companion of whatever originates its own motion; nor can the third occur.

V.1.2

For no destructive change can ever break out within it from that inward principle which gives rise to its vital and life-giving motion. Nor can such a change come from without, for the fountain of motion does not receive its motion from elsewhere. This, then, is a property of the third essence. And since, under this common definition, all rational souls belong to that essence, the same property belongs to them all.

V.1.3

They are immortal for this further reason: by the nature of the third essence and of primary motion, they are carried in a circle.

Caput 1, continuatur

V.1.4

Nam si moventur in circulum, numquam desinunt. Circuitus enim non effundit vires, sed sua quaeque recolligit in se ipsum; et cum deficere putatur, se renovat, ut rationem illam Pythagorae ad praesens praeteream, quae ostendit nullum esse in sphaera principium aut finem, ideoque illum qui movetur in sphaeram neque cepisse moveri umquam neque desinere.

V.1.5

Esse autem rationales animas sphaeras quasdam spiritales et circuitum in se ipsis facere spiritalem, postquam corpora ipsa, quae illarum umbrae sunt, figuram talem habent et motum. Ita ut sphaerae circuitusque visibiles sphaerarum et circuituum invisibilium umbrae sint; ac si umbrae sint perpetuae, multo magis substantias illas fore perpetuas, quae per virtutem termino carentem motionis actum peragunt sine termino. Nec est illis contrarium aliquid a quo perimantur, sicut et motui illarum, qui circuitus est, nullus est motus contrarius.

V.1.4-V.1.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1, continued

V.1.4

For if they move in a circle, their motion never ceases. Circular motion does not let its powers flow away; instead, it gathers all that belongs to it back into itself, and when it seems to fail, it renews itself. I pass over for the present Pythagoras's argument, which shows that a sphere has neither beginning nor end, and therefore that whatever is carried in a spherical circuit neither ever began to move nor ever ceases.

V.1.5

That argument further shows that rational souls are certain spiritual spheres and trace within themselves a spiritual circuit, since the bodies themselves, which are their shadows, possess just such a figure and motion. Thus visible spheres and circuits are shadows of invisible spheres and circuits. And if the shadows are perpetual, much more must those substances be perpetual, for through a power without limit they sustain the act of motion without limit. Nor is there anything contrary to them that could destroy them, just as their own circular motion has no contrary motion.

Caput 2

Secunda ratio: quia stat per substantiam.

V.2.1

Atque ita immortalem esse animam per motum eius ratio superior demonstravit. Idem quoque per statum animae demonstratur. Quando animam nominamus, rationalium animarum genus intelligi volumus. Nam irrationales vitas non animas proprie appellamus, sed idola et simulacra animarum. Si essentia illa tertia, de qua tam multa diximus, licet per operationem moveatur, manet nihilominus per substantiam, sequitur ut anima, quae eadem est quod essentia illa, per substantiam non mutetur. Quod autem tale est, esse desinit numquam.

V.2.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2

Second argument: because it stands firm in its substance.

V.2.1

The preceding argument showed from the soul's motion that it is immortal. The same conclusion is also shown by the soul's stability. Whenever we speak of soul, we mean the class of rational souls; for we do not properly call irrational lives souls, but images and likenesses of souls. If that third essence, of which we have said so much, remains nevertheless stable in substance although it is moved in operation, it follows that the soul, which is the same thing as that essence, does not change in substance. And what is of this kind never ceases to be.

Caput 3

Tertia ratio: quia haeret divinis.

V.3.1

Ac si duo quaedam in infimo naturae gradu locata, materia scilicet et quantitas, sunt passiva, et duo alia in supremo sunt activa, Deus et angelus, anima et qualitas, quae mediam inter passiva et activa obtinent regionem, quomodo se habebunt? Sic profecto utraque particeps passionis evadit. Sed qualitas, quia patientibus inhaeret, omnino per operationem et essentiam suscipit passionem; anima vero, quae distat longius, etsi in operandi facultate corporalem aliquam percipit passionem, in essentia tamen passionis est expers. Et sicut corpus ex materia et quantitate passivum inhaerentem sibi qualitatem reddit subiectam corruptioni, ita Deus et angelus activi animam sibi proximam et a corpore segregatam divinitate sua efficiunt immortalem.

V.3.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 3

Third argument: because it cleaves to divine things.

V.3.1

If two things placed at the lowest level of nature—namely matter and quantity—are passive, and two at the highest—God and angel—are active, how will soul and quality, which occupy the region midway between passive and active things, be disposed? Each, to be sure, comes to share in passivity. Yet because quality inheres in things that undergo action, it is wholly subject to passion in both operation and essence. The soul, by contrast, stands farther away; and although it undergoes a certain bodily passion in its capacity for action, in its essence it remains free from passion. Thus, just as a body, passive through matter and quantity, makes the quality inhering in it subject to corruption, so God and angel, both active, make the soul nearest to them and separated from body immortal through their divinity.

Caput 4

Quarta ratio: quia materiae dominatur.

V.4.1

Sed et in hoc maxime immortalitas eius apparet, quod oportet primam ipsam rerum materiam, quae movetur et formatur ab anima, perpetuam esse. Naturam ars imitatur. Ars opera sua hoc facit ordine, videlicet in subiecta quadam materia formas alias et alias imprimit, quarum nulla sibi propriam habet materiam. Nullam enim propriam vasis alicuius formam habet lutum, sed varias vicissim capit a figulo; et fractis vasis superest lutum, ex quo alia reparentur. Ergo et ipsa natura rerum artifex subiectam quandam sibi materiam habet omnium expertem formarum, ad omnes suscipiendas pariter praeparatam, quia sicut in gradu rerum summo Deus est actus purus, nullius indigus, formarum omnium effector, ita in infimo esse aliquid debet quod sit pura potentia, omnium egena, et ipsa per se informis sit formarum omnium susceptiva. Sic universali artifici atque naturae subest universalis materia, formarum quarumlibet indifferens susceptaculum. Haec prima vocatur materia, quae elementorum aliorumque corporum formis aeque subiicitur. Et modo hanc a vi naturali accipit, modo illam, neque ullam natura sua habet propriam. Non enim esset infima, si quam haberet perfectionem et agendi facultatem sibi ex forma propria naturalem; nec esset ad aliam formam formae suae repugnantem idonea. Nam si frigiditas materiae propria naturalisque sit, quonam pacto calorem suscipiet? Et si humiditas, quomodo siccitatem? Animadverte mutuam elementorum commutationem, si cupis latentem hanc materiam invenire. Nam quando cernimus ubi prius terrae species fuit, ibi aquae postea speciem apparere, dicere non possumus aquae formam, quae nuper advenit, in terrae forma recipi. Hae namque oppositae quodammodo sibi invicem sunt, quippe cum terra siccitatem, humiditatem aqua contineat. Non igitur forma terrae formam suscipit aquae, sed accedente aquea specie abit in chaos. Forma autem aquae sine subiecto esse non potest, neque novum subiectum in aquae generatione accessit. Eadem ergo materia quae terrenae formae subiecta fuerat aquae iam subit formam. Atque haec est argumentatio qua Timaeus Pythagoricus utitur. Item quando sol radiis suis mare percutiendo aquam in fumos extenuat et ex aqua generat aerem, aliquam certe aquei corporis portiunculam ex aquae elemento detraxit.

Chapter 4

Fourth argument: because it rules over matter.

V.4.1

Indeed, its immortality is especially apparent in this: the very first matter of things, which is moved and given form by soul, must be everlasting. Art imitates Nature. Art proceeds in its works in this order: it impresses one form after another upon some underlying matter, though none of those forms has matter proper to itself. Clay, for example, has no form proper to any one vessel, but receives various forms in succession from the potter; and when the vessels are broken, the clay remains, from which others are made again. In the same way, Nature herself, the artisan of things, has a certain underlying matter of her own, devoid of every form and prepared equally to receive them all. Just as, at the highest level of things, God is pure act, in need of nothing and the maker of all forms, so at the lowest there must be something that is pure potency, lacking all things, formless in itself, and receptive of every form. Thus beneath the universal artisan and beneath Nature lies universal matter, an impartial receptacle for forms of every kind. It is called primary matter and is equally subject to the forms of the elements and of other bodies. From natural power it receives now this form, now that, while by its own nature it has none. For it would not be the lowest thing if it possessed any perfection or natural capacity for action from a form proper to itself; nor would it be fitted to receive another form opposed to its own. If coldness were proper and natural to matter, how could it receive heat? And if moisture were proper to it, how could it receive dryness? If you wish to find this hidden matter, observe the mutual transformation of the elements. When we see the form of water appear where the form of earth was before, we cannot say that the newly arrived form of water is received in the form of earth. The two are in a certain way opposed, since earth contains dryness and water moisture. Thus the form of earth does not receive the form of water; instead, when the watery form approaches, the earthly form passes into chaos. Yet the form of water cannot exist without a subject, and no new subject has entered in the generation of water. The same matter that was subject to the earthly form therefore now assumes the form of water. This is the argument used by Timaeus the Pythagorean. Again, when the sun strikes the sea with its rays, thins water into vapors, and generates air from water, it has certainly taken some small portion of watery body from the element of water.

Caput 4, continuatur

V.4.2

Quaerimus utrum portiunculam istam aquae in nihilum primo redegerit, postea genuerit aerem, an servaverit aquae nonnihil. Si aquam in nihil omnino deduceret, ad malum esset naturae intentio, quae tamen est semper ad bonum, cum a summa Dei bonitate regatur. Atque esse ipsum, quod aeterni Dei peculiare donum est, quandoque ex rebus a sequentibus post Deum causis subtraheretur; quod fieri non potest, cum Deus semper quod semel dedit suo conservet influxu, cui nullius agentis opponitur violentia. Nam res Deo inferiores, quia non habent esse absolutum omnino, sed esse aliquid et tale esse vel tale, ideo non habent vim ad esse omnino auferendum, sed esse hoc modo potius aut illo. Sequeretur etiam ut sol novum illum aerem generaret ex nihilo, si totam aquae prioris portionem in nihilum consumpsisset. Ex nihilo autem aliquid facere agentia naturalia nequeunt. Facilius enim est ex qualibet re existente aliquid facere quam ex nihilo.

V.4.3

Non possunt autem ex quolibet semine rem quamlibet generare: numquam ex tritico pyra, ex milio ficus, ex hominis semine aquilam. Multo minus poterunt ex nihilo aliquid generare. Hac ratione monstratur solem non potuisse portionem illam aquae mari detractam in nihilum vertere. Ergo in ea naturae prioris aliquid restat. Quid illud? Aqua certe illa frigida erat et humida. Abscessit frigiditas; humiditas restat, ut placet Platonicis, quae aeri et aquae est communis. Si restat humiditas, restat et materia aliqua humiditati subiecta. Humiditas enim non est forma a corporibus separata. Itaque materia quae prius sub aquae frigore latuerat iam sub aeris calore eadem delitescit.

V.4.2-V.4.3 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

V.4.2

We ask whether the sun first reduced that little portion of water to nothing and then generated air, or whether it preserved something of the water. If it were to reduce the water entirely to nothing, Nature's intention would be directed toward evil, though it is always directed toward good, since it is ruled by the supreme goodness of God. Being itself, the peculiar gift of the eternal God, would at times be withdrawn from things by causes that follow after God. But that cannot occur, since God always preserves by his own influx what he has once given, and no violence from any agent opposes that influx. For things below God do not possess unqualified being in every respect, but only the being of something—being in this way or that. They therefore have no power to remove being altogether, but only to alter the mode in which a thing exists. It would also follow that the sun generated that new air from nothing, if it had wholly consumed the prior portion of water into nothing. Yet natural agents cannot make anything from nothing; it is easier to make something from any existing thing than from nothing.

V.4.3

Nor can natural agents generate just anything from just any seed: pears never come from wheat, figs from millet, or an eagle from human seed. Far less, then, can they generate anything from nothing. This argument shows that the sun could not turn the portion of water taken from the sea into nothing. Something of its former nature therefore remains in it. What is it? The water was cold and moist. Coldness has departed; moisture remains—according to the Platonists, it is common to air and water. If moisture remains, then some matter subject to that moisture also remains, for moisture is not a form separated from bodies. Thus the very same matter that formerly lay hidden beneath the coldness of water now lies concealed beneath the warmth of air.

Caput 4, continuatur

V.4.4

Cum vero ex aere fit ignis, humiditatem quoque amittit et accipit siccitatem. Materia huiusmodi, quae tantum extenuata rarefactione in formam ignis ascendit, vicissim densitate descendit: turgescit in aere, postea densatur in aquam, denique gravescit in terram. Vides materiam unam omnes vicissim indui formas, dum et ascendit rarefactione et densitate descendit. Quae ideo una est, tum quia una uni sufficit mundo, tum quia cum sit informis non habet quicquam per quod in se discerni possit in plura.

V.4.5

Quod si universum in unum formabile desinit, consentaneum est ab uno quoque incipere formatore, totumque illi subesse. Sed de hoc alias et diximus et dicemus. Materia vero haec ideo numquam corrumpitur, quia totius naturae corporalis est fundamentum, quo diruto omnis mundi machina corruet. Neque in partes dissolvitur umquam, quia non est per naturam suam ex partibus constituta. Partes enim per quantitatem fiunt.

V.4.6

Materia vero quantitatem praecedit. Est enim quantitatis qualitatisque subiectum. Subiectum vero semper rem illam quae in ipso iacet antecedat oportet. Neque per accessum alicuius contrariae qualitatis interimetur. Nulla quippe ipsi est contraria qualitas, quia aeque omnes suscipit per naturam; atque nulla forma quae indiget materiae sustentaculo ipsi repugnat. Sibi namquemet repugnaret, si suum destrueret fundamentum. Neque indiget materia alia quadam sede, qua forte subtracta decidat in profundum. Ipsa enim est primum omnium sustentaculum. Ac si qua violentia illam destruat, aut eam deducet in nihilum, aut in aliquid aliud transmutabit. Primum fieri nequit. Nam quicquid agit aliquid ex naturali appetitu perfectionis propriae propagandae inducitur ad agendum, ut aliud quiddam sibi pro viribus simile generet, quod in elementis, plantis, animalibus est perspicuum.

V.4.4-V.4.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

V.4.4

When air becomes fire, however, it also loses moisture and receives dryness. Matter of this kind, which ascends into the form of fire when rarefaction has made it so exceedingly thin, descends again through condensation: it swells in air, is then condensed into water, and at last, growing heavy, becomes earth. You see one matter clothing itself in every form in turn, as it ascends by rarefaction and descends by condensation. It is one both because one matter suffices for one world and because, being formless, it has nothing within itself by which it could be distinguished into many.

V.4.5

And if the whole universe terminates in a single receiver of form, it is fitting that it should likewise begin from a single giver of form and that the whole should be subject to it. But we have spoken of this elsewhere and shall do so again. Now this matter is never corrupted, because it is the foundation of the whole of bodily nature; if that foundation were destroyed, the entire machinery of the world would collapse. Nor is matter ever dissolved into parts, for by its own nature it is not constituted from parts. Parts, after all, arise through quantity.

V.4.6

Matter, however, precedes quantity. It is the subject of quantity and quality alike, and the subject must always precede the thing that rests in it. Nor will matter be destroyed by the arrival of any contrary quality. It has no contrary quality, since by nature it receives them all equally; and no form that needs the support of matter is opposed to matter, for it would be opposing itself if it destroyed its own foundation. Nor does matter require some other seat, whose removal might cause it to fall into the depths. It is itself the primary support of all things. If any violence were to destroy it, that violence would either reduce it to nothing or transmute it into something else. The first is impossible. For whatever acts upon something is impelled to act by a natural desire to propagate its own perfection, so that, as far as its powers allow, it may generate something else like itself. This is manifest in the elements, plants, and animals.

Caput 4, continuatur

V.4.7

Ubi apparet appetitum naturalem ad bonum, videlicet ad vitam, ad esse atque similia, non ad contraria dirigi, quia a summo bono, ut diximus, omnibus sequentibus est insertus. Unde enim sunt, inde moventur et illuc feruntur omnia. Igitur omnis omnium appetitio operatioque a bono exoriens tendit reflectiturque in bonum.

V.4.8

Quin etiam qui materiam funditus tollit e medio nequit novum opus suum alicubi stabilire, cessante formarum omnium generabilium fundamento. Ita et perderetur illa et novi nihil generaretur. Id enim quod denuo faciendum est, si eget materia, iam fieri non poterit illa sublata. Si non eget materia, ab ea liberum est. Quod est a materia liberum eamque supereminet ab auctore suo seorsum a materia procreatur. Itaque ipsius auctor, dum ipsum agit, quoniam fabricat ipsum ab illa longe semotum, nullam ex hoc illi violentiam infert, neque in ipsius generatione illam ullo modo movet, qua non indiget opus conficiendum. Igitur quod novam rem gignit, qualiscumque ea sit, sive materiae indiga sive aliena ab illa, materiam non perducit in nihilum.

V.4.9

An forte in aliquid aliud commutabit, ita ut pars una supersit materiae, pars vero perierit? Minime. Simplex enim illa est, quia neque ex materia et forma componitur, cum sit prima informisque potentia, neque certam quandam partium congeriem ad suam existentiam exigit, cum naturali origine praecedat quantitatis dimensiones. Praeterea si illa ita mutetur, ut expleta mutatione supersit aliquid, quid istud erit? Materiane? Si materia, nondum in aliud permutata videtur, cum supersit. Si quantitas aut qualitas, absurdum id quidem, quia non possunt haec absque illa manere. Si forma quaedam supersit materiam supereminens, quid opus erat materiam perdere, ut forma haec alienissima fieret, quae nullo modo ex ea fit et longe procul ab illa producitur?

V.4.7-V.4.9 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

V.4.7

Here it is evident that natural desire is directed toward the good—toward life, being, and like things—not toward their contraries, because, as we have said, the supreme good has implanted it in all things that follow after it. For from the source from which all things have their being, they are moved, and toward that source they are borne. Thus every desire and every activity of all things, arising from the good, tend and turn back toward the good.

V.4.8

Moreover, whoever wholly removes matter from the midst cannot establish his new work anywhere, once the foundation of all generable forms has ceased to exist. Matter would thus be destroyed, and nothing new would be generated. For if what is to be made anew requires matter, it can no longer be made once matter has been removed. If it does not require matter, it is free from matter; and whatever is free from matter and rises above it is brought forth by its maker apart from matter. Consequently, while its maker brings it into being—fashioning it far removed from matter—he does matter no violence by doing so; nor in producing it does he in any way move the matter that the work does not require for its completion. Hence whatever generates a new thing, whatever sort it may be, whether it needs matter or is independent of it, does not reduce matter to nothing.

V.4.9

Or perhaps it will change matter into something else, so that one part of matter survives while another perishes? By no means. Matter is simple: it is not composed of matter and form, since it is the first and formless potency; nor does it require a particular assemblage of parts for its existence, since by its natural origin it precedes the dimensions of quantity. Moreover, if matter were so changed that something remained when the change was complete, what would that thing be? Matter? If matter, then while it survives, it does not appear to have been changed into something else. Quantity or quality? That too is absurd, since neither can remain without matter. Suppose that what survived were some form rising above matter. What need was there to destroy matter in order that this wholly alien form might arise—a form that is in no way made from matter and is produced far apart from it?

Caput 4, continuatur

V.4.10

Immo vero, quia omnino aliud est materia, aliud forma ab ea semota, nihil per hoc materiae reliquum est quod illa commutata forma semota restat. Sic igitur colligamus: materia nequit ex eo quod est aliter permutari quam si vertatur in nihilum. In nihilum verti aliquid natura non patitur. Materia ergo non interit. Multo minus interibit vis ipsa naturalis, quae est materiae domina. Domina illius est vis ea efficiens quae format ipsam. Hanc format vis ea quae primum movet. Fons motionis est anima rationalis, cui qualitates ad movendam materiam serviunt ut instrumenta. Atque omnis anima rationalis per naturam essentiae tertiae universae materiae praesidet. Sed de hoc alias. Materiam quidem producit unitque Deus; firmat, ut Platonicis placet, et ordinat angelus; movet formatque anima. Immortalis unitas Deus est, qui immortali materiae dat unitatem. Immortalis ordo est angelus, qui immortali materiae ordinem exhibet. Immortalis vita est anima, quae movendo immortali materiae praebet vitam.

Chapter 4, continued

V.4.10

Indeed, because matter is one thing and a form separated from it quite another, no trace of matter remains merely because a separated form survives after matter has been changed. Let us therefore draw the argument together. Matter can be changed from what it is in no other way than by being turned into nothing. Nature does not permit anything to be turned into nothing. Matter therefore does not perish. Far less will natural power itself—the mistress of matter—perish. Matter's mistress is the efficient power that forms it. That power in turn is formed by the power which first moves. The fountain of motion is rational soul, and qualities serve it as instruments for moving matter. By the nature of the third essence, every rational soul accordingly presides over universal matter. But we have spoken of this elsewhere. God indeed produces and unites matter; the angel, as the Platonists hold, stabilizes and orders it; the soul moves and forms it. God is immortal unity, giving unity to immortal matter. The angel is immortal order, furnishing order to immortal matter. The soul is immortal life, giving life to immortal matter by moving it.

Caput 5

Quinta ratio: quia est a materia libera.

V.5.1

Quattuor naturalium rerum causae a physicis numerantur: efficiens, finis, materia, forma. Efficiens hominis causa est natura universalis et homo; finis, humana felicitas; materia, corpus; forma est anima. Quotiens aliquid per se esse dicitur, esse intelligitur sine causa; quotiens esse per aliud, esse per causam. Solus Deus ita per se exsistit, ut per nullam sit causam; quocirca omnino per se est, quia quattuor excludit a se genera causarum. Corpus naturale omnino per aliud est, quia quattuor simul includit. Infra Deum nihil esse potest quod efficiente careat atque fine. Quippe Deus unus effector est omnium atque finis; quare nihil praeter Deum invenietur quod ita per se esse sit dicendum, ut efficientem causam finemque non habeat. Non tamen omnia sub Deo ita esse decet per aliud, ut sint omnino per aliud. Nempe duo haec, omnino per se et omnino per aliud, intervallo a se invicem distant longissimo; quare inter haec aliquo utrisque similiore opus est medio.

V.5.2

Cum enim omne agens ex sua agat natura, necesse est opus proxime ab ipso factum, quia statim ex agentis natura depromitur, illi quam simillimum apparere. Ergo quod proxime et principali, ut ita loquar, proposito fit a Deo, Deo dissimillimum non debet evadere. Sunt ergo inter Deum et corpus aliqua quae non omnino per aliud esse dicantur. Talis apparet qualitas, quae non per quattuor, ut corpus, causas fit, sed ex tribus solummodo pendet causis.

V.5.1-V.5.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5

Fifth argument: because it is free from matter.

V.5.1

Natural philosophers reckon four causes of natural things: efficient cause, end, matter, and form. The efficient cause of man is universal nature together with man; his end is human happiness, his matter body, and his form soul. Whenever something is said to exist through itself, it is understood to exist without a cause; whenever it exists through another, it exists through a cause. God alone exists through himself in such a way that he has no cause. He is therefore wholly through himself, because he excludes from himself all four kinds of cause. A natural body is wholly through another, because it includes all four at once. Below God nothing can exist without an efficient cause and an end. For God alone is the maker and end of all things; hence nothing besides God will be found that can be said to exist through itself in such a way as to lack both an efficient cause and an end. Yet not everything below God ought to exist through another in such a way that it is wholly through another. These two—being wholly through oneself and wholly through another—stand at the greatest possible distance from each other. Between them, therefore, there must be a middle term resembling each.

V.5.2

For since every agent acts from its own nature, the work made immediately by it, issuing as it does directly from the agent's nature, must appear as like that agent as possible. Therefore what God makes most immediately and, so to speak, by his primary intention ought not to turn out utterly unlike God. There are, then, certain things between God and body that are not said to exist wholly through another. Quality appears to be such a thing: unlike body, it comes to be not through four causes, but depends upon only three.

Caput 5, continuatur

V.5.3

Corpus materiam habet et formam ut sui causas, efficientem etiam atque finem; qualitas formam non habet ut formalem causam. Ipsa enim forma quaedam est. Forma vero nulla, quantum est forma, formatur; efficitur tamen ab aliquo qualitas et ad finem quendam ab agente dirigitur, atque etiam a materia pendet ut causa, siquidem ex praegnante materiae alvo talis fetus in lucem educitur et cum ipsa extenditur atque dividitur. Quapropter qualitas gradu uno superat corpus, quod aliquo modo per se dicitur, cum non formetur ab alio.

V.5.4

At cur non etiam essentia tertia, quae qualitate sublimior est, uno saltem gradu superet qualitatem, sicut qualitas uno superat corpus? Superat certe. Sed quomodo? Non eo quod haec essentia efficiente careat aut fine, cum hoc Deo soli conveniat. Non hoc etiam, quod essentia haec formam sui causam non habet; idem namque possidet qualitas. Solum ex eo restat ut superet, quod a materia non dependet, quod minime convenit qualitati. Ita oportet a quattuor oppositis in quattuor opposita per tria et duo gradatim procedere, ut sicut super quattuor corporis causas in tres causas qualitatis ascendimus, ita super tres causas qualitatis in duas essentiae tertiae causas ascendamus.

V.5.5

Quapropter essentia haec solum efficientem et finalem habebit causam; formam vero et materiam non habebit. Denique angelus uno hanc essentiam superat, quoniam angelus neque a materia dependet neque ad materiam inclinatur, cum a Deo proxime occupetur. Essentia tertia, licet a materia non dependeat, tamen a Deo facta longinquior et propinqua materiae ad eam quodammodo inclinatur; ob quam inclinationem anima nuncupatur. Et licet inclinetur, non tamen ab ipsa dependet, quod multis rationibus demonstravimus.

V.5.6

Prima est quam assignavimus.

V.5.3-V.5.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5, continued

V.5.3

Body has matter and form as its causes, as well as an efficient cause and an end. Quality does not have form as a formal cause, since it is itself a kind of form. No form, insofar as it is form, is itself formed. Quality is nevertheless produced by something and directed by its agent toward some end; it also depends upon matter as a cause, since such an offspring is brought forth into the light from the pregnant womb of matter and is extended and divided together with matter. Quality therefore stands one degree above body because it is said, in a certain sense, to exist through itself, since it is not formed by another.

V.5.4

Why, then, should the third essence, which stands higher than quality, not likewise surpass quality by at least one degree, just as quality surpasses body by one? It certainly does. But how? Not because this essence lacks an efficient cause or an end; that belongs to God alone. Nor because this essence does not have form as its cause, for quality possesses that same exemption. It remains that the third essence surpasses quality solely because it does not depend upon matter, a freedom that quality certainly does not possess. We must therefore advance by degrees from four opposed terms to their four opposites, passing through three and two: just as we rose above body's four causes to quality's three, so we must rise above quality's three causes to the third essence's two.

V.5.5

Consequently, this essence will have only an efficient and a final cause; it will have neither form nor matter as a cause. Finally, the angel surpasses this essence by one degree, since an angel neither depends upon matter nor inclines toward it, being held most immediately by God. The third essence, although it does not depend upon matter, was made farther from God and nearer to matter and therefore inclines toward matter in a certain way. Because of this inclination it is called soul. Yet although it inclines toward matter, it does not depend upon it, as we have shown by many arguments.

V.5.6

The first is the argument we have already given.

Caput 5, continuatur

V.5.7

Secunda est quia, si haec essentia esset immersa materiae, numquam emergeret in divina, quae sunt a materia remotissima; atque ita non esset competens mundi nodus, quia non connecteret infima cum supremis.

V.5.8

Tertia est quia, cum moveatur primo, necessario movetur per se, libere, in circuitum. Si per se movetur, per se utique operatur. Si hoc est, etiam per seipsam, nullis addicta corporibus. Si movetur libere, non est alligata materiae. Si volvitur in circuitum, in seipsam se recipit, relicta materia.

V.5.9

Quarta est quia, si materiae dominatur movendo illam primum atque formando, materiae non miscetur. Per haec apparet essentiam illam, quae est animae sedes, quam etiam animarum pateram Plato nominat in Timaeo, nullam habere originem a corporibus, atque etiam neque ex partibus quantitatis constitui. Partes siquidem huiusmodi solis corporibus et qualitatibus insunt, non autem formis a corpore separatis. Non igitur ob id anima dissipabitur quod in partes aliquas dissolvatur. Sane nullam habet distantiam partium, quoniam in corpore non dividitur; neque ex eo deficiet umquam quod a suo aliquo sustentaculo deseratur. Nullo quippe eget corporis fundamento essentia illa quae per naturam suam est domina corporum. Neque etiam per hoc interibit quod contrariae atque inter se pugnantes elementorum vires aliquando eam turbent; hae siquidem in materia pugnant. Anima vero est a Deo super materiam, ut eam non attingat elementorum procella et iniquitas certantium qualitatum. Numquam rursus ex eo inquinabitur quod alienam aliquam et naturae suae adversam quandoque suscipiat qualitatem, quae noxiam ipsi inferat passionem. Primum namque subiectum passioni expositum materia est, per quam et quantitas ipsi immersa et qualitas quantitati cohaerens exponitur passioni. Quocirca essentia illa quae est a materia separata, id est potentia separabilis, nullam habet in seipsa potentiam per quam alienum quicquam et hostile suscipiat, unde passioni subiiciatur.

V.5.7-V.5.9 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5, continued

V.5.7

The second is that, if this essence were immersed in matter, it would never rise to divine things, which are farthest removed from matter. It would thus not be a fitting bond of the world, for it would not connect the lowest things with the highest.

V.5.8

The third is that because its motion is primary, it necessarily moves of itself, freely, and in a circle. If it moves of itself, it certainly acts of itself. If so, it acts also through itself, bound to no bodies. If it moves freely, it is not fettered to matter. If it revolves in a circle, it returns into itself, leaving matter behind.

V.5.9

The fourth is that, if it rules matter by first moving and forming it, it is not mingled with matter. From these arguments it is evident that the essence which is the soul's seat—and which Plato in the Timaeus also calls the mixing-bowl of souls—has no origin from bodies and moreover is not constituted from parts of quantity. Parts of this kind belong only to bodies and qualities, not to forms separated from body. The soul therefore will not be scattered through dissolution into parts. Indeed, it contains no spatial separation of parts, since it is not divided within the body; nor will it ever fail because some support of its own deserts it. For the essence that by its nature is mistress of bodies requires no bodily foundation. Nor will it perish because the contrary and mutually warring powers of the elements at some time disturb it, since these powers do battle in matter. The soul, however, is from God and stands above matter, so that the storm of the elements and the discord of contending qualities cannot reach it. Nor again will it ever be defiled by receiving some alien quality opposed to its nature, which might inflict a harmful passion upon it. Matter is the first subject exposed to passion; through matter, quantity immersed in it and quality inhering in quantity are likewise exposed to passion. Therefore that essence which is separated from matter—that is, separable in potency—has within itself no potency through which it might receive anything alien and hostile and thereby become subject to passion.

Caput 6

Sexta ratio: quia est individua.

V.6.1

Praeterea cum indivisibilis sit, divisibiles et corporeas non suscipit qualitates. Non enim quod divisibile est tangit indivisibile. Nam si indivisibile tangi ab eo quod divisibile est dicatur, quaeremus utrum res haec divisibilis puncto quodam sui ipsius tangat rem illam indivisibilem, an parte quadam sui dividua. Si primum admiseris, tunc punctum est dumtaxat quod rem illam tangit; atque ita non res haec dividua, sed individuum aliquid tangit rem illam indivisibilem. Sin autem dixeris quod parte quadam sui dividua tangit, tunc ita ratiocinamur. Si res haec dividua tangit illam quam tu individuam vocas per partem sui aliquam divisibilem, necesse est et illam per partem sui similiter divisibilem tangi. Quomodo enim haec illam tangit, nisi et illa tangatur? Et quomodo per plures sui partes tangit haec illam, nisi illa quoque per partes sui ipsius tangatur? Siquidem quatenus haec tangit, eatenus illa tangitur. Quapropter res illa quam tu indivisibilem affirmabas tunc primum esse cogitur divisibilis, quando a re aliqua divisibili tangi conceditur. Itaque essentia illa animae individua numquam tangitur ab aliqua dividua qualitate. Non tangitur, inquam, per rectam lineam neque etiam per reflexam: non per rectam, quia ipsa anima qualitatem ex adverso occurrentem non excipit; non per reflexam, quia cum a corpore sit exempta, ferventibus in corpore qualitatibus, illarum impetu et furore non rapitur; ideoque a nulla corrumpitur. An forte ab aliqua indivisibili, quam facile susceperit, corrumpetur? Minime. Susceptio namque indivisibilium qualitatum perficit illud quod suscipit, non corrumpit. Quod patet per eas indivisibiles rerum imagines quae ab aqua, speculis, anima, tum per sensum, tum per rationem suscipiuntur. Proprie vero non alia ratione haec res agit in illam, nisi ut haec illi suam formam exhibeat. Siquidem omnia propter suae naturae propagationem ducuntur ad operandum. Nulla vero res corporea potest aut nititur formam sui corporalem in animae essentia generare, quae ita est a materia segregata ut in ea nullum habeant formae corporales ingressum. Sed numquid Deus vel angelus formam novam inducunt in animam, per quam anima perturbetur? Nequaquam, quia si illi aliquam formam creant per se subsistentem, illam seorsum creant ab anima; non ergo per illius creationem anima perturbatur. Sin autem vim aliquam infundunt in animam, vis huiusmodi benefica est, cum ab optimis causis venerit animae ipsius conservatricibus; ergo per ipsam non interit anima, sed servatur.

Chapter 6

Sixth argument: because it is indivisible.

V.6.1

Moreover, since the soul is indivisible, it does not receive divisible and corporeal qualities. For what is divisible does not touch what is indivisible. Suppose it is said that the indivisible is touched by something divisible. We shall ask whether this divisible thing touches the indivisible with some point of itself or with some divisible part. If you grant the first, then only the point touches it; thus it is not the divisible thing, but something indivisible, that touches the indivisible. But if you say that it touches with some divisible part, we reason as follows. If this divisible thing touches what you call indivisible by a divisible part of itself, then the latter must likewise be touched in a divisible part of itself. For how does the one touch the other unless the other is touched? And how does the one touch it with several of its own parts unless the other too is touched in several parts of itself? Insofar as the one touches, the other is touched. Consequently, what you had declared indivisible is first compelled to become divisible when you allow it to be touched by something divisible. The indivisible essence of the soul, therefore, is never touched by any divisible quality. It is touched, I say, neither along a straight line nor by a reflected one: not along a straight line, because the soul does not admit a quality that encounters it head-on; not by reflection, because, being exempt from body, it is not swept away by the force and fury of qualities raging in the body. Thus no such quality corrupts it. Might it perhaps be corrupted by some indivisible quality, which it readily receives? By no means. The reception of indivisible qualities perfects what receives them; it does not corrupt it. This is evident from the indivisible images of things received by water and mirrors, and by the soul through both sense and reason. Properly speaking, one thing acts upon another in no other way than by presenting it with its own form, for all things are drawn to act in order to propagate their nature. Yet no corporeal thing either can or strives to generate a corporeal form of itself within the soul's essence, which is so removed from matter that corporeal forms have no entrance into it. But do God or an angel introduce a new form into the soul by which the soul might be disturbed? Certainly not. If they create a form that subsists in itself, they create it apart from the soul; the soul is therefore not disturbed by its creation. If, however, they pour some power into the soul, such a power is beneficent, since it comes from the best causes, which preserve the soul itself. Through this power, therefore, the soul does not perish but is preserved.

Caput 7

Septima ratio: quia esse suum habet in sua essentia.

V.7.1

Aliud essentiam vocamus, aliud esse. Essentiam quidem dicimus rationem rei quae definitione comprehenditur. Esse vero actum ipsius essentiae et quandam eius in rerum natura praesentiam. Exemplum accipe de crinita. Essentia crinitae est ratio haec ipsius et definitio, utputa vapor siccus in aere summo accensus ab igni, perque aerem ordine circumiens. Quae quidem definitio hodie vera est, etsi nusquam hodie crinita effulgeat. Esse vero crinitae huiusmodi quiddam dicitur, ut videlicet talis illa natura crinitae, quae per definitionem quotidie designatur, iam nunc alicubi luceat. Esse hoc absque certo loco et tempore non fit. Non aliter enim fit illa essentia praesens quam hic vel ibi, hac hora vel illa. Igitur esse naturalium rerum certo loco eget et tempore; essentia iis non indiget. Vera enim est crinitae ratio illa, etsi ad praesens crinita nusquam caleat. Immo si definitio illa certum includeret tempus et locum, puta hodie hic aut cras ibi, in eadem utique hora eademque aeris plaga in qua una crinita exsistit, cunctae simul essent crinitae. In singulis enim crinitis inest communis crinitae essentia et ratio eadem. Quod si ratio haec certo sit loco temporique adstricta, ad eosdem terminos loci et temporis crinitae omnes adstringerentur, quemadmodum rationalis potentia, cum in definitione hominis includatur, singulis hominibus convenit. Essentia itaque et esse naturalium rerum hoc inter se differunt, quod esse certo loco temporique adstringitur; essentia vero quantum in se est ad omne tempus ferme omnemque locum aeque se habet. Siquidem humanitas ipsa non minus saeculis aliis quam nostris aut in oriente minus quam occidente potest consistere. Plato vero et Socrates, hoc aut illo ut sint et vivant, loco egent et tempore. In ipsa humanitate essentia designatur; in singulis istis hominibus esse conspicitur. Igitur essentia a singulis temporis et loci limitibus est exclusa. Quapropter ad sui conservationem per sui naturam nullo indiget loco, neque terminos habet temporis quibus aliquando excedatur, quandoquidem ab huiusmodi terminis est exempta. Ubique ergo viget et semper. Essentia igitur omnis secundum se ipsam dicitur immortalis. Talis autem est per naturam suam formae cuiusque essentia.

V.7.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 7

Seventh argument: because it has its being in its own essence.

V.7.1

We call one thing essence and another being. By essence we mean the account of a thing that is comprehended in its definition. Being, however, is the act of that essence and a certain presence of it in the natural world. Take the example of a comet. The essence of a comet is its account and definition: a dry vapor in the upper air, kindled by fire and circling through the air in an ordered course. This definition is true today even if no comet shines anywhere today. But for a comet of this kind to have being means that the cometary nature which the definition designates day after day is now actually shining somewhere. Such being cannot occur without a determinate place and time, for the essence becomes present only here or there, at this hour or that. Thus the being of natural things requires a determinate place and time; their essence does not. The account of the comet remains true even if no comet is now aflame anywhere. Indeed, if its definition included a determinate time and place—say, here today or there tomorrow—then all comets would have to exist together in the same hour and the same region of the sky in which one comet exists. For in every comet there is the common essence of a comet and the same account. If that account were bound to a determinate place and time, all comets would be bound to the same limits of place and time, just as rational capacity, because it is included in the definition of man, belongs to every man. Essence and being in natural things therefore differ in this: being is bound to a determinate place and time, whereas essence, so far as lies in itself, is equally disposed toward almost every time and every place. Humanity itself can subsist no less in other ages than in ours, and no less in the East than in the West. Plato and Socrates, however, need this place or that and this time or that in order to be and to live. Essence is denoted in humanity itself; being is discerned in these individual men. Essence is therefore excluded from every particular limit of time and place. By its own nature it needs no place in order to be preserved, nor does it have temporal bounds that may one day be overstepped, since it is exempt from bounds of that kind. It flourishes, therefore, everywhere and always. Every essence, considered in itself, is thus called immortal; and such by its nature is the essence of every form.

Caput 7, continuatur

V.7.2

Verum cum omnium auctor formarum gignit essentias atque illas in esse producit, alias ad tale esse determinat ut exsistant in corpore; unde esse talis essentiae sive formae talis ad corporales condiciones ab agente contrahitur. Quando esse ad corpus contrahitur, iisdem quoque essentia limitibus coarctatur. Condiciones naturalium corporum sunt ut locum impleant et tempore moveantur. Idcirco forma illa quae per se super certum tempus locumque fuisset, tempus iam proprium subit et locum. Quia tempus subit, ideo incipit paulatim, mutatur et definit. Quia locum, ideo dum corpus ipsum in quo illa iacet contrarias quotidie suscipit qualitates, illa quoque qualitatum huiusmodi tempestate turbatur, fitque mortalis. Tales sunt formae qualitatesque corporum. Alias autem formarum essentias auctor ille ita in esse producit ut ipsum suum esse non in alia quadam re aut materia sortiantur, sed in se ipsis contineant. Tales sunt formae omnes a materiae commercio alienae. Esse namque suum in se ipsis habent, non in materia. Quicquid autem ab aliquo capitur, pro captu eius quod capit accipi solet atque ad eius trahi proprietatem. Essentia vero quaelibet per se immortalis est. Ergo esse quod ab ipsa essentia capitur, quoniam a re immortali per modum capitur immortalem, efficitur immortale. Quapropter forma quae est a materiae societate seiuncta undique, id est tam secundum esse suum quam secundum suam essentiam, est immortalis. Talis est essentia tertia, rationalium fons animarum.

Chapter 7, continued

V.7.2

Yet when the author of all things begets the essences of forms and brings them into being, he determines some to a mode of being in which they exist in a body. The being of such an essence or form is thereby restricted by its agent to bodily conditions. When being is restricted to a body, the essence too is confined within the same limits. Natural bodies are conditioned to fill a place and to move through time. A form that in itself would have stood above determinate time and place therefore comes under a time and place of its own. Because it comes under time, it gradually begins, changes, and comes to an end. Because it comes under place, whenever the body in which it lies receives contrary qualities from day to day, the form too is disturbed by the storm of those qualities and becomes mortal. Such are the forms and qualities of bodies. Other essences of forms, however, the author brings into being in such a way that they obtain their own being not in some other thing or in matter, but contain it within themselves. Such are all forms alien to commerce with matter: they have their being in themselves, not in matter. Whatever is received by something is customarily received according to the receiver's capacity and drawn into its character. Now every essence is immortal in itself. Hence the being received by the essence becomes immortal, because it is received by an immortal thing in an immortal manner. A form separated from association with matter is therefore immortal in every respect—that is, both in its being and in its essence. Such is the third essence, the fountain of rational souls.

Caput 8

Octava ratio: quia esse proprium habet et numquam a sua forma discedit.

V.8.1

Generatio et corruptio ita sibi invicem opponuntur ut ad contradictoria tendant: et generatio via quaedam sit ad esse, corruptio via sit ad non esse. Unumquodque autem ex eo tendit ad esse quod certam quandam accipit formam; ad non esse vero ex eo quod formam suam amittere cogitur. In artibus nullum opus tale aut tale est propter materiam, sed propter formam. Aeneus equus aut homo non propter aeris materiam talis dicitur, quippe cum aes ad omnium animalium figuras suscipiendas aeque sit praeparatum, sed propter equi aut hominis formam quandam similitudinemque ab artifice profectam. Haec pars aeris equus dicitur, illa homo. In natura similiter. Materia quidem non illud est per quod Plato est homo aut ficus est arbor. Eadem quippe mundi prima materia hominibus, brutis, arboribus est communis; ac multa ante Platonem saecula, multa etiam post Platonem, materia illa eadem exstat, Plato vero nequaquam. Igitur non propter materiam Plato humanam habet speciem, sed propter complexionem corporis talem atque animam, quae formae dicuntur. Similiter de aliis iudicandum, ac summatim concludendum quodlibet a forma habere proprium suum esse, naturam et speciem ab aliis differentem.

V.8.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 8

Eighth argument: because it has a being of its own and never departs from its form.

V.8.1

Generation and corruption are so opposed to one another that they tend toward contradictories: generation is a kind of path toward being, corruption a path toward non-being. Each thing tends toward being by receiving some determinate form, and toward non-being by being compelled to lose its form. In the arts, no work is this or that because of its matter, but because of its form. A bronze horse or man is not called such because its matter is bronze, since bronze is equally prepared to receive the shapes of every animal, but because a likeness in the form of a horse or man has proceeded from the artist. This portion of bronze is called a horse, that one a man. The same holds in nature. Matter is not that by which Plato is a man or a fig tree is a tree. The same first matter of the world is common to men, beasts, and trees. That matter existed through many ages before Plato and continues through many after him, whereas Plato does not. Plato therefore belongs to the human species not because of matter, but because of a certain bodily constitution and a soul, both of which are called forms. We should judge other things in the same way and conclude in sum that each thing receives from form its own proper being, nature, and species, by which it differs from others.

Caput 8, continuatur

V.8.2

Quapropter quicquid esse definit, ipsum esse suum amittit ex eo quod a forma propria separatur, sicut esse antea coeperat quando formam propriam fuerat consecutum. Ideo res ex materia formaque composita, puta ignis ex mole sua et naturali caliditate compositus, interit quando a sua forma seiungitur. Potest autem frigus aquae vel terrae se materiae ignis insinuare, atque inde naturalem caliditatem, ignis formam, expellere; qua expulsa definit esse ignis. Sic ignis ille ex materia et tali quadam caliditate compositus esse amittit, quando suam amittit caliditatem; suam, inquam, substantialem formam cum eius proprietatibus, quam nunc, quoniam manifestum nomen non habet, caliditatem disputandi causa nominamus. Caliditas autem ipsa quando esse suum amittit, cum sit forma et a forma sit esse? Quando videlicet ex materia illa depellitur. In rebus enim compositis naturaliter esse tribuitur toti, non partibus. Nempe esse ignis ipsius compositi est proprie, non materiae solius neque caloris. Nam cum calor in ignis generatione ab agente naturali ex materiae semine eductus fuit, ea condicione fuit per omnem materiam ignis extensus, ut inde omnino penderet; neque esse proprium sibi calor haberet, sed per ipsum commune esse totius ignis calor quoque esse diceretur. Esse autem illud commune tunc cessat quando duae illae partes a se invicem disiunguntur. Quando esse commune cessat, perit et forma quae per esse commune vigebat. Materia vero non perit, quoniam subito aliam suscipit formam per quam exsistat; ita ut dum certum amittit calorem, esse igneum amittat; dum certam quandam frigiditatem accipit vel humiditatem, esse capiat terreum aut aqueum. Conclude rem compositam, ut ignem et aquam, tunc interire quando a sua forma seiungitur; formam vero illam perdi quando a formantis lege discedit. Sol qui genuit ignem, ignis formator exstitit. Is ea lege calorem ex fomite materiae illius eduxit, ut in ea materia iacens sub esse compositi totius contineretur. Hanc legem transgreditur quando ex illa abit materia. Abit quando fugatur a frigore. Quod ergo neque a sua forma neque a formantis lege discedit, quonam pacto interit, cum esse cuiusque a forma procedat et formantis lege servetur?

Chapter 8, continued

V.8.2

Consequently, whatever ceases to be loses its own being because it is separated from its proper form, just as it first began to be when it acquired that form. A thing composed of matter and form therefore perishes when it is severed from its form. Take fire, composed of its bodily mass and its natural heat. The cold of water or earth can insinuate itself into the matter of fire and drive out its natural heat, the form of fire. Once that form has been expelled, the fire ceases to be. Thus fire, composed of matter and a certain kind of heat, loses its being when it loses its heat—by which I mean its substantial form together with that form's properties, though for the purpose of the argument we now call it ‘heat’ because it has no readily evident name. But when does heat itself lose its being, since heat is a form and being comes from form? When, of course, it is driven out of that matter. In composite things, being is naturally attributed to the whole, not to the parts. Properly speaking, the being of the composite fire belongs neither to its matter alone nor to its heat. When heat was drawn from the seed of matter by a natural agent in the generation of fire, it was extended throughout all the fire's matter on the condition that it depend entirely upon that matter. Heat thus had no being proper to itself; rather, through the common being of the whole fire, heat too was said to be. That common being ceases when the two parts are separated from one another. When their common being ceases, the form that flourished through it also perishes. Matter, however, does not perish, for it at once receives another form through which it exists. When it loses a determinate heat, it loses fiery being; when it receives a determinate coldness or moisture, it takes on earthy or watery being. Conclude, then, that a composite thing such as fire or water perishes when it is separated from its form, while the form itself perishes when it departs from the law of its fashioner. The sun that generated the fire was its fashioner. By its law the sun drew heat from the tinder of that matter so that the heat, lying in the matter, would be contained under the being of the composite whole. Heat transgresses this law when it leaves the matter; it leaves when cold drives it away. How, then, can that which departs neither from its form nor from the law of its fashioner perish, since the being of each thing proceeds from form and is preserved by the fashioner's law?

Caput 8, continuatur

V.8.3

Anima vero propter tertiae illius essentiae proprietatem mera quaedam forma est, non composita ex materia et forma neque recubans in materia. Ideo in se ipsa permanens, quicquid in se est nihil est aliud praeter formam. Ipsa igitur sua essentia non formatur per aliud quicquam, sed sui ipsius est forma; id est, ipsamet forma est. Nihil est autem quod per se a sua essentia separetur, quia nihil a se ipso discedit. Omnia siquidem naturali instinctu nixuque perpetuo se ipsa servant pro viribus sibique inhaerent. Igitur anima, si numquam a se disiungitur et ipsa sui forma est, numquam a sua forma disiungitur. Itaque numquam desinit esse, cum esse a forma semper hauriatur. Sua quidem sponte a se non separatur, ut diximus. Sed neque etiam ab extrinseca violentia cogitur ut a se ipsa secedat, quoniam quicquid extrinsecus accipit suo quodam accipit modo. Ipsa plane spiritalis est atque a loco et tempore absoluta. Ergo spiritali modo et absolute accipit omnia. Spiritalia vero et absoluta quando ab aliquo capiuntur nequaquam interimunt. Spiritalis namque susceptio cum fit in corporibus, corpora ipsa, licet sibi dissimilia, non corrumpit, ut simulacrorum susceptio in aqua et speculo. Multo minus corrumpet rem spiritalem sibi persimilem. Praeterea cum absolutum illud quod ab animae essentia suscipi fingebatur aeternum sit, cur susceptaculum suum interimat? An ut ex illius materia se ipsum alat? Non, cum alimento non egeat illud quod est aeternum. An ut se ipsum propaget generetque ex illius materia sibi simile aliquid? Nequaquam. Non enim eget propagatione quod semper idem manet, neque etiam potest ex re corruptibili perpetuam generare. Non ergo corrumpit quicquam ut perpetuum aliquid sibi simile generet. Nullo itaque modo potest quicquam animae essentia capere a quo perdatur. Merito non potest capere omnino noxium quicquam, cum materia careat, quae primum et proprium passionum talium dicitur receptaculum.

Chapter 8, continued

V.8.3

The soul, however, by the property of the third essence is a pure form: it is neither composed of matter and form nor lodged in matter. Therefore, remaining in itself, the soul has within it nothing other than form. Its own essence is therefore not formed by anything else; it is the form of itself—that is, it is form itself. Nothing, however, separates itself from its own essence, because nothing departs from itself. By natural instinct and perpetual striving, all things preserve themselves as far as they can and cling to themselves. Therefore, if the soul is never separated from itself and is itself its own form, it is never separated from its form. It never ceases to be, since being is always drawn from form. As we have said, it does not separate itself from itself of its own accord. Nor is it compelled by outward violence to withdraw from itself, for whatever it receives from without, it receives in its own manner. The soul is wholly spiritual and free from place and time; it therefore receives everything spiritually and without limitation. Spiritual and absolute things do not destroy that by which they are received. Indeed, when spiritual reception occurs in bodies, it does not corrupt the bodies themselves even though what they receive is unlike them, as we see in the reception of images by water and a mirror. Much less will it corrupt a spiritual thing closely akin to itself. Moreover, since the absolute thing supposed to be received by the soul's essence is eternal, why should it destroy its own receptacle? Is it to nourish itself from the receptacle's matter? No, for what is eternal has no need of nourishment. Is it to propagate itself and generate from that matter something like itself? By no means. What always remains the same has no need of propagation, nor can it generate something perpetual from a corruptible thing. It therefore corrupts nothing in order to generate something perpetual like itself. In no way, then, can the soul's essence receive anything by which it might be destroyed. With good reason, then, it can receive nothing harmful at all, since it lacks matter, which is called the first and proper receptacle of passions of this kind.

Caput 8, continuatur

V.8.4

Immo vero si ista essentia sui ipsius est forma, inter eam et formam suam nihil umquam intercidet. Nam si quid medium aliquando inter ipsam et formam suam caderet, fieret profecto illud ipsius formae propinquius quam ipsa eius essentia. Essentia vero ipsa est ipsamet eius forma. Ita fieret ipsi aliquid propinquius quam ipsa sibi, quod est omnium absurdissimum. Quapropter nihil se inter eam eiusve formam inserit medium. Si ita est, illa a sui forma nullo interveniente disiungitur. Sed neque etiam sponte seiungitur sua. Quare nullo modo a se ipsa suique forma discedit. Neque etiam a formantis discedit lege. Ea siquidem lege creata est ut in se ipsa consisteret. Semper autem ita permanet. Ex eo enim statu a nullo deicitur: non a se ipsa, nam res quaeque speciem et dignitatem suam pro viribus sibi conservat; non a superioribus causis, quia illae qua lege eam produxerunt in eadem et continent; non ab inferioribus, superius enim ab inferiori non vincitur. Quam ob rem anima quia mera forma est, ideoque neque a sui forma neque a formantis lege discedit, permanet procul dubio immortalis.

V.8.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 8, continued

V.8.4

Indeed, if this essence is its own form, nothing can ever come between it and its form. For if some middle term were ever to fall between the essence and its form, that term would necessarily be nearer to the form than the essence itself is. Yet the essence itself is that very form. Something would thus be nearer to it than it is to itself, which is the greatest absurdity of all. No middle term, therefore, inserts itself between the essence and its form; no intervening thing separates it from its form. Nor does it separate itself from its own form of its own accord. Thus it departs in no way from itself or from its form. Nor does it depart from the law of its fashioner, for it was created under the law that it should subsist in itself, and so it always remains. Nothing casts it down from that state: not the soul itself, for each thing preserves its own form and dignity as far as it can; not the higher causes, because they preserve it under the same law by which they produced it; and not inferior things, because what is higher is not conquered by what is lower. Since, then, the soul is pure form and departs neither from its own form nor from the law of its fashioner, it undoubtedly remains immortal.

Caput 9

Nona ratio: quia sibi per se convenit esse.

V.9.1

Quod alicui per se convenit, numquam separatur ab ipso. Rotunditas suapte natura circulo inest. Atque ideo nullus umquam sine rotunditate est circulus. Ligno autem quandoque rotunditas inest, non quia lignum est. Omne enim lignum rotundum esset. Sed quia ab artifice figuram accipit circularem quam rotunditas comitatur, ideo tunc rotunditatem capere cogitur. Desinit aliquando lignum esse rotundum, cum primum esse desinit circulare. Deinde restat lignum, sed non rotundum. Figura vero circularis ita necessario rotunda est ut, si desierit esse rotunda, esse etiam desinat circularis. Similiter calor igni per se convenit, humor aquae, soli lumen. Non aliter et formae esse per se convenit. Nam quicquid aliquid est in aliqua specie, id certe quod est a propria quadam forma sortitur ad talem speciem conducente. Quoniam igitur esse proprium cuique per formam propriam competit, sequitur ut esse communiter et simpliciter per genus ipsum formae conveniat. Unde oportet ipsam formam fontem dici essendi et per se esse. Quod si per aliud esse dicatur ab aliquo, interrogabimus utrum illud per quod forma dicitur esse naturam formae habeat an materiae. Non materiae, quia videmus in compositis singulis esse cuiusque proprium non sequi materiam. Ergo neque in hac ipsa forma per quam res compositae sunt, illud per quod ipsa est vim habet materiae; ergo formae. Ita quaestio redit in idem. Utrum forma illa alia per quam forma est per se ipsa sit an per aliud quippiam? Si per se, tunc constat formam fontem essendi dici debere. Sin per aliud, tunc quaeremus ut ante, atque in infinitum erit progressio. Quapropter formae per se convenit esse.

V.9.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 9

Ninth argument: because being belongs to it in its own right.

V.9.1

What belongs to something in its own right is never separated from it. Roundness belongs to a circle by its very nature; therefore no circle is ever without roundness. Wood, however, is sometimes round, not because it is wood—for then every piece of wood would be round—but because an artisan gives it a circular figure, which is accompanied by roundness. Only then is it compelled to receive roundness. The wood ceases to be round as soon as it ceases to be circular. The wood then remains, but is no longer round. A circular figure, by contrast, is necessarily round, so that if it ceased to be round, it would also cease to be circular. In the same way heat belongs to fire in its own right, moisture to water, and light to the sun. In the same way, being too belongs to form in its own right. For whatever a thing is within a given species, it receives what it is from a proper form that brings it into that species. Since the proper being of each thing belongs to it through its proper form, it follows that being universally and without qualification belongs to the very genus of form. Form itself must therefore be called the fountain of being and must exist in its own right. But if anyone says that form exists through something else, we shall ask whether that through which form is said to exist has the nature of form or of matter. It cannot have the nature of matter, because we see that in every composite thing its proper being does not follow from matter. Thus, in the very form through which composite things exist, that through which the form itself exists cannot have the character of matter; it must have that of form. The question therefore returns to the same point: does that other form through which a form exists itself exist in its own right, or through something else? If in its own right, it is clear that form must be called the fountain of being. If through something else, we shall ask the same question as before, and the regress will proceed to infinity. Being therefore belongs to form in its own right.

Caput 9, continuatur

V.9.2

At enim formarum conditor ad certum operis mundani finem integritatemque formas ea distinctione producit in esse ut singulas naturaliter ad certum esse determinet, et alias quidem ad esse in corpore, alias ad esse in se ipsis absque materia. Forma impressa materiae non proprie est neque proprium habet esse, sed dicitur id quo compositum ipsum est; et ipsa per commune esse totius exsistit. Si esse formae per se congruit, haec certe forma quae est in corpore, quia et ipsa forma est, id habet ut et ipsi esse per se conveniat. At quomodo, cum a materia pendeat et sub esse totius compositi contineatur? Attende: esse per se convenit illi, id est, per se sequitur illam. Sequitur, inquam, per se, id est secundum naturam suam. Quid enim aliud per se significat quam per sui naturam? Natura sua talis est qualem sibi suus opifex assignavit. Opifex autem statuit ut materiae inhaereret. Haec itaque natura sua est, inhaerere materiae. Per hanc naturam esse eam sequitur. Ergo esse eam sequitur per se, eam, inquam, materiae inhaerentem; ita prius quodammodo sibi competit materiae infigi quam exsistere. Quare tamdiu exsistit quamdiu haeret materiae. Non haeret autem semper, quia materia omnibus parata formis locum saepe dat formis contrariis, priores formas inde pellentibus. Non ergo exsistit semper. Forma vero illa quae ita a conditore est ad esse determinata ut in se ipsa consistat seorsum a corpore, etiam quia forma est, habet illud ut esse sibi per se conveniat; per se, inquam, per naturam suam. Natura ipsi assignata est sibimet ipsi haerere. Igitur esse suum eam sequitur quantum sibi haeret, id est exsistere suum eam sequitur ex subiecto minime pullulantem. Et quotiens dicis esse per se sequitur eam, totiens dicis esse eam sequitur sibi ipsi haerentem. Nihil autem a se ipso discedit. Quid enim intercidit inter se et ipsummet quod separet ipsum a semet ipso? Si quatenus haeret sibi eatenus est, quia haeret semper, est et semper. Talis quidem forma est anima. Est igitur immortalis.

V.9.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 9, continued

V.9.2

Yet the creator of forms, with a view to the determinate end and completeness of the work of the world, brings forms into being with this distinction: he naturally determines each to a definite mode of being, some to be in a body and others to be in themselves without matter. A form impressed upon matter does not properly exist and has no being of its own. Rather, it is called that by which the composite itself exists, and it exists through the common being of the whole. If being belongs to form in its own right, then surely, because a form in a body is itself form, being must likewise belong to it in its own right. But how can this be, when it depends upon matter and is contained under the being of the composite whole? Attend closely. Being belongs to it in its own right—that is, being follows it through itself. It follows through itself, I say, according to the form's own nature. For what else does ‘through itself’ mean but ‘through its own nature’? Its nature is such as its maker assigned to it, and its maker ordained that it should inhere in matter. Its own nature, therefore, is to inhere in matter. Through this nature being follows it. Being thus follows it through itself, but follows it, I say, as inhering in matter; in a certain sense it belongs to the form to be implanted in matter before it belongs to it to exist. It therefore exists only so long as it inheres in matter. It does not inhere forever, because matter, prepared for every form, often gives place to contrary forms that drive out the earlier ones. It therefore does not exist forever. But a form determined by the creator to a mode of being in which it subsists in itself apart from body has, because it too is form, the further property that being belongs to it in its own right—that is, through its own nature. The nature assigned to it is to adhere to itself. Its being therefore follows it insofar as it adheres to itself; that is, its existence follows it without springing from a subject. Whenever you say that being follows it through itself, you are saying that being follows it as it adheres to itself. Yet nothing departs from itself. For what could fall between a thing and its very self and separate it from itself? If it exists insofar as it adheres to itself, then because it always so adheres, it also always exists. The soul is a form of this kind. It is therefore immortal.

Caput 9, continuatur

V.9.3

Sed potest aliquis huic rationi sic obicere, quod quemadmodum ignis qui per se calet calet semper dum est, non tamen est semper, ex quo etiam non calet absolute semper, ita etiam animae essentia, quia proprie et vere forma est in se ipsa subsistens, ideo per se est; et quia per se est, ideo est et semper, scilicet dum est. Non tamen semper est. Ergo non est semper. Haec obiectio duabus de causis ridicula iudicatur. Primo sibimet ipsi repugnat quando ita contexitur: Forma illa per se est; ergo semper est, dum scilicet est; non autem est semper. Quattuor enim hic orationes sunt, quarum secunda illa quae dicit, Ergo semper est, posteriori huic contradicit quae infert, Non autem est semper. Deinde obiectio huiusmodi abundat superfluis quando addit, Dum scilicet est. Istud siquidem, dum est, non potest dici aliud esse quam primum illud ubi dicitur, Semper est. Sic enim esset eadem in re geminum est et geminum esse; neque exsisteret res una quaedam, sed duae. Hinc sequitur ut illud est quod ponitur quando additur, Dum scilicet est, sit illud idem quod iam erat positum quando prius dicebatur, Est semper. Quae sunt eadem eadem sunt ratione tractanda. Idcirco si primum est absolute profertur, ita secundum est absolute proferri debet absque illa dictione, Dum scilicet est. Ergo dici oportet: Est, semper est, est; non autem addendum, dum scilicet est. Vel si addis illi primo est illud postea, Dum scilicet est, adde et huic secundo est quod sequitur post dum scilicet est rursus illud, Dum scilicet est, et huic tertio est rursus, Dum scilicet est, atque ita in infinitum. Neque usquam reperies primam essendi radicem per quam competat illi rei quod sit sitque semper. Quod autem radicem essendi non habet nihil est omnino. Age iam siste pedem. Forma illa separata qualis est anima per se est. Ergo est semper.

Chapter 9, continued

V.9.3

But someone may object to this argument as follows. Fire, which is hot in its own right, is always hot while it exists, yet it does not always exist; hence it is not hot always without qualification. In the same way, the soul's essence, because it is properly and truly a form subsisting in itself, exists in its own right; and because it exists in its own right, it exists always—that is, while it exists. Yet it does not always exist. Therefore it does not exist always. This objection is judged ridiculous for two reasons. First, it contradicts itself when it is joined together in this form: 'That form exists in its own right; therefore it always exists, while, of course, it exists; yet it does not always exist.' There are four assertions here. The second, 'Therefore it always exists,' contradicts the later conclusion, 'Yet it does not always exist.' Second, an objection of this kind abounds in superfluities when it adds, 'while, of course, it exists.' For 'while it exists' cannot mean anything other than the first assertion, 'it always exists.' Otherwise, in the same thing there would be a double 'is' and a double being, and what existed would not be one thing but two. It follows that the 'is' introduced when one adds 'while it is' is the very same 'is' already posited when one first said 'it always is.' Things that are the same must be treated in the same way. Hence, if the first 'is' is uttered without qualification, the second 'is' must likewise be uttered without qualification and without the words 'while, of course, it is.' The statement should therefore run: 'It is; it always is; it is'—not with the addition 'while, of course, it is.' Or, if after the first 'is' you add 'while, of course, it is,' then to the second 'is' that follows after 'while it is,' add 'while, of course, it is' once again; and to this third 'is,' again add 'while, of course, it is,' and so on to infinity. Nowhere will you find the first root of being through which it belongs to the thing both to be and to be always. But what has no root of being is nothing at all. Come now, stop here. A separate form such as the soul exists in its own right. Therefore it exists always.

Caput 9, continuatur

V.9.4

Quin etiam si idem prorsus exsisteret esse atque calere, quando ita componis, Ignis quia per se calet, calet semper, adderes protinus, Calere et esse idem est; ergo est et semper. Nunc autem non potes eo modo concludere, quia non idem est esse atque calere. Alioquin quaecumque sunt calerent, et quicquid calere desinit desineret esse, quod non accidit. Itaque ignis semper dum est calet, quia prius quodammodo est et postea calet. Et quia esse est ante calere et aliud quam calere, ideo per aliquod medium videtur calor essentiae ignis inesse, ita ut primo ponatur ignis essentia, secundo eius esse, tertio loco calere. Immo vero essentia ignis sortitur esse per id quod haeret materiae. Prius enim quodammodo latet in materiae sinu quam edatur in lucem. Et sicut latuit antequam exsisteret, sic etiam haeret postea ut non cesset exsistere. Sortitur quoque calere per id quod possidet esse. Quapropter calere desinit quando desinit esse; desinit esse quando desinit inhaerere. Sed animae essentia, quoniam est forma soluta, esse sortitur per semet ipsam. Et in ea ipsum esse est primus et proprius actus essentiae; nec ullum vinculum est per quod esse cum essentia connectatur, quo soluto accidat dissolutio. Ac licet tam calere quam esse per aliquam condicionem conveniat ignis essentiae, animae tamen essentiae non convenit esse per condicionem ullam, sed absolute. Idcirco licet ignis cum certa quadam condicione sit et caleat semper, anima tamen semper est absolute.

V.9.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 9, continued

V.9.4

Indeed, if being and being hot were altogether the same, then when you frame the premise, ‘Because fire is hot in its own right, it is always hot,’ you would immediately add, ‘Being hot and being are the same; therefore it exists, and exists always.’ But you cannot draw that conclusion, because being and being hot are not the same. Otherwise everything that exists would be hot, and whatever ceased to be hot would cease to exist, which does not happen. Fire is therefore always hot while it exists, because in a certain sense it first exists and afterward is hot. Since being comes before being hot and is other than it, heat seems to inhere in the essence of fire through some intermediary: first the essence of fire is posited, second its being, and in the third place its being hot. Indeed, the essence of fire obtains being through adhering to matter. In a certain sense it lies hidden in the womb of matter before it is brought forth into the light; and just as it lay hidden before it existed, so afterward it continues to adhere, lest it cease to exist. It also obtains being hot through possessing being. Hence it ceases to be hot when it ceases to be, and ceases to be when it ceases to inhere. But because the soul's essence is a separate form, it obtains being through itself. In the soul, being itself is the first and proper act of essence. There is no bond by which being is connected with essence and whose loosening could bring dissolution. Although both being hot and being belong to the essence of fire under some condition, being belongs to the soul's essence under no condition at all, but absolutely. Thus, although fire exists under a determinate condition and is always hot, the soul exists always without qualification.

V.9.4 | independent English translation | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Caput 10

Decima ratio: quia per se refertur ad Deum.

V.10.1

Si qua tamen videatur esse condicio cuius virtute anima sit semper, ea non est per respectum aliquem ad corpora, quorum adiumento non eget, sed per respectum ad causam primam unde descendit. Sed et respectus huiusmodi quoniam per ipsammet animae naturam completur, nihil prohibet quin anima per se et absolute et absque condicione sit semper. Quod quidem hac ratione investigabimus. Quoniam a prima rerum causa cuncta dependent, eatenus singula in suo esse permanent quatenus ad primam causam referuntur. Respiciunt autem illam ut aliquam ipsius similitudinem gerunt. Causa illa actus purissimus est, ab omni materiae proprietate alienissimus. Huic actui res inferiores non ex sua materia sed ex forma potius, quae actus quidam exsistit, similes iudicantur. Quo fit ut per formam suam omnia primam respiciant causam. Quare quaecumque ex materia et forma composita sunt, ut elementa et mixta, non per se neque per totam sui naturam, sed per partem illam sui dumtaxat quae forma dicitur, causam primam respiciunt. Argumentare hunc in modum. Ut ad primum principium referuntur, ita sunt. Referuntur autem per aliud. Ergo per aliud sunt. Quae sunt per aliud stabilia non sunt. In se ipsis enim relicta in nihilum evanescunt. In se ergo sunt nihil quae sunt per aliud quicquid exsistunt. Talia profecto sunt naturalia corpora.

V.10.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 10

Tenth argument: because by its own nature it is related to God.

V.10.1

If, nevertheless, there seems to be some condition by virtue of which the soul exists always, it is not a relation to bodies, whose aid the soul does not need, but a relation to the first cause from which it descends. Yet because a relation of this kind is fulfilled through the soul's own nature, nothing prevents the soul from existing always in its own right, absolutely, and without condition. We may establish this by the following argument. Since all things depend upon the first cause of things, each remains in its own being insofar as it is related to the first cause. Things look toward that cause insofar as they bear some likeness to it. The first cause is the purest act, utterly removed from every property of matter. Lower things are judged similar to this act not through their matter but rather through their form, which is itself a kind of act. It follows that all things look toward the first cause through their form. Accordingly, whatever is composed of matter and form, such as the elements and mixed bodies, looks toward the first cause neither through itself nor through its whole nature, but only through the part of itself called form. Frame the argument in this way: things exist in the same way that they are related to the first principle. They are related through another; therefore they exist through another. Things that exist through another are not stable, for if left to themselves they vanish into nothing. Thus things that owe whatever existence they have to another are nothing in themselves. Natural bodies are certainly of this kind.

Caput 10, continuatur

V.10.2

Corporales vero formae quales? Certe similes. Forma enim corporibus insita excellentiam quidem amisit suam et corporalis prorsus evasit, siquidem omnes condiciones corporis iam subiit. Condiciones corporis duae sunt: secundum locum extensio et secundum tempus mutatio. Forma vero immersa corporibus cum latitudine corporis dilatatur et mutatur corpore permutato. Quoniam igitur facta est penitus corporalis, pristina excellentia destituta, per se quidem minime est, ut diximus alias, et esse nullum habet proprium; sed ita cum materia copulatur ut unum sit esse totius. Si ergo per se non est, per se certe non agit. Ideo si referatur ad primam causam, per aliud aliquid referetur: per illud videlicet per quod est. Est autem per formam aliam sublimiorem, a materia liberam, a qua etiam pendet in materiam continue, quemadmodum a vultu hominis imago in speculum, per quam ad primam causam assidue quoque refertur. Si omnino per aliud est forma corporea, cum etiam ad primum principium per aliud referatur, quidnam est illud per quod tam corpus naturale quam eius forma refertur ad primum? Sane est essentia illa tertia quam supra corporum qualitates iam pridem locavimus. Essentia vero huiusmodi eodem modo ad Deum refert corporum qualitates quo eas efficit in materia. Efficit autem operatione sua. Operatio sua est mobilis. Per agitationem igitur generat; per agitationem et refert. Itaque refert mutabiliter. Hinc sequitur ut naturalia corpora eorumque formae, quia per aliud perque motum referuntur in Deum, neque per se sint neque stabilia, sed vacillent prorsus et pereant.

Chapter 10, continued

V.10.2

What, then, of corporeal forms? They are certainly similar to bodies in this respect. A form implanted in bodies has lost its own excellence and become wholly corporeal, since it has now undergone every condition of body. The conditions of body are two: extension with respect to place and change with respect to time. A form immersed in bodies is extended together with the breadth of the body and changes when the body is altered. Since it has thus become thoroughly corporeal and has been deprived of its former excellence, it does not exist in its own right, as we have said elsewhere, and has no being of its own. Rather, it is so joined with matter that there is one being of the whole. If it does not exist through itself, it certainly does not act through itself. Hence, if it is related to the first cause, it must be related through something else—namely, through that by which it exists. It exists through another, higher form, free from matter, from which it continually hangs down into matter as an image in a mirror depends upon a man's face; through this higher form it is also constantly related to the first cause. If a corporeal form exists altogether through another and is likewise related to the first principle through another, what is that through which both the natural body and its form are related to the first? It is assuredly that third essence which we long ago placed above the qualities of bodies. This essence relates bodily qualities to God in the same way that it produces them in matter. It produces them by its operation, and its operation is mobile. Through motion, therefore, it generates them, and through motion it also relates them. Thus its mode of relating them is mutable. It follows that natural bodies and their forms, because they are related to God through another and through motion, neither exist through themselves nor remain stable, but waver utterly and perish.

Caput 10, continuatur

V.10.3

Essentia vero tertia quia sui ipsius est forma, immo ipsamet forma est et forma a materia libera, idcirco per se refertur in Deum. Ut refertur, ita est. Ergo est et per se ipsam. Refertur autem per essentiam suam; illa stabilis est. Quapropter ad stabilem Deum per stabilem sui ipsius essentiam relata, stabilis permanet. Nempe essentia haec relationis suae causa est; relatio perfectionis. Se ipsam vero numquam deserit; numquam ergo desinit se ipsam referre, numquam se ipsam perficere referendo. Deus quidem semper exuberat; illa semper haurit. Igitur tum ex parte hausti tum haurientis, semper quidem esse ipsum bibit ac permanet immortalis.

V.10.3 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 10, continued

V.10.3

The third essence, however, is the form of itself—indeed, is form itself—and is a form free from matter. It is therefore related to God through itself. As it is related, so it exists; hence it also exists through itself. It is related through its own essence, and that essence is stable. Related to the stable God through its own stable essence, it therefore remains stable. For this essence is the cause of its own relation, and that relation is the source of its perfection. It never abandons itself; therefore it never ceases to relate itself and never ceases to perfect itself through that relation. God always overflows, and the soul always draws from him. Thus, from both sides—from what is drawn and from the one who draws—the soul forever drinks being itself and remains immortal.

V.10.3 | independent English translation | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Caput 11

Undecima ratio: quia non componitur ex aliqua potentia in quam possit resolvi.

V.11.1

Sicut generatio fit per coniunctionem formae cum materia, ita per separationem formae a materia fit corruptio. Ubi non est harum rerum coniunctio, non accidit separatio. Talis autem compositio non est in anima. Sed rationem hanc latius prosequamur. In corruptione cuiusque rei perditur ipse rei actus; sed post illum superest aliquid quod suberat illi actui, veluti potentia aliqua susceptiva, ne fiat corruptio in nihilum, sicut non fit ex nihilo generatio. Res quidem ex forma materiaque composita resolvitur in materiam. Forma quoque illa quae ex materiae fomite educta fuerat reducitur in materiae fomitem. In anima vero actus ipsius est ipsum suum esse. Essentia vero et substantia eius est illa ipsa potentia quae essendi actui subest. Non enim est in formis absolutis ferme alia compositio quam ex essentia atque esse, aut similis. Essentia locum materiae et potentiae tenet; esse vero locum formae et actus. Si corrumpitur anima, perditur eius esse omnino. Sed numquid etiam essentia? Nequaquam. Nulla enim res in nihil resolvitur, quia res quae usque adeo est simplex ut non aliter resolvi possit quam in nihilum etiam talis est ut sit a Deo facta per creationem ex nihilo. Quae autem talis est, soli auctori suo subest Deo.

V.11.2

Dei vero influxus vitalis atque beneficus nihil interimit. Itaque si anima destruitur, licet amittat esse eius, tamen essentia remanet. Quod etiam inde constat, quod quanto nobilior res est, tanto nobiliorem habet materiam, nobiliorem et formam. Animae sunt admodum praestantiores corporibus. Igitur sub illarum esse tamquam sub forma et actu latet materia quaedam et potentia, si qua latet, praestantior quam sub forma et sub esse corporis cuiuscumque.

Chapter 11

Eleventh argument: because it is not composed of any potency into which it could be resolved.

V.11.1

Just as generation occurs when form is joined to matter, so corruption occurs when form is separated from matter. Where there is no conjunction of the two, no separation can take place; and no composition of this kind exists in the soul. Let us, however, pursue the argument more fully. When anything is corrupted, the actuality that belonged to it is lost, yet something remains beneath that actuality—a receptive potentiality—so that corruption does not terminate in nothing, just as generation does not begin from nothing. A thing composed of form and matter is resolved into matter; even the form that had been drawn from the tinder of matter is reduced again to that tinder. In the soul, by contrast, its actuality is its very being. Its essence and substance are the potentiality underlying the actuality of being, for in separate forms there is scarcely any composition other than, or analogous to, that of essence and being. Essence occupies the place of matter and potentiality; being, the place of form and actuality. If the soul is corrupted, therefore, its being is wholly lost. But is its essence lost as well? By no means. No thing is resolved into nothing. A thing so simple that it could be resolved only into nothing is precisely the kind of thing God creates from nothing, and such a thing is subject to God alone as its author.

V.11.2

Yet God’s life-giving and beneficent influx destroys nothing. Thus, even if the soul were destroyed and lost its being, its essence would remain. This is also clear from the principle that the nobler a thing is, the nobler are both its matter and its form. Souls far surpass bodies. Therefore, if beneath their being—as beneath form and actuality—there lies any matter or potentiality at all, it must be nobler than what lies beneath the form and being of any body whatsoever.

Caput 11, continuatur

V.11.3

Quod autem tenet in animabus primae materiae potentiaeque locum, ipsa earum essentia est. Itaque essentia illarum eminentior est quam materia corporum. Materia corporum incorruptibilis est; ergo quid mirum si esse potest incorruptibilis illa? Quo fit ut, si quando anima esse suum fingatur amittere, supersit necessario adhuc essentia atque substantia. Haec si superest, est certe. Si est adhuc, esse nondum est amissum. Ita anima, si corrumpi dicatur, etiam post corruptionem necessario superest, immo etiam vivit. Esse namque animae nihil aliud est quam vivere.

V.11.4

Sed ne quis dicat ipsum animae esse resolvi in essentiam atque essentiam ulterius non existere, quia sit absque actu, quamvis potentia forte supersit alicubi, meminisse oportet essentiam illam non posse in materiae potentiamve materiae redigi.

V.11.5

Quia neque ex materia constat tamquam parte sui, neque ex materiae potentia pullulat. Rursus non posse resolvi in potentiam causae alicuius agentis, nisi forte in Dei virtutem, qui solus animam procreavit. Non autem ob id moritur animus, quod in primam vitam resolvitur. Moreretur autem, si reductus in Deum desineret esse animus.

V.11.3-V.11.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 11, continued

V.11.3

What occupies in souls the place of prime matter and potentiality is their essence itself. Their essence is therefore more exalted than the matter of bodies. Bodily matter is incorruptible; why, then, should it be surprising if the soul's essence is incorruptible too? Hence, if we suppose that the soul at some point loses its being, its essence and substance must still remain. But if that essence remains, it certainly is; and if it still is, its being has not yet been lost. Thus, even when the soul is said to be corrupted, it necessarily survives its corruption—indeed, it remains alive, since for a soul to be is nothing other than to live.

V.11.4

But someone might say that the soul's very being is resolved into essence, while the essence then ceases to exist because it is without actuality, even though some potentiality may perhaps remain somewhere. Against this we must remember that the soul's essence cannot be reduced either to matter or to a potentiality belonging to matter.

V.11.5

For it is neither composed of matter as one of its parts nor does it spring from matter's potentiality. Nor, again, can it be resolved into the power of any efficient cause—unless perhaps into the power of God, who alone brought the soul forth. Yet the mind does not die by being resolved into the primal life. It would die only if, on being led back to God, it ceased to be a mind.

Caput 11, continuatur

V.11.6

Atqui sicut figura cerae a sigillo impressa, quando sigillo penitus adaequatur, non destruitur, sed in speciem suam redintegratur, sic essentia animi, si quando ideae per quam Deus eam in certa essendi specie disposuerat admovetur, in esse pristino confirmatur, maxime enim sequens actus roboratur a primo. Nam quomodo Deus esse potest terminus in quem corruptio tendat, cum sit efficiens terminus unde et a quo omnis creatio generatioque deducitur? Aut quo pacto Deus, qui actus est purus, nascente anima ad animae ipsius compositionem concurrit, ita ut, quemadmodum ex materiae potentia et actu potentiae addito forma fit corporalis et in eam potentiam denique actus formae resolvitur, sic ex Dei potentia quadam et adiecto quodam actu fiat animus, qui tandem in Dei potentiam quasi materiam resolvatur? Non enim gerit umquam materiae vicem qui primus est actus.

V.11.7

Asseret aliquis essentiam animae neque in materiam neque in Deum resolvi, sed ipsam se statim in se recipere, esse priore sublato. Verum sicut materia corporalis absque actu corporali esse nequit, ita neque spiritalis seorsum a spiritali. Quapropter essentia quae est materia spiritalium et ad esse spiritale quasi actum aliquem comparatur numquam segregatur ab esse, ab esse, inquam, spiritali. Nisi forte quis dicat essentiam animae, dum esse aliud exuit, aliud indui, ac tales in esse spiritali vices hanc essentiam variare quales in formis suis materia variat. Absurdum id quidem dictu.

Chapter 11, continued

V.11.6

Consider a figure impressed upon wax by a seal. When the figure is brought into complete conformity with the seal, it is not destroyed but restored to the integrity of its own form. So too, if the essence of the mind is brought near the Idea by which God assigned it a definite mode of being, it is confirmed in its original being, for a subsequent actuality is strengthened above all by the first. How could God be the terminus toward which corruption tends when he is the efficient source from which, and by which, every creation and generation proceeds? Or how could God, who is pure actuality, enter into the soul's composition at its birth in such a way that—as bodily form arises from matter's potentiality when an actuality is added to it, and the actuality of form is finally resolved back into that potentiality—the mind should arise from some potentiality in God by the addition of an actuality and at last be resolved into God's potentiality as though into matter? What is first actuality never assumes the role of matter.

V.11.7

Someone may maintain that the soul's essence is resolved neither into matter nor into God, but immediately receives itself back into itself once its former being has been removed. Yet just as bodily matter cannot exist without bodily actuality, neither can spiritual matter exist apart from spiritual actuality. Hence the essence that serves as the matter of spiritual things, and stands to spiritual being as to an actuality, is never separated from being—from spiritual being, I mean. One might still claim that when the soul's essence puts off one being it puts on another, and that this essence passes through changes within spiritual being like those through which matter passes among its forms. But such a claim is plainly absurd.

Caput 11, continuatur

V.11.8

Tum quia essentia spiritalium stabilior est quam materia corporalium; tum quia essentia animae, cum propria ipsius animae ratio sit, non esse aliud omnino et aliud respicit pariter, sed esse solummodo animale secundum certam videlicet animae speciem. Materia quidem communis absque hoc actu vel illo esse potest; materia vero propria absque proprio actu nequaquam. Quapropter essentia animae quae in tali specie animarum est numquam actum speciei alterius animarum suscipiet; neque migrabit rursus essentia in eadem specie de animo hoc in illum, ne mobilis aeque sit ac materia corporalium. Immo, si materia caeli eadem forma contenta est semper, ut placet quamplurimis, quid mirum materiam animi spiritalem eodem essendi actu semper esse contentam? Ea essentia vita est; hoc esse, vivere. Semper itaque vivit.

Chapter 11, continued

V.11.8

It is absurd, first, because the essence of spiritual things is more stable than bodily matter; and second, because the soul's essence, being the soul's own defining nature, is not equally open to being now one thing and now another. It is directed only to animal being according to one determinate species of soul. Common matter can exist without this or that particular actuality, but the proper matter of a thing cannot exist without its proper actuality. Therefore the essence of a soul established in a given species of souls will never receive the actuality of another species. Nor, within the same species, will an essence migrate from this mind into that one, for then it would be as mutable as bodily matter. Indeed, if the matter of heaven remains forever content with one and the same form, as very many hold, why should it be surprising that the mind's spiritual matter remains forever content with one and the same actuality of being? That essence is life; for it, to be is to live. Therefore it lives forever.

Caput 12

Duodecima ratio: quia non habet in se potentiam ad non esse.

V.12.1

Nulla res corrumpitur umquam nisi habeat in se potentiam ad non esse. Si enim nequiret non esse, numquam esse desineret. Anima nullam habet talem potentiam, quoniam anima nihil aliud est apud Platonicos nisi forma simplex per se subsistens, in essentia quidem sua perfecta et integra, ad speciem quoque animalis efficiendam conducens.

V.12.2

Actus quidem existendi ibi est in ipsa, scilicet, forma integra et perfecta. Siquidem per formae integritatem est unumquodque. Igitur proprium subiectum ipsius esse ibi est sua forma atque essentia. Ubi autem erit potentia ad non esse, quod est ipsius esse oppositum? Numquid in ipso esse? At quomodo unum repugnans vim habet ad repugnans alterum capiendum? An in ipsa essentia? Neque hic quidem. Nam si essentia, ex eo quod simplex et integra forma est, proprium est ipsius esse subiectum, quomodo habet potentiam ad non esse, quod dicitur esse ipsius oppositum? Quo enim pacto propria substantia ignis, quae proprium caloris talis subiectum est, habet ad frigus suscipiendum potentiam aliquam per quam et frigus accipiat et maneat ignis? Atqui in his ipsis substantiis corporalibus mortalibusque non est potentia ad non esse quantum sunt in specie sua completae substantiae formaque praeditae—secundum hoc enim existunt—sed quantum illis subest materia prima, quae numquam sub tali aliqua forma quiescit. Haec vero abest ab anima. Nusquam igitur potentia ad non esse in anima reperitur. Est igitur immortalis. Sed hanc rationem planius exponamus. In rebus iis quae ex forma et materia componuntur id accidit, ut materia opus ipsum quodammodo antecedat.

V.12.3

Quis enim dubitet quin materia prius quodammodo sit quam formetur? Accipio materiam hanc operi faciundo quodammodo praecedentem atque interrogo: utrum opus illud ex natura huius materiae fore necessarium sit, an impossibile, an forte possibile? Non necessarium, quia sic materiae vis statim per se ipsam operi necessitatem daret, neque praestantiore aliquo egeret formante; nunc vero indiget, quia quod est informe formare se nequit. Igitur quantum ad materiam attinet futurum opus non est necessarium.

Chapter 12

Twelfth argument: because it has within itself no potency toward non-being.

V.12.1

Nothing is ever corrupted unless it contains within itself a potentiality not to be. If it were incapable of not being, it would never cease to be. The soul has no such potentiality, because for the Platonists the soul is nothing other than a simple form subsisting in its own right: complete and whole in its own essence, yet also capable of contributing to the formation of an animal species.

V.12.2

Here the actuality of existing lies in the complete and perfect form itself, for each thing is what it is through the integrity of its form. Thus the proper subject of being is the thing's own form and essence. Where, then, could the potentiality not to be reside—the potentiality opposed to being itself? In being? But how could one contrary possess a capacity for receiving the other? In the essence? No more there than in being. If the essence, precisely because it is a simple and integral form, is the proper subject of its own being, how could it contain a potentiality for the opposite of that being? How, for example, could the proper substance of fire, which is the proper subject of its heat, possess a potentiality for receiving cold while both becoming cold and remaining fire? Even in mortal bodily substances the potentiality not to be does not belong to them insofar as they are complete in their species and endowed with form—for it is in this respect that they exist—but insofar as prime matter lies beneath them, never resting under any one form. The soul has no such matter. Therefore a potentiality not to be is found nowhere in it, and it is consequently immortal. Let us now unfold this argument more plainly. In things composed of form and matter, matter in a certain sense precedes the finished work.

V.12.3

Who can doubt that matter in some sense exists before it is formed? Let us take this matter as in some sense preceding the work to be made and ask whether, from the nature of that matter, the work must necessarily come to be, cannot possibly come to be, or merely may come to be. It is not necessary. If it were, matter's own power would at once impose necessity upon the work and would need no nobler agent to form it. Yet it does need such an agent, because what is formless cannot form itself. Considered solely with respect to matter, therefore, the future work is not necessary.

Caput 12, continuatur

V.12.4

Numquid impossibile? Neque hoc quidem. Sic enim esset materia adeo ad opus illud inepta ut numquam ad illius formam atque effectum perduceretur. Si quantum ad materiam spectat opus agendum neque necessarium est neque etiam impossibile, restat ut sit possibile. Hoc enim inter duo illa est medium.

V.12.5

Possibile, inquam, esse atque non esse. Nam si ex natura materiae foret possibile esse solum, foret absque dubio necessarium. Sin ex natura eiusdem foret solum possibile non esse, foret et impossibile. Quapropter cum ex natura materiae opus ipsum possibile sit esse pariter et non esse, constat quod in ipsa materia, quantum ad faciendum opus est, potentia ad esse pariter atque non esse. Cum vero simplex materia sit, ex naturis pluribus non composita, eadem natura materiae est potentia ad esse atque non esse.

V.12.6

Quoniam est indifferens ad utrumque neque ex se ad alterutrum terminatur, superiori ergo agente indiget, quod eam formando ad esse determinet. Accipit ab illo formam leonis, unde fit leo; et materia ista leonis, quae ante habebat in se potentiam ad esse leonem atque non esse, iam nunc ad esse leonem determinatur. Sed numquid adhuc restat in materia prima eadem illa indifferens ad utrumque potentia? Si non restaret, cessaret protinus natura materiae, neque quicquam ex materia fieret et constaret, si statim cum fit aliquid materia prima natura privatur sua peritque. Ergo, cum restet leone iam genito potentia eadem illa secundum speciem in materia non propinqua leoni, secundaque, sed prima, potentia, inquam, ad esse pariter atque non esse, id accidit ut, quemadmodum per illam potentiam esse leo quandoque coepit, cum prius non fuisset, ita per eandem esse quandoque desinat postquam fuit.

Chapter 12, continued

V.12.4

Is the work, then, impossible? Not that either. In that case matter would be so unfit for the work that it could never be brought to the work's form and completion. If, considered with respect to matter, the work to be done is neither necessary nor impossible, it remains possible; possibility is the middle between those two extremes.

V.12.5

By 'possible' I mean able both to be and not to be. For if matter's nature made only being possible, the work would unquestionably be necessary; if that same nature made only nonbeing possible, the work would be impossible. Since, therefore, the nature of matter leaves the work equally able to be and not to be, matter itself, with respect to the making of the work, clearly contains a potentiality both for being and for nonbeing. Since matter is simple and not composed of several natures, one and the same nature of matter is the potentiality both to be and not to be.

V.12.6

Because matter is indifferent to either outcome and does not of itself come to rest in one rather than the other, it needs a higher agent to form it and determine it toward being. From that agent it receives the form of a lion and so becomes a lion. The lion's matter, which previously contained a potentiality both to be and not to be a lion, is now determined to being one. But does that same potentiality, indifferent to either outcome, still remain in prime matter? If it did not, the nature of matter would immediately cease; nothing could be made from matter or consist of it if prime matter lost its own nature and perished the instant something came to be. Thus, when the lion has been generated, that same specific potentiality remains—not in the secondary matter proximate to the lion, but in prime matter: the potentiality, I mean, both to be and not to be. It follows that, just as through that potentiality the lion once began to be when previously it was not, so through the same potentiality it will at some time cease to be after having been.

Caput 12, continuatur

V.12.7

Quoniam potentia ad extremum utrumque indifferens vel ad neutrum vertitur vel aeque atque vicissim vertitur ad utrumque; et sicut ad esse ex non esse conversa est, ita vicissim ab esse vertitur in non esse. Atque hinc sequitur rerum corruptio corporalium. Verum rationalis anima, cum sit forma simplex unde motus exoritur in compositis, non potest ex aliqua materia praecedente et subsequente forma facta fuisse; et cum sit forma in se subsistens, non innixa materiae, quia et supra et infra materiam progreditur iudicando, non est composita ex aliqua potentia materiae velut animae inchoatione et actu potentiae addito velut ipsius animae perfectione. Neque igitur ex materia constat, neque exstat.

V.12.8

Si talis est, ex nihilo processit in lucem.

V.12.9

Eius ergo solus Deus est auctor, ut alias ostendemus. Atqui haec nisi potuisset fieri, numquam profecto facta fuisset.

V.12.10

Quapropter praecessit animam nostram nascendi potentia. Ubinam erat illa potentia? Non in anima, quae nondum erat; non in parte animae, quae est simplex et tota simul efficitur, non per partes; non in materia aliqua, quoniam anima a materia non dependet; non in nihilo, non enim potentia ipsa essendi fundatur in nihilo. Nam quo pacto alterum oppositum sit oppositi et contradictorii alterius fundamentum? Esse vero et non esse contradictoria sunt. Restat ut illa potentia in solo animae auctore fundetur Deo. Igitur potentia essendi per quam anima ad esse producitur ipse solus immortalis stabilisque est Deus.

Chapter 12, continued

V.12.7

A potentiality indifferent to both extremes either turns toward neither or turns equally and by turns toward both. Just as it was converted from nonbeing to being, so in turn it is converted from being to nonbeing; and from this follows the corruption of bodily things. The rational soul, however, is a simple form from which motion originates in composites. It therefore cannot have been made from some preexisting matter followed by an added form. Moreover, because it is a form subsisting in itself and does not rest upon matter—for in judgment it ranges both above and below matter—it is not composed of a material potentiality serving as the soul's initial seed and an actuality added to that potentiality as the soul's completion. It is therefore neither constituted from matter nor drawn out from it.

V.12.8

If the soul is of this kind, it has come forth from nothing into the light.

V.12.9

God alone, then, is its author, as we shall show elsewhere. And certainly, unless the soul had been capable of being made, it would never have been made.

V.12.10

A potentiality for being born therefore preceded our soul. Where was that potentiality? Not in the soul, which did not yet exist; not in some part of the soul, since the soul is simple and is brought into being all at once rather than part by part; not in any matter, since the soul does not depend upon matter; and not in nothing, for the very potentiality of being cannot be founded upon nothing. How could one opposite serve as the foundation of the other opposite and contradictory? Being and nonbeing are contradictories. It remains, then, that this potentiality is founded in God alone, the soul's author. Thus the potentiality of being through which the soul is brought into existence is God himself, who alone is immortal and stable.

Caput 12, continuatur

V.12.11

Potentiae vero secundum congruentiam respondet actus. Actus ergo illi potentiae divinae respondens est stabilis per essentiam. Talis actus est anima. Et quemadmodum in Deo eadem potentia est per quam et Deus potest facere animam et anima fieri, sic in anima idem actus est, id est nixus idem, per quem et anima subsistit in natura sua et Deus eam sistit in ipsa.

V.12.12

Quo fit ut non minori desiderio Deus animam in natura animae sistat quam subsistat anima in eadem. Quae cum soli subiciatur Deo, si perimenda est ab aliquo, ab illo est perimenda. Ab illo vero non potest. Quomodo enim causa alicuius effectrix et conservatrix erit quoque corruptrix eiusdem? Aut quo pacto ipsum bonum cuiquam perniciosum est? Aut prima vita et infinita vita est alicui mortis origo? Dicet aliquis: non perimit Deus animam vim novam aliquam inferendo, sed vim ante illi tributam auferendo, id est subtrahendo influxum suum per quem anima vixerat, sicut qui intuitu imaginem suam creat in speculo, subtrahendo vultum desinit imaginem procreare. Sed contingere hoc ibi non potest, ut paulo ante ostendimus. Rursus, si Deus nunc infundit animae vitam, postea non infundit, mutatio ibi provenit ab infundendo in non infundendum. Quaero utrum anima desinat haurire vitam, an Deus infundere. Non desinit anima haurire.

Chapter 12, continued

V.12.11

An actuality corresponds fittingly to a potentiality. The actuality corresponding to that divine potentiality is therefore stable in its very essence; the soul is such an actuality. And just as in God there is one and the same power by which God can make the soul and the soul can be made, so in the soul there is one and the same actuality—one and the same sustaining impulse—by which the soul subsists in its own nature and God establishes it there.

V.12.12

It follows that God's desire to establish the soul in the nature of soul is no less than the soul's desire to subsist in that nature. Since it is subject to God alone, if anyone is to destroy it, God must do so. But God cannot. How could the cause that produces and preserves a thing also be the cause of its corruption? How could the good itself be ruinous to anything? How could the first and infinite life become the source of death for another? Someone will object that God destroys the soul not by bringing a new force against it but by withdrawing the force previously bestowed upon it—that is, by withholding the influx through which it lived. In the same way, a person whose gaze produces an image in a mirror ceases to produce it by turning away his face. But, as we showed shortly before, that cannot happen here. Again, if God now pours life into the soul and later does not, there is a change from infusing to not infusing. I ask, then: does the soul cease to draw in life, or does God cease to pour it forth? The soul does not cease to draw it in.

Caput 12, continuatur

V.12.13

Quippe infusio vitae in essentiam animae fit, quoniam vita est primus actus essentiae cum primum acceperit esse. Animae essentia est immobilis, quoniam a stabili Deo sine medio pendet, quia stando et quiescendo perficitur. Turbatur motu, attingit stabilia, regit caduca, sistit mobilia, colligit dissipata, conciliat repugnantia. Nec est in ea potentia illa ad esse pariter atque non esse qualis est in corporibus, quae est totius mutationis initium. Non igitur cessat animae essentia umquam vitae actum accipere; non cessat Deus eundem infundere. Solis namque illis significavit Deus se vim suam aliquando infundere cessaturum, quibus ab origine inseruit proclivitatem illam ad non essendum. Praeterea Deus, naturae institutor, numquam rei quicquam subtrahit quod rei illius est proprium. Propria animae vita est, vita, inquam, perpetua.

V.12.14

Quia quantum rationalis est, etiam absque disciplina et usu per solam eius naturae virtutem quotidie in se parit species absolutas, per quas proxime ad aeternas itur ideas. Si naturale est animo rationali ascendere ad ideas, naturale est ipsi quiescere in ideis, ut sicut naturaliter illis vixit ita naturaliter vivat in illis; et qui operabatur secundum naturam assidue ad perpetua, operetur quandoque secundum naturam perpetuo in perpetuis.

V.12.15

Et quia idea quaeque aeterna vita est, qui secundum naturam suam ideam per ideae modum potest consequi potest etiam per modum aeternum vitam consequi sempiternam.

Chapter 12, continued

V.12.13

For the infusion of life enters the soul's essence: life is the first actuality of essence as soon as essence receives being. The soul's essence is immovable because it depends immediately upon the stable God and is perfected by standing still and resting. Motion disturbs it; it reaches what is stable, governs what passes away, brings what moves to rest, gathers what is scattered, and reconciles what is opposed. Nor does it contain, as bodies do, that potentiality both to be and not to be which initiates every change. The soul's essence therefore never ceases to receive the actuality of life, and God never ceases to infuse that actuality. God has indicated that he will at some time cease to pour forth his power only in those things into which, from their origin, he planted an inclination not to be. Moreover, as the founder of nature, God never takes from a thing what properly belongs to it. Life is proper to the soul—and by that I mean perpetual life.

V.12.14

For insofar as the soul is rational, even without instruction or practice it daily brings forth within itself, by the power of its nature alone, separate forms through which one approaches most nearly to the eternal Ideas. If it is natural for the rational mind to ascend to the Ideas, it is also natural for it to rest in them: just as it has lived naturally through them, so it should live naturally in them. The mind that by nature was continually active toward perpetual things should at some time, in accordance with that same nature, act perpetually among things perpetual.

V.12.15

And because every Idea is eternal life, a being that by its nature can attain an Idea in the manner of an Idea can also attain everlasting life in an eternal manner.

Caput 13

Tertiadecima ratio: quia esse a Deo accipit sine medio.

V.13.1

Quamquam Plotinus et Proculus aliique nonnulli Platonicorum animam fieri arbitrantur ab angelo, tamen Dionysium Areopagitam, Origenem et Aurelium Augustinum, Platonicos excellentissimos, sequor libentius, qui animam putant a Deo unico procreari. Quod equidem hac ratione demonstrari posse confido. Anima est forma ita simplex atque ita libera ut neque ex pluribus partibus componatur neque ex materiae visceribus eruatur. Quando igitur fit, non potest ex rebus ullis prius existentibus generari. Non enim ex rebus diversis procul ante positis, deinde coactis in unum, conficitur, cum careat partibus; neque ex materiae fomite prius informi, deinde formato, cum sit supra materiam. Igitur fit ex nihilo. Ex nihilo autem aliquid facere Dei solius est proprium. Nam ex ordine operum ordo causarum investigatur; causis enim effectus accommodatur. Quare oportet effectus proprios in proprias causas reducamus, atque id quod commune in omnibus effectibus propriis reperitur in communem omnium causam referamus. Ita, cum omnibus in rebus praeter proprias singularum condiciones ipsum esse commune cunctis inveniatur, singularum condicionum et qualitatum causas singulas afferre debemus.

V.13.2

Ipsius autem esse, quod unum omnibus est commune, unam causam omnibusque communem. Omnibus communis causa unus ipse est Deus. Igitur essendi re vera Deus est causa; essendi vero hoc aut illud, hoc modo vel illo, aliae quaedam praeter Deum sunt causae. Ita, ut sis, a Deo solo habes; ut sis homo, etiam ab homine; ut calidus sis, ab igne. Deus operibus esse dabit; aliae causae inter se diversae diversos essendi modos, et eos quidem virtute Dei.

Chapter 13

Thirteenth argument: because it receives its being from God without an intermediary.

V.13.1

Although Plotinus, Proclus, and certain other Platonists think that the soul is made by an angel, I prefer to follow Dionysius the Areopagite, Origen, and Aurelius Augustine—Platonists of the highest distinction—who hold that the soul is brought forth by God alone. I trust that the following argument can establish this. The soul is a form so simple and so free that it is neither composed of many parts nor drawn from the entrails of matter. Therefore, when it comes to be, it cannot be generated from anything previously existing. Since it has no parts, it is not assembled from diverse things first lying apart and then forced into one; and since it stands above matter, it is not drawn from matter's tinder, first formless and later formed. It therefore comes to be from nothing, and to make something from nothing belongs to God alone. The order of causes is discovered from the order of their works, because an effect is proportioned to its cause. We must accordingly refer proper effects to their proper causes, and whatever is found in common among all proper effects to the common cause of them all. Thus, since being itself is found to be common to all things in addition to the particular conditions proper to each, we must assign particular causes to those particular conditions and qualities.

V.13.2

But being itself, which is the one feature common to all, requires one cause common to all; and the one cause common to all is God himself. God, therefore, is truly the cause that things are. Other causes besides God account for their being this or that, or being in this mode or that. Thus you have from God alone that you are; from a human parent as well that you are human; and from fire that you are hot. God gives being to works, while causes diverse from one another give diverse modes of being—and do so through God’s power.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.3

Esse quidem illud quod post nihilum sequitur esse dicitur absolutum. Statim enim post nihil sequitur esse simpliciter. Post esse simpliciter sequitur esse hoc aut illud, aut tale esse vel tale, puta hominem esse vel equum, album esse vel nigrum. Non enim potest quicquam fieri hoc et illud et tale, nisi sit prius quod hoc et illud et tale fiat. Quapropter esse tale et hoc et illud haud e vestigio post nihilum sequitur, sed post esse ipsum simplex et absolutum.

V.13.4

Cum igitur Dei proprium sit esse ipsum commune et absolutum cunctis tribuere, id vero esse ante omnes essendi modos sequatur post nihilum, solius Dei officium erit aliquid ex nihilo in esse producere, ut primum quod datur omnibus, ipsum, scilicet, esse, a prima sit causa; a sequentibus causis munera secunda vel tertia. Profecto quod naturae alicuius est particeps non potest eam naturam producere absolutam, quia, cum id quod est tale aliquid secundum participationem necessario sequatur id quod est absolute tale, immo etiam sit per illud quicquid ipsum est, si hoc illud gigneret, certe quod est posterius rem se ipso priorem atque etiam sui ipsius causam gigneret, ubi gigneret et se ipsum.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.3

The being that follows immediately after nothing is called absolute being. For what follows nothing directly is being simply; only after being simply come being this or that and being of one kind or another—for example, being a human or a horse, being white or black. Nothing can become this, that, or such-and-such unless there is first something that can become this, that, or such-and-such. Determinate being, therefore, does not follow on the heels of nothing; it follows being itself, simple and absolute.

V.13.4

Since it belongs properly to God to bestow upon all things being itself, common and absolute, and since that being comes after nothing but before every mode of being, it belongs to God alone to bring something from nothing into being. What is given first to all—being itself—must come from the first cause; second or third gifts come from subsequent causes. Whatever participates in a nature plainly cannot produce that nature in its absolute form. What possesses a character by participation necessarily follows what possesses it absolutely and, indeed, owes to that absolute source whatever it is. If the participant were to generate the absolute nature, what comes later would generate something prior to itself and even generate its own cause, since in generating that cause it would also generate itself.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.5

Igitur Ariston, quia non absolutus homo fuit, sed hic homo in tali materia constitutus, humanitatem ipsam non genuit absolutam, sed hominem hunc, Platonem, scilicet, et in materia tali. Quoniam vero, quantum pertinet ad essendi naturam, quicquid sub Deo est esse ipsius est particeps, et esse non habet simpliciter, sed tale esse vel tale in quadam essentia specieque determinatum, sequitur ut res nulla subiecta Deo ipsum esse producat, sed talem quendam essendi modum tali cuidam materiae tribuat. Quo fit ut ad opus suum priori semper egeat fundamento. Praeterea tam ars quam natura quicquid agit ex potentia quadam producit in actum. Sculptor ex lapide ita praeparato ad statuam ut quodammodo habeat statuam in potentia statuam actu fabricat; homo ex semine in cuius virtute homo est generat hominem. Materia illa ex qua ars et natura aliquid faciunt interdum obediens multum et apta ad opus existit, interdum ineptior, ita ut materiae potentia alias minus, alias magis distet ab actu operis fabricandi. Parum distat aeris potentia ab ignis effectu, longe vero ab hoc aquae potentia. Facile itaque est ex aere, difficile ex aqua ignem accendere. Unde apparet tanto potentiorem esse oportere eum qui agit quanto longius intervallum est inter potentiam illam et actum a qua in quem opus suum est deducturus.

V.13.6

Distantia vero inter nihil et esse est infinita, tum quia in nihilo nulla est proportio ad esse, tum quia nulla distantia maior hac esse aut excogitari potest. Distantiam vero proportione et fine carentem sola illa vis potest transcendere quae nullam habet ad alias vires proportionem nec habet finem. Virtus huiusmodi solus est Deus. Omnia enim alia a Dei potentia exceduntur. Solus itaque Deus aliquid ex nihilo in esse producit.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.5

Ariston, then, was not man in the absolute but this particular man constituted in this particular matter. He did not generate humanity itself in the absolute; he generated this man, Plato, in matter of this kind. With respect to the nature of being, everything beneath God participates in being itself. It does not possess being simply, but some determinate kind of being within a definite essence and species. It follows that no thing subject to God produces being itself; it merely gives a particular mode of being to a particular matter. Its work therefore always requires a prior foundation. Moreover, whether art or nature acts, it brings something from a given potentiality into actuality. A sculptor makes an actual statue from a stone prepared in such a way as already to contain the statue in potentiality; a human generates a human from seed in whose power the human is present. The matter from which art and nature make something is at times highly obedient and well suited to the work, and at other times less suited. Thus its potentiality stands now nearer, now farther from the actuality of the work to be made. The potentiality of air is not far from the effect of fire, whereas the potentiality of water is far from it; it is therefore easy to kindle fire from air and difficult to kindle it from water. Hence the greater the interval between the potentiality from which an agent begins and the actuality to which it must bring its work, the more powerful that agent must be.

V.13.6

The distance between nothing and being is infinite: there is no proportion between nothing and being, and no greater distance can exist or even be conceived. Only a power that itself bears no proportion to other powers and has no limit can cross a distance lacking all proportion and limit. God alone is such a power, for every other power is surpassed by God’s. God alone, therefore, brings something from nothing into being.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.7

Praeterea res omnis praeter ipsum Deum creatura dicitur a theologis et ex quatuor quibusdam componitur necessario. Ideo Pythagorici non solum in corporibus, verum etiam in spiritibus quodammodo ponunt quatuor elementa, quia utraque constant ex essentia, esse, virtute et actione. Nempe aliud in eis essentia est, aliud esse. Est enim esse actus essentiae. Quod si praeter hunc actum non esset illic essentia cui talis actus haereret, esset actus purus et infinitus, quia non circumscriptus ab ullo. Hic autem solus est Deus. Rursus esse ipsum ab omni esset participatione alterius absolutum. Omne vero tale unicum est in natura. Soli igitur Deo convenit. Merito autem creatura non est ipsum esse suum, quia ipsa suus actus esse nequit, cum habeat in se potentiae passivae nonnihil immixtum, quia subest Deo; potentia vero opponitur actui.

V.13.8

Quoniam vero operatio differt ab essentia magis quam esse ipsum—prius enim est essentia quam operetur—ideo ubi est essentiae et ipsius esse distinctio multo magis est distincta operatio ab essentia.

V.13.9

Operatio quidem ita est virtutis essentialis actus sicut esse est actus essentiae. Quia vero creata essentia non est suus actus, ideo nec est operatio sua. Alioquin operatio talis esset per se subsistens, ab omni participantis limite penitus absoluta. Quod tale est, unicum diximus et infinitum existere. Sed numquid operatio differt ab esse sicut ab essentia differre monstratur?

V.13.10

Proculdubio. Duplex enim est operatio: una effluit extra operantem, ut calefactio; altera manet intus, ut cognitio et voluntas.

V.13.7-V.13.10 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.7

Moreover, theologians call every thing except God himself a creature, and every creature is necessarily composed of four elements of a certain kind. Hence the Pythagoreans posit, in a qualified sense, four elements not only in bodies but also in spirits, because both kinds of creature consist of essence, being, power, and action. In them essence is one thing and being another, for being is the actuality of essence. If there were no essence there besides this actuality—no essence in which such an actuality inhered—it would be pure and infinite actuality, circumscribed by nothing; but that is God alone. Again, being itself would then be wholly free from participation in anything else. Whatever is of that kind is unique in nature and therefore belongs to God alone. A creature, accordingly, is not its own being, because it cannot be its own actuality. Some passive potentiality is mingled in it, since it is subject to God, and potentiality is opposed to actuality.

V.13.8

Operation differs from essence even more than being itself does—for essence exists before it operates. Wherever essence is distinct from its being, therefore, operation is much more distinct from essence.

V.13.9

Operation is the actuality of an essential power just as being is the actuality of essence. Since a created essence is not its own actuality, neither is it its own operation. Otherwise such an operation would subsist in itself, wholly free from every limit imposed by what participates in it; and we have said that whatever is of this kind is unique and infinite. But does operation differ from being as it has been shown to differ from essence?

V.13.10

Without question. Operation is of two kinds: one flows outward beyond the agent, as heating does; the other remains within, as cognition and will do.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.11

Quae effluit sine controversia distat ab esse, quod a re ipsa non effluit. Quae manet ob id etiam discrepat, quia esse creaturae certa quadam rerum specie clauditur; operatio talis per genera multa vagatur, immo vero intelligentia ipsa atque voluptas per infinita. Illius enim obiectum est ipsum verum, huius ipsum bonum. Verum autem et bonum saltem tam late patent quam ipsum quod ens vocatur.

V.13.12

Operatio vero ab obiecto trahit speciem. Ergo operatio talis omnibus rerum omnium speciebus induitur. Sed num differt operatio a virtute, et virtus ab essentia atque esse? Certe. Primo enim, quia actus potentiae semper opponitur, operatio, quae est actus, a virtute discrepat et essentia, quae potentiae quaedam sunt; et virtus ab esse, quod est actus; et ab essentia, quia potentiae per suos actus distinguuntur, cum propria potentia proprium respiciat actum. Essentiae actus est esse; virtutis actus est operatio. Igitur tanto inter se distant essentia atque virtus quanto esse distat et operatio.

V.13.13

Quorsum haec tam multa? Ut intelligas operationem cuiuslibet creaturae virtuti haerere; virtutem et esse essentiae; ac nullam creaturam per substantiam proxime operari, sed per virtutem operatricem, quae est qualitas sive accidens, cum a substantia undique distinguatur. Quotiens ergo aliquid operatur, qualitates quasdam proxime generat et esse dat quale habet ipsa, id est inhaerens alteri semper. Talia vero praecedente indigent fundamento. Quae fundamento indigent ex nihilo non creantur. Ergo nulla creatura creat aliquid; nec iniuria. Operatio enim eius et virtus, quia haerent alteri, et quicquid haeret non restat liberum atque integrum, sed pro facultate suscipientis accipitur, subiecti sui limitibus finiuntur. Creatio vero operatricem virtutem exigit infinitam. Itaque anima a solo creatur Deo.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.11

The operation that flows outward plainly differs from being, since being does not flow out of the thing itself. The operation that remains within also differs from being for this reason: a creature's being is enclosed within one determinate species, whereas such an operation ranges across many genera—indeed, understanding itself and pleasure range across infinitely many things. For the object of the former is the true itself, and of the latter the good itself. The true and the good extend at least as widely as whatever is called being.

V.13.12

Operation takes its species from its object; such an operation therefore clothes itself in all the species of all things. But is operation distinct from power, and power from essence and being? Certainly. First, because actuality is always opposed to potentiality, operation, which is an actuality, differs from power and essence, which are potentialities of a kind. Power likewise differs from being, which is an actuality, and from essence, because potentialities are distinguished by their own actualities, each proper potentiality being directed toward its proper actuality. The actuality of essence is being; the actuality of power is operation. Essence and power are therefore as far apart as being and operation.

V.13.13

Why so much argument? So that you may understand that the operation of every creature inheres in its power, while its power and being inhere in its essence; and that no creature operates immediately through its substance, but through an operative power. Since that power is distinguished from substance at every point, it is a quality or accident. Whenever a creature acts, therefore, what it immediately produces are qualities; and it gives the kind of being it possesses itself, namely, a being that always inheres in another. Such things require a preexisting foundation, and whatever requires a foundation is not created from nothing. No creature, then, creates anything—and rightly so. Because a creature’s operation and power inhere in another, and because whatever inheres does not remain free and whole but is received according to the capacity of its recipient, they are bounded by the limits of their subject. Creation, however, requires an infinite operative power. The soul is therefore created by God alone.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.14

Sed forsitan putabit quispiam animam ita a Deo fieri ut per angelum tamquam medium efficiatur, atque Deus in ea creatione sit opifex, angelus instrumentum. Quae quidem opinio ideo videtur absurda, quoniam instrumentum hanc habet naturam ut ipsum ab alio motum moveat aliud, afficiat subiectum aliquod formamque principalis agentis traducat in subiectum per temporis intervallum. Creatio autem neque subiectum exigit neque fit motu vel tempore.

V.13.15

Rursus, si creationis opus virtutem requirit immensam, quid absurdius quam ad id exequendum virtutem ipsam, quae in Deo immensa est, prius in angelo, cuius natura terminata est, terminari—

V.13.16

Deinde opus illud quod ad immensam virtutem spectat peragere? Ex supradictis concluditur animam a Deo summo sine medio procreari. Cur non perfectione pares inter se sunt angelus atque anima, cum utraque a Deo absque medio pendeant? Quia sub alia idea et ratione Deus angelum producit, sub alia animam: illum sub altiori idea, istam sub inferiori; quemadmodum ab eodem pictore homo et equus picti non aeque sunt pulchri. Pulchrior enim hominis figura quam equi, quia pictor ad pulchrius suae mentis exemplar hominis picturam expressit quam equi.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.14

Someone may perhaps think that the soul is made by God in such a way that an angel serves as intermediary: God would be the craftsman in its creation and the angel his instrument. This opinion seems absurd because an instrument, by its nature, is moved by another and in turn moves something else; it acts upon an underlying subject and conveys the principal agent's form into that subject over an interval of time. Creation, however, requires no subject and takes place through neither motion nor time.

V.13.15

Again, if the work of creation requires immeasurable power, what could be more absurd than for that very power, immeasurable in God, first to be bounded in an angel whose nature is bounded—

V.13.16

—and then for it to accomplish a work that belongs to immeasurable power? From what has been said, we conclude that the soul is brought forth immediately by the supreme God. Why, then, are an angel and a soul not equal in perfection, since each depends upon God without an intermediary? Because God produces the angel under one Idea and intelligible plan and the soul under another: the angel under a higher Idea, the soul under a lower. In the same way, a man and a horse painted by the same artist are not equally beautiful. The human figure is more beautiful than the horse because the painter fashioned the human image according to a more beautiful exemplar in his mind.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.17

Sed finem iam sic rationi huic imponamus. Si animae essentia proxime a Deo fit, nihil inter eam et Deum ipsius conservatorem intercidit medium quod ipsam a conservante disiungat. Ac si solo Deo eget ut fiat, solo etiam eget ut maneat. Et quia Deus per eandem vim servat creata per quam creavit, ideo sicut ex infinita Dei bonitate anima ex nihilo ad esse processit, ita per eandem in esse permanet procul a nihilo, ut vita Deo proxima divinae vitae simillima sit. Quod ita demum erit, si anima aut principio et fine caruerit sicut Deus, aut, si habuerit principium, finem saltem nullum sit habitura.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.17

Let us now bring this argument to its close. If the soul's essence comes immediately from God, no intermediary falls between it and God its preserver to separate it from the one who preserves it. And if it needs God alone in order to come to be, it also needs God alone in order to remain. God preserves created things through the same power by which he created them. Therefore, just as the soul came forth from nothing into being through God's infinite goodness, through that same goodness it remains in being, far from nothing, so that a life nearest to God may be most like the divine life. This can be so only if the soul either lacks both beginning and end, as God does, or, having had a beginning, will at least have no end.

Caput 13, continuatur

V.13.18

Timaei Platonisque sententia est Deum mundi opificem per ideas, id est exemplares absolutasque rationes, sua opera procreare; proinde quicquid per talem aut talem proxime creatur ideam semper tale perseverare; quod vero deinceps, non necessario semper, sed aliquando tale. Oportere enim effectum proximum causae prodire simillimum, remotiorem vero minus similem, atque deinceps dissimiliorem semper evadere, adeo ut idea sit virtus et in se ipsa simul et sempiterna; virtus vero quae inde fit proxime non in se, immo in aliquo sit, sed semper; quae autem fit deinceps neque in se neque semper per naturam suam vel eadem vel similis perseveret. Cum igitur rationalis quidem anima per ideam vitae absque medio fiat, tali quadam proximae originis potestate forma est semper vivens. Irrationalis autem, cum inde per rationalem proficiscatur, secundum se aliquando vivens. Quod enim ab idea sola creatur actione, actione fit penitus stabili, stabilemque inde habet essentiam. Quod autem ab idea per animam quasi mediam nascitur, quoniam actione mutabili gignitur, mobilem secundum se inde naturam ducere cogitur. Secundum se, inquam, quia vitam ab anima aethereo impressam vehiculo, tamquam speculo sempiterno, existimant semper imprimentem animam comitari; impressam vero vitam composito corpori et caduco non semper. Nempe arbitrantur ab animae substantia semper vivente aethereum corpus sibi proximum perpetuo animari; elementale vero corpus ab ea per illud aliquando vitam accipere. Sed de his alias.

Chapter 13, continued

V.13.18

Timaeus and Plato teach that God, the maker of the world, brings forth his works through the Ideas—that is, through absolute exemplary principles. Whatever is created immediately through this or that Idea therefore remains forever what it is; what comes afterward is of that character not necessarily forever but only at times. The effect nearest its cause must issue from it in the closest likeness; a more remote effect is less like it, and each succeeding effect grows still more unlike. Thus an Idea is a power existing in itself, all at once and eternally. The power produced immediately from it does not exist in itself but in another, yet it exists forever; what is produced at the next remove neither exists in itself nor by its nature remains forever the same or like itself. Since the rational soul is made immediately through the Idea of life, by virtue of the power of that proximate origin it is a form that lives forever. The irrational soul, because it proceeds from that Idea through the rational soul, lives in itself only at times. What is created by the action of an Idea alone is created by an entirely stable action and so possesses a stable essence. What is born from an Idea through the soul as intermediary is generated by a mutable action and is therefore compelled to derive from it a nature mutable in itself. “In itself,” I say, because the Platonists hold that the life impressed by the soul upon its ethereal vehicle, as upon an everlasting mirror, always accompanies the soul that impresses it; the life impressed upon a composite and perishable body, however, does not always accompany the soul. They think that the ethereal body nearest the soul is perpetually animated by the soul’s ever-living substance, but that the elemental body receives life from the soul through the ethereal body only at certain times. We shall treat these matters elsewhere.

Caput 14

Quartadecima ratio: quia est per se vita.

V.14.1

Anima est essentia; est et vita. Superioribus rationibus ostendimus eam esse immortalem quia sit essentia per se existens; in praesentia vero eiusdem immortalitatem ostendimus quia sit vita per se vivens. Porro anima ex ipsa sui essentia vita est, quia totum quod est in ea est vita. Si quid enim esset in ea quod vita non esset, illud quidem non pars esset animae, et totum ipsum animatum quiddam potius quam anima diceretur. Fateamur igitur totam animae essentiam esse vitam. Si tota est vita, per se certe secundum formam vita dicenda est. Nam quod per aliud vivit, ipsum per se non vivens, ex duabus componitur partibus: ex natura, inquam, sui propria secundum se non viva, atque ex vita illa aliunde accepta. Ita conclude: si res illa quae per aliud vivit non tota vita est, sequitur ut res quae tota est vita per se vivat. Ergo anima, quae tota est vita, per se vivit, praesertim cum per se moveatur. Si ita est, per se est vita. Est igitur animae essentia vita. Cuius rei signum est quod cuicumque advenit praestat vitam, quasi per se sit hoc ipsum quod tribuit alteri. Unde, abeunte illa, desinit corpus vivere; ac, dum adest corpori, nullum momentum cessat vitae opera exercere corpus vivificando. Quare perennis animae actus vivificatio est. Perennis actio propria est rei actio. Propria igitur est animae actio vivificare. Vivificare autem vitae ipsius est proprium, sicut caloris est calefacere. Igitur essentia animae vita est.

V.14.2

Accipe rursus aliam coniecturam, quod parato corpore anima statim illud vivificat. Aut ergo suo esse dat vitam, aut appetitu, aut cognitione sive consilio. Si anima cognitione et consilio corpus vivificaret, scirent omnes quid quolibet momento gignat et alat in visceribus anima, qualisque sit interni operis dispositio; et nisi cognoscerent, ista non fierent. Sed numquid appetitu? Neque hoc quidem. Alioquin quamdiu vellet animus esse in corpore, tamdiu esset; et qui odit corporis consuetudinem a corpore confestim discederet. Restat ut ipso esse, id est naturali virtute, vivificet corpus. Si ipso esse vivificat, per suam essentiam est vita aut vivens, sicut quod ipso esse calefacit per essentiam suam virtutemve est calor aut calens. Conclude animae essentiam esse quandam vitam.

Chapter 14

Fourteenth argument: because it is life in itself.

V.14.1

The soul is an essence, and it is also life. By the preceding arguments we showed it to be immortal because it is an essence existing in its own right; now we show the same immortality because it is a life living in its own right. The soul is life by its very essence, because everything in it is life. If anything in it were not life, that thing would not be a part of the soul, and the whole would be called an animated thing rather than a soul. Let us therefore acknowledge that the soul's entire essence is life. If it is wholly life, it must in its formal nature be called life in its own right. Whatever lives through another and is not itself alive in its own right is composed of two parts: a proper nature not alive in itself, and life received from elsewhere. Conclude, then: if a thing that lives through another is not wholly life, a thing that is wholly life must live through itself. The soul, being wholly life, lives through itself—especially since it moves itself. If so, it is life in its own right. The soul's essence is therefore life. A sign of this is that, wherever it arrives, it bestows life, as though it were in itself the very thing it gives to another. When it departs, the body ceases to live; while it is present to the body, it never for one instant ceases to perform the works of life by giving the body life. Vivification is therefore the soul's perpetual activity. A perpetual activity is a thing's proper activity; the soul's proper activity is thus to give life. And giving life belongs properly to life itself, just as heating belongs to heat. The soul's essence, therefore, is life.

V.14.2

Consider another indication. As soon as a body is prepared, the soul gives it life. It must do so either by its being, by desire, or by cognition and deliberation. If the soul vivified the body through cognition and deliberation, everyone would know what the soul generates and nourishes in the organs at every moment and how its internal work is arranged; unless they knew these things, those processes would not occur. Does the soul act by desire? Not that either. Otherwise the mind would remain in the body as long as it wished, and anyone who hated association with the body would leave it at once. It remains that the soul vivifies the body by its very being—that is, by its natural power. If it gives life by its very being, then through its essence it is either life or a living thing, just as whatever heats by its very being is through its essence or power either heat or something hot. Conclude that the soul's essence is a kind of life.

Caput 14, continuatur

V.14.3

Quod si non libeat eam vocare vitam per se viventem, quemadmodum soles dicere calorem per se calentem, saltem per superiora cogeris confiteri animam esse substantiam propria vita vitalem, quemadmodum dicis ignem substantiam proprio calore calentem. Utrum horum acceperis minime curo. Utrinque enim sequitur idem quod quaerimus. Sed ego superioribus rationibus adducor ut animam per se vitam appelle, vitam, inquam, naturalem formamque vitalem. Vitae autem formaeque vitali contraria mors quodammodo dicitur, seu aliqua mortifera qualitas formae, sicut caliditati frigiditas, humiditati contraria est siccitas.

V.14.4

Ea vero est contrariarum natura formarum ut neque aliqua earum aliam capiat, ut calor non suscipit frigus, neque substantia cui una illarum formarum est propria etiam suscipiat aliam formam suae formae contrariam, ut ignis, cui calor est proprius, frigus non accipit ut simul sit et ignis et frigidus.

V.14.5

Sed abit potius aut perditur tam calor quam ignis frigore veniente quam aut calor aut ignis fiat frigidus. Est ergo uterque, ut ita loquar, infrigescibilis, cum frigoris particeps evadere nequeat. Similiter anima, quoniam aut vita ipsa naturalis est aut vitam habet tamquam naturalem sui pedisequam, mortem, ut dixi, ipsius contrariam non admittit. Si non admittit mortem, ita ferme immortalis est, sicut ignis, quia non suscipit frigus, infrigescibilis. Si idem foret infrigescibile quod imperdibile, ignis sicut non frigescit ita neque etiam perderetur. Nunc autem perditur potius quam frigescat. Verum, cum idem sit immortale quod imperdibile, anima, quae non admittendo mortem dicitur immortalis, est etiam imperdibilis.

V.14.6

Ideo abit veniente morte, non perditur. Tota superior disputatio his verbis Zoroastris comprehenditur: ἀθάνατός τε μένει καὶ ζωῆς δεσπότις ἐστί, id est, immortalis manet ac vitae domina est. Quasi dicat: ideo immortalis manet, quia vitam habet pedisequam, sicut sol lucem, crinita comam.

V.14.3-V.14.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 14, continued

V.14.3

If you are unwilling to call the soul a life that lives through itself, as you are accustomed to speak of heat that is hot through itself, the preceding arguments at least compel you to admit that the soul is a substance made vital by its own life, just as you call fire a substance made hot by its own heat. I care little which account you accept, since either yields what we seek. The foregoing arguments nevertheless lead me to call the soul life in its own right—natural life, I mean, and a life-giving form. Death, or some death-bearing formal quality, is in a certain sense called the contrary of life and of a life-giving form, just as cold is contrary to heat and dryness to moisture.

V.14.4

The nature of contrary forms is such that neither one receives the other—heat, for example, does not admit cold—nor does a substance to which one of them properly belongs receive the form contrary to its own. Fire, whose proper form is heat, does not admit cold while remaining at once both fire and cold.

V.14.5

Rather than heat or fire becoming cold when cold arrives, both the heat and the fire depart or perish. Each is therefore, so to speak, incapable of becoming cold, since neither can come to participate in cold. Likewise, because the soul is either natural life itself or possesses life as its natural attendant, it does not admit death, its contrary, as I have said. If it does not admit death, it is immortal in much the same way that fire, because it does not admit cold, is incapable of becoming cold. If being incapable of cold were the same as being incapable of destruction, fire would no more perish than become cold. In fact, it perishes rather than becoming cold. But since to be immortal is the same as to be imperishable, the soul, which is called immortal because it does not admit death, is also incapable of destruction.

V.14.6

Therefore, when death arrives, the soul departs; it does not perish. The whole preceding argument is contained in these words of Zoroaster: ‘It remains immortal and is mistress of life.’ It is as though he said that the soul remains immortal because life follows in its train, as light attends the sun and streaming hair attends a comet.

Caput 14, continuatur

V.14.7

Hic pugnabit sic Strato vel Epicureus aliquis: sane mortem non suscipit anima, quia veniente mortifera qualitate abit anima et desinit esse. Si esse desinit, suscipit certe nihil. At nos, o Epicuree, non ita desipimus ut ignoremus non posse mortem ab aliquo suscipi: tum quia ipsa nihil est—quod vero non est non capitur—tum quia neque viventes eam capiunt neque defuncti; illi, quia dum vivunt a morte absunt; isti, quia si non sunt, ut ipse putas, nihil suscipiunt, et si supersunt, ut nostri volunt, etiam absunt a morte. Desistamus ludere verbis. Audi quid velimus. Quando dicimus animam non suscipere mortem, intelligimus eam non admittere in se ipsa ullam mortiferam qualitatem per quam desinat vivere. Profecto contrariae qualitates se invicem non suscipiunt, nam se vicissim et fugant et fugiunt. Ideo calor natura sua non modo non suscipit frigus, sed neque loco etiam illi propinquat. Longissime namque sese fugant et fugiunt quae per naturam longissimo discrepant intervallo. Postquam natura sua hae formae tales sunt, si in mera sui et sola natura consisterent essentque ita ut modo sunt contrariae invicem, numquam sibi invicem propinquarent. Natura enim illas dissociaret, neque adesset medius aliquis illarum conciliator. Tales profecto forent, si calor ita in se ipso subsisteret a materia separatus ut nihil praeter calorem haberet admixtum, atque frigus similiter. Nunc iacet calor in materia, quae suapte natura non minus ad frigus parata quam ad calorem advenienti frigori sinum pandit suum; quam ingressa frigiditas calorem inde detrudit, qui inde depulsus extinguitur, cum ab auctore suo ea lege fuerit ad esse productus ut tamdiu maneret quamdiu a tali sinu materiae foveretur. Quapropter formae quae a materia sustinentur, licet formas sibi contrarias non suscipiant, illarum tamen impetu et propinquatione perduntur.

V.14.7 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 14, continued

V.14.7

At this point Strato, or some Epicurean, will object: ‘Certainly the soul does not receive death, because when a death-bearing quality arrives the soul departs and ceases to be. If it ceases to be, it surely receives nothing.’ But, Epicurean, we are not so foolish as to be unaware that death cannot be received by anything. Death is itself nothing, and what does not exist cannot be received; moreover, neither the living nor the dead receive it. The living do not, because while they live they are absent from death. The dead do not because, if they do not exist, as you suppose, they receive nothing; and if they survive, as our philosophers hold, they too are absent from death. Let us stop playing with words and hear what we mean. When we say that the soul does not receive death, we mean that it admits into itself no death-bearing quality by which it ceases to live. Contrary qualities certainly do not receive one another: each in turn drives the other away and flees from it. Heat, therefore, not only does not receive cold by its nature; it does not even draw near to it in place. Things separated by the greatest natural interval drive one another away and flee to the greatest distance. Since these forms are of this character by nature, if each subsisted in its own pure nature alone and remained opposed just as it now is, they would never come near one another. Their natures would keep them apart, and no mediator would be present to reconcile them. So it would be if heat subsisted in itself, separated from matter and mixed with nothing but heat, and likewise with cold. As things stand, heat lies in matter; and matter, no less prepared by its own nature for cold than for heat, opens its bosom to the approaching cold. Cold enters and drives heat out. Once expelled, the heat is extinguished, because its author brought it into being under the law that it should remain only so long as it was cherished in that bosom of matter. Thus forms sustained by matter do not receive forms contrary to themselves, yet they perish under the assault and approach of those contraries.

Caput 14, continuatur

V.14.8

Quae vero in se ipsis permanent et, si quando materiae haerere videntur, illam sustinent potius quam ab illa sustineantur, contrariam sibi vim non possunt admittere; verum si qua vis advenit materiae gremio, qualitates et formas inquinat astrictas materiae; formam vero illam quae materiam supereminet non attingit. Talis est anima, anima, inquam, rationalis, quae, cum fons motionis sit corporumque motrix, non potest a corporibus e suo statu mutari. Cumque speciei suae ingenitam habeat vitam utpote propriam, vivit semper absque labore vivendi, praecipue quamdiu secum ipsa vivit. Propinquans vero corpori irrationalem, ut Platonice loquar, ex se fundit vitam velut umbram. Ipsa quidem vera est anima animalisque vitae fons; talemque vitam non modo ad tempus suppeditat corpori, sed multo magis sibi ipsi semper, cum numquam deserat semet ipsam neque ad se deserendam compellatur a corpore, cuius qualitas in formam non transit incorporalem. Rursus neque ad idem cogatur ab animabus, quarum officium est vivificare, non perdere. Talis proculdubio rationalis anima iudicatur. Irrationalis autem non vera est anima, quia neque essentia vera est neque vera vita. Non vera essentia est, quia non existit per semet ipsam, siquidem per se non operatur, quandoquidem nihil agit absque corporis instrumentis. Non vera vita est, quoniam motionis libertate privatur. Non enim ducitur a se ipsa, sed vi trahitur ab iis rebus quae sensibus offeruntur. Ideo Platonici multi aiunt animam rationalem esse et animam et vitam subsistentem atque ex se corpus vivificantem; sed irrationalem formam potius, animationem vivificationemque corporis, esse putant; quam etiam esse immortalem Xenocrates, Speusippus, Numenius, Plotinus existimant; Porphyrius autem et Proculus et alii quamplurimi negant. Neque mirari debemus si animas alias veras, alias falsas esse multi Platonici arbitrantur. Rerum siquidem varietas decentibus nectitur intervallis.

Chapter 14, continued

V.14.8

Forms that remain in themselves, however, and only seem at times to inhere in matter, sustain matter rather than being sustained by it. They cannot admit a force contrary to themselves. If such a force enters matter's womb, it stains the qualities and forms bound to matter, but it does not touch the form that rises above matter. Such is the soul—the rational soul, I mean. Since it is the fountain of motion and the mover of bodies, bodies cannot dislodge it from its state. And because it possesses as its own a life inborn in its species, it lives forever without the labor of living, above all while it lives with itself. Yet as it approaches body, it pours from itself, to speak as a Platonist, an irrational life like a shadow. The rational soul itself is true soul and the fountain of animal life. It supplies such life not only to the body for a time but, far more, to itself forever, since it never deserts itself and cannot be compelled to do so by body, whose quality does not pass into incorporeal form. Nor can it be forced to this by other souls, whose office is to give life, not to destroy. Such, beyond doubt, is the rational soul. The irrational soul, by contrast, is not true soul, because it is neither true essence nor true life. It is not true essence because it does not exist through itself: it does not act through itself, since it does nothing without bodily instruments. It is not true life because it lacks freedom of motion; it is not led by itself but forcibly drawn by objects presented to the senses. Hence many Platonists say that the rational soul is both soul and subsistent life and gives life to the body from itself; but they regard the irrational soul rather as a form—the animation and vivification of the body. Xenocrates, Speusippus, Numenius, and Plotinus hold that this irrational soul too is immortal; Porphyry, Proclus, and very many others deny it. We should not be surprised that many Platonists call some souls true and others false, for the variety of things is joined together by fitting intervals.

Caput 14, continuatur

V.14.9

Deus verum bonum est. Angelus imago quidem est bonitatis, sed intellectus est verus. Rationalis anima imago intellectus, anima vera. Irrationalis anima imago animae, natura vera. Qualitas quae dividitur in materia naturae imago est, verum naturalium agentium instrumentum. Sed meminisse oportet eos qui animas nostras inferiores esse sempiternas existimant, etiam plantarum animas, secutos esse Aegyptios Pythagoreosque, existimantes animas humanas esse mentes delapsas in rationem atque sensum, animas vero brutorum esse nostras in sensum generationemque omnino prolapsas, plantarum denique animas esse easdem lapsas omnino in generandi potentiam, posseque omnes iterum ad superiora converti. Quod quidem Empedocles, Timaeus Locrus, Origenes, Plotinus significasse videntur. Sed haec ipsi viderint; nos autem propositum prosequamur.

Chapter 14, continued

V.14.9

God is the true good. An angel is an image of goodness, yet is true intellect. The rational soul is an image of intellect, yet true soul. The irrational soul is an image of soul, yet true nature. A quality divided through matter is an image of nature, yet a true instrument of natural agents. We must remember, however, that those who hold our lower souls—even the souls of plants—to be everlasting followed the Egyptians and Pythagoreans. They supposed that human souls are minds fallen into reason and sense; that the souls of beasts are our own souls fallen altogether into sensation and generation; and finally that the souls of plants are those same souls fallen wholly into the power of generation. All, they thought, can turn again toward higher things. Empedocles, Timaeus of Locri, Origen, and Plotinus appear to have intimated this. Let them answer for these views; we shall pursue our proposed course.

Caput 15

Quintadecima ratio: quia vita est praestantior corpore.

V.15.1

Rationalis anima vera naturalis vita est. Vera vita per se corporis est formatrix et rectrix, ideoque corpore est longe praestantior. Corpus, quamvis in varias vertatur qualitates aut etiam millies dividatur in partes, numquam tamen desinit esse corpus. Semper enim restat natura corporis divisibilis, cum dividantur partes in particulas sine fine. Ergo multo magis anima rationalis, quae vera est corporis vita, quantumcumque mutetur, numquam desinit esse vita.

V.15.2

Huius argumentationis vim in eo potissimum consistere arbitramur, quod tertia essentia, quae est sedes rationalium animarum, tres habet dotes ex eo quod omnium medium obtinet. Primam, quod in ea refulgent verae imagines divinorum. Secundam, quod ipsa format continetque totam machinam corporalem. Tertiam, quod divina et corporalia conciliat invicem.

V.15.3

Omnes hae dotes esse ostendunt animam sempiternam. Prima, quia, si in genere corporum aliqua sempiterna sunt in quibus umbrae sunt divinorum, multo magis animae rationales animarum omnium praestantissimae, in quibus sunt divinorum imagines, sempiternae sunt. Prior enim in divinis vita est quam splendor, quoniam splendor eorum est tum reflexio, tum effusio vitae.

Chapter 15

Fifteenth argument: because life is more excellent than body.

V.15.1

The rational soul is true natural life. True life in its own right forms and governs the body and is therefore far more excellent than the body. A body may be changed into various qualities or even divided into parts a thousand times, yet it never ceases to be body, for the divisible nature of body always remains as its parts are divided into ever smaller particles without end. Far more, then, does the rational soul—which is the body's true life—never cease to be life, however greatly it may be changed.

V.15.2

We judge the force of this argument to lie chiefly in the fact that the third essence, the dwelling place of rational souls, possesses three gifts because it occupies the middle of all things. First, true images of divine things shine within it. Second, it forms and contains the whole bodily fabric. Third, it reconciles divine and bodily things with one another.

V.15.3

All three gifts show the soul to be everlasting. The first does so because, if within the bodily order some things are everlasting in which there are shadows of divine things, then much more must rational souls be everlasting: they are the highest of all souls, and within them are images of divine things. For in the divine order life is prior to radiance, since that radiance is both the reflection and the outpouring of life.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.4

Quapropter inde prius manat in animam vitae immortalis ubertas quam divinarum splendor imaginum. Secunda, quia si rationalis anima principium est formandi et continendi, neque formam suam neque constantiam naturalem potest amittere. Nempe, cum totum animale genus sit toto genere corporali praestantius et in omnibus mundi membris sint aliqua corporalia sempiterna, probabile est ut in omnibus his sint animae sempiternae. Quis enim negaverit animarum genus caput habere perpetuum, in quo rationales animae sunt, postquam corporalis mundus membra quaedam habet ubique perpetua? Tertia, quia, si anima conciliationis universalis et vinculi fons est, distrahi et dissolvi non potest. Si enim universorum vinculum resolvatur, quid ulterius vincietur?

V.15.5

Platonica haec mysteria ita deinceps Aurelii Augustini sententia confirmabimus. Si anima rationalis interiret corpore pereunte, necessario mutaretur corpore permutato. Non mutatur autem a corpore. Ipsa enim motionis principium est. Ideo cum a corpore mutari videtur, tunc ipsa et corpus mutat et se ipsam ducit ut lubet. Si anima movet saepissime corpus immobilis perseverans, longe magis ex eo quod sistit continetque corpus se ipsam sistit et continet. Quod enim stat plurimum in movendo alio stare potest semper in sistendo se et continendo. Quis autem nesciat, quando corpus vel proprium vel alienum movetur ab animo, tam motionem ipsam quam rem motam non habere sua omnia simul, sed labi prorsus a futuro in praesens atque praeteritum; in animo autem tunc esse simul propositum operis totius immobile, intentionem praesentis operis, memoriam praeteriti, expectationemque futuri? Illic intentio animi circa ea quae non sunt est ipsa.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.4

Therefore the abundance of immortal life flows into the soul from that source before the radiance of divine images does. The second gift proves the same conclusion because, if the rational soul is the principle that forms and contains, it can lose neither its own form nor its natural constancy. The entire animal order is more excellent than the whole bodily order, and in every region of the world there are some everlasting bodies; it is therefore reasonable that in all those regions there should also be everlasting souls. Who would deny that the genus of souls has a perpetual head, where rational souls are found, when the bodily world everywhere possesses members that are perpetual? The third gift proves the conclusion because, if the soul is the fountain of universal reconciliation and union, it cannot be torn apart or dissolved. If the bond of all things were itself unbound, what would any longer be bound?

V.15.5

We shall now confirm these Platonic mysteries with a judgment of Aurelius Augustine. If the rational soul perished when the body perished, it would necessarily change whenever the body changed. But the body does not change the soul, for the soul itself is the principle of motion. Thus, when it appears to be changed by the body, it is then both changing the body and directing itself as it chooses. If the soul so often moves the body while itself remaining unmoved, then much more, in holding the body steady and containing it, does it hold and contain itself. What stands firm while moving another can always stand firm by establishing and containing itself. Everyone knows that when a mind moves either its own body or another, neither the motion itself nor the thing moved possesses all of itself at once; each slips entirely from future to present and into past. Yet in the mind there are simultaneously the unchanging purpose of the whole work, attention to the present task, memory of the past, and expectation of the future. There the mind’s attention is itself directed toward things that do not exist.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.6

Dum tam ea quae nondum sunt quam ea quae non sunt amplius ipsa connectit in unum. Circa temporalia est supra tempus; circa mobilia est immobilis. Cur ergo substantia eius circa mortalia non sit immortalis? Immo cur in perpetuis attingendis non fiat ipsa perpetua, quandoquidem in tractandis mobilibus manet immobilis? Praeterea, si non tam id quod in mole est corporis quam id quod est in specie facit esse corpus—corpus enim tanto magis est quanto speciosius est atque pulchrius, tantoque minus est quanto foedius atque deformius; quae defectio non praecisione molis, sed speciei privatione contingit—putandum est animum illum a quo tamquam principio datur corpori forma per quam est corpus et connexio partium per quam consistit numquam vel forma propria vel unione privari per quam est et permanet animus, quandoquidem corpus numquam omni forma et unione per quam est permanetque corpus orbatur; neque tamen transire de specie in speciem animam sicut corpus. Mutatio enim ab anima descendit in corpus, et stabilior est illa quam istud. Ergo, si hoc semper in genere corporali permanet, illa permanet semper in specie animali; neque in ipsa specie animali de alia in aliam animam commutabitur. Non enim subest materia per quam fiat huiusmodi commutatio. Si non accidit mutatio talis, neque animus esse nisi vivat potest; numquam profecto animus moritur.

V.15.7

Quod si quisquam non eum interitum dicat formidandum animo quo efficitur ut nihil sit quod aliquid est, sed eum quo dicimus ea mortua quae vita carent, attendat quod nulla res se ipsa caret. Est autem animus vita quaedam. Unde quod animatum est vivere; omne autem inanime quod animari potest mortuum, id est vita privatum, intelligitur. Non ergo potest animus mori.

V.15.6-V.15.7 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.6

Yet it unites into one both what does not yet exist and what no longer exists. In attending to temporal things it stands above time; in attending to moving things it remains unmoved. Why, then, should its substance not be immortal while it concerns itself with mortal things? Indeed, why should it not become perpetual as it reaches perpetual things, since it remains unmoved while handling things in motion? Moreover, what makes a body be body is not so much its bulk as its form. A body is body to a greater degree the more shapely and beautiful it is, and to a lesser degree the more ugly and deformed; that deficiency arises not because some bulk has been cut away but because form has been lost. We must therefore hold that the mind—the principle from which body receives the form through which it is body and the connection of parts through which it coheres—can never be deprived of its own form or of the unity through which it is and remains a mind, since a body is never deprived of every form and unity through which it is and remains a body. Yet the soul does not pass from species to species as body does, for change descends from the soul into the body, and the soul is more stable than body. Therefore, if body always remains within the bodily genus, the soul always remains within the species of soul. Nor within that species will it be changed from one soul into another, since no matter underlies it through which such a change could occur. If no such change occurs, and if the mind cannot exist without living, the mind certainly never dies.

V.15.7

Suppose someone says that the destruction the mind should fear is not the one by which something becomes nothing, but the one by which we call dead whatever lacks life. Let him observe that no thing can lack itself. The mind is a certain life. Hence what is ensouled is understood to live, while anything without soul that is capable of being ensouled is understood to be dead—that is, deprived of life. The mind, therefore, cannot die.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.8

Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus verus, sed animatum aut aliquod animi simulacrum est. Quod si absurdum est, multo minus hoc genus interitus timendum est animo, quod vitae certe non est timendum. Nam prorsus, si tunc moritur animus cum eum deserit vita, illa ipsa vita quae hunc deserit multo melius verus intelligitur animus, ut iam non sit animus quicquid a vita deseritur, sed ea ipsa vita quae deserit. Quicquid enim a vita desertum mortuum dicitur, id ab anima desertum intelligitur. Haec autem vita quae deserit ea quae moriuntur, quia ipse est animus et se ipsam non deserit, non moritur animus; nisi forte veram vitam, temperationem aliquam corporis aut aliquid eam sequens, ut Aristoxenus et Dicaearchus opinabantur, debemus credere.

V.15.9

Quibus profecto numquam hoc visum esset, si ea quae vere sunt et incommutabilia permanent eodem animo a corporum consuetudine alienato atque purgato videre valuissent. Quis enim bene se inspiciens non expertus est tanto se aliquid intellexisse sincerius quanto longius removere atque subducere intentionem mentis a corporis sensibus potuit? Quod si ad temperationem corporis animus pertineret, non utique id posset accidere. Non enim ea res quae naturam propriam non haberet neque per se subsisteret, sed in subiecto corpore tamquam corporalis forma inseparabiliter esset, ullo modo se ab eodem corpore ad intelligibilia percipienda conaretur avertere; et quantum id posset, tantum illa posset et intueri eaque visione melior et praestantior fieri.

V.15.10

Nullo quippe modo forma talis, vel ipsa etiam corporis temperatio quae certa commixtione efficitur earum quattuor naturarum quibus idem corpus consistit, avertere se ab eo potest in quo subiecto est inseparabiliter. Quin etiam, cum humorum consonantia accidens quoddam compositum sit, si anima vel consonantia esset vel ab ipsa dependens, nullo modo substantiarum rerumque simplicium rationes cognosceret, affectaret et caperet.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.8

For if it could lack life, it would not be the true mind but an ensouled thing or some image of mind. And if that is absurd, still less should the mind fear this kind of destruction, which life itself plainly has no reason to fear. If the mind dies precisely when life deserts it, then the life that deserts it is far more properly understood to be the true mind. Whatever life deserts would no longer be mind; mind would instead be the very life that departs. Whatever is called dead because life has left it is understood to have been left by soul. But the life that leaves dying things is itself the mind; and because it does not leave itself, the mind does not die—unless we are to believe, as Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus supposed, that true life is some bodily temperament or something consequent upon it.

V.15.9

They would never have held that opinion if, with the same mind estranged and purified from familiarity with bodies, they had been able to see the things that truly are and remain unchangeable. Who, on looking carefully within, has not found that the farther he could withdraw and lift the mind's attention away from the bodily senses, the more purely he understood something? If the mind belonged to the body's temperament, this could never occur. A thing possessing no nature of its own and not subsisting through itself, but existing inseparably in the body as in a subject and as a bodily form, could not in any way strive to turn away from that same body in order to perceive intelligible things. Nor could its power to contemplate those things, and through that vision become better and more excellent, increase in the very measure of its withdrawal.

V.15.10

A form of this kind—or even the body's temperament itself, produced by a determinate mixture of the four natures from which the body is constituted—cannot possibly turn away from the subject in which it exists inseparably. Moreover, since the harmony of the humors is a composite accident, if the soul were either that harmony or something dependent upon it, it could in no way know, desire, and grasp the intelligible principles of substances and simple things.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.11

Ad haec ea quae intelligit animus, cum se averterit a corpore, non sunt profecto corporea, et tamen sunt maxime quae sunt.

V.15.12

Nam eodem modo sese semper habent. Nihilque absurdius dici potest quam ea esse quae oculis videmus, ea non esse quae intelligentia cernimus, cum dubitare dementis sit intelligentiam incomparabiliter oculis anteferri. Haec autem quae intelliguntur, eodem modo sese habentia, cum ea intuetur animus absque aliquo instrumento, satis ostendit se illis esse coniunctum miro quodam eoque incomparabili modo, scilicet non secundum locum. Nam aut in illo sunt, aut ipse in illis, aut utrumque per se subsistit. Si primum illud est, non est harmonia corporis animus aut harmoniae mancipatus.

V.15.13

Quicquid enim tale est a corpore tamquam subiecto separari non potest; proptereaque quicquid in illo est corpori aeque atque illud astringitur. Mutabile autem est corpus humanum. Mutabiles igitur erunt rationes illae rerum quae sunt in animo contemplante, si animus mutabili corpori alligatur. Mutabiles autem esse rationes illae non possunt.

V.15.14

Semper enim eodem modo verum est quod duo et quattuor sex conficiunt, quodque quae comparatio est duorum ad quattuor eadem quattuor est ad octo, ceteraque generis huius quamplurima. Rationes huiusmodi inseparabiliter insunt animo, qui semper et subito his utitur pro arbitrio.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.11

Furthermore, the things the mind understands when it turns away from the body are certainly not corporeal; nevertheless, they are supremely real.

V.15.12

For they remain always in the same state. Nothing could be more absurd than to say that the things we see with our eyes exist while the things we discern by intelligence do not, since only a madman could doubt that intelligence is incomparably superior to sight. When the mind beholds without any instrument these intelligible things, which remain always the same, it shows clearly that it is joined to them in a wondrous and incomparable manner—not, of course, by place. Either they are in the mind, the mind is in them, or each subsists in its own right. If the first is true, the mind is neither a harmony of the body nor enslaved to such a harmony.

V.15.13

Whatever is of that kind cannot be separated from the body as its subject; consequently, everything in it is bound to the body just as it is. The human body is mutable. Therefore, if the contemplating mind were tied to a mutable body, the intelligible principles of things present in that mind would also be mutable. But those principles cannot be mutable.

V.15.14

It is always true in the same way that two and four make six, and that the relation of two to four is the same as the relation of four to eight; and there are very many other truths of this kind. Principles such as these are inseparably present in the mind, which can always employ them at once and at will.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.15

In quibus ars consistit ratiocinandi, quae ab animo rationali minime separatur. Nam si ab eo ratio illa artificiosa vel ars rationalis, quae rationum coetus est, separabitur, aut nusquam erit, aut in re aliqua non vivente, aut in re vivente. Nusquam esse non est dicendum perpetuas et immutabiles rationes. Esse quoque in re non vivente rationes veras impossibile est, siquidem vita rationis est fundamentum. Si autem artificiosa ratio de vita transit in vitam, numquam id facit commodius quam cum docet quis alios. Cum vero id non contingat—nemo enim docendo alios obliviscitur—non fit transitus.

V.15.16

Ars igitur inseparabiliter inest animo. Inesset quoque corpori, si animus esset corporis harmonia. Quapropter mutabilis esset sicut corpus tam ratio ipsa quam animus. Cum vero ratio talis sit immutabilis, ideoque et animi essentia immutabilis, cui illa tamquam subiecto inest, non est animus corporis temperatio.

V.15.17

Atque ita disputasse sufficiat ex primo illo divisionis superioris membro, quo concessum sit animo rationes inesse. Praeterea, si quis secundum illud membrum admiserit, scilicet illis inesse animum, sequitur idem. Quo enim pacto animus est corporis temperatio, si in ratione rerum a corpore separata est tamquam subiecto, cum non possit esse alibi quam in corpore corporis temperatio? Si tertium divisionis illius membrum concesseris, scilicet utrumque substantiam per se subsistentem esse, tam animum quam ipsam rationem rerum, per se subsistet animus, neque temperationi corporis astringetur.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.15

In these principles consists the art of reasoning, which is in no way separable from the rational mind. If this structured reason, or rational art—the ordered gathering of intelligible principles—were separated from the mind, it would have to exist nowhere, in something not alive, or in something alive. We cannot say that perpetual and immutable principles exist nowhere. Nor can true principles exist in a lifeless thing, since life is the foundation of reason. If structured reason passes from one living thing into another, it can do so in no more fitting way than when someone teaches others. Yet no such transfer takes place, for no one forgets a truth by teaching it to others. Therefore reason does not pass from one life into another.

V.15.16

The art of reasoning is therefore inseparably present in the mind. It would also be present in the body if the mind were a harmony of the body. In that case both reason and mind would be mutable like the body. But since reason of this kind is immutable, the essence of the mind in which it inheres as in a subject is likewise immutable. The mind is therefore not a temperament of the body.

V.15.17

Let this suffice as an argument from the first member of the foregoing division, which grants that intelligible principles are present in the mind. The same conclusion follows if someone accepts the second member, namely, that the mind is present in those principles. How could the mind be a bodily temperament if it exists as in a subject within a principle of things that is separate from body, when a bodily temperament can exist nowhere but in a body? If you grant the third member of the division—that both the mind and the intelligible principle of things are substances subsisting in their own right—then the mind will subsist in its own right and will not be bound to a bodily temperament.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.18

Denique quodcumque membrum divisionis acceperis, una haec summopere ratio persuadet animum in complexione corporis tamquam origine non iacere, quia non tam avide, tam facile, tam assidue, dum philosophamur, mutabili posthabito corpore, immutabilibus rationibus sese misceret, neque melius esset cum est in illis quam cum est in corpore. Est autem in illis tanto melius quam in corpore quanto praestantius vivit in illis quam in ipso. Tanto autem vivit praestantius quanto perfectius operatur. Operatur vero in illis perfectius quia intelligit verius, desiderat pacatius, fruitur dulcius, plenius atque securius. Et cum saepe consonante secum corpore animus ipse dissonet secum tum speculatione tum moribus, atque contra consonet dissonante, qui non viderit animum non consistere in corporis consonantia, is dissonat veritati.

V.15.19

Sed ut revertamur ad Aurelium: hic forte oboritur nonnulla quaestio. Utrum, sicut non interit animus, ita nec in deteriorem commutetur essentiam. Videri enim cuipiam potest, neque iniuria, id effectum esse ratione hac ut animus ad nihilum pervenire non possit.

V.15.20

Converti autem in corpus forsitan possit. Si enim quod erat ante animus corpus fuerit effectum, non utique omnino non erit. Sed hoc fieri non potest nisi aut ipse id velit aut ab alio cogatur. Neque continuo tamen animus, sive ipse id appetierit sive coactus fuerit, poterit corpus esse. Illud enim sequitur ut, si sit, necessario velit aut cogatur. At illud non sequitur ut, si velit aut cogatur, sit. Numquam autem volet. Nam omnis eius appetitus ad corpus aut ut id possideat est, aut ut vivificet, aut ut quodammodo fabricet, aut quolibet pacto ei consulat. Nihil autem horum fieri potest si non sit corpore ipse melior. At si erit corpus, melior corpore profecto non erit.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.18

Finally, whichever member of the division you accept, this one consideration above all persuades us that the mind does not lie in the body's composition as in its source. Otherwise, when we philosophize and leave the mutable body behind, the mind would not mingle so eagerly, readily, and continually with immutable principles, nor would it be better when present in them than when present in the body. It is better in those principles than in the body to the extent that it lives in them more excellently; it lives more excellently to the extent that it operates more perfectly; and it operates more perfectly there because it understands more truly, desires more peacefully, and enjoys more sweetly, fully, and securely. Moreover, the body is often in harmony with itself while the mind is at variance with itself in both contemplation and conduct; and conversely, the mind may be in harmony while the body is discordant. Anyone who fails to see from this that the mind does not consist in bodily harmony is himself out of harmony with truth.

V.15.19

But let us return to Aurelius. A question may arise here: just as the mind does not perish, is it also incapable of being changed into an inferior essence? Someone might reasonably think that the present argument has established that the mind cannot come to nothing.

V.15.20

Perhaps, however, it might be converted into a body. If what was formerly mind became body, it would not altogether cease to be. Yet this could occur only if the mind either willed it itself or were compelled by another. Even then it does not immediately follow that, merely because it desired or was forced to become body, it could do so. If it did become body, it would necessarily have willed or been forced; but the converse does not follow—that if it willed or were forced, it would become body. In fact, it will never will this. Every desire it has concerning body is directed toward possessing a body, giving it life, shaping it in some manner, or caring for it in some other way. None of these acts is possible unless the mind is superior to body. But if it became body, it certainly would not be superior to body.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.21

Non igitur esse corpus volet; neque ullum huius rei certius argumentum est quam cum se ipsum hoc interrogat animus. Ita enim facile comperit appetitum se non habere nisi agendi aliquid aut sciendi aut sentiendi aut vel tantummodo vivendi, quantum sua illi potestas est. Si autem cogitur corpus esse, a quo tandem cogitur? Num a quolibet? Certe a potentiore. Non igitur a corpore potest. Nullo enim modo ullo animo ullum potentius corpus. Potentior autem animus non cogit in aliquid nisi quod suae potestati subditum est; nec ullo modo animus potestati alterius animi nisi suis cupiditatibus subditur. Cogit ergo ille animus non magis quam quantum eius cupiditates sinunt quem cogit. Dictum est autem cupiditatem non posse animum habere ut corpus sit. Illud etiam manifestum est, ad nullam suae cupiditatis expletionem pervenire dum amittit omnem cupiditatem; et amittit dum corpus fit. Non ergo potest ab eo cogi ut fiat, qui potestatem cogendi nisi per subditas cupiditates non habet.

V.15.22

Deinde quisquis animus alterum animum habet in potestate magis eum necesse est velit in potestate habere quam corpus, et ei vel bonitate consulere vel malitia imperare. Non ergo volet ut corpus sit. Postremo iste animus cogens aut animal est aut caret corpore. Sed si caret corpore, in hoc mundo non est; sed si ita est, summe bonus est, nec potest velle alteri tam turpem commutationem. Si autem animal est, aut animal etiam est ille quem cogit aut non est. Sed si non est, nihil cogi ab alio potest. Non enim habet potentiorem qui in summo est, id est non cogitur qui est solutus. Si autem in corpore est, ab eo rursus qui in corpore est per corpus cogitur ad quodcumque cogitur. Quis autem dubitet nullo modo per corpus fieri tantam commutationem animo? Fieret enim si esset illo corpus potentius. Quamvis quicquid illud est ad quod per corpus cogitur prorsus non per corpus sed per cupiditates suas cogitur, de quibus satis est dictum. Quod autem rationali anima melius est, omnibus consentientibus divinum est, quod profecto consulit animae, et ideo non ab eo cogi anima potest ut convertatur in corpus. Si igitur nec propria voluntate nec alio cogente id anima patitur, unde id pati potest?

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.21

The mind will therefore never will to be body, and there is no surer proof of this than the mind's asking itself the question. It then readily discovers that every desire it has is for acting, knowing, sensing, or at the very least living, insofar as these lie within its power. If it is instead compelled to be body, by whom is it compelled? By just anyone? Surely only by something more powerful. It cannot be compelled by body, for no body is in any way more powerful than any mind. But a more powerful mind compels another only in matters subject to its power; and one mind is subject to the power of another only through its own desires. The compelling mind therefore has power only to the extent that the desires of the mind it compels permit. Yet we have said that the mind can have no desire to become body. It is also plain that it reaches the fulfillment of none of its desires by losing every desire, which it would do on becoming body. Therefore it cannot be forced to become body by another mind, whose power to compel extends only through the desires subjected to it.

V.15.22

Next, any mind that has another mind in its power must wish to possess it as mind rather than as body, whether it cares for it through goodness or rules it through malice. It will therefore not wish the other to become body. Finally, the compelling mind either is an embodied living being or is without body. If it is without body, it is not in this world; and if so, it is supremely good and cannot wish so degrading a transformation upon another. If it is embodied, then the mind it compels is either embodied too or is not. If the other is not embodied, nothing can compel it, for what stands at the summit has nothing more powerful than itself: what is free is not compelled. But if it is in a body, then whatever compulsion it suffers from another embodied mind is exercised through body. Who can doubt that no body could work so great a transformation upon a mind? It could do so only if body were more powerful than mind. In fact, whatever an embodied mind seems to compel another to do through body, it compels not through body at all but through the other mind's own desires, of which enough has been said. By universal agreement, whatever is superior to the rational soul is divine; and the divine assuredly cares for the soul, so it cannot compel the soul to be converted into body. If the soul undergoes this change neither by its own will nor under another's compulsion, from what source could it undergo it?

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.23

An quia invitos nos plerumque opprimit somnus, metuendum est ne quo tali defectu animus convertatur in corpus? Quasi vero, quoniam somno membra nostra marcescunt, idcirco animus fiat ex parte ulla debilior. Sensibilia tamen non sentit, quia quicquid illud est quod somnum facit e corpore est atque in corpore operatur. Corporeos enim sensus sopit et claudit quodammodo, ita tamen ut tali commutationi corporis cedat anima cum voluntate, quia secundum naturam est talis commutatio quae reficit corpus a laboribus.

V.15.24

Non tamen haec adimit animo vel sentiendi vim vel intelligendi. Nam et imagines sensibilium praesto habet tanta expressione similitudinis ut eo ipso tempore discerni nequeant ab iis rebus quarum imagines sunt. Et si quid intelligit, aeque dormienti ac vigilanti verum est. Nam, verbi gratia, si per somnum disputare sibi visus fuerit verasque rationes secutus in disputando didicerit aliquid, etiam expergefacto eadem incommutabilia manent, quamvis falsa reperiantur cetera, veluti locus ubi disputatio et persona cum qua disputatio fuisse visa erat et verba ipsa quae ad somnum attinent quibus disputari videbatur et alia huiuscemodi quae ipsis sensibus sentiuntur agunturque a vigilantibus; praetereunt tamen, nec ulla ex parte sempiternam praesentiam verarum rationum assequuntur. Ex quo colligitur tali commutatione corporis quae somnus est non vim ipsius animae sed vitam corporis posse minui.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.23

Because sleep often overcomes us against our will, must we fear that some comparable failure could convert the mind into body? That would be as though, because our limbs grow slack in sleep, the mind itself became weaker in some part. It does not, to be sure, perceive sensible things while asleep, because whatever causes sleep comes from the body and operates in the body. It lulls and in a sense closes the bodily senses. Yet the soul yields willingly to this bodily change, since the change accords with nature and restores the body after its labors.

V.15.24

Sleep does not, however, take from the mind either its power of sensing or its power of understanding. It has images of sensible things immediately present with so vivid a likeness that at the time they cannot be distinguished from the things whose images they are. And whatever it understands is no less true for the sleeper than for one awake. Suppose, for example, that someone dreams he is conducting an argument and, by following true principles, learns something in the course of it. On waking, those same immutable truths remain, although everything else proves false: the place where the argument seemed to occur, the person with whom it seemed to be conducted, the very words belonging to the dream through which the argument seemed to proceed, and other things of this sort. Such things are perceived by the senses and enacted by waking people, yet they pass away and in no respect attain the everlasting presence of true principles. From this we conclude that the bodily change called sleep can diminish not the power of the soul itself but only the life of the body.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.25

Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, summis illis aeternisque rationibus quae incommutabiliter manent nec utique continentur loco prior afficitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior quanto propinquior, et eadem causa tanto etiam magis quanto corpore est melior; nec ista propinquitas loco sed naturae ordine dicta sit. Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit et eo ipso est quo animatur, sive universaliter ut mundus sive particulariter ut unumquodque animal intra mundum. Quapropter consequens erat ut anima per animam corpus fieret, nec omnino aliter posset. Quod quia non fit—manente quippe anima in eo quod anima est, corpus per illam subsistit, dantem speciem, non adimentem—commutari in corpus anima non potest.

V.15.26

Si enim non tradit speciem quam sumit a summo bono, non per illam fit corpus; et si non per illam fit, aut non fit omnino, aut tam propinque speciem sumit quam anima. Nec etiam fit corpus, quia si tam propinque sumeret speciem idem esset quod anima. Nonne eo ipso est anima melior quo sumit propinquius? Tam propinque autem etiam corpus sumeret si non per animam sumeret; etenim nullo interposito tam propinque utique sumeret. Nec invenitur aliquid congruens medium inter summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est incommutabilis, et id quod ultimum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima. Quod si tradit speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus quantum est, non utique speciem tradendo adimit; adimit autem speciem in corpus animam transmutando. Non igitur anima sive per se ipsam corpus fit quod per eam fit—quia non nisi manente anima corpus per eam fit—sive per alia, quia non nisi traditione speciei fit corpus per animam, et ademptione speciei anima in corpus converteretur si converteretur.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.25

Finally, although body occupies place, the soul is not joined to body spatially. The soul is affected before the body by those supreme and eternal principles which remain unchangeable and are not contained in place—and it is affected by them not only earlier but more deeply. It is prior in proportion as it is nearer to them, and for the same reason it is affected more deeply in proportion as it is better than body. This nearness must be understood not spatially but according to the order of nature. In that order, supreme essence is understood to bestow upon body, through soul, the form by which body is whatever it is. Body therefore subsists through soul and is what it is precisely insofar as it is ensouled, whether universally as the world or particularly as each living being within the world. It would therefore follow that, if soul became body, soul would have to become body through soul; there is no other way it could do so. But this does not happen. Body subsists through soul only while soul remains what it is, giving form rather than taking it away; hence soul cannot be changed into body.

V.15.26

If soul does not transmit the form it receives from the highest good, body does not come to be through it. And if body does not come to be through soul, either it does not come to be at all or it receives form as immediately as soul does. Yet then it would not be body, because if it received form so immediately it would be the same as soul. Is not soul better precisely because it receives from a nearer source? Body too would receive form equally near the source if it did not receive it through soul, for with no intermediary it would necessarily receive it just as immediately. No fitting mean can be found between the supreme life—which is wisdom and immutable truth—and the last thing to be vivified, namely body, except the soul that gives life. If soul gives form to body so that body may be whatever it is, soul does not take form away by giving it; but it would take form away by transmuting soul into body. Therefore soul does not become body, either through itself—that is, become what comes to be through it, since body comes to be through soul only while soul remains soul—or through other agents, because body comes to be through soul only by the transmission of form, whereas soul, if it were converted into body, would be converted by the removal of form.

Caput 15, continuatur

V.15.27

Hoc et de irrationali anima vel vita, quod nec in eam rationalis anima convertitur, dici potest. Et ipsa enim, nisi inferiori ordine rationali subiceretur, aeque speciem sumeret et talis esset. Tradunt ergo speciem a summa pulchritudine acceptam potentiora infirmioribus naturali ordine. Et utique, cum tradunt, non adimunt; eoque sunt quae infirmiora sunt, quantum sunt, quod species qua sunt eis a potentioribus traditur, quae quidem potentiora etiam meliora sunt. Quod his naturis datum est, quae non mole maiore plus possunt minoribus molibus, sed sine tumore ullo localis magnitudinis eadem specie potentiora sunt qua meliora. In quo genere est anima corpore melior et potentior. Quapropter, cum per illam, ut dictum est, corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus converti nullo modo potest. Corpus enim nullum fit nisi accipiendo per animam speciem. At anima, ut corpus fieret, non accipiendo speciem sed amittendo fieri posset. Et ideo fieri nullo modo potest.

Chapter 15, continued

V.15.27

The same can be said of irrational soul or life: rational soul is not converted into it either. Unless irrational life were subject to rational soul at a lower level, it would receive form equally and would be of the same order. More powerful natures therefore transmit to weaker ones, in the natural order, the form they have received from supreme beauty. In transmitting it they do not lose it. The weaker things are whatever they are because the form through which they are is given them by more powerful natures, and the more powerful are also better. This belongs to natures whose greater power over smaller bodies does not depend on greater bulk, but which, without any swelling of local magnitude, are more powerful through the same form by which they are better. Soul belongs to this order: it is better and more powerful than body. Since body subsists through it, as has been said, soul can in no way be converted into body. No body comes to be except by receiving form through soul. But if soul were to become body, it could do so not by receiving form but only by losing it. Therefore it cannot become body in any way.

LIBER VI

Book VI

Sextus liber tractat de anima per rationes proprias, quod sit indivisibilis quantum ad partem vegetativam.

The sixth book treats the soul through arguments proper to it, showing that it is indivisible with respect to the vegetative part.

Caput 1

Reductio opinionum de anima in quinque capita.

VI.1.1

Haec olim in agro Regnano apud Ioannem Cavalcantem, unicum amicum nostrum, Kalendis Martiis sub lauro disputaveram. Quibus disserendis interfuerunt praecipui familiares nostri tres: Christophorus Landinus, Bernardus Nuthius, Georgius Antonius Vespuccius, viri probitate et doctrina clarissimi. His autem Ioannes summa cum attentione auditis, ‘Marsili Ficini,’ inquit, ‘dici non posset quantum superiori disputatione fuerim delectatus. Sed hoc insuper cupio: ut, postquam de communi animarum rationalium immortalitate disseruisti, deinceps, si placet, diligentius de animae nostrae immortalitate propriis rationibus disseras. Assentior equidem quinque esse rerum gradus, quemadmodum superiori disputatione disposuisti, atque horum medium obtinere tertiam illam essentiam, quae a materia soluta sit ac perpetua. Praeterea caelestes animas in illius essentiae gradu collocari non dubito. Opinor etiam probabile esse ut ibidem noster animus collocetur. Arbitror tamen non prius id posse penitus affirmari quam omnes opiniones philosophorum de hominis anima ad quinque capita reducantur et, quattuor confutatis, ultima teneatur.’

VI.1.2

Aut enim anima corpusculum aliquod est tenuissimum, corpori huic crassiori suffusum. Sive igneum id sit, ut Democritus, Leucippus et Hipparchus existimant; sive aereum, ut Anaximenes, Diogenes Apolloniates et Critias; sive aqueum, ut Hippias; sive terreum, ut Hesiodus et Pronopides; sive ex igne constet et aere, ut Boethus et Epicurus; sive ex aqua et terra, ut Xenophantes.

VI.1.3

Aut melius aliquid est anima, id est, non moles ipsa corpusculi proprie, sed qualitas illius aliqua per partes corpusculi sparsa, puta calor vel complexio calida. Quod voluisse videntur Zeno Cittieus, Cleantes, Antipater, Posidonius.

VI.1.1-VI.1.3 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1

The views concerning the soul are reduced to five principal positions.

VI.1.1

Once, on the Kalends of March, I debated these matters beneath a laurel tree in the country near Regnano, at the home of Giovanni Cavalcanti, my one and only friend. Three of our closest associates took part in the discussion: Cristoforo Landino, Bernardo Nuzzi, and Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, men distinguished for integrity and learning. Giovanni listened to them with the greatest attention and then said: 'Marsilio Ficino, it would be impossible to say how greatly I delighted in your preceding disputation. But I desire this as well. Now that you have discussed the immortality common to rational souls, I should like you, if you please, to examine the immortality of our own soul more carefully by arguments proper to it. I fully agree that there are five grades of things, as you set out in the preceding disputation, and that the middle one is occupied by that third essence which is free from matter and everlasting. Nor do I doubt that the celestial souls are placed within the grade of that essence. I also think it probable that our soul belongs there. Yet I do not believe this can be firmly affirmed until every philosophical opinion concerning the human soul has been reduced to five principal positions and, after the first four have been refuted, the last has been upheld.'

VI.1.2

Either the soul is some exceedingly subtle little body diffused throughout this coarser body. It may be fiery, as Democritus, Leucippus, and Hipparchus hold; airy, as Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Critias maintain; watery, as Hippias believes; earthy, as Hesiod and Pronopides teach; composed of fire and air, as Boethus and Epicurus suppose; or composed of water and earth, as Xenophantes holds.

VI.1.3

Or the soul is something better: not, strictly speaking, the bulk of that little body itself, but some quality of it spread throughout its parts—heat, for example, or a warm constitution. This appears to have been the view of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Antipater, and Posidonius.

Caput 1, continuatur

VI.1.4

Aut purius aliquid, veluti punctum aliquod lucidum qualitatis illius in quadam ipsius qualitatis et corpusculi parte potiori, puta corde vel cerebro, assignatum, ibi residens, inde reliqua membra gubernans; ut est apud Chrysippum, Archelaum et Heraclidem Ponticum.

VI.1.5

Aut liberius adhuc quiddam, ceu punctum aliquod nulli parti affixum, sed ab omni determinato situ seclusum ac totum parti corporis cuique praesens; sed tale, ut sit ab ipsa corporis natura dependens. Dependens, inquam, duobus modis, scilicet vel quia corporis complexio ipsum genuerit; vel quia, licet complexio ipsum non genuerit, tamen genitor suus, quicumque sit ille, ipsum ex materiae potentia eiusque visceribus eduxerit, id est, ex aliquo semine sive incohatione seu proportione materiae ipsius in lucem eruerit, atque ipsi materiae tamquam naturali gremio prorsus addixerit. Quam sententiam Xenophanes Colophonius, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus, Critolausque sequuntur, apud quos anima est vel vis quaedam corporis agilis ad movendum, vel partium corporalium harmonia.

VI.1.4-VI.1.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1, continued

VI.1.4

Or it is something purer: a kind of luminous point belonging to that quality, fixed in some nobler part of the quality and its little body—say, the heart or the brain—residing there and governing the remaining members from that seat. Such is the position found in Chrysippus, Archelaus, and Heraclides of Pontus.

VI.1.5

Or it is something freer still: a kind of point attached to no part, excluded from every determinate place, yet wholly present to each part of the body. Even so, it depends upon the body's own nature. I say that it may depend in either of two ways: the body's constitution may have generated it; or, although that constitution did not generate it, its producer, whoever he may be, may have drawn it from the potency and very entrails of matter—that is, brought it into the light from some seed, beginning, or proportion of matter itself—and bound it entirely to matter as to its natural womb. This position is followed by Xenophanes of Colophon, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus, and Critolaus. For them the soul is either an active power of the body for producing motion, or a harmony of bodily parts.

Caput 1, continuatur

VI.1.6

Aut postremo divinum quiddam est hominis anima, id est, aliquid individuum, totum cuique parti corporis adstans, et ab incorporeo auctore ita productum, ut ex agentis virtute solummodo, non ex materiae incohatione aut capacitate aut fomento dependeat; sicut nos docent prisci theologi Zoroaster, Mercurius, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Plato, quorum vestigia sequitur plurimum physicus Aristoteles. Praeter has quinque opiniones aliae nullae inveniuntur. Tu vero tunc demum immortalitatem ad nos pertinere monstraveris, quando, reprobatis quattuor superioribus opinionibus, approbaveris ultimam. Sic enim constabit animam nostram in tertiae essentiae ordine collocari. Id vero non mihi solum videtur, sed etiam, cum superioribus diebus apud Bernardum Bembum tuum, clarissimum equitem atque hoc tempore Veneti senatus oratorem, convivio discumberemus, meministi, ut arbitror, idem Antonio Chronico Veneto ac Demetrio Attico, disputatoribus argutissimis, visum fuisse; mox etiam a Richardo Angellerio Anglariensi et ab Oliverio Arduino Florentino, insignibus Peripateticis, similiter esse conclusum, ubi affuerunt tres amici, Naldus Naldius, Bartholomaeus Fontius, Ioannes Baptista Bonisegnius, viri doctissimi. Eandem esse sententiam nostri Petri Leonis Spoletini, qui Platonica Peripateticis praeclarissime iunxit. Haec ille. His ego ita respondi.

Chapter 1, continued

VI.1.6

Or lastly, the human soul is something divine: an indivisible reality, present as a whole to every part of the body, and produced by an incorporeal author in such a way that it depends solely upon the power of the agent, not upon any beginning, capacity, or tinder within matter. So the ancient theologians teach us—Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato—whose footsteps Aristotle the natural philosopher follows for the most part. Beyond these five positions no others are to be found. Only when you have rejected the preceding four and approved the last will you have shown that immortality belongs to us. For then it will be established that our soul is placed in the order of the third essence. Nor does this seem so to me alone. You will remember, I think, that some days ago, when we reclined at dinner in the home of your Bernardo Bembo, a distinguished knight and at present an orator of the Venetian senate, the same conclusion commended itself to Antonio Cronico of Venice and Demetrius of Attica, two exceedingly acute disputants. It was soon afterward reached in the same way by Richard Angellerius of Anghiari and Oliviero Arduino of Florence, eminent Peripatetics, in the presence of three learned friends: Naldo Naldi, Bartolomeo Fonzio, and Giovanni Battista Boninsegni. It is also the judgment of our Pier Leone of Spoleto, who has most brilliantly joined Platonic teachings to Peripatetic ones.' Thus Giovanni spoke, and I answered him as follows.

Caput 2

Plebei philosophi non ratione aliqua persuasi, sed prava decepti consuetudine corporalem animam posuerunt.

VI.2.1

Principio plebeos philosophos, qui corporalem esse animam arbitrantes opinionem ex illis quattuor aliquam secuti sunt, non ratione aliqua persuasos, sed longa quadam et infelicissima consuetudine in hanc sententiam compulsos existimo. Tria potissimum animae nostrae officia esse videntur. Siquidem agit in corpore, agit per corpus, operatur etiam per se ipsam. In corpore agit per eam potentiam quam vegetatricem vocant Peripatetici, Platonici vero nostri naturam, quando generat corpus, nutritque et auget. Per corpus agit secundum sensum tum exteriorem, quando videt, audit, olfacit, gustat et tangit; tum interiorem, quando eorum corporum quae sensit extrinsecus imagines, quasi reliquias sensuum, secum ipsa revolvit. Per se ipsam agit quando neque corpora per sensus exteriores attingit neque imagines corporum per interiorem sensum recolligit, sed ipsa mera vis animae incorporeaque incorporeum aliquid investigat et invenit, quod neque corpus sit neque corporis alicuius imago. Quam quidem actionem intelligentiam nominamus. Habes igitur actionem naturalem, sensum, intelligentiam. Actione naturali utitur anima in ipso fetu, statim corpus ingressa; sensu paulo post, homine videlicet statim nato; intelligentia pura vix tandem adulto iam corpore. Magna vero pars hominum fere numquam, illi praesertim qui etiam trigesimo aetatis anno sunt pueri.

VI.2.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2

Philosophers of the common sort, persuaded by no argument but misled by corrupt habit, held that the soul was corporeal.

VI.2.1

To begin, I believe that the common philosophers who judged the soul to be corporeal and adopted one of the first four positions were persuaded by no argument. A long and most unhappy habit drove them to this opinion. The soul appears to have three principal offices: it acts within the body, it acts through the body, and it also operates through itself. It acts within the body by the power which the Peripatetics call vegetative and our Platonists call nature, when it generates the body, nourishes it, and makes it grow. It acts through the body by outward sense when it sees, hears, smells, tastes, and touches, and by inward sense when it turns over within itself the images of bodies perceived outside, like vestiges left by the senses. It acts through itself when it neither reaches bodies by the outward senses nor gathers bodily images by the inward sense, but, as the soul's bare and incorporeal power, investigates and discovers something incorporeal, which is neither a body nor an image of any body. We call this activity understanding. Thus you have natural activity, sensation, and understanding. The soul employs natural activity in the fetus as soon as it has entered the body; sensation a little later, as soon as the human being is born; and pure understanding scarcely even when the body has at last become adult. Indeed, a great part of humanity scarcely ever employs it, especially those who are still children in their thirtieth year.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.2

Si potentiam illam naturalem quid anima sit interroges, corpus esse procul dubio respondebit. Ea siquidem vis nihil attingit aliud nisi corpus. Si sensum exteriorem rogaveris, corpus similiter respondebit. Oculi figuram quandam et colorem animae ascribent; aures vocem; olfactus odorem; saporem gustus; pondus soliditatemque et calorem et similia tactus. Quod si sensum interiorem, qui reliquiis externorum sensuum pascitur, de anima fueris percontatus, ipse quoque animam corporum pinget simulachris. Nihil enim habet aliud quod adhibeat. Infelix adolescentia nostra sub indoctis praeceptoribus his nutrita cogit nos per omnem aetatem stulte sentire de anima, dum eam opinamur esse corpoream, ab his docti magistris qui sola sentiunt corporalia. Maxime vero hic error inde videtur exortus, immo vero potius confirmatus: quod, si quando tribus his praeceptoribus tamquam sophistis omnino dimissis ad mentem illam sapientiae magistram confugimus et ab ea quid sit anima sciscitamur, illa talem esse respondet qualem et ipsa videt. Illa vero, heu, qualem videt! Quam foedam! Quam miserabilem! Profecto non talem qualis olim caelo descenderat, sed potentiam illam animae naturalem, corporis fabricatricem, cernit quattuor humorum, in quibus ipsa mergitur, tabe pollutam et membrorum pinguedine suffocatam. Sensus quoque externos inspicit undique declinantes ad corpora, agentes per corpus, a corporibus quodammodo patientes. Sensum etiam interiorem, quem nominant phantasiam, variis diversorum corporum figuris et qualitatibus quasi per sensus haustis cernit opertum. Dum igitur animam corporali veste aspicit involutam et appetitum eius proclivem esse ad corpora animadvertit, certe respondet eam esse corpoream, non aliter ac si puer aliquis statim natus luto oblitus ita fuisset, ut undique per omnem pueritiam lutea testa esset obductus, ac postea rogaretur: ‘Quale tuum est, o puer, corpusculum?’ Nonne esse luteum responderet? Ablue, puer, corpus; absterge carnes a glebis. Carneum te videbis, non luteum.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.2

If you ask the natural power what the soul is, it will answer without hesitation that the soul is a body, for that power touches nothing but body. If you ask outward sense, it will give the same answer. The eyes will ascribe a shape and color to the soul; the ears a voice; smell an odor; taste a flavor; and touch weight, solidity, heat, and qualities of that kind. If you question inward sense, which feeds upon the vestiges left by the outward senses, it too will paint the soul with images of bodies, for it has nothing else at hand. Our unhappy youth, nourished under these ignorant teachers, compels us to think foolishly about the soul throughout our lives. We suppose it corporeal because we learned from masters who perceive only corporeal things. This error seems especially to have arisen—or rather, to have been confirmed—in another way. If we ever dismiss these three teachers altogether as sophists and take refuge in the mind, that mistress of wisdom, asking it what the soul is, it answers that the soul is such as the mind itself sees it. But alas, what does the mind see? How foul a soul, how pitiable! Certainly not the soul as it was when it descended from heaven. The mind sees the soul's natural power, the fashioner of the body, stained by the corruption of the four humors in which it is submerged and smothered by the fat of the members. It sees the outward senses bending everywhere toward bodies, acting through the body and in some fashion being acted upon by bodies. It sees also the inward sense they call imagination, covered with the forms and qualities of diverse bodies, as though these had been drawn in through the senses. Thus, when the mind beholds the soul wrapped in a bodily garment and observes its appetite inclining toward bodies, it naturally answers that the soul is corporeal. It is just as if a boy had been smeared with mud at birth and encased on every side in an earthen crust throughout his childhood. If someone later asked him, ‘What is your little body like, child?’ would he not answer that it was made of clay? Wash the body, child; clear the clods from your flesh. You will see that you are flesh, not clay.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.3

Dimittite sensus, o miseri, impios nimium praeceptores. Piam dumtaxat mentem interrogate, eo tamen pacto ut animam illi puram, qualem accepistis, non corpori mancipatam, non vitiorum maculis sordidam ostendatis. Mens protinus respondebit non incorporalem esse animam solummodo, sed divinam. Magnum quiddam es, o anima, si te parva non implent. Optimum quoque, si displicent tibi mala. Pulcherrimum, si horres turpia. Sempiternum, si temporalia parvipendis. Postquam talis es, si invenire te cupis, quaere, obsecro, ibi te ipsam ubi sunt talia. Magna vero ibi sunt solum ubi nullum locus imponit limite finem; optima, ubi nihil contingit adversi; pulcherrima, ubi nihil est dissonum; sempiterna, ubi defectus est nullus. Quaere te igitur extra mundum. Verum ut quaeras te et invenias, extra vola; immo extra respice. Es enim extra, dum mundum ipsa complecteris. Sed esse te putas in infimo loco mundi, quia te ipsam quidem non cernis super aethera pervolantem, sed umbram tuam, corpus, vides in infimo.

VI.2.4

Perinde ac si puer aliquis super puteum constitutus esse se in fundo putei arbitretur, dum in se ipsum aciem non converterit, sed suam in fundo prospicit umbram.

VI.2.5

Aut si avis in aere volans credat se in terra volare, dum umbram suam videt in terra.

VI.2.3-VI.2.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.3

Dismiss the senses, unhappy souls, for they are impious teachers. Question only the pious mind—but on this condition: show it the soul pure, as you received it, neither enslaved to the body nor soiled with the stains of vice. The mind will answer at once that the soul is not merely incorporeal but divine. You are something great, O soul, if small things do not fill you; something of the highest good, if evils displease you; something most beautiful, if you shudder at ugliness; something everlasting, if you esteem temporal things but little. Since you are such a thing, if you desire to find yourself, seek yourself, I beg you, where such things dwell. Great things are found only where place sets no boundary as their limit; the best, where nothing adverse can befall them; the most beautiful, where there is no discord; the everlasting, where there is no defect. Seek yourself, then, beyond the world. To seek and find yourself, fly beyond it—or rather, look beyond it. You are already beyond, since you yourself embrace the world. Yet you think yourself lodged in the lowest place of the world, because you do not see yourself flying above the heavens; you see only your shadow, the body, in the depths below.

VI.2.4

It is as though a boy standing above a well were to imagine himself at the bottom because he did not turn his gaze upon himself, but looked instead at his shadow deep below.

VI.2.5

Or it is as though a bird flying in the air were to believe that it flew upon the ground because it saw its shadow there.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.6

Ergo, relictis umbrae huius angustiis, revertere in te ipsam. Sic enim reverteris in amplum. Immensam esse scito in spiritu amplitudinem, in corpore vero infinitam, ut ita loquar, angustiam. Quod ex hoc licet perspicere: quod numeri, qui spiritali naturae propinquant, cum et situ careant et metiantur numerentque secundum formam tam incorporea quam corporea, nihil aliud sint quam quaedam unitatis ipsius replicationes; unitas autem sit incorporea, quia omne corporale sit multiplex. Numeri, inquam, qui spiritales sunt, sine fine crescunt, non tamen sine fine decrescunt. Magnitudo contra terminum quidem habet augmenti, quamvis non habeat terminum decrementi.

VI.2.7

Cur tanti facitis sensuum iudicium, infelices, qui falsis imaginibus ita decipiuntur, ut visus solem, qui terra longe est amplior, vix bicubitum iudicet; caelum, quod rapidissime currit, quiescere; rectum in aqua remum fractum videat et obliquum; currere litus, dum navis ipsa movetur? Auditus vocem aliunde quam mittatur saepe venire significet; gustus saepenumero quae dulcia sunt amara, et infinita generis eiusdem. Sensuum errata quis corrigit? Ratio. Nobilius autem est quod emendat et perficit quam quod perficitur. Idcirco diligentior et veracior ratio est quam sensus.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.6

Leave behind the confinement of this shadow, then, and return into yourself. In doing so you return to open space. Know that in spirit there is immeasurable breadth, but in body an infinite narrowness, if I may speak so. This can be seen from number. Numbers approach spiritual nature: they have no position, yet according to form they measure and number both incorporeal and corporeal things. They are nothing other than repetitions of unity itself; and unity is incorporeal, because everything corporeal is multiple. Numbers, I say, are spiritual: they increase without end, but do not decrease without end. Magnitude, by contrast, has a limit to its increase, though no limit to its decrease.

VI.2.7

Why, unhappy souls, do you set so great a value on the judgment of the senses, when false images deceive them so thoroughly? Sight judges the sun, which is far larger than the earth, to be scarcely two cubits wide; it judges the swiftly revolving heavens to stand still; it sees a straight oar in water as bent and crooked, and the shore as running while the ship itself moves. Hearing often reports that a voice comes from somewhere other than its source. Taste repeatedly calls sweet things bitter, and commits countless errors of the same kind. Who corrects the errors of the senses? Reason. What amends and perfects is nobler than what is perfected. Reason is therefore more discerning and more truthful than sense.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.8

Ratio iudicat inveniri posse aliquid incorporeum semperque circa huiusmodi quiddam ipsa versatur. Est ergo verum per iudicium rationis esse alicubi aliquid incorporeum, sicut verum est per iudicium sensuum esse multa in mundo corporea. Horum tamen iudicium in eo fallitur quod nihil affirmat aliud nisi corpus. Sic etiam falleretur iudicium rationis, si forte asseveraret non esse in rebus aliquid corporale. Nunc vero tantum abest a falso ut etiam fallaciam sensus emendet. Sentiendi autem vires usque adeo fallaces sunt ut non modo emendentur a ratione, verum etiam a se invicem ipsae damnentur. Si visui te soli committas, nihil in mundo esse aliud dices quam quae videntur in lumine; voces autem et odores et reliqua quae non videntur omnino non esse. Si auribus solis confidas, colores esse negabis. Si olfactui, solos esse in mundo putabis odores. Atque ita de aliis est putandum. Sicut autem quisque sensuum negat esse alicubi aliud quicquam praeter id quod est suum, et tamen per alium sensum damnamus alium et esse aliquid aliud invenimus praeter id quod unius sensus est proprium, et recte invenimus; ita cuncti sensus una conspirantes negant esse posse aliquid in natura quod non sit corpus. Nihilominus ratio cunctos redarguens esse etiam aliquid incorporale vaticinatur; et vere vaticinatur, et multo verius quam sensus, qui et a se invicem damnantur et redarguuntur ab illa.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.8

Reason judges that something incorporeal can be found, and it is always engaged with some such reality. It is therefore true by the judgment of reason that something incorporeal exists, just as it is true by the judgment of the senses that many corporeal things exist in the world. Yet the senses err when they affirm that nothing exists except body. Reason would likewise err if it asserted that nothing corporeal exists among things. But reason is so far from falsehood that it even corrects the deceptions of sense. The powers of sensation are so fallible that they are not only corrected by reason, but condemned by one another. If you entrust yourself to sight alone, you will say that nothing exists in the world except what is visible in the light, and that voices, odors, and all the other things that cannot be seen do not exist at all. If you trust only your ears, you will deny that colors exist. If you trust smell, you will suppose that nothing exists in the world but odors. The same must be understood of the other senses. Each sense denies that anything exists beyond its own proper object; yet by one sense we condemn another and rightly discover that something exists beyond what belongs to any single sense. In the same way all the senses conspire together to deny that anything can exist in nature which is not body. Reason nevertheless refutes them all and prophesies that something incorporeal also exists. Its prophecy is true—far truer than the senses, which condemn one another and are themselves refuted by reason.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.9

Quid enim stultius est quam concedere nos bestiis ratione praestare atque ea quae sensu percipimus existere aliquid confiteri, quae etiam nonnullae bestiae acutius sentiunt; id autem quod rationis oculo intuemur nihil esse contendere? Nullum enim animal esset insipientius homine, si ea vis animi quae hominis propria est magis quam sensus, qui communis est bestiis, falleretur. Nefas est autem animalium regem dicere omnium dementissimum. Dementissimus autem is erit solus qui non fatebitur tanto praestantius esse mentis obiectum sensus obiecto quanto mens est sensu praestantior, ac propterea incorporeas naturas in excellentiore substantiae genere revera inveniri quam corporea. Praesertim quia, si obiecta mentis eam movent, sicut obiecta sensus movent sensum, oportet ea ipsa mentis obiecta aliquam per se habere substantiam, ut mentem movere queant. Sin autem dicatur intellectum a suis obiectis minime agitari, iam satis probatum erit saltem intellectum ipsum esse naturam incorpoream, postquam, dum fabricat sua, non movetur ab alio et aedificia fabricat incorporea. Meminisse vero oportet quemadmodum puer qui natus est caecus difficile credit colorum varietatem lucemque esse, cum tamen ceteris hominibus nihil sit luce clarius; sic animum nuper tenebris corporis circumfusum vix adduci ut existimet lucem aliquam incorporalem existere, cum tamen nihil sit illa in rerum ordine angelis manifestius. Hoc Plato in septimo De republica longe conqueritur; hoc Aristoteles in secundo Divinorum confirmat, dicens humanum intellectum ad ea quae sunt per se in ordine rerum manifestissima non aliter se habere quam ad solis lucem noctuae oculum.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.9

What could be more foolish than to concede that reason makes us superior to the beasts, to acknowledge that the things perceived by sense possess reality—although some beasts perceive them more keenly than we do—and yet to contend that what we behold with the eye of reason is nothing? No animal would be less wise than man if the power of the soul proper to man were more deceptive than sense, which he shares with beasts. It is an outrage to call the king of animals the most insane of them all. Yet the truly insane man is the one who will not admit that the object of mind is as far superior to the object of sense as mind is superior to sense, and therefore that incorporeal natures are truly found within a more excellent order of substance than corporeal things. For if the objects of mind move it as sensible objects move sense, those intellectual objects must possess some substance in their own right if they are to move the mind. But if the intellect is said not to be affected by its objects, then at least the intellect itself has already been sufficiently shown to be an incorporeal nature, since, while fashioning its own works, it is not moved by another and fashions incorporeal structures. We should remember that a child born blind finds it difficult to believe in the variety of colors or the existence of light, although nothing is clearer than light to everyone else. In the same way, a soul only lately enveloped in the darkness of the body can scarcely be brought to believe that an incorporeal light exists, although to the angels nothing in the order of things is more manifest. Plato laments this at length in the seventh book of the Republic, and Aristotle confirms it in the second book of the Divine Philosophy, saying that the human intellect stands toward things which are in themselves most manifest in the order of reality just as an owl's eye stands toward the light of the sun.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.10

Respiscant igitur quandoque minuti philosophi, qui sensuum iudicio freti incorporealem divinamque esse animam cogitare non possunt. Animadvertant aliquando ex diuturna cum corpore consuetudine se factos esse usque adeo corporales ut merito nihil noverint nisi corpus aut rem corpore natam. Purificentur, et pura percipient. Experiantur aliquando in se ipsis. Possunt enim, modo velint, quod iam diu in universo desiderant. Percipiunt certe composita; percipiunt et formas plurimas in compositis. Formas insuper desiderant aliquas extra composita segregatas. Ipsi ex anima et corpore compositi sunt. Habent vitam ab anima corpori traditam; habent et vitam animae ipsius in se ipsa vigentem. Illam ergo despiciant, hanc aspiciant. Vitam intellectualem agant a corpore separatam. Separati statim separatas formas attingent, Socraticamque mox sententiam re ipsa probabunt: super formas quae in subiectis formatis iacent, quoniam imperfectae sunt, esse formas in se ipsis atque perfectas, unde informia subiecta formentur. Atque unicam ad incorporea non attingenda solum, sed etiam possidenda viam esse se ipsum videlicet incorporeum reddere, hoc est mentem a motu, sensu, affectu, imaginatione corporali pro viribus sevocare. Sic enim experientia ipsa constabit, primo quidem qualis sit purus animus, id est ratio secum ipsa vivens seque circa ipsum veritatis lumen avide versans; secundo qualis angelus, id est intellectus purus, infuso iam veritatis lumine gaudens; tertio, quando animus ipse tamquam angelus pleno veritatis gaudebit lumine, Deum esse persentiet, tum veritatem ipsam se ipsa lucentem atque gaudentem.

VI.2.11

Tum ipsam lucem veritate gaudentem propria; tum ipsum gaudium veritate propria lucens.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.10

Let those narrow philosophers at last come to their senses. Relying on the judgment of the senses, they cannot conceive that the soul is incorporeal and divine. Let them at last observe that long familiarity with the body has made them so corporeal that no wonder they know nothing except body or a thing born from body. Let them be purified, and they will perceive pure things. Let them make trial within themselves. If only they are willing, they can find there what they have long sought in the universe. They certainly perceive composites and many forms within composites; moreover, they desire forms separated from composites. They themselves are composed of soul and body. They possess a life imparted by the soul to the body, and also the life of the soul itself, vigorous within itself. Let them look down upon the former and turn their gaze to the latter. Let them lead the intellectual life apart from the body. Once separated, they will at once reach separated forms and confirm in experience the Socratic teaching: beyond the forms that lie in formed subjects, which are imperfect, there are forms existing in themselves and perfect, from which formless subjects are formed. They will also confirm that the one path not merely to touching but to possessing incorporeal realities is to render oneself incorporeal—that is, as far as possible to withdraw the mind from motion, sensation, affection, and bodily imagination. Experience itself will then show, first, what the pure soul is like: reason living with itself and eagerly turning about the very light of truth; second, what an angel is like: pure intellect rejoicing in the light of truth already poured into it; and third, when the soul itself rejoices like an angel in the full light of truth, it will perceive that God exists, and then behold truth itself shining and rejoicing through itself.

VI.2.11

Then it will behold light itself rejoicing in its own truth, and joy itself shining with its own truth.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.12

Esse vero plebeiorum errorem a corporea consuetudine natum nosse incipiemus aliquantum, si saltem contrariam illius educationem aliquam cogitemus, qualem in sexto Naturalium excogitat Avicenna. Creetur a Deo homo aliquis subito, inquit Avicenna, in aetate perfecta constitutus, sed ita dispositus ut nihil per aliquem quinque sensuum apprehendat. Sic affecti hominis mens aliquid cogitabit, cum sit in aetate adulta, in qua corporis fabrica intelligentiam non perturbat, neque sit ad opera sensuum occupatus, quae mentis operationem impediunt. Ac etiam adsit aliquid quod possit intelligi. Adest enim ipsa animae substantia menti. Mens igitur a nullo turbata praesentem sibi animae substantiam cogitabit. At qualem cogitabit? Num coloratam, longam aut amplam? Minime. Caecus enim similia non apprehendit. Num sonantem vel bene olentem atque similia? Neque ista quidem. Nondum enim talia quaedam per sensus accepit, ut possit talem naturam animae assignare. Igitur nihil poterit corporale anima illa sibi tribuere. Quid tandem de se ipsa asseverabit? Profecto id saltem quod sibi primo offeretur intuitu. Est autem hoc ipsius essentia. Quapropter affirmabit esse se ipsam, neque tamen corporale quicquam in se ipsa perspiciet. Itaque affirmabit esse se prorsus incorporalem.

VI.2.12 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.12

We shall begin to understand that the error of the common people is born from bodily habit if we imagine at least some education contrary to theirs, such as Avicenna devises in the sixth book of his Natural Philosophy. ‘Let a human being,’ Avicenna says, ‘be created by God in an instant, already at the perfection of adulthood, but so disposed that he apprehends nothing through any of the five senses.’ The mind of a person so constituted will think of something, for he is an adult, at an age when the structure of the body does not disturb understanding, and he is not occupied with the operations of the senses that impede the operation of mind. Let there also be something present that can be understood. The very substance of the soul is present to the mind. The mind, disturbed by nothing, will therefore contemplate the soul's substance present to it. But what will it take that substance to be? Colored, long, or broad? Certainly not, for a blind person apprehends no such things. Sounding, sweet-smelling, or the like? Not these either, for it has not yet received anything of that kind through the senses from which it could assign such a nature to the soul. Thus that soul will be able to attribute nothing corporeal to itself. What, then, will it affirm of itself? At least what first presents itself to intuition—its own essence. It will therefore affirm that it exists, but will discern nothing corporeal within itself. And so it will affirm that it is wholly incorporeal.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.13

Neque fingere quidem poterit esse se corpus, sicut plebis animae nunc aliter creatae atque educatae nequeunt se ipsas incorporales considerare. Quod si quis dixerit animam illam nihil de se ipsa affirmare horum corporum quae per quinque sensus accipimus, sed aliud quoddam corpus diversae naturae: vanum hoc nimium. Nam si ne nunc quidem, cum tot varia corpora perceperimus, possumus novi aliquid machinari quod non vel in his insit vel ex his saltem aut componatur aut eliciatur, quomodo in eo statu horum corporum ignarus posset animus novi corporis naturam effingere? Ac etiam si possibile esset eam aliquod sui corporis membrum excogitare, illud nullo modo putaret ad propriam substantiam pertinere. Affirmabit igitur animus ille de se ipso esse; tamen corporeum aliquid non affirmabit. Diversa vero inter se sunt duo haec, id quod affirmatur et id quod minime affirmatur. Igitur essentia animi in ea consideratione erit aliquid praeter corpus. Iudicium vero considerationis illius ideo verum fore putamus, quia meram prorsus naturam animae sequeretur, non imagines acceptas extrinsecus. Esset ergo iudicium naturale admodum, ideoque verissimum. Itaque si deinde expergiscatur, ut nos nunc, et sentiat, non erit, ut nos, ad inquisitionem spiritalium ineptissimus, sed viam aliquam habebit commodiorem, per quam ita quandoque ad sui ipsius considerationem se comparet, ut pronuntiet se esse aliquid praeter corpus. Qua quidem via carent nunc animae miserae, quae per naturam et sensus corpora tum propria tum aliena prius attigerunt quam se ipsas considerarent. Unde miserabilis ille profectus est error, ut nequeant se ipsas seorsum a labe corporis pervidere.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.13

Nor could it imagine that it was a body, just as the souls of the multitude, created and educated otherwise as they now are, cannot consider themselves incorporeal. If anyone should say that this soul would deny that it was any of the bodies we receive through the five senses, but would affirm that it was some other body of a different nature, this is utterly empty. Even now, after perceiving so many different bodies, we cannot devise anything new which is not either present in them or at least composed or derived from them. How, then, in that condition could the mind, ignorant of these bodies, fashion the nature of a new kind of body? And even if it were possible for the soul to imagine some member of its own body, it would in no way think that member belonged to its proper substance. That mind will therefore affirm that it exists, yet it will affirm nothing corporeal of itself. What is affirmed and what is not affirmed are two different things. In that contemplation, therefore, the essence of the soul will be something besides body. We think the judgment reached in that contemplation will be true because it would follow the soul's wholly unadulterated nature, not images received from without. It would thus be a thoroughly natural judgment, and for that reason utterly true. If afterward it should awaken, as we are now awake, and begin to sense, it will not, as we are, be entirely unfit for investigating spiritual things. Rather, it will possess an easier path by which it may sometimes prepare itself for self-contemplation and pronounce that it is something besides body. Miserable souls now lack this path, because through nature and the senses they encountered both their own and other bodies before they considered themselves. From this came that pitiable error which leaves them unable to see themselves apart from the stain of body.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.14

Hactenus educationem fictam ab Avicenna narravisse sufficiat. Deinceps qualem Plato noster educationem in septimo De republica libro describit breviter perstringamus. Finge, inquit, quandam sub terra speluncam. In ea homines nutritos a pueritia, ita cervicem et manus a tergo pedesque columnis quibusdam alligatos, ut neque moveri usquam neque alia nisi quae e conspectu imposita speluncae parte apparent aspicere possint. Post tergum vero superne lampas accensa sit; atque inter lampadem et illos qui ligati sunt alii multi deambulent loquanturque invicem, ferentes manibus varia arborum animaliumque simulachra. Qui igitur ita vincti sunt numquam revera vel se ipsos vel alia eorum quae narravimus ulla videbunt, sed solas vel sui umbras vel aliorum, quae propter ignem a tergo accensum tantum ante suos oculos in adversam partem speluncae resultant. Quam ob rem nihil aliud aut se esse quam sui umbras, aut alia aliud esse quam umbras illorum existimabunt; aut lumen ipsum esse aliud quam exiguum illud quod ibi reflexum apparet opinabuntur.

VI.2.14 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.14

So much will suffice for recounting the imagined education devised by Avicenna. Let us next sketch briefly the kind of education our Plato describes in the seventh book of the Republic. ‘Imagine,’ he says, ‘a cave beneath the earth. Imagine people raised there from childhood, with their necks and hands bound behind them and their feet fastened to pillars, so that they can neither move anywhere nor look at anything except what appears before them on the facing wall of the cave. Behind them, high above, let a lamp burn; and between the lamp and those who are bound let many other people walk about and speak with one another, carrying in their hands various images of trees and animals. Those bound in this way will never in reality see either themselves or any of the other things we have described. They will see only their own shadows or those of the others, cast before their eyes upon the opposite wall of the cave by the fire burning behind them. Consequently they will believe that they themselves are nothing other than their own shadows, and that other things are nothing other than the shadows of those objects; or they will suppose that light itself is nothing other than that faint reflection which appears there.’

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.15

Si quis autem horum qui vincti sunt forte solvatur, subitoque lampadem et alia sub illa quae sequuntur a tergo retro versus intueri cogatur, caligabit protinus et dolebit; ac propter splendorem intueri non poterit illa quorum umbras paulo ante cernebat. Multoque id magis illi mali continget si a spelunca sursum ad caeleste diurnumque lumen repente trahatur. Quare non subito, sed paulatim convenientibus gradibus, ab umbris rerum ad res ipsas, item a luminis imagine ad lumen ipsum est perducendus, ita ut quae in spelunca sunt apud illos prius illic in aqua videat quam ibidem in se ipsis inspiciat. Rursus quae extra speluncam apud nos sunt, primo nocte hic ad lunam in aqua similiter, deinde in se ipsis terrena haec, similiterque in caelo caelestia nocte itidem solum intueatur. Postea vero die tam solem ipsum quam quae sub sole videntur prius in aqua, post in se ipsis illa, demum solem in caelo suspiciat. Hac potissimum ratione singula sincere facileque discernet; atque existimabit se caecum deceptum miserumque fuisse, quando sub specu vinctus exiguis rerum umbris fuerat occupatus.

VI.2.16

Proinde quae comparatio est speluncae illius ad hunc mundum quem visibilem nominamus, eadem ferme mundi huius ad illum quem invisibilem divinumque vocamus. Siquidem hic animae miserae moribundi corporis clausae tenebris et carcere caeco neque se ipsas umquam neque alia ulla revera neque verum solem, immo sui aliorumque umbras et exilem quandam veri solis imaginem intuentur. Verae enim mentes, verae res quaeque, verus sol in mundo solum sunt invisibili; quae si absque congruis educationis disciplinarumque gradibus repente intueri conemur, caligamus protinus et dolemus.

VI.2.15-VI.2.16 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.15

If one of the prisoners happens to be released and is suddenly forced to turn about and look back toward the lamp and the other things passing behind him beneath it, his vision will at once be clouded and he will suffer pain. Because of their brilliance, he will be unable to look at the things whose shadows he had seen shortly before. Far more will this harm befall him if he is suddenly dragged upward from the cave into the celestial light of day. He must therefore be led not suddenly but gradually, by fitting stages, from the shadows of things to the things themselves, and likewise from the image of light to light itself. Thus, while still in the cave, he should first see in water the things that are there among the prisoners before looking at those same things there in themselves. Once outside the cave here in our world, he should again first view earthly things in water at night by moonlight, then see those earthly things in themselves; likewise, he should behold the heavenly things in heaven, again only at night. Afterward, by day, let him first view in water both the sun itself and the things seen under the sun, then those things in themselves, and finally raise his eyes to the sun in heaven. By this method above all he will discern each thing easily and without distortion. He will judge that he was blind, deceived, and miserable when he was bound beneath the cave, occupied with the meager shadows of things.

VI.2.16

Thus the relation of that cave to this world which we call visible is nearly the same as the relation of this world to the one we call invisible and divine. Here miserable souls, shut within the darkness and blind prison of a dying body, never truly behold themselves, any other things, or the true sun. They see instead the shadows of themselves and others and a feeble image of the true sun. For true minds, all true realities, and the true sun are found only in the invisible world. If we attempt to behold them suddenly, without the fitting stages of education and discipline, our vision is at once clouded and we suffer pain.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.17

Convenientibus vero tum morum tum doctrinarum tum temporis perducti gradibus sincere discernimus iudicamusque caecos illos et miseros qui falsis mundi huius umbris imaginibusque falluntur, occupantur atque premuntur. Verumtamen quando animus ab immenso invisibilis mundi lumine in corpus obscurum regendum movendumque descendit, novis suaeque naturae contrariis obrutus tenebris, caecutire diu et titubare compellitur. Adde et propter repentinam maximamque in deterius mutationem diu cogitur aegrotare, atque ferme sic affici ut ii qui propter phrenesim vel somnum vel ebrietatem falsis imaginibus illuduntur atque vexantur. Aut certe non aliter se habere quam si quis a solis lumine in cavernam illam quam descripsimus repente praecipitetur. Adeo enim novis tenebris offundetur ut aut nullo modo aut vix tandem sub exiguo illo cavernae lumine umbras illas tantum quas narravimus discernere possit. Praeterea ob subitam illam et in peius mutationem in morbos tam sensus quam corporis varios incidet. Haec a Platone in libro De republica septimo. Sed redeamus tandem ad ea quae ab initio statueramus.

VI.2.18

Emergite, obsecro, mortalium animae nunc immersae corporibus. Naturam vestram supra corporis fines statim reperietis.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.17

When, however, we have been led through fitting stages of character, learning, and time, we discern without distortion and judge those people blind and miserable who are deceived, preoccupied, and oppressed by the false shadows and images of this world. Nevertheless, when the soul descends from the immeasurable light of the invisible world into the dark body it must govern and move, it is buried under a new darkness contrary to its own nature and is compelled to grope blindly and stumble for a long time. Add to this that, because of so sudden and profound a change for the worse, it is compelled to remain ill for a long time. Its condition is almost that of people mocked and tormented by false images through frenzy, sleep, or intoxication. Or certainly it fares no differently from someone suddenly hurled out of the sunlight into the cavern we have described. The new darkness will be poured over it so completely that, beneath that meager light of the cave, it will either not discern at all, or only with difficulty and at last, the very shadows we have described. Besides, because of that sudden change for the worse, both its senses and its body will fall into various disorders. These teachings are drawn from Plato in the seventh book of the Republic. But let us return at last to what we laid down at the beginning.

VI.2.18

Rise up, I beg you, souls of mortals now immersed in bodies. You will at once find your nature above the limits of body.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.19

Corpus siquidem longum est, latum atque profundum. Quoniam vero nullum corpus est infinitum, ideoque finem habet profunditatis, finitur in superficiem non profundam. Habetis iam superficiem longam quidem et latam sicut corpus, sed profunditate carentem, atque ex una hac parte surgentem ad incorporea. Superficiei quoque latitudo finita ad longam lineam terminatur, neque profundam neque latam. Habetis lineam duabus partibus ad spiritum accedentem. Sed haec ipsa lineae longitudo, quia finita est, ad punctum ducitur, non profunditate solum et latitudine privatum, sed etiam longitudine. Habetis punctum tribus partibus ad naturam vergens incorporealem. Sed hoc, quoniam lineae terminus est, ideo certum habet situm in corpore, neque implet totum neque vivificat. Separate, si placet, ipsum a linea. Potest autem cogitatione saltem a linea separari, quod est lineae terminus et prius in se ipso est quodammodo quam terminet lineam. Quod autem prius est, licet ab eo quod est posterius separare. Habetis punctum quodammodo, id est cogitatione, solutum a linea, quarto iam gradu discedens a corpore. In hac ipsa solutione assequitur ut omnes partes corporis aeque respiciat. Fundatur per omnes et moveat: hic irrationalis anima sedem habet.

VI.2.20

Et quoniam rationalis cogitatio non fallitur ascendendo, ideo sicut invenit punctum a corpore cogitatione liberum, sic re vera inveniet punctum, id est individuum aliquid re ipsa solutum a corpore, quod non modo impleat corpus et moveat, sed ipsum libere moveatur et tollatur ad supera, quod iam unitatis nomine appellatur. Hic anima viget rationalis, quinto gradu a mole corporis aliena. Si tanto quid impurius est quanto eget patiturque magis, corpus impurius est quam superficies. Pluribus enim ad hoc ut sit dimensionibus eget atque ex partibus dividitur pluribus. Superficies simili ratione cedit lineae, linea puncto, punctum denique unitati, quae neque dimensionibus indiget neque situ. Si horum perfectissima substantialis unitas est, et quia perfectissima, ideo potentissima et verissima, atque haec sunt aliquid existuntque, quis negaverit vere existere unitatem? Ergo quid prohibet animam esse aliquid, et id quidem virtute magnum, licet non sit magnum aliquid quantitate?

VI.2.19-VI.2.20 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.19

Body is long, broad, and deep. Yet because no body is infinite and it therefore has a limit to its depth, it is bounded by a surface without depth. You now have a surface, long and broad like a body, but lacking depth and in this one respect rising toward incorporeal things. The breadth of the surface, being finite, likewise ends at a long line which is neither deep nor broad. You have a line approaching spirit in two respects. Yet because the length of the line is itself finite, it is brought to a point deprived not only of depth and breadth, but also of length. You have a point inclining in three respects toward incorporeal nature. But because it is the limit of a line, it has a determinate position in the body and neither fills the whole nor gives it life. Separate it, if you please, from the line. It can at least in thought be separated from the line, because it is the line's limit and in a certain way exists in itself before it bounds the line. What is prior may be separated from what is posterior. You now have a point in some manner—that is, in thought—released from the line and withdrawing from body by a fourth degree. In this very release, let it attain the power to regard all parts of the body equally. Let it be diffused throughout them all and move them. Here the irrational soul has its seat.

VI.2.20

And because rational thought is not deceived in its ascent, just as it discovered a point freed from body in thought, so in reality it will discover a point—that is, an indivisible something actually released from body. This not only fills and moves the body, but is itself freely moved and raised to things above; and it is now called by the name of unity. Here the rational soul thrives, removed from the bulk of body by a fifth degree. If a thing is more impure the more it needs and undergoes, body is more impure than surface. In order to exist, it needs more dimensions and is divided into more parts. For the same reason surface yields to line, line to point, and point at last to unity, which needs neither dimensions nor position. If substantial unity is the most perfect of these, and because it is most perfect is therefore the most powerful and the most true, and if these other things are something and do exist, who will deny that unity truly exists? What, then, prevents the soul from being something, and indeed something great in power, although it is not something great in quantity?

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.21

Agite, igneam formam quae in corpore vestro tricubito tricubita est colligite totam in cordis centrum. Hinc tantum virtute crescat quantum creverit unione, non aliter ac solis radii in concavi aeneique speculi collecti centro, qui usque adeo roborantur ut inde resilientes durissima quaeque accendant subito atque consumant. Subtrahite portiunculam illam cordis qua forma ignis illa deprimitur. Restet forma individua, agilis, calens, lucens, et aliter quam prius et mirabilius. Quia individua agilisque est secundum se totam, corpus totum aeque collustret. Quia fervet incredibiliter, vitalis sit atque vivifica. Quia mirifice fulget, sentiat. Intelligat insuper si reflectitur in se ipsam sursumque attollitur.

VI.2.22

Hactenus per ea quae tanguntur pedetentim progredientes invenistis animam, quando a solido corpore ad quiddam quasi punctum omnino liberum processistis. Rursus per ea quae cernuntur oculis animam perscrutemini. Cur, quaeso, diffiditis esse spiritale aliquid in natura, cum ipsis etiam oculis spiritum quodammodo videatis? Scitis lumen id solis oculo manifestum ideo corpus non esse, quia momento se fundit in omnia; infusum non frangit corpora nec inficitur. Ecce videtis spiritum. Quid negatis? An forsitan illum negabitis esse quem non cernitis? Si ita est, sphaeras aeris ignisque et caeli, aqua et terra praestantiores, quia non videantur nihil esse dicetis. Itaque pars maxima et praestantissima mundi, quia non sit visibilis, nihil erit. Sed redeamus ad lumen.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.21

Come, gather the whole fiery form, which in your three-cubit body is three cubits, into the center of the heart. From there let it grow as much in power as it has grown in unity, just as the sun's rays, gathered at the center of a concave bronze mirror, are strengthened so greatly that, rebounding from it, they suddenly set fire to and consume even the hardest things. Remove that small portion of the heart by which the form of fire is weighed down. Let an indivisible form remain—active, warm, and shining, and so in a different and more wonderful manner than before. Because it is indivisible and active throughout its whole self, let it illumine the whole body equally. Because it burns beyond belief, let it be alive and life-giving. Because it shines marvelously, let it sense. Let it also understand, if it is turned back upon itself and raised upward.

VI.2.22

Thus far, advancing step by step through things that can be touched, you have found the soul by proceeding from solid body to something like a point entirely free. Search for the soul again through things seen by the eyes. Why, I ask, do you distrust the existence of something spiritual in nature, when even with your eyes you see spirit in a certain fashion? You know that this light of the sun, manifest to the eye, is not body, because in an instant it pours itself into all things; once poured in, it neither shatters bodies nor is stained. Behold, you see spirit. Why do you deny it? Or perhaps you will deny the existence of whatever you do not see. If so, you will say that the spheres of air, fire, and heaven, more excellent than water and earth, are nothing because they are not visible. Thus the greatest and most excellent part of the world will be nothing because it cannot be seen. But let us return to light.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.23

Ita lumen esse negabitis in sphaera ignis, quoniam oculis non prospicitur. Sed et ipse solis fulgor, etiam si non videretur, existeret, quandoquidem existit nunc et non videtur a noctuis; atque ipsius splendor aliquis mixtus vaporibus potius quam ipse videtur a nobis, sed ipsum esse alicubi ex hoc eius splendore coniicimus. Sic etiam inesse lumen caelestibus animis spiritale ex ipso siderum lumine, quod illius imago est, coniectamur. An nescitis lucis actum nihil esse aliud quam lucere, ac tanto clarius rutilare quanto longius a crassis corporibus separatur? Secernite ipsam ab omni materia: mirabilius rutilabit, et vivet quidem tunc maxime, si quando victura sit. Ubi enim crescit actus, augetur et vita, praesertim cum per eius calorem haec omnia vivant. Sentiet quoque, ut ita dixerim, quando per eius radios haec omnia sentiunt; ipsa tamen minime sentietur. Nam et tenuitate subterfugiet aciem oculorum et ubertate fulgoris intelligibilis superabit terreni visus capacitatem.

VI.2.24

Scitis in sphaeris elementorum ignem infimum usque adeo ad naturam supremi aeris declinare, aerem vero contra supremum ita ad ignem illum attolli, ut et ignis ille nihil ferme aliud videatur esse quam tenuis aer, et aer ille crassior ignis; adeo ut quicumque aerem illum cernit vidisse se ignem possit absque mendacio affirmare. Eadem comparatio est mentis infimae, qualis est anima rationalis, ad sublime corpus, quod est caelum. Ergo et anima quodammodo est tenue caelum, et caelum est crassior anima. Et qui caelum suspicit prospicit animam.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.23

In the same way, you will deny that light exists in the sphere of fire because it is not discerned by the eyes. But the sun's own radiance would exist even if it were not seen, since it exists now and is not seen by owls. What we see is a certain splendor of it mixed with vapors rather than the radiance itself; yet from this splendor we infer that the radiance itself exists somewhere. So too, from the light of the stars, which is its image, we infer that spiritual light inheres in celestial souls. Do you not know that the activity of light is nothing other than to shine, and that it glows more clearly the farther it is separated from dense bodies? Separate it from all matter: it will shine more wonderfully, and then it will live most of all, if it is ever to live. For where activity increases, life also increases, especially since all these things live through its heat. It will also sense, so to speak, since through its rays all these things sense; yet it will not itself be sensed. By its subtlety it will elude the sharpness of the eyes, and by the abundance of its intelligible radiance it will surpass the capacity of earthly sight.

VI.2.24

You know that among the elemental spheres the lowest fire descends so far toward the nature of the highest air, while the highest air in turn rises so far toward that fire, that the fire appears to be scarcely anything other than subtle air, and the air a denser fire. Thus anyone who sees that air can affirm without falsehood that he has seen fire. The same comparison holds between the lowest mind, such as the rational soul, and the sublime body which is heaven. The soul is therefore in a certain way a subtle heaven, and heaven a denser soul. Whoever looks up at heaven looks forth upon the soul.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.25

Cogitate punctum aliquod geometricum, quod quia aeque respicit quamlibet loci partem circumdantis ipsum, si quando movetur per quamlibet movetur in orbem; unde quod erat punctum, circumferentia videtur effectum. Ubi sane circumferentia est punctum circumcurrens evolutumque foras; punctum vero est circumferentia stabili quodam cardine convoluta. Cogitate rursus scintillam quandam luminis invisibilis, quae quoniam super omnem existit locum aeque in partem loci quamlibet sese fundat, ac dum movetur in gyrum flammeus orbis evadat, orbis, inquam, oculis manifestus; ubi scintilla est flamma compressa, flamma est scintilla profusa. Scintilla huiusmodi anima est; flamma corpus aethereum. Et quanta est in animabus rationalibus varietas luminis spiritalis, tanta est in propriis earum caelestibusque corporibus visibilis luminis varietas. Atque id lumen ita lucem sequitur spiritalem ut lunae lucem pallidus orbis in nubibus.

VI.2.26

Ea vero est inter rationales animas differentia, quod animae fixarum stellarum planetarumque solum lucido corpore circumdantur; ceterae corporibus geminis, lucido et opaco, aut certe altero lucidissimo, altero minus lucido. Eadem quasi lux esse videtur quae, dum scintilla manet, sentit quidem sed non sentitur; cum vero explicatur in flammam, sentitur quidem iam sed ipsa nil sentit amplius. Et sicut sensu careret quicumque flammam videns scintillam se videre negaret, ita carebit anima qui, dum globos aethereos suspicit quasi quosdam circuitus animarum, animas inesse illis quasi centra non senserit; neque concesserit animas esse globos luminum implicatos, globos autem esse animas explicatas. Quod ita significavit Heraclitus: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη, id est: lux sicca, anima sapientissima. Hinc efficitur ut nihil animo aut gratius aut mirabilius sit quam lumen, neque possit alibi quam in lumine spirituum habitare dum colit terras. Iam igitur et hic invenistis animam esse tamquam lucem invisibilem, vivificam, sentientem, intelligibilem, intelligentem.

VI.2.25-VI.2.26 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.25

Imagine a geometrical point. Because it regards equally every part of the place surrounding it, if it is moved through any part, it moves in a circle; and what was a point appears to have become a circumference. Here the circumference is a point running round and unfolded outward, while the point is a circumference rolled together upon a stable hinge. Imagine again a spark of invisible light. Because it exists above every place, it pours itself equally into every part of place; and as it moves in a circle it becomes a flaming orb—an orb, I say, manifest to the eyes. Here the spark is a compressed flame, and the flame a spark poured forth. A spark of this kind is the soul; the flame is the ethereal body. As great as the variety of spiritual light in rational souls is, so great is the variety of visible light in the celestial bodies proper to them. That visible light follows the spiritual light just as a pale circle in the clouds follows the light of the moon.

VI.2.26

The difference among rational souls is this: the souls of the fixed stars and planets are surrounded by a luminous body alone, while the others are surrounded by two bodies, one luminous and one opaque—or certainly one most luminous and the other less luminous. It seems to be, as it were, the same light: while it remains a spark, it senses but is not sensed; when it is unfolded into flame, however, it is sensed, but the flame itself senses nothing further. Just as anyone who saw a flame yet denied that he saw a spark would be devoid of sense, so anyone who looks upon the ethereal globes as so many circuits of souls yet fails to perceive the souls within them as centers—and does not grant that souls are enfolded globes of lights, while globes are unfolded souls—will be devoid of a soul. Heraclitus signified this as follows: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη, that is, ‘A dry light is the wisest soul.’ Hence it follows that nothing is more pleasing or more wonderful to the mind than light, and that while the mind dwells on earth it can live nowhere but in the light of spirits. Here, then, you have also discovered the soul as an invisible, life-giving, sentient, intelligible, and intelligent light.

Caput 2, continuatur

VI.2.27

Et paulo ante tamquam punctum a corpore liberum, agile per se ipsum, calens, vivificum, sentiens, capax superiorum, quod substantialis quaedam unitas appellatur. Atque haec prima quaedam excursio sit et quasi praeludium, quo infelix diffidentia illa tollatur quae longissime a spiritalium confessione abducit animos plebeiorum.

Chapter 2, continued

VI.2.27

And a little earlier you discovered it as a point free from body, active through itself, warm, life-giving, sentient, and receptive of higher things—a point which is called a kind of substantial unity. Let this be a first excursion and, as it were, a prelude by which that unhappy distrust may be removed—the distrust that draws the minds of the common people far away from acknowledging spiritual realities.

Caput 3

Anima non est corpus aut forma divisa in corpore, ut ostenditur per virtutem animae naturalem.

VI.3.1

Propositae quaestionis ordo requirit, ut in prima sequentis disputationis parte ostendamus per virtutem animae naturalem hominis animam potissimum quidem non esse corpus, partim etiam non esse formam divisam in corpore. In secunda parte per virtutem sentiendi monstremus idem, scilicet animam esse formam indivisibilem, ac insuper illud adiiciamus, eam videlicet non alicui corporis membro affigi, sed totam per singula fundi. In tertia vero parte per virtutem intelligendi eadem confirmemus, scilicet eam esse formam impartibilem ubique totam, et illud adiiciamus, quod nullam trahat originem a materia.

VI.3.2

Sic enim anima hominis ad tertiam illam essentiam, quae est perpetua, pertinebit et immortalis merito iudicabitur. Iam vero primam disputationis partem divino numine invocato in hunc modum aggrediamur.

Chapter 3

The soul is neither a body nor a form divided within a body, as its natural power shows.

VI.3.1

The order of the question proposed requires us, in the first part of the following disputation, to show from the soul's natural power that the human soul is principally not a body and, in part, that it is not a form divided within a body. In the second part, from the power of sensation, we shall demonstrate the same point—namely, that the soul is an indivisible form—and add that it is not fastened to any one member of the body but is poured forth whole throughout every member. In the third part, from the power of understanding, we shall confirm these same conclusions: that it is an impartible form, whole everywhere, and, in addition, that it derives no origin from matter.

VI.3.2

For in this way the human soul will belong to that third essence which is everlasting, and will rightly be judged immortal. Now then, invoking the divine power, let us begin the first part of the disputation in the following manner.

Caput 4

Prima ratio: quia anima est principium nutriendi et quomodocumque aliter operandi.

VI.4.1

Animantes et plantae virentes corpora sunt. Corpora etiam sunt ligna et saxa ex terra convulsa. Corpora illa coalescunt. Haec vero nequaquam. Quid autem est in illis principium alimenti? Non materia corporalis, quoniam alia etiam corpora nutrirentur, quibus talis materia est communis.

VI.4.2

Cum ergo vis illa per quam adolescunt aliud quiddam sit praeter materiam corporalem, et illa non sit aliud quam anima nutritiva, sequitur ut talis anima non sit corpus. Si quis autem obiecerit ita:

VI.4.3

Immo vero est corpus, non corpus quodlibet, sed tale quiddam et sic affectum, qualis natura plantis et animantibus propria sit, saxis vero et lignis aridis non communis.

VI.4.4

Quaeremus ab illo de huiusmodi tali certoque corpore quod vocat animam, utrum duo quaedam in se contineat, corporalem scilicet molem atque insuper certam quandam affectionem per quam tale vocatur et certum fit propriumque corpus, an nihil habeat ultra materiam corporibus omnibus ubique communem. Si nihil respondeatur habere praeter communem hanc molem, vana fuerat nimium obiectio illa per quam dicebatur non quodlibet corpus esse animam, sed corpus tale et certo modo dispositum. Non enim fit corpus tale et certo modo dispositum nisi per qualitatem ipsam et propriam quandam affectionem ipsi corpori superadditam, per quam non modo sit corpus sed et tale, per quam etiam a quolibet alio differat corpore.

VI.4.1-VI.4.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4

First argument: because the soul is the principle of nourishment and of every other mode of action.

VI.4.1

Living creatures and flourishing plants are bodies. Logs and stones torn from the earth are bodies as well. The former grow together; the latter do not. What, then, is the principle of nourishment in the former? It is not corporeal matter, for then other bodies, which share matter of this kind, would also be nourished.

VI.4.2

Since, therefore, the power by which they grow is something other than corporeal matter, and since that power is nothing other than the nutritive soul, it follows that a soul of this kind is not a body. But someone may object as follows:

VI.4.3

On the contrary, it is a body—not just any body, but a body of a certain kind and so disposed, with a nature proper to plants and living creatures but not shared by stones and dry wood.

VI.4.4

We shall ask him whether this definite body of such a kind, which he calls soul, contains two things within itself: corporeal bulk, and besides it some definite condition by which it is called a body of such a kind and becomes a definite and proper body; or whether it possesses nothing beyond the matter common to all bodies everywhere. If his answer is that it possesses nothing beyond this common bulk, then the preceding objection was entirely futile: that not just any body is soul, but a body of such a kind and disposed in a definite way. For a body becomes such and is disposed in a definite way only through a quality itself and some proper condition superadded to the body, by which it is not merely a body but a body of such a kind, and by which it also differs from every other body.

Caput 4, continuatur

VI.4.5

Itaque si nihil aliud est ibi praeter molem solam communemque corporis, cum illa etiam aridis lignis insit et saxis, haec quoque habebunt animam per quam alantur. Quod quia falsum esse constat, necessarium est corpus illud tale, quod adversarius animam appellabat, non materiam corporis solam, sed qualitatem etiam sive formam aliquam continere. Atque illud non propter materiam ipsam corporis anima nominatur, quia materia omnibus etiam vita carentibus corporibus competit. Restat ut propter formam. Formam, inquam, vivificam. Id enim est animae proprium. Formam ipsam vivificam vocabimus animam.

VI.4.6

Materiam vero illam cui adiuncta est, quia inde vitae fit particeps, neque animam neque animae partem, sed animatum quiddam esse dicemus. Praesens autem ratio maxime per eam sententiam confirmatur, quam induximus a principio, quando disserebamus corpus ex se agere nihil posse. Quippe cum videamus anima corporibus accedente multas inde operationes proficisci, quae et ante animae accessum et post eius discessum minime fiunt. Quapropter animam, quae huiusmodi operationum principium est, corpus non esse concludimus.

VI.4.5-VI.4.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

VI.4.5

Therefore, if there is nothing there beyond the common bulk of body alone, since that bulk is also present in dry wood and stones, these too will have a soul by which they are nourished. Since this is plainly false, the body of a certain kind which our opponent was calling the soul must contain not only the matter of body, but also some quality or form. Yet that thing is not called soul on account of the matter of body itself, since matter belongs to every body, even those devoid of life. It remains, then, that it is called soul on account of the form—the life-giving form, I mean. For this is proper to soul. We shall call the life-giving form itself the soul.

VI.4.6

The matter joined to it, however, since it thereby comes to share in life, we shall call neither soul nor a part of soul, but something animate. The present argument is especially confirmed by the proposition we advanced at the outset, when we argued that body can do nothing of itself. For we see that, when soul comes to bodies, many operations proceed from them which do not occur at all before the soul's arrival or after its departure. We therefore conclude that the soul, which is the principle of operations of this kind, is not a body.

Caput 5

Secunda ratio: nec corpus animatum est nec inanimatum.

VI.5.1

Quale corpus esse vis animam? Animatumne an inanime? Inanime non dices, quod alteri vitam tribuit animalem. Quomodo enim, si anima inanime corpus sit, vivificat corpora? Neque animatum corpus eam potes dicere. Quia si anima animatum corpus dicatur, certe illud corpus postquam animatum dicitur per aliquam animam dicitur animatum.

VI.5.2

De illa anima rursus interrogo, corpusne sit an non? Si corpus, utrum animatum vel inanime? Si inanime responderis, absurdum quidem. Si animatum, iterum de anima illa quaeram per quam dicitur animatum. Atque procedere cogeris in infinitum, quamdiu corpus esse animam asseres, ac semper respondere compelleris absurde. Utraque enim responsio delira videtur: tum animam esse animatam, tum inanimem; quemadmodum de sapientia: tum esse illam sapientem, tum etiam insipientem.

VI.5.3

Aut de lumine: tum esse illud illuminatum, tum obscurum. Sicut enim neque obscurum est lumen quod alia illustrat, neque ab alio illuminatum, quod ipsum est primum lumen, sic anima neque est inanimis, quia dat vitam, neque etiam per aliud animata, cum ipsa illud proprie sit per quod revera quodlibet animatur. Ac si ad aliud illam retuleris per quod animetur, ego similiter illud aliud rursus ad aliud referam, aliudque rursus ad aliud. Neque cessabo umquam; aut si cessabo, in eo ipso certe quiescam, ut dicam aut illud ipsum quod primo ponebatur aut aliquid sequens neque animatum neque vivificatum esse ab aliquo, sed ipsum proprie per se esse quod animat aliud atque vivificat.

Chapter 5

Second argument: the soul is neither an animate body nor an inanimate one.

VI.5.1

What kind of body do you wish the soul to be—animate or inanimate? You will not call it inanimate, for it gives animal life to another. How, indeed, could soul vivify bodies if it were an inanimate body? Nor can you call it an animate body. For if soul is said to be an animate body, surely that body, once called animate, is called so through some soul.

VI.5.2

Concerning that soul I ask again: is it a body or not? If it is a body, is it animate or inanimate? If you answer inanimate, the absurdity is plain. If animate, I shall ask again about the soul through which it is called animate. And you will be forced to proceed to infinity so long as you assert that soul is a body, and always be compelled to answer absurdly. For both answers appear deranged: that soul is animate, and that it is inanimate—just as it would be deranged to say of wisdom both that it is wise and that it is foolish.

VI.5.3

Or take light: it would be both illuminated and dark. For just as the light that illuminates other things is neither dark nor illuminated by another—since it is itself the first light—so the soul is neither inanimate, because it gives life, nor animated by something else, since it is itself, properly speaking, that by which everything is truly animated. If you refer it to something else by which it is animated, I shall likewise refer that other thing again to another, and that one again to another. I shall never cease; or if I do cease, I shall certainly come to rest in this very conclusion: either the thing first posited, or something subsequent, is neither animated nor vivified by another but is itself, properly and through itself, that which animates and vivifies another.

Caput 5, continuatur

VI.5.4

Tale quiddam animam et vitam proprie, non quodvis aliud appellabo. Tu forsitan, ut infinitum illum progressum et responsiones deliras iam devites et tamen animam corpus esse asseras, inferes eam esse corpus non quidem animatum, sed corpus animale, non vivificatum, sed vivens. Si ita est, revolveris eodem. Equidem percontabor utrum illud ea ratione qua corpus est anima sit, an alia quadam ratione novae alicuius additionis, per quam animale dicatur et vivens. Certe non ea ratione qua corpus. Omnia siquidem corpora essent animae ac operationes prae se ferrent.

VI.5.5

Sequitur ut alia quaedam illic insit natura praeter corporis rationem, per quam animale corpus illud vivensque dicatur. Illam ego vitam proprie et animam nuncupabo.

VI.5.4-VI.5.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5, continued

VI.5.4

Something of this kind I shall properly call soul and life, and not just anything else. Perhaps, to avoid that infinite regress and those deranged answers, while still asserting that soul is a body, you will infer that it is not indeed an animated body but an animal body, not something vivified but something living. If so, you will circle back to the same place. I shall ask whether that thing is soul by the same reason by which it is body, or by some other reason, arising from some new addition by which it is called animal and living. Certainly not by the same reason by which it is body. Otherwise all bodies would be souls and would display operations.

VI.5.5

It follows that some other nature, beyond the nature of body, is present there, by which that body is called animal and living. This is what I shall properly name life and soul.

Caput 6

Tertia ratio: neque crassum corpus est neque subtile.

VI.6.1

Numquid crassum corpus est anima? Puta vel aqua vel terra atque similia? An potius subtile rarumque, ut ignis et aer? Primum dici non potest, quoniam animae officium est penetrare facillime corpora, implere, movere. Huic operationi crassa corpora sunt ineptissima.

VI.6.2

Secundum vero illud esse fortasse videbitur probabilius, ut rarum sit corpus anima, ut ignis aut aer. Verum si ignis dicatur esse, utrum ignis ille qua ratione ignis anima est, aut quadam alia ratione? Si qua ratione ignis est, esse dicatur anima, profecto quilibet ignis anima erit et omnia ignita viventia.

VI.6.3

Igitur alia ratione. Ita de aere percontandum, concludendumque animam semper esse ultra naturam corporis requirendam. Neque adducat quispiam quintum aliquod tenuissimumque corpusculum praeter quattuor elementa, quod crassioribus infusum corporibus illorum sit anima. Eadem namque redibit quaestio: utrum corpusculum illud per materiam suam sit anima, an per vim aliquam materiae superadditam. Si primum detur, omnia corpora erunt animae, quia omnibus subest materia. Si secundum, assecuti erimus iam quod cupimus, ut anima sit ad aliquam vim quodammodo incorpoream referenda.

Chapter 6

Third argument: the soul is neither a gross body nor a subtle one.

VI.6.1

Is the soul a dense body—for example, water, earth, or something similar? Or is it rather a subtle and rarefied body, like fire or air? The first cannot be maintained, because the soul's office is to penetrate bodies with the greatest ease, fill them, and move them. Dense bodies are utterly unfit for this operation.

VI.6.2

The second possibility may perhaps appear more plausible: that soul is a rarefied body, such as fire or air. But if it is said to be fire, is that fire soul by the same reason that it is fire, or by some other reason? If it is said to be soul precisely insofar as it is fire, then every fire will certainly be a soul, and everything fiery will be alive.

VI.6.3

It must therefore be soul by some other reason. The same question must be asked about air, and we must conclude that the soul is always to be sought beyond the nature of body. Nor let anyone introduce a fifth and exceedingly subtle little body beyond the four elements, infused into denser bodies to serve as their soul. For the same question will return: is that little body soul through its own matter, or through some power superadded to the matter? If the first is granted, all bodies will be souls, since matter underlies them all. If the second, we shall already have gained what we desire: the soul must be referred to some power that is in some manner incorporeal.

Caput 6, continuatur

VI.6.4

Afferuntur hic a nonnullis breves quaedam persuasiones huiusmodi. Si anima dicatur esse divisibilis, quaeritur numquid partes eius vivant ut totum, necne. Si vivunt, tota anima in singulis est suis particulis. Quo fit ut non egeat quantitate, quandoquidem per divisionem non diminuitur. Si non vivunt, ex non viventibus vita consistet, quod est impossibile. Rursus omne corpus alicui quinque sensuum innotescere potest, anima nulli. Omne corpus figura aliqua vel termino circumscribitur, anima minime. Omne corpus operationem suam necessario peragit temporis intervallo. Cum enim divisibile sit in essentia, multo magis in actione. Anima saepe momento temporis operatur. Corpus per quantitatem potius quam per essentiam est in loco, quia propter quantitatem implet locum. Anima per essentiam adest corpori. Ut enim adest illi, dat illi esse. Esse per essentiam datur, sicut per sapientiam sapere. Adest igitur per essentiam. Corpus ita in alio est, ut contineatur ab eo in quo ponitur, atque excedatur. Anima in corpore est non comprehensa, sed comprehendens. Ipsa enim corpus perficit, continet atque ducit. Anima denique quolibet corpore et toto corpore praestantior est. Quare lineis punctisque quae in corporibus sunt ut in subiecto est praestantior.

VI.6.5

Indivisibile divisibili excellentius est. Animus igitur magis indivisibilis est quam aut linea aut punctum.

VI.6.4-VI.6.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 6, continued

VI.6.4

Some offer here several short arguments of the following kind. If soul is said to be divisible, we ask whether its parts live as the whole does or not. If they live, the whole soul is in each of its particles. Thus it does not need quantity, since division does not diminish it. If they do not live, life will consist of things that do not live, which is impossible. Again, every body can become known to one of the five senses; soul to none. Every body is bounded by some figure or limit; soul is not. Every body necessarily carries out its operation over an interval of time—for since it is divisible in essence, it is much more divisible in action. The soul often operates in an instant. Body is in place through quantity rather than through essence, because it fills place on account of quantity. Soul is present to body through essence. For in being present to body, it gives body being. Being is given through essence, just as being wise is given through wisdom. Thus soul is present through essence. A body is in another thing in such a way that it is contained and surpassed by that in which it is placed. Soul is in body not as something comprehended but as that which comprehends. For it perfects, contains, and guides the body. Finally, soul is more excellent than any body and than body as a whole. It is therefore more excellent than lines and points, which exist in bodies as in a subject.

VI.6.5

The indivisible is more excellent than the divisible. The soul, therefore, is more indivisible than either a line or a point.

Caput 7

Quarta ratio: corpus ex materia et forma componitur.

VI.7.1

Corpus naturale ex materia et forma componitur. Animal est naturale corpus. Materia itaque in eo est et forma. Constat autem ex anima atque corpore. Corpus quidem non est forma naturalis, quia forma naturalis alicuius est forma et in aliquo est tamquam subiecto quodam atque formato. Corpus autem nullius forma est, neque in aliquo est subiecto, sed loco. Restat ut anima forma sit, ob hoc potissimum quod est proprium internumque operationum motionumque principium. Immo etiam essendi principium est animali. Totum hoc ad formam spectat. Est igitur anima forma. Quod si ipsa quoque esset corpus, opus esset adhuc alia quadam forma tam animae quam corpori, per quam ambo simul unum animal vocarentur. Quam quidem formam aliam proprius animam vocaremus. Nam per animam quasi per formam corpus quod ante potentia quadam est vivens, actu fit vivens atque animal actu. Anima igitur solum est forma. Praesertim quia si duas haberet partes, materiam scilicet atque formam, tria sequerentur absurda. Primum, quod non secundum se totam formaret corpus, quia non formaret ipsum per partem eius quae est materia.

VI.7.2

Oportet tamen propriam formam secundum totam sui essentiam totam perficere materiam propriam. Secundum, quod pars illa animae quae forma dicitur duarum materiarum rationis eiusdem perfectio foret, quod natura non patitur, sicut neque patitur formas duas rationis eiusdem eandem formare materiam. Tertium, quoniam anima in corpora haec inferiora commutaretur atque vicissim, si communem cum iis materiam possideret.

Chapter 7

Fourth argument: a body is composed of matter and form.

VI.7.1

Every natural body is composed of matter and form. An animal is a natural body. It therefore has matter and form within it. Yet it is made up of soul and body. Body, however, is not a natural form, because a natural form is the form of something and exists in something as in a subject that it forms. But body is the form of nothing and does not exist in something as in a subject, but in a place. It remains that soul is the form, chiefly because it is the proper and inward principle of operations and motions. Indeed, it is also the animal's principle of being. All this belongs to form. Soul, therefore, is form. If the soul itself were also a body, another form would still be needed, belonging both to soul and body, by which the two together would be called one animal. We would more properly call that other form soul. For through soul, as through form, the body which before was living in a certain potency becomes living in act and an animal in act. Soul, then, is form alone. This is especially so because, if it had two parts, namely matter and form, three absurdities would follow. First, it would not form the body according to its whole self, because it would not form it through the part of itself that is matter.

VI.7.2

Yet a proper form must, through its entire essence, perfect the whole of its proper matter. Second, the part of soul called form would be the perfection of two matters of the same kind, which nature does not permit, just as it does not permit two forms of the same kind to form the same matter. Third, soul would be changed into these lower bodies, and they in turn into soul, if it possessed matter in common with them.

Caput 7, continuatur

VI.7.3

Quod ideo nefas est, quia si fiat corporum animarumque mutua commutatio, multo magis fiet quarumlibet animarum in quaslibet animas transmutatio, rursusque quorumlibet corporum in corpora quaelibet. Sit igitur anima solum forma. Forma, inquam, non accidentalis, sed substantialis. Nam cum anima ipsa sit rectrix motrixque corporis, ita ut contineat ipsum, sistat et torqueat, corpore praestantior est. Corpus substantia est. Nullum vero accidens nobilius est substantia. Rursus motor, quantum est principium motionis, non pendet secundum esse suum ex eo quod movetur. Igitur anima ipsa quae revera est motrix corporis a corpore non dependet quasi pedisequa corporis. Itaque non est corporis accidens. Praeterea quicquid vicissim opposita suscipit atque ipsum interim permanet idem substantia est; anima, dum permanet eadem, recipit tum opinionem hanc, tum illam inter se contrarias, tum scientiam, tum ignorantiam et repugnantes affectus.

VI.7.4

Anima igitur est substantia. Substantia, inquam, ut forma quaedam substantialis. Forma autem non est corpus, quia omne corpus forma aliqua designatur. Forma vero qua ratione forma est formari non potest. Hinc fit ut anima non sit corpus. Missas facio in praesentia rationes quibus ostenditur animam nostram accidens esse non posse: quia si necessitate quadam haereret subiecto, non posset illi repugnare; neque in se umquam reflecteretur; neque super accidentium genus ad substantiae genus ascenderet; ipsumve proprie definiret vel discernere posset ab accidentibus vel quanto intervallo accidentia superat rite metiri.

VI.7.3-VI.7.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 7, continued

VI.7.3

This is impious, because if bodies and souls were mutually transmuted, then all the more would any souls be transmuted into any other souls, and in turn any bodies into any other bodies. Let soul therefore be form alone—form, I say, not accidental but substantial. For since the soul itself is the ruler and mover of the body, containing it, holding it firm, and turning it, the soul is more excellent than the body. Body is a substance, and no accident is nobler than substance. Again, a mover, insofar as it is the principle of motion, does not depend for its being on what is moved. The soul itself, therefore, which is truly the mover of the body, does not depend upon the body as though it were the body's handmaid. It is consequently not an accident of body. Moreover, whatever receives opposites in turn while itself remaining the same is a substance. The soul, while remaining the same, receives now one opinion and now another opposed to it, now knowledge and now ignorance, as well as conflicting affections.

VI.7.4

The soul, then, is a substance—a substance, I say, as a certain substantial form. Form is not body, since every body is designated by some form; but form, insofar as it is form, cannot itself be formed. Hence soul is not a body. For the present I pass over the arguments showing that our soul cannot be an accident: if it inhered in a subject by some necessity, it could not resist that subject; it would never turn back upon itself; it would not rise above the kind of accidents to the kind of substance; nor could it properly define substance itself, distinguish it from accidents, or rightly measure how far it surpasses them.

Caput 8

Quinta ratio: corpus natura sua dispersum est.

VI.8.1

Corpus natura sua dispersum est penitus. Primo, quia distantiam partium patitur, ita ut semper in alio loco sit alia. Secundo, quia continue transmutatur. Nam si subiicitur tempori, sicut varia momenta succedunt in tempore, sic affectiones momentis singulis variantur in corpore.

VI.8.2

Quae quidem varietas cum fiat in caelis, multo magis fit raptu caelorum in elementis. Tertio, quia contrariis subiicitur qualitatibus, calori et frigori et similibus. Unde fit ut contra naturam corporis sit coire in unum, manere simile et sibi ipsi constare.

VI.8.3

Extensio namque ipsa quantitatis partes corporis disiunctas manere compellit. Motus perennis cogit mutare naturam, neque sua simul habere, sed aliud amittere, quaerere aliud. Qualitatum contrarietas impellit ut altera fugiat alteram; per quam fugam corpus ipsum compositum dissipatur.

VI.8.4

Quamvis autem per haec appareat corpus natura sua nullo modo posse firmiter in unitate consistere, tamen corpus quodlibet aliquo modo in suis partibus nectitur, cunctis in unam totius corporis copulam conspirantibus. Est igitur in corpore aliquid ultra corporis naturam quod ipsum unit, sistit et continet. Unit, inquam, distantiam partium. Sistit fluxum perennem.

VI.8.1-VI.8.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 8

Fifth argument: a body is by nature dispersed.

VI.8.1

Body is by its nature thoroughly dispersed. First, because it admits distance between its parts, so that one is always in one place and another elsewhere. Second, because it is continually transformed. For if it is subject to time, then just as successive moments follow one another in time, so its conditions change at every moment.

VI.8.2

This variation occurs even in the heavens, and much more in the elements under the sweep of the heavens. Third, because body is subject to contrary qualities, heat and cold and the like. Thus it is contrary to the nature of body to gather into one, to remain like itself, and to remain consistent with itself.

VI.8.3

For the very extension of quantity compels the parts of body to remain disjoined. Perpetual motion compels body to change its nature and not to possess all that is its own at once, but to lose one thing and seek another. The contrariety of qualities drives one to flee the other; through this flight the composite body itself is scattered.

VI.8.4

Although these considerations show that by its nature body cannot in any way stand firmly in unity, nevertheless every body is somehow bound together in its parts, all of them conspiring in the single bond of the whole body. There is therefore in body something beyond the nature of body that unites it, holds it firm, and contains it. It unites, I say, parts standing at a distance. It arrests their perpetual flux.

Caput 8, continuatur

VI.8.5

Continet invicem per suam simplicem consonantiam dissonas corporis qualitates. Quid hoc est, corpusne? Si corpus est, eget similiter alio connectente. Quid aliud illud? Num corpus? Si corpus, eget et alio. Quocirca fatendum est nullam esse posse in corporibus unitatem, nullam constantiam, nullamve concordiam, nisi illis insit vis aliqua incorporea. Ergo si et anima corpus dicatur esse, eget ipsa etiam aliqua copula. Vim autem huiusmodi copulantem nos animam vel virtutem animae potius quam illud copulatum asseverabimus, cum videamus esse animae proprium humores contrarios membraque diversa in unam animalis compagem devincire, qua abeunte diffluunt omnia. Igitur anima neque est corpus, sed copula corporis intima vel substantia copulatrix. Neque forma divisa per corpus.

VI.8.6

Talis enim forma, ut Platonici putant, simplicitatis et constantiae naturam amittit in corpore. Unde ipsa aeque ut corpus eget alio continente, quod unum in se ipso consistat, ad divisionem corporis minime dissipatum.

VI.8.7

Si quis autem quaerat unde saxa et ligna sortiantur suarum partium unionem, respondebunt Platonici illa quamdiu affiguntur terrae, ab anima sortiri et unionem et augmentum. Postquam vero avulsa sunt, non augmentum amplius, sed unionem.

Chapter 8, continued

VI.8.5

By its own simple concord, it holds the discordant qualities of body together with one another. What is this? A body? If it is a body, it likewise needs another thing to connect it. What is that other thing? A body? If it is a body, it too needs another. We must therefore admit that no unity, no constancy, and no concord can exist in bodies unless some incorporeal power is present in them. Hence, if soul too is said to be a body, it itself also needs some bond. We, however, shall affirm that the power which binds in this way is the soul, or the soul's power, rather than the thing bound. For we see that it is proper to the soul to bind contrary humors and diverse members into the single structure of an animal; when the soul departs, all these flow apart. The soul, therefore, is not a body, but the body's inward bond or a substance that binds. Nor is it a form divided throughout body.

VI.8.6

For such a form, as the Platonists hold, loses in the body the nature of simplicity and constancy. It too, like the body, therefore needs something else to contain it—something that remains one in itself and is not in the least scattered when the body is divided.

VI.8.7

If anyone asks whence stones and wood obtain the union of their parts, the Platonists will reply that as long as they are fastened to the earth, they obtain both union and growth from the soul; but once torn away, they obtain no further growth, only union.

Caput 9

Sexta ratio: duo corpora non sunt in eodem loco.

VI.9.1

Duo corpora in eodem loco penitus invicem aequari non possunt. Nam si eodem in loco penitus esse debeant, oportet illa primum in partes dividi. Deinde partes suas vicissim partibus iungere. Quae quidem partes si indivisibiles sunt, iam corpora illa in individua resoluta sunt. Et quoniam ex iisdem composita fuerant in quae dissolvuntur, sequitur ut ex individuis quibusdam corporis magnitudo concreverit. Quod ideo fieri non potuit, quia individua congregata simul numquam conficiunt magnitudinem. Sin autem partes illae divisibiles fuerint, quaelibet per se erit corpus, ac situm proprium seorsum habebit ab alia. Itaque non erunt corpora duo in loco uno, immo in multis loculis multa corpuscula.

VI.9.2

Si ergo corpora duo eodem in loco aequari invicem nequeunt, anima quae corpori vivo sese ubique infundit et per omnia se porrigit corporis puncta non est corpus. Quod autem ubique in corpore sit ex eo in praesentia patet, quod nihil magis intrinsecum essentiae est quam esse. Ideoque forma per quam esse substantiale tribuitur tum corpori toti tum partibus, toti partibusque est intima. Et quia sicut res se habet ad esse, sic et ad unum, anima quae per se dat esse per se absque medio unitur corpori universo. Quod autem esse substantiale tribuat inde patet, quod ea sublata omnia membra mutant speciem. Quoniam vero ab essentia fluit esse, a virtute operatio, anima quae singulis membris esse operationemque largitur singulis quoque essentiam suam virtutemque communicat. Ita enim esse operationemque praestat sicut unitur. Quare si illa praestat singulis, unitur et singulis.

Chapter 9

Sixth argument: two bodies do not occupy the same place.

VI.9.1

Two bodies cannot entirely coincide with one another in the same place. For if they are to occupy precisely the same place, they must first be divided into parts and then join their respective parts to one another in turn. If these parts are indivisible, the bodies have now been resolved into indivisibles; and since they were composed of the very things into which they are dissolved, it follows that the magnitude of a body has grown out of certain indivisibles. But this cannot have occurred, because indivisibles, however many are gathered together, never make up a magnitude. If, on the other hand, those parts are divisible, each will itself be a body and will have a position of its own apart from the other. There will therefore not be two bodies in one place, but many little bodies in many little places.

VI.9.2

If, then, two bodies cannot coincide with one another in the same place, the soul—which pours itself everywhere into the living body and extends through every point of it—is not a body. That it is everywhere in the body is clear for the present from this: nothing lies more inward to essence than being. Hence the form through which substantial being is given both to the whole body and to its parts is inward to the whole and to the parts alike. And because a thing stands in the same relation to unity as it does to being, the soul, which of itself gives being, is of itself united to the whole body without any intermediary. That it gives substantial being is clear because, when it is removed, all the members change their species. Being flows from essence, and operation from power. Accordingly, the soul that bestows being and operation upon each member also communicates its own essence and power to each. It gives being and operation in the same manner in which it is united. Therefore, if it gives them to each member, it is united to each as well.

Caput 9, continuatur

VI.9.3

Nonne si corpus quodlibet naturale carens anima unum quiddam est per formam unam in toto et partibus existentem, multo magis animatum corpus unum erit per animam toti partibusque praesentem? Quod si anima in uno solum membro sit, illius solius erit forma. Reliquorum aliae erunt formae, unde non conficietur ex membris omnibus naturale corpus revera unum, sed congregatum quiddam tamquam domus ex parietibus. Neque erit in qualibet animalis parte consensio et concordia ad quamlibet, qualis modo est, nisi per unam animam varia membra conglutinentur, sicut neque ad tractum nervi omnes articuli contrahuntur nisi idem sit nervus in omnibus. Adde quod in quavis quantumcumque minima corporis portiuncula inest vita, et in plurimis motus et sensus. Hae animae vires operationesque intimae sunt. Vis actioque agenti alicui intima sine agentis substantia non existit. In illis ergo est anima, si in illis viget et agit.

Chapter 9, continued

VI.9.3

If every natural body devoid of soul is one thing through one form present in its whole and its parts, will not an animate body be one all the more through a soul present to the whole and to the parts? For if the soul were in only one member, it would be the form of that member alone. The other members would have other forms, and so all the members together would make, not one natural body in truth, but an aggregate like a house made of walls. Nor would each part of the animal possess the harmony and concord with every other part that it now possesses unless one soul bound the various members together—just as all the joints are not drawn together by the pull of a sinew unless the same sinew is present in them all. Add that life is present in every portion of the body, however small, and motion and sensation in most of them. These powers and operations of the soul are inward to those parts. A power and action inward to any agent cannot exist without the agent's substance. The soul is therefore in those parts, if it flourishes and acts in them.

Caput 9, continuatur

VI.9.4

Quae quando suo modo movetur corpus non dissipat, quia non fit dolor aliquis ex animae motu per corpus. Fieret autem perpetuus in corpore dolor, si ad motum animae partes eius dissiparentur et turbarentur. Dissiparentur autem procul dubio, si anima esset corpus, cum ipsa per corpus suo quodam motu perpetuo moveatur. Quonam pacto anima corpus erit, quae est ubique per corpus et sine ulla corporis offensione totum undique implet et penetrat? Porro si solidum corpus esset, vel totum corpus non impleret neque viveret inde totum, vel si impleret, penetrando frangeret frangereturque, et dolor in nobis perpetuus proveniret. Sin autem corpus esset fluxum et labile, anima corpus animantis neque devinciret neque firmiter solidaret, sed et ipsa alio quodam vinculo, ut supra diximus, indigeret, cuius stabilitate firmaretur, regeretur et moveretur. Illud vero vinculum libentius animam, immo virtutem animae appellabimus. Siquidem animae virtus in corpore idem ferme est quod vel coaguli virtus in lacte, quod inde coagulatur; vel vis magnetis in ferro, quod inde trahitur et suspenditur; vel temperatio artis in horologio, quod inde ordine mirabili regitur, movetur et sonat. Ipsa vero anima non est virtus temperatiove humorum, sed forma quaedam substantialis, simplex, indivisibilis, quae virtute et arte naturali spiritus, humores membraque temperat.

Chapter 9, continued

VI.9.4

When the soul is moved in its own manner, it does not scatter the body, for the soul's motion through the body causes no pain. Yet pain would arise continually in the body if its parts were scattered and disturbed by the soul's motion. They would certainly be scattered if the soul were a body, since the soul itself moves perpetually through the body with a motion of its own. How, then, could the soul be a body when it is everywhere throughout the body and, without injuring it in any way, fills and penetrates the whole from every side? Moreover, if the soul were a solid body, either it would not fill the whole body, and the whole would therefore not live, or, if it did fill it, the soul would break the body by penetrating it and would itself be broken, and continual pain would arise in us. If instead it were a fluid and unstable body, the soul would neither bind nor firmly consolidate the animal's body; rather, as we said above, it too would need some other bond by whose stability it might be held firm, governed, and moved. We should more readily call that bond the soul—or rather the soul's power. For the soul's power in the body is much like the power of rennet in milk, which it curdles; the power of a magnet in iron, which it draws and suspends; or the ordering skill in a clock, by which the clock is governed, moved, and made to sound in marvelous order. The soul itself, however, is not a power or a tempering of the humors, but a substantial form—simple and indivisible—which by its natural power and art tempers the spirits, humors, and members.

Caput 10

Septima ratio: corpus non est simul totum in pluribus.

VI.10.1

Neque corpora neque formae divisae per corpora possunt omnino esse simul in pluribus partibus aut locis. Vis seminaria tota est in qualibet particula seminis. In quot enim particulas semen dividitur, totidem animalia oriuntur, quod maxime in piscium ovis apparet. Si ex quacumque guttula seminis totum pullulat animal, tota illic delitescit seminaria virtus. Haec vero est animae instrumentum generationi subserviens. Quapropter multo magis tota anima est in qualibet seminis corporisque particula. Postquam ergo tota est in singulis animae virtus, nonne virtus vegetatrix tota est in quolibet plantae semine, cum plantam integram producat ex quolibet? Vegetativa quoque anima exigua primum radice vel germine capitur, deinde crescente arbore per omnes se fundit ramos. Siccatis denique ramis vel amputatis, rursus sese contrahit in radicem. Hanc animam quantitate carere Plotinus Porphyriusque existimant, quae aeque clauditur minimis, implet amplissima.

VI.10.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 10

Seventh argument: a body is not wholly present in several places at once.

VI.10.1

Neither bodies nor forms divided throughout bodies can be wholly present at once in several parts or places. Yet the seminal power is whole in every particle of seed. For however many particles the seed is divided into, that many animals arise—a fact seen most clearly in the eggs of fish. If a whole animal springs from any drop of seed, the whole seminal power lies hidden there. This power is the soul's instrument, serving generation. How much more, then, is the whole soul present in every particle of the seed and of the body. Since the soul's power is whole in each, is not the vegetative power also whole in every seed of a plant, when from each it produces an entire plant? The vegetative soul, too, is at first enclosed in a tiny root or shoot; then, as the tree grows, it pours itself into every branch. When at last the branches have dried or been cut away, it draws itself back again into the root. Plotinus and Porphyry hold that this soul is without quantity: it is enclosed equally in the smallest things and fills the greatest.

Caput 11

Octava ratio: anima est vita aut fons vitae.

VI.11.1

Animam esse putamus naturam quandam quae aut vita quaedam sit, aut vitam ceu comitem habeat et pedisequam, postquam corpora vitam per animam sortiuntur. Corpus necessario in plures partes dividitur. Nam corpus aliud est ex pluribus elementis compositum. Aliud elementum, ex elementis aliis minime congregatum, sed ex forma et materia constitutum. Si animam dixeris esse corpus constructum ex pluribus elementis, sciscitabimur numquid illa elementa quaelibet per se seorsum ab aliis vitam habeant, aut nulla sed congregata simul vitam pariant, aut unum quiddam illorum possideat vitam. Si quodlibet illorum per se habet vitam, tot ibi sunt animae quot elementa. Neque ibi est anima una ex multis conflata partibus, sed animae multae sedem eandem colentes. Si nullum illorum habet vitam, numquam concursu mutuo vitam creabunt. Ac si in eorum concursu vita nascatur, non quidem ipsorum vi, cum ipsa vita careant, sed vi potius alicuius concursum illum ordinantis vita illa nascetur. Praesertim cum sit fatendum, etiam si concursione multorum vita constetur, non tamen quomodocumque concurrant, verum si certa ratione viaque concurrant, vitam in illis gigni. Ita illius certe concursionis intimus ordinator anima ipsa erit, vitam suo modo confluentibus exhibens. Sin dixeris aliquid e multis elementis habere vitam, illud solummodo anima ipsa erit; neque opus erit praeter istud aliis elementis ut anima generetur. Quamobrem anima nullo modo putanda est esse corpus ex elementis pluribus constitutum. Sed neque elementum unum. Quia elementum quodlibet ex materia et forma componitur. Si istud viveret, non per materiam viveret, cum informis materia nequeat vitam aut alicui aut sibi ipsi praebere. Igitur tale viveret per formam. Forma igitur esset anima.

VI.11.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 11

Eighth argument: the soul is life or the source of life.

VI.11.1

We take the soul to be a certain nature which either is a kind of life or has life as its companion and attendant, since bodies receive life through the soul. A body is necessarily divided into several parts. One kind of body is composed of several elements; another is an element, not gathered from other elements but constituted of form and matter. If you say that the soul is a body constructed from several elements, we shall ask whether each of those elements has life by itself, apart from the others; whether none has life but together they produce it; or whether some one of them possesses life. If each has life of itself, there are as many souls present as there are elements. There is then not one soul compounded of many parts, but many souls inhabiting the same seat. If none of them has life, they will never create life by coming together. And if life does arise in their conjunction, it will arise not by their own power, since they themselves lack life, but rather by the power of something that orders their conjunction. This is especially so because we must admit that, even if life is constituted by the conjunction of many things, it is not generated in them however they happen to meet, but only when they meet according to a definite order and way. The soul itself will therefore certainly be the inward orderer of that conjunction, giving life in its own manner to the things that flow together. If you say that something among the many elements has life, that thing alone will itself be the soul; no other elements beyond it will be needed to generate the soul. The soul, therefore, must in no way be thought a body constituted from several elements. Nor is it a single element. For every element is composed of matter and form. If such an element lived, it would live not through matter—since formless matter can give life neither to anything else nor to itself—but through form. The form, then, would be the soul.

Caput 11, continuatur

VI.11.2

Quin etiam si anima est corpus, sive elementum sit sive simile quiddam, et seu simplex seu compositum, certe, ita ut dicam, vel similiter erit affectum, scilicet calidum vel frigidum, siccum vel humidum, leve vel grave, rarum vel densum, fluxum, solidum, album, nigrum, atque similia. Si calidum, calefaciet solum. Si leve, alta petet. Et omnino qualecumque corpus sit, secundum naturam propriam operabitur et effectum naturae suae oppositum numquam aget. Non enim frigidum calefacit. Est autem cuiuslibet corporis certa et determinata natura ac forma, sicut locus terminatus est, et certum tempus, et finita potentia. Igitur cuiusque corporis determinata operatio est et ad effectus contrarios non extenditur. Anima vero ad contraria quaelibet vim habere videtur. Nam et in diversis corporibus animalium et in eodem multa inter se efficit repugnantia. Sistit, movet, contrahit, extendit, rarefacit, condensat, acuit, obtundit, aperit, claudit, fundit et solidat. Contrarios odores, sapores atque colores, oppositas vires et figuras humoribus membrisque tradit; leves spiritus deorsum movet ad pedes, graves humores sursum ducit ad caput. Quod fit contra corporum naturam. Agitat corpus in omnem partem: sursum contra gravium elementorum pondera, deorsum contra levium sublimitatem, in latus et in circuitum contra omnem corporis facultatem. Cum ergo omnes ferme effectus inter se contrarios faciat, et ad repugnantes motus ita sit compos ut praeter corporum ordinem moveat, quis adeo demens erit ut aut corpus aut eius qualitatem sive qualitatis aliquid esse animam fateatur?

VI.11.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 11, continued

VI.11.2

Moreover, if the soul is a body—whether an element or something like one, whether simple or composite—it will surely, so to speak, have one or another such condition: hot or cold, dry or moist, light or heavy, rare or dense, fluid or solid, white or black, and the like. If it is hot, it will only heat; if light, it will seek the heights. Whatever kind of body it may be, it will act according to its own nature and will never produce an effect opposed to that nature. What is cold does not heat. Every body, moreover, has a fixed and determinate nature and form, just as it has a bounded place, a definite time, and a finite power. The operation of every body is therefore determinate and does not extend to contrary effects. The soul, by contrast, appears to possess power over every kind of contrary. Both in the different bodies of animals and within the same body, it produces many effects opposed to one another. It brings to rest and sets in motion; contracts and extends; rarefies and condenses; sharpens and dulls; opens and closes; makes fluid and makes solid. It gives contrary odors, tastes, and colors, as well as opposed powers and shapes, to the humors and members. It moves light spirits downward to the feet and draws heavy humors upward to the head, contrary to the nature of bodies. It drives the body in every direction: upward against the weight of the heavy elements, downward against the loftiness of the light, sideways and in a circle against every capacity of body. Since, then, the soul produces almost every effect together with its contrary and commands opposing motions so as to move beyond the order of bodies, who could be so senseless as to admit that the soul is either a body, a quality of body, or anything belonging to such a quality?

Caput 12

Nona ratio: corpus se ipsum non movet.

VI.12.1

Quod vere et primo est per se ipsum mobile, ita ut ipsum omnino idem sit et fons et receptaculum motionis, secundum se totum per se mobile debet esse, sicut in ceteris omnibus apparet quaecumque per se et primo sic talia quaedam dicuntur esse vel talia; sicut quod ita est clarum, secundum se totum est clarum. Quod ita bonum, totum bonum est. Quod ita intellectum, intellectuale est totum. Nam essentia quae primo effundit qualitatem aliquam et amplectitur suscipitque primo, quia perfecte agit utrumque, efficit utrumque per totum.

VI.12.2

Oportet autem in natura alicubi reperiri essentiam illo modo per se sive ex se mobilem, atque animam esse talem, ut libris superioribus demonstravimus. Corpus autem etiam si fingatur per se primoque esse mobile, nondum tamen secundum se totum poterit esse tale. Quoniam oporteret quamlibet eius partem a se ipsa moveri, et partium partes atque particulas. Nam si una particula sit in corpore quae se non moveat, non erit corpus illud secundum se totum ex se mobile. Atque ita non vere et primo erit tale, sed alterius cuiusdam primo talis participatione atque praesentia. Quare ad hoc ut perfecte per se mobile sit, concedendum esset quaslibet eius particulas a se ipsis moveri. Illae dividuntur in infinitum. Unde innumerabiles erunt illae particulae quae se movebunt. Quod movet agit; quod agit existit actu. Erunt igitur infinitae partes in actu sese agitantes et infiniti in quovis corpore mundi motores.

Chapter 12

Ninth argument: a body does not move itself.

VI.12.1

Whatever is truly and primarily self-moving—so that one and the same thing is wholly both the source and the receptacle of motion—must be self-moving throughout itself. This is evident in all other things that are said to be such in themselves and primarily: what is clear in this way is clear throughout itself; what is good in this way is wholly good; what is understood in this way is wholly intelligible. For an essence that first pours forth some quality, and first embraces and receives it, performs both offices perfectly and brings both about throughout itself.

VI.12.2

There must, however, be found somewhere in nature an essence self-moving or moved from itself in just this way; and the soul is such an essence, as we showed in the preceding books. But even if body is supposed to be self-moving in the primary sense, it still cannot be so throughout itself. For every part of it would have to be moved by itself, as would the parts and particles of those parts. If there were a single particle in the body that did not move itself, the body would not be moved from itself throughout. It would therefore not be truly and primarily self-moving, but would be so through the participation and presence of some other thing that is such primarily. Hence, for the body to be perfectly self-moving, every one of its particles would have to be moved by itself. Those particles are divisible to infinity, and thus the particles that move themselves will be innumerable. What moves acts, and what acts exists in actuality. There will therefore be infinitely many parts actively moving themselves, and infinitely many movers in every body in the world.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.3

Immo vero non erunt partes illae alterius corporis, ex eo ipso quod actu erunt suo, sed quaelibet per se tota consistet, atque erit infinita quaedam multitudo corpusculorum existens actu. Impossibile autem est talem esse multitudinem in natura. Quoniam igitur nequeunt esse corporis partes actu infinitae, immo vero neque actu quidem revera esse omnino, quando nullum habent esse proprium, sed sub ipso esse totius compositi continentur, sequitur ut partes corporis sese non moveant, ne propter hoc actu cogantur esse et actu penitus infinitae. Concludamus igitur corpus non posse vere primoque per se mobile esse, cum ipsi secundum se totum id competere nequeat, quando partes eius assequi id non valent, ut se moveant.

VI.12.4

Ad idem rursus alia via progrediamur. Quando aliquis corpus asserit movere se ipsum, ex iis quattuor unum aliquid potissimum compellitur confiteri: aut partem corporis alteram moveri ab altera; aut totum a parte; aut a toto partem; aut totum a toto, id est ab omnibus partibus partes omnes. Si primum affirmetur, cum aliud quiddam sit pars altera, aliud altera, non idem movebit se ipsum, sed aliud potius aliud. Neque ex hoc corpus illud compositum vere movebit se ipsum, cum sit ex aliquibus partibus constitutum quae se non movent, sed duo quaedam habebit in se distincta invicem, quorum alterum moveat alterum. Si secundum illud divisionis membrum acceperis, scilicet quod pars movet totum, vel tertium, scilicet quod totum movet partem, nondum vere compositum illud sese agitat. Aliud namque partem, aliud totum esse volumus. Atque illa pars quae movet totum movet utique omnes partes. Ideoque in numero aliarum partium etiam se ipsam mutat.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.3

Indeed, those parts will not be parts of another body at all, precisely because each will exist in its own actuality. Each will instead subsist as a complete thing by itself, and there will be an infinite multitude of little bodies existing in actuality. But no such multitude can exist in nature. Since, therefore, the parts of a body cannot be actually infinite—and indeed cannot, in truth, even exist in actuality at all, since they have no being of their own but are contained under the being of the composite whole—it follows that the parts of a body do not move themselves. Otherwise they would be forced for that reason to exist in actuality and to be actually infinite without qualification. Let us conclude, then, that body cannot be truly and primarily self-moving, since this cannot belong to it throughout itself when its parts cannot attain self-motion.

VI.12.4

Let us approach the same conclusion again by another path. When someone asserts that a body moves itself, he is compelled to admit one chiefly among four possibilities: one part of the body is moved by another; the whole is moved by a part; a part is moved by the whole; or the whole is moved by the whole—that is, all the parts by all the parts. If the first is affirmed, since one part is one thing and the other another, the same thing will not move itself; one thing will instead move another. Nor on this account will the composite body truly move itself, since it is constituted of parts that do not move themselves. It will merely contain two things distinct from one another, one of which moves the other. If you accept the second member of the division, namely that a part moves the whole, or the third, that the whole moves a part, the composite still does not truly move itself. For we take a part to be one thing and the whole another. And the part that moves the whole must move every part; consequently, among the other parts it also changes itself.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.5

Similiter si totum movere partem dicatur, per omnes partes unam commovet partem. Ergo unam quandam solummodo agitat quodammodo per se ipsam. Vides in his duobus divisionis illius membris non posse aliter dici totum illud movere se ipsum, nisi per partem illam sui quae sese agitat, per alias minime. Atque ita non totum illud revera erit per se mobile, sed pars forsan illa totius, quae etiam pars eius non erit, cum per se aliquid operetur. Quod si quartum concesseris, scilicet totum a toto moveri, cum totum fortasse non sit aliud quam cunctae simul partes, fateberis partes omnes ab omnibus permutari. Ubi compositum illud non aliam ob causam affirmari debet movere se ipsum nisi quia pars quaelibet eius agitat semetipsam.

VI.12.6

Quapropter ad partem semper confugere cogeris per se mobile corpus affirmaturus. Quod in primis idcirco damnamus, quia corpus illud compositum non erit proprie per se mobile, postquam id ab alio, id est a partibus, mutuatur. Nam ratione partium dicitur per se mobile. Licet enim corpus illud quodammodo cunctas simul partes esse constet, tamen motum huiusmodi mutuari videtur a singulis, sicut et substantiam suam a singulis accipit. Responde quaeso de illa parte vel partibus illis quarum ratione totum asseritur sese movere, ex eo quod illae se movent: suntne individuae? Si sunt, profecto quod sese movet non corpus est, sed individuum quiddam in corpore, cuius impulsu et corpus sponte sua ferri videtur. Sin dividuae, illa similiter partiemur, ut et totum iam secuimus. Atque eadem ratione comperiemus nullo modo affirmari posse de illis partibus quod per se moveantur, nisi ratione particularum quae se moveant.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.5

Similarly, if the whole is said to move a part, it moves that one part through all the parts. Thus, in a certain way, it moves only that one part by itself. You see that in these two members of the division the whole can be said to move itself only through the part of it that moves itself, and not at all through the other parts. The whole, therefore, will not in truth be self-moving; perhaps only that part of the whole will be—and it will not even be a part of the whole if it performs something of itself. But if you grant the fourth possibility, that the whole is moved by the whole, then, since the whole may be nothing other than all the parts together, you will admit that all the parts are changed by all. In that case the composite should be said to move itself for no other reason than that every one of its parts moves itself.

VI.12.6

Accordingly, whenever you wish to affirm that a body is self-moving, you will be forced to take refuge in a part. We condemn this at the outset because the composite body will not be self-moving in the proper sense once it borrows that power from something else—namely, its parts. It is called self-moving by reason of its parts. Although that body may in some way be nothing other than all its parts together, it nevertheless seems to borrow this sort of motion from each of them, just as it receives its substance from each. Tell me, then, about the part or parts by reason of which the whole is asserted to move itself because they move themselves: are they indivisible? If they are, what moves itself is certainly not a body, but something indivisible within a body, by whose impulse the body too seems to be borne along of its own accord. If they are divisible, we shall divide them just as we have already divided the whole. By the same reasoning, we shall discover that they can in no way be said to move themselves except by reason of particles that move themselves.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.7

De particulis similiter perscrutabimur. Quae quoniam in infinitum distribuuntur, novos semper et plurimos motores inveniemus; neque umquam perveniemus ad unum, cum dividendo semper plurimos habeamus. Neque umquam ad primos aut primum, cum dividamus similiter infinite. Nusquam igitur est in substantia corporis unus ac primus ipsius motor. Quam ob rem nullam in se habet sui motus originem per quam revera asseri valeat ex se ipso moveri, sed ad impartibile aliquid compellimur devenire, unde nascatur omnis corporalis agitationis origo. Internus autem corporis agitator est anima, qua praesente corpora sua sponte quodammodo et in omnem partem feruntur. Absente vero anima externo indigent commovente.

VI.12.8

Si ista quoque sit corpus, eget ipsa quoque movente, movente, inquam, intrinseco, siquidem absque impulsu externo viventia quaeque moventur. Ille quidem motor intimus anima ipsa erit, quam per se oportet moveri, quandoquidem corpora per animam vim sese movendi habere videntur. Omne autem tale ad naturam aliquam vere sui met agitatricem est reducendum. Ita anima proprie per se movetur, si eius participatione facultatem cetera nanciscuntur ut per se quodammodo moveantur. Haec igitur non est corpus, sed neque etiam forma in corpore dissipata. Nam haec etiam per rationes superiores se movere non valet, iisdem subiecta quibus et corpus conditionibus, ut apparuit.

VI.12.7-VI.12.8 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.7

We shall examine the particles in the same way. Since they are divisible to infinity, we shall always find new and ever more numerous movers. We shall never arrive at one, because division always leaves us with many; nor shall we ever arrive at the first movers or the first mover, because our division proceeds without end. Nowhere, therefore, in the substance of body is there one first mover belonging to it. Body accordingly possesses within itself no origin of its own motion by which it could truly be said to move from itself. We are instead compelled to arrive at something impartible from which the origin of all bodily motion arises. The inward mover of body is the soul: while it is present, bodies are in a certain way borne of their own accord in every direction; when the soul is absent, they need something external to set them in motion.

VI.12.8

If this inward mover too were a body, it too would need a mover—an inward mover, I mean—since all living things move without an external impulse. That innermost mover will therefore be the soul itself, which must move of itself, because bodies appear to possess through soul the power of moving themselves. Everything of this kind must be referred back to some nature that is truly its own mover. Thus the soul moves properly of itself if, by participating in it, other things acquire the capacity to move in some manner of themselves. The soul, then, is not a body, nor is it a form scattered throughout a body. Such a form likewise cannot move itself by the arguments given above, for it is subject to the same conditions as body, as has become clear.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.9

Ubi cavillatio illa excluditur, qua nonnulli contendunt ostendere corpus aliquod per se moveri, dicentes ipsum ex materia et forma vel ex quattuor elementis ita componi, ut alia quaedam natura praeter materiam et formam et quattuor elementa proveniat, quae sit totius integritas, quae se ipsam moveat, quia per formam habet hoc ut moveat, per materiam ut moveatur. Talis obiectio adversus Platonicos nihil valet: tum quia in alia essentia erit radix per quam movere, in alia per quam moveri videbitur. Oportet tamen ad aliquam essentiam pervenire quae sit et fons et receptaculum motionis et vitae, quemadmodum ad aliquam pervenitur quae lucis, et ad aliquam quae caloris radix est simul et fundamentum. Tum quia natura illa quae est totius integritas, si quantitate protenditur, non magis poterit ex se ipsa moveri quam moles ipsa corporea, ut supra monstravimus. Sin autem indivisibilis est, iam, ut cupiebamus, ad naturam pervenimus incorpoream, in qua sit sui ipsius agitandi potestas.

VI.12.10

Non quod in se ipsam agat et patiatur. Motio enim in ea non transitum significat ab agente in patiens, sed naturalem essentiae illius vicissitudinem, qua suarum affectionum variat vices, atque ita per se discurrit, non agitante alio; ut per se calet ignis, neque alio calefaciente, neque parte sui alia in aliam fundente calorem. Motus igitur animalis cum non sit a corpore, quod est sua natura pigrum, neque sit a solo composito, in quo non erit vis ulla movendi, si ex partibus talibus sit conflatum in quibus nulla vis sit ad motum, necessario est ab anima; quae si vim migrandi ex otio in actum tribuit animali, multo magis priusque tribuit ipsa sibi. Quicquid enim boni actusque vitalis a causa traducitur in effectum, prius explicatur in causa. Sic enim calor calet fervetque secum ipse prius quam materiam aliam calefaciat. Et animata corpora turgent seminibus fetusque concipiunt in se ipsis prius quam partus edant. Dum igitur anima vitalem a potentia in actum progressionem explicat in se ipsa, dicitur a se ipsa moveri.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.9

This excludes the quibble by which some try to show that a body can move itself. They say that it is composed of matter and form, or of the four elements, in such a way that some further nature arises beyond matter and form or the four elements. This nature, they claim, is the integrity of the whole and moves itself, because through form it has the power to move and through matter the capacity to be moved. Such an objection has no force against the Platonists. First, the root through which the thing moves will lie in one essence, and the root through which it appears to be moved in another. Yet we must arrive at some essence that is both the source and the receptacle of motion and life, just as we arrive at one essence that is the root of light and another that is at once the root and foundation of heat. Second, if the nature that is the integrity of the whole is extended in quantity, it will no more be able to move from itself than the corporeal mass itself, as we showed above. But if it is indivisible, we have now reached, as we wished, an incorporeal nature possessing the power to move itself.

VI.12.10

This does not mean that the soul acts upon itself and is acted upon. For motion in it does not signify a passage from agent to patient, but the natural alternation of that essence, by which it varies the successive states of its own affections. Thus it ranges through them of itself, with nothing else acting upon it—just as fire is hot of itself, without something else heating it or one part of the fire pouring heat into another. Since the motion of an animal does not come from body, which is inert by its nature, nor from the composite alone—which will have no power to move if it is compounded of parts in which there is no such power—it must necessarily come from soul. And if the soul gives the animal the power to pass from rest into act, it gives that power first and still more fully to itself. For whatever good and vital act is carried from a cause into its effect is first unfolded in the cause. Heat is itself hot and seethes within itself before it heats other matter; animate bodies swell with seed and conceive offspring within themselves before they bring forth their young. Thus, when the soul unfolds within itself life's advance from potency into act, it is said to move itself.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.11

Motum quidem in anima proprie actionem Platonici nominant, quoniam in fonte suo fit, formetque corpus et agitet. In corpore vero motum nominant passionem. Cumque molem corpoream etiam universi oporteat moveri ab alio, concludunt universi corporis motum passionem esse a motu animae universalis tamquam ab actione quadam illatum. Et quemadmodum in quolibet genere imperfecta semper ad perfecta reducunt, ita motum corporis imperfectum ad animae motum tamquam perfectum in ipso motionis genere referunt.

VI.12.12

Proinde cum quaeritur quonam motu praecipue anima moveatur, respondent: non corporali, est enim incorporea; non imaginabili, caret enim figura; non cognitivo, ignorat enim se ipsam; sed motu secundum essentiam vitalem. Sicut enim essentiae actus est esse, atque intellectus ipsius actus est intelligere, sic vitae actus est vivere. Non enim adventitiam, sed ex se ipsa possidet vitam; atque, ut illorum verbis utar, anima est vita se generans et producens. Vita vero omnis est motus. Quare si omne vivens movetur, etiam quod per se vivit per se quoque movetur; atque quod vivit semper, movetur et semper, non intellectuali videlicet motu, sed vitali. Quapropter semper movetur et non semper. Nam mens quidem secundum potentiam est, vita vero secundum actum. Denique essentia semper vivit, perpetuumque intrinsecus exercet motum, quoniam essentialis vita semper est mobilis. Vires autem et actus quae tam circa vitam quam circa intellectum contingunt vel intermitti vel aberrare quandoque possunt.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.11

The Platonists properly call motion in the soul an action, because it takes place in its own source and both forms and moves the body. Motion in the body, however, they call a passion. And since even the corporeal mass of the universe must be moved by another, they conclude that the motion of the universal body is a passion brought upon it by the motion of the universal soul, as though by an action. Just as in every kind they always refer imperfect things back to perfect ones, so they refer the imperfect motion of body back to the soul's motion as perfect within the very kind of motion.

VI.12.12

Accordingly, when the Platonists are asked by what motion the soul is chiefly moved, they answer: not a corporeal motion, for it is incorporeal; not an imaginable motion, for it has no shape; not a cognitive motion, for it does not know itself; but a motion according to its vital essence. Just as the act of essence is to be, and the act of intellect is to understand, so the act of life is to live. For the soul possesses life not as something adventitious but from itself; and, to use their words, the soul is life generating and producing itself. All life, moreover, is motion. Therefore, if every living thing is moved, what lives of itself also moves of itself; and what lives always is always moved—not, to be sure, by an intellectual motion, but by a vital one. Hence the soul is always moved and not always moved. The mind exists in potency, but life in act. In short, the essence always lives and perpetually exercises motion within itself, since essential life is always mobile; yet the powers and acts that attend both life and intellect can sometimes be interrupted or go astray.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.13

Idem nobis tertia haec sequens ratio persuadet. Motus omnes hi sunt: alteratio, generatio, corruptio, augmentum, decrementum, condensatio, rarefactio, progressio. Numquid secundum alterationem se ipsum movet corpus? Nequaquam. Si enim se debeat calefacere, calorem habeat oportet quem sibimet tribuat. Oportet etiam ut non habeat, si modo sit accepturum. Non enim accipit quisquam quod possidet. Ergo ut calefacit calidum iam est; ut calefit nondum est calidum. Dictu quidem ridiculum istud, habere aliquid simul et non habere; nisi forte quis aquam dicat frigiditatem quandam secundum virtutem habere, quam retineat etiam postquam igne fuerit calefacta, per quam remota ab igne ad frigiditatem secundum actum iterum revertatur. Huic Platonici respondebunt: vel aquam illam ab elementis extrinsecis frigefieri; vel si qualitas eius secundum actum, quae aliquantum ad naturam vergit incorporalem, pullulat ex intrinseca illa virtute qualitatis productivae, quae quidem virtus etiam multo magis naturae incorporali propinquat, sequi ut virtus huiusmodi rursus a substantia quadam scaturiat, quae penitus incorporalis existat. Substantia vero huiusmodi erit principium motus in corpore.

VI.12.14

Nullum igitur corpus alteratione se ipsum movet. Sed neque etiam se ipsum generat, quia quod generat aliud generato dat esse. Habet igitur genitor esse quod tribuit genito. Quod generatur aliunde accipit esse quod ipsum non possidet. Nihil igitur sibi potest esse tribuere. Haberet enim ipsum simul et non haberet. Et cum genitor genitum antecedat, qui sui ipsius secundum finitam naturam genitor est et genitus, se ipso simul prior est atque posterior, quod in natura finita nemo utique finxerit. Atqui neque corrumpit etiam se ipsum corpus. Quippe cum res quaeque prolem suam ex natura propria generet, atque ideo sibi convenientem proferat non contrariam, sequitur ut naturalis rei cuiusque instinctus, qui proles quaedam est essentiae atque ipsius esse, contra essentiam et esse non surgat. Nulla ergo res instinctu suo ducitur ad non esse, nedum sui, sed neque alterius cuiusquam. Immo cum rei cuiusque nixus ad se ipsam servandam proficiscatur, in contrarium non flectetur.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.13

The following third argument persuades us of the same conclusion. All motions are these: alteration, generation, corruption, increase, decrease, condensation, rarefaction, and progression. Does a body move itself by alteration? Not at all. If it is to heat itself, it must possess the heat that it gives itself. Yet it must also not possess that heat if it is to receive it, for no one receives what he already possesses. Thus, insofar as the body heats, it is already hot; insofar as it is heated, it is not yet hot. It is plainly absurd to say that the same thing both has and does not have something at once. Perhaps someone will say that water possesses a certain coldness virtually, which it retains even after fire has heated it, and through which, once removed from the fire, it returns again to coldness in act. The Platonists will reply in either of two ways. Either the water is cooled by external elements; or, if its actual quality—which approaches somewhat toward incorporeal nature—springs from an inward power productive of quality, and if that power approaches still nearer to incorporeal nature, it follows that such a power in turn springs from some substance that is wholly incorporeal. A substance of this kind will be the principle of motion in the body.

VI.12.14

No body, then, moves itself by alteration. Nor does a body generate itself. For whatever generates another gives being to what it generates. The begetter therefore possesses the being it gives the begotten, whereas what is generated receives from elsewhere the being it does not itself possess. Nothing, then, can give itself being; it would both possess being and not possess it at once. And since the begetter precedes the begotten, whatever within finite nature were both its own begetter and its own offspring would be at once prior and posterior to itself—something no one would suppose possible in a finite nature. Nor, again, does a body corrupt itself. For every thing generates its offspring from its own nature and therefore brings forth what accords with it, not what is contrary to it. It follows that the natural impulse of each thing, which is a kind of offspring of its essence and of its very being, does not rise against essence and being. No thing, therefore, is led by its own impulse toward non-being—least of all its own non-being, but not that of anything else either. Indeed, since the striving of each thing sets out to preserve itself, it will not be turned in the contrary direction.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.15

Sed neque auget se ipsum corpus aut minuit. Non enim fieri id sine alteratione contingit, ac etiam generatione quadam et corruptione. Nam per qualitatum alterationem crescimus et decrescimus. Et dum crescimus, novae in nobis partes corporis generantur. Dum decrescimus, veteres corrumpuntur. Si ergo incrementum et decrementum alteratione generationeque et corruptione indigent, corpus quod per alterationem, generationem, corruptionem se non movet, neque augendo quidem movet se ipsum vel minuendo; neque etiam condensat se ipsum vel rarefacit, quoniam sine alteratione ista quoque non fiunt.

VI.12.16

Dixerit forte quispiam: corpus saltem per se loco mutatur per transitum vel circuitum. Hoc quoque impossibile dictu. Si enim ad superiores illos motus qui interni sunt est impotens, multo magis erit impotens ad externos. Motus quidem externos voco circuitum atque transitum, qui ad terminos remotiores tendunt quam motus interni. Itaque si corpus non valet per se moveri ad terminos proprios, quonam pacto poterit ad terminos alienos? Quam ob rem sic iam concludamus. Nulli apparent in corporibus alii motus praeter illos octo iam numeratos. Per nullum illorum ex se ipsis aguntur. Ergo nullo modo ex se corpora agitantur.

VI.12.17

Moventur tamen, ut cuique constat, a natura quadam intrinsecus agitante, etiam sine externis impulsibus. Hanc animam esse Platonicus nemo negaverit, quam moveri per se possibile est, quia in ea alii quidam praeter octo illos alterius naturae motus reperiuntur. Quantum ad partem spectat qua regitur corpus, reperitur in anima temporalis vicissitudo seminum alias aliter in ea emergentium ad corporalia generanda. Quantum vero ad partem animae pertinet quae in cognitione versatur, inest in ipsa de cognitione affectioneque alia in aliam discursus temporalis. Ab effectibus naturae ultimis in superna principia per causas medias temporalis ascensio. Ac vicissim a supernis principiis per medias causas ad ultimos effectus descensio.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.15

Nor does a body increase or diminish itself. For neither can occur without alteration and without a kind of generation and corruption. We grow and diminish through changes of qualities: while we grow, new bodily parts are generated in us; while we diminish, old ones are corrupted. If, then, increase and decrease require alteration, generation, and corruption, a body that does not move itself through alteration, generation, or corruption does not move itself by increasing or diminishing either. Nor does it condense or rarefy itself, since these motions too do not occur without alteration.

VI.12.16

Someone may perhaps say that a body at least changes its place of itself, either by passing from one place to another or by circular motion. But this too is impossible to maintain. For if body is powerless with respect to the preceding motions, which are internal, it will be still more powerless with respect to external motions. By external motions I mean circular motion and passage, which extend to termini more remote than those of internal motions. Thus, if a body cannot of itself be moved to its own termini, how could it be moved to termini that belong to something else? Let us therefore now conclude as follows. No motions appear in bodies other than the eight already enumerated. Through none of them are bodies driven by themselves. Therefore bodies are in no way moved from themselves.

VI.12.17

Yet bodies are moved, as everyone knows, by a certain nature acting from within, even without external impulses. No Platonist will deny that this nature is the soul, which can move itself because motions of another nature, beyond those eight, are found in it. Insofar as the part by which the body is governed is concerned, the soul contains a temporal succession of seeds arising within it now in one fashion and now in another to generate corporeal things. Insofar as that part of the soul which is occupied in cognition is concerned, it contains a temporal passage from one cognition and affection to another: a temporal ascent from the lowest effects of nature through intermediate causes to the highest principles, and conversely a descent from the highest principles through intermediate causes to the lowest effects.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.18

Hae discursiones motiones quaedam sunt et naturae animi propriae, ut alias declaravimus. Non enim Deo vel angelis congruunt, qui simul omnia possident atque vident. Non corporibus competunt, quae per se nihil agunt. Non formis corporeis, quae ad incorporalia non moventur. Huiusmodi vero discursiones ad divina nos ducentes supra naturam corporis elevant. Efferri vero supra naturam suam neque corpus neque aliud quicquam per se ipsum valet. Igitur revolutiones tales quae sunt a corporibus alienae, animo tamen insunt, testantur animam vel corpus vel formam divisam in corpore esse non posse. Praesertim cum anima secundum illas per se, id est per naturam ac vim propriam, agitetur, ideoque per se moveatur, quod nequit corpus.

VI.12.19

Praeterea apparent in anima motionum corporalium exemplaria. Generationis, quando divinis haeret. Corruptionis, quando mortalibus. Augmenti, quando reminiscitur. Decrementi, quando obliviscitur. Alterationis, quando variat vices affectionum. Condensationis, prout subito aliquid intuetur vel sese colligit. Rarefactionis, prout discurrit vel circa multa distrahitur. Progressionis in rectum, cum primum attingit externa. Circuitus autem, cum vel in rebus ipsis effectum resolvit in causam et a causa deducit effectum, vel in se ipsam considerandam reflectitur. Moveri rursus videtur in rectum, quando ad corpus sensumque declinat. In obliquum, quando in se angelumve reflectitur. In circulum, quando in Deum principium finemque suum. Sursum ad universalia. Deorsum ad particularia. Ad dexteram quoque atque sinistram in oppositas videlicet generis differentias. Denique ante et retro, quando ad causas naturales effectusve se vertit.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.18

These courses of reasoning are a kind of motion proper to the nature of the soul, as we have explained elsewhere. They do not belong to God or the angels, who possess and see all things at once; nor to bodies, which do nothing of themselves; nor to corporeal forms, which are not moved toward incorporeal things. Yet courses of reasoning of this kind, by leading us to divine things, raise us above the nature of body. Neither body nor anything else can of itself be carried above its own nature. Such revolutions, therefore, although alien to bodies, are nevertheless present in the soul and testify that the soul can be neither a body nor a form divided throughout a body. This is especially so because in these revolutions the soul is moved of itself—that is, by its own nature and power—and therefore moves itself, which body cannot do.

VI.12.19

Moreover, exemplars of corporeal motions appear in the soul. There is an exemplar of generation when it cleaves to divine things; of corruption when it cleaves to mortal things; of increase when it recollects; of decrease when it forgets; of alteration when it varies the succession of its affections; of condensation when it suddenly beholds something or gathers itself together; of rarefaction when it ranges abroad or is distracted among many things; and of progression in a straight line when it first reaches external things. There is an exemplar of circular motion when, within things themselves, it resolves an effect into its cause and derives the effect from the cause, or when it turns back to contemplate itself. Again it seems to move in a straight line when it descends toward body and sense; obliquely when it turns back upon itself or toward an angel; in a circle when it turns toward God, its beginning and end; upward toward universals; downward toward particulars; to the right and left toward the opposed differences of a kind; and finally forward and backward when it turns toward natural causes or effects.

Caput 12, continuatur

VI.12.20

Quis neget animam motionum fontem esse, cum in ea proprii motus sint et motionum corporalium exemplaria, in quibus contra corporis naturam ipsa sese generat quodammodo vel, ut ita dixerim, quasi corrumpit, auget minuitque, et transfert, et reliqua? Merito igitur per eius praesentiam corpora viventia facultatem hanc adipiscuntur, ut sese alterent, nutriant, augeant, dum ex se aliquid generant in se ipsis. Ac rursus ut ex se gradiantur quocumque iudicaverint gradiendum. Quorum nihil efficiunt quae non vivunt, quasi spontaneus motus vitae sit proprius.

Chapter 12, continued

VI.12.20

Who can deny that the soul is the source of motions, when it possesses motions of its own and exemplars of bodily motions? In these it acts against the nature of body, in a certain manner generating itself—or, so to speak, as though corrupting, increasing, diminishing, and transporting itself, and performing the rest. It is therefore fitting that through the soul's presence living bodies acquire this power: they alter, nourish, and increase themselves, generating within themselves something from themselves; and again they proceed of themselves wherever they have judged they should go. Things that do not live accomplish none of these acts, as though spontaneous motion were proper to life.

Caput 13

Decima ratio: anima non crescit ad corporis huius augmentum.

VI.13.1

Si anima corpus est, implet certe corpus istud quod vides solidum, ut vivat totum; et ipsa tenue atque agile corpus est, quod animi celeritas indicat. Quare si corpus animalis partiaris in membra, sicut frusta omnia corporis corpora sunt, ita corpuscula illa quae in membris sectis supersunt sunt animae. Praesertim cum anima unius sit tota naturae, ut diversa coniungat. Vivent igitur, movebuntur et sentient ad tempus brachia et crura a corpore separata.

VI.13.2

Et anima quae in reliquo restat corpore, quae saepe brachiis et cruribus amputatis vivit ibi decennium, multo erit minor quam antea. Ideo pusillanimis erit, hebes, obliviosa. Immo etiam sic argumentemur.

VI.13.3

Si anima corpus est, manifesti huius corporis magnitudinem quantitate sua penitus aequans, crescente ipso crescet, decrescente decrescet. In vasto corpore magnificentior erit et divinior animus. Atque in eodem homine, quando adolescente corpore adolescet et anima, oportebit ut per adiunctionem corporis sibi similis adolescat. Alimentum huiusmodi vivitne in se antequam ab anima capiatur, an non? Si non vivit, quonam pacto vitam animae praestat et auget, quod et vita caret, et antequam vitam animae mutuet, oportet ipsum vitam ab anima mutuari? Si vivit, iam habet animam.

VI.13.4

Novae igitur quotidie animae a nobis hauriuntur ad nostrae huius animae nutrimentum. Transit autem semper alimonia in eius naturam quod alitur. Itaque multae quotidie animae a natura perdentur, ut una servetur anima, quod bonitas naturae non patitur.

VI.13.1-VI.13.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 13

Tenth argument: the soul does not increase with the growth of this body.

VI.13.1

If the soul is a body, it certainly fills the solid body you see so that the whole may live; and the soul itself is a subtle and agile body, as the swiftness of the soul indicates. Therefore, if you divide an animal's body into its members, then, just as all the severed pieces of the body are bodies, so the little bodies that remain in the severed members are souls—especially since the whole soul is of a single nature, so that it may bind diverse things together. Arms and legs separated from the body will therefore live, move, and feel for a time.

VI.13.2

And the soul that remains in the rest of the body—often living there for ten years after the arms and legs have been amputated—will be much smaller than before. It will therefore be small-souled, dull, and forgetful. Indeed, let us argue further in this way.

VI.13.3

If the soul is a body, fully matching by its own quantity the magnitude of this visible body, it will grow as the body grows and diminish as the body diminishes. In a vast body the soul will be more magnificent and more divine. And when, in the same human being, the soul grows as the body matures, it will have to grow by the addition of a body like itself. Does food of this kind live in itself before it is taken up by the soul, or not? If it does not live, how can what lacks life bestow life on the soul and increase it? Before it could lend life to the soul, it would itself have to borrow life from the soul. If it lives, it already has a soul.

VI.13.4

Every day, then, new souls are drawn into us to nourish this soul of ours. For nourishment always passes into the nature of what is nourished. Many souls will therefore be destroyed by nature each day so that one soul may be preserved—something the goodness of nature does not permit.

Caput 13, continuatur

VI.13.5

Immo vero neque prior anima nostra servabitur, si substantia sua assidue subterfugiat. Unde novas animas cogatur sibi semper adsciscere, per quas anima iugiter innovetur. Verum quonam pacto recens anima cum priori consentit?

VI.13.6

Quomodo, si continue effluit aliquid ab anima nostra et influit in animam alimentum, sicut fieri in carne videmus, manet voluntas eadem in plerisque semper? Idem mos, opinio eadem et scientia, perpetuaque eiusdem rei memoria? Quomodo post decennium agnoscimus illa statim visa quae ante decennium videramus, nisi earundem rerum nobis acceptae quondam incolumes adhuc serventur imagines? Quis eas servat nisi idem qui acceperat et iudicaverat animus? Quo pacto servat, si non servatur? Qua ratione non stante animo stabunt imagines et scientiae?

VI.13.7

Neque dicat quisquam stare diu animum, si corpus fuerit. Quod enim corpus sub caelo manere in eodem statu potest diu, caelo ipso tam celeriter percurrente? Proinde si corpus aliquod tale sit ut maneat aliquantum, corpora tamen subtilia et agilia minime omnium permanebunt. Anima vero si corpus sit tenuissimum sit oportet, ut visceribus suffusa facillime cuncta vivificet. Ideo et ossa et nervi diutius consistent quam anima, immo etiam caro, quae tamen brevi tempore labitur et renovatur in dies. Erit autem anima flatus alicuius instar, instabilis prorsus et momentis singulis evanescens. Quapropter neque diem quidem unum scientias rerum imaginesque servabit.

Chapter 13, continued

VI.13.5

Indeed, not even our former soul will be preserved if its substance is continually slipping away. It will therefore be forced always to summon new souls to itself, through which the soul is ceaselessly renewed. But how does a newly arrived soul agree with the one that came before it?

VI.13.6

If something is continually flowing out of our soul and nourishment is flowing into it, as we see happen in the flesh, how does the same will endure always in most people? How do the same character, the same opinion and knowledge, and the perpetual memory of the same thing endure? How, after ten years, do we recognize at once things we had seen ten years before unless the images of those same things, once received by us, are still preserved intact? Who preserves them if not the same soul that had received and judged them? How can it preserve them if it is not itself preserved? If the soul does not remain, by what account will images and knowledge remain?

VI.13.7

Nor let anyone say that the soul can endure for a long time if it is a body. What body beneath the heavens can remain long in the same state when the heavens themselves course so swiftly? Even if some body can remain for a while, subtle and agile bodies will endure least of all. Yet if the soul is a body, it must be exceedingly subtle so that, poured throughout the organs, it may most readily give life to them all. Bones and sinews will therefore endure longer than the soul—indeed, even flesh will, though flesh slips away and is renewed in a short time, day by day. The soul will be like a breath, wholly unstable and vanishing at every moment. It will therefore preserve its knowledge and images of things not even for a single day.

Caput 13, continuatur

VI.13.8

Idem quoque patietur si anima qualitas sit et complexio aliqua humorum atque membrorum. Pariter enim qualitas fluit et humor. Atque in ipsa nutritione anima effluet refluetque sicut corpus; neque constabit animal secundum formam magis quam secundum materiam propriam. Neque servabitur innumeralis unitas animalis, neque continuatio motionis nutrimenti aut augmenti. Neque erit in animali vis aliqua horum motuum ordinatrix, quae ita sibi ipsa constet ut et ordinem ipsis progrediendi et terminum imponat progressioni, quousque nutriri oporteat vel augeri. Necesse est enim rectorem illum in se consistere qui ordinat sistitque mobilia.

VI.13.9

Obiciet forte aliquis: ita videmus in corpore nostro figuram eandem diutissime permanere, licet caro labat et refluat. Similiter quid prohibet in anima easdem rerum cognitarum imagines permanere, licet animae substantia ex vetere mutetur in novam? Respondemus: neque eandem prorsus manere figuram, neque penitus similem, sed priorem frequenter abeunte carne abire et in carne recente novam priori quodammodo similem refici. Idque fieri a quodam artifice stabilissimo interius fabricante, qui cum maneat semper idem habeatque in se membrorum familiaris corporis disponendorum rationes et semina, potest novis humoribus quotidie influentibus complexionem similem ac prioribus tradere et recenti carni similem ac veteri praebere figuram.

VI.13.10

Non aliter quam vultus qui flumen superne despiciens fluentes undas novasque quolibet momento novis imaginibus sui depingit, ita ut idem in variis undis vultus persistere videatur. Intimus autem ille faber corporis atque stabilis anima est. Quae si et ipsa fluat, certe neque similes corpus prae se diu feret effigies et figuras, neque anima scientias similes retinebit. Quia tunc neque ipsa vi sua eas tenebit, neque aderit illi aliquis qui aut stabiliat illas in animo aut similes prioribus alias generet.

Chapter 13, continued

VI.13.8

The same result will follow if the soul is a quality and a certain temperament of the humors and members. For quality flows away just as humor does. In the very process of nourishment the soul will flow out and flow back in like the body, and the animal will no more remain constant in its form than in its proper matter. Nor will the animal's unity beyond number be preserved, nor the continuity of the motion of nourishment or growth. Nor will there be in the animal any power that orders these motions, remaining so constant in itself that it both establishes the order in which they proceed and sets a limit to their progress—how long the animal ought to be nourished or to grow. The ruler that orders and brings moving things to rest must itself stand firm within itself.

VI.13.9

Someone may perhaps object: we see the same figure remain in our body for a very long time, although the flesh ebbs and flows. What, then, similarly prevents the same images of things known from remaining in the soul, although the soul's substance changes from an old one into a new? We answer that not precisely the same figure remains, nor one entirely similar. Rather, as the former flesh repeatedly departs, its figure departs with it, and in the fresh flesh a new figure is fashioned that in some measure resembles the former. This is done by a supremely stable craftsman working within. Because it always remains the same and contains within itself the patterns and seeds for arranging the members of its familiar body, it can give the new humors that flow in each day a temperament like the former one and can give the fresh flesh a figure like the old.

VI.13.10

It is just as a face, looking down upon a river from above, paints the flowing waves—new at every moment—with ever new images of itself, so that the same face appears to persist in the changing waters. That inward and stable craftsman of the body is the soul. If the soul itself also flows, the body will certainly not long display similar likenesses and forms, nor will the soul retain similar knowledge. For then the soul will not hold them by its own power, and no one will be present either to establish them firmly in the soul or to generate others like those that came before.

Caput 13, continuatur

VI.13.11

Non enim dicendum est, quando anima imaginem rei possidens effluit, eandem influenti animae imaginem se ipsam insinuare, quia nequit qualitas ulla in subiectum novum de vetere subiecto transire. Neque etiam evanescens illa prior anima imaginem aliam suae similem in anima veniente figurat. Figurare quidem, cum sit actio, perfectum requirit agentem. Illa vero anima dum interit deficit quidem ipsa, neque potest tunc animam novam perficere. Formare vero se ipsam anima nova nequit, eo praesertim ipso momento quo nascitur, quia ipsa etiam tunc est imperfecta. Quocirca nullo modo potest anima rerum earum quas olim novit imagines scientiasque tenere memoriter, si corporis et qualitatis instar effluat paulatim et influat.

Chapter 13, continued

VI.13.11

For we must not say that, when a soul possessing the image of a thing flows away, that same image insinuates itself into the soul that flows in. No quality can pass from an old subject into a new one. Nor does the former soul, as it vanishes, fashion in the incoming soul another image like its own. Fashioning, to be sure, is an action and requires a perfect agent. But as the former soul perishes, it itself fails and cannot then perfect the new soul. Nor can the new soul form itself, especially at the very moment when it comes to be, since it too is then imperfect. Therefore, if the soul gradually flows out and flows in like a body and a quality, it can in no way retain in memory the images and knowledge of the things it once knew.

LIBER VII

Book VII

Anima non est corpus aut forma divisa in corpore aut talis formae punctum aliquod; sed est forma in qualibet parte corporis tota, ut ostenditur per potentiam sentiendi.

The soul is neither a body nor a form divided throughout a body, nor any point of such a form; rather, it is a form wholly present in every part of the body, as the power of sensation shows.

Caput 1

Prima ratio. Corpus non capit imagines aptas ad sensum.

VII.1.1

Nescio quo pacto in superiori argumentatione incidimus in secundam disputationis huius partem, in qua probaturi sumus propositum nostrum per potentiam sentiendi. Sic igitur hanc partem ulterius prosequamur. Corpus, si quando suscipit quicquam, modo suscipit corporali: partes videlicet rei in suis partibus; neque potest rem maiorem quam sit ipsum capere, quemadmodum cera a sigillo figuram suscipiens numquam ampliorem figuram quam ipsa sit accipit. Quod si haberet cera sensum quo figurae magnitudinem iudicaret, tantam plane iudicaret quantam haberet. Neque potest aliam rursus figuram accipere nisi vel amittat priorem vel utrasque ita in se confundat, ut vix invicem discernantur. Sic anima, si corpus sit, per oculum corporum imagines modo suscipiet corporali, ita ut imago Platonis in oculo Socratis non maior sit quam Socratis oculus. Ita Socratis anima non maiorem putabit esse Platonem quam suus sit oculus, vel certe non maiorem quam sit cerebrum in quod ab oculo transferetur imago, tandem non maiorem quam sit Socratici corporis magnitudo. Anima enim Socratis, si magna est, non est suo corpore maior. Ideo, si in se tota Platonis imaginem suscipit, non maiorem suscipit quam sit ipsa; quapropter nihil umquam maius existimabit esse Socratico corpore. Quin etiam, quando Xenophontis et Alcibiadis et Phaedri imagines accipit, tunc vel amittit Platonis imaginem vel ita habet cunctas deinde confusas, ut alium illorum ab alio non discernat.

VII.1.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1

First argument. A body does not receive images suited to sensation.

VII.1.1

I do not know how, in the course of the preceding argument, we entered upon the second part of this inquiry, in which we intend to prove our proposition from the power of sensation. Let us now pursue this part further. Whenever a body receives anything, it receives it in a bodily manner: the parts of the thing in its own parts. Nor can it contain anything larger than itself, just as wax receiving an impression from a seal never receives a figure larger than the wax itself. If wax possessed a sense by which it judged the size of the figure, it would plainly judge the figure to be only as large as the impression it contained. Nor can wax receive another figure unless it either loses the first or so confuses both within itself that they can scarcely be distinguished from one another. Accordingly, if the soul is a body, it will receive the images of bodies through the eye only in a bodily manner, so that the image of Plato in Socrates' eye will be no larger than Socrates' eye. Socrates' soul will therefore suppose Plato to be no larger than his own eye—or at any rate no larger than the brain to which the image is transferred from the eye, and ultimately no larger than Socrates' body. For if Socrates' soul has magnitude, it is no larger than his body. Hence, if the whole soul receives Plato's image within itself, the image it receives is no larger than the soul itself; therefore it will never judge anything to be larger than Socrates' body. Moreover, when it receives images of Xenophon, Alcibiades, and Phaedrus, it must either lose the image of Plato or thereafter hold all the images so confused together that it cannot distinguish one man from another.

Caput 1, continuatur

VII.1.2

Conclude etiam ita. Anima vel solidum corpus est vel fluxum. Si solidum, vix a corporibus figuratur; peritque docilitas et acumen. Atque una unius rei accepta figura vel alias non capit, vel, si alias post alias cepit, cunctae invicem obfuscantur. Si labile corpus est, nullas tenet figuras nullamque prorsus habet memoriam. Praeterea nonne constat rem eandem in specillo parvulo parvam videri, in maiori maiorem? Ceu si vultum tuum in mea pupilla prospexeris, deinde in speculo, hic exiguum, illic ingentem pronuntiabis. Ubi pro speculorum ipsorum magnitudine et parvitate maiora vel minora corpora iudicantur. In anima hominis corporum paene omnium lucent imagines, per quas anima corpora quanta sunt iudicat; nullumque est tam ingens, tam immensum corpus quod ipsa vel intueri vel excogitare non possit, semperque aliud corpus ultra excogitato corpore maius. Ex quo apparet nullum esse animae praescriptum magnitudinis terminum, tum quoad illa quae comprehensura est, tum quoad propriam spectat animae ipsius substantiam. Si quam enim haberet in se propriam magnitudinem, tanta esset praecipue quanta est proprii corporis magnitudo. Unde in tam pusillo animali speculo non possent res tam variae, tam perspicuae, tam immensae lucere, cum pro diversa speculorum quantitate maiores minoresve soleant apparere.

VII.1.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1, continued

VII.1.2

Draw the conclusion in another way. The soul is either a solid body or a fluid one. If it is solid, it can scarcely be impressed by bodies, and its capacity to learn and its keenness are lost. Once it has received the figure of one thing, it either cannot receive others or, if it has received others one after another, all of them obscure one another. If the soul is a fluid body, it retains no figures and has no memory at all. Besides, is it not evident that the same object appears small in a little mirror and larger in a larger one? If you were to look at your face first in my pupil and then in a mirror, you would pronounce it tiny here and immense there. There, bodies are judged larger or smaller according to the size or smallness of the mirrors themselves. Yet images of almost every body shine in the human soul, and by them the soul judges how large bodies are. No body is so vast or so immeasurable that the soul cannot either behold or conceive it; indeed, beyond any body conceived, it can always conceive another still larger. It follows that no limit of magnitude has been prescribed for the soul—either with respect to the things it will comprehend or with respect to the soul's own substance. For if the soul possessed a magnitude of its own, above all it would be as large as its own body. Things so various, so clear, and so immense could not then shine in so small a living mirror, since images ordinarily appear larger or smaller according to the different size of the mirrors.

Caput 1, continuatur

VII.1.3

Non tamen putare debemus spiritales colorum imagines vel a corporibus fieri vel suscipi in speculis atque cerebro. Ipsae enim nihil aliud sunt quam splendores luminis corpora verberantis. Id autem visibile lumen, licet emicet in corporibus, fit tamen atque servatur ab invisibili lumine caelestium animorum, quod ex ingenti copia exuberat foras evaditque perspicuum. Corporibus quidem nullis affigitur. Potest tamen luci nostri spiritus, quae a nostra anima pendet, coniungi eique suos splendores offerre. Significationes praeterea vocum ad auditum pervenientes, quae ipsae quoque spiritales sunt, neque a corpore fiunt neque figuntur in corpore, sed ab anima transmittuntur in animam, atque animarum virtute fiunt et conservantur. Verum superiorem disputationem hac divisione breviter concludamus. Si anima sit aliquid corporale, vel simulacra corporum eius faciem attingent sicut speculum, vel eorum qualitates in profundam animae substantiam penetrabunt sicut in aquam sapores atque odores. Si primum contingat, corpora forsitan praesentia sentiemus, sed non poterimus absentia cogitare; nam simulacra non servabimus. Sin alterum fiet, sensus gradatim semper et cum corporis passione, similiterque memoria, et qualitates sine discretionis iudicio invicem confundentur.

Chapter 1, continued

VII.1.3

We must not, however, suppose that the spiritual images of colors are either produced by bodies or received in mirrors and in the brain. They are nothing other than splendors of light striking bodies. Although this visible light shines forth in bodies, it is made and sustained by the invisible light of heavenly souls, which overflows from its immense abundance, issues outward, and becomes visible. It is fastened to no body, yet it can be joined to the light of our spirit, which depends upon our soul, and offer that light its own splendors. Likewise, the meanings of words that reach the hearing are themselves spiritual: they are neither produced by a body nor fixed in a body, but are transmitted from soul to soul, and are made and preserved by the power of souls. Let us briefly conclude the preceding argument with the following division. If the soul is something bodily, either the images of bodies will touch its surface as they touch a mirror, or their qualities will penetrate the depths of its substance as tastes and odors penetrate water. If the first occurs, we may perhaps sense bodies that are present, but we shall be unable to think of those that are absent, since we shall not preserve their images. If the second occurs, sensation will always arise gradually and together with a bodily alteration, and memory will do the same; the qualities, lacking any discriminating judgment, will be confused with one another.

Caput 2

Secunda ratio. Oportet quinque sensus ad unum centrum conduci.

VII.2.1

Visus colores attingit, non voces; auditus voces duntaxat; olfactus odores. Animus colorem, vocem, odorem ita invicem comparat, aut aliud colorem esse quam vocem et alia similiter iudicet. Illa vis per quam ita iudicat animus cognoscit tum colores tum voces et alia quae invicem comparat. Quomodo enim diceret colorem aliud esse quam vocem nisi simul utrumque cognosceret? Quaenam ista vis est? Visusne? Minime. Non enim voces agnoscit. Ita neque auditus, qui colorum ignarus est, neque unus aliquis omnino quinque sensuum. Quisque enim illorum unum quiddam nuntiat solum neque potis est plura invicem comparare. Vis una certe illa est interior animae, ad quam velut centrum a quinque sensuum instrumentis circumpositis undique varia nuntiantur. Illa una omnia illorum quinque sensuum obiecta et operationes diiudicat. Neque dicas duas aut plures esse animae vires internas per quas anima illa comparet. Sint, si vis, geminae vires. Responde igitur: quoties anima colorem ad vocem comparatura est, utrum per utramque vim apprehendat utrumque, colorem scilicet atque vocem, an per alteram alterum? Si utraque vis apprehendit utrumque, quid opus est viribus geminis, cum una sufficiat ad comparationis opus et tantundem faciat una quantum ambae? In necessariis rebus natura non deficit; supervacuis non abundat. Sin per alteram vim alterum tantum noscit, per neutram invicem comparabit utrumque. Tamen per vim aliquam comparat. Est igitur alia quaedam vis praeter geminas illas ante confictas per quam anima plura illa comparat invicem.

VII.2.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2

Second argument. The five senses must be brought together at a single center.

VII.2.1

Sight apprehends colors, not voices; hearing, voices alone; smell, odors. The mind compares color, voice, and odor with one another—or, put another way, judges that color is one thing and voice another, and similarly with the rest. The power through which the mind judges in this way knows both the colors and the voices, together with the other things it compares. How could it say that color is one thing and voice another unless it knew both at once? What, then, is this power? Sight? Certainly not, for sight does not recognize voices. Nor is it hearing, which knows nothing of colors, nor any one of the five senses. Each reports only one kind of thing and cannot compare several things with one another. There is assuredly one inward power of the soul, like a center to which the five surrounding instruments of sense report different things from every side. This one power distinguishes all the objects and activities of the five senses. Do not say that there are two or more inward powers of the soul through which it makes this comparison. Grant, if you wish, that there are two. Then answer this: whenever the soul compares a color with a voice, does each power apprehend both objects—the color and the voice—or does one apprehend one and the other apprehend the other? If each power apprehends both, what need is there of two powers, when one is sufficient for the work of comparison and one accomplishes as much as both? Nature does not fail in necessary things, nor does she abound in superfluities. But if each power knows only one object, neither will compare the two with one another. Yet some power does compare them. There is therefore another power, beyond the pair just imagined, through which the soul compares these several things with one another.

Caput 2, continuatur

VII.2.2

Utrum vis illa una indivisibilis sit, an corporis instar in plures partes divisa? Puta utrum sit vis illa tamquam punctum aliquod individuum quod a vocetur, an linea quaedam ab a in b protracta. Si dixeris eam esse lineam ab a in b, talem a b, quaeram abs te hunc in modum. Quoties anima colorem ad vocem per huiusmodi lineam comparatura est, certum est quod utrumque istorum eam tangit lineam. Utrum igitur color solum caput lineae quod est a attingit, ad b non pervenit, et vox solum b lineae finem tangit, ad a non transit? An potius ambo, tam color quam vox, ad ambo simul, tam scilicet ad a quam ad b, veniunt? Si primum concesseris, scilicet quod alterum tantum venit ad terminum lineae alterum, profecto duo illi termini duae a se invicem erunt distinctae vires, quarum utraque quod suum est agnoscet, alterum ignorabit. Ideo per neutram vim illa animus comparabit. Sin concesseris ambo illa ad terminos ambos concurrere, ita ut vis utriusque termini ambo persentiat, una illarum sufficit. Vacat altera, quandoquidem nihil plus vires ambae quam alterutra faciunt. Immo vero duae vires erunt indivisibiles ambae. Ita cogimur confiteri vim illam animae unam per quam plura diiudicat non esse partibilem. Igitur vis illa magistra sensuum neque corpus est neque qualitas diffusa per corpus. Si talis est animae vis, quid prohibet animam esse talem? Nisi forte putes substantiae alicuius vim substantia sua esse nobiliorem.

VII.2.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VII.2.2

Is this one power indivisible, or is it divided into several parts like a body? Imagine that it is either an indivisible point called a, or a line drawn from a to b. If you say it is a line from a to b—a line a–b—I shall ask you the following. Whenever the soul is to compare a color with a voice by means of such a line, both objects must touch the line. Does the color reach only the endpoint a and not pass on to b, while the voice touches only the endpoint b and does not cross to a? Or do both color and voice reach both endpoints at once, a as well as b? If you grant the first alternative, so that only one object reaches each endpoint of the line, the two endpoints will plainly be two powers distinct from one another. Each will recognize what belongs to it and remain ignorant of the other object. The mind will therefore make the comparison through neither power. But if you grant that both objects converge upon both endpoints, so that the power of each endpoint perceives both, one of the two powers is sufficient and the other is idle, since the pair accomplish no more than either one alone. Indeed, the two powers will both be indivisible. We are thus compelled to confess that the soul's one power by which it distinguishes many things is not divisible. This power, the mistress of the senses, is therefore neither a body nor a quality diffused through a body. If a power of the soul is of this kind, what prevents the soul itself from being such? Unless, perhaps, you suppose that the power of a substance is nobler than the substance to which it belongs.

Caput 3

Tertia ratio. Quo angustior sensus est, eo est perspicacior.

VII.3.1

Profecto oportet imaginem visibilis corporis ad aliquid impartibile colligi, quod et in ipsis fit pupillis. Alioquin ingentia corpora atque caelum ipsum per tam minimam pupillam non cerneremus. Quod si, quantum ad oculum spectat ut cernat acutius, ampliore quantitate opus non est, immo parvissimi oculi acrius inspiciunt quam amplissimi, ut oculi aquilae quam bovis, quasi visum non modo non iuvet sed impediat magnitudo; si, inquam, exterior acies magnitudine ad percipiendum minime indiget, quid de illo interiori visu et communi sensu dicemus? Qui quanto singulis sensibus est praestantior et acutior, tanto etiam debet sufficientior esse; erit autem sufficientior, si nulla indigeat corporis quantitate. Denique et ipsa animae substantia, sensuum fundamentum, erit omni sensu sufficientior, si quantitate non egeat. Quis eam dixerit quantitatis dimensionibus indigere, cum neque conducat ad animi dotes corporis magnitudo neque noceat? Si conduceret necessario, non esset apis ove sollertior, vulpes astutior sue, simia ingeniosior asino, leo bove audentior. Sin necessario noceret, non esset elephas prudentior equo, canis agno sagacior. Quod si ad has animae vires quae versantur circa corporum quantitatem nihil valet corporis quantitas, multo minus eam valere putandum est ad eam vim animi quae transcendit corporum quantitatem, ad rationem scilicet, quam suo loco tractabimus.

VII.3.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 3

Third argument. The more confined the sense, the keener it is.

VII.3.1

The image of a visible body must surely be gathered into something impartible, as happens even in the pupils themselves. Otherwise we could not see immense bodies and heaven itself through so tiny a pupil. If the eye needs no greater size in order to see more keenly—indeed, the smallest eyes see more sharply than the largest, as the eagle's eyes do in comparison with the ox's, so that magnitude seems not merely to fail to help sight but actually to hinder it—if, I say, the outward sight has no need of magnitude in order to perceive, what shall we say of the inward sight and the common sense? The more excellent and acute it is than each individual sense, the more self-sufficient it ought to be; and it will be more self-sufficient if it needs no bodily magnitude. Finally, the soul's own substance, which is the foundation of the senses, will be more self-sufficient than every sense if it has no need of quantity. Who would say that it requires quantitative dimensions, when bodily size neither helps nor harms the gifts of mind? If size necessarily helped them, the bee would not be more skillful than the sheep, the fox more cunning than the pig, the ape more ingenious than the ass, or the lion bolder than the ox. If size necessarily harmed them, the elephant would not be wiser than the horse, nor the dog more discerning than the lamb. And if bodily quantity has no force in relation to those powers of soul that deal with the quantity of bodies, much less should it be thought to have force in relation to the power of mind that transcends bodily quantity—namely reason, which we shall treat in its proper place.

Caput 4

Quarta ratio. Si sensus dividuus sit, in eo imago sensibilis dividetur.

VII.4.1

Esto, si vis, intimus ille visus corporea mole distentus. Quid inde sequatur, attende. Cum coloris externi capit concipitve imaginem, suo modo accipit atque corporeo. Imago huiusmodi per partes huius visus dividitur, et alia pars visus aliam coloris aspicit partem; nec erit in nobis aliquid quod totum colorem visibilem comprehendat. Oportet tamen unam rei unius comprehensionem ab uno fieri comprehendente. Ac si dixeris unum ipsum comprehendens esse formam quandam totius compositi, cunctis communem partibus, quaeremus numquid dividua sit, unde quaestio redibit eadem; an individua, unde comprehensionem in vi individua collocabimus. Oportet igitur sensum esse magnitudinis corporalis expertem, praesertim quia, si magnus sit, parvis non congruet neque sentiet illa totus, sed pars eius ipsa quae parvis aequatur. Si parvus, magna non capiet; si medius, non quadrabit extremis. At tu, si vis sensibilem colorem una cum sensu partiri, quonam pacto distribues? An aequalem aequali aptabis? Sed non potes. Non enim aequalis est sensus rei cuilibet sentiendae. In quot autem partes utrumque distribues? Num in quasdam partes numero quidem terminatas et naturali ordine minimas? Quod si feceris, non invenies unam rei unius comprehensionem.

VII.4.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4

Fourth argument. If the faculty of sensation is divisible, the sensible image within it will be divided.

VII.4.1

Grant, if you wish, that this inward sight is extended through bodily bulk. Consider what follows. When it receives or conceives the image of an external color, it receives that image in its own bodily manner. Such an image is divided among the parts of this sight: one part of sight beholds one part of the color, another beholds another, and there will be nothing in us that comprehends the whole visible color. Yet one comprehension of one thing must be made by one comprehending power. If you say that this one comprehending power is a form of the whole composite, common to all its parts, we shall ask whether that form is divisible, in which case the same question returns, or indivisible, in which case we shall have placed comprehension in an indivisible power. Sensation must therefore be free of bodily magnitude, especially because, if it were large, it would not be suited to small objects, nor would the whole of it sense them, but only the part equal to their size. If it were small, it would not contain large objects; if of a middle size, it would fit neither extreme. But suppose you wish to divide a sensible color together with the faculty of sensation: how will you distribute them? Will you fit an equal portion of one to an equal portion of the other? You cannot, for the faculty of sensation is not equal in size to every object sensed. Into how many parts, then, will you divide each? Into a determinate number of parts that are smallest by nature? If you do so, you will not find one comprehension of one thing.

Caput 4, continuatur

VII.4.2

Sed more mathematicorum in omnes quas habent, puto, te partiturum. In particulas igitur infinitas tam visum quam colorem secabis, et visus partes singulae singulas coloris sentient portiones. Itaque innumerabiles ibi erunt visus, innumerabiles visi colores, innumerabiles visiones. Atque ita numquam poterit color unus visum incurrere quin eodem illo momento infiniti visus infinitos colores videant infinite. Quod ne fingi quidem potest. Forsan, ut haec monstra vitemus, subiciemus totum illum visum sentire, partes eius nequaquam. Sed hoc etiam temerarium. Quo enim modo quae sensu carent sentientem substantiam generabunt? Nullo. Igitur neque partes illae sentiendi expertes sensum ipsum constituent. An dicemus singulas partes visus sentire, sed per eandem totius visus et integram visionem, ac sentire speciem totam partesque cum tota? Non. Primo, quia species non videtur, sed color ipse per speciem. Deinde, quia operatio quae fit ex congregatione partium distinctarum fit quoque per congregationem momentorum ac transigitur paulatim; sensus autem fit subito, quod significat sentiendi vim esse indivisibilem. Denique, si pars quaeque visus per se sufficit ad videndum, quid opus est pluribus? Si non sufficit, ex non sentiente fit sentiens? Nisi forte partes illae congregentur in unum a superiore aliquo sentiente. At illud erit anima potius atque sensus. Quapropter numquam deliras responsiones effugiemus quamdiu sensum esse partibilem affirmabimus. Sit ergo impartibilis sensus. Sit et anima talis, quae fons est indivisibilis virtutis atque subiectum.

Chapter 4, continued

VII.4.2

But I suppose you will divide them after the manner of mathematicians, into all the parts they can have. You will therefore cut both sight and color into infinitely many particles, and each part of sight will sense a corresponding portion of color. There will thus be countless acts of sight, countless colors seen, and countless visions. In this way a single color could never meet the sight without infinitely many acts of sight seeing infinitely many colors, and seeing them infinitely, at that very moment. This cannot even be imagined. Perhaps, to avoid these monstrosities, we shall suppose that the whole faculty of sight senses, while its parts do not. But this too is rash. How could things devoid of sensation generate a substance that senses? They could not. Parts incapable of sensing will therefore not constitute the faculty of sensation itself. Shall we say instead that every part of sight senses, yet that all do so through the same complete vision belonging to the whole faculty; and that each senses the whole form and the parts together with the whole? No. First, it is not the form that is seen, but the color itself through the form. Second, an operation produced by assembling distinct parts is also produced through an accumulation of moments and is completed gradually; sensation, however, occurs at once, which shows that the power of sensing is indivisible. Finally, if every part of sight is by itself sufficient for seeing, what need is there of several? If it is not sufficient, does something sentient arise from what does not sense? Unless, perhaps, those parts are gathered into one by some higher sentient power. But that power will be the soul and the faculty of sensation itself. We shall therefore never escape these deranged answers so long as we affirm that sensation is divisible. Let sensation, then, be impartible; and let the soul be such as well, since it is both the source and the subject of indivisible power.

Caput 5

Quinta ratio. Anima sentit ubique tota.

VII.5.1

An ignoras partem corporis alicuius ipsi toti aequalem esse non posse, atque ideo formam quae talis est ut per diversas partes corporis protendatur in qualibet corporis parte totam existere non valere? Alioquin toti pars foret aequalis. Admitto ista. Quid tum? Nempe anima cuilibet parti corporis adest tota, quia tota sentit cuiuslibet corporalis particulae passionem. Nam si aliquo offensus casu pes doleat, statim illuc advertitur oculus, admovetur e vestigio manus, os clamat et reliqua membra ferme similiter. Quod certe numquam fieret nisi id quod ipsius animae inest partibus corporis omnibus etiam in pede sentiret. Atqui sentire quod ibi factum est absens non posset. Neque enim nuntio aliquo credendum est id fieri non sentiente quod nuntiat, quia quod non sentit non nuntiat. Neque passio quae fit per continuationem molis semper potest occurrere, ut ceteras animae partes quae alibi sunt latere non sinat, quia non semper fit dolor ubique. Sed illud tota sentit anima quod fit in pedis particula, et ibi tantum sentit ubi fit. Tota igitur singulis partibus simul adest, quae tota simul sentit in singulis.

VII.5.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5

Fifth argument. The soul as a whole senses everywhere.

VII.5.1

Do you not know that a part of a body cannot be equal to the whole body, and that a form extended through different parts of the body therefore cannot exist whole in every part? Otherwise a part would equal the whole. I grant all this. What follows? The soul is nonetheless present whole to every part of the body, because the whole soul senses the affection of every bodily particle. If the foot happens to be hurt and feels pain, the eye at once turns toward it, the hand immediately moves to it, the mouth cries out, and nearly all the other members respond in like fashion. This could never happen unless that which belongs to the soul in every bodily part sensed the injury even in the foot. What is absent could not sense what has happened there. Nor should we suppose that some messenger which does not sense what it reports performs this office, for what does not sense cannot report. Neither can an affection propagated through continuous bodily bulk always account for the event by keeping the soul's other parts elsewhere from remaining unaware, since pain is not always produced everywhere. Rather, the whole soul senses what happens in one small part of the foot, and it senses it only there, where it happens. The soul is therefore present whole and at once to each part, because it senses as a whole and at once in every part.

Caput 5, continuatur

VII.5.2

Formae autem sparsae per corpus, puta albedini, idem in hoc accidit quod et corpori, ut videlicet passio unius partis non necessario reliquas partes omnes commutet. Quid enim prohibet unam corporis albedinisque partem infici et foedari, reliquis non pollutis? Ceterum nihil in una quavis particula animalis accidit quin id ad totam mox pertineat animam. Mysterium hoc Platonicum Augustinus noster ita confirmat. Anima per totum corpus quod animat non locali diffusione, sed quadam vitali intensione porrigitur. Nam per omnes particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, nec in maioribus maior, sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius; et in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter quicquid in corpore etiam non in toto sentit, tamen tota sentit. Nam cum exiguo puncto in carne unum aliquid tangitur, quamvis locus ille non solum totius corporis non sit, sed vix in corpore videatur, animam tamen totam non latet. Neque id quod sentitur per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit. Unde ergo ad totam mox pervenit quod non in toto fit? Nec ut tota ibi sit, cetera deserit. Vivunt etenim illa ea praesente ubi nihil tale factum est. Quod si fieret utrumque simul, utrumque totam pariter non lateret. Haec Aurelius. Verum dices fortasse animam quidem ita per universum corpus porrectam ut pars eius in pede sit, pars in crure, alia in femore, pectore, collo, summa in cerebro, ubi fiat iudicium principale; ac dolorem pedis non ideo iudicari a vi animae quae sedet in cerebro quia illa vis adsit et pedi, sed quoniam successione quadam altera pars animae alteri ad cerebrum usque passionem pedis enuntiat. Profecto non negabis partes istas animae inferiores sentire, cum evidenter appareat in membris illis percipi passionem. Si enim pedis passio sit cerebro nuntianda, vel ex eo nuntiatur quod gradatim membra intermedia patiuntur, vel ex eo quod, licet non patiantur, sentiunt tamen dolorem pedis eumque cerebro referunt.

Chapter 5, continued

VII.5.2

A form spread through a body—whiteness, for example—undergoes what the body itself undergoes in this respect: an affection of one part does not necessarily alter all the other parts. What prevents one part of the body and its whiteness from being stained and disfigured while the rest remains unpolluted? Yet nothing happens in any particle of a living creature without at once concerning the whole soul. Our Augustine confirms this Platonic mystery as follows. The soul extends through the whole body it animates, not by a diffusion through place but by a certain vital intensity. It is present whole and at once through every particle: not smaller in smaller parts, nor larger in larger ones, but more intense in one place and less intense in another; whole in all and whole in each. Only so can it sense as a whole whatever occurs in the body, even when it does not occur in the whole body. For when something is touched at a tiny point in the flesh, although that place is not the whole body—indeed, it scarcely seems to be in the body at all—the whole soul is nevertheless aware of it. What is sensed does not run throughout every part of the body; it is sensed only where it occurs. How, then, does what does not happen in the whole body reach the whole soul at once? Nor does the soul abandon the other parts in order to be whole there, for those parts in which nothing of the kind has happened live by its presence. If both events happened at once, neither would equally escape the whole soul. Thus Aurelius. But perhaps you will say that the soul is extended through the entire body in such a way that one part is in the foot, another in the lower leg, another in the thigh, breast, or neck, and the highest part in the brain, where the principal judgment is made. On this account, you may say, the soul's power seated in the brain judges the pain in the foot not because that same power is also present in the foot, but because, in a kind of succession, one part of the soul reports the foot's affection to another until it reaches the brain. You will surely not deny that these lower parts of the soul sense, since it is plainly evident that an affection is perceived in those members. For if the foot's affection must be reported to the brain, the report occurs either because the intervening members are affected one after another, or because, although they are not affected, they nevertheless sense the pain of the foot and convey it to the brain.

Caput 5, continuatur

VII.5.3

Certe non semper totum patitur aeque, nec est idem in mediis membris qui in pede est cruciatus, sed molesta quaedam cruciatus illius persensio. In omnibus igitur molestia quaedam inest et sensus. Quid hinc sequatur, adverte. Pars animae quae in pede est cruciatum sentiet pedis; pars quae in crure, non pedis sed cruris molestiam sentiet—ibi enim sentit solum ubi est et passionem sentit solummodo quae in eam incurrit. Pars quae in genu praesentem similiter tantum percipiet passionem, ceteraeque similiter. Post omnes, vis illa iudiciaria cerebri praesentem sibi solum molestiam animadvertet. Partes animae a pede ad cerebrum, sicut et corporis, ferme innumerabiles sunt, si et ipsa sit corporalis. Ergo, semel offenso ad lapillum pede, non fiet unus sentiendi actus et subitus, sed multi gradatim, et innumerabiles paene contingent dolores sicut perceptiones innumerabiles. Post omnes autem animae partes—quod nefas est—sentiet illa in qua principalis est sensus. Sentiet autem non pedis passionem, sed suam solummodo; neque iudicabit umquam ubi sit laesio, ubi sit succurrendum, neque per eius imperium membra corporis convertentur ad pedem. Ut haec absurda vitentur, fatendum est totam vim illam iudiciariam animae una cum tota animae ipsius substantia singulis membris esse praesentem, ut quicquid sit, statim sine internuntio tota praesentiat, tota sibimet compatiatur et consonet, cunctas animae vires cunctas etiam partes corporis imperio subito ad medelam laesae partis adhibeat. Atque ita quicquid et quantumcumque animae est in membris ullis ab alio quovis membro non abest, quia in quovis ad quodlibet admovet quaelibet. Corpus et forma per ipsum fusa eiusve punctum talia non sunt, ut in multis sint tota simul et secum ipsa in suis partibus absque mora prorsus compatiantur atque concurrant. Est igitur anima ab iis longe diversa.

Chapter 5, continued

VII.5.3

Certainly the whole does not always suffer equally. The distress in the intermediate members is not the same torment as that in the foot, but a painful awareness of that torment. Some distress and some sensation will therefore be present in every member. Consider what follows. The part of the soul in the foot will sense the foot's torment; the part in the lower leg will sense not the foot's distress but that of the lower leg—for it senses only where it is and only the affection that falls upon it. The part in the knee will likewise perceive only the affection present there, and the other parts will do the same. After them all, the judging power in the brain will attend only to the distress present to itself. If the soul is corporeal, its parts from foot to brain will be almost as countless as the body's. Consequently, when the foot strikes a stone, there will not be one sudden act of sensation. Many acts will arise by degrees, and almost countless pains will occur, just as there are countless perceptions. Only after all the other parts of the soul—which is an impious absurdity—will the part in which the principal sense resides begin to sense. Even then it will sense not the affection of the foot but only its own. It will never judge where the injury is or where aid must be given, nor will the bodily members be directed toward the foot by its command. To avoid these absurdities, we must acknowledge that the soul's entire power of judgment, together with the soul's whole substance, is present to every member. Whatever happens, the whole power perceives it at once without an intermediary; the whole soul suffers with itself and answers in concord, and by an immediate command it brings all the soul's powers and all the body's parts to the aid of the injured part. Thus whatever of the soul, and however much of it, is present in any member is absent from no other, because whatever is in any member moves every part toward whatever member requires it. Neither a body, nor a form diffused through body, nor any point of such a form is of this kind: none can be whole in many places at once or, in its several parts, immediately suffer and act in concert with itself. The soul is therefore utterly different from them.

Caput 5, continuatur

VII.5.4

Neque nos turbent animalia multa quorum corpora cum secantur utraque frusta moventur et sentiunt, quasi anima ita longa fuerit sicut corpus, postquam, dum corpus secatur in corpora, anima quoque secari videtur in animas. Non enim dividitur anima primo, sed interit cum primum illa ipsa corporis compago resolvitur cui fuerat attributa. Fiunt autem subito novae animae a vita mundi in frustis illis ad animam suscipiendam idoneis. Talis enim illorum natura est qualis fuerat et totius. Et quia animae tales ita viles sunt ut paucissimas vires operationesque habeant ideoque paucissimis egeant instrumentis, factum est ut corpus illis sufficiat etiam si non sit variis instrumentis instructum, quod non sufficit perfectioribus animabus, quae ob hoc in singulis membris non vivunt. Si lignum aliquod secetur in puncto, punctum hoc, licet indivisibile sit, perit tamen, ac in duobus frustis duo extrema videntur puncta renasci. Si speculum fregeris in quo tui vultus apparebat imago, non conciditur imago primo, sed abit, ac duae a te pro una imagines in duobus speculis recreantur. Si nomen hoc Lucifer, in quo vox locum tenet corporis, significatio animae, in duo membra diviseris quasi animal, luci et fer, cessat primo illa significatio per quam Venus designabatur. Non tamen dividitur; est enim indivisibilis significatio nominis, ut alias ostendemus. Adhuc tamen duae quaedam sunt in duabus partibus significationes per quas tamquam animas dictiones huiusmodi supervivunt: luci per lucis significationem, fer per significationem aliquam lationis. Quid igitur prohibet quo minus reptilia animam habeant secundum Platonicos individuam, quamvis membra divisa vivant?

Chapter 5, continued

VII.5.4

Nor should we be troubled by the many living creatures whose severed bodies leave two fragments that both move and sense, as though the soul had been as extended as the body and, when the body is cut into bodies, the soul too appeared to be cut into souls. The soul is not first divided; rather, it perishes as soon as the very structure of the body to which it had been assigned is dissolved. New souls, however, arise at once from the life of the world in those fragments capable of receiving a soul, for the nature of the fragments is the same as the nature of the former whole. Because souls of this kind are so lowly that they possess very few powers and activities, and therefore need very few instruments, even a body not furnished with diverse organs is enough for them. Such a body is not enough for more perfect souls, which for this reason do not live in each separate member. If a piece of wood is cut at a point, that point, although indivisible, nevertheless perishes, and two terminal points seem to be born anew in the two fragments. If you break a mirror in which the image of your face appeared, the original image is not itself cut in two; it vanishes, and in the two mirrors two images of you are created anew in place of the one. Consider also the name Lucifer, in which the spoken sound occupies the place of body and the meaning the place of soul. If you divide it like a living creature into two members, luci and fer, the original meaning by which Venus was designated first ceases. It is not divided, for the meaning of a name is indivisible, as we shall show elsewhere. Yet two meanings now exist in the two parts, and through them, as through souls, utterances of this kind survive: luci through the meaning of light, and fer through a meaning associated with bearing. What, then, prevents creeping animals, according to the Platonists, from possessing an indivisible soul even though their divided members remain alive?

Caput 6

Sexta ratio. Anima non necessario patitur sentiendo.

VII.6.1

Anima ipsa, ut vera philosophia docet, cum sit purissima, crasso huic et terreno corpori ab ea longe distanti non aliter quam per tenuissimum quoddam lucidissimumque corpusculum copulatur, quem spiritum appellamus, a cordis calore genitum ex parte sanguinis tenuissima, diffusum inde per universum corpus. Huic anima sibi cognatissimo facile se insinuans, primo quidem per hunc totum se fundit spiritum, deinde hoc medio per corpus penitus universum; vitam primum huic praestat et motum, facitque vitalem; perque hunc regit movetque corpus; et quicquid a corpore in hunc spiritum permanat, anima ipsi praesens continuo percipit, quam perceptionem sensum cognominamus. Deinde hanc perceptionem animadvertit et iudicat, quam animadversionem phantasiam esse volumus. Quorsum haec? Quando secat medicus cutem corporis extimam, frangitur caro, dissolvitur et contrahitur spiritus. Sentit haec omnia tactus, qui per omnia membra universalis est animae sensus; iudicat haec et condolet phantasia. Quomodo potest discindi caro quin spiritus illi suffusus partim cum soluta carne solvatur, partim etiam in se ipsum fugiens contrahatur? Quo etiam pacto solutio et contractio spiritus latere suam animam poterit? Ac si non latet, cur non moleste ferat anima operis sui perniciem? Spiritus quidem et corpus opus est animae. Opus vero proprium omnia diligunt. In carne quidem est passio, cruciatus in spiritu, sensus in tactu, compassio et condolentia, ut ita loquar, in phantasia.

Chapter 6

Sixth argument. The soul is not necessarily acted upon in sensing.

VII.6.1

The soul itself, as true philosophy teaches, is utterly pure. It can be joined to this gross and earthly body, which is far removed from it, only through an exceedingly subtle and luminous little body that we call the spirit. This spirit is generated by the heart's heat from the subtlest part of the blood and is diffused from there throughout the whole body. The soul readily insinuates itself into this spirit, which is most akin to it: first it pours itself throughout the spirit, then through this medium throughout the entire body. It first gives the spirit life and motion and makes it living; through the spirit it rules and moves the body; and whatever passes from the body into the spirit is continuously perceived by the soul present to it. We call this perception sensation. The soul then attends to and judges the perception, and this act of attention we call imagination. What is the purpose of this account? When a physician cuts the outer skin of the body, the flesh is broken and the spirit is loosened and contracted. Touch, the soul's universal sense extending through every member, senses all these events; imagination judges them and shares their pain. How can the flesh be severed without the spirit infused through it being partly loosened with the opened flesh and partly contracted as it retreats into itself? And how could the loosening and contraction of the spirit escape its soul? If it does not escape the soul, why should the soul not grieve over the destruction of its own work? Spirit and body are the soul's work, and all things love what is properly their own work. In the flesh there is bodily affection; in the spirit, torment; in touch, sensation; and in imagination, shared suffering and shared pain, so to speak.

Caput 6, continuatur

VII.6.2

Complectere paucis. Tam in carne quam in spiritu perniciosa quaedam fit substantiaeque corruptrix solutio vel contractio; hanc vocemus noxiam laesionem. Numquid etiam in animam laesio transit huiusmodi? Minime. Haec enim substantiam perdit; perdit igitur substantiae ipsius virtutem, perdit deinceps virtutis operationem. In qualibet igitur carnis et spiritus vel levissima laesione animae substantia illis praesens similiter laederetur; laederetur et virtus multo magis; laederetur et operatio. Sensus et phantasia vires animae sunt; sentire et iudicare per sensum harum virium actiones. Ergo, si discissio illa in animae substantiam pertransiret, neque sentiremus eam neque qualis sit et unde et quomodo succurrendum iudicaremus, sed vel lateret animam penitus vel minimum quid perciperetur et falso iudicaretur ab anima. Et cum anima sit ubique tota, si ipsa in parte corporis secta patitur, tota patitur. Eadem vero tota anima quae ibi est est et per totum corpus. Per totum igitur corpus patitur. Si ubique patitur, non potest percipere et nuntiare passionem illam in parte una animalis magis quam in alia esse. Quin etiam, cum aliud sit passio, aliud iudicium passionis, et passio semper iudicetur ab alio, si in ipso iudicio insit passio, opus est ulterius alio quodam iudicio quo passivum iudicium iudicetur. Si illud quoque sit passivum, rursus opus est alio.

VII.6.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 6, continued

VII.6.2

Sum up the matter briefly. In both flesh and spirit there occurs a destructive loosening or contraction that corrupts their substance; let us call this a harmful injury. Does an injury of this kind also pass into the soul? By no means. Such an injury destroys substance; it therefore destroys the power belonging to that substance, and thereafter the power's operation. Consequently, in even the slightest injury to flesh or spirit, if the injury passed into the soul, the soul's substance present to them would likewise be injured; its power would be injured still more, and its operation as well. Sensation and imagination are powers of the soul; sensing and judging through sensation are the activities of those powers. If, then, the cut passed into the soul's substance, we should neither sense it nor judge what kind of injury it is, where it comes from, and how aid should be given. Either it would remain wholly hidden from the soul, or at most something slight would be perceived, and the soul would judge it falsely. Moreover, since the soul is whole everywhere, if the soul itself suffers where one part of the body is cut, the whole soul suffers. But the same whole soul that is there also extends through the entire body; it therefore suffers throughout the entire body. If it suffers everywhere, it cannot perceive and report that the affection is present in one part of the living creature more than in another. Moreover, the affection is one thing and the judgment of it another, and an affection is always judged by something else. If an affection inheres in the judgment itself, a further judgment is needed to judge that affected judgment. If this second judgment too is affected, yet another is again required.

Caput 6, continuatur

VII.6.3

Quapropter veniendum denique est ad iudicem quendam liberum passione. Hic, dum iudicat corporis passiones, si accipit inde qualitatem aliquam corporalem, procul dubio patitur. Si non accipit, non formatur a corpore. Sit ergo oportet talis iudex ut neque passiones accipiat a corporibus neque formas. Non posset autem anima talis esse si ipsa vel corpus esset tenuissimum in hoc corpore mersum vel aliqua corporis huius affectio sive punctum quoddam affectionis. Platonica haec ita Augustinus Plotinusque comprobant. Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere. Et has actiones, sive faciles propter convenientiam sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere. Et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. Sed iste sensus, qui etiam dum nihil sentitur inest tamen, quasi per instrumentum est corporale, quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima ut in eo sit ad passiones corporis cum attentione agendas paratior, similia similibus ut adiungat repellatque quod noxium est. Agit porro, ut opinor, luminosum aliquid in oculis, aereum serenissimum et mobilissimum in auribus, caliginosum in naribus, in ore humidum, in tactu terreum et quasi lutulentum. Agit autem haec omnia cum quiete, si illa quae sunt in animali in unitate valitudinis familiari quadam consensione cohaeserint. Cum autem adhibentur ea quae nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt, agit attentiores actiones suis quibusdam locis aut instrumentis accommodatas, et tunc sentire dicitur. Quibus actionibus congrua libenter associat et moleste obsistit incongruis. Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere. Cum aereus auris spiritus verberatur sono, anima quae ante percussionem huiusmodi in silentio corpus aurium vegetabat vegetat tunc attentius. Idque facere est non pati. Attentior operatio non latet animam operantem. Non latere sentire est. Summatim, sensus est aut animadversio operationis illius attentioris aut iudicium corporeae passionis et qualitatis excitatum ab attentiore illa animae actione.

Chapter 6, continued

VII.6.3

We must therefore arrive at last at a judge free from affection. While this judge passes judgment on the body's affections, if it receives from them some bodily quality, it is without doubt acted upon; if it receives no such quality, it is not formed by the body. The judge must therefore be of such a kind that it receives neither affections nor forms from bodies. The soul could not be such a judge if it were itself either an exceedingly subtle body submerged in this body, or some affection of this body, or a point belonging to such an affection. Augustine and Plotinus confirm these Platonic conclusions. It seems to me that when the soul senses within the body, it does not undergo anything from the body but acts with greater attention amid the body's affections. These activities—easy when there is agreement, difficult when there is disagreement—do not escape the soul; and this is the whole of what we call sensing. Yet this sensory capacity, which remains present even when nothing is being sensed, exists through something like a bodily instrument. The soul gives that instrument such a temperament that the sensory power within it is readier to act attentively upon the body's affections, so that it may join like things to like and repel what is harmful. The soul activates, as I suppose, something luminous in the eyes; in the ears, something airy, utterly clear and mobile; in the nostrils, something misty; in the mouth, something moist; and in touch, something earthy and, as it were, muddy. It activates all these quietly so long as the things within the living creature cohere in the unity of health through a certain harmonious consent. But when things are applied that affect the body with a certain otherness, so to speak, the soul performs more attentive activities, fitted to their particular places or instruments, and is then said to sense. Through these activities it gladly associates what is congenial and painfully resists what is uncongenial. When the soul senses, I believe it displays these activities in response to the body's affections; it does not receive those same affections. When the airy spirit of the ear is struck by sound, the soul—which before such an impact animated the bodily organ of hearing in silence—animates that organ with greater attention. To do this is to act, not to be acted upon. The soul that performs the more attentive activity is aware of it, and to be aware of it is to sense. In sum, sensation is either awareness of that more attentive activity or a judgment of bodily affection and quality awakened by the soul's more attentive action.

Caput 7

Septima ratio. Rationes propriae per naturalem et sensitivam animae vim quod anima non sit forma dividua, quia qualitatis opus unum est.

VII.7.1

Et si superioribus rationibus non modo animam corpus non esse probavimus, verum etiam neque sparsam per corpora formam, tamen propriis argumentationibus secundam hanc partem ostendendam fore putamus. Atque, ut commodius hac de re loquamur, formam talem, ut diximus alias, tum qualitatem tum affectionem corporis Platonicorum more vocabimus. Si anima esset qualitas corporalis, vel esset simplex qualitas vel complexio vel forma istis astricta. Simplex esse non potest. Quaelibet enim simplex qualitas aut forma illam sequens, ut alias declaravimus, unum quiddam facit dumtaxat, ad opposita non extenditur; anima plurima et contraria. Neque etiam erit complexio aut forma sequens complexionem, quoniam in hac semper una quaedam prae ceteris qualitas dominatur, cuius operatio ante alias viget in corpore. Anima nulli qualitati, nulli proprio motui est astricta.

Chapter 7

Seventh argument. Arguments drawn specifically from the soul's natural and sensitive power show that the soul is not a divisible form, since a quality has a single operation.

VII.7.1

Although the preceding arguments have proved not only that the soul is not a body but also that it is not a form dispersed through bodies, we think this second conclusion must still be demonstrated by arguments proper to it. To speak more conveniently about the matter, following the Platonists we shall call a form of this kind, as we have said elsewhere, both a quality and an affection of body. If the soul were a bodily quality, it would have to be either a simple quality, a bodily constitution, or a form bound to one of these. It cannot be simple. Every simple quality, or every form that follows such a quality, produces only one kind of effect, as we have shown elsewhere, and does not extend to opposites; the soul produces many and contrary effects. Nor will it be a constitution or a form that follows a constitution, since in every constitution one quality always dominates the rest and its operation prevails over the others in the body. The soul is bound to no quality and to no motion proper to any one quality.

Caput 8

Octava ratio. Complexio agit per vim qualitatum.

VII.8.1

Actio complexionis eiusque formae semper per qualitates ex quibus ipsa est conflata peragitur. Ideoque numquam aliquid tam sublime complexio operatur, quin ad illud qualitatum se vires extendant. Caloris opus est penetrare atque dissolvere. Animae autem nutritiva potentia per calorem tamquam instrumentum non dissolvit tantum cibos, quod ipsius caloris est proprium, sed etiam concoquit digeritque et ad formam vivae carnis et figuram humanam perducit; quae quidem actio caloris excedit potentiam. Augmentum quoque animalis a calore provenire non potest tamquam causa principali. Non enim fit nisi per nutrimentum; et cum ad certum terminum magnitudinis perducatur, certamque figuram, calor autem, si detur materia, sine certo termino vel figura se fundat, cumve oporteat terminum figuramque operi a principali agente praescribi, constat principalem augmenti fabrum calorem esse non posse; immo vero neque aliam ullam accidentalem formam id posse facere, si non potest calor, qui est omnium praestantissimus. Fit tamen augmentum ab anima. Ex quo concluditur animam non esse formam accidentalem, quod saepissime nobis est probandum. Concluditur etiam non esse eam ex formis accidentalibus constitutam, quia non posset qualitates quae absque certo termino, gradu, proportione, figura vagantur, ad haec ipsa rationaliter ordinare. Concluditur postremo animam non esse substantialem aliquam formam elementi vel mixti. Talis enim formae motus ad unicum dirigitur terminum, sicut diximus. Augmentum vero in quamlibet partem aeque porrigitur.

VII.8.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 8

Eighth argument. A bodily constitution acts through the power of its qualities.

VII.8.1

Every operation of a bodily constitution and of its form is carried out through the qualities of which that constitution is composed. Thus a constitution never performs anything so lofty that the powers of its qualities do not extend to that result. The work of heat is to penetrate and dissolve. The soul's nutritive power, however, uses heat as an instrument not merely to dissolve food—which is heat's own proper work—but also to cook and digest it and bring it to the form of living flesh and the human figure. This action exceeds the power of heat. Nor can an animal's growth proceed from heat as its principal cause. Growth occurs only through nourishment; and since it is brought to a definite limit of size and a definite figure, whereas heat, given matter, spreads without definite limit or figure, and since the principal agent must prescribe the limit and figure of its work, it is clear that heat cannot be the principal craftsman of growth. Indeed, no other accidental form can do this if heat, the most excellent of them all, cannot. Yet growth is brought about by the soul. From this we conclude that the soul is not an accidental form—a conclusion we must prove repeatedly. We also conclude that it is not constituted from accidental forms, for it could not rationally order qualities that wander without definite limit, degree, proportion, or figure toward those very determinations. Finally, we conclude that the soul is not some substantial form of an element or a mixture. The motion of a form of this kind is directed toward a single limit, as we have said, whereas growth extends equally in every direction.

Caput 9

Nona ratio. Complexio est accidentalis forma.

VII.9.1

Complexio natura quaedam est ex contrariis quodammodo qualitatibus constituta, quae inter eas quasi medium obtinet. Ex quo fit ut forma substantialis esse non possit, quia non in se subsistit, sed in eo corpore quod est contrariarum illarum qualitatum subiectum; quae, quia invicem pugnant, sese invicem non suscipiunt, verum susceptae a materia et invicem mixtae complexionem generant. Haec igitur complexio tum ex eo quod dixi substantia non est, tum ex eo quod aliquid sibi habet contrarium, puta excessum alicuius extraneae qualitatis, conflationem suam dissociantis. Praeterea suscipit magis ac minus. Intenditur enim ac remittitur natura, vis, operatioque complexionis. Substantia vero neque habet proprium sibi contrarium, cum consistat in alio genere quam substantiae ipsa rerum contrarietas, hoc est in genere qualitatis; neque in natura sua aut in magis intenditur aut in minus remittitur, ut nunc magis nunc minus haec aut illa substantia sit quod est semel substantia, hoc est magis minusve lapis iste quam ille. Cum igitur complexio non sit substantia, anima, si substantia sit, non est complexio.

Chapter 9

Ninth argument. A bodily constitution is an accidental form.

VII.9.1

A bodily constitution is a certain nature made up in some fashion from contrary qualities and occupying a kind of middle position among them. From this it follows that it cannot be a substantial form, for it does not subsist in itself but in the body that is the subject of those contrary qualities. Because the qualities conflict with one another, they do not receive one another; rather, matter receives them, and when they are mingled with one another they generate a constitution. This constitution, therefore, is not a substance both for the reason I have given and because it has something contrary to it—namely, an excess of some foreign quality that disrupts its composition. Moreover, it admits of more and less: the nature, power, and operation of a constitution are intensified and diminished. Substance, however, neither has a contrary proper to itself—since the very contrariety of things belongs to a genus other than substance, namely the genus of quality—nor is substance in its own nature intensified toward more or diminished toward less, as though this or that substance, once it is a substance, were now more and now less what it is; that is, as though this stone were more or less a stone than that one. Since, therefore, a constitution is not a substance, if the soul is a substance, it is not a constitution.

Caput 9, continuatur

VII.9.2

Quod autem anima sit substantia, hinc etiam patet, quia per eam animal certam aliquam et substantialem sortitur speciei generisque naturam atque cognomen. Per hanc animam hoc quidem canis est, per illam illud equus, per aliam illud homo. Illa quidem qualitas quae accidens est subiecto suo advenit postquam illud in specie sua iam est perfectum. Anima vero suum ipsa sibi fabricat corpus, factum servat et, dum deficit, reficit, pugnantia elementa connectit in unum. Anima abeunte labitur corpus, neque prior complexio aut species retinetur. Talis quidem necessario est anima nutritiva. Neque dicendum est animam illam quae solum nutritiva est corpus ita construere, cui postea iam perfecto anima sensitiva tamquam accidens quoddam adveniat. Nam corpus animae sensitivae congruum instrumenta sentiendi et progrediendi oportet habere. Anima quidem nutritiva, quantum talis est, sola instrumenta faciet nutriendi; alia vero instrumenta faciet anima alia propter eas vires quarum usui instrumenta sunt servitura. Neque sunt in eodem corpore duae quaedam animae, quarum una instrumenta fabricet alteri. Siquidem quae nutrit est eadem et quae sentit. Quippe sensuum perturbationes opus impediunt nutriendi vel augent. Tristitia enim phantasiae illud debilitat, laetitia roborat; quasi una sit anima in homine, cuius utraque sint officia. Quae ideo substantia est, quia est artifex corporis, non pedissequa. Igitur non est complexio.

Chapter 9, continued

VII.9.2

That the soul is a substance is also evident from this: through it a living creature receives a definite and substantial nature, together with the name of its species and genus. Through this soul one creature is a dog, through that soul another is a horse, and through a different soul another is a man. An accidental quality comes to its subject after the subject is already complete in its species. The soul, however, fashions its own body for itself, preserves it once made, restores it when it fails, and binds the conflicting elements into one. When the soul departs, the body collapses, and neither its former constitution nor its species is retained. The nutritive soul, then, must necessarily be a substance of this kind. Nor should we say that the soul which is solely nutritive constructs the body and that afterward, when the body is already complete, a sensitive soul comes to it as a kind of accident. For a body suited to a sensitive soul must possess instruments for sensing and for moving from place to place. The nutritive soul, insofar as it is nutritive, would make only the instruments of nourishment; another soul would make other instruments for the sake of those powers whose use they are to serve. Yet there are not two souls in the same body, one of which fashions instruments for the other. The soul that nourishes is the same soul that senses. Indeed, disturbances of the senses hinder the work of nourishment or increase it: sorrow in the imagination weakens that work, while joy strengthens it, as though there were one soul in man to which both offices belong. The soul is therefore a substance, because it is the craftsman of the body, not its handmaid. It is therefore not a constitution.

Caput 10

Decima ratio. Harmonia complexionis nihil agit in corpus.

VII.10.1

Neque liceat Aristoxeno aut musicis aliis somniare animam esse harmoniam quandam ex ipsa complexione progenitam. Sic enim anima similiter esset non substantia quaedam, sed accidens. Nonne harmonia totam vim suam trahit a fidibus? Neque quicquam ipsa per se exsistit, neque quicquam valet omnino in chordis efficere. Quippe non movet ipsa chordas, sed iis aliunde motis nascitur harmonia. Anima ergo, si sit harmonia humorum certo modo compositorum, tota pendebit ex illis, neque ipsa illos movebit, sed illis ab alio agitatis anima orietur. Neque illos reget, sed ipsam illi regent et sustinebunt. Non erunt igitur motus in corpore aliqui praeter humorum conditionem, non opera ulla super illorum imperium, sicuti modo sunt, ut in superioribus enarravimus. Non figura artificiosa, non dispositio. Non repugnabit umquam animus affectibus corporalibus, neque se vel in se reflectet vel disiunctum a corporeis incorporeis copulabit, neque per se aliquid operabitur, si nullo modo extiterit per se ipsum. Sed de hoc alias diximus et dicemus.

Chapter 10

Tenth argument. The harmony of a bodily constitution produces no effect upon the body.

VII.10.1

Nor should Aristoxenus or any other musicians be allowed to dream that the soul is a kind of harmony generated from the constitution itself. For then the soul likewise would not be a substance but an accident. Does not harmony derive all its power from the strings? It neither exists at all by itself nor has any power whatever to produce an effect upon the strings. Harmony does not itself move the strings; rather, it arises when they are moved from elsewhere. Therefore, if the soul is the harmony of humors composed in a definite manner, it will depend wholly upon them. It will not itself move them, but the soul will arise when they are set in motion by something else. Nor will it rule them; they will rule and sustain it. There will therefore be no motions in the body beyond the condition of the humors, and no activities above their control, although such motions and activities now exist, as we explained above. There will be no artfully fashioned figure, no ordered arrangement. The soul will never resist bodily affections, nor will it either turn back upon itself or, when separated from bodily things, join itself to incorporeal things; nor will it perform anything through itself if it does not in any way exist through itself. But we have spoken of this elsewhere and shall do so again.

Caput 11

Undecima ratio. In omni corpore composito est harmonia.

VII.11.1

In omni corpore ex multis composito est aliqua suarum partium harmonia, per quam conspiratione mutua concinunt. Itaque si harmonia ipsa sit anima, corpora quaelibet composita ea vivent et coalescent. Dices forsitan animam esse quidem harmoniam, id est concinnitatem et consonantiam, sed non quamlibet harmoniam, verum aliquam certo et proprio modo contemperatam. Vides non eandem esse rationem animae atque consonantiae, postquam non ex eo dumtaxat quod res aliqua consonantia est, est etiam anima, sed ex eo quod certo modo disposita. Certum huiusmodi dispositionis modum concinnitas ipsa non ex sui natura haurit, quia esset in qualibet concinnitate. Igitur aliunde ab extrinsecone principio? Immo vero. Ceterum extrinsecum istud non sufficit. Non enim movet et temperat assidue et naturaliter harmoniam quod extra ipsam est. Latet igitur in humorum consonantia vis quaedam praestantior corporalis consonantiae temperatrix, quae in viventium corporibus suo modo humores contemperans, ipsorum concinnitatem reddit certam et ab aliis corporibus differentem; quae propria consonantia vitalis harmonia est, a vivifico spiritu interius latente progenita.

VII.11.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 11

Eleventh argument. There is harmony in every composite body.

VII.11.1

In every body composed of many parts there is some harmony of those parts, through which they accord in mutual agreement. Therefore, if harmony itself is the soul, every composite body will live and cohere through it. You may perhaps say that the soul is indeed a harmony—that is, a fitting arrangement and concord—but not just any harmony; rather, one tempered in a definite and proper manner. You see that the defining account of soul is not the same as that of concord, since a thing is not a soul merely because it is a concord, but because it is disposed in a definite manner. A fitting arrangement does not draw this definite manner of disposition from its own nature, for then it would be present in every fitting arrangement. Does it draw it, then, from elsewhere—from an external principle? Indeed it does. Yet that external principle is not sufficient, for what lies outside the harmony does not continually and naturally move and temper it. Hidden within the concord of the humors, therefore, is some power more excellent than bodily concord, which tempers that concord. By tempering the humors in its own manner within living bodies, this power renders their fitting arrangement definite and different from that of other bodies. This proper concord is vital harmony, generated by a life-giving spirit hidden within.

Caput 12

Duodecima ratio. Harmonia intelligitur aut compositio ipsa membrorum aut aliqua compositionis ratio.

VII.12.1

Quando animam esse consonantiam asserit aliquis, duo quaedam posse illum arbitror intelligere: aut compositionem ipsam humorum membrorumque, aut compositionis ipsius aliquam rationem. Anima profecto non est compositio, quia oporteret quamlibet animae partem esse partium aliquarum corporis compositionem. Quod plane quomodo fiat assignare non possumus. Compositio quidem corporis physicis manifesta est, anima vero ignota. Et quomodo ex suis viribus, scilicet intellectu, sensu, appetitu et reliquis, componatur, difficile cognitu. Difficillimum rursus quomodo vires singulae componant. Praeterea compositio nihil est aliud quam unio plurium; plura vero non uniuntur nisi ab uno. Ab uno, inquam, quod insit pluribus, ut ab intimo coagulo conglutinentur. Illa igitur una vis insita membris a qua unio fit membrorum anima ipsa est potius quam unio inde profecta. Neque etiam compositionis ipsius est ratio. Cum enim diversis corporis membris diversae insint compositionis rationes atque proportiones, singula membra singulas animas possiderent: aliam quippe animam os, aliam nervus, caro aliam; similiterque de ceteris. Siquidem membra ista sunt diversa inter se proportione composita. Unius vero animantis vitam unam assignare nequaquam poterimus, nisi unicam illi formam, motorem unum atque rectorem, id est unam animam, tribuerimus. Cernimus etiam consonantiae rationem qualitatibus corporis magis quam animae convenire. Sanitas humorum consonantia. Robur consonantia ossium atque nervorum. Pulchritudo quodammodo membrorum atque colorum. Sensus autem et intellectus, qui actus simplices sunt, nescio quales et cuius sint harmoniae. Quando substantiam rei cognoscimus, facile inde possumus de accidentibus iudicare. Igitur quia cognita humorum membrorumve proportione facile de his iudicamus quae ad sanitatem, robur et pulchritudinem attinent, patet tria haec in illorum proportione consistere. At vero quia tali quadam proportione inventa, nondum tamen vires, affectus, actus, habitus animae clare discernimus, constat substantiam animae in ea proportione nequaquam consistere. Quis enim illa reperta statim sentiendi et intelligendi naturam reperisse inde se iactet? Cognoscit horum naturam Aristoteles melius quam Hippocrates; illorum vero proportionem diligentius Hippocrates considerat.

Chapter 12

Twelfth argument. Harmony is understood either as the composition of the parts itself or as some proportion within that composition.

VII.12.1

When someone asserts that the soul is a concord, I think he can mean one of two things: either the composition itself of the humors and members, or some proportion within that composition. The soul is certainly not the composition itself, for then every part of the soul would have to be a composition of some parts of the body. How this could occur we plainly cannot explain. The composition of the body is manifest to natural philosophers, whereas the soul is unknown. It is difficult to understand how the soul is composed from its powers—namely, intellect, sensation, appetite, and the rest. Still more difficult is to understand how the individual powers compose the soul. Moreover, composition is nothing other than the union of many things, but many things are united only by one thing. By one, I mean, that inheres in the many, so that they are glued together as if by an inward glue. That one power implanted in the members, from which their union arises, is therefore the soul itself rather than the union that proceeds from it. Nor is the soul some proportion of the composition itself. For since different members of the body contain different relations and proportions of composition, each member would possess its own soul: bone one soul, nerve another, flesh another, and likewise for the rest, since these members are composed in proportions differing from one another. Yet we can by no means assign one life to a single living creature unless we give it one form, one mover and ruler—that is, one soul. We also see that the account of concord belongs more to qualities of the body than to the soul. Health is a concord of the humors, strength a concord of bones and nerves, and beauty, in a certain way, a concord of members and colors. But sensation and intellect, which are simple acts—I do not know what kind of harmonies they are or what they are harmonies of. When we know the substance of a thing, we can readily judge its accidents from it. Thus, because once we know the proportion of humors or members we can readily judge the things that pertain to health, strength, and beauty, it is clear that these three consist in their proportion. Yet when some such proportion has been found, we still do not clearly discern the soul's powers, affections, acts, and habits. It is therefore plain that the soul's substance does not consist in that proportion. Who, upon discovering it, would boast that he had thereby immediately discovered the nature of sensing and understanding? Aristotle understands the nature of these activities better than Hippocrates, whereas Hippocrates considers the proportion of those bodily constituents more carefully.

Caput 13

Decimatertia ratio. Harmonia humorum nihil capit absque materia.

VII.13.1

Quicquid aliquid efficit, eo quod ab ipso fit esse debet praestantius. Quo quid a materia liberius est, eo est et sublimius. Quare semper debet causa esse a materia liberior quam effectus. Nullus itaque effectus potest esse a materia quam causa sua liberior. Vis nutriendi a materia admodum libera est, quae plurima et super et praeter ordinem elementorum operari demonstrata est alias. Vis sentiendi etiam magis est a materia libera, quia in ipso suo sentiendi actu formas rerum accipit absque rerum ipsarum materia. Non enim visus colorem parietis cum pariete simul accipit, sed coloris attingit imaginem spiritalem. Multo magis intelligentia idem facit, ut in sequentibus apparebit. Quoniam igitur hae vires animi multum sunt a materia liberae, nequeunt ab ea causa proficisci quae sit materia vel immersa materiae. Humores omnino corporales sunt. Quamobrem nullo modo humores possunt sua quadam mixtione vel consonantia vires huiusmodi procreare, multo minus animam ipsam virium huiusmodi fontem. Quippe si anima in humorum qualitatibus substantiam habeat, quicquid capiet per humorum affectiones suscipiet. Per eas vero formae solum corporales suscipiuntur. Siquidem per caliditatem siccitatemque non ignis imaginem spiritalem accipiet, sed ignis substantiam corporalem. Rursus per frigus siccumque ipsam accipiet terram. Ipsa quoque terra, quoniam similiter accipiet atque anima, similiter sentiet. Idem faciet lapis et reliqua.

Chapter 13

Thirteenth argument. A harmony of the humors receives nothing apart from matter.

VII.13.1

Whatever produces something must be more excellent than what is produced by it. The freer anything is from matter, the more sublime it is. A cause, therefore, must always be freer from matter than its effect. No effect, then, can be freer from matter than its own cause. The nutritive power is very free from matter, for we have shown elsewhere that it performs many things both above and beyond the order of the elements. The power of sensation is still freer from matter, because in the very act of sensing it receives the forms of things without the matter of those things. Sight does not receive the color of a wall together with the wall itself, but touches a spiritual image of its color. Understanding does the same to a much greater degree, as will appear in what follows. Since, therefore, these powers of the soul enjoy great freedom from matter, they cannot proceed from a cause that is itself matter or immersed in matter. The humors are wholly corporeal. They therefore cannot in any way produce powers of this kind through some mixture or concord of their own, much less the soul itself, the source of powers of this kind. For if the soul has its substance in the qualities of the humors, whatever it receives it will receive through the affections of the humors. Through these, however, only bodily forms are received. Through heat and dryness it will receive not a spiritual image of fire but the bodily substance of fire; in turn, through cold and dryness it will receive earth itself. Earth itself, since it receives in the same manner as the soul, will also sense in the same manner. A stone and all the rest will do the same.

Caput 14

Decimaquarta ratio. Quae magis concinit, magis est harmonia.

VII.14.1

Harmonia ita in plurium concentu consistit, ut magis concinentibus fidibus magis sit harmonia, minus concinentibus vero minus. Anima nequissimi hominis minime concinit secum ipsa. Dissentit enim a ratione sensus. Pugnant quoque invicem appetitus. Anima probi hominis concinit undique. Si anima sit harmonia, anima probi viri quae concinit magis, magis est harmonia, igitur et anima magis. Anima vita quaedam est. Ergo et magis vita. Vivacior itaque, audentior et robustior erit probi viri anima quam latronis. Neque concoquet cibum latronis anima perinde ut iusti viri, neque generabit prolem, neque corporis membra sustinebit vibrabitque, neque acute inveniet, firmiter reminiscetur, loquetur eleganter, aggredietur audacter, neque diu spirabit, et reliqua.

Chapter 14

Fourteenth argument. The greater a thing's concord, the more fully it is a harmony.

VII.14.1

Harmony consists in the concord of many things in such a way that the more fully the strings accord, the more harmony there is, and the less they accord, the less harmony there is. The soul of a thoroughly wicked man is least in accord with itself: sensation dissents from reason, and the appetites also fight one another. The soul of a good man accords in every respect. If the soul is harmony, then the soul of the good man, which accords more fully, is more harmony and therefore more soul. The soul is a kind of life; it is therefore also more life. Thus the good man's soul will be more lively, daring, and robust than the robber's. The robber's soul will not digest food as well as the just man's soul, nor generate offspring, nor support the body's members and set them in motion; nor will it display acuity in discovery, remember firmly, speak elegantly, undertake things boldly, or breathe for long—and so forth.

Caput 15

Decimaquinta ratio. Harmonia nihil admittit dissonum.

VII.15.1

Harmonia vera, ut rectius procedamus, nihil admittit dissonum, dum permanet harmonia. Si harmonia est, consonat; sin dissonat, non est harmonia. Animam vero nostram nonne videmus assidue dissonantibus opinionibus et affectibus distrahi, et nihilominus veram animam permanere, atque aeque vitalem? Neque obiicias quod affectuum discordia licet non perimat animam, discordia tamen elementorum humorumque perimit. Porro si non potest animus propria intimaque dissonantia perire, alia nulla potest. Propria animi humani et intima dissonantia illa est, quae soli et omni animo convenit, id est opinionum affectuumque dissensio, quae corpora vita carentia non attingit, et omnes mortalium pulsat animos. Dissensio talis eos e vitae sensusque statu non deicit. Multo igitur minus humorum discordia, quae ab animo alienior est, animi ipsius naturalem habitum dissipabit, qui certe humoribus vel paulum dissonantibus dissiparetur, si in eorum concentu consisteret. Quamobrem nihil obstat quin partes animi corporisque longe dissonent et anima nihilominus vera vitalisque anima perseveret. Id harmonia non patitur. Igitur errabit qui dixerit animam harmoniam.

Chapter 15

Fifteenth argument. Harmony admits nothing discordant.

VII.15.1

True harmony, to proceed more correctly, admits nothing discordant so long as it remains harmony. If it is harmony, it is consonant; if it is dissonant, it is not harmony. Yet do we not see our soul continually torn by discordant opinions and affections, while nevertheless remaining a true soul and no less vital? Do not object that, although discord among the affections does not destroy the soul, discord among the elements and humors does destroy it. For if the soul cannot perish through its own inward dissonance, no other dissonance can destroy it. The proper and inward dissonance of the human soul is that which belongs to the soul alone and to every soul—that is, the disagreement of opinions and affections, which does not touch bodies devoid of life and assails every mortal soul. Such disagreement does not cast these souls down from the state of life and sensation. Still less, therefore, will discord among the humors, which is more foreign to the soul, destroy the soul's own natural state. Yet that state would certainly be destroyed when the humors were even slightly out of harmony if it consisted in their concord. Nothing, then, prevents the parts of soul and body from being widely discordant while the soul nevertheless persists as a true and vital soul. Harmony does not allow this. Whoever says that the soul is harmony will therefore be mistaken.

Book VIII

Anima est forma individua ubique tota et nullam trahit originem a materia, ideoque immortalis est, ut ostenditur per intelligendi virtutem.

The soul is an indivisible form, wholly present everywhere, and does not derive its origin from matter; therefore it is immortal, as the power of understanding shows.

Caput 1

Animus per quattuor gradus ascendit ad spiritum. Prima ratio.

VIII.1.1

Tertiam nunc disputationis partem aggrediemur, quae propositum nostrum ostendit per intelligendi virtutem, si prius exposuerimus quo pacto animus noster secundum Platonicorum sententiam per quattuor gradus cognoscendo a corpore ascendit ad spiritum, quorum est postremus intelligentia. Ascendit enim per sensum, imaginationem, phantasiam, intelligentiam. Per sensum quidem videt Socrates Platonem, ubi incorporale Platonis simulacrum absque Platonis materia attingit per oculos, ea tamen conditione, ut oculus Platonem non videat aliter quam corpore ipso Platonis praesente. Deinde etiam absente Platone per internam imaginationem Platonis cogitat colorem figuramque quam viderat, item Platonis suavem illam quam audiverat vocem et reliqua quae per quinque sensus acceperat. Surgitque huiusmodi imaginatio supra materiam magis quam sensus, tum quia, ut cogitet corpora, praesentia illorum non indiget, tum quia ipsa una facit quicquid quinque sensus omnes efficiunt. At enim non omnino pura est, quia nihil aliud sapit quam quod sensus accepit sive concepit. Sensus quidem circa corpora, imaginatio circa imagines corporum per sensus acceptas sive conceptas sese volutat. Paulo post Socrates per phantasiam de hoc universo Platonis simulacro, quod per quinque sensus imaginatio ipsa collegerat, sic incipit iudicare: Quis hic tam procero corpore, ampla fronte, latis humeris, colore candido, glaucis oculis, elato supercilio, naso aquilino, ore parvo, voce suavi? Plato hic est, homo pulcher, bonus, discipulus dilectissimus. Cernis quantum excellat imaginationem Socratis phantasia. Imaginatio ipsa talem quidem collegit Platonis effigiem, sed quem designaret et qualem effigies illa non novit. Phantasia iam discernit eam esse effigiem hominis huius qui Plato vocatur, effigiem pulchram viri boni atque amici. Ergo in his sensum aliquem habet iam substantiae, ut quidam putant, et pulchritudinis, bonitatisque et amicitiae. Platonici tamen substantiam a phantasia cognosci revera negant, quoniam rationem substantiae non agnoscat. Imaginatio neque substantiam rei suspicatur quidem, sed rei superficiem exterioremque picturam; phantasia substantiam saltem auguratur, dum pronuntiat: Obvius ille homo aliquis est, et Plato. Atque etiam res incorporales quodammodo somniare videtur, dum Platonem iudicat pulchrum, bonum, amicum, discipulum. Pulchritudo enim, bonitas, amicitia, disciplina incorporalia sunt neque sensibus neque imaginationi patentia. Huiusmodi quidam conceptus phantasiae incorporales quodammodo corporum intentiones vocantur.

Chapter 1

The soul ascends through four stages to spirit. First argument.

VIII.1.1

We shall now enter the third part of the inquiry, which establishes our proposition from the power of understanding, provided that we first explain how, according to the Platonists, our soul rises in knowledge through four stages from body to spirit, the last of which is intelligence. It ascends through sensation, imagination, phantasy, and intelligence. Through sensation Socrates sees Plato: through his eyes he apprehends an incorporeal image of Plato apart from Plato's matter, yet on this condition—that the eye cannot see Plato unless Plato's own body is present. Then, even when Plato is absent, by inward imagination Socrates thinks of the color and figure he had seen, of the pleasant voice of Plato he had heard, and of all else he had received through the five senses. Imagination of this kind rises farther above matter than sensation does, both because it does not need bodies to be present in order to think of them and because it alone accomplishes what all five senses accomplish together. Yet it is not wholly pure, for it knows nothing except what sensation has received or conceived. Sensation is occupied with bodies, while imagination moves among images of bodies received or conceived through the senses. A little later, through phantasy, Socrates begins to judge the entire image of Plato which imagination itself had gathered through the five senses: 'Who is this, so tall in body, broad in forehead and shoulders, fair in complexion, grey-eyed, with raised brow, aquiline nose, small mouth, and pleasant voice? This is Plato—a handsome and good man, a pupil most dear to me.' You see how far Socrates' phantasy surpasses his imagination. Imagination did indeed gather such an image of Plato, but it did not know whom or what manner of man the image represented. Phantasy now discerns that it is the image of this man called Plato: the handsome image of a good man and a friend. In these judgments phantasy already possesses some sense of substance, as some hold, and of beauty, goodness, and friendship. Yet the Platonists deny that phantasy truly knows substance, since it does not recognize the rational account of substance. Imagination does not even surmise the substance of a thing, but only its surface and outward picture; phantasy at least divines substance when it declares, 'That figure approaching us is a man—and that man is Plato.' It also seems in some manner to dream of incorporeal things when it judges Plato to be handsome, good, a friend, and a pupil. For beauty, goodness, friendship, and learning are incorporeal and lie open neither to sensation nor to imagination. Certain conceptions of phantasy are in a sense called incorporeal intentions of bodies.

Caput 1, continuatur

VIII.1.2

Verum nondum super materiam prorsus animus evolat, tum quia phantasia intentiones huiusmodi esse incorporeas non agnoscit, tum quia huiusmodi Socratis phantasia inspicit proprie hominem hunc, Platonem scilicet, hoc in loco et situ, in hoc tempore et hora diei, hanc pulchritudinem, hanc bonitatem, et reliqua eodem pacto, ubi Platonem sub eisdem conditionibus in se ipsa depingit quibus exstat et in materia. At enim dum phantasia circa singulares hominis huius conditiones vagatur, intellectus communes concipit rationes, et uterque simul suum opus exequitur. Sic enim intelligentia ratiocinatur: Qualis homo est Plato, talis ferme Antisthenes; talis est et Xenophon, effigie similes, pulchrique et boni, amici, discipuli, eodem modo. Ergo in his tribus una est communis humanitas, per quam aeque sunt homines; una pulchritudinis natura, una etiam bonitatis, per quas aeque pulchri sunt et aeque boni. Humanitas ipsa quae his communis est, innumerabilibus quoque aliis qui sunt, fuerunt, eruntve, quocumque in tempore et quocumque in loco nascantur, communis exsistit, similiter pulchritudo et reliqua. Sed quod loquor de humanitate, de reliquis etiam dictum puta. Si ergo humanitas singulis personis, locis, temporibus se aeque communicat, nulli est astricta personae, nulli loco, nulli etiam tempori. Natura huiusmodi singulas condiciones corporum videtur transcendere. Est ergo secundum se ipsam quodammodo incorporea; et quia corporibus singulis se infundit, ex quo et in alio est et in multis, et super id quod in alio est esse oportet id quod in se ipso manet, et super illud unum quod est in multis esse oportet unum ipsum quod in se ipso consistat; idcirco super corpora omnia exstat ratio quaedam ideaque humanitatis ipsius, cuius participatione quadam vel similitudine homines fiunt quicumque sunt homines.

Chapter 1, continued

VIII.1.2

Yet the soul has not altogether soared above matter. This is so both because phantasy does not recognize intentions of this kind as incorporeal and because Socrates' phantasy contemplates precisely this man—namely Plato—in this place and position, at this time and hour of the day, together with this beauty, this goodness, and the rest under the same conditions. It paints Plato within itself under the very conditions in which he exists in matter. But while phantasy ranges over the singular conditions of this man, intellect conceives their common principles, and each faculty performs its own work at the same time. Intelligence reasons in this way: 'What manner of man Plato is, nearly such is Antisthenes, and such too is Xenophon. They are alike in appearance, handsome and good, and in the same way friends and pupils. Hence in these three there is one common humanity by which they are equally men, one nature of beauty and also one of goodness, by which they are equally handsome and equally good.' The very humanity common to these men is likewise common to countless others who are, have been, or will be, whenever and wherever they may be born; and the same is true of beauty and the rest. Take what I say of humanity as said also of the others. If, then, humanity communicates itself equally to individual persons, places, and times, it is bound to no person, no place, and no time. A nature of this kind appears to transcend all the particular conditions of bodies. In itself, therefore, it is in some manner incorporeal. And because it pours itself into individual bodies, so that it exists both in another and in many, there must stand above what exists in another that which remains in itself, and above the one that exists in many there must stand the one itself that subsists in itself. Consequently, above all bodies there exists a certain principle and Idea of humanity itself, through some participation in or likeness to which all human beings become human.

Caput 1, continuatur

VIII.1.3

Siquidem natura illa quae personis singulis est communis neque contingit casu, quia semper similiter ordinatur, neque per se subsistit, cum nequeat in se subsistere. Eget enim materiae fundamento. Fit ergo a causa quadam; non tamen fit a materia, quae se ipsam non format; non a persona una, quae non potest operari in omnes, quaeve quicquid agit proprium agit, reliquis non commune. Non ab omnibus personis, quae quatenus inter se differunt, non commune aliquid faciunt, sed diversa; quatenus conveniunt, per hanc ipsam naturam conveniunt, immo per eam consistunt, tanto illis priorem quanto est ipsa simplicior. Quippe ipsi tamquam priori proprietates variae superveniunt ad personas constituendas. Fit tamen ipsa ab una quadam forma, postquam una est, quae forma sit super multitudinem personarum, ne illa quoque fiat ab alia, atque illa rursus ab alia sine fine. Sic ad divinam ideam ascendimus, quae necessario est super omnes, ut aeque agat in omnes et communi natura conciliet. Si a parte quae sub toto est ad totum, ab hoc ad id quod super totum, surgendum est, merito a singulis personis quae in partibus loci temporisque sunt ad naturam illis secundum se communem surgimus, quae quasi per omnem locum sit totumque tempus; ab hac ad rationem quae super locum totum tempusque exsistat, quam Plato vocat ideam. Ipsam deinceps divinam ideam suspicit intellectus, sive apud se ipsum sive in divino lumine exsistentem. Ratio enim dictat species naturales, quia sempiternae sunt, a causa mobili esse non posse; alioquin per motionem factae quandoque deficerent. Factae tamen sunt, quia partes sunt universi quod est aliunde compositum, et a causa una omnes sunt. Siquidem ita ordinatae sunt invicem ut in unam naturam, in unum opus finemque conducant. Hinc intellectus humanus concludit super mundum mobilem in mente immobili motrice mundi esse species specierum naturalium exemplaria, non in natura corporea vel animali—mobiles enim forent—sed intellectuali, immo intelligibili; intelligibilia enim in summo intelligibili sunt collocanda.

Chapter 1, continued

VIII.1.3

For that nature common to individual persons does not come about by chance, since it is always ordered in the same way; nor does it subsist by itself, since it cannot stand in itself but needs the foundation of matter. It is therefore brought about by some cause. Yet it is not brought about by matter, which does not form itself; nor by one person, who cannot act upon them all and, whatever that person produces, produces something particular, not common to the rest; nor by all persons, for insofar as they differ from one another they produce not something common but different things. Insofar as they agree, they agree through this very nature—indeed, through it they subsist; and it is prior to them to the same degree that it is simpler than they are. Their various properties supervene upon it as something prior in order to constitute the persons. Yet this nature itself, since it is one, is produced by some one form, a form standing above the multitude of persons; otherwise that form too would be produced by another, and that one in turn by another, without end. Thus we ascend to the divine Idea, which must stand above them all so that it may act equally in all and unite them by a common nature. If we must rise from a part beneath the whole to the whole, and from the whole to what stands above the whole, we rightly rise from individual persons, who occupy parts of place and time, to the nature common to them in itself, which is as though spread through every place and the whole of time; and from this nature to the principle that stands above all place and time, which Plato calls the Idea. Intellect next beholds this divine Idea, whether it apprehends the Idea as present within itself or as existing in the divine light. For reason declares that natural species, because they are everlasting, cannot proceed from a movable cause; otherwise, having been made through motion, they would at some time fail. Yet they have been made, since they are parts of the universe, whose composite being comes from another source, and they all proceed from one cause. For they are so ordered with one another that they converge upon one nature, one work, and one end. From this the human intellect concludes that above the movable world, in the immutable mind that moves the world, there are exemplar forms of the natural species—not in a bodily or animate nature, for then they would be movable, but in an intellectual, indeed an intelligible nature; for intelligible things must be placed in the supreme intelligible.

Caput 1, continuatur

VIII.1.4

Non tamen talis argumentatio necessaria est, ut intellectus rationes rerum communes attingat; immo sicut phantasia suapte natura de rebus iudicat singulatim, ita intellectus vi naturali statim absque ulla discursione, simul ac depicta est singularis imago illa Platonis in phantasia, subito, inquam, dimisso certo hoc homine, humanam illam communem omnibus tum naturam tum ideam excogitat. Picta illa pulchritudine et bonitate, illico universalem pulchritudinis et bonitatis cogitat naturam rationemque in nulla certa materia, nullo proprio situ vel tempore positam, sed vel in omni materia vel absolutam a materia in se ipsa simpliciter subsistentem. Quapropter sensus circa corpora versatur, imaginatio circa simulacra corporum, phantasia circa singulas simulacrorum intentiones, intellectus circa singularum intentionum naturas communes ac rationes penitus incorporeas.

Chapter 1, continued

VIII.1.4

No argument of this kind, however, is necessary for the intellect to attain the common principles of things. Just as phantasy by its own nature judges things singly, so intellect by its natural power acts immediately and without any discursive reasoning. As soon as that singular image of Plato is painted in phantasy, it suddenly—I say—sets aside this determinate man and conceives both the human nature common to all and its Idea. Once that beauty and goodness have been depicted, intellect immediately conceives the universal nature and principle of beauty and goodness, placed in no determinate matter, position, or time, but either present in all matter or, released from matter, subsisting simply in itself. Thus sensation is occupied with bodies, imagination with images of bodies, phantasy with the particular intentions of those images, and intellect with the common natures of those particular intentions and with wholly incorporeal principles.

Caput 1, continuatur

VIII.1.5

Meminisse vero oportet intellectum non universalem modo naturam, sed particularem quoque cognoscere; alioquin non posset utramque invicem comparare, cognoscere insuper vires infra se omnes actusque ipsarum, quando omnes comparat ad se ipsum. Prius tamen universalem quam particularem naturam ab ipso cognosci paene omnes consentiunt. Siquidem pro natura formae intelligibilis in primis agit. Ea vero cum abstractione quadam concipiatur, absoluta est; unde naturam in primis refert universalem. Quam quidem vim a virtute intellectus in quo et a quo est adipiscitur, quasi intellectus ipse sit absolutus. A simulacro vero quod in phantasia est particulare solum repraesentatur. Quod quidem particulare ab intellectu solum secundo quodam actu atque reflexo prospici, tum Platonici tum Peripatetici plurimum arbitrantur, quatenus intellectus, postquam subito rectaque via per speciem universalem intuitus est, inde discursu quodam per actum speciemque in simulacrum, quo incitante species concepta fuerat, sese reflectens, particulare iam prospicit. Ideo motus ad incorporea absolutaque maxime naturalis est menti, quandoquidem primo, subito, recte ad ipsa se confert, ubi apparet intelligendi virtutem esse prorsus incorporealem. Si ergo per opera nutriendi, atque idem per opera sentiendi, quorum prima in corpore fiunt, secunda per corpus et circa corpora, ostendimus animam non esse divisam in corpore, quanto magis putandum est idem quoque per opera intelligendi patere, atque illud insuper: animam scilicet neque ducere originem a materia neque esse mortalem? Siquidem ipsa per se intelligendi opus exsequitur, in quo materiam relinquit omnino atque ad incorporales ascendit et perpetuas rationes. Age itaque videamus qua via possimus quod quaerimus per opera et effectus intelligentiae invenire.

VIII.1.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 1, continued

VIII.1.5

We must remember, however, that intellect knows not only universal nature but particular nature as well; otherwise it could not compare the two with one another. It also knows all the powers below itself and their acts, since it compares them all with itself. Almost everyone agrees, nevertheless, that intellect knows universal nature before particular nature. For it acts first in accordance with the nature of intelligible form. Because such a form is conceived through an act of abstraction, it is absolute, and therefore represents universal nature first. It acquires this power from the efficacy of the intellect in which and from which it exists, as though intellect itself were absolute. By contrast, the image in phantasy represents the particular alone. Both Platonists and Peripatetics commonly hold that intellect sees this particular only by a second and reflexive act. After it has suddenly and directly beheld the universal form, it turns back through a certain discursive movement, by way of act and form, toward the image whose prompting occasioned the form's conception; only then does it behold the particular. The movement toward incorporeal and absolute realities is therefore supremely natural to the mind, since first, suddenly, and directly it carries itself toward them. Here it becomes evident that the power of understanding is wholly incorporeal. If, through the operations of nutrition and likewise through those of sensation—the former taking place in the body, the latter through and about the body—we have shown that the soul is not divided in the body, how much more must the same truth become evident through the operations of understanding? And this further truth as well: that the soul neither derives its origin from matter nor is mortal. For the soul performs the work of understanding by itself; in that work it entirely leaves matter behind and ascends to incorporeal and eternal principles. Let us therefore now see by what path we can discover what we seek from the operations and effects of intelligence.

Caput 2

Anima alitur veritate. Ratio secunda.

VIII.2.1

Alimentum ea ratione assumitur ut in substantiam eius quod alendum est transeat, sicut comeditur panis ut caro efficiatur. Ideo cibus cognatus admodum esse debet illi quod est alendum, ut possit in eius naturam facile pertransire. Ita aquatica aqueis alimentis, terrestria terrenis, aerea pascuntur aereis. Similiter corpora corporalibus, incorporea incorporeis nutriuntur. Non enim corpus transit in spiritum, neque spiritus migrat in corpus, quia non subest illis communis materia per quam et in qua invicem se commutent. Constat animam corporibus non nutriri; constat incorporeis ali; constat igitur eam esse incorporealem. Si aliquibus anima vesceretur corporibus, illis maxime vesceretur quibus et corpus suum. Nam cum istud maxime animae congruat, alimenta etiam sua inter omnia corporalia congruent maxime, dummodo alimenta illa adeo tenuentur atque purgentur ut corpusculo illi subtili, quod vulgo anima esse putatur, conveniant. Erit igitur in corpore pingui validior anima quam in tenui, acutior ad inveniendum, ad reminiscendum firmior, promptior ad agendum, ad pervincendas turpes corporis illecebras continentior; magnanimitas in grandi corpore, in parvo pusillanimitas. Crescente corpore adolescet animus, etiam si nihil discat, si nullo studio rerum exerceatur. Decrescente per aetatem corpore et viribus eius debilitatis, sapientia, iudicium, constantiaque perdentur. Post epulas et vina acutius erit ingenium et sublimius. Omnia haec acciderent si animus cibis corporalibus coalesceret. Horum vero nunc contraria fiunt. Animus igitur corporalibus non pascitur alimentis.

VIII.2.2

Quid ergo? Nullis. Ita erit aeternus, si nulla alimonia indigebit, quod nos maxime cupimus. An forte spiritalibus vescitur epulis? Immo vero aliis nullis omnino, quod sapienti viro non est dubium, qui talibus alitur saepenumero.

Chapter 2

The soul is nourished by truth. Second argument.

VIII.2.1

Nourishment is taken so that it may pass into the substance of what is nourished, as bread is eaten so that it may become flesh. Food must therefore be closely akin to that which it nourishes, so that it can readily pass into its nature. Aquatic creatures feed on foods of water, terrestrial creatures on foods of earth, and creatures of the air on airy foods. In the same way, bodies are nourished by bodily things and incorporeal beings by incorporeal things. Body does not pass into spirit, nor spirit migrate into body, because they share no common matter through which and in which they could be changed into one another. It is evident that the soul is not nourished by bodies; it is evident that it is nourished by incorporeal things; therefore it is evident that the soul is incorporeal. If the soul fed on any bodies at all, it would above all feed on those by which its own body is fed. For since its own body is most closely suited to the soul, among all bodily things its foods also would be most closely suited to the soul, provided that they were so refined and purified as to agree with that subtle little body which is commonly supposed to be the soul. The soul would then be stronger in a stout body than in a slender one, keener in discovery, firmer in recollection, readier in action, and more self-controlled in overcoming the body's shameful allurements. Greatness of soul would inhabit a large body and littleness of soul a small one. As the body grew, the soul would mature even if it learned nothing and were trained by no study; as the body diminished with age and its strength declined, wisdom, judgment, and constancy would be lost. After food and wine, the understanding would be sharper and more sublime. All this would happen if the soul grew together with bodily food. Yet in fact the opposite occurs. The soul therefore is not nourished by bodily food.

VIII.2.2

What then—does it feed on no food at all? Then it will be eternal if it needs no nourishment, which is precisely what we desire. Or does it perhaps feast upon spiritual banquets? Indeed it feeds on no others at all. No wise man doubts this, for the wise man is often nourished by such fare.

Caput 2, continuatur

VIII.2.3

Neque assentiendum est Epicureis opinantibus animam cum corpore coalescere, quia maiores vires sint in pueris grandiusculis quam infantibus, atque inde adolescentes in dies viribus praestent, virique similiter, donec rursus senescente corpore minuantur. Siquidem ea est animae ad membra comparatio quae artis ad instrumenta. Ars autem saepe eadem permanens atque similis, modo facilius instrumenta movet, modo difficilius, quoniam haec alias aptiora sunt, alias ad motum ineptiora. Sic, quamvis eadem semper vis sit in anima, membra tamen propter nimiam aut mollitiem aut ariditatem neque constant aeque neque flectuntur. Atque ipsa vis quae videtur in corpore esse non tam carnis sequitur pondus quam proportionem membrorum naturalem conformationemque artificiosam, quae duo ad spiritum potius pertinent quam ad molem. Vis etiam quae inest animae non corporis acquiritur incremento—quod patet in iis qui torpent ignavia, in quibus crescente corpore nihil proficit animus—sed ex ipsa animi industria comparatur ingenio, usu, affectu. Quis neget tempore vires corporis comparari? Animo autem saepe momento fortitudo praestatur, quando vel ratio aliquid monstrat imperatque magnificum, vel furor arma ministrat; et saepe pusillus homo superat grandiorem, et qui non crescit corpore crescit tamen saepe virtute animi. Immo dum decrescimus corpore, saepe animo crescimus. Scientiam magnanimitatemque saepissime acquirit subito animus.

VIII.2.4

Corpus autem neque dare quicquam potest neque accipere nisi tempore. Denique virtus animi est aequalitas quaedam, ut Magi tradunt, per quam animus et sibimet et ipsi vero bonoque consonat. Si quo pacto quadrangularis quaedam linea circularis efficiatur, perfectior evadet, non tamen quod longior fiat, sed quod aequalior. Rursus, si temperetur lyra, perfectior erit, non quod grandior fiat, sed consonantior. Ita cum adolescens aliquis virtute adolescit, tunc anima non quantitate crescit, sed spiritali quadam aequalitate et consonantia proficit.

Chapter 2, continued

VIII.2.3

Nor should we agree with the Epicureans, who suppose that the soul grows together with the body because somewhat larger boys have greater strength than infants, adolescents then excel more each day in strength, and men do likewise until their strength in turn diminishes as the body ages. The relation of soul to limbs is that of an art to its instruments. The art often remains the same and unchanged, though at one time it moves its instruments more easily and at another with greater difficulty, because sometimes they are better fitted for motion and sometimes less fitted. Thus, although the same power always remains in the soul, excessive softness or dryness prevents the limbs from either holding firm or bending equally well. Even the strength which appears to lie in the body depends not so much upon the weight of the flesh as upon the limbs' natural proportion and skillful formation, both of which pertain more to the vital spirit than to bulk. Nor is the power within the soul acquired by an increase of body—as is plain in those who lie sluggish in idleness, whose bodies grow while their souls make no progress. It is acquired instead through the soul's own industry—by native ability, practice, and ardor. Who denies that bodily strength is acquired over time? Yet courage is often granted to the soul in a moment, whether reason shows and commands something noble and magnificent or a frenzy supplies the weapons. A small man often overcomes a larger one; and someone who does not grow in body often grows in power of soul. Indeed, while we diminish in body, we often grow in soul. Knowledge and greatness of soul are very often acquired by the soul in an instant.

VIII.2.4

A body, however, can neither give nor receive anything except over time. Finally, the soul's virtue is a certain equality, as the Magi teach, through which the soul accords both with itself and with the true and the good. If by some means a four-angled line were made circular, it would become more perfect—not because it became longer, but because it became more equal. Again, if a lyre were tuned, it would be more perfect, not because it grew larger, but because it became more harmonious. So when a young man matures in virtue, the soul does not grow in quantity; it advances in a certain spiritual equality and harmony.

Caput 2, continuatur

VIII.2.5

Neque obiiciat quisquam ita, quod quando corpus neque gravatur epularum nimio pondere neque fame languescit, sed mediocriter alitur, tunc animus similiter enutritur fitque in eo statu validior, aliter autem contra. Nam id quidem verum est, animum in eo hominis statu valere quam plurimum; non tamen hoc inde provenit, quod similiter alatur ut corpus, sed quia animus natura regit corpus, et quando ipsum aegrotat gravaturque, animus adeo in eo curando atque regendo occupatur ut ad inquirendam veritatem non sit intentus. Quieto autem corpore, expedite mens speculatur, et tunc maxime propriis vescitur alimentis. Escam vero animi quam esse dicemus aliam praeter illam quam esurit semper et sitit, qua parta gaudet summopere, qua sumpta crescit et impletur? Omnis animus tum in omni aetate, tum continue veritatem prae ceteris appetit, quam in omni arte quaerunt artifices; et in qualibet re quid de re ipsa sit verum etiam infantes interrogant curiose, neque semel aut bis aut ter singulis diebus, ut corporis escam, sed momentis singulis verum in omnibus negotiis investigant. Proinde veritatis acquirendae studio alimoniam corporis praetermittimus saepenumero; neque tempori neque pecuniae parcimus neque laboribus; enervamus corpus, quo enervato animus fit nervosior. Hanc veritatem animus ipse cupit, non corpus; haec enim corpus non auget, sed obest plerumque illius studium corpori. Quin etiam propter se ipsum expetit illam animus, non propter corpus. Quid enim corpori conferat? Quod si quando videatur veritas conducere corpori, non propter ipsam veritatem id evenit, sed propter aliquod commodum corporale, quod cognita veritate contingit. Immo vero animus, etiam si nihil inde sequatur utilitatis, veritatem studiose perquirit; et pleno cibis suis corpore, esurit sititque adhuc animus veritatem, qua inventa exsultat, non ad tempus, sicut propter corporis usus, sed perpetuo gaudet, illuminatur, adolescit, evadit magnificus, adeo ut illi prae magnitudine sua minima videantur illa quae solent esurienti animulae videri quam maxima. Hac etiam alimonia fit invictus, temperans, iustus, hominum gubernator et dominus, excelsior caelo, par angelis, Deo similis.

VIII.2.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VIII.2.5

Let no one object that when the body is neither burdened by the excessive weight of food nor weakened by hunger, but is moderately nourished, the soul is nourished in the same way and becomes stronger in that condition, whereas under the opposite conditions the reverse occurs. It is indeed true that the soul is at its strongest when a human being is in this condition. But this does not result from the soul being fed as the body is. Rather, the soul by nature governs the body, and when the body is ill and weighed down, the soul is so occupied with caring for and governing it that it cannot attend to the search for truth. When the body is at rest, the mind contemplates freely, and then it feeds most fully on its own proper nourishment. What food of the soul shall we name except that for which it always hungers and thirsts, whose acquisition gives it the highest joy, and whose reception causes it to grow and be filled? Every soul, at every age and continually, desires truth before all else. Artisans seek it in every art, and in every matter even children eagerly ask what is true of the thing itself. They investigate the truth in all their affairs not once, twice, or three times a day, as they take bodily food, but at every moment. In the desire to acquire truth we often forgo the body's nourishment; we spare neither time, money, nor labor. We exhaust the body, and as it loses its sinews the soul becomes more sinewy. The soul itself desires this truth, not the body; truth does not increase the body, and the pursuit of it often harms the body. The soul desires truth for its own sake, not for the sake of the body. What benefit could it bring the body? If truth at times seems to benefit the body, this is not because of truth itself, but because some bodily advantage comes from knowing it. Indeed, even if no advantage follows, the soul still pursues truth eagerly. Though the body is filled with its own food, the soul still hungers and thirsts for truth. Having found it, the soul exults—not for a time, as with things sought for the body's use, but it rejoices forever. It is illumined, matures, and grows magnificent, until in the greatness it has attained those things appear smallest to it which ordinarily seem greatest of all to a famished little soul. By this nourishment it also becomes unconquered, temperate, just, a governor and lord of men, higher than heaven, equal to angels, and like to God.

Caput 2, continuatur

VIII.2.6

Quis igitur ambigat ulterius quin veritas humanae mentis naturalis sit esca? Eandem escam omnes appetunt mentes, eandem quaeque mens semper. Quae quidem consensio stabilis appetendi significat mentes inter se mirifice convenire et quamlibet mentem in natura sua stabilem permanere, quandoquidem appetitus earum non ita variatur mutaturve ut appetitio sensuum, quae pro diversitate corporum diversa est et ad mutationem corporis permutatur, quasi sensus corporum mutationem sequantur, mens divinorum stabilitatem. Odit namque corporis alimenta, atque eodem cibo vescitur quo caelestes et sempiternae mentes. Hic cibus est veritas.

VIII.2.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VIII.2.6

Who, then, can any longer doubt that truth is the natural food of the human mind? All minds desire the same food, and every mind desires it always. This stable agreement in desire signifies both that minds accord wonderfully with one another and that each mind remains stable in its own nature. Their appetite does not vary or alter as the appetite of the senses does, which differs with the diversity of bodies and changes when the body changes—as though the senses followed the mutability of bodies, but the mind the stability of divine things. For the mind hates the body's foods and feeds upon the same food as the celestial and everlasting minds. This food is truth.

Caput 2, continuatur

VIII.2.7

Veritas autem non est corporea; alioquin rebus incorporeis non inesset. Nunc autem inest Deo, angelisque et numeris, quae et incorporalia sunt et vera. Et quoniam incorporalia tanto veriora sunt corporibus quanto puriora firmioraque sunt, fit ut veritas in illis sit potius quam corporibus. Atqui, quod maius est, non est proprie veritas in corporibus. In his enim duo sunt, materia et forma. Non est veritas in materia; nam per eam nihil vere in specie aliqua rerum est: non homo revera per eam aliquid est, non equus, et reliqua. Neque tamen in forma corporis iacet veritas, cum vera forma non sit cuius virtus inficitur in materia. Testantur hoc et mathematici, qui veras figuras in corporibus non reperiunt. Verus quippe circulus locatus in vero plano assidue volvitur; hoc fieri ratio cogit, cum circulus ille planum tangat in puncto, in puncto autem corpus quiescere nequeat. Nemo haec in corporibus vidit umquam. Non insunt igitur verae figurae corporibus, quia forte neque vera principia figurarum, saltem quantum spectat ad sensum, qualia sunt puncta, lineae, superficies. Ratio quidem ostendit verum punctum longitudine carere debere, veram lineam latitudine, superficiem veram profunditate. Talia vero in materia nusquam sensu reperiuntur. Cum ergo alicubi sit veritas et a corporibus sensuque absit, est procul dubio in spiritibus. Est igitur incorporea. Idem ex eo patet, quia ibi maxime consistit veritas ubi scientia. Haec vero in rationibus rerum universalibus revera versatur, ceu cum quis cognoscit quid bonitas ipsa sit, quid iustitia, singulis bonis et iustis actionibus officiisque communis, atque similia. Rationes vero huiusmodi incorporales sunt, quoniam in nullo particulari corpore concluduntur, sed sunt ad multa communes. Ratio corporis vel circuli tota in minimo corpore vel circulo sicut in maximo reperitur; ratio longitudinis vel latitudinis vel profunditatis tota in minima linea, superficie, altitudine, sicut in maxima. Denique ratio quantitatis ipsius tota adaequatur toti rei cuiuslibet quantitati. Quapropter rationes corporis, figurae, dimensionis atque ipsius etiam quantitatis corporales et extensae non sunt; multo minus rationes aliae corporales et extensae esse possunt. Praeterea rationes rerum immutabiles sunt, nam aliter se habere non possunt; omnia vero corporalia mutabilia sunt. Quapropter scientia, cum in his versetur, est incorporea; igitur et veritas incorporea.

Chapter 2, continued

VIII.2.7

Truth, however, is not bodily; otherwise it would not be present in incorporeal things. Yet it is present in God, in angels, and in numbers, all of which are both incorporeal and true. And since incorporeal things are truer than bodies in proportion as they are purer and more stable, truth exists in them more fully than it does in bodies. More than this, truth does not properly exist in bodies at all. Bodies consist of two things, matter and form. Truth does not lie in matter, for through matter nothing truly belongs to any species of things: matter does not make anything truly a man, a horse, or any other determinate thing. Nor does truth lie in a bodily form, since no form whose power is tainted in matter is a true form. Mathematicians also bear witness to this, for they do not find true figures in bodies. A true circle placed upon a true plane would roll continually. Reason requires this, since such a circle touches the plane at one point, while a body cannot rest upon a point. No one has ever seen such things in bodies. True figures are therefore not present in bodies, perhaps because even the true principles of figures—at least so far as sense is concerned—are not present there: points, lines, and surfaces. Reason shows that a true point must lack length, a true line breadth, and a true surface depth. Nowhere in matter are such things found by sense. Since truth exists somewhere, yet is absent from bodies and sensation, it is without doubt in spirits. Truth is therefore incorporeal. The same conclusion is evident from this: truth resides most fully where knowledge resides. Knowledge is truly concerned with the universal principles of things, as when someone knows what goodness itself is or what justice is—the justice common to particular good and just actions and duties—and with similar things. Principles of this kind are incorporeal, since they are enclosed in no particular body but are common to many. The principle of body or circle is found whole in the smallest body or circle just as in the largest. The principle of length, breadth, or depth is entire in the smallest line, surface, or depth just as in the greatest. Finally, the principle of quantity itself corresponds as a whole to the entire quantity of any given thing. Therefore, the principles of body, figure, dimension, and even quantity itself are not bodily or extended; much less can other principles be bodily and extended. Moreover, the principles of things are immutable, for they cannot be otherwise, whereas all bodily things are mutable. Since knowledge is concerned with these principles, it is incorporeal; therefore truth too is incorporeal.

Caput 2, continuatur

VIII.2.8

Quo fit ut de ipsa veritate rerum—quid sit, qua ratione constet inveniaturque, quid ipsi sit propinquius quidve remotius—non sensus ullus, immo sola ratio iudicet, et tunc potissimum quando sese a sensuum corporumque fallacia sevocat. Est ergo veritas incorporea. Talis est autem maxime veritas et scientia divinorum, qua praecipue animus oblectatur et alitur. Quo igitur modo animus potest corporalis esse, qui corporalibus cibis offenditur, spiritalibus alitur, quandoquidem veritate omni, praesertim divinarum rerum veritate, delectatur, alitur, augetur? Aut quo pacto mortalis erit, si veritate pascitur immortali, cum neque corruptibilis venter cibum incorruptibilem cupiat aut capiat, neque cibus incorruptibilis in corpus transeat corruptibile? Sane si immortalis est veritas, atque est continuus animi cibus, ut certe est, sive ipsa convertatur in animum sive animum in se ipsam convertat, eum efficit immortalem. Quoniam vero, dum familiari hoc vescitur cibo, ea voluptate perfunditur quae neque molestiam habet admixtam neque in fastidium vertitur vel dolorem, constat mentem neque fatigari umquam, neque turbari contrarii alicuius occursu, neque in contrarium aliquid posse corrumpi. Rursus, quia menti nihil natura optabilius est quam veritas, veritas autem per separationem quandam a rebus mortalibus comparatur, nihil menti, qua ratione mens est, magis est naturale familiareque quam a mortalibus segregari. Ex eo vero quod maxime naturale est non remissio vitae sequitur, sed intensio. Quapropter tunc vivet mens praecipue cum hinc abierit. Hanc vero argumentationem nostram argumentatione quadam Olympiodori Platonici confirmare possumus, quam partim Pythagoricis, partim Platonicis mysteriis a Phaedone Gorgiaque acceptis sic ille contexuit. Mens naturali veritatis aviditate continue tum se a corpore, tum formas a materia separat, cupitque ita atque conatur separata vivere, quamvis quotidie in contrarium corpus sensusque detorqueant. Separatam vero illam a caduco corpore vitam naturaliter appetit, tamquam naturaliter, id est revera, bonam, praesertim cum vita sit omnino dedita veritati atque bonitati. Vita eiusmodi si bona est, ergo et possibilis est. Quod enim impossibile est, idem quoque inutile; bonum vero inutile non est dicendum. Item, si impotentia ad malum pertinet, ad bonum potentia pertinet. Ergo bonum omne natura sua possibile est. Hinc efficitur ut naturalis appetitio boni sit possessionis possibilis appetitio. Ac si etiam quod apparet bonum est possibile, certe et ipsum revera bonum potentissimum est, et vera bona vere beneque quaerentibus possibilia sunt.

VIII.2.8 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 2, continued

VIII.2.8

Consequently, no sense but reason alone judges what the truth of things is, by what principle it is constituted and discovered, and what lies nearer or farther from it; reason judges most fully when it withdraws from the deceit of senses and bodies. Truth, then, is incorporeal. Above all, truth and knowledge of divine things are of this kind; in such knowledge the soul chiefly delights and is nourished. How, then, can the soul be bodily when bodily food offends it and spiritual food nourishes it, since every truth—and above all the truth of divine things—delights, nourishes, and enlarges it? Or how can it be mortal if it feeds on immortal truth, when a corruptible stomach can neither desire nor contain incorruptible food, and incorruptible food cannot pass into a corruptible body? Certainly, if immortal truth is the soul's continual food, as it surely is, whether truth is converted into the soul or converts the soul into itself, it makes the soul immortal. Moreover, while the mind feeds upon this familiar food, it is filled with pleasure unmixed with distress and turning neither to disgust nor pain. It is therefore evident that the mind is never wearied or disturbed by the encounter with any contrary and cannot be corrupted into anything contrary. Again, since nothing is more desirable to the mind by nature than truth, whereas truth is gained through a certain separation from mortal things, nothing is more natural or congenial to the mind, insofar as it is mind, than separation from mortal things. What is most natural brings not a weakening of life but its intensification. The mind, therefore, will live most fully when it has departed hence. We can confirm our argument by one that the Platonist Olympiodorus wove from mysteries partly Pythagorean, partly Platonic, received from the Phaedo and the Gorgias. In its natural hunger for truth, the mind continually separates itself from body and forms from matter; it desires and strives to live thus apart, though every day body and senses wrench it in the opposite direction. It naturally desires this life apart from the perishable body, regarding it as naturally—that is, truly—good, especially as such a life is wholly devoted to truth and goodness. If such a life is good, it is also possible. The impossible is also useless; but the good cannot be called useless. Again, if impotence belongs to evil, power belongs to good. Every good, therefore, is possible by nature. It follows that natural desire for good is desire for a possible possession. And if even what merely appears good is possible, surely the truly good itself is supremely powerful, and true goods are possible for those who seek them truly and well.

Caput 3

Tertia ratio. Virtus animae, quia indivisibilis est, corporis qualitas esse nequit.

VIII.3.1

Quod indivisibile est corporis qualitas esse nequit. Nam si qualitas eius esse ponatur, ita interrogabimus: numquid tangat partem aliquam divisibilem corporis, an punctum aliquod corporis indivisibile? Si conceditur primum, profecto qualitas huiusmodi divisibilis erit, cum modo divisibili tangat; atque ita non indivisibile divisibilis ipsius erit qualitas, sed alicuius divisibilis divisibile. Si secundum conceditur, certe illa qualitas puncti illius quod attingit solum qualitas est, non corporis. Quamobrem quod individuum est corporis qualitas numquam erit. Individua vero virtus animae humanae est qualitas. Igitur anima non est corpus. Sufficiens quidem putabitur huiusmodi demonstratio, si duo illa planius ostenderimus, videlicet et virtutem esse animae qualitatem et hanc ipsam virtutem individuam esse. Primum cuique est evidentissimum, quandoquidem per virtutis praesentiam talis ac talis anima fit et dicitur sapiens, prudens, iusta, fortis et temperans. Atque abesse virtus ab anima potest anima remanente. Huiusmodi vero est condicio qualitatum. Secundum praeterea illud, videlicet virtutem esse indivisibilem, sic ostendimus. Virtutum duo sunt genera: aliae in intellectu, in appetitu vero sive rationali sive irrationali aliae. Illae speculativae vocantur, istae morales; illae speculativae quia speculando comparantur et comparatae versantur in speculando; istae morales quia more et consuetudine acquiruntur atque acquisitae in moribus et operum usu consistunt. In eo genere sunt divinorum sapientia, scientia naturalium, civilium prudentia, ars operum humanorum. In hoc sunt iustitia, quae suum cuique tribuit; fortitudo, quae ad opera honesta promptior abicit a nobis timoris impedimentum; temperantia, quae libidinis mollitiem, quod alterum honestorum impedimentum est, repellit. Hae quidem sunt apud Platonem virtutum descriptiones. Si qua esset in iis virtutibus corporea magnitudo, quo quisque grandior est eo sapientior iustiorque fieri posset, neque possent exigui homines grandes virtutibus superare aut aequare. Rursus scientia quae maximorum corporum notitia est amplior et clarior esset quam scientia quae minorum. Cognoscimus autem multa quorum non valemus magnitudinem adaequare. Totusque animus et aeque et ita rem magnam percipit sicut parvam.

Chapter 3

Third argument. Because the soul's virtue is indivisible, it cannot be a quality of a body.

VIII.3.1

What is indivisible cannot be a quality of a body. For if it is assumed to be a quality of a body, we shall ask whether it touches some divisible part of the body or some indivisible point of it. If the first is granted, a quality of this kind will certainly be divisible, since it touches in a divisible manner; thus, the quality of the divisible thing will not be indivisible, but what belongs to something divisible will itself be divisible. If the second is granted, that quality will surely be a quality only of the point it touches, not of the body. Hence, what is indivisible will never be a quality of a body. Now the indivisible virtue of the human soul is a quality. Therefore the soul is not a body. This demonstration should be deemed sufficient if we establish its two claims more plainly: that virtue is a quality of the soul, and that virtue itself is indivisible. The first is perfectly evident to everyone, since by the presence of virtue the soul becomes such and such in character and is called wise, prudent, just, courageous, and temperate. Virtue, moreover, can be absent from the soul while the soul remains; such is the condition of qualities. The second claim—that virtue is indivisible—we establish as follows. There are two kinds of virtue: some reside in the intellect, while others reside in appetite, whether rational or irrational. The former are called contemplative virtues, the latter moral virtues. The contemplative virtues are acquired through contemplation and, once acquired, are exercised in contemplation. The moral virtues are acquired through conduct and custom and, once acquired, consist in character and the practice of deeds. The first kind comprises wisdom concerning divine things, knowledge of natural things, prudence in civil affairs, and skill in human works. The second comprises justice, which renders to each what is his own; courage, which removes from us the obstacle of fear so that we are readier for honorable deeds; and temperance, which repels the softness of desire, the other obstacle to honorable deeds. These are Plato’s descriptions of the virtues. If there were any bodily magnitude in these virtues, the larger a person was, the wiser and more just he could become, and men small in body could neither surpass nor equal large men in virtue. Again, knowledge of the largest bodies would be wider and clearer than knowledge of smaller ones. Yet we know many things whose magnitude we cannot equal. The whole soul perceives a large thing just as fully and in just the same manner as it perceives a small one.

Caput 3, continuatur

VIII.3.2

Summatim vero quid aliud speculativa virtus est nisi claritas intellectus? Quid aliud moralis nisi fervor stabilis appetitus ab intellectus claritate succensus? Claritas illa non paulatim fit, licet ad eam pedetentim perveniamus. Sicut post longam per vestigia multa investigationem subito lepus aspicitur, ita quisque in se ipso animadvertit, post diuturnam indaginem, se momento quid verum sit ea de re quam quaesiverit intueri.

VIII.3.3

Subito veritatis lumen, ut Plato inquit, effulget in animo, non subito excussum a rebus, sed longa quadam discussione ut ex lapide saepius colliso scintilla. Similiter diuturna consuetudine iuventus ad mores disponitur, donec paululum quod ad accendendum stabilem illum rationalemque appetitus ardorem deficit; nondum sufficienter accenditur, nondum virtus moralis habetur; saepius inspirando subito tandem flagrat aestus appetitus sufficiens ad virtutem. Quid plura? Verso ad solem speculo, in speculo lumen momento refulget; supposita illi speculo lana, statim ut parata est, in ipsa ignis accenditur. Quare et repentinus splendor in speculo fit et repentinus ignis in lana. Non aliter subita in intellectu claritas veritatis, subita inde in appetitu flagrantia.

VIII.3.4

Resume iterum hoc pacto. Virtus speculativa est quaedam cognitio veritatis. Si gradatim constetur, pars nunc quidem habebitur, pars deficiet et quaeretur. Quatenus pars veritatis habebitur, sciemus quidem; quatenus pars deerit, etiam nesciemus. Ita eandem rem et sciemus simul et nesciemus, quod ne ebrius quidem aliquis somniaret.

VIII.3.2-VIII.3.4 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 3, continued

VIII.3.2

In sum, what is contemplative virtue other than the clarity of intellect? And what is moral virtue other than the steady ardor of appetite kindled by the clarity of intellect? This clarity does not arise by degrees, although we reach it little by little. Just as, after a long search through many tracks, the hare is suddenly sighted, so each of us observes within himself that after prolonged investigation he sees in a moment what is true concerning the matter he has been seeking.

VIII.3.3

As Plato says, the light of truth suddenly flashes forth in the soul. It is not suddenly struck from things, but is brought forth by a long process of inquiry, as a spark is struck from a stone repeatedly beaten. In the same way, long habituation disposes a young person toward moral character. So long as the little that is needed to kindle that stable and rational ardor of appetite is still lacking, it is not yet sufficiently kindled and moral virtue is not yet possessed. Yet by blowing upon it again and again, at last the heat of appetite sufficient for virtue suddenly bursts into flame. Why say more? Turn a mirror toward the sun, and light flashes in the mirror in an instant; place wool beneath that mirror, and as soon as it is prepared, fire is kindled in the wool. Thus the splendor in the mirror arises suddenly, and so does the fire in the wool. In just this way, the clarity of truth suddenly arises in the intellect and from it a sudden flame in appetite.

VIII.3.4

Let us take up the point once more in this way. Contemplative virtue is a certain knowledge of truth. If it were constituted by degrees, one part would now be possessed while another was still lacking and being sought. To the extent that part of the truth was possessed, we would know; to the extent that part was lacking, we would not know. We would thus know and not know the same thing at the same time—a thing that not even a drunken man would dream.

Caput 3, continuatur

VIII.3.5

Quapropter speculativa virtus non gradatim a parte sui in aliam sui partem progreditur, sed tota simul e vestigio lucet. Virtus quoque moralis est voluntas quaedam constans quodcumque ratio dictaverit eligendi. Si partes habeat multas fiatque sensim, pars huius voluntatis inerit, pars adhuc aberit. Quantum pars inest, volumus; quantum pars abest, etiam nolumus. Sic eandem rem simul per eandem vim animae volemus pariter atque nolemus, quod est monstro persimile.

VIII.3.6

Quoniam igitur virtus fit momento indivisibili, est ipsa quoque indivisibilis, si modo natura cuiusque propriam originem sequitur, praesertim cum finem habeat indivisibilem. Cuius autem ortus et finis individuus est, cur non sit ipsum etiam individuum? Quis virtutis finis? Moralis quidem finis, animam a corpore divisibili purgare atque seiungere; speculativae autem, incorporeas universalesque rerum rationes a dividuis corporibus procul positas comprehendere. Cernis finem utriusque virtutis, sicut et ortum, esse individuum aliquid, ideoque virtutes ipsas oportere individuas iudicari. Ostendunt utraeque virtutes huiusmodi quandam sui naturam in eo quam maxime, quod multae scientiae simul in intellectu sunt, multae virtutes morales simul in appetitu, neque sese sua numerositate confundunt, sed augent potius et lucidant. Atque unius scientiae conceptionem in nobis seorsum ab alia pervidemus, ita ut sine consideratione alterius possimus alteram cogitare. Proinde tales habemus artificiorum ideas in mente, unitas, inquam, pariter et distinctas, usque adeo ut possimus ad unius ideae exemplar loqui et fabricare aliquid ipsi proprium, etiam si nihil ad alterius conceptionis exemplar agamus. Corpora esse nequeunt tales intelligentiae, quae ita in eodem manent animae gremio, ut neque sese detrudant pellantque, neque se mutua mixtione confundant. Eadem est de moralibus virtutibus ratio.

VIII.3.5-VIII.3.6 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 3, continued

VIII.3.5

Therefore contemplative virtue does not advance gradually from one part of itself to another; it shines forth all at once and immediately. Moral virtue likewise is a certain steadfast will to choose whatever reason dictates. If it possessed many parts and came into being by degrees, part of this will would be present while part was still absent. To the extent that one part was present, we would will; to the extent that another was absent, we would also not will. By the same power of the soul, then, we would simultaneously will and not will the same thing, which would be very like a monstrosity.

VIII.3.6

Since virtue, then, comes into being in an indivisible moment, it too is indivisible, provided that the nature of each thing follows its proper origin—especially since virtue also has an indivisible end. When a thing's origin and end are indivisible, why should the thing itself not also be indivisible? What is the end of virtue? The end of moral virtue is to purify and separate the soul from the divisible body; that of contemplative virtue is to apprehend the incorporeal and universal principles of things, placed far beyond divisible bodies. You see that the end of each kind of virtue, like its origin, is something indivisible, and therefore that the virtues themselves must be judged indivisible. Both kinds of virtue reveal this nature of theirs most clearly in the following fact: many branches of knowledge coexist in the intellect and many moral virtues in appetite, yet their number does not confuse them with one another; rather, they increase and illuminate one another. Within ourselves we discern the conception belonging to one branch of knowledge separately from another, so that we can think of either without considering the other. Thus we hold in the mind ideas of the arts—united, I say, and at the same time distinct—so much so that we can speak and fashion something proper to the exemplar of one Idea even if we do nothing according to the exemplar conceived by another. Acts of intelligence such as these cannot be bodies. They remain together in the same bosom of the soul without dislodging and driving one another out or becoming confused through mutual mixture. The same reasoning applies to the moral virtues.

Caput 3, continuatur

VIII.3.7

Quinetiam cum multae sint in anima sapientis intelligentiae, unaquaeque illarum tota in singulis invenitur. Profecto qui in geometria sive theologia peritus est, propositionem aliquam habet facultatis illius primam, habet secundam, tertiamque et reliquas, atque ex cognitione unius in alterius cognitionem progreditur. Si prima docet secundam, secunda tertiam, et quisquis docet aliquid possidet in se ipso quod docet, sequitur ut in qualibet praecedente propositione sequentes omnes contineantur. Quin immo et in qualibet sequente insunt similiter praecedentes. Quippe solemus sequentium indiciis praecedentia saepe rimari. Neque id iniuria, siquidem in effectibus lucent imagines causarum. Hac rerum serie fit ut vir sapiens, una quavis propositione excogitata, velocissime percurrat in multas atque ita multas, immo omnes, in una conspiciat. Est ergo quaelibet intelligentia in qualibet, et una quaeque tota continetur in singulis. Idem in virtutibus moralibus accidit. Nam acquisita illarum una, statim omnes habentur. Quis enim iuste distribuet, si aut timeat minas aut libidini serviat? Quisnam metus fortiter superabit, si emolliatur libidine? Quis domabit cupiditates, si formidini succubuerit? Denique quis honeste vitam aget, nisi per prudentiam optimum vitae finem statuerit et vias ad finem elegerit rectiores? Aut quis prudenter inspiciet, si mentis acies caligine vitiorum obnubiletur? Sunt ergo virtutes istae ita connexae invicem ut in una sint omnes et quaelibet virtus tota comprehendatur in singulis, sicut et tota geometriae facultas in praecipua eius propositione, immo in qualibet delitescit, cum per sollertis ingenii sagacitatem ex qualibet propositione omnes eliciantur. Non potest autem divisibilis qualitas tota simul rebus multis inesse. Profecto in una sola est, id est corpore uno, et alias sui partes per alias corporis partes extendit, neque tota eius quantitas singulis corporis partibus inest. Ideo intelligentiae illae moresque omnino indivisibiles sunt.

VIII.3.7 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 3, continued

VIII.3.7

Moreover, although there are many acts of understanding in the soul of a wise man, each of them is found whole in each of the others. One who is skilled in geometry or theology possesses a first proposition of that discipline, a second, a third, and all the rest, and proceeds from knowledge of one to knowledge of another. If the first teaches the second and the second the third, and whoever teaches something possesses within himself what he teaches, it follows that every preceding proposition contains all that follow. Indeed, every later proposition similarly contains those that precede it, for we often investigate earlier things by the signs found in what follows. Rightly so, since the images of causes shine in their effects. Through this order of things, once a wise man has conceived any one proposition, he passes with the greatest speed through many, and so beholds many—indeed all—within one. Every act of intelligence therefore exists in every other, and each is contained whole in each. The same occurs among the moral virtues. Once one of them has been acquired, all are immediately possessed. Who will distribute things justly if he either fears threats or serves desire? Who will courageously overcome fear if he is softened by desire? Who will master his desires if he succumbs to fear? Finally, who will lead an honorable life unless through prudence he has set the best end of life before himself and chosen the straighter paths to that end? Or who will see prudently if the eye of his mind is clouded by the darkness of vice? These virtues, then, are so bound together that all are present in one and every virtue is contained whole in each. In the same way, the whole power of geometry lies hidden in its chief proposition—indeed, in any proposition—since the sagacity of an acute mind can elicit all of them from any one. Yet a divisible quality cannot be present whole and at once in many things. It is present in one thing only, that is, in one body; it extends different parts of itself through different parts of the body, and its whole quantity is not present in each bodily part. These acts of intelligence and these moral dispositions are therefore altogether indivisible.

Caput 3, continuatur

VIII.3.8

Quamobrem anima neque corpus neque forma divisa per corpus esse potest, siquidem ipsa est subiectum indivisibilium qualitatum. Ergo sicut delirat qui aut quaerit quanta sit scientia vel iustitia, aut putat geometriam corpore geometrae esse minorem, ita desipit qui aut interrogat quanta sit anima, aut eam opinatur corpore minorem esse, quandoquidem nullo modo corporalis est. Non solum enim incorporalia suscipit, verum etiam multa in se ipsa facit incorporalia, dum species rerum rationesque et habitus concipit, praesertim cum definitiones incorporalium fabricat. Quis autem eam quae incorporalium causa est esse dixerit corporalem? Aut eam mortalem quae subiectum est virtutum, cum virtutum officium sit repugnare mortalibus, siquidem speculativa virtus illa fugit, moralis fugat? Non potest autem qualitas subiecto proprio repugnare. Immo immortale est illud necessario quod naturale receptaculum est qualitatum earum quarum proprium est adversari et imperare mortalibus. Vis autem rationis huius in eo consistit maxime, quod anima non modo subiectum est talium qualitatum, sed et principium; ideoque naturam illam mortalibus repugnantem sortiuntur ab anima.

Chapter 3, continued

VIII.3.8

Hence the soul can be neither a body nor a form divided throughout the body, since it is the subject of indivisible qualities. Just as a man raves if he asks how large knowledge or justice is, or supposes geometry to be smaller than the geometer's body, so a man is senseless if he asks how large the soul is or supposes it to be smaller than the body, since it is in no way bodily. It not only receives incorporeal things, but also makes many things incorporeal within itself when it conceives the forms and principles of things and habits, above all when it constructs definitions of incorporeal things. Who would call bodily that which is the cause of incorporeal things? Or who would call mortal what is the subject of virtues, when the office of the virtues is to oppose mortal things—for contemplative virtue flees them, while moral virtue drives them away? A quality cannot oppose its own subject. That which is the natural receptacle of qualities whose proper function is to resist and rule mortal things must therefore be immortal. The force of this argument lies especially in the fact that the soul is not only the subject of such qualities but also their principle; consequently, it is from the soul that they receive their nature of opposition to mortal things.

Caput 4

Quarta ratio. Species conceptioque intelligibilis suscipi non potest a corpore.

VIII.4.1

Id sentiunt Graeci omnes Platonici. Idem possumus ita Platonicorum Arabum sententia confirmare. Intellectus rem aliquam, puta hominem, non intelligit nisi formam quandam universalem hominum significatricem adipiscatur, quam intelligibilem formam et speciem nominant. Hanc adeptus, quid sit hominis natura ita iudicat: homo est animal rationale. Iudicium hoc tum conceptus et conceptio mentis vocatur, tum rei cognoscendae ratio et definitio, quam etiam solemus scientiam appellare. Si intellectus a corporis latitudine protendatur, tam forma intelligibilis quam conceptio latitudini corporis adhaerebit. In hac ipsa latitudine duo considerantur, punctum scilicet et extensio latitudinis. Igitur formae illius conceptionisque sedes erit vel solum punctum aliquod corporis vel extensio. At vero si neutrum concedi debet, ut demonstrabimus, sequitur ut intellectus in corpore minime protendatur. Ostendamus prius punctum sedem talem esse non posse. Primum quidem animadvertendum est punctum non existere per se ipsum, sed esse mensurae corporis sic affixum ut semper eius sit terminus. Si pro natura sua rem capit, certe numquam accipit nisi terminum aliquem magnitudinis alicuius quae in illa corporis mensura suscipiatur, cuius terminus est punctum. Ita ut sicut corporalis mensura suscipit rei advenientis magnitudinem, sic talis mensurae terminus terminum suscipiat magnitudinis. Quare quicquid puncto corporis suscipi dicitur non est a magnitudine liberum. Ideo si formae intelligibilis receptaculum sit punctum, fieri non poterit quin ea species divisibilis sit et terminum suum in puncto corporis habeat, reliquas vero partes in corporis latitudine. Eam tamen indivisibilem esse probabimus in sequentibus.

Chapter 4

Fourth argument. Neither an intelligible form nor an intelligible conception can be received by a body.

VIII.4.1

All the Greek Platonists hold this view. We can also confirm it from the teaching of the Arab Platonists. The intellect does not understand a thing—for example, a human being—unless it acquires a universal form signifying human beings, which they call an intelligible form and species. Once it has acquired this form, it judges what human nature is: a human being is a rational animal. This judgment is called both a concept and conception of the mind, and also an account and definition of the thing to be known, which we are accustomed to call knowledge. If the intellect extended across the breadth of a body, both the intelligible form and the conception would adhere to that bodily breadth. Within such breadth two things must be considered: a point and the extension of the breadth. The seat of that form and conception will therefore be either a single point of the body or its extension. But if neither can be granted, as we shall demonstrate, it follows that the intellect is not extended within a body at all. Let us first show that a point cannot be such a seat. We must observe at the outset that a point does not exist by itself, but is so bound to the measure of a body that it is always that measure's limit. If by its nature it receives a thing, it certainly receives nothing except some limit of a magnitude received within that bodily measure, the point being the magnitude's limit. Thus, just as bodily measure receives the magnitude of the thing that enters it, the limit of that measure receives the limit of the magnitude. Whatever is said to be received at a bodily point is therefore not free from magnitude. Consequently, if a point were the receptacle of an intelligible form, that species could not fail to be divisible: it would have its limit in the bodily point and its remaining parts throughout the breadth of the body. Yet in what follows we shall prove it to be indivisible.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.2

Praeterea si dicatur punctum ita formam illam capere ut solum ipsum sit eius sedes et fundamentum atque illa per hoc maneat a corporis latitudine segregata, oportet punctum quoque esse disiunctum a latitudine, praesertim cum nihil sit proprium accidentis alicuius subiectum nisi quod proprie existit actu. Punctum huiusmodi erit a linea separatum, neque erit lineae aliquid neque terminus latitudinis; et linea per aliud quoddam punctum huic proximum terminabitur. Rursus aliud illud punctum similiter proprio existet actu, quo possit et ipsum accidentis formae sedes fieri; eritque ipsum quoque seiunctum a linea, praecipue cum sit eadem punctorum omnium ratio. Quo efficitur ut aut nullum sit punctum in linea, quo nihil est dictu stultius—terminis namque careret—aut lineae longitudo conficiatur ex punctis, quod etiam dictu ridiculum, quia punctum puncto additum non auget longitudinem. Quod ea ratione conspicitur, quoniam si tria puncta cogitentur sibi invicem succedentia, interrogabimus numquid punctum illorum medium cogat duo extrema puncta inter se ita distare ut se invicem non contingant, aut non impediat extremorum concursum. Si distare cogat, certe non eadem sui parte tangit eorum unum qua tangit alterum; alioquin non disiungeret invicem. Quod si altera parte sui unum extremorum respicit, altera alterum, ipsum duabus partibus constituitur nec est punctum, siquidem est divisibile. Quare cogimur confiteri punctum medium non impedire aliorum concursum. Itaque erunt in omnibus omnia neque ullam suo concursu efficient longitudinem, quando per punctum medium nullum inter alia puncta nascitur intervallum. Si non constat ex punctis aliqua corporis longitudo, nullum reperitur in ea punctum quod per se quandoque ita possit actu fieri ut fiat intelligibilis formae subiectum. Dixerit forte quispiam punctum non actu sed potentia esse in corpore et per eam ipsam potentiam fieri intelligibilis formae subiectum. Quamvis id iam fuerit confutatum, sic tamen iterum confutatur. Puncta huiusmodi tum quia potentia sunt, non actu, tum quia sunt infinita, nulla ratione ita invicem distinguuntur ut aliud illorum potius quam aliud formam illam capiat. Omnia itaque illam capiunt. Quocirca intellectus aut infinitas simul rei cuiusque intelligendae formas accipiet actu, aut infinite simul per infinita puncta rem eandem intelliget. Utrumque impossibile est: tum esse formas infinitas actu, tum esse simul intelligentias infinitas.

VIII.4.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.2

Suppose, moreover, that the point receives that form so that it alone is the form's seat and foundation, while the form remains separate from the body's breadth. The point too must then be detached from the breadth, especially since nothing is properly an accident's subject unless it exists in actuality in its own right. Such a point will be separated from the line; it will be neither anything belonging to the line nor the limit of its breadth, and the line will be bounded by some other point next to it. That other point will likewise exist in an actuality of its own, so that it too may become the seat of an accidental form; it too will therefore be severed from the line, especially since the same account applies to every point. It follows either that no point exists in a line—which is the height of folly, since the line would have no limits—or that the length of a line is made from points. That too is ridiculous, because adding point to point does not increase length. This appears as follows. Conceive three points in succession. We shall ask whether the middle point forces the two outer points so far apart that they do not touch, or instead fails to prevent them from coinciding. If it forces them apart, it certainly does not touch one with the same part of itself by which it touches the other; otherwise it would not separate them. But if one part of it faces one outer point and another part the other, the middle point itself consists of two parts and is no point at all, since it is divisible. We are therefore compelled to admit that the middle point does not prevent the others from coinciding. All the points will thus be in all the others, and by their coincidence they will produce no length, since the middle point creates no interval between the other points. If no bodily length is composed of points, no point is found within it that can ever come to exist by itself in actuality and become the subject of an intelligible form. Someone may perhaps say that a point exists in a body not in actuality but in potency, and by that very potency becomes the subject of the intelligible form. Although this has already been refuted, it may be refuted once more in this way. Because such points are in potency rather than actuality, and because they are infinite, nothing distinguishes them from one another so that one rather than another should receive the form. All of them therefore receive it. The intellect will consequently either receive in actuality infinitely many forms at once for each thing to be understood, or through infinitely many points understand the same thing infinitely many times at once. Both are impossible: there cannot be infinitely many forms in actuality, nor infinitely many acts of understanding at once.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.3

Per haec manifestum est punctum corporis intelligibilis speciei sedem esse non posse. Sed numquid ipsa punctorum continuatio corporisve extensio sedes erit? Nequaquam. Omnis enim forma quae divisibili subiecto recipitur fit dividua, quemadmodum nivis albedo nivis divisione dividitur. Itaque si a corporis latitudine species illa suscipitur, fit et dividua. Talem vero illam fieri impossibile est, quod sic ostendam. Si species secatur in partes, aut partes illae dicuntur omnino similes esse aut dissimiles. Sed horum neutrum est admittendum. Non est admittendum quod similes sint omnino, quia si ita similes sunt ut in quavis parte ratio integra sit speciei totius, sicut in singulis aquae guttis integra ratio totius aquae servatur, certe intellectus in qualibet parte inspiciet totum, atque una speciei pars ad totius rei intelligentiam satisfaciet; superfluae erunt ceterae. Praeterea per talem speciem, quae undique sibi ipsi persimilis est et tali similitudine decipit intellectum inde ductum ad cognoscendum, confundetur prorsus iudicium intellectus in partibus discernendis a toto, tum in qualibet re ex partibus constituta, tum vel maxime in re illa quae ex naturis variis est composita. Neque poterit partes vel a partibus vel a toto discernere. Alia tamen revera ratio partis est ut pars est, totius alia ut est totum, et hoc semper per mentis iudicium affirmatur, cum neque ipsum totum pars esse valeat neque pars totum. Negandum igitur arbitramur speciei partes omnino similes esse, ob eam maxime rationem, quia cum mens rei partes intelligat ut partes sunt et intelligat totum ut est totum atque totum vere distinguat a partibus, neque possit vere distinguere nisi aliqua sit in ipsis distinctio naturalis, sequitur ut partes intelligibilis speciei, si modo partes habet, tam invicem quam a toto naturali aliqua discrepent varietate. Accedit et alia ratio. Nempe partes quae inter se et ad totum similes sunt omnino, quando totum aliquod mutuo congressu conficiunt, non aliter perficiunt totum quam per numeri vel magnitudinis augmentum, quod in tritici granis et aquae guttis aspicimus. Ubi enim forma non variatur et tamen aliqua intrinsecus fit mutatio, incrementum ibi quodammodo fit vel decrementum. Itaque illa mentis species, si talibus concrescit partibus, numerus aliquis erit vel aliquid numerosum, aut cumulus vel continuum aliquid. Ergo per illam numeros solum et numerosa aut magnitudines quasdam intelligemus sive figuras; eritque species ad imaginationem et phantasiam pertinens potius quam ad mentem.

VIII.4.3 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.3

From this it is evident that a bodily point cannot be the seat of an intelligible species. But might the continuity of points, or the body's own extension, be its seat? By no means. Every form received in a divisible subject becomes divisible, just as the whiteness of snow is divided when the snow is divided. Thus, if that species is received by the breadth of a body, it too becomes divisible. Yet this is impossible, as I shall now show. If the species is cut into parts, those parts must be said to be either wholly alike or unlike; neither alternative can be admitted. They cannot be wholly alike. For if they are alike in such a way that each part preserves the complete account of the whole species, just as each drop of water preserves the complete account of the whole water, the intellect will surely behold the whole in every part. One part of the species will suffice for understanding the whole thing, and the rest will be superfluous. Moreover, a species everywhere perfectly like itself would deceive the intellect which it leads to knowledge by that very likeness. The intellect's judgment would be utterly confused when distinguishing parts from the whole, both in every thing composed of parts and especially in a thing composed of diverse natures. It could distinguish neither one part from another nor the parts from the whole. Yet the account of a part as part is truly one thing, and that of the whole as whole another. The mind always affirms this in judgment, since the whole itself cannot be a part, nor a part the whole. We therefore hold that the parts of an intelligible species cannot be wholly alike. The strongest reason is this: the mind understands a thing's parts as parts and its whole as a whole, and truly distinguishes the whole from the parts. Since it could not truly distinguish them unless some natural distinction existed within them, it follows that the parts of an intelligible species—if it has parts at all—must differ by some natural diversity both from one another and from the whole. Another argument follows. When parts wholly like one another and the whole unite to compose some whole, they complete it only by increasing its number or magnitude, as we see in grains of wheat and drops of water. Where the form does not vary although some inward change occurs, there is in a certain sense only increase or decrease. If, then, the species in the mind grows together from parts of this kind, it will be some number or numbered thing, a heap, or something continuous. Through it we shall therefore understand only numbers and numbered things, certain magnitudes, or figures. Such a species will belong to imagination and phantasy rather than to the mind.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.4

Ex his concluditur formam intelligibilem in partes inter se similes minime dividi. Num forte secatur in partes dissimiles, sicut animalis corpus in ossa, carnes et nervos? Nullo modo. Nam per hanc formam mens quid rei substantia sit cognoscit, ut diximus. Substantia rei definitione maxime comprehenditur. Definitio genere constat et differentia, ut hominis definitio animali constat et rationali. Animal genus est, per quod homo cum ceteris animalibus communiter convenit; rationale differentia, per quam differt ab animalibus carentibus ratione. Quare si qua sit in ea forma diversitas partium, haec erit potissimum per genus et differentiam. Sint hae duae, si vis, intelligibilis formae partes. Sint extensae per latitudinem corporalem. Quid hinc sequatur, audi. Quia partes corporis dividi possunt in infinitum, idcirco una cum illis tam genus quam differentia absque fine secabitur; eruntque in definitione una innumerabilia genera et innumerabiles differentiae. Nec erit revera definitio, quia non comprehendetur ab intellectu si infinita fuerit, neque suis finibus terminabitur. Et, quod absurdius est, vel infinite eadem genera easdemque differentias replicabimus, vel a genere resolvendo ascendemus in genus in infinitum, a differentia similiter dividendo descendemus in differentiam. Ascensus talis atque descensus impossibilis est, quia ratio vera tandem ad prima rerum genera et ultimas differentias pervenit, ultra quae non liceat progredi. Siquidem substantia supremum genus est in homine, quod in genus aliud non resolvitur. Certa vero discurrendi potentia est ultima differentia, quam non licet in aliam differentiam coarctare. Auget errorem illum hoc prae ceteris, quod si genus et differentia in re aliqua sunt, infinita talia erunt effectu. Quae enim ad rei essentiam conducunt et ad ordinem pertinent naturalem, effectu ac revera existunt in natura, non cogitatione finguntur humana. Esse autem multitudinem aliquam talem re ipsa sive effectu innumerabilem natura non patitur, praesertim in corpore; in quo tamen esset innumerabilis multitudo, si genera innumerabilia et innumerabiles differentiae per partes corporis pariter secarentur: totidem namque essent etiam ipsius corporis portiones.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.4

It follows from this that an intelligible form cannot be divided into parts which are like one another. Is it perhaps cut into unlike parts, as an animal's body is cut into bones, flesh, and sinews? Not at all. For through this form the mind knows what the substance of a thing is, as we have said, and the substance of a thing is grasped above all by definition. A definition consists of genus and difference: the definition of a human being, for example, consists of animal and rational. Animal is the genus through which a human being has something in common with other animals; rational is the difference by which a human being differs from animals devoid of reason. If there is any diversity of parts in that form, it will therefore consist chiefly in genus and difference. Let these two, if you will, be the parts of the intelligible form; and let them be extended across bodily breadth. Hear what follows. Since the parts of a body can be divided to infinity, both genus and difference will be cut without end along with them, and one definition will contain innumerable genera and innumerable differences. It will no longer be a definition at all, because if it is infinite the intellect cannot comprehend it, nor will it be bounded by its own limits. More absurdly still, we shall either repeat the same genera and differences infinitely, or by resolving genus ascend from genus to genus without end and, by dividing difference in the same way, descend from difference to difference. Such ascent and descent are impossible, because true reason at last reaches the first genera of things and their ultimate differences, beyond which it may not proceed. Substance is the supreme genus in a human being and is not resolved into any further genus. A certain power of discursive reasoning is the ultimate difference and cannot be narrowed into another difference. The error is increased above all by this: if genus and difference are present in any thing, infinitely many such constituents will exist in actuality. For whatever contributes to the essence of a thing and belongs to the natural order exists actually and truly in nature; it is not fashioned by human thought. Yet nature does not permit such a multitude to be innumerable in reality or actuality, least of all in a body. Still, an innumerable multitude would exist in a body if innumerable genera and differences were divided together with its bodily parts, for there would be just as many portions of the body itself.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.5

Rursus percontamur Epicureos qui speciem dividunt in intellectu velut formam in corpore et partem eius unam in una mentis parte locant, verbi causa genus in parte dextera mentis, differentiam vero sinistra. Cur dextera pars potius congruat generi, differentiae vero sinistra? Nonne quaelibet pars mentis aeque mens est? Ne ex partibus amentibus fiat mens. Quaelibet igitur particula mentis aeque utrumque, tam genus quam differentiam, respicit. Ideo quaelibet capit utrumque. Quod si quaelibet ambo suscipit et in utraque sunt ambo, fit ut illa non sint invicem separata. Verum, ut Epicurei volunt, casus efficit ut duorum illorum alterum in dexteram cadat, alterum in sinistram. Sed respondeant nobis illi utrum sic deinde distincta permaneant an invicem misceantur. Si dent primum, sequitur ut inde scientia non nascatur. Nulla enim fit definitio ex genere et differentia invicem separatis. In neutro illorum seorsum posito perfecta habetur de re ipsa scientia. Misceantur oportet in unum, ut una scientia de re una ab una mente per definitionem unam in uno tempore possit haberi. Oportet profecto utrumque in tota mente esse ut vere intelligatur. Nam quod in parte mentis est nondum integre intelligitur. Actio enim rei totius est, non partis. Fateantur ergo oportet illa misceri. Sed unde miscentur, numquid casu vel mente? Casu, inquiunt. Nimium hoc dictu nefas. Nam rarissima fieret mixtio talis, et quando fieret, tunc demum concederent illa sic unita incorporalia esse, quod ipsi volumus. Concedent denique illa a mente misceri. Ex hac concessione duo statim nos inferemus. Primum, mentem esse incorporealem, si acceptas formas ducit ad habitum incorporeum; quae sententia Epicureis adversatur. Secundum, mixtionem illam a mente factam non aliter fore veram nisi in rebus ipsis talis quaedam sit unio. Quod enim a mente praeter naturam rerum fabricatur figmentum est potius quam scientia. Omnino autem oportet genera et differentias natura coniungi invicem vel disiungi, non mentis figmento vel situ.

VIII.4.5 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.5

Let us question once more the Epicureans who divide a species in the intellect as though it were a form in a body and locate one of its parts in one part of the mind—for example, the genus in the mind's right side and the difference in its left. Why should the right-hand part be suited particularly to genus, and the left to difference? Is not every part of the mind equally mind? We must not make a mind out of mindless parts. Every particle of the mind therefore regards both genus and difference equally, and so every particle receives both. If each receives both and both are in each, genus and difference are not separated from one another. Yet, as the Epicureans would have it, chance causes one of the two to fall on the right and the other on the left. But let them tell us whether the two then remain distinct in this way or are mingled with each other. If they grant the former, it follows that knowledge cannot arise from them, for no definition is formed from a genus and difference separated from one another. Perfect knowledge of the thing itself is not possessed in either one taken apart. They must be mingled into one, so that one mind may possess one knowledge of one thing through one definition at one time. Both must indeed be present in the whole mind if they are truly to be understood. What is present in only part of the mind is not yet understood completely, for the act belongs to the whole thing, not to a part. They must therefore admit that genus and difference are mingled. But what mingles them—chance or the mind? Chance, they say. It is altogether impious to say so. Such a mixture would occur only very rarely; and whenever it did occur, they would at last have to concede that the elements so united are incorporeal, which is precisely what we maintain. In the end they will admit that the mind mingles them. From this concession we shall immediately infer two things. First, the mind is incorporeal if it brings the forms it receives into an incorporeal condition—a conclusion opposed to the Epicureans. Second, the mixture produced by the mind can be true only if some such union exists within the things themselves. For whatever the mind fashions apart from the nature of things is an invention rather than knowledge. Genus and difference must therefore be joined or separated from each other by nature, not by a fiction or spatial arrangement of the mind.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.6

Si enim figmento mentis id fiat, erramus, non discimus. Si autem situ, ita ut genus in parte mentis dextra sit, differentia in sinistra, sane quia licet menti communia haec resolvere, illa mens dividet. Per hanc ipsam divisionem modo corporeo secabuntur, et dimidium generis unum in parte dimidia dextrae partis relinquetur, dimidium alterum relinquetur in altera. Idem accidet differentiae. Licebit partiri iterum. Hinc dilaniatio sequetur, non resolutio, et dum communia discerptemus scientiam disperdemus. Quod si per divisionem non lacerentur communia illa, sed genus in quavis sui parte supersit integrum, et similiter differentia, iam non erunt amplius corporalia, quia certa quantitate non indigent; ac etiam innumerabilia genera totidemque differentias qui ita secabit inveniet. Atque horum multitudo non natura constabit, sed mentis machinatione nascetur.

VIII.4.7

Forsitan Epicurei, ut has obiectiones devitent, non dabunt amplius speciem illam intelligibilem ex genere differentiaque componi, sed partibus aliis. Nos autem quaeremus numquid speciei pars, qualiscumque illa sit, a tota specie differat necne. Si non differat, sane neque pars erit illa quae a toto non differt, sed erit totum; neque species illa erit composita, si nihilo differt a partibus, quia sic partium caret diversitate. Ergo differre speciei partem a specie fatebuntur. Nos autem ab illis quomodo differat sciscitabimur. Si non tamquam genus differentiave a specie, ut ostendimus, num saltem tamquam a specie species, ceu a colore figura? Sed hoc admitti non potest. Non est enim species talis intra speciem; non continetur sub colore figura. Pars tamen intra totum est et continetur ab illo.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.6

If this union is made by a fiction of the mind, we are in error rather than learning. If it is made by spatial arrangement, with genus in the right side of the mind and difference in the left, then, since the mind may resolve these universals, it will divide them. By this very division they will be cut in a bodily manner: one half of the genus will remain in one half of the mind's right part, and the other half in the other half; the same will happen to the difference. They may then be divided again. The result will be mangling, not analysis; while we tear the universals apart, we shall scatter knowledge itself. But if division does not mutilate these universals—if the genus remains whole in each of its parts, and the difference likewise—they are no longer bodily, because they require no determinate quantity. Moreover, whoever divides in this fashion will discover innumerable genera and an equal number of differences. Their multitude will not be established by nature, but will arise from the mind's contrivance.

VIII.4.7

Perhaps, to escape these objections, the Epicureans will no longer grant that the intelligible species is composed of genus and difference, but will say that it has other parts. We shall then ask whether a part of the species, whatever it may be, differs from the whole species or not. If it does not differ, what does not differ from the whole will certainly not be a part but the whole itself; nor will the species be composite if it differs in no respect from its parts, for it will then lack any diversity of parts. They will therefore admit that a part of the species differs from the species. We in turn shall ask how it differs. If it differs not as genus or difference differs from a species, as we have shown, does it at least differ as one species differs from another—as figure, for example, differs from color? This too cannot be admitted. A species of that kind is not within another species: figure is not contained under color. A part, however, is within the whole and contained by it.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.8

Forsitan ut speciem illam conceptionemque mentis habere partes convincant, quae sub illa contineantur, ad numeros confugient, atque inferent speciem a suis partibus discrepare sicut quattuor a duobus, ab uno duo. Nos autem, licet id supra confutaverimus, rursus tamen ita refellimus. An volunt partes illas speciei conceptionisque, quam scientiam vocant, esse scientias? Si nolunt, creabunt scientiam ex inscitiis, ac si albedinem constituerent ex figuris. Si volunt, sic eos arguimus. Constat apud philosophos quamlibet scientiam habere obiectum suum in quo versatur, quod scitum vocant. Declarent nobis isti, siquidem scientiae illae quae sunt unius scientiae partes obiecto carere non debent, numquid idem sit scitum proprium cuiusque illarum atque totius, an aliud. Si idem esse respondeant, tunc nulla illarum pars erit, sed unaquaeque totum, postquam aequatur toti. Ubi enim aequantur obiecta, scientiae quoque aequantur. Sin aliud fateantur, rursus id sequetur absurdum, quod scientia ipsa totius sciti praeter partium scientiam erit, neque ex partium cognitione cognoscetur totum, ubi non concurrunt scientiae singulae in scientiam universam.

VIII.4.8 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.8

Perhaps, in order to prove that the species and the mind's conception have parts contained beneath them, the Epicureans will take refuge in numbers. They will infer that the species differs from its parts as four differs from two, and two from one. Although we have already refuted this, let us answer it once more in the following way. Do they wish the parts of the species and of the conception, which they call knowledge, to be themselves branches of knowledge? If not, they will create knowledge out of ignorances, as though they were to construct whiteness out of figures. If they do, we argue against them as follows. Philosophers agree that every branch of knowledge has its own object about which it is concerned, and they call that object the thing known. Since those branches of knowledge which are parts of one body of knowledge cannot lack an object, let the Epicureans tell us whether the proper object of each part is the same as the object of the whole or different. If they answer that it is the same, none of the branches will be a part; each will be the whole, since it is equal to the whole. For where objects are equal, the corresponding branches of knowledge are equal as well. But if they admit that the objects differ, another absurdity follows: knowledge of the whole object will exist in addition to knowledge of the parts, and the whole will not be known from knowledge of the parts, since the several branches do not converge into universal knowledge.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.9

Verum sic iterum procedamus. Mens ut plurimum intelligit rationem ipsam rerum et unam et universalem, ut puta bonitatem ipsam multis bonis aeque communem. Ratio huiusmodi, quantum una et universalis est, est et simplex. Ratio quoque Dei sive angeli, quoties vere cognoscitur, tamquam indivisibilis iudicatur. Hae rationes essentiae intelligibiles appellantur. Eas nostra mens numquam cognosceret nisi formas earum haberet in se velut imagines. Nam si cognoscendo agit aliquid, nec agit nisi sit actu, nec agit aliter quam actu sit; actu vero fit per formam. Numquam essentias contemplatur nisi earundem formis ornetur. Formae tales, licet quandoque intelligibiles appellentur, proprius tamen intellectuales dici debent, essentiae vero intelligibiles. Haec enim est veterum Platonicorum consuetudo. Si forma quaedam talis, essentiae talis imago, in nostra mente spargatur in partes, tunc partes illae aut ita se habent ut nulla illarum essentiam ipsam respiciat, aut alia respiciat quidem, sed non alia, aut omnes. Si primum detur, tunc forma illa tota essentiam nullo modo respiciet, cum nullus sit respectus in partibus. Sicut enim tota forma constat ex partibus, sic totius respectus ex partium respectibus congregatur. Quod si nullo pacto essentiam aspicit, non erit eius imago neque ad eius intelligentiam conferet. Si detur secundum, pars quae non respicit essentiam nihil attinet ad intellectualem formam, postquam ad essentiam non spectat intelligibilem. Si autem tertium concedatur, statim interrogabimus utrum quaeque pars eundem habeat aspectum an aliae potius alium. Si eundem habere respondeatur, et habere eundem non possunt aliter quam si quaeque referat essentiam totam, profecto nulla earum pars formae intellectualis erit, sed quaelibet erit tota. Una ad cognoscendum sufficiet. Supererunt aliae, quae etiam innumerabiles erunt actu, si corporis divisione secantur, et conducunt ad actionem. Si autem aspectum habeant alium atque alium, nec aliter hoc fieri potest quam si partes singulae formae totidem aspiciant essentiae partes, quandoquidem intellectuale intelligibili oportet aequari. Sequitur ut essentia illa sit divisibilis, quam tamen ratio vera esse simplicem concludebat. Neque posset simplicem iudicare nisi aspectu simplici eam intueretur; multiplici autem aspectu partium diversarum multiplicem iudicaret.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.9

Let us proceed once more in this way. The mind generally understands the very account of things as one and universal—for example, goodness itself, equally common to many good things. Such an account, insofar as it is one and universal, is also simple. The account of God or of an angel, whenever it is truly known, is likewise judged indivisible. These accounts are called intelligible essences. Our mind could never know them unless it possessed their forms within itself as images. For if the mind does anything in knowing, it acts only insofar as it exists in actuality, and it acts according to the actuality it possesses; it is brought into actuality through form. It never contemplates essences unless it is adorned with their forms. Although forms of this kind are sometimes called intelligible, they should more properly be called intellectual, while the essences are intelligible. This is the customary language of the ancient Platonists. Suppose a form of this kind—the image of such an essence—is scattered into parts in our mind. Its parts must then be related in one of three ways: none of them regards the essence itself; some regard it while others do not; or all regard it. If the first is granted, the whole form will in no way regard the essence, since no such relation exists in its parts. Just as the whole form consists of its parts, the relation belonging to the whole is gathered from the relations belonging to the parts. If it does not regard the essence at all, it will not be the essence's image and will contribute nothing to understanding it. If the second is granted, any part which does not regard the essence has no place in the intellectual form, since it does not look toward the intelligible essence. If the third is granted, we shall immediately ask whether every part has the same regard or different parts have different regards. If the answer is that they have the same regard—and they can do so only if each refers to the whole essence—then none of them will be a part of the intellectual form; each will be the whole form. One will suffice for knowing. The others will be left over; indeed, if they are cut by the division of a body, they will be innumerable in actuality, and all will contribute to the act of knowing. But if the parts have different regards, this can happen only if the several parts of the form regard an equal number of parts of the essence, since the intellectual must be equal to the intelligible. It follows that the essence itself is divisible, although true reason had concluded that it is simple. Nor could the mind judge it simple unless it beheld it with a simple regard; with the multiple regards of diverse parts it would judge the essence multiple.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.10

Opinamur autem eos in hunc errorem propterea incidisse quod scientias nonnullas in rebus compositis versari considerabant, qualis est scientia de homine, qui ex animali rationalique componitur tamquam genere suo et differentia; qualis est scientia de septenario et denario numerisque aliis, qui ex numeris vel unitatibus congregantur. Nos autem putamus hominem, quatenus homo est, unum quid esse et simplex, quia una eius est forma. Huius signum est quod in plures homines non dividitur. Sive enim secundum speciem dividas ipsum in genus et differentiam, neutrum illorum homo est; sive secundum singula in caput, pectus et femur, illorum nihil est homo. Corpus quidem secas, quia discerpis in membra quae corpora sunt; non secas hominem, quia non secas in homines. Quod autem tale quiddam est in se ipso et in plura talia non dividitur, illud certe, quantum est tale, individuum est et simplex. Denarius quoque, quantum denarius, non dividitur. Nam una species est dumtaxat et una forma, quam in plures denarios partiri non possumus. Quod si partiamur, numerum quidem partimur, quia partimur in numeros; denarium non partimur, quia non distribuimus in denarios. Neque obstat quod in specie genus et differentia videantur includi. Non enim in ea sunt duae formae, sed una. Nam licet aliud sit in rerum ordine animal esse, aliud esse rationale, in homine tamen est idem et, ut Platonice loquar, ipsa hominis natura rationalitas quaedam est. Rationalitas autem nihil est in homine aliud quam animalitas ipsa in actum rationis educta. Talis autem forma simplex esse simplicis fundamentum species est, quae non dispertit se ipsam in singulos homines, sed totam singulis se communicat, et per hanc singuli unum sunt.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.10

We think they fell into this error because they observed that some branches of knowledge concern composite things. Such is knowledge of a human being, who is composed of animal and rational as genus and difference; such too is knowledge of seven, ten, and other numbers gathered from numbers or units. We, however, hold that a human being, precisely as human, is one and simple, because his form is one. A sign of this is that he is not divided into several human beings. If you divide him according to species into genus and difference, neither constituent is a human being. If you divide him into individual parts—head, breast, and thigh—none of them is a human being. You do cut the body, because you tear it into members that are bodies; you do not cut the human being, because you do not cut him into human beings. Whatever is such a thing in itself and is not divided into several things of the same kind is certainly, insofar as it is such, indivisible and simple. Ten too, insofar as it is ten, is not divided. It is only one species and one form, which we cannot partition into several tens. If we divide it, we divide a number because we divide it into numbers; we do not divide ten because we do not distribute it into tens. Nor is it an objection that genus and difference appear to be included within a species. There are not two forms within it, but one. Although in the order of things being animal is one thing and being rational another, in a human being they are the same; and, to speak in Platonic terms, human nature itself is a certain rationality. Rationality in a human being is nothing other than animality itself brought into the act of reason. The species, then, is such a simple form, the foundation of simple being: it does not distribute itself among individual human beings, but communicates itself wholly to each, and through it the individuals are one.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.11

Differunt autem per alia quae extrinsecus adiacent, ad speciem minime pertinentia. Quod quidem speciei simplicitatem significat, quae ex eo quoque non parum significatur quod species magis minusve non suscipit et in quodam certo consistit gradu naturae, cui nihil addi potest, nihil demi, quin species ipsa mutetur. Testantur hoc species numerorum. Septenarius species quaedam est numeri. Adiunge huic unum, novam creabis speciem, scilicet octonarium. Subtrahe unum, senarium habes, novam rursus numeri speciem. Quoniam vero scientia non de singulis vel generibus proprie, sed de speciebus habetur—singula enim, quia innumerabilia sunt mutanturque, neque comprehenduntur neque firma tenentur; genera vero propter confusionem in se perfecte non discernuntur—quoniam, inquam, de speciebus scientia est, species vero sunt simplices, scientia quoque illarum est simplex, si modo scientia veritatis adeptio est. Veritas autem est rerum cum mentibus adaequatio. Neque nos turbet aut multitudo vocabulorum aut cogitationum multiplicium varietas, ex quibus conflari scientia forte videtur. Praeparationes quidem hae sunt ad scientiam sive pedisequae. Scientia actus est unicus sive habitus: tactus, inquam, simplex simplicis formae, individuus individuae veritatis intuitus, subitum intelligentiae lumen.

VIII.4.12

Sed ex hoc eorum error evidentius redarguitur, quod multae sunt scientiae de rebus procul dubio individuis. Quis enim dividat unitatem? Quis item simplicitatem et puritatem? Quis dividat esse ipsum simpliciter? Porro quicquid dividimus, in partes dividimus toto priores. Haec vero ex nullis partibus praecedentibus componuntur. Hominem quippe in animal et rationale resolvimus, animal in corpus et sentiendi naturam, corpus in substantiam et quantitatem, substantiam in esse et sufficientiam subsistendi. Esse vero ipsum in quas partes resolvamus ignoro, nisi forte in unitatem et multitudinem Plotinus Proculusque resolvant. At vero unitatem ipsam ulterius non resolvent. Nemo unitatem resolvet in numeros, nemo punctum in magnitudines, nemo formam rei ultimam in aliam formam, aut primam materiam in materiam, nullus denique simplices illos mentis nostrae conceptus, qui de scientiarum principiis semper intra nos lucent, in conceptus aut notiores referet aut priores. Ubi resolutio cessat, cessat divisio; ubi divisio definit, perfecta simplicitas possidetur.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.11

Individual human beings differ through other things which attach to them from without and do not belong to the species at all. This indicates the species' simplicity. That simplicity is also strongly indicated by the fact that a species does not admit of more or less, but stands at a certain fixed degree of nature from which nothing can be added or taken away without changing the species itself. The species of numbers bear witness to this. Seven is a certain species of number. Add one and you create a new species, namely eight; subtract one and you have six, again a new species of number. Knowledge, moreover, properly concerns neither individuals nor genera, but species. Individuals, because they are innumerable and subject to change, are neither comprehended nor firmly retained; genera, because of their confusion within themselves, are not perfectly distinguished. Since, I say, knowledge concerns species, and species are simple, the knowledge of them is also simple—if knowledge is the attainment of truth. Truth is the conformity of things with minds. We should not be troubled by the multitude of words or the variety of many thoughts from which knowledge may seem to be composed. These are preparations for knowledge, or its attendants. Knowledge is one act or habit: I mean the simple touch of a simple form, the indivisible beholding of indivisible truth, the sudden light of intelligence.

VIII.4.12

Their error is refuted more clearly still by the fact that many branches of knowledge concern things which are unquestionably indivisible. Who can divide unity? Who can divide simplicity and purity? Who can divide being itself as such? Whatever we divide, moreover, we divide into parts prior to the whole. But these simple things are composed of no preceding parts. We resolve a human being into animal and rational; animal into body and a nature capable of sensation; body into substance and quantity; and substance into being and the capacity to subsist. Into what parts being itself may be resolved I do not know, unless perhaps Plotinus and Proclus resolve it into unity and multiplicity. Yet they will not resolve unity itself any further. No one will resolve unity into numbers, a point into magnitudes, the ultimate form of a thing into another form, or prime matter into matter. Finally, no one will refer those simple concepts of our mind which always shine within us concerning the principles of the sciences to concepts better known or prior. Where resolution ceases, division ceases; where division ends, perfect simplicity is possessed.

Caput 4, continuatur

VIII.4.13

Quamobrem concludendum est primos conceptus mentis simplices esse, et illa quae inde noscuntur partim talia esse ut, quamvis dividi videantur, ea tamen ratione noscantur qua minime dividuntur, ideoque notionem eorum esse indivisibilem; partim esse talia ut penitus simplicia sint et propterea simplicem esse eorum perceptionem, si modo intelligentia rebus intellectis aequatur. Si conceptus, notio, perceptio simplices sunt, formae quoque intelligibiles unde nascuntur ista sunt simplices. Si ita est, mens quoque est simplex, quae simplicium est subiectum. Et quoniam quo quid simplicius est eo est magis indissolubile, mensque summum simplicitatis attingit gradum, ut diximus, in cognoscendo, summum quoque gradum naturae indissolubilis assequitur in vivendo. Intelligentia enim est vitae reflexio in se ipsam. Ideo si per intelligentiam, quae vitam sequitur, simplicitatem summam attingit, quae naturam antecedit indissolubilem, multo magis per vitam, intelligentia priorem, assequitur indissolubilem gradum, simplicitate ipsa posteriorem.

Chapter 4, continued

VIII.4.13

We must therefore conclude that the mind's first concepts are simple. Of the things known through them, some are such that although they appear divisible, they are known precisely under the aspect in which they are not divided at all, and our notion of them is therefore indivisible. Others are wholly simple, and our perception of them is consequently simple, provided that intelligence is equal to the things understood. If concept, notion, and perception are simple, then the intelligible forms from which they arise are also simple. If so, the mind too is simple, since it is the subject of simple things. And because the simpler a thing is, the more indissoluble it is, the mind—which, as we have said, reaches the highest degree of simplicity in knowing—also reaches the highest degree of an indissoluble nature in living. For intelligence is life's reflection back into itself. Therefore, if through intelligence, which follows life, the mind attains the highest simplicity, and that simplicity precedes an indissoluble nature, then far more through life, which precedes intelligence, it attains the indissoluble degree that follows upon simplicity itself.

Caput 5

Quinta ratio. Si mens est corpus, tangendo intelligit et currendo.

VIII.5.1

Si mens est corpus aut forma diffusa per corporis magnitudinem, duo quaedam in se habet, ut alias indicavimus: punctum videlicet et latitudinem. Atque eisdem condicionibus mancipatur quibus et corpus. Ideo non aliter res intelligendas comprehendet quam tangendo illas, seque per illas amplificando, et instar corporis transcurrendo. Aut igitur tangere dicetur puncto solum ut intelligat, aut sola latitudine, aut utrisque. Si solo utitur puncto et ad cognoscendum indiget tactu, rerum magnitudines non cognoscet; quippe per punctum puncta attingit, non magnitudines. Atqui etiam si attingeret, numquam tamen totus aut totas eas agnosceret. Nam puncta in eo sunt infinita, infinita quoque in magnitudine. Illorum omnium cumulus est intellectus; horum quodammodo cumulus est magnitudo. Infinita pertransire non licet. Ergo neque mens ipsa tota intelliget umquam, neque totam intelliget magnitudinem. Igitur non solo utitur puncto. Num sola utitur latitudine ad tangendum? Nequaquam. Sola namque illa cognosceret quae latitudine ipsa tanguntur. Haec vero ea sunt tantum quae et ipsa latitudine distenduntur. Nunc autem praeter haec alia multa cognoscimus. Confugient ad hoc nonnulli, ut mentem confiteantur ambobus uti ad cognoscendum: puncto quidem ad simplicia, ad alia latitudine. Verisimile istud apparet, non tamen est verum. Primo quidem per punctum simplicia illa attinget solum quae corpori applicantur ut punctum; formas vero solutas aut numeros non attinget. Deinde per latitudinem suam percurret totam cognoscendi corporis magnitudinem, ut intelligat totum. Non potest autem latitudo aliqua totum aliquod transcurrere spatium magnitudinis, nisi qualibet sui parte in longum quamlibet spatii illius percurrat partem. Ergo mens singulas ipsius partes cuique parti corporis cognoscendi discurrendo per ordinem admovebit; admovendo cognoscet. Admovebit autem partes quodammodo infinitas. Tot enim partes mens habebit, si latitudo corporalis extiterit. Itaque brevi tempore quasi innumerabiliter quamlibet illius corporis portionem intelliget, et ipsum corpus secundum particulas paene infinitas innumerabiliter cognitas, infinitis, ut ita loquar, vicibus innumere apprehendet.

Chapter 5

Fifth argument. If the mind is a body, it understands by touching things and by traversing them.

VIII.5.1

If the mind is a body, or a form diffused throughout the magnitude of a body, it contains two things within itself, as we have shown elsewhere: a point and breadth. It is bound by the same conditions as the body. It will therefore apprehend things to be understood only by touching them, enlarging itself through them, and traversing them as a body does. It must accordingly be said to touch in order to understand either with a point alone, with breadth alone, or with both. If it uses only a point and needs contact in order to know, it will not know the magnitudes of things, since through a point it reaches points, not magnitudes. Even if it did reach magnitudes, the mind as a whole would never know them in their entirety. For the points within it are infinite, and those within a magnitude are likewise infinite. The intellect is the aggregate of all the former, while magnitude is in a certain way the aggregate of the latter. But an infinity cannot be traversed. The whole mind will therefore never understand, nor will it understand a whole magnitude. Thus it does not use a point alone. Does it then use breadth alone in order to touch? By no means. It would know only those things which are touched by breadth itself, and these are only things which are themselves extended in breadth. Yet we know many other things besides these. Some will seek refuge in the claim that the mind uses both point and breadth in knowing: the point for simple things and breadth for everything else. This appears plausible, but it is not true. Through a point the mind would reach only simple things that can be applied to a body as a point can; it would not reach separate forms or numbers. Then, through its breadth, it would have to run across the whole magnitude of the body to be known in order to understand it as a whole. But no breadth can traverse an entire space of magnitude unless each part of that breadth, stretched lengthwise, runs across each part of the space. The mind will therefore move each of its parts in succession toward each part of the body to be known, and it will know by moving toward it. Yet it will be moving parts that are in a sense infinite, for that is how many parts the mind will have if it possesses bodily breadth. In a brief time, then, it will understand each portion of the body in an almost innumerable fashion, and it will grasp the body itself, in its nearly infinite particles known innumerably, an infinite number of times, so to speak, and without number.

Caput 5, continuatur

VIII.5.2

Sed hanc argumentationem nobili quadam Plotini nostri sententia breviter concludamus. Quaecumque intelliguntur aut sua natura simplicia sunt, aut saltem dum per resolutionem simplicia fiunt intelliguntur. Quia vero individua solis individuis capiuntur, vis illa in nobis quae capit talia est individua. Si ergo mens esse dicitur corporalis, non tamen latitudine sua capiet illa, sed aliquo potius impartibili. Si solo hoc capit, solo intelligit. Solum igitur hoc eius impartibile revera mens erit. Quid reliquis opus est partibus ut sit intellectus, quando non opus est aliis ad intelligendum, postquam unum illud impartibile sufficit? Unum igitur hoc mens est. Hoc retine. Segrega cetera: mentem simplicem es adeptus. Cuius simplicitas etiam hinc apparet, quod accipit sine longitudine punctum, sine latitudine lineam, superficiem sine profunditate, numeros absque situ, pulchritudinem sine turpitudinis mixtione. Sic enim seorsum ista discernit considerando; neque considerat aliter quam accipiat. Forma vero corporalis non omnino sic accipit ista seorsum. Si animum esse simplicem individuumque illud liquido ostendit, quod simplicia et individua comprehendit, multo liquidius hoc declarat quod quaecumque secundum se simplicia vel individua forent, et tamen quia cum aliis iunguntur composita dividuaque evadunt, animus segregat ab oppositis, redditque simplicia prorsus et individua. Non posset autem illis restituere simplicem individuamque naturam, nisi ipse esset simplex et individuus. Denique si infectis restituit puritatem, ipse est extra et super infectionem.

VIII.5.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 5, continued

VIII.5.2

Let us bring this argument briefly to a close with a noble teaching of our Plotinus. Whatever is understood is either simple by its own nature, or at least is understood when analysis has made it simple. Since indivisible things are grasped only by what is indivisible, the power within us that grasps such things is itself indivisible. If the mind is said to be bodily, then, it will not grasp them by its breadth, but rather by something impartible. If it grasps only by this, it understands only by this. This impartible element alone will therefore be the mind in truth. Why are the remaining parts needed for it to be an intellect, when they are not needed for understanding once that one impartible element is sufficient? This one thing, then, is the mind. Retain it; set the rest aside, and you have attained the simple mind. Its simplicity is also evident from this: it receives a point without length, a line without breadth, a surface without depth, numbers without position, and beauty without any admixture of deformity. In considering these things, it distinguishes each separately; and the manner in which it considers them is the manner in which it receives them. A bodily form, however, does not receive these things separately in quite this way. If the fact that the soul comprehends simple and indivisible things clearly shows it to be simple and indivisible, the following shows this still more clearly: things that are simple or indivisible in themselves nevertheless become composite and divisible because they are joined to others. The soul separates them from their opposites and restores them to complete simplicity and indivisibility. It could not restore a simple and indivisible nature to them unless it were itself simple and indivisible. Finally, if it restores purity to things that have been tainted, it stands outside and above every taint.

Caput 6

Sexta ratio. Intellectus accipit secundum se totum quicquid capit; quod non faciet, si fuerit corporalis.

VIII.6.1

Nullum corpus aliquid in se continet, nisi per eam quantitatis adaequationem per quam se toto totam rem comprehendat, partem vero parte, atque maiore sui parte maiorem rei contentae partem, minore minorem. Intellectus non hoc pacto res ipsas capit. Nam se toto capit quicquid accipit. Eodem quippe modo capit quo intelligit. Intelligit autem se toto quicquid intelligit. Nempe si quis dixerit intellectum duas partes corporales habere, quarum una quidem capiat rem et intelligat, alia minime, redarguemus eum, asseverantes intellectum revera esse partem illam quae rem capit atque intelligit, siquidem ab intelligendo dicitur intellectus; illam vero quae non intelligit intellectum non esse. Quapropter natura illa quae revera intellectus est se tota rem quamlibet intelligendam capit atque cognoscit. Quando ergo intelligit hominis corpus, intelligit et corporis illius membra; se toto cognoscit totum corpus humanum, se toto cognoscit quodlibet eius membrum. Nam qui membrum quodlibet ad quodlibet comparat et membra quaelibet ad totum refert, necesse est ut idem tam singula membra cognoscat quam corpus totum. Neque duas ponere debes partes in intellectu, quarum una unum cognoscat membrum, altera alterum. Per neutram enim illarum posset illa comparatio fieri. Si ut cognoscit, ita et capit, se certe toto capit tam totum corpus quam membra corporis singula. Nullum vero corpus, nullaque forma corporea, hoc pacto potest aliquid capere; neque potest corpus unum omnibus pariter aequari corporibus. Quomodo enim corpus canis corpori formicae, equi, elephantis, solis aequabitur? Mens autem corporibus omnibus, tam maximis quam minimis, pariter adaequatur, cum omnia intelligendo similiter comprehendat. Neque iis solum, verum etiam quodammodo summae se aequat aequalitati, dum res omnes minus magisve aequales per accessum ad aequalitatem summam recte metitur, ubi mens inter res quaslibet aequalitatis ipsius participes et ipsam aequalitatem se inserit mediam. Quod si summae aequalitati proxime adaequatur, nulla inaequalium qualitatum iniquitate pulsatur.

VIII.6.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 6

Sixth argument. Whatever the intellect receives, it receives with its whole self; it would not do so if it were bodily.

VIII.6.1

No body contains anything within itself except through a quantitative correspondence by which its whole embraces the whole thing, one part embraces one part, a larger part of itself embraces a larger part of the thing contained, and a smaller part a smaller. The intellect does not receive things in this way. Whatever it receives, it receives with its whole self, for it receives in the same manner as it understands; and whatever it understands, it understands with its whole self. Suppose someone says that the intellect has two bodily parts, one of which receives and understands a thing while the other does not. We shall refute him by affirming that the part which receives and understands is in truth the intellect—since intellect is named from understanding—whereas the part which does not understand is not intellect. Therefore, the nature which truly is intellect receives and knows with its whole self any thing presented for understanding. Thus, when the intellect understands a human body, it also understands that body's members. With its whole self it knows the whole human body, and with its whole self it knows each of its members. For the same intellect which compares each member with every other and relates every member to the whole must know both the individual members and the whole body. You must not posit two parts in the intellect, one knowing one member and the other another, for neither of them could make the comparison. If the intellect receives as it knows, it assuredly receives with its whole self both the whole body and every one of its members. Yet no body and no bodily form can receive anything in this manner; nor can one body be equally matched to every body. How could the body of a dog be matched to the bodies of an ant, a horse, an elephant, and the sun? The mind, however, is equally commensurate with all bodies, the greatest as well as the least, since it embraces them all in understanding in the same way. And it is matched not only to them, but in a certain sense even to supreme equality itself: it rightly measures all things that are more or less equal by their approach to supreme equality, placing itself between any things that participate in equality and equality itself. If the mind is thus most nearly matched to supreme equality, it is not assailed by any disproportion among unequal qualities.

Caput 7

Septima ratio. Intellectus accipiendo rerum formas non amittit suam; corpora contra.

VIII.7.1

Solent corpora, quando corporum aliorum formas accipiunt, suas amittere. Quomodo enim aqua igneam caliditatem induet, nisi frigiditatem suam exuerit? Quod si quando aliena accepta remanet etiam propria, fit imperfectior, ut quando remanet dulcedo in vino et aqua illi infusa fit dulcis, sapor inde debilior. Mens autem rerum omnium accipit formas, dum omnes agnoscit et cognitas in se ipsa volutat; neque illas accipiendo formam propriam amittit aut debilitat. Quippe cum ex operatione semper cuiusque formae habitus designetur, atque operatio intellectus intelligentia sit, sequitur ut forma intellectus sit ipsa, ut ita dixerim, intellectualitas naturalis, quae tunc perfecta maxime iudicatur quando operatio eius intelligentia perfectissima est. Haec autem tanto est perfectior quanto plures rerum formas attingit. Sublimior enim fit, velocior et lucidior. Quamobrem intellectus corporum omnium formas accipiendo non modo non amittit aut non remittit suam, sed, quod est contra naturam corporis, summopere perficit. Penetrat eorum substantias et cuncta in singulis conspicit, dum in simplicibus per compositionem videt mixta, in mixtis per resolutionem simplicia intuetur. Ergo mens ita esse videtur in omnibus ut in singulis ipsa sit cuncta. Rursus est extra et supra omnia corporalia. Alioquin non posset haec ab incorporeis secernere et illa ab iis discernere. Si est in omnibus corporalibus omnia, atque etiam extra omnia, omnibus imperat per naturam. Quapropter nullius corporis violentia e suo statu deicitur.

Chapter 7

Seventh argument. In receiving the forms of things, the intellect does not lose its own form; bodies do.

VIII.7.1

Bodies commonly lose their own forms when they receive the forms of other bodies. For how could water put on the heat of fire unless it put off its own coldness? And if its own form sometimes remains when a foreign one has been received, it becomes less perfect. Thus the sweetness remains in wine, and water poured into it also becomes sweet, but the flavor is thereby weakened. The mind, however, receives the forms of all things when it recognizes them all and turns them over within itself once they are known; yet in receiving them it neither loses nor weakens its own form. For since the character of each form is always disclosed by its activity, and the activity of intellect is understanding, it follows that the form of intellect is—if I may speak so—natural intellectuality itself. This is judged most perfect when its activity, understanding, is most perfect. This intellectuality is more perfect in proportion as it reaches more forms of things, for it becomes more sublime, more swift, and more lucid. Therefore, in receiving the forms of all bodies, the intellect not only neither loses nor slackens its own form, but—contrary to the nature of body—perfects it to the highest degree. It penetrates the substances of bodies and beholds all things in each: by composition it sees mixtures in simple things, and by analysis it beholds simple things within mixtures. The mind thus seems to be in all things in such a way that it is itself all things in each. Again, it stands outside and above everything bodily. Otherwise it could not separate bodily things from incorporeal things and distinguish the incorporeal from them. If it is all things within all bodily things and is also outside them all, by nature it rules them all. Consequently, no bodily violence casts it down from its own state.

Caput 8

Octava ratio. Forma est in mente universalis. Talis in corpore esse non potest.

VIII.8.1

Corpus et forma per corpus extensa adeo, ut ita loquar, materialia sunt ac particulari situi temporique astricta, ut universalem vim nullam habeant. Quo enim quid corporali materiae propinquat magis, eo angustius est; quo discedit longius, eo fit amplius. Quamobrem si intellectus esset corpus vel forma diffusa per ipsum, formae omnes ab eo susceptae, etiam si in se ipsis essent universales, in eo saltem particulares omnino materialesque evaderent. Nam formae in subiecto quod est astrictum materiae passionibus nullam vim retinent ad universale quicquam repraesentandum. Ita intellectus quicquid cogitaret per formam materialem singularibusque condicionibus astrictam excogitaret. Cum vero operatio rei cuiusque formam rei operantis sequatur, intellectus per talem formam operans, id est excogitans, singulariter solum operaretur. Qualis autem operatio est, tale semper est opus. Ideo intellectus singulariter cogitans sola singularia cogitaret, neque commune quicquam et universale cognosceret. Unum quidem hominem, puta Socratem vel Platonem, in se revolveret; humanam vero naturam illis aeque communem minime. Neque regulam in moribus et artibus ad plura universalem statueret, neque legem conderet umquam multos hominum actus respicientem.

VIII.8.2

Si mens etiam sine electione et usu quotidie in se ipsa formas parit universales, fit ut ipsa fons earum naturalis sit et receptaculum naturale. Formae huiusmodi propriae alicui materiae minime astringuntur; neque mens igitur materiae alligatur, neque corrumpetur umquam. Corruptio enim ex materiae insidiis provenit.

Chapter 8

Eighth argument. A form in the mind is universal; such a form cannot exist in a body.

VIII.8.1

A body, and a form extended throughout a body, are so material, if I may speak in this way, and so bound to a particular place and time that they possess no universal power. For the nearer a thing comes to bodily matter, the narrower it is; the farther it withdraws, the more ample it becomes. Therefore, if the intellect were a body or a form diffused throughout one, every form it received—even if universal in itself—would at least become wholly particular and material within it. Forms in a subject bound by the passions of matter retain no power to represent anything universal. Whatever the intellect thought, then, it would think through a material form bound by singular conditions. Since the activity of every thing follows the form of the thing acting, an intellect operating through such a form—that is, thinking through it—would operate only in a singular manner. The work is always of the same character as the operation. Thus an intellect thinking singularly would think only singular things and would know nothing common or universal. It would turn over within itself one individual human being, such as Socrates or Plato, but by no means the human nature equally common to them both. Nor would it establish in morals and the arts a universal rule applying to many instances, or ever frame a law governing the actions of many human beings.

VIII.8.2

If the mind, even without deliberate choice or habitual practice, brings forth universal forms within itself day after day, it follows that it is their natural source and their natural receptacle. Forms of this kind are in no way bound to any matter as its exclusive property. The mind therefore is not bound to matter and will never be corrupted, for corruption arises from the snares of matter.

Caput 9

Nona ratio. Mentes se invicem complectuntur, corpora nequaquam.

VIII.9.1

Duo corporea se invicem mutuis amplexibus continere non possunt. Quod enim per quantitatem aliud continet, maius est illo quod continetur. Non potest autem unum corpus alio quodam uno corpore amplius esse simul atque angustius. Sic Saturni sphaera Iovis sphaeram ambit et continet, non econverso. Alia vero mens aliam continet et ab eadem pariter continetur. Mens quidem mea tuam considerat, tua meam. Itaque nostrae mentes se invicem considerando vicissim se capiunt; capiendo intelligunt, complectuntur intelligendo. Et, quod maius est, una mens amplectitur omnes, quando mentium omnium naturam considerat. Quare si quaeque mens mentem quamlibet intuetur, quod potest quidem si animadvertat, quavis mente mens quaelibet clauditur. Non potest autem quodlibet corpus quolibet corpore claudi. Si quaelibet rerum species est immortalis, consequens est ut singularis substantia quae speciei suae se ipsam aequat sit immortalis. Mens autem quaelibet quaslibet, si contingat, introspicit, et in singulis cunctarum conspicit speciem, ubi suae speciei per actum reflexum, qui cognitio est, se aequat. Ergo et per actum rectum, qui est vita, prius se aequavit eidem. Si ita est, sequitur ut vel quaelibet mens semper fuerit futurave sit, sicut ipsa mentium species, vel saltem futura sit semper ut illa.

Chapter 9

Ninth argument. Minds embrace one another; bodies do no such thing.

VIII.9.1

Two bodily things cannot contain one another in a mutual embrace. Whatever contains another thing by quantity is larger than what it contains, and one body cannot be at once both larger and narrower than one and the same other body. Thus the sphere of Saturn encircles and contains the sphere of Jupiter, not the reverse. But one mind contains another and is equally contained by it. My mind considers yours, and yours considers mine. By considering one another, then, our minds receive one another in turn; by receiving they understand, and in understanding they embrace. What is more, one mind embraces all minds when it considers the nature of them all. Therefore, if every mind beholds any mind whatever—as indeed it can if it directs its attention—every mind is contained within any mind. No body, however, can be contained within any body whatever. If every species of things is immortal, it follows that an individual substance which makes itself equal to its own species is immortal. Any mind can look into any others when occasion permits, and within individual minds it beholds the species common to them all. There, through the reflex act which is cognition, it makes itself equal to its own species; therefore, through the direct act which is life, it had already made itself equal to that species. If this is so, it follows either that every mind always has existed and will exist, just as the species of minds itself does, or at least that it will exist forever hereafter as that species does.

Caput 10

Decima ratio. Mens per omnia corpora operatur et supra corpora.

VIII.10.1

Quoniam forma operandi principium est, res quaeque secundum genus suum agit; ex quo omnia prolem sibi similem, modo possint, in specie generant. Ultra vero genus suum nihil agit. Sed neque etiam haec inferiora ultra speciem operantur—numquam enim canis generat ovem—et multo minus aliquid supra suam speciem operantur. Nam quo pacto canis hominem procreabit? Quo fit ut corpus agendi vim suam nec ultra proprium genus et multo minus supra naturam suam possit extendere. Numquam igitur attinget, assequetur, producet aut quodlibet corpus aut incorporalia. Intellectus si corpus esset, certum quoddam corpus esset in specie aliqua corporum. Ex hoc duo sequerentur absurda. Primum, quod multorum corporum formas neque susciperet neque conciperet. Corporum quidem ipsius similium formas non caperet, quoniam iam haberet. Quomodo enim ignis formam alterius ignis accipiat? Dissimilium vero corporum formas nequaquam conciperet aut pareret. Quaelibet enim natura sibi simile parit. Ad hoc autem quod intelligat oportet ut rei intelligendae formam accipiat primum, deinde ex illa definitionem rei rationemve concipiat. Tunc demum perficitur intellectio. Perpauca igitur corpora intellectus cognoscet, si corpus fuerit, cum nullius corporis similis accipiat formam, nullius dissimilis corporis formam concipiat, et intelligere nequeat nisi et accipiat pariter et concipiat. Quod si quo modo fieri possit ut corporalem aliquam formam accipiat vel concipiat, profecto non aliter quam secundum naturam propriam hoc efficiet. Si accipiet aliunde formam, in naturam trahet suam. Si concipiet ex se ipso, secundum naturam suam parturiet. Ergo per formam quamlibet ab ipso susceptam vel etiam conceptam semper certam quandam speciem corporis sibi convenientem et congruam apprehendet, neque corporalium generum diversitatem considerabit. Nunc autem videmus mentem non modo quaecumque corpora sunt animadvertere, sed alia infinite plura et varia prout libet effingere. Secundum vero sequeretur absurdum, si intellectus esset corpus, quod videlicet ordinem corporum non transcenderet, cum corpora ferme numquam ultra suam speciem, certe numquam supra suum genus aliquid operentur. Mens igitur numquam cognoscet incorporalia. Utrum horum praestantius arbitraris, substantiamne an actionem? Substantiam certe, quae ipsius actionis est causa. Cavendum itaque ne operationem aliquando substantia sublimiorem confiteamur.

VIII.10.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 10

Tenth argument. The mind acts through all bodies and beyond them.

VIII.10.1

Since form is the principle of operation, each thing acts according to its own kind; hence all things, so far as they can, generate offspring like themselves in species. Nothing acts beyond its own kind. Nor do these lower things act beyond their species—a dog never generates a sheep—and much less do they produce anything above their species. For how could a dog beget a human being? It follows that a body cannot extend its power of action beyond its proper kind, and still less above its own nature. It will therefore never reach, attain, or produce every kind of body, still less anything incorporeal. If the intellect were a body, it would be some definite body belonging to a species of bodies. Two absurdities would follow. First, it would neither receive nor conceive the forms of many bodies. It would not receive the forms of bodies like itself, because it would already possess them. How could fire receive the form of another fire? Nor could it conceive or bring forth the forms of unlike bodies, for every nature brings forth what is like itself. Yet in order to understand, the intellect must first receive the form of the thing to be understood, then from that form conceive the thing's definition or account. Only then is the act of understanding complete. If the intellect were a body, it would therefore know very few bodies, since it would receive the form of no body like itself, conceive the form of no body unlike itself, and could not understand unless it both received and conceived. Even if it were somehow possible for a bodily intellect to receive or conceive a bodily form, it would certainly do so only in accordance with its own nature. If it received a form from elsewhere, it would draw that form into its own nature; if it conceived one from itself, it would bring it forth according to its own nature. Through any form received or conceived by it, therefore, it would always apprehend some definite bodily species suited and conformable to itself, and would never consider the diversity of bodily kinds. Yet we see that the mind not only observes whatever bodies exist, but freely fashions infinitely many other and varied bodies. A second absurdity would follow if the intellect were a body: it would not transcend the order of bodies, since bodies scarcely ever act beyond their own species and certainly never above their own kind. The mind would therefore never know incorporeal things. Which do you judge the more excellent, substance or action? Substance, surely, since it is the cause of the action itself. We must therefore beware of ever admitting that an activity is more sublime than its substance.

Caput 10, continuatur

VIII.10.2

Esset autem mentis operatio sublimior quam substantia, si substantia quidem eius certum corpus esset solummodo, intelligentia vero eius et corpora quaeque et incorporea comprehenderet. Quapropter non est corpus, quandoquidem ultra corpora quaelibet apprehendit etiam incorporea. Atqui neque etiam est forma aliqua mixta corpori. Nam forma mixta, sicut per corporis divisionem fit dividua, sic fit qualis per corporis qualitatem. Ideoque certam quandam mens sibi contraheret qualitatem a corpore, per quam ipsa ad certam speciem corporalium rerum determinata certam speciem corporalium cognosceret solum, sicut visus per oculum ad colores contrahitur. Et formas simillimas non caperet, ut diximus, neque etiam dissimillimas. Atque haec Aristotelis sententia est Platonicis comprobata. Sed addunt Platonici quod mens, si mixta esset, neque caperet incorporea, quia quod mixtum est sincera non comprehendit, neque affectaret attingere aliquid a corpore separatum; alioquin affectaret a corpore separari atque dissolvi. Neque aliter cognosceret quam moveatur, sicut materialis potentia solet. Nunc autem non ut movetur, sed ut ipsa sibimet efficit species, sic abstrahit, discurrit, seque in se quasi absque fine reflectit. Neque obstrepat hic nostris auribus Epicureus aliquis negans intellectum incorporalia capere. Sane et cupit illa semper, et capit sola summa cum voluptate tamquam ipsi simillima. Neque solum illa cupit et capit, sed etiam procreat. Quid enim nos aliud modo in his disputationibus nitimur nisi rem aliquam mentis nostrae, ut ita loquar, manibus fingere a corpore alienissimam? Quam finximus iam et fingimus, atque iis ipsis mentis manibus attrectamus. Et antequam effingeremus, prospeximus effingendam. Nempe cum primum statuimus animam monstrare incorpoream esse, videbamus iam aliquem alicubi incorporealis naturae gradum, ad quem perducere animam volebamus. Quid quotidie facimus disputando? Quoties esse rem aliquam asseveramus quae existat quidem, nullam vero habeat longitudinem, latitudinem, profunditatem, vel qualitatem aliquam, vel figuram, tunc certe spiritum quendam mente creamus supra corpus et corporis passiones. Ibi profecto nostra mens est ubi parit; parit, inquam, prolem sibi persimilem, nullo modo substantia sua sublimiorem. Igitur mens nostra corpora et condiciones corporum supereminet. Quamobrem neque loco clauditur neque temporum limitibus circumscribitur. Ubique igitur esse potest et semper. Idcirco nihil prohibet illam fore perpetuam.

Chapter 10, continued

VIII.10.2

Yet the mind's activity would be more sublime than its substance if its substance were merely some definite body while its understanding embraced every body and incorporeal things as well. The mind is therefore not a body, since beyond every kind of body it also apprehends the incorporeal. Nor, again, is the mind a form mixed with a body. For just as a mixed form becomes divisible through the body's division, so it takes its character from the body's quality. The mind would therefore contract some determinate quality from the body. Confined by it to one species of bodily things, it would know only that species, just as sight is confined through the eye to colors. And, as we have said, it would receive neither forms most like itself nor forms most unlike it. The Platonists confirm this teaching of Aristotle. They add that if the mind were mixed with a body, it would not grasp incorporeal things, because what is mixed does not comprehend what is pure; nor would it desire to reach anything separate from body, for then it would desire to be separated from the body and dissolved. It would know only in the manner in which it is moved, as a material potency is accustomed to do. Yet the mind does not abstract, range in thought, and reflect back upon itself almost without end by being moved, but by producing forms for itself. And let no Epicurean clamoring in our ears deny that the intellect grasps incorporeal things. Indeed, the mind always desires incorporeal things, and it alone grasps them with supreme delight, as things most like itself. It not only desires and grasps them, but even brings them forth. For what else are we now attempting in these arguments except, so to speak, to fashion with the hands of our mind a thing utterly alien to body? We have already fashioned it and are fashioning it still, and with those same hands of the mind we touch and handle it. Before we fashioned it, moreover, we foresaw that it was to be fashioned. For when we first resolved to show that the soul is incorporeal, we already beheld somewhere a certain degree of incorporeal nature toward which we wished to lead the soul. What do we do each day in disputation? Whenever we affirm that some thing exists although it has no length, breadth, depth, quality, or figure, we assuredly create in the mind a certain spirit above body and the passions of body. Our mind is truly present where it gives birth; it gives birth, I say, to an offspring most like itself and in no way more sublime than its own substance. Our mind therefore rises above bodies and the conditions of bodies. Hence it is neither enclosed by place nor circumscribed by the limits of time. It can therefore exist everywhere and always; and so nothing prevents it from being perpetual.

Caput 11

Undecima ratio. Mens statu proficit, corpus motu.

VIII.11.1

Numquam corpus formam novam accipit nisi per motum. Nam per alterationem, ut aiunt physici, forma inducitur in materiam. Mens autem neque per motum accipit formas, neque accipiendo movetur. Quae quanto magis ab omni perturbationum et negotiorum motu quietem agit, tanto magis proficit speculando. Ubi etiam apparet eius aeternitas, quia suapte natura solam speculationem veritatis affectat, atque ideo statum, sine quo non perficitur speculatio. Proficit autem corpus motu, quod per motum natum est. Quod ergo stando proficit, ex statu dependet, ideoque stabilem habet substantiam atque perpetuam.

Chapter 11

Eleventh argument. The mind advances through stillness, the body through motion.

VIII.11.1

A body never receives a new form except through motion. For, as the natural philosophers say, a form is introduced into matter by alteration. Mind, however, neither receives forms through motion nor is moved by receiving them. The more completely it rests from all the agitation of passions and worldly affairs, the more it advances in contemplation. Here its eternity also becomes apparent: by its own nature it desires only the contemplation of truth, and therefore desires repose, without which contemplation cannot be perfected. A body, by contrast, advances through motion, for motion is the source of its birth. Whatever advances by remaining still therefore depends upon stillness and accordingly possesses a stable and perpetual substance.

Caput 12

Duodecima ratio. Quae in materia sunt contraria, non sunt in mente contraria.

VIII.12.1

Formae contrariorum elementorum, dum sunt in materia, contrariae inter se sunt, quia pellunt se invicem et interimunt. In mente non sunt contrariae, quia ibi non modo non pellunt se invicem, sed et iuvant. Simul quidem nostra mens habet contrariorum elementorum formas, quando simul elementa considerat. Simul quoque comprehendit bona et mala, utilia et inutilia, pulchra atque deformia, lucem et tenebras, vocem atque silentium, dulce et amarum, et reliqua; atque ex cognitione alterius contrarii sincerius iudicat alterum. Non igitur est corporea, neque etiam proprie corruptibilis. Quippe quod corrumpitur ut plurimum corrumpitur a contrario. Quid autem esse potest menti contrarium, quae tantam habet super contraria potestatem, ut ab ipsis auferat contrarietatem et sua pace conciliet inimica? Neque rursus corruptibilis est, quod a suis conservatoribus disiungatur. Nam si aliena et contraria alienis contrariisque conciliat, multo magis se suis tum causis tum servatoribus admovet.

Chapter 12

Twelfth argument. Things contrary in matter are not contrary in the mind.

VIII.12.1

While the forms of contrary elements are in matter, they are contrary to one another, for they drive one another out and destroy one another. In the mind they are not contrary, since there they not only fail to drive one another out but even assist one another. Our mind possesses the forms of contrary elements at the same time when it considers the elements together. It also comprehends at once good and evil, useful and useless, beautiful and deformed, light and darkness, voice and silence, sweet and bitter, and all the rest; and from knowing one contrary it judges the other more clearly. The mind is therefore not corporeal, nor, properly speaking, corruptible. For what is corrupted is for the most part corrupted by its contrary. Yet what can be contrary to a mind that has such power over contraries that it removes their contrariety and reconciles enemies within its own peace? Nor, again, is the mind corruptible through separation from the things that preserve it. For if it reconciles alien and contrary things with things alien and contrary to them, much more will it draw itself near both to its own causes and to its preservers.

Caput 13

Decimatertia ratio. Mens accipiendo formas non mutatur.

VIII.13.1

Corporis cuiusque forma, quando vere ab alio corpore capitur, tale reddit omnino illud quod suscipit ipsam, quale est corpus illud a quo forma tribuitur. Veluti quando flamma ignis a ligno suscipitur, lignum facit calidum atque igneum. Flamma vero illa in speculo longe distante resplendens speculum non reddit calidum aut igneum, quia non vere ab illo suscipitur, cum propter distantiam ad veram ignis flammam non sit paratum. Immo vero nullo modo flammula illa, id est imago illa flammae, cum spiritalis sit, in speculi corpore figitur, sed in spiritali solis lumine, quod ambit speculi superficiem. Fiunt autem huiusmodi rerum imagines non a corporibus his quorum imagines sunt—corpus enim non procreat aliquid incorporeum—sed a lumine spiritali corporibus circumfuso. Lumen quoque ipsum a solis globo non nascitur, sed a solis anima, cuius lux, cum intra se sit invisibilis, effusa longius fit visibilis, in qua ipsa quoque anima fit conspicua. Nam, ut placet Orphicis et Heraclito, lumen nihil aliud est nisi visibilis anima, unde per hoc omnia reviviscunt; anima vero lux invisibilis. Sed ne longius digrediamur, formae vel imagines corporum non vere sunt in speculis. Mens autem corporum accipit omnium formas, quando de corporibus iudicat. Num accipit vere? Vere profecto. Nempe ut accipit, ita iudicat. Vere iudicat; vere igitur accipit. Accipit inquam a se ipsa, ut Platonici opinantur, quando corporum simulacris excitata formas quae in mentis aditis latent promit in lucem. Accedit quod ubi perfectior forma est, ibi est et verior. Quanto vero perfectior sit forma corporum in mente quam in ipsis corporibus, et alias declaravimus, declarabimusque; et hinc patet quod humana natura in Platone vel Socrate solius Platonis est et solius Socratis propria. Humana autem natura illa quae mente concipitur, quando sub una hominis definitione hominum condiciones considerat, ad singulos homines habet vim, siquidem omnes complectitur. Praeterea, si veritas rei cuiusque in pura integritate consistit vel integra puritate, atque forma in materia vim suam integram non retinet propter passionis admixtionem et extraneis accidentibus circumfunditur, verior res quaeque invenitur in mente, ubi rei ipsius idea naturaliter insita notionem rei parit, necessaria quidem includentem omnia, supervacua vero penitus excludentem. Mens igitur usque adeo vere corporum capit formas, ut verius etiam eas habeat quam materia corporum.

VIII.13.1 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 13

Thirteenth argument. The mind is not changed when it receives forms.

VIII.13.1

Whenever the form of one body is truly received by another, it makes the receiver altogether such as the body from which the form is imparted. Thus, when a flame of fire is received by wood, it makes the wood hot and fiery. But a flame shining in a mirror at a distance does not make the mirror hot or fiery, because it is not truly received by the mirror, which on account of the distance is not disposed to receive the fire's real flame. Indeed, that little flame—that is, the image of the flame—being spiritual, is not fixed in the body of the mirror at all, but in the spiritual light of the sun that envelops the mirror's surface. Images of things of this kind are produced not by the bodies whose images they are—for a body cannot generate anything incorporeal—but by the spiritual light poured around those bodies. Light itself, moreover, is born not from the sun's globe but from the sun's soul. The light of that soul, invisible while it remains within, becomes visible when poured farther abroad; and in that light the soul itself also becomes manifest. For, as the Orphics and Heraclitus hold, light is nothing other than visible soul, through which all things revive; the soul, in turn, is invisible light. But lest we wander too far, the forms or images of bodies are not truly in mirrors. The mind, however, receives the forms of all bodies when it judges bodies. Does it receive them truly? Truly indeed. It judges according as it receives; it judges truly, and therefore receives truly. It receives them, I say, from itself, as the Platonists believe: awakened by the images of bodies, it brings into the light forms that lie hidden in the recesses of the mind. Moreover, wherever a form is more perfect, there it is also more true. How much more perfect the form of bodies is in the mind than in bodies themselves we have shown elsewhere and shall show again. This is also evident from the fact that the human nature in Plato or Socrates is proper to Plato alone or to Socrates alone, whereas the human nature conceived by the mind, when it considers the conditions of human beings under one definition of man, applies to every human being, since it embraces them all. Furthermore, if the truth of each thing consists in pure integrity or integral purity, while form in matter does not retain its full power because it is mingled with passivity and surrounded by extraneous accidents, then each thing is found more truly in the mind. There the Idea of the thing, naturally implanted, produces a conception of it that includes everything necessary and wholly excludes what is superfluous. The mind therefore receives the forms of bodies so truly that it possesses them more truly even than bodily matter does.

Caput 13, continuatur

VIII.13.2

Igitur, si ipsa sit aliquid corporale, talis redderetur omnino qualia corpora. Fiet ergo aqua cum aquam intelliget; cum ignem intelliget, ignis. Et quia simul intelligit calorem atque frigus, fiet contraria simul. Nunc autem formas accipit omnium, neque e suo statu deicitur; immo proficit capiendo. Hinc apparet intellectum non esse corporeum. Apparet etiam non esse mortalem. Ille siquidem eo modo quo est accipit quicquid accipit. Esse suum intellectuale est dumtaxat. Non ergo accipit quicquam aliter quam intelligendo. Per huiusmodi susceptionem non modo non deficit, sed et proficit. Nihil ergo suscipit aliunde quod ipsum mutet et perdat; et, quod maius est, tantum in omnibus formis suscipiendis lucratur, ut lucrari etiam videatur in malis. Si tanto perfectior evadit quanto cognoscit plura, certe perfectior est si rerum privationes, defectus et mala discernit quam si ignorat. Quae ergo in se ipsis mala sunt et noxia, in mente fiunt bona atque salubria. Multum abest ut ea natura a malis noxiisque rebus interimatur, quae ita mala convertit in bona, ut ipsi bona sint omnia.

Chapter 13, continued

VIII.13.2

If the mind itself were something corporeal, therefore, it would be made altogether such as the bodies it understands. It would become water when it understood water, and fire when it understood fire; and because it understands heat and cold together, it would become contraries at once. In fact, however, it receives the forms of all things without being cast down from its own state; indeed, it advances by receiving them. Hence it is apparent that intellect is not corporeal. It is also apparent that it is not mortal. For it receives whatever it receives according to the mode in which it exists, and its being is purely intellectual. It therefore receives nothing except by understanding. Through reception of this kind it not only does not fail but actually advances. Thus it receives nothing from outside that can change and destroy it; and, what is more, it gains so much in receiving every form that it seems to gain even from evils. If it becomes more perfect in proportion as it knows more things, it is surely more perfect when it discerns the privations, defects, and evils of things than when it is ignorant of them. Things that are evil and harmful in themselves thus become good and wholesome in the mind. So far is this nature from being destroyed by evil and harmful things that it converts evils into goods, with the result that all things become good for it.

Caput 14

Decimaquarta ratio. Operatio corporis tendit ad rem compositam, mentis ad simplicia.

VIII.14.1

Operatio cuiusque rei esse ipsum rei semper sequitur, ita ut illius sit operatio cuius et esse, et modus operandi idem sit qui et essendi, et opus ad quod terminatur operatio sit simile operanti. In rebus ex materia et forma corporali compositis, esse non est materiae proprium aut formae, sed totius compositi ex utrorumque coniunctione confecti. Igitur et compositi ipsius proprie operatio est; quare et modo composito operatur et opus producit compositum. Hoc in elementis, plantis, animalibus intuemur, quae quidem opera composita, sicut ipsa sunt, generant. Si intellectus corpus aliquod esset ex materia et forma compositum, cum eius operatio intelligentia sit, haec ipsa intelligentia semper ad aliquid compositum terminaretur; unde numquam aliud praeter res compositas intelligeret. Nunc vero nostra mens usque adeo naturalem excellit compositionem, ut corpora composita in materiam resolvat et formam, et cogitet utrumque seorsum. Utrumque vero per se est simplex. Atque in hoc maxime excellentia eius aspicitur, quod illa quae in materia quodammodo falsa sunt tamquam vera comprehendit, sicut figuras et principia figurarum. Quae in materia sunt impura, discernit ut pura. Qualitates enim quae sunt in materia mixtae invicem et infectae contrariis, ipsa secundum proprias diiudicat rationes. Quae in se multa sunt conspicit tamquam unum, ceu sub una specie homines infinitos. Quae in se mobilia sunt tamquam stabilia speculatur, quando temporis partes, quae in se ipsis fluunt, simul colligit et praesenti annectit praeteritum et futurum. Quae in se distantia sunt tamquam unita saepissime contuetur, quando totum orbem viderit in puncto. Neque temporum intervalla neque locorum spatia mentis intuitum cohibent. Quae, ut ita loquar, mortua tamquam viventia: siquidem lapides qui vita carent mens vivos intra se possidet, quando ad primam a qua facti sunt comparat vitam. Quae corruptibilia tamquam perpetua, quando singula corpora quae loco subiiciuntur et tempori mens intuitu suo a locis et temporibus eximit. Ex omnibus his colligitur intellectum neque esse corporeum aliquid, cum longe aliter quam corpora operetur, neque esse impurum, infectum, dispersum, mutabilem, corruptibilem, quippe cum illa etiam quae talia sunt sua quadam vi ab huiusmodi liberet passionibus.

Chapter 14

Fourteenth argument. A body's activity tends toward a composite thing; the mind's activity, toward simple things.

VIII.14.1

The operation of every thing always follows the thing’s own being: operation belongs to that which possesses being; the manner of operating is the same as the manner of being; and the work in which an operation terminates is like the agent. In things composed of matter and corporeal form, being belongs properly neither to the matter nor to the form, but to the whole composite made from the conjunction of both. Operation therefore belongs properly to the composite itself; hence it operates in a composite manner and produces a composite work. We see this in the elements, plants, and animals, which generate composite works just as they themselves are composite. If intellect were a body composed of matter and form, then, since its operation is intelligence, that intelligence would always terminate in something composite, and it would never understand anything except composite things. But our mind so far surpasses natural composition that it resolves composite bodies into matter and form and thinks of each separately. Each, however, is simple in itself. Its excellence is seen most of all in this: things that in matter are in a certain way false, it comprehends as true, as with geometrical figures and their principles. Things impure in matter it distinguishes as pure. Qualities that in matter are mixed with one another and tainted by their contraries, it judges according to their proper principles. Things that are many in themselves it beholds as one, as when it sees infinitely many human beings under one species. Things movable in themselves it contemplates as stable, when it gathers together the parts of time, which flow in themselves, and joins past and future to the present. Things distant in themselves it very often beholds as united, when it sees the whole world in a point. Neither intervals of time nor expanses of place restrain the mind’s gaze. Things dead, so to speak, it beholds as living: stones devoid of life the mind holds alive within itself when it compares them to the first life from which they were made. Things corruptible it beholds as perpetual, when by its gaze it removes individual bodies subject to place and time from places and times. From all this we conclude that intellect is not anything corporeal, since it operates in a manner far different from bodies; nor is it impure, tainted, dispersed, mutable, or corruptible, since by a power of its own it frees even things that possess these conditions from affections of this kind.

Caput 15

Decimaquinta ratio. Actio mentis finitur in actione; actio corporis in corpore.

VIII.15.1

Nullius corporis actio in ipsam actionem proprie desinit, sed in exteriorem transit materiam. Nam si in actionem desineret, actio illa in operante restaret, ubi in se ipsum operaretur, puta ignis se ipsum calefaceret. Quod non potest a corpore fieri, quia si corpus non agit ex se, etiam non agit in se. Rursus, si quicquid corpus agit movendo agit, certe, cum movere se nequeat, in se ipsum agere nequit. Videmus autem mentis operationem, ipsam scilicet intelligentiam, in se ipsam desinere, neque quicquam per se extrinsecus facere, nisi forte quandoque moveat voluntatem, quae motis brachiis opus aliquod extra producat, quale fuerat cogitatum. Sensum autem dicimus quodammodo extra se fluere, quia aliunde movetur, prospicit aliena, externi finis gratia operatur, neque sui ipsius est conscius. Mens contra movetur libere, se suaque inspicit, sui gratia operatur. Ideo essentia apud Platonem status dicitur, quia, si sine vita sit, torpet; vita motus, quia iam exit in actum; mens reflexio, quia sine hac vita in externum opus efflueret. Sed mens sistit vitalem essentiae motum in semetipso; reflectit ipsum in essentiam quadam sui ipsius animadversione. Trahit quoque cetera omnia ad se ipsam, prout res potius ut ipsa mens est quam ut res extra existunt considerat. Vocatur etiam reflexio infinita, quia in operationem suam non modo semel mens hominis terminatur, verum etiam innumerabiliter, cum se aliquid intelligere animadvertit, et quod animadvertat agnoscit; et cum aliquid velle se vult, et vult quod velit se velle, atque eadem ratione deinceps, ubi vel operatio alia in infinitum terminatur ad aliam vel eadem in se replicatur innumere.

Chapter 15

Fifteenth argument. The mind's action has its end in action; a body's action, in a body.

VIII.15.1

No body’s action properly ends in the action itself; rather, it passes into external matter. For if it ended in the action, that action would remain within the agent, which would then act upon itself—as though fire were to heat itself. A body cannot do this, because if a body does not act from itself, neither does it act upon itself. Again, if whatever a body does it does by moving, then, since it cannot move itself, it cannot act upon itself. Yet we see that the mind’s operation—intelligence itself—ends in the mind, and of itself produces nothing outside, except perhaps when at some time it moves the will, which sets the arms in motion and produces outwardly a work such as had been conceived. Sensation, however, is said in a certain way to flow outside itself, because it is moved from elsewhere, regards things foreign to itself, acts for the sake of an external end, and is not conscious of itself. Mind, by contrast, moves freely, beholds itself and its own contents, and acts for its own sake. Thus in Plato essence is called repose, because without life it lies dormant; life is called motion, because it has now gone forth into act; and mind is called reflection, because without reflection life would flow outward into an external work. Mind, however, arrests the vital motion of essence within itself and turns that motion back into essence through a certain awareness of itself. It also draws all other things to itself, considering things rather according to the mode in which mind itself exists than according to the mode in which they exist outside it. This is also called infinite reflection, because the human mind terminates in its own operation not only once but countless times: it notices that it understands something, recognizes that it notices, wills itself to will something, and wills that it wills itself to will, and so onward in the same manner. Here either one operation terminates endlessly in another, or the same operation is folded back upon itself without number.

Caput 15, continuatur

VIII.15.2

Hinc patet intellectum non solum esse incorporeum, sed etiam immortalem. Siquidem per se ipsum operatione sua se format semper et perficit, semper intelligendo atque volendo. Hoc autem nihil est aliud quam se ipsum vel facere vel servare vel renovare continue, quod quidem cotidianae renovationis nomine Paulus apostolus appellavit. Quo fit ut numquam a suo perfectore vel servatore desciscat et absit, cum nequeat abesse umquam a semetipso, atque ideo formetur semper atque perficiatur. Quin etiam, si naturalis generationis finis immortalitas quaedam est, multo magis intellectualis generationis finis est immortalitas. Sed quia natura prolem extra se gignit, immortalitas eius expletur in successione nascentium. Quia vero mens generat in se ipsa tum se tum alia, quantum et sui et aliorum omnium concipit rationes, quando aut se intelligit aut alia, sequitur ut immortalitatis huius virtus in mente ipsa genitrice servetur. Hic etiam latet argumentatio quaedam huiusmodi. Praestantius est bene esse quam simpliciter esse. Quisquis igitur bene esse sibi praebet, multo magis potest sibi esse se praebere. Intellectus sibi dare bene esse videtur, quando format perficitque se ipsum tum speculatione tum moribus. Quapropter esse quoque sibi potest secundum formam ita praestare, ut numquam desinat esse. Mitto quod Proculus ait animam, cum sit generationis principium, ita se ipsam gignere atque vivificare, ut essentiam habeat a se ipsa. Atque summatim de omni indivisibili substantia in sua essentia existente affirmat tum producere tum continere se ipsam. De omni autem substantia divisibili, etiam de ipso caelo, dicit necessario aliunde produci atque contineri. Sed hoc ipse viderit. Latet praeterea alia quaedam talis argumentatio. Quando intellectus operationem suam primo, atque inde vim suam et substantiam comprehendit et amat, tunc procul dubio in se ipsum agit. Igitur et per se ipsum. Nihil enim inter intellectum atque ipsummet medium interponitur. Adde quod, quemadmodum corpus, quia ex se non agit, ideo non operatur in se, sic intellectus, quia in se operatur, idcirco ex se operari censetur. Si ex se in se agit, igitur et per se ipsum. Si enim utrique in eo actionis termini sunt, igitur et medium. Quid ergo prohibet intellectum a corpore separatum operari et vivere, praesertim cum operatio ipsius, quae ex se in se ipsum per se expletur, necessario fiat et resideat in se ipso?

VIII.15.2 | Latin reading text | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Chapter 15, continued

VIII.15.2

From this it is clear that intellect is not only incorporeal but also immortal. For through itself and by its own operation it always forms and perfects itself, always understanding and willing. This is nothing other than continually making, preserving, or renewing itself—the state the apostle Paul called daily renewal. It follows that intellect never departs or withdraws from its own perfecter and preserver, since it can never be absent from itself; and therefore it is always formed and perfected. Moreover, if the end of natural generation is a kind of immortality, much more is immortality the end of intellectual generation. But because nature begets offspring outside itself, its immortality is fulfilled in the succession of those who are born. Mind, however, generates within itself both itself and other things, insofar as it conceives the principles of itself and of all other things whenever it understands either itself or other things. It follows that the power of this immortality is preserved in the mind itself as parent. Another argument of this kind also lies concealed here. To be well is more excellent than simply to be. Whoever therefore provides well-being for himself can much more provide being for himself. Intellect appears to give itself well-being when it forms and perfects itself both through contemplation and through conduct. It can therefore also provide itself with being according to form in such a way that it never ceases to be. I pass over Proclus's statement that the soul, since it is the principle of generation, so begets and gives life to itself that it has its essence from itself. In sum, he affirms of every indivisible substance existing in its own essence that it both produces and contains itself; but of every divisible substance, even heaven itself, he says that it must be produced and contained by another. But let him see to that himself. There is, moreover, another argument concealed here. When intellect first comprehends and loves its own operation, and through that its own power and substance, then beyond doubt it acts upon itself and therefore also through itself. Nothing stands as a medium between intellect and intellect itself. Add that just as a body does not act upon itself because it does not act from itself, so intellect is judged to act from itself because it acts upon itself. If it acts from itself upon itself, it also acts through itself. For if both termini of the action are within it, the medium is within it as well. What, then, prevents intellect when separated from the body from acting and living, especially since its operation, which is fulfilled from itself, upon itself, and through itself, necessarily comes to be and remains within itself?

Caput 15, continuatur

VIII.15.3

Sed hoc ita planius explicabitur. Si mentis operatio proprie in ipsam mentem finitur, mens ipsa quodammodo suae operationis est finis. Idem vero est rei cuiusque finis ac principium, cum omnia originem suam appetant et tamquam sui motus finem sibi illam proponant. Igitur substantia mentis est operationis suae principium. Per se igitur operatur, quod Plato noster appellat per se moveri. Ut operatur, ita vivit. Vita enim est interior operatio. Vivit itaque per se ipsam. Ut vivit, ita etiam est. Nam vita est primus existentiae actus. Est ergo similiter per se ipsam. Quid impedit eam esse semper, quandoquidem sui ipsius est causa? Causa, inquam, non efficiens, sed formalis, cuius virtute esse tribuitur et servatur. Qualitas et vita cuius operatio omnis in alia effluit necessario secundum naturam suam quattuor ex partibus deficit. Primo, quia effluendo vacillat, alieno indiget sustentaculo. Secundo, diffluendo debilitatur. Tertio, dum influit aliis, ab extraneis inquinatur. Quarto, propter indigentiam, debilitatem inquinationemque a natura sua quandoque defluere cogitur. Si ita est, sequitur ut rationalis vita quae relabitur in se ipsam se ipsam sustineat, non debilitetur, non inquinetur, non defluat. Merito, sicut vita quae omnino profluere cogitur extra se ipsam, dum discedit a vita, tendit consumiturque in mortem, sic vita quae redundat in semetipsam adolescit et consummatur in vitam. Denique, si uberior motus vitae uberioris indicium est, vita rationalis quae universum motionum genus exercet, implet et terminat, universum quoque genus implet vivendi. Ideoque ipsi neque privatio vitae miscetur, neque condicio ulla obnoxia morti. Exercere autem ipsam omnes species motionum in corpore, implere motionum omnium exemplaria in se ipsa, terminare motum omnem in se ipsam suumque principium per mentis ipsius reflexiones, alias declaravimus.

Chapter 15, continued

VIII.15.3

But this will be explained more clearly as follows. If the mind's operation properly terminates in the mind itself, then the mind is in a certain manner the end of its own operation. The end and principle of each thing are the same, since all things desire their origin and set it before themselves as the end of their motion. The substance of the mind is therefore the principle of its own operation. It consequently operates through itself, which our Plato calls self-motion. As the mind operates, so it lives; for life is inward operation. It therefore lives through itself. As it lives, so it also exists, for life is the first act of existence. It likewise exists, then, through itself. What prevents it from existing always, since it is its own cause? I mean not an efficient cause, but a formal cause, by whose power being is bestowed and preserved. A quality and a life whose every operation flows into other things necessarily fail in four respects according to their own nature. First, because in flowing out they waver and need support from another. Second, in streaming away they are weakened. Third, while flowing into other things they are sullied by what is foreign. Fourth, because of need, weakness, and defilement they are at times compelled to ebb away from their own nature. If this is so, it follows that rational life, which flows back into itself, sustains itself, is not weakened or defiled, and does not ebb away. Accordingly, just as a life compelled to flow wholly outside itself departs from life and tends toward and is consumed in death, so a life that overflows back into itself grows and is consummated in life. Finally, if fuller motion is a sign of fuller life, then rational life, which exercises, brings to fullness, and terminates the whole range of motion, likewise brings the whole range of living to fullness. Therefore neither any privation of life nor any condition subject to death is mingled with it. We have shown elsewhere that rational life exercises every species of motion in the body, brings the exemplars of all motions to fullness within itself, and through the mind's own reflections brings every motion to its end in itself and in its own principle.

Caput 16

Decimasexta ratio. Forma corporalis non habet vim infinitam; mens habet.

VIII.16.1

Constat apud physicos formam corporalem, praesertim elementalem, esse usque adeo terminatam, ut nullo modo vim aliquam infinitam indefessamque possit habere. Mens autem absque termino pervagatur, neque fatigatur umquam. Principio in se ipsa quasi est sine termino: intelligit enim se ipsam. Ideo intellectio eius profecta ab ipsa mentis substantia in eandem revolvitur. Revolutio infinitus est motus. Ad nullum enim terminum proficiscitur extrinsecus acquirendum, quo pacto quiescat, sed propriam ambit substantiam, sui ipsius avida. Sui vero ipsius aviditas numquam extinguitur. Substantia igitur quae suimet cupiditate coepit semel sibi undique fieri obvia et circumeundo se ipsam undique contueri, eadem cupiditate perpetuo instigante, semet ipsam perpetuo similiter pro arbitrio amplectetur. Motus igitur intellectus, quoniam orbicularis est, in se ipsum circumvolutus, quatenus intellectualis est, est utique sempiternus. Caret etiam fine, ut diximus, ob eam causam quod infinite intelligentia replicatur. Potest enim qui aut se aut aliud quodvis intelligit, sicut rem ipsam intelligit, sic suam intelligentiam intelligere, itemque aliam et aliam sine fine, dum et rem cognoscit et quod cognoscat illam animadvertit. Rursus, quod sic animadvertat, ipsum non latet, et similiter absque termino. Talem intelligentiae cursum comitatur rationalis appetitio illa quam nuncupant voluntatem. Haec sane se ipsam vult aut quodvis aliud, et vult se velle, et rursus vult quod velit, similiterque deinceps. Quin etiam corpora dividit in partes plurimas partiumque particulas. Numeros auget supra numeros absque fine. Figurarum modos mutuasque illarum proportiones, atque etiam numerorum comparationes innumerabiles invenit; lineam supra caelum ultra terminum undique protendit. Tempus in praeteritum absque principio, in futurum absque fine producit. Neque solum ultra omne tempus aliud antiquius cogitat et prolixius, verum etiam ultra omnem locum alium semper cogitat ampliorem. Innumeros quoque effingit gradus in singulis qualitatibus. Accedit quod non uno quodam rerum genere mens, sicuti sensus, contenta est. Non solis coloribus ut visus, non solis vocibus ut auditus, sed currit per omnia; per omnia, inquam, non modo quae sunt, sed quae fuerunt, eruntve. Neque id solum, sed per illa etiam quae neque sunt neque fuerunt umquam aut erunt. Multa enim excogitat quae forte esse possent, non tamen fient umquam; et multa quae esse forsitan numquam possunt ipsa fingit.

Chapter 16

Sixteenth argument. A bodily form does not possess infinite power; the mind does.

VIII.16.1

It is agreed among the natural philosophers that a corporeal form, especially an elemental one, is so bounded that it can possess no infinite and unwearied power. Mind, however, ranges without limit and is never fatigued. To begin with, it is as though without limit within itself, for it understands itself. Thus its act of understanding, proceeding from the mind's own substance, returns into that same substance. Revolution is an infinite motion. For it does not set out toward any external end to be acquired, at which it might rest, but circles its own substance in desire for itself; and its desire for itself is never extinguished. A substance, therefore, which through desire for itself has once begun to meet itself from every side and, by circling itself, to behold itself on every side, will, under the perpetual impulse of that same desire, perpetually embrace itself in the same way and at will. The motion of intellect, then, because it is circular and revolves upon itself, is assuredly everlasting insofar as it is intellectual. It also has no end, as we have said, because intelligence is repeated infinitely. Whoever understands himself or any other thing can understand his own act of intelligence just as he understands the thing itself, and then a further act and another without end: he both knows the thing and notices that he knows it. Again, he is not unaware that he notices this, and so onward without limit. This course of intelligence is accompanied by the rational appetite they call will. The will desires itself or any other thing, wills itself to will, and in turn wills that it wills, and so onward in the same manner. Furthermore, mind divides bodies into many parts and the parts into particles. It raises number upon number without end. It discovers innumerable kinds of figures, their mutual proportions, and comparisons of numbers; it extends a line in every direction above the heavens and beyond all limit. It carries time backward into a past without beginning and forward into a future without end. Nor does it merely conceive another time older and more protracted than every span of time; beyond every place it also always conceives another place more spacious. It fashions innumerable degrees within each quality. Add that the mind, unlike sensation, is not confined to any one class of things: not to colors alone, as sight is, nor to sounds alone, as hearing is, but it ranges through all things. Through all things, I say—not only those that are, but those that have been or will be; and not these alone, but also things that neither exist nor ever have existed or will exist. For it devises many things that might perhaps exist but never will, and itself invents many things that perhaps could never exist.

VIII.16.1 | independent English translation | full witness locators in the comparison-unit register

Caput 16, continuatur

VIII.16.2

Quamquam non minus in rerum natura esse videntur quae mens per se pingit in se ipsa quam per linguam in aere vel per manum pingit in pariete. Novas quoque semper rerum facies vi propria et quodam ordine fabricat, et rursus innovat alias. Nonne etiam, postquam gradatim per mundi sphaeras ascendit, gradatim quoque angelos ita considerat, ut alium videat semper alio altiorem, neque tam sublimem reperit umquam quin possit alium uno saltem gradu et alium rursus alio gradu invenire maiorem? Atque id tamdiu facit quamdiu finitum esse angelum quemque pronuntiat. Ex quo, quolibet finito spiritu, invenit alium altiorem. Atque ita sine termino progrederetur, nisi ipsamet sibi modum imponeret concluderetque esse spiritum aliquem infinitum, qui omnem angelum, et qui est et qui cogitari potest, innumeris gradibus superet. Quis infinite progreditur? Quis infinitum progressum quodammodo terminat? Quis terminum illum progrediendi infinitum assequitur? Mens certe haec facit. Mentis igitur quodammodo infinita virtus est. Quae in eo quoque apparet, quod non modo reperit infinitum actum, qui deus est, verum etiam potentiam infinitam, quae est materia subdita deo atque ad innumerabiles formas inde capiendas idonea. Hinc etiam infinitam invenimus generationis vicissitudinem, quae potest per infinitum tempus ab actu infinito fundi in potentiam infinitam. Apparet rursus ex eo quod universales rerum rationes capit. Sub quolibet autem universali, seu specie sive genere, innumerabilia continentur. Innumerabiles sub humana specie homines successione perpetua, itemque sub aliis infinita individua colligit in unam speciem, species multas in genus unum, multa genera in unam essentiam, essentiam unam in divinam unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem. Vicissim ab hac una gradatim descendit in multitudinem infinitam. Mira profecto virtus, quae infinita reddit unum, unum reddit infinita.

Chapter 16, continued

VIII.16.2

And yet the things the mind paints within itself by its own power seem to exist in the nature of things no less than those it paints in the air through speech or on a wall through the hand. By its own power and in a certain order it continually fashions new appearances of things and then fashions others anew. Moreover, once it has ascended step by step through the spheres of the world, does it not consider the angels also by degrees, so that it always sees one higher than another? It never finds one so sublime that it cannot discover another at least one degree higher, and then another higher by yet another degree. It does this so long as it pronounces every angel finite: beyond any finite spirit it discovers another still higher. It would thus advance without limit unless it imposed a measure upon itself and concluded that there is an infinite spirit surpassing by countless degrees every angel both actual and conceivable. Who advances infinitely? Who in some manner brings an infinite advance to its term? Who attains that infinite terminus of advance? The mind assuredly does these things. The mind therefore possesses a power that is in some manner infinite. This power also appears in the fact that mind discovers not only infinite act, which is God, but also infinite potency: matter subject to God and fitted to receive from him innumerable forms. Hence we also discover an infinite succession of generation, which can for infinite time flow from infinite act into infinite potency. The same power appears again because mind receives the universal principles of things. Under each universal—whether species or genus—innumerable things are contained. It gathers innumerable human beings in perpetual succession under the human species, and likewise infinite individuals under other species; it gathers them into one species, many species into one genus, many genera into one essence, and the one essence into divine unity, truth, and goodness. In turn, it descends step by step from this one into infinite multitude. Wondrous indeed is the power that makes the infinite many one and the one an infinite many.

Caput 16, continuatur

VIII.16.3

Huic formae non proprius in natura gradus est ullus, quatenus sursum deorsumve penetrat omnes. Non situs est proprius, quatenus nusquam sistitur. Non certa, ut ita dicam, et terminata potestas, quatenus ad omnia aequaliter operatur. Illud quoque mihi videtur vim mentis, ut ita loquar, interminatam prae ceteris demonstrare, quod ipsam infinitatem esse invenit, quidve sit et qualis definit. Cum vero cognitio per quandam mentis cum rebus aequationem perficiatur, mens cognitae infinitati aequatur quodammodo. Infinitum vero oportet esse quod aequatur infinitati. Ac si tempus, quod successione quadam metitur motum, infinitum esse oportet, si modo motus fuerit infinitus, quanto magis infinitam esse oportet mentem, quae non modo motum tempusque stabili notione, sed infinitatem ipsam quoque metitur? Cum necesse sit mensuram ad id quod ipsa metitur habere proportionem. Finito vero ad infinitum fit nulla proportio. Idem quoque evidenter ex eo monstratur quod a non esse considerando transit in esse atque e converso. Esse autem et non esse immenso inter se discrepant intervallo. Immensam vero oportet esse virtutem quae spatium percurrit immensum. Currere autem illud quis neget, quando creationem quae ex non esse fit ad esse et interitum qui fit contra certissimis rationibus comprehendimus, atque utriusque extremi naturam describimus, et ipsius esse communis vim intellectu consequimur, quae rebus eius progressione nascentibus per innumerabiles essendi modos communicat? Denique, ut summatim dicam, infinitam quodammodo esse in mente virtutem illud nobis testimonio esse poterit, quod fames corporis sitisque et somnus cito et re paucula satiantur; mentis ardor numquam extinguitur, sive humana respiciat sive divina. Si autem humana, quis divitiarum cumulus, quae imperii amplitudo hunc terminat? Si divina, nulla rerum creatarum finitarumque scientia impletur. Merito quiescit numquam, nisi infinitum deum capiat, qui capacitatem eius ab ipso manantem impleat infinitam.

Chapter 16, continued

VIII.16.3

This form has no rank in nature proper to itself, insofar as it penetrates every rank above and below. It has no proper position, insofar as it comes to rest nowhere; and no fixed and bounded power, so to speak, insofar as it operates equally upon all things. This above all else also seems to me to show the mind's unbounded power, as I may call it: mind discovers that infinity itself exists and defines what it is and of what kind. Since knowledge is perfected through a certain equality between mind and things, the mind is in some manner made equal to the infinity it knows. But what is equal to infinity must itself be infinite. And if time, which measures motion by a certain succession, must be infinite provided the motion is infinite, how much more must mind be infinite, since by a stable conception it measures not only motion and time but infinity itself? For the measure must bear a proportion to that which it measures, whereas there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. The same is also shown clearly by the fact that in its consideration the mind passes from nonbeing into being and conversely. Being and nonbeing differ from one another by an immeasurable interval, and the power that traverses an immeasurable space must itself be immeasurable. Who can deny that the mind traverses this interval, when by the surest arguments we comprehend creation, which passes from nonbeing into being, and destruction, which passes in the opposite direction; when we describe the nature of both extremes; and when by intellect we attain the power of being in common, which communicates itself through innumerable modes of being to things born from its procession? Finally, to speak in sum, this may testify that the mind possesses a power in some manner infinite: hunger, thirst, and sleep of the body are quickly satisfied by some small thing, but the mind's ardor is never extinguished, whether it looks to human or divine things. If to human things, what accumulation of riches or what extent of empire puts an end to it? If to divine things, no knowledge of created and finite beings fills it. Rightly, then, it never rests unless it receives the infinite God, who fills its infinite capacity flowing from him.

Caput 16, continuatur

VIII.16.4

Quae si finita esset, aliqua re finita vel impleretur vel saltem sitis eius utrumque levaretur. Nunc vero per quorumlibet finitorum adeptionem non modo non extinguitur, sed flagrat ardentius, quoniam quo magis plura capiendo deo infinito quadam praeparatione propinquat, eo ardet magis igni suo facta propinquior, atque eo currit rapidius infinito sui motus fini iam proxima. Quod et ignis elementum facit, quando in propriam sphaeram se recipit. Facit idem lapis etiam manifestius, quando descendit ab alto; qui quo terrae fit propinquior, eo vehementius defertur in terram. Quis dixerit mentem elementale corpus esse vel corporale quicquam, si vim possidet infinitam? Vim, inquam, tum perseverandi et capiendi, tum ambiendi percurrendique, sive se ipsa hanc habeat, sive, ut verius loquar, quadam amplificatione divina, quatenus videlicet absoluta infinitas dei mentibus animabusque proxime ab ipsa pendentibus intellectualem vitalemque infinitatem inserit servatque continue, atque ab infinito principio ad finem revocat infinitum. Si enim solet ubique ab absoluta qualitate manare similis aliqua communicata qualitas, quid mirum ab absoluta infinitate talem quandam alicubi aut talem infinitatem effluere? Imprimis autem in mentes et animas, per quas Platonici putant in mundo quoque temporis generationisque successionem procedere infinitam. Quis igitur adeo demens erit, ut velit mentem habituram esse aliquem in perduratione sua terminum, cum in virtute saltem adeo amplificata et operatione non habeat, quasi possit habere extra se terminum quem in se ipsa non habet? Si vita origine antecedit intelligentiam et intelligentia pretio vitam excedit, atque humanus animus tanta est dignitate donatus ut concessa sibi fuerit infinita quodammodo virtus intelligendi ac volendi, multo prius magisque concessa eidem fuisse debet virtus infinita vivendi.

Chapter 16, continued

VIII.16.4

If this capacity were finite, it would either be filled by some finite thing, or at least its thirst for both human and divine things would be relieved. But now, through the attainment of any finite things, its thirst not only is not extinguished but burns more ardently. For the more the mind, by receiving many things, approaches the infinite God in a certain preparation, the more fiercely it burns with its own fire as it draws nearer, and the more swiftly it rushes, now close to the infinite end of its motion. The element of fire does the same when it returns to its proper sphere. A stone does so even more plainly when it descends from a height: the nearer it comes to the earth, the more forcefully it is borne down to earth. Who would call mind an elemental body, or anything corporeal at all, if it possesses an infinite power? I mean a power both of persevering and receiving, and of encompassing and traversing, whether it has this power from itself or—as I should more truly say—through a certain divine enlargement. For the absolute infinity of God implants an intellectual and vital infinity in minds and souls that depend most immediately upon it, preserves that infinity continually, and recalls it from an infinite principle to an infinite end. For if some communicated quality resembling an absolute quality commonly flows from it everywhere, what wonder is it that from absolute infinity some infinity of one kind or another should flow forth somewhere—above all into minds and souls, through which the Platonists believe the infinite succession of time and generation proceeds within the world? Who, then, will be so senseless as to maintain that mind must have some limit to its duration, when it has no such limit at least in its so greatly enlarged power and operation—as though it could possess outside itself a limit that it does not possess within itself? If life precedes intelligence in origin, while intelligence surpasses life in worth, and if the human soul has been endowed with such dignity that a power of understanding and willing which is in some manner infinite has been granted to it, then much earlier and in still greater measure there must have been granted to it an infinite power of living.

Notes variants and locators

Substantive variants and editorial notes

V.1.1 - variant

M1482: spontaneus motus assiduus comes est; G1559 and P1641 insert non before assiduus, producing a negation at odds with the three-case argument. The grammatical and logically coherent M1482 reading governs.

V.1.1 - note

M1482's body passes directly from numquam desinit vivere to Praeterea. Its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liii, f.i) directs insertion here of Si enim quod movetur ab alio ... moveri desinit numquam; G1559 and P1641 incorporate the addition. The reading text applies the M1482 correction.

V.1.1 - note

The repeated primo moventur and motus primus are rendered through ‘primary motion’ to preserve their hierarchical rather than merely temporal force.

V.1.1 - note

The metaphor fons motus is retained as ‘the fountain of motion’.

V.1.2 - note

Ex quo is taken with ab intrinseco: the inward principle gives rise to vital and life-giving motion and therefore cannot originate a destructive change.

V.1.3 - note

Essentiae tertiae and primique motus are read as coordinated genitives after naturam; the latter continues the chapter's language of primary motion.

V.1.4 - note

Sua quaeque is kept broad as ‘all that belongs to it’; narrowing the neuter phrase to vires alone would be more specific than M1482.

V.1.4 - note

The accusative in sphaeram describes motion in a spherical course. The final infinitives remain governed by ostendit: Pythagoras's argument shows both that a sphere has no beginning or end and that such motion neither began nor ceases.

V.1.5 - variant

M1482's body prints spiritalis and lacks facere. Its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liii, f.i) corrects spiritalis to spiritales and orders facere inserted after ipsis; G1559 and P1641 incorporate both corrections. The reading text applies the corrected M1482 wording.

V.1.5 - note

The painted source break divides the accusative-and-infinitive construction from its governing ostendit in V.1.4; the English repeats the minimum governing phrase, ‘That argument further shows’, to remain grammatical.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.1.5 - note
Postquam is causal here (‘since’): the visible bodies, as shadows of the souls, supply the confirming figure and motion.

V.1.5 - note
The repetition termino carentem ... sine termino is preserved as ‘without limit ... without limit’.

V.2.1 - note
Statum is rendered ‘stability’ because the proof contrasts operational motion with abiding substance; the wording also accords with the chapter heading stat per substantiam.

V.2.1 - note
Irrationales vitas is retained as ‘irrational lives,’ while idola et simulacra remains the paired ‘images and likenesses.’

V.3.1 - note
Particeps passionis is rendered ‘share in passivity’ to continue the active/passive frame; suscipit and percipit passionem retain the technical ‘passion,’ an undergoing or being acted upon.

V.3.1 - note
Divinitate sua is taken with Deus et angelus activi: their divinity makes the disembodied soul nearest to them immortal.

V.4.1 - variant
M1482's heading reads Quarta ratio qui materiae dominatur; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liii, f.ii) corrects qui to quia. The corrected heading is recorded in the structure file.

V.4.1 - variant
M1482's body lacks si before humiditas; the same authorial correction entry orders si inserted, yielding et si humiditas, quomodo siccitatem? G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.4.1 - variant
M1482 reads Deus est actus purus. G1559 and P1641 omit Deus; the explicit and rhetorically balanced base reading governs.

V.4.1 - note
The pure-act/pure-potency antithesis is preserved, including M1482's explicit Deus at the summit and primary matter at the lowest level.

V.4.1 - note
The vessel, potter, hidden-matter, elemental-transformation, chaos, and solar-vapor images are all retained in Ficino's order.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.4.1 - note
Direct measurement against the locked facing-page typography confirmed that this long source paragraph fits without an editorial split.

V.4.2 - note
A sequentibus post Deum causis denotes secondary causes following after God; the English keeps both their subordinate rank and the claim that they cannot withdraw being itself.

V.4.2 - note
Esse absolutum and esse aliquid are distinguished as unqualified being and the determinate being of something; hoc modo ... aut illo is consequently rendered as a change of mode rather than annihilation.

V.4.3 - note
The repeated quolibet ... quamlibet is unfolded as ‘just anything from just any seed’ without compressing the three examples.

V.4.3 - note
Latuerat ... delitescit is preserved through the paired ‘lay hidden ... lies concealed,’ maintaining the image of matter hidden beneath sensible qualities.

V.4.4 - note
The opposing motions of rarefaction and condensation are retained, together with Ficino's ascending and descending sequence through fire, air, water, and earth.

V.4.4 - note
Indui formas keeps its clothing image: one matter ‘clothes itself’ in every form in turn.

V.4.5 - note
Unum formabile and uno ... formatore are rendered as the paired ‘single receiver of form’ and ‘single giver of form,’ preserving the reciprocal terms without importing a new entity.

V.4.5 - note
Mundi machina retains its concrete force as ‘the entire machinery of the world.’

V.4.6 - variant
M1482's body reads ad angelum; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liiii, f.ii) corrects this to ad agendum. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.4.6 - note
The subject/support/foundation sequence is preserved: matter underlies quantity and quality, supports form, and requires no deeper seat of its own.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.4.6 - note

The corrected ad agendum governs inducitur, while ut aliud ... generet preserves the purpose of natural action: propagating an agent's perfection by producing something like itself.

V.4.7 - note

Omnibus sequentibus refers to all things following after the supreme good in the order of being; the English preserves this hierarchy.

V.4.7 - note

Unde ... inde ... illuc and exoriens ... reflectitur retain the movement from the good and the return toward the good.

V.4.8 - variant

M1482's body reads a medio; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liiii, f.ii) corrects this to e medio. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.4.8 - note

Editorial subdivision: no new M1482 paraph precedes Quin etiam. The split is made at Ficino's new reinforcing argument so that each side fits one facing page; it subdivides the source paragraph that begins at V.4.7.

V.4.8 - note

The abbreviated M1482 eamque is expanded with the support of G1559 and P1641: what is free from matter also rises above it.

V.4.9 - variant

M1482's body reads istuc and later materiam quidem. Its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. liiii, f.ii) corrects these to istud and materiam perdere. G1559 and P1641 incorporate both corrections, which the reading text applies.

V.4.9 - note

Editorial subdivision: no new M1482 paraph precedes An forte. The rhetorical question opens the second alternative—transmutation rather than annihilation—and is a genuine logical joint within the source paragraph that begins at V.4.7.

V.4.9 - note

The proof of matter's simplicity preserves both grounds: it is not composed of matter and form, and it naturally precedes quantitative dimensions and their assemblages.

V.4.10 - variant

M1482's body reads materiae ordinet; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lv, f.i) corrects ordinet to ordinem. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.4.10 - variant

M1482 punctuates after anima and continues Immortalis unitas Deus est, preserving the threefold anaphora Immortalis unitas ... Immortalis ordo ... Immortalis vita. G1559 and P1641 instead read anima immortalis. Unitas Deus est. The rhetorically coherent M1482 reading governs.

V.4.10 - note

Editorial subdivision: no new M1482 paraph precedes Immo vero. The phrase draws the reductio together and begins the chapter's conclusion; the split is a genuine logical joint within the source paragraph that begins at V.4.7.

V.4.10 - note

In Hanc format vis ea quae primum movet, hanc refers to the efficient power that forms matter, not directly to matter: the first-moving power forms that subordinate power, and rational soul is then named as the fountain of motion.

V.4.10 - note

The closing unity/order/life triad preserves M1482's words, its threefold anaphora, and the sixfold recurrence of forms of immortalis.

V.5.1 - note

The four causes and the repeated per se/per aliud contrast are kept explicit; felicitas is rendered ‘happiness,’ in distinction from the charter's ‘blessedness’ for beatitudo.

V.5.1 - note

Efficiens hominis causa is singular in Latin although universal nature and man are jointly named; ‘together with’ preserves that joint causal role without suppressing either term.

V.5.2 - note

Principali ... proposito is read as an ablative of guiding purpose: God makes the work ‘by his primary intention’; ut ita loquar preserves Ficino's own qualification, ‘so to speak.’

V.5.2 - note

The repeated proxime retains causal immediacy, not merely proximity in place.

V.5.3 - note

Ut causa is construed with a materia pendet: quality depends upon matter as a cause. Siquidem then supplies the image that explains this dependence.

V.5.3 - note

The pregnant-womb and birth-into-light imagery is retained, together with the material extension and division of quality.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.5.4 - note

The rhetorical question, immediate answer, and second question are preserved before the exclusions are considered in Ficino's order.

V.5.4 - note

The compressed a quattuor oppositis in quattuor opposita describes the graded ascent from four causal dependencies toward their opposites; the explicit four-to-three-to-two sequence controls the English.

V.5.5 - note

‘As a cause’ is supplied after form and matter from the governing causal sequence; Ficino is not denying that the third essence is itself form.

V.5.5 - note

The distinction between inclination toward matter and dependence upon matter is repeated rather than varied away; it grounds the name anima without compromising the proof.

V.5.6 - note

Assignavimus refers back to the argument already set out against the soul's dependence upon matter; the concise source unit remains concise in English.

V.5.7 - note

Mundi nodus retains Ficino's binding image as ‘bond of the world’; the singular non connecteret agrees with haec essentia and governs infima cum supremis.

V.5.8 - note

Primo continues Book V's established hierarchy of ‘primary motion’; it is not reduced to a merely temporal ‘first.’

V.5.8 - note

The repeated per se, the freedom from bodily bonds, and the circular return into the self are all retained in their original sequence.

V.5.9 - note

Pateram preserves Plato's image as the ‘mixing-bowl of souls’; the reference is Ficino's own and no modern source note has been imported.

V.5.9 - note

Potentia separabilis is read adverbially as ‘separable in potency,’ distinguishing the essence's capacity for separation from the later potentiam by which something alien might be received.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.5.9 - note
Passio remains the technical ‘passion’ throughout: matter is its primary subject, and quantity and quality are exposed to it through matter. The elemental storm and the discord of contending qualities preserve Ficino's rhetoric.

V.5.9 - note
The unit ends immediately before the displayed heading of V.6 on both M1482 c.143 and G1559 p.215.

V.6.1 - variant
M1482's body reads impetu a furore; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lvi, f.i) replaces a with et, yielding impetu et furore. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.6.1 - note
Direct inspection of M1482 shows one chapter-opening unit and no later painted paraph within V.6; colored sentence initials were not counted as source breaks.

V.6.1 - note
Per rectam lineam ... per reflexam is rendered as direct and reflected modes of contact. The following clauses explain why neither corporeal impact nor a reflected bodily disturbance reaches the soul.

V.6.1 - note
In the final alternatives, illi refers jointly to Deus vel angelus, while per ipsam refers to the beneficent vis infused into the soul.

V.7.1 - note
M1482 has no painted paraph anywhere within V.7. The chapter is divided editorially after this unit only because the complete source unit is too long for a facing page.

V.7.1 - note
Crinita, literally a ‘hairy’ heavenly body, is rendered ‘comet’; Ficino's definition is retained rather than silently modernized.

V.7.1 - note
Esse is kept as the technical ‘being’, distinct from essentia, while English verbal constructions are used where repeating the abstract noun would obscure the example.

V.7.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Verum cum omnium auctor. The break is placed at the genuine argumentative turn from essence considered in itself to the creator's two ways of determining forms to being.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.7.2 - note
The repeated contrahitur and coarctatur are rendered ‘restricted’ and ‘confined’ to preserve Ficino's image of an intrinsically unrestricted essence being narrowed to bodily limits.

V.7.2 - note
The metaphor qualitatum ... tempestate is preserved as ‘the storm of those qualities’.

V.8.1 - variant
M1482's body reads ad non esse non ex eo; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lvii, fa.i) replaces this with ad non esse vero ex eo. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the corrected adversative, which the reading text applies.

V.8.1 - note
Direct inspection shows that V.8 is one unbroken M1482 source paragraph; V.8.2-V.8.4 are editorial subdivisions necessitated by its length.

V.8.1 - note
Complexio corporis is rendered ‘bodily constitution’ rather than ‘complexion’ to retain its premodern physiological sense without inviting the modern color-of-skin meaning.

V.8.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: the break before Quapropter begins the inference from form as the source of proper being and follows the opening unit's summary conclusion.

V.8.2 - note
Ficino explicitly uses caliditas as a provisional name for the unnamed substantial form of fire; the English therefore retains ‘heat’ but preserves his qualification.

V.8.2 - note
The paired images materiae semine and ex fomite materiae are retained as ‘the seed of matter’ and ‘the tinder of that matter’.

V.8.3 - note
Editorial subdivision: Anima vero marks Ficino's return from the examples of composite things and fire to the soul itself.

V.8.3 - note
Spiritalis susceptio is rendered ‘spiritual reception’; Ficino's examples of images in water and a mirror preserve his distinction between reception and destructive material passion.

V.8.3 - note
The repeated questions An ut ...? are preserved as questions, including the arguments from nourishment and propagation.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.8.4 - note
Editorial subdivision: Immo vero begins a new reductio concerning a supposed middle term between the soul's essence and its form.

V.8.4 - note
In illa a sui forma nullo interveniente disiungitur, nullo interveniente is taken with passive-instrumental force: no intervening thing separates the soul from its form. This reading is required by the reductio immediately before it and by the conclusion Quare nullo modo ... discedit.

V.8.4 - note
The three possible agents of displacement-the soul itself, higher causes, and inferior things-are all retained in Ficino's order.

V.9.1 - note
Direct inspection shows one unbroken M1482 source paragraph throughout V.9; V.9.2-V.9.4 are editorial subdivisions at changes in the argument.

V.9.1 - note
Per se is rendered ‘in its own right’ where Ficino contrasts an intrinsic property with one possessed through another; later clauses retain ‘through itself’ where the causal wording is more explicit.

V.9.1 - note
Fons essendi preserves the chapter's fountain image as ‘the fountain of being’.

V.9.2 - variant
M1482's body reads et quia forma est; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lviiii, f.i) changes this to etiam quia forma est. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.9.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: At enim formarum conditor begins Ficino's reply to the apparent difficulty posed by forms that exist only in matter.

V.9.2 - note
The repeated per se / per naturam suam equivalence is preserved rather than varied away, because the chapter's proof depends on it.

V.9.2 - note
Ex subiecto minime pullulantem is rendered ‘without springing from a subject’, retaining Ficino's organic image.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.9.3 - note
Editorial subdivision: Sed potest aliquis introduces the chapter's formal objection and its first refutation.

V.9.3 - note
The deliberately repetitive series est ... semper est ... dum est is retained rather than summarized. Punctuation follows the syntactic analysis shared by G1559 and P1641 while preserving every occurrence in M1482.

V.9.3 - note
Prima essendi radix is retained as ‘the first root of being’; Ficino's brief rhetorical Age iam siste pedem is rendered ‘Come now, stop here’.

V.9.4 - variant
M1482's body reads ita ut proponatur ignis essentia; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lviiii, fa.ii) changes proponatur to primo ponatur. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.9.4 - note
Editorial subdivision: Quin etiam begins the second reply to the objection, distinguishing being from being hot.

V.9.4 - note
Materia sinu is rendered ‘the womb of matter’, preserving Ficino's image of fire's essence hidden before being brought into the light.

V.9.4 - note
Forma soluta is rendered ‘separate form’ in continuity with Ficino's contrast between dependence on matter and being through oneself.

V.10.1 - note
Direct inspection shows that V.10 is one unbroken M1482 source paragraph; V.10.2-V.10.3 are editorial subdivisions at explicit changes in the argument.

V.10.1 - note
Respectus and referri are rendered consistently through ‘relation’ and ‘to be related’, while respicere retains the visual force ‘to look toward’.

V.10.1 - note
The compact in se ergo sunt nihil quae sunt per aliud quicquid exsistunt is unfolded without changing its claim: things whose entire existence is through another are nothing in themselves.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.10.2 - variant

M1482's body reads Sane in essentia illa tertia; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lx, fa.i) deletes in and inserts est, yielding Sane est essentia illa tertia. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction, which the reading text applies.

V.10.2 - variant

M1482 reads mutabiliter; G1559 and P1641 read mirabiliter. The base reading governs: the third essence's operation is mobile, it generates and relates through motion, and natural bodies therefore lack stability. The English ‘Thus its mode of relating them is mutable’ follows M1482.

V.10.2 - note

Editorial subdivision: Corporales vero formae quales? turns from natural bodies to corporeal forms while retaining the preceding conclusion that both exist through another.

V.10.2 - note

Pendet in materiam is rendered ‘hangs down into matter’, and the comparison with an image depending upon a face in a mirror is kept intact.

V.10.2 - note

Agitatio is rendered ‘motion’ in the English argument; its double role in generating bodily qualities and relating them to God is preserved.

V.10.3 - variant

M1482 reads relatio perfectionis; G1559 and P1641 read ratio perfectionis. The M1482 reading governs and forms an elliptical parallel with the preceding causa est: the essence causes its relation, and the relation its perfection.

V.10.3 - note

Editorial subdivision: Essentia vero tertia begins the final contrast between mutable bodily forms and the stable third essence.

V.10.3 - note

The ellipsis in essentia ... relationis suae causa est; relatio perfectionis is supplied minimally in English as ‘the essence is the cause of its own relation, and that relation is the source of its perfection’. The next sentence confirms that relation is the means by which the soul perfects itself.

V.10.3 - note

Ficino's concluding liquid imagery is retained: God ‘overflows’, the soul ‘draws’, and it ‘drinks being itself’. Ex parte hausti ... haurientis is rendered as the two sides of what is drawn and what draws.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.11.1 - note
Ficino’s sustained analogy assigns essence the role of potentiality or matter and esse the role of actuality or form; the English preserves that technical pairing throughout.

V.11.1 - note
Fomes is rendered consistently as “tinder,” preserving Ficino's repeated image and its echo with V.8.2.

V.11.2 - note
Influxus is kept as ‘influx,’ Ficino’s term for the sustaining communication of divine life.

V.11.2 - note
The conditional phrasing is preserved: Ficino provisionally grants the imagined destruction of the soul in order to show that the hypothesis defeats itself.

V.11.3 - note
The sequence ‘remains—therefore is—therefore has not lost being’ is retained step by step because the apparent circularity is the point of Ficino’s reductio.

V.11.3 - note
Esse animae ... vivere is rendered with the compact ontological equation ‘for a soul to be is ... to live.’

V.11.4 - note
The objection’s distinction between essence without actuality and a residual potentiality is kept explicit; the response begins only with the final clause.

V.11.5 - note
Animus is rendered ‘mind’ here, where Ficino contrasts its determinate identity with God as prima vita; anima remains ‘soul’ elsewhere.

V.11.5 - note
Pullulat retains its organic force in ‘spring from.’

V.11.6 - note
The seal-and-wax image is preserved in full: conformity to the exemplar restores rather than erases the impressed figure.

V.11.6 - note
Terminus is differentiated as the end toward which corruption tends and the efficient source from which production proceeds; ‘first actuality’ preserves Ficino’s Aristotelian vocabulary.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.11.7 - note
Spiritalis is retained as ‘spiritual’ rather than modernized to ‘immaterial,’ because the argument depends on an analogy between bodily and spiritual matter and actuality.

V.11.7 - note
The repeated ab esse ... ab esse ... spiritali is preserved through an explicit self-correction in English.

V.11.8 - note
Ratio is rendered ‘defining nature’ because it names the determinate intelligible character proper to the soul, not discursive reasoning.

V.11.8 - note
The distinctions between common matter, proper matter, species, and individual mind are all retained; ‘for it, to be is to live’ preserves the concluding identity.

V.12.1 - note
Potentia ad non esse is consistently rendered ‘potentiality not to be,’ preserving its opposition to the actuality of being.

V.12.1 - note
Conducens is not made the sole cause of the animal; the soul ‘contributes to’ the constitution of the living composite.

V.12.2 - note
Subiectum is rendered ‘subject’ in its technical sense: that in which an actuality or quality inheres.

V.12.2 - note
The fire example preserves both requirements of the impossible supposition—receiving cold and still remaining fire.

V.12.3 - note
The repeated quodammodo is preserved as ‘in some sense’ because Ficino qualifies both matter’s priority and the kind of precedence at issue.

V.12.3 - note
The trilemma—necessary, impossible, possible—is stated before Ficino eliminates its first two members.

V.12.4 - note
Effectus here is the completed result of formation, rendered ‘completion’ rather than the efficient effect of a cause.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.12.5 - note
The modal distinctions are not compressed: ‘possible’ is explicitly defined as openness to either of two opposed outcomes.

V.12.6 - variant
M1482’s body reads secunda sed prima; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxii, f.i) supplies secundaque sed prima. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the corrected wording. The reading text applies M1482’s correction.

V.12.6 - note
The corrected secundaque sed prima distinguishes secondary, proximate matter from prime matter; the English makes both levels explicit.

V.12.6 - note
The lion example preserves the difference between being determined to a form and retaining, at the level of prime matter, the potency for its loss.

V.12.7 - note
Exstat is read in its context as being brought forth from matter, not merely as ‘exists’; the English makes the contrast with constat ex materia explicit.

V.12.7 - note
The soul’s judgment ‘above and below matter’ preserves Ficino’s claim that it surveys both immaterial and material orders.

V.12.8 - note
The emergence metaphor in processit in lucem is retained rather than flattened into the abstract ‘was created.’

V.12.9 - note
The modal premise—actual creation presupposes a capacity to be created—is kept distinct from the following inquiry into where that capacity resides.

V.12.10 - note
The four rejected locations of the soul’s preexistent capacity are preserved in their exact sequence.

V.12.10 - note
Nascendi is rendered ‘being born’ while produci ad esse is ‘brought into existence,’ preserving Ficino’s shift from natal to ontological language.

V.12.11 - note
Nixus is rendered ‘sustaining impulse,’ preserving both active effort and stable support; sistit and subsistit are echoed in ‘establishes’ and ‘subsists.’

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.12.12 - note
The paired water language of infundere and haurire is retained as ‘pour forth’ and ‘draw in,’ sustaining the image of divine influx.

V.12.12 - note
The mirror illustration is preserved as an objection, not adopted as Ficino’s own account; his answer turns on the impossibility of change in God.

V.12.13 - note
The six balanced clauses from turbatur to conciliat are preserved as a rhetorical sequence rather than summarized.

V.12.13 - note
Stando and sistit retain the stillness/stability wordplay through ‘standing still’ and ‘brings … to rest.’

V.12.14 - note
The progression ‘through the Ideas’ to ‘in the Ideas’ is preserved, as is the final movement from continual activity toward perpetual objects to perpetual activity within them.

V.12.14 - note
Species absolutae is rendered ‘separate forms,’ the stable technical sense required by the project profile.

V.12.15 - note
The twofold modus—attaining an Idea ‘in the manner of an Idea’ and life ‘in an eternal manner’—is retained rather than paraphrased away.

V.13.1 - note
The visceral image in materiae visceribus is preserved as ‘the entrails of matter.’

V.13.1 - note
The causal method moves from proper effects to proper causes and from the common fact of being to a common cause; each step is retained explicitly.

V.13.2 - note
The repeated distinction between esse and a determinate modus essendi is preserved as ‘that things are’ versus ‘being this or that.’

V.13.3 - note
Haud e vestigio is rendered through the motion image ‘does not follow on the heels of,’ preserving the contrast with immediate succession.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.13.4 - variant
M1482's body reads an omnes; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxiii, f.ii) corrects this to ante omnes. G1559 and P1641 read ante omnes. The reading text applies M1482's correction.

V.13.4 - note
The hierarchy 'first gift / first cause / later gifts / subsequent causes' is retained.

V.13.4 - note
The final reductio preserves both absurd consequences: the later would generate the prior and would generate its own cause and hence itself.

V.13.5 - variant
M1482's body reads aeris potentie; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxiiii, f.i) corrects potentie to potentia. G1559 and P1641 have the corrected nominative. The reading text applies M1482's correction.

V.13.5 - note
The Ariston/Plato example distinguishes absolute humanity from the generation of a determinate individual in determinate matter.

V.13.5 - note
The potentiality-to-actuality interval is preserved through the stone, seed, air, and water examples without compression.

V.13.6 - note
The repeated proportion/distance/limit vocabulary is maintained so that the conclusion about infinite power follows visibly from the premises.

V.13.7 - variant
M1482's body reads utraque constat; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxiiii, f.i) corrects this to utraque constant. G1559 and P1641 have the corrected plural. The reading text applies M1482's correction.

V.13.7 - note
The four Pythagorean 'elements' are listed without turning the qualified analogy into literal physical elements.

V.13.7 - note
Esse is rendered 'being' and actus 'actuality' throughout the essence/being analysis.

V.13.8 - note
The comparative structure is retained: operation is farther from essence than being is because essence is prior to operating.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.13.9 - note
The closing question is left open for the next source unit, preserving Ficino's staged progression from essence to being to power to operation.

V.13.10 - note
Effluit is rendered 'flows outward,' maintaining the contrast with an operation that 'remains within.'

V.13.11 - variant
M1482 reads per infinita; G1559 reads per infinitas, apparently with species understood. The reading text follows M1482.

V.13.11 - note
Voluptas is "pleasure," not "desire"; V.13.10 has just named voluntas ("will"), and V.13.11 deliberately pairs intelligentia with voluptas, whose object is the good itself.

V.13.12 - note
Virtus is 'power' here, while potentia is 'potentiality,' so that Ficino's fourfold structure remains legible.

V.13.12 - note
The clothing metaphor in omnibus ... speciebus induitur is retained.

V.13.13 - note
The nested inherence relation—operation in power, power and being in essence—is preserved before the argument turns to qualities inhering in subjects.

V.13.13 - note
Nec iniuria is rendered 'and rightly so,' preserving Ficino's emphatic judgment rather than treating it as a new premise.

V.13.14 - note
The instrumental-causation account retains all three features Ficino rejects for creation: a subject, motion, and temporal interval.

V.13.15 - note
The painted M1482 paragraph sign falls inside a single quid absurdius construction. The dash preserves the source division and carries the syntax into V.13.16 rather than disguising the break.

V.13.16 - note
The opening dash completes the interrogative construction divided by M1482's painted paragraph sign.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.13.16 - note
Ratio is ‘intelligible plan’ alongside Idea; the painter analogy preserves the distinction between one efficient source and unequal exemplars.

V.13.17 - note
The paired creation/preservation clauses and the motion ‘from nothing into being’ / ‘remaining far from nothing’ are preserved.

V.13.17 - note
Ficino’s final alternative carefully denies only an end to a created soul, not its temporal beginning.

V.13.18 - note
The full causal sequence—Idea, proximate power, remoter product—is preserved before application to rational soul, irrational soul, ethereal vehicle, and elemental body.

V.13.18 - note
The mirror metaphor and the qualification secundum se are both retained; they prevent the changing embodiment of life from being confused with change in the rational soul itself.

V.14.1 - note
The contrast between anima and animatum is preserved as ‘soul’ and ‘animated thing.’

V.14.1 - note
The repeated chain whole life → lives through itself → life in its own right → essence is life is kept intact rather than condensed.

V.14.2 - note
The three alternatives—being, appetite, cognition/deliberation—are preserved, as are the separate refutations of the latter two.

V.14.2 - note
Viscera is ‘organs’ here because Ficino refers to hidden physiological generation and nourishment, not using the word metaphorically.

V.14.3 - note
The two permissible formulations—life itself or a substance vital through its own life—are distinguished before Ficino states his preference.

V.14.3 - note
Vitalis is rendered according to context as ‘made vital’ and ‘life-giving,’ preserving the argument without a wooden repetition.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.14.4 - note

The distinction between contrary forms and the substances whose proper forms they are is preserved.

V.14.5 - note

Ficino’s coined contrast infrigescibilis / imperdibilis is rendered by the repeated ‘incapable of becoming cold’ / ‘incapable of destruction.’

V.14.5 - note

The qualification in the fire analogy is preserved: fire avoids its contrary by perishing, whereas the immortal soul is also imperishable.

V.14.6 - note

M1482 and G1559 read the feminine δεσπότις; the normalized Greek agrees with Ficino's Latin domina, “mistress.” The English follows Ficino's own gloss rather than importing a later rendering.

V.14.6 - note

Pedisequa retains the image of an attendant following behind; Ficino’s compressed sun/light and comet/hair comparisons are both kept.

V.14.7 - note

The Epicurean objection and Ficino’s semantic clarification are kept distinct before the physical analogy resumes.

V.14.7 - note

The personified rhetoric of contraries—driving away, fleeing, matter opening its bosom, matter cherishing heat—is preserved in full.

V.14.8 - variant

M1482’s body reads materiae haerent; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxvi, f.ii) replaces this with materiae haerere videntur. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the corrected wording. The reading text applies M1482’s correction.

V.14.8 - note

The correction ‘seem to inhere in matter’ is philosophically consequential: separate forms support matter rather than being ontologically borne by it.

V.14.8 - note

Ficino’s fountain, outpouring, and shadow metaphors are preserved, as is the disputed doxography on the irrational soul’s immortality.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.14.8 - note
Quam is a feminine relative referring back to the irrational soul: Xenocrates, Speusippus, Numenius, and Plotinus affirm its immortality, whereas Porphyry, Proclus, and very many others deny it.

V.14.9 - note
The descending image/true-being ladder is preserved in five stages from God to material quality.

V.14.9 - note
The three degrees of ‘fall’—into reason and sense, into sense and generation, and into generative power alone—are kept distinct; Ficino reports but does not endorse the doctrine.

V.15.1 - note
The a fortiori movement from body’s persistence as divisible body to the soul’s persistence as life is preserved without supplying a stronger conclusion than Ficino states.

V.15.2 - note
Sedes and machina retain their concrete force as ‘dwelling place’ and ‘fabric’; the three gifts are stated in Ficino’s order.

V.15.3 - note
The distinction between bodily ‘shadows’ and rational-soul ‘images’ is retained.

V.15.3 - note
Splendor, reflexio, and effusio preserve Ficino’s linked light and outpouring metaphors.

V.15.4 - note
The second and third ‘gifts’ are fully developed, including the body/member and soul/head analogy.

V.15.4 - note
Fons, vinculum, distrahi, dissolvi, and resolvi retain the fountain and binding/unbinding imagery.

V.15.5 - note
The temporal contrast is retained in full: bodily motion passes future–present–past, while purpose, attention, memory, and expectation coexist in mind.

V.15.5 - note
Sistit and stare continue the chapter’s language of stability through ‘holding steady,’ ‘stand firm,’ and ‘establishing.’

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.15.6 - note
The argument distinguishes bodily bulk from form and beauty, then infers the soul's preservation of its own form and unity; none of these steps is compressed.

V.15.6 - note
Mutatio 'descends' from soul into body, a directional metaphor retained to express the causal hierarchy.

V.15.7 - note
Animus, animatum, and inanime are distinguished as 'mind,' 'ensouled,' and 'without soul'; the argument turns on life being what the mind is, not merely what it has.

V.15.8 - note
The repeated verbs deserit/desertum are kept as 'deserts/leaves' so that the identity of soul with the departing life remains visible.

V.15.8 - note
Simulacrum is 'image' rather than 'illusion'; Ficino contrasts true mind with a derivative ensouled thing.

V.15.9 - note
Alienato atque purgato is preserved as the twofold philosophical discipline of estrangement from and purification of bodily familiarity.

V.15.9 - note
The comparative structure—greater withdrawal, purer understanding—is retained and then turned against the temperament theory.

V.15.10 - note
Consonantia is 'harmony' here, while rationes are the 'intelligible principles' of simple realities; their contrast drives the argument.

V.15.11 - variant
M1482's body reads profecto corpora; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxviii, f.ii) corrects corpora to corporea. G1559 and P1641 have the corrected adjective. The reading text applies M1482's correction.

V.15.11 - note
Maxime quae sunt is rendered 'supremely real,' preserving the claim about degrees of being without the awkward literalism 'most of all the things that are.'

V.15.12 - note
The three possible relations between mind and intelligibles are stated without deciding among them; each is handled in subsequent source units.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.15.12 - note
Mancipatus is rendered ‘enslaved,’ preserving the force of legal subjection rather than weakening it to mere dependence.

V.15.13 - note
The binding language astringitur/alligatur is kept, continuing the contrast between intellectual conjunction and bodily dependence.

V.15.14 - note
The two mathematical examples and the mind’s immediate, voluntary access to them are retained as separate claims.

V.15.15 - note
Ratio artificiosa / ars rationalis is rendered ‘structured reason / rational art,’ while rationum coetus is made explicit as an ordered gathering rather than a merely social ‘assembly.’

V.15.15 - note
The teaching example preserves Ficino’s test for transfer: communication does not remove the knowledge from the teacher.

V.15.16 - note
The conclusion depends on the subject of immutable reason sharing its immutability; that inherence inference is stated explicitly.

V.15.17 - variant
M1482’s body reads primo illo; its authorial correction list (c.23, Car. lxviiii, f.i) inserts ex, yielding ex primo illo. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the correction. The reading text applies M1482’s correction.

V.15.17 - note
The three members of the division are preserved in order: principles in mind, mind in principles, or each subsisting in itself.

V.15.18 - note
The ascent better living → more perfect operation → truer understanding, calmer desire, fuller enjoyment is preserved step by step.

V.15.18 - note
Ficino’s closing play on consonare, dissonare, consonantia, and truth is retained as harmony, variance, discord, and being ‘out of harmony with truth.’

V.15.19 - note
The new question is stated narrowly: survival from annihilation does not by itself exclude ontological degradation into body.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.15.20 - note

The necessary-condition argument is preserved in both directions: becoming body would imply willing or compulsion, but willing or compulsion would not be sufficient.

V.15.20 - note

The four relations of soul to body—possession, vivification, formation, and care—are retained.

V.15.21 - note

The introspective test and the subsequent coercion argument are kept distinct.

V.15.21 - note

Ficino's account of one mind's power over another is conditional upon the latter's cupiditates; 'desires' is used consistently throughout the chain.

V.15.22 - note

Every branch of the coercer's alternatives—disembodied or embodied, and the compelled mind embodied or free—is retained.

V.15.22 - note

Solutus is rendered 'free' in the sense of released from bodily subjection, not merely 'dissolved.'

V.15.23 - note

The rhetorical analogy between involuntary sleep and ontological conversion is rejected without denying the bodily inhibition of sensation.

V.15.23 - note

Cedit ... cum voluntate is rendered 'yields willingly,' preserving the soul's consent within a natural restorative process.

V.15.24 - note

The dream example distinguishes immutable rational content from the false yet vividly sensible setting, persons, and words; all elements are retained.

V.15.24 - note

Praesentia is 'presence,' not mere duration: true principles possess an everlasting present unavailable to sensory events.

V.15.25 - note

The difficult Augustinian clause ut anima per animam corpus fieret is retained in the Latin and translated conditionally from its argumentative context: if soul became body, it would have to do so through soul, since body receives form only through soul.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

V.15.25 - note
The distinctions between natural order and spatial nearness, and between giving and removing form, are preserved.

V.15.26 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Si enim. The split falls at Ficino's new conditional analysis of how body can receive form and keeps the synchronized Latin–English unit within the facing-page capacity.

V.15.26 - note
The entire mediation proof is preserved: without soul, body would either not arise or would receive form as immediately as soul and therefore would no longer be body; transmission of form is then opposed to its removal.

V.15.27 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Hoc et de irrationali anima vel vita. The phrase opens the genuine final extension of the proof from body to irrational life and the hierarchy of stronger and weaker natures.

V.15.27 - note
The closing hierarchy—supreme beauty, rational soul, irrational life, and body—is preserved, as are the contrasts transmission/removal of form and power through form/power through bodily bulk.

VI.1.1 - variant
The place-name is Regnano in M1482 and P1641; G1559 appears to print Regoano. The base reading is retained.

VI.1.1 - note
The opening Haec refers back to the questions just discussed at the end of Book V; 'these matters' preserves that backward reference.

VI.1.1 - note
The direct speech and every step of Giovanni's proposed five-position method are retained; the familiar Italian forms of transparent personal names are used in the English.

VI.1.2 - note
The first of the five positions begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign.

VI.1.2 - note
Corpusculum is kept as 'little body,' since the diminutive is part of the theory rather than an incidental stylistic flourish.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.1.3 - variant
M1482 reads Cittieus and Cleantes; G1559 gives Citticus and Cleanthes. These are orthographic forms of the same names and do not alter the argument.

VI.1.3 - note
The second position begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign.

VI.1.3 - note
Complexio calida is rendered ‘a warm constitution,’ preserving its technical physiological sense rather than reducing it to temperature alone.

VI.1.4 - note
The third position begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign.

VI.1.4 - note
Ipsius qualitatis et corpusculi is allowed to retain Ficino's deliberately hybrid account: the privileged seat belongs both to the posited quality and to its subtle body.

VI.1.5 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs Critolaus q. to be read Critolausque at fol. 71v; the corrected reading is applied. G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.1.5 - variant
P1641 omits the first of Ficino's two alternatives, vel quia corporis complexio ipsum genuerit. M1482 and G1559 preserve the necessary two-part distinction, which governs the reading text.

VI.1.5 - note
The fourth position begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign.

VI.1.5 - note
Viscera, semen, incohatio, proportio, in lucem, and naturale gremium are all represented; the biological and birth imagery has not been compressed.

VI.1.6 - note
The fifth position begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign and continues through the end of VI.1; the colored initials later in the passage are not paragraph signs.

VI.1.6 - note
Fomentum retains the image of combustible material as ‘tinder’; the contrast is between dependence on the incorporeal agent alone and every latent resource in matter.

VI.1.6 - note
Physicus Aristoteles is translated ‘Aristotle the natural philosopher,’ and the closing dialogue formula is retained.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.1 - note
Direct inspection places VI.2 on G1559 PDF p.251/fol. 80v, not p.250/fol. 80r as the preliminary inventory stated.

VI.2.1 - note
Agit in corpore, agit per corpus, operatur per se ipsam is kept as a three-member architecture and governs every example that follows.

VI.2.1 - note
Intelligentia is rendered ‘understanding’ here as an activity, while mens and intellectus remain ‘mind’ and ‘intellect’ in later units.

VI.2.2 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, restores responderet at fol. 72v where the body text lacks the initial r. G1559 and P1641 incorporate the corrected verb.

VI.2.2 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Si potentiam.

VI.2.2 - note
The three misleading teachers are the natural power, outward sense, and inward sense; later tribus his praeceptoribus refers to precisely this triad.

VI.2.2 - note
The garment, humors, fat, mud, earthen crust, clods, flesh, and clay are all retained as stages of one sustained image.

VI.2.3 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Dimittite.

VI.2.3 - note
The fourfold ascent—great, good, beautiful, everlasting—is preserved in the same order, as are the matching descriptions of the realm in which each can be found.

VI.2.3 - note
Corpus is appositional to umbram tuam: the body is the soul's shadow, not a second object alongside it.

VI.2.4 - note
The brief comparison begins at a directly inspected painted M1482 paragraph sign; it is not merged with the adjacent bird comparison.

VI.2.4 - note
The spatial contrast super puteum / in fundo is retained as ‘above a well’ / ‘at the bottom.’

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.5 - note
The bird comparison has its own painted M1482 paragraph sign and remains an independent synchronized unit.

VI.2.6 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Ergo.

VI.2.6 - note
The paradoxical pair immensam amplitudinem / infinitam angustiam is retained as ‘immeasurable breadth’ / ‘infinite narrowness.’

VI.2.6 - note
The opposed directions of number and magnitude are not rationalized away: number can increase indefinitely but reaches unity when diminished, whereas Ficino gives magnitude a maximum while allowing division without a final minimum.

VI.2.7 - note
The long source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Cur. It is divided editorially after the explicit conclusion that reason is more truthful than sense; VI.2.8 and VI.2.9 continue the same source paragraph.

VI.2.7 - note
Every sensory example—sun, heavens, oar, shore, voice, and sweetness—is retained in Ficino's order.

VI.2.8 - note
Editorial subdivision: Ratio iudicat begins the positive judgment of reason after the catalogue of sensory errors.

VI.2.8 - note
The repeated legal and prophetic vocabulary—judgment, condemnation, refutation, and prophecy—is preserved rather than collapsed into a generic claim that reason is reliable.

VI.2.9 - note
Editorial subdivision: Quid enim stultius begins a new reductio from man's rational superiority, followed by the two alternatives concerning how intellectual objects move the mind.

VI.2.9 - note
Secundo Divinorum is rendered descriptively as ‘the second book of the Divine Philosophy’; the report identifies the traditional Aristotelian allusion without importing a modern apparatus.

VI.2.9 - note
The king-of-animals and owl-and-sun comparisons retain Ficino's deliberately heightened rhetoric.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.10 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Respiscant and culminates in Ficino's three-stage ascent from pure soul to angel to God.

VI.2.10 - note
Illam despiciant, hanc aspiciant contrasts the life transmitted to the body with the soul's own inward life; the directional wordplay is retained as looking down upon the former and turning one's gaze to the latter.

VI.2.10 - note
Every term in the discipline of withdrawal—motion, sensation, affection, and bodily imagination—is preserved.

VI.2.11 - note
The painted M1482 paragraph sign creates a deliberately brief, antiphonal unit, although the grammar continues the preceding sequence.

VI.2.11 - note
The minimum subject ‘it will behold’ is supplied in English; the reciprocal pattern of light, joy, and truth is left intact.

VI.2.12 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Esse vero. It is divided editorially at Neque fingere; VI.2.13 continues the same source paragraph.

VI.2.12 - note
Ficino's version of Avicenna's thought experiment is translated from Ficino's Latin on its own terms; sexto Naturalium is rendered descriptively as ‘the sixth book of his Natural Philosophy.’

VI.2.12 - note
The sequence from the absence of sensible predicates to the intuition of existence and then incorporeality is preserved clause by clause.

VI.2.13 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs corporis providere to be read corporis pervidere at fol. 74v. The corrected reading is applied; G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.2.13 - note
Editorial subdivision: Neque fingere opens Avicenna's answer to the objection that the isolated mind might invent a body of some wholly different kind.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.13 - note
The proof distinguishes what the mind affirms—its own existence—from what it does not affirm—anything corporeal—and then grounds the judgment in nature uncontaminated by exterior images.

VI.2.13 - note
Expergiscatur ... et sentiat marks the thought experiment's transition from isolated awareness to ordinary waking sensation; both steps are explicit in the English.

VI.2.14 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs apparent respicere to be read apparent aspicere at fol. 74v. The corrected reading is applied; G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.2.14 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Hactenus and carries the cave narrative through the prisoners' mistaken account of themselves, the objects, and light.

VI.2.14 - note
Lampas and ignis name the same artificial light-source in the imagined cave; the English preserves both ‘lamp’ and ‘fire’ rather than silently assimilating them to the sun.

VI.2.14 - note
Every element of the staging—underground cave, childhood, bonds, pillars, facing wall, elevated lamp, walkers, speech, carried images, and projected shadows—is retained.

VI.2.15 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Si quis autem.

VI.2.15 - note
The ordered pedagogy remains fully articulated: shadows, reflected cave-objects, cave-objects themselves, earthly reflections by moonlight, earthly and celestial things at night, daytime reflections, things under the sun, and finally the sun itself.

VI.2.15 - note
Sincere is rendered ‘without distortion,’ its force here being undeceived or unmixed perception rather than moral sincerity.

VI.2.16 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Proinde and explicitly maps cave to visible world, and visible world to invisible divine world.

VI.2.16 - note
Moribundi corporis is ‘a dying body,’ preserving Ficino's stronger claim rather than weakening it to ‘mortal body.’

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.16 - note
The threefold verae mentes, verae res quaeque, verus sol is preserved as true minds, all true realities, and the true sun.

VI.2.17 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs effundetur to be read offundetur at fol. 75v. The corrected reading is applied; G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.2.17 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Convenientibus and reverses the cave's ascent by describing the soul's descent into bodily darkness.

VI.2.17 - note
The three conditions—frenzy, sleep, and intoxication—and both consequences of descent—confused perception and disorders of sense and body—are all retained.

VI.2.17 - note
Sincere again means perception free from mixture or distortion; the English echoes VI.2.15 to keep Ficino's linkage visible.

VI.2.18 - note
The exhortation begins at its own painted M1482 paragraph sign and is kept as a brief synchronized unit.

VI.2.18 - note
Emergite answers the preceding descent into the body's darkness; ‘Rise up’ preserves both physical emergence and spiritual ascent.

VI.2.19 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Corpus siquidem and climbs from body through surface, line, point, and a point released in thought.

VI.2.19 - note
Each lost dimension and each numbered approach toward incorporeal nature—one, two, three, and finally four degrees—is retained.

VI.2.19 - note
Fundatur ... et moveat is read within the thought experiment as jussive: ‘Let it be diffused ... and move them’; the irrational soul is then assigned to this fourth degree.

VI.2.20 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Et quoniam and adds the fifth degree: actual indivisible unity, free to rise toward higher things.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.20 - note
Eget patiturque is kept as the paired test of impurity—needing and undergoing—rather than reduced to material divisibility alone.

VI.2.20 - note
Virtute magnum / quantitate magnum is preserved as the concluding contrast between greatness in power and greatness in quantity.

VI.2.21 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs igneique to be read aeneique at fol. 76r. The corrected ‘bronze’ is applied; G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.2.21 - note
Editorial subdivision: Agite begins a new imaginative test within the same source paragraph as VI.2.20.

VI.2.21 - note
The literal three-cubit measure, the gathering into the heart, and the concentrated solar rays in a concave bronze mirror are retained as successive stages of Ficino's experiment.

VI.2.21 - note
The final sequence—indivisible, active, warm, shining; illuminating, living, giving life, sensing, and understanding—is neither reordered nor compressed.

VI.2.22 - variant
M1482 and P1641 read lumen id solis; G1559 reads lumen ipsum solis. The grammatical base reading governs.

VI.2.22 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Hactenus and moves from the earlier tactile proof to a new visual proof.

VI.2.22 - note
Momento, infusum non frangit corpora, and nec inficitur are all explicit: light pours itself everywhere in an instant without shattering bodies or being stained by them.

VI.2.22 - note
The apparently paradoxical Ecce videtis spiritum is retained in its direct rhetorical form.

VI.2.23 - variant
M1482 reads prospicitur; G1559 and P1641 read perspicitur. The grammatical base reading governs.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.23 - note
Editorial subdivision: Ita lumen resumes the light proof after VI.2.22's explicit Sed redeamus ad lumen.

VI.2.23 - note
Fulgor and splendor are distinguished as the sun's own ‘radiance’ and its vapor-mixed ‘splendor’; the inference from the seen image to its unseen source remains explicit.

VI.2.23 - note
The rise from shining to living to sensing, followed by the double reason light escapes bodily sight—subtlety and intelligible abundance—is preserved in full.

VI.2.24 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Scitis.

VI.2.24 - note
The crossed motion of lowest fire downward and highest air upward is preserved before Ficino transfers the same comparison to rational soul and heaven.

VI.2.24 - note
Suspicit / prospicit is kept as a visual cadence: one who ‘looks up’ at heaven ‘looks forth’ upon soul.

VI.2.25 - note
The source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Cogitate and contains two exactly paired expansions: point into circumference, then spark into flame.

VI.2.25 - note
Ficino's paired language is maintained: the circumference is the point unfolded, the point the circumference rolled up; the spark is compressed flame, the flame an outpoured spark.

VI.2.25 - note
The final lunar halo comparison preserves the dependence of bodily visible light upon the soul's spiritual light.

VI.2.26 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, c.23, directs ea vere to be read ea vero; the corrected reading is applied. G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

VI.2.26 - variant
The same correction list directs alicubi to be read alibi at fol. 77r; the corrected ‘elsewhere’ is applied. G1559 and P1641 incorporate it.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.2.26 - note
Editorial subdivision: Ea vero begins the distinction between celestial rational souls, clothed in one luminous body, and other rational souls, clothed in two bodies.

VI.2.26 - note
The compressed puns of sense and soul are retained: one who denies the spark in the flame lacks sense; one who denies the soul at the center of the celestial globe lacks a soul.

VI.2.26 - note
The Greek maxim and Ficino's own Latin gloss are both preserved; intelligibilem and intelligentem remain the distinct ‘intelligible’ and ‘intelligent.’

VI.2.27 - note
The closing source paragraph begins at the painted M1482 sign before Et paulo ante; VI.3 begins later on the same M1482 page and has not been absorbed into this batch.

VI.2.27 - note
The recap retains each predicate of the liberated point—self-activity, warmth, life-giving power, sensation, capacity for higher things, and substantial unity.

VI.2.27 - note
Excursio and praeludium mark the whole chapter as an initial expedition and prelude; the conclusion is not inflated into a claim that the full proof is already complete.

VI.3.1 - variant
After hominis, G1559 and P1641 add quidem; M1482's less repetitive reading governs.

VI.3.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial and lays out the natural, sensory, and intellectual stages of the proof in their stated order.

VI.3.1 - note
Indivisibilis and impartibilis are kept distinct as ‘indivisible’ and ‘impartible’; tota per singula and ubique tota retain Ficino's repeated claim that the soul is whole throughout.

VI.3.2 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxvii, f.i, directs iudicabimur to iudicabitur. The corrected third-person reading is adopted; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VI.3.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Sic enim.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.3.2 - note
The conclusion preserves the move from the soul's place in the everlasting third essence to its being judged immortal, followed by Ficino's invocation of divine power.

VI.4.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial.

VI.4.1 - note
Illa and haec are made explicit as the former living things and the latter uprooted logs and stones; the contrast between growth and mere corporeality is not compressed.

VI.4.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Cum ergo.

VI.4.2 - note
The paired premises and their conclusion remain explicit; the unit ends with Ficino's introduction to the objection, as the next painted sign begins its quoted substance.

VI.4.3 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Immo vero; the sentence continues across the M1482 page turn.

VI.4.3 - note
Tale quiddam and sic affectum retain the opponent's twofold claim: a body of a determinate kind and a body disposed in a determinate way.

VI.4.4 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Quaeremus.

VI.4.4 - note
Moles, affectio, qualitas, and superadditam are all represented; the reply distinguishes common corporeal bulk from the added condition that makes a body this determinate kind.

VI.4.5 - variant
G1559 and P1641 add itaque after Formam; M1482's unadorned Formam ipsam vivificam is retained without changing the inference.

VI.4.5 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Itaque.

VI.4.5 - note
The reductio through dry wood and stones leads in full to the distinction between matter and the life-giving form; Ficino's clipped Restat and Formam, inquam cadence is preserved without obscuring its syntax.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.4.6 - variant
M1482 reads animatum quiddam, ‘something animate’; G1559 and P1641 read animarum quiddam, ‘something of souls.’ The coherent base reading is retained.

VI.4.6 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Materiam vero.

VI.4.6 - note
The matter/form distinction is carried into the concluding causal test: operations begin with the soul's arrival and cease with its departure, so their principle cannot be body.

VI.5.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial.

VI.5.1 - note
The repeated animate/inanimate language and the distinction between animal life and the soul that gives it are preserved without substituting a looser contrast between living and dead.

VI.5.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes De illa anima; the argument continues across both the M1482 and G1559 page turns.

VI.5.2 - note
The regress and both branches of its dilemma are retained, as is Ficino's deliberately jarring parallel with wisdom being wise and foolish.

VI.5.3 - variant
M1482 and P1641 read ego, agreeing with the first-person referam; G1559 prints ergo. The base witness's explicit first-person reading is retained.

VI.5.3 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Aut de lumine.

VI.5.3 - note
The analogy with first light, the repeated regress from one cause to another, and the final stopping point in what animates and vivifies through itself are all preserved.

VI.5.4 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxviii, f.i, directs vitae rationes after ac to operationes. The corrected reading ac operationes is adopted; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VI.5.4 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Tale quiddam.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.5.4 - note
The attempted escape from ‘animated’ to ‘animal,’ and from ‘vivified’ to ‘living,’ remains a verbal and metaphysical distinction rather than being paraphrased away.

VI.5.4 - note
Ratio remains ‘reason’ in the causal test; the corrected operationes is kept as the broader ‘operations’ rather than narrowed to principles of life.

VI.5.5 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Sequitur.

VI.5.5 - note
The conclusion keeps the distinction between the corporeal nature and the further nature by which the body is animal and living.

VI.6.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial.

VI.6.1 - note
Crassum, subtile, and rarum are kept as the physical contrasts ‘dense,’ ‘subtle,’ and ‘rarefied’; the soul's three offices of penetrating, filling, and moving bodies remain in sequence.

VI.6.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Secundum vero.

VI.6.2 - note
The question qua ratione is repeated as the same ‘reason’ or account by which the supposed fiery body would be both fire and soul; the universal consequence for every fire is explicit.

VI.6.3 - variant
M1482 reads Si primum detur; G1559 and P1641 read Si primum dicitur. Both introduce the first branch, but the base witness's conditional formulation is retained.

VI.6.3 - variant
M1482 reads quintum aliquod tenuissimumque corpusculum; G1559 and P1641 omit -que and read quintum aliquod tenuissimum corpusculum. The base witness's coordination is retained.

VI.6.3 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Igitur alia ratione; the source paragraph continues across the page turn.

VI.6.3 - note
Quintum is the proposed fifth body beyond the four elements, not a generic quantity; corpusculum retains its diminutive force as ‘little body.’

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.6.3 - note
The final alternative preserves Ficino's qualification quodammodo: the superadded power is ‘in some manner’ incorporeal.

VI.6.4 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Afferuntur hic.

VI.6.4 - note
The successive tests—living parts, sensible appearance, boundary, temporal operation, presence in place, containment, and excellence—are kept discrete and in their source order.

VI.6.4 - note
Comprehensa and comprehendens retain their active contrast: the soul is not contained by the body but perfects, contains, and guides it.

VI.6.5 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Indivisibile.

VI.6.5 - note
Animus is rendered ‘soul’ in continuity with anima throughout the argument; the deliberately comparative magis indivisibilis is preserved even in relation to a geometrical point.

VI.7.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial and continues across the M1482 page turn; G1559 places the heading on PDF p.266/fol. 88r but the body begins on p.267/fol. 88v.

VI.7.1 - note
The apparent competing decompositions—matter and form, then soul and body—are preserved because they drive the conclusion that soul, rather than body, must be the animal's form.

VI.7.1 - note
Potentia, actu, and actu are rendered with the repeated technical terms ‘potency’ and ‘act.’

VI.7.2 - variant
M1482 reads tamen where G1559 and P1641 have autem, and formare where both later witnesses have informare. The base readings preserve the same adversative and formal-causal sense and are retained.

VI.7.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Oportet tamen, dividing Ficino's first absurdity after its negative half.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.7.2 - note
Both occurrences of totam are represented: the form acts through its entire essence and perfects the whole of its proper matter.

VI.7.2 - note
The English supplies the minimal antecedent ‘they’ for the reciprocal vicissim while preserving the proposed mutual transformation of soul and lower bodies.

VI.7.3 - variant
M1482 reads ita ut contineat ipsum, ‘so that it contains it.’ G1559 and P1641 add non before contineat, producing a contradiction with the following sistat et torqueat and with Ficino's argument that the ruling soul contains the body. The base reading is retained.

VI.7.3 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Quod ideo nefas.

VI.7.3 - note
The argument advances through three tests of substantial form: soul rules and contains body; a mover does not depend for being on what it moves; and soul remains the same while receiving opposites.

VI.7.3 - note
Rectrix, motrix, contineat, sistat, and torqueat are all represented, without reducing Ficino's sequence to a generic claim of control.

VI.7.4 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Anima igitur.

VI.7.4 - note
Forma and formari retain Ficino's formal echo; the concluding series preserves resistance, self-reflection, ascent from accident to substance, definition, distinction, and measurement.

VI.8.1 - note
The chapter opens at the directly inspected decorated M1482 initial and continues across the M1482 page turn.

VI.8.1 - note
The first two sources of corporeal dispersion—spatial distance among parts and continual temporal alteration—remain separately numbered and fully stated.

VI.8.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Quae quidem.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.8.2 - note

Raptu caelorum is kept as the dynamic ‘sweep of the heavens’; the three things contrary to bodily nature—unity, likeness to itself, and self-consistency—remain distinct.

VI.8.3 - variant

M1482 has the active infinitive mutare, with body understood as the object of cogit and the subject of the infinitive; G1559 and P1641 print mutari, ‘to be changed.’ The base syntax is retained and made explicit in English.

VI.8.3 - note

A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Extensio.

VI.8.3 - note

Extension, perpetual motion, and contrary qualities are preserved as three distinct dispersive forces; Ficino's image of qualities fleeing one another remains visible.

VI.8.4 - note

A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Quamvis autem; the unit crosses both the G1559 and P1641 page turns.

VI.8.4 - note

The apparent paradox is retained: body cannot of itself stand in unity, yet its parts conspire in one bond, requiring something beyond bodily nature.

VI.8.4 - note

Unit, sistit, and continet are carried into the English as the repeated operations ‘unites,’ ‘holds firm,’ and ‘contains.’

VI.8.5 - note

A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Continet invicem.

VI.8.5 - note

Consonantia, dissonas, copula, copulantem, copulatum, compagem, and copulatrix retain Ficino's sustained vocabulary of concord and binding rather than being collapsed into a generic claim of unity.

VI.8.5 - note

The two-question regress and the threefold nullam ... nullam ... nullamve are preserved before the conclusion that an incorporeal power must be present.

VI.8.6 - note

A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Talis enim.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.8.6 - note
The relative quod is taken with alio continente: the required container must itself remain one and undispersed when bodily division occurs.

VI.8.7 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxix, f.ii, removes terrae from the body-text phrase ab anima terrae, yielding ab anima. The corrected reading is adopted; G1559 and P1641 retain ab anima terrae.

VI.8.7 - note
A separate painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Si quis autem; the next heading on both early witnesses begins VI.9 and is outside this batch.

VI.8.7 - note
The contrast between attached and severed stones or wood preserves both gifts of soul—union and growth—and the survival of union alone after severance; the English does not silently restore the corrected-away terrae.

VI.9.1 - variant
For M1482's partes suas vicissim partibus iungere, G1559 and P1641 read partes illas invicem iungi. The more explicit base wording governs.

VI.9.1 - variant
M1482 numbers the chapter Cap. viiii (IX). G1559 prints Cap. 6 and P1641 CAPVT VI, evidently assimilating the chapter number to Sexta ratio; the M1482 numbering and the continuous VI.8–VI.10 sequence govern.

VI.9.1 - note
The chapter opens at M1482's decorated initial; no painted paragraph sign intervenes before the chapter ends on c.192.

VI.9.1 - note
This first editorial segment follows the proof from indivisible parts to divisible parts and ends at the corresponding contrast between one place and many little places.

VI.9.2 - variant
G1559 and P1641 add quoque after the second per se in anima quae per se dat esse; M1482's less repetitive reading is retained.

VI.9.2 - note
This disclosed editorial division remains within the chapter's single M1482 source paragraph and begins at the inference from the impossibility of bodily coincidence.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.9.2 - note
Esse substantiale, essentia, virtus, and operatio retain their distinct roles; the repeated movement from whole to parts and from giving to union is preserved clause by clause.

VI.9.3 - note
This disclosed editorial division begins with Ficino's rhetorical question about the unity of an animate body.

VI.9.3 - note
The house and sinew comparisons, the paired consensio et concordia, and the progression from life to powers, operations, and the agent's substance are all retained.

VI.9.4 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxx, f.ii, directs perveniret to proveniret. The corrected reading is adopted; G1559 agrees, while P1641 retains perveniret.

VI.9.4 - note
This final disclosed division of the single source paragraph begins with the harmless motion of soul through body and carries the proof through its three closing images.

VI.9.4 - note
Solidum and fluxum et labile remain contrasting hypotheses; the rennet, magnet, and clock comparisons retain their separate causal relations.

VI.10.1 - variant
After the question ending ex quolibet, G1559 and P1641 add certe; M1482 proceeds directly to Vegetativa quoque anima, and the base reading is retained.

VI.10.1 - note
The chapter occupies one M1482 source paragraph beneath its decorated initial.

VI.10.1 - note
The translation preserves the movement from seminal power as the soul's instrument to the stronger claim about the whole soul, followed by the tree's expansion and contraction and the final paradox of magnitude.

VI.11.1 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxxi, f.i, directs unum aliquid to aliquid in Sin dixeris aliquid e multis elementis. The correction is adopted; G1559 and P1641 retain unum aliquod.

VI.11.1 - note
The chapter is a single painted M1482 paragraph; this first segment ends after the reduction of a living element to its form.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.11.1 - note

All three alternatives for the elements—each alive, none alive, or one alive—remain explicit, as do the separate roles of conjunction, its orderer, matter, and form.

VI.11.2 - note

This disclosed editorial division begins at Ficino's second reduction, from any possible bodily constitution to one determinate range of effects.

VI.11.2 - note

The pairs of contrary qualities, operations, products, and directions are preserved rather than summarized; compos is rendered as command over opposing motions in light of its governing ad construction.

VI.12.1 - note

The chapter opens at M1482's decorated initial and continues as one long source paragraph to the painted sign before Ad idem on c.195; this first segment is an editorial division at the close of Ficino's governing analogy.

VI.12.1 - note

Fons and receptaculum remain the distinct active and receptive poles of motion; utrumque is represented twice and not collapsed.

VI.12.2 - note

This disclosed editorial division begins where Ficino transfers the general account of primary self-motion to soul and tests it against body.

VI.12.2 - note

The regress through parts, parts of parts, and particles, and the act/actuality inference that generates infinitely many movers, are retained in their stated order.

VI.12.3 - note

This final editorial segment of the first source paragraph distinguishes a part's actuality from the actuality of the composite whole.

VI.12.3 - note

The repeated actu is preserved as ‘in actuality’ because the proof depends on the difference between potential division and an actually infinite multitude.

VI.12.4 - note

A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Ad idem; this source paragraph continues through c.196 to the sign before Ubi cavillatio.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.12.4 - note
The four exhaustive alternatives are stated before the first three are tested; aliud ... aliud remains a strict numerical distinction rather than a loose contrast.

VI.12.5 - note
This disclosed editorial division completes the tests of the third and fourth alternatives.

VI.12.5 - note
The apparently paradoxical claim that the independently acting part would no longer be a part is preserved, as is the fourth alternative's return to self-moving parts.

VI.12.6 - note
This disclosed editorial division begins at the return of all four alternatives to a supposedly self-moving part.

VI.12.6 - note
Mutuatur is kept as ‘borrows,’ preserving Ficino's contrast between motion received from parts and motion possessed properly in oneself.

VI.12.7 - note
This disclosed editorial division carries the infinite regress to its positive terminus in something impartible and identifies the soul as the body's inward mover.

VI.12.7 - note
Unus ac primus, impartibile, internus, praesente, and absente retain the proof's contrasts rather than being compressed into a generic appeal to soul.

VI.12.8 - variant
M1482 and G1559 read intrinseco, which the logic requires; P1641 reads extrinseco. The base and primary witnesses govern.

VI.12.8 - note
This final disclosed division of the Ad idem source paragraph distinguishes the inward mover from any external impulse and concludes against both body and a dispersed bodily form.

VI.12.8 - note
Sui met agitatricem is rendered as ‘its own mover’; Ficino's participatory explanation of derivative self-motion is preserved in full.

VI.12.9 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Ubi cavillatio; this source paragraph continues to the sign before Idem nobis on c.198.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.12.9 - note
The opponent's emergent ‘integrity of the whole’ and Ficino's two replies are kept distinct; the second reply turns explicitly on whether that integrity is quantitatively extended or indivisible.

VI.12.10 - note
This disclosed editorial division clarifies the mode of incorporeal self-motion and ends with Ficino's definition of the soul's vital progression.

VI.12.10 - note
The agent/patient distinction, fire analogy, causal priority, and the images of seed and birth all remain present; actus and potentia are rendered consistently as ‘act’ and ‘potency.’

VI.12.11 - note
This disclosed editorial division states the Platonic distinction between action in soul and passion in body, then scales it to the body and soul of the universe.

VI.12.11 - note
Actio and passio remain technical opposites; Ficino's reduction of imperfect to perfect motion is not recast as a merely comparative claim.

VI.12.12 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxxiii, f.i, corrects the misprint nun imaginabili to non imaginabili; G1559 and P1641 agree with the corrected reading.

VI.12.12 - variant
On Car. lxxxiii, f.ii the same list directs enim to be inserted after Non in Non enim adventitiam. The insertion is adopted; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VI.12.12 - note
This final disclosed segment of the Ubi cavillatio source paragraph specifies vital motion and explains Ficino's paradox that soul is always moved and not always moved.

VI.12.12 - note
The essential motion of life is distinguished from the interruptible powers and acts of life and intellect; Ficino's statement that this motion is not cognitive is retained without doctrinal expansion.

VI.12.13 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Idem nobis; this source paragraph ends at the sign before Nullum igitur on c.198.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.12.13 - note
The heating aporia preserves the simultaneous possession and non-possession of heat; the reply distinguishes virtual coldness, an externally caused quality, an inward productive power, and the incorporeal substance from which that power springs.

VI.12.14 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Nullum igitur; the source paragraph turns from alteration to generation and corruption as possible forms of bodily self-motion.

VI.12.14 - note
The double contradiction in self-generation—possessing and not possessing being, being prior and posterior—is retained, as is Ficino's image of natural impulse as the offspring of essence and being.

VI.12.15 - note
This final disclosed segment of the Nullum igitur source paragraph reduces increase, decrease, condensation, and rarefaction to the motions already excluded.

VI.12.15 - note
The generation of new parts and corruption of old ones are preserved as Ficino's stated mechanisms of growth and decline.

VI.12.16 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Dixerit forte; this compact source paragraph tests the remaining forms of local motion.

VI.12.16 - note
Termini proprii and termini alieni are retained as the body's own and another's termini because Ficino's contrast depends on the technical reach of internal and external motion.

VI.12.17 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Moventur tamen; this source paragraph continues across c.200 to the sign before Praeterea.

VI.12.17 - note
The governing and cognitive parts of soul remain distinct, as do their two kinds of temporal succession: seminal emergence and discursive ascent and descent.

VI.12.18 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxxiiii, f.ii, directs ad corporalia to ad incorporalia. The corrected reading is adopted; G1559 and P1641 agree.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.12.18 - note

This disclosed editorial division concludes the Moventur tamen source paragraph by locating discursive revolutions among the motions proper to soul.

VI.12.18 - note

The exclusions of God and angels, bodies, and corporeal forms are all retained before the argument from rising above one's own nature.

VI.12.19 - note

A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Praeterea; this final source paragraph of the chapter continues to the heading of VI.13.

VI.12.19 - note

Each bodily motion receives its stated psychic exemplar; Ficino's spatial rhetoric—straight, oblique, circular, upward, downward, right, left, forward, and backward—is preserved in full.

VI.12.20 - note

This disclosed editorial division begins at Ficino's rhetorical conclusion from the catalogue of psychic exemplars.

VI.12.20 - note

The cautious force of quodammodo and quasi is preserved; the final claim remains an analogy—‘as though’ spontaneous motion were proper to life—rather than an intensified definition.

VI.13.1 - note

The chapter opens at M1482's decorated initial and reaches a painted sign before Et anima at the foot of c.200.

VI.13.1 - note

Anima unius sit tota naturae is read as a hyperbaton of anima tota unius naturae: the whole soul is of one nature and therefore able to bind diverse things together. The reductio through severed members is preserved without softening.

VI.13.2 - variant

M1482 reads vivit ibi decennium; G1559 and P1641 omit ibi. The base's explicit locative is retained.

VI.13.2 - note

A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Et anima; this source paragraph crosses the page turn and ends before the painted sign at Si anima corpus est.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.13.2 - note
The second quae resumes anima: Ficino imagines the soul living in the remaining body after amputation, then draws the reductio's consequences for its supposed diminution. Immo etiam sic argumentemur supplies the transition to the next source paragraph.

VI.13.2 - note
Pusillanimis is rendered ‘small-souled’ rather than merely ‘fainthearted’ because Ficino exploits its literal force immediately after saying that the soul would be much smaller; compare pusillanimitas in VIII.2.1.

VI.13.3 - variant
M1482 reads magnitudinem quantitate sua penitus aequans; G1559 and P1641 read magnitudinem quantitatem penitus aequans. The base's explicit instrumental phrase governs.

VI.13.3 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Si anima corpus est; the next sign begins Novae igitur.

VI.13.3 - note
The argument preserves both hypotheses about nourishment, including Ficino's pointed reversal of lending and borrowing life.

VI.13.4 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Novae igitur; this long source paragraph continues through the top of c.202 to the sign before Obiciet forte.

VI.13.4 - note
Hauriuntur preserves the image of souls being drawn in as nourishment, while the purpose ut una servetur remains explicitly purposive.

VI.13.5 - note
This disclosed editorial division develops the further consequence that the allegedly bodily soul cannot itself remain the same.

VI.13.5 - note
Subterfugiat and adsciscere retain Ficino's images of substance slipping away and the soul recruiting replacements.

VI.13.6 - note
This disclosed editorial division turns the replacement hypothesis against the continuity of will, character, opinion, knowledge, memory, and recognition.

VI.13.6 - note
The repeated questions and the repetitions of eadem, idem, and earundem are retained as Ficino's pressure on personal identity.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.13.7 - note
This disclosed editorial division tests whether an extremely subtle bodily soul could preserve memory even briefly.

VI.13.7 - note
The swift heavens, enduring bones and sinews, daily-renewed flesh, and breath image retain the ascending rhetorical force of Ficino's reductio.

VI.13.8 - variant
M1482 and G1559 read innumeralis unitas animalis; P1641 prints innumerabilis. The base reading is retained and understood as the animal's unity not reducible to a succession of counted material constituents.

VI.13.8 - note
This final editorial segment of the Nove igitur source paragraph extends the flux argument from body to quality and temperament.

VI.13.8 - note
The ordering power must remain constant in order to prescribe both sequence and limit; the closing ruler image preserves the contrast between what orders and what moves.

VI.13.9 - variant
G1559 and P1641 regularize M1482's licet caro labat to licet caro labatur. The base's vivid finite verb labat is retained.

VI.13.9 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Obiciet forte; this source paragraph continues to the sign before Non enim dicendum.

VI.13.9 - note
The distinction between numerical sameness and a newly fashioned likeness remains explicit, as do the inward craftsman's enduring patterns and seeds.

VI.13.10 - note
This disclosed editorial division begins with Ficino's river image and draws its consequence for a supposedly flowing soul.

VI.13.10 - note
The same face and ever-new waves remain distinct; similes is repeated as ‘similar’ because the objection concerns reproduced likeness, not strict identity.

VI.13.11 - variant
M1482 reads imaginem aliam suae similem; G1559 and P1641 read imaginem aliam sive similem. The base's precise relational phrase governs.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VI.13.11 - variant
M1482's authorial correction list, Car. lxxxv, f.ii, corrects equidem to quidem after Figurare. The corrected Figurare quidem is adopted. G1559 and P1641 instead read Figurare enim.

VI.13.11 - note
A painted M1482 paragraph sign precedes Non enim dicendum; the paragraph ends with Book VI, immediately before the Book VII rubric on the same G1559 page.

VI.13.11 - note
The three excluded transmissions remain distinct: an image cannot migrate with a quality to a new subject; a failing former soul cannot fashion the new one; and an imperfect new soul cannot form itself at its birth.

VII.1.1 - note
The chapter opens at the large decorated M1482 initial. This complete source paragraph fits one locked synchronized page and is therefore left undivided.

VII.1.1 - note
The wax analogy and its application to Socrates' bodily image preserve every stated limit: receiver, eye, brain, whole body, and the confused images of Plato, Xenophon, Alcibiades, and Phaedrus.

VII.1.2 - variant
M1482 reads cepit; G1559 and P1641 read ceperit. The base perfect is retained; the conditional sense remains ‘if it has received others one after another.’

VII.1.2 - variant
M1482 reads Ubi pro speculorum ipsorum magnitudine; G1559 and P1641 read Nam pro speculorum ipsorum magnitudine. The base local connective is retained as ‘There’; the later witnesses make the relation explicitly causal.

VII.1.2 - variant
M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxvi, f.ii, directs animali specuo to animali speculo. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VII.1.2 - variant
M1482 reads tum quoad illa ... tum quoad propriam spectat; G1559 and P1641 regularize both constructions to tum quod ad. The base wording is retained.

VII.1.2 - note
A separate painted M1482 paraph precedes Anima. The whole source paragraph fits one synchronized page.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.1.2 - note
Solid and fluid body are the two alternatives; the mirror argument then moves from optical scale to the soul's unlimited conception of magnitude without omitting the living-mirror image.

VII.1.3 - note
A separate painted M1482 paraph precedes Non tamen. The formal closing division at Verum remains within the intact source paragraph because the full unit fits the page.

VII.1.3 - note
Visible splendor is distinguished from the invisible light of heavenly souls, meanings pass from soul to soul, and the final alternatives of surface image and penetrating quality retain their distinct consequences.

VII.2.1 - variant
M1482 and P1641 read aut aliud ... iudicet; G1559 reads ut aliud ... iudicet. The M1482 conjunction is retained and rendered as a reformulation, ‘or, put another way,’ rather than silently adopting G1559's result clause.

VII.2.1 - variant
M1482 reads Illa una; G1559 and P1641 insert vero. The base reading is retained; no adversative is supplied in English.

VII.2.1 - note
The chapter opens at the large decorated M1482 initial. Its one source paragraph exceeds a page and is divided once, at the geometrical question beginning the next unit.

VII.2.1 - note
Animus is ‘mind’ as the comparing faculty; the first dilemma shows that two inward powers are either redundant or unable to compare their separate objects.

VII.2.2 - variant
M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxvii, f.ii, directs the malformed substanite to substantiae. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 print the corrected genitive.

VII.2.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Utrum vis illa. Ficino begins the geometrical model of a point or line here; the split is the single division required to fit the source paragraph.

VII.2.2 - note
The endpoints a and b, both contact alternatives, the redundancy conclusion, and the final irony about a power nobler than its own substance are all retained.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.3.1 - note
The whole chapter is one M1482 source paragraph beginning at the decorated initial, and its synchronized Latin and English both fit the locked page without division.

VII.3.1 - note
Impartibile is kept as ‘impartible’; the ordered animal comparisons and the ascent from outward sight to common sense, soul, and reason are preserved without condensation.

VII.4.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial. Its one source paragraph exceeds the English page measure and is divided once at the mathematical infinite in the next unit.

VII.4.1 - note
The divided sensory image, the one comprehending power, and the mismatches between large, small, intermediate, and partitioned senses are preserved in their full sequence.

VII.4.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Sed more mathematicorum. The move to infinitely many parts is the chapter's one necessary internal division.

VII.4.2 - note
The triple innumerabiles, the two proposed escapes, the contrast between gradual aggregation and sudden sensation, and the conclusion to impartible sensation and soul are not compressed.

VII.5.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial. Its first source paragraph is too long for one spread and continues through the next two editorial units.

VII.5.1 - note
Tota is repeated throughout, preserving the claim that the same whole soul senses in every bodily part rather than communicating through non-sentient messengers or mere bodily propagation.

VII.5.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Formae autem. The contrast with dispersed whiteness and Augustine's confirmation is a genuine joint and begins the second of three required portions of the source paragraph.

VII.5.2 - note
Augustine's whole-soul account and the ensuing objection based on successive soul-parts reporting to the brain are translated in full.

VII.5.3 - variant
M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxix, f.i, directs ubique sit to sit. The corrected reading ut quicquid sit is adopted, removing the redundant ubique; G1559 and P1641 retain the uncorrected wording.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.5.3 - variant
M1482's abbreviated persensio is confirmed by G1559; P1641 reads perpensio. The base and principal-collation reading is retained and translated ‘awareness,’ not ‘weighing.’

VII.5.3 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Certe. The local-affection reductio begins here and forms the final portion required by the source paragraph's size.

VII.5.3 - note
Foot, lower leg, knee, and brain lead to countless gradual pains; Ficino then states the whole soul's immediate concord and distinguishes it from body, diffused form, and a point of such a form.

VII.5.4 - variant
M1482 reads quae ob hoc in singulis membris non vivunt. G1559 and P1641 omit non. The base reading is retained: the severed member lacks the varied instruments required by a more perfect soul.

VII.5.4 - note
A separate painted M1482 paraph precedes Neque nos turbent. The complete second source paragraph—including severed creatures, wood, mirror, and Lucifer—fits one synchronized page.

VII.5.4 - note
Each analogy distinguishes the disappearance of the original indivisible principle from the arising of new souls, endpoints, images, or meanings; the Latin wordplay luci/fer is explained without fabricating an English equivalent.

VII.6.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial. Its single source paragraph requires two editorial divisions, yielding three capacity-safe units.

VII.6.1 - note
Soul, bodily spirit, body, sensation, and imagination remain distinct; the surgical example preserves the four ordered levels of flesh, spirit, touch, and imagination.

VII.6.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Complectere paucis. Ficino explicitly gathers the example into the causal chain substance → power → operation; this is the first of the two necessary internal divisions.

VII.6.2 - note
The consequences for sensing and locating injury and the regress of passive judgments are retained as separate stages within the argument.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.6.3 - note

Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Quapropter veniendum. The regress terminates in an affect-free judge, then Ficino gives his positive active account of sensation; this is the second and final capacity division.

VII.6.3 - note

The three rejected bodily alternatives, the five sensory media, quiet health, stimulating otherness, and the final opposition of acting to being acted upon are all preserved.

VII.7.1 - note

The whole chapter is one M1482 source paragraph beginning at the decorated initial. The VII.8 heading on c.213 and G1559 p.295 was checked to secure its terminal boundary.

VII.7.1 - note

Qualitas, affectio, complexio, and forma astricta remain distinct. The elliptical anima plurima et contraria is rendered from the governing facit: the soul produces many and contrary effects.

VII.8.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and forms one continuous source paragraph; the many colored sentence initials are not paragraph signs.

VII.8.1 - note

Complexio is rendered consistently as ‘bodily constitution’; accidental and substantial form remain distinct, and the principal-craftsman image is retained.

VII.8.1 - note

The argument preserves the full sequence from heat's limited work, through determinate growth, to the three conclusions about what the soul is not.

VII.9.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial. Its single source paragraph requires one capacity division, placed after the negative demonstration and before the positive proof that the soul is substance.

VII.9.1 - note

The middle state of contrary qualities, dependence upon matter, exposure to an opposing excess, and admission of more and less are preserved as four distinct marks of a bodily constitution.

VII.9.1 - note

Substance and quality remain separate genera; the comparison between stones retains Ficino's test that substance does not become more or less what it is.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.9.2 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Quod autem. The sentence begins the chapter's positive proof that soul is substance, a genuine logical joint after VII.9.1 and the sole division required for capacity.

VII.9.2 - note
The proof preserves the species examples, the body's construction and repair, the rejection of separate nutritive and sensitive souls, and the effects of sorrow and joy upon nourishment.

VII.9.2 - note
Artifex and pedissequa retain Ficino's closing contrast: the soul is the body's ‘craftsman,’ not its ‘handmaid.’

VII.10.1 - variant
M1482 reads extiterit, agreeing with the singular animus; G1559 and P1641 read extiterint. The grammatical base reading is retained.

VII.10.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and is one continuous source paragraph.

VII.10.1 - note
The musical analogy preserves the direction of dependence: strings moved from elsewhere produce harmony, whereas harmony neither moves nor rules the strings.

VII.10.1 - note
The closing sequence retains bodily affection, self-reflection, separation from bodily things, union with incorporeal things, and acting through oneself.

VII.11.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and forms one uninterrupted source paragraph across the G1559 page turn.

VII.11.1 - note
Harmonia, consonantia, and concinnitas remain respectively ‘harmony,’ ‘concord,’ and ‘fitting arrangement,’ so the proposed definition and Ficino's reply do not collapse into one term.

VII.11.1 - note
The question about an external principle and the answer Immo vero remain explicit; the argument then moves to the superior power and life-giving spirit hidden within.

VII.12.1 - variant
M1482 reads quomodo vires singulae componant, ‘how the individual powers compose [the soul]’; G1559 and P1641 read componantur, ‘how the individual powers are composed.’ The active base reading governs and its understood object is made explicit in English.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.12.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and forms one continuous source paragraph; colored sentence initials within it are not paragraph signs. Exact production measurement confirms that no editorial subdivision is required.

VII.12.1 - note

The two proposed senses of consonantia remain in order: composition itself is rejected first, followed by a proportion within the composition.

VII.12.1 - note

M1482's active componant is retained and translated with the soul as its understood object; the later witnesses' passive componantur is disclosed in the variant record.

VII.12.1 - note

Coagulum and conglutinentur preserve Ficino's concrete image of the many being glued together by an inward glue; the final horum/illorum contrast distinguishes the activities Aristotle knows from the bodily proportions Hippocrates examines.

VII.13.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and is one continuous source paragraph across all three witness page turns.

VII.13.1 - note

The degrees of freedom from matter are preserved in order: effect, cause, nutritive power, sensory power, understanding, and finally the soul as the fountain of those powers.

VII.13.1 - note

The closing reductio retains the paired qualities of fire and earth and the consequence that earth, stone, and the rest would sense in the same manner as soul.

VII.14.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and forms one source paragraph.

VII.14.1 - note

The reductio's complete ascent—more concord, more harmony, more soul, and more life—is retained before Ficino tests its consequences in bodily and mental operations.

VII.14.1 - note

From Neque concoquet onward, the robber's soul remains the subject throughout the catalogue; sustinebit vibrabitque preserves both supporting the members and setting them in motion.

VII.15.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial, continues across the page turn, and ends immediately before the Book VIII rubric on all three witnesses.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VII.15.1 - note
Animus and anima are both rendered ‘soul’ here because Ficino alternates them for the same subject throughout the dissonance argument.

VII.15.1 - note
The objection and reply preserve three nested kinds of discord: affections and opinions, elements and humors, and the potentially dissonant parts of soul and body.

VIII.1.1 - variant
M1482’s correction list, Car. lxxxxiii, fa.ii, directs sapit qui quod to sapit quam quod. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.1.1 - variant
M1482’s correction list, Car. lxxxxiiii, fa.i, orders the word introspicit deleted after auguratur. The deletion is applied; G1559 and P1641 omit the word.

VIII.1.1 - note
The unit begins at the decorated chapter initial on M1482 c.218. The long opening source paragraph requires later editorial divisions; this first division occurs at the genuine adversative and faculty transition Verum nondum.

VIII.1.1 - note
Imaginatio is rendered ‘imagination’ and phantasia ‘phantasy’ because Ficino explicitly distinguishes the two faculties here. Intentiones is retained as the technical ‘intentions’; both qualifications in incorporales quodammodo ... intentiones are preserved rather than flattened into images.

VIII.1.2 - note
This editorial division lies inside the opening M1482 source paragraph at Verum nondum, where Ficino marks phantasy’s remaining dependence on singular material conditions before contrasting it with intellect.

VIII.1.2 - note
The ascent is preserved clause by clause: singular Plato, common humanity, universality across persons/place/time, then the self-subsisting Idea above bodies.

VIII.1.3 - note
This second editorial division inside the opening source paragraph begins at Siquidem natura illa, where Ficino turns from the existence of a common nature to the causal ascent from matter and persons to the divine Idea.

VIII.1.3 - note
The infinite-regress argument, the part–whole–above-whole ascent, and the distinction between movable nature and the immutable world-moving mind are preserved without compression.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.1.4 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph on c.221 begins Non tamen. The source paragraph requires one editorial division, made in the next unit at Meminisse vero oportet after the four-faculty ascent reaches intellect's common incorporeal principles.

VIII.1.4 - note

The four faculties remain distinct; statim, simul ac, subito, inquam retains its immediate rhythm and authorial aside rather than being compressed into a single adverb.

VIII.1.5 - note

Editorial division within the painted source paragraph beginning Non tamen. Meminisse vero oportet shifts from intellect's immediate grasp of universal nature to its reflexive knowledge of the particular and the final immortality inference.

VIII.1.5 - note

Immediate universal intellection and the intellect's secondary reflexive return to the particular image remain distinct; the paragraph's final comparison with nutrition and sensation is preserved in full.

VIII.2.1 - variant

M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxxv, fa.ii, directs contrario to contraria. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.2.1 - variant

M1482 heads the chapter Ratio secunda; G1559 and P1641 reverse the words to Secunda ratio. The base heading is reflected in structure.json.

VIII.2.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated M1482 initial on c.222. This first source paragraph runs through the reductio based on bodily nourishment.

VIII.2.1 - note

Corpusculum is rendered 'subtle little body' to preserve both the diminutive and Ficino's rejection of the popular supposition that such a body is the soul.

VIII.2.2 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quid ergo. Ficino's clipped questions and answers are preserved rather than absorbed into the preceding proof.

VIII.2.2 - note

The masculine aeternus follows animus understood from the preceding paragraph; the English makes that subject explicit through 'it' and preserves the future real condition erit ... indigebit.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.2.3 - variant

M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxxvi, fa.i, changes the first non tamen to non tam. The correction is applied in non tam carnis sequitur pondus; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.2.3 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Neque assentiendum. The art-and-instruments comparison answers the Epicurean inference from bodily growth to growth of soul.

VIII.2.3 - note

Spiritus is the subtle bodily mediator and is rendered 'vital spirit'; affectus in the triad ingenio, usu, affectu is rendered 'ardor' to denote the soul's engaged disposition, not a bodily affection.

VIII.2.4 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Corpus autem. The paragraph's contrast between temporal bodily increase and the soul's non-quantitative perfection is preserved through the line and lyre analogies.

VIII.2.4 - note

M1482's abbreviated quod in the line and lyre comparisons is expanded with the agreement of G1559 and P1641; verum and bonum are substantive principles and are rendered 'the true and the good.'

VIII.2.5 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Neque obiiciat. The objection, Ficino's reply, and the ascent from truth as food to likeness to God form one source paragraph.

VIII.2.5 - note

The ellipsis after neque laboribus supplies parcimus ('nor do we spare labor'); a semicolon then separates enervamus corpus. The wordplay enervamus corpus ... animus fit nervosior is preserved as 'the body loses its sinews [while] the soul becomes more sinewy.'

VIII.2.6 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quis igitur. The repeated eandem, the force of Odit, and the closing identification Hic cibus est veritas retain their rhetorical force.

VIII.2.6 - note

Mens is 'mind' throughout this paragraph; senses follow bodily mutability, while mind follows the stability of divine things.

VIII.2.7 - variant

M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxxvii, fa.i, changes fit veritas to sit veritas. The correction is applied in cum ergo alicubi sit veritas; G1559 and P1641 agree.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.2.7 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Veritas autem. Ficino moves from incorporeal bearers of truth through matter, form, and mathematical figures to a second proof from knowledge and immutable universal principles. The whole span fits one synchronized page and is therefore left undivided.

VIII.2.7 - note

Veritas remains metaphysical truth. Ratio is ‘principle’ for universal intelligible content and ‘reason’ for the judging faculty; spiritibus here denotes incorporeal spirits, not the subtle bodily spiritus of VIII.2.3.

VIII.2.8 - note

This is the sole editorial division within the source paragraph beginning Veritas autem. Quo fit ut turns from incorporeal knowledge to truth as immortal nourishment; Hanc vero argumentationem then introduces Olympiodorus’s confirmation from natural desire. Both movements fit one synchronized page, so no further division is retained.

VIII.2.8 - note

The conditional Sane si ... ut certe est, the repeated naturaliter, the food and conversion images, the separative language, the possible/useful and impotence/power oppositions, and the climactic vere beneque are preserved without compression.

VIII.3.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated M1482 initial on c.227. The opening source paragraph gives the point-or-divisible-part dilemma, identifies virtue as a quality, distinguishes contemplative and moral virtues, and denies bodily magnitude to either.

VIII.3.1 - note

Virtus is ‘virtue’ throughout the ethical argument; individuus and indivisibilis are both rendered ‘indivisible’ because Ficino uses them interchangeably here of the same quality.

VIII.3.2 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Summatim vero. The gradual hunt and sudden sighting of the hare preserve Ficino’s distinction between preparation over time and indivisible intellection.

VIII.3.2 - note

Fervor stabilis appetitus is rendered ‘the steady ardor of appetite,’ retaining both stability and heat before the next paragraph’s fire imagery.

VIII.3.3 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Subito veritatis lumen. The stone and spark, repeated breath and flame, mirror and sun, and wool and fire remain distinct stages in the analogy.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.3.3 - note

Discussio carries the double resonance of inquiry and striking apart; donec ... deficit is kept as an interval of lack rather than strengthened into an unstated final increment.

VIII.3.4 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Resume iterum. Ficino's reductio is preserved as a compact sequence: partial possession, simultaneous knowledge and ignorance, then the drunken dream.

VIII.3.4 - note

Constetur is read conditionally as 'were constituted by degrees,' not merely as becoming known gradually; G1559 and P1641 confirm the expanded form.

VIII.3.5 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quapropter speculativa. The parallel reductio for moral virtue retains the repeated part-in/part-absent and will/not-will structure.

VIII.3.5 - note

E vestigio is rendered 'immediately,' while tota simul preserves 'all at once.'

VIII.3.6 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quoniam igitur. Origin and end establish indivisibility; the paragraph then turns to many mutually distinct sciences and virtues coexisting within one soul.

VIII.3.6 - note

Scientiae are rendered 'branches of knowledge' where plurality requires distinct bodies of knowledge; intelligentiae are 'acts of intelligence,' not a plurality of intellects.

VIII.3.7 - variant

M1482 reads quod docet; G1559 and P1641 read quod docetur. The base active is retained and translated 'what he teaches.'

VIII.3.7 - note

Editorial division within the source paragraph beginning Quoniam igitur: Quinetiam cum marks the shift from coexistence without confusion to the stronger claim that each act of understanding and each virtue contains the others.

VIII.3.7 - note

The causal images shining in effects, the five rhetorical questions, and the conclusion from mutual containment to indivisibility are preserved in full.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.3.8 - variant
M1482's correction list, Car. lxxxxix, fa.ii, directs enim to be inserted after solum. The insertion is applied in Non solum enim; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.3.8 - note
A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quamobrem. The opening of VIII.4 on c.230 and G1559 p.315 was checked to secure the chapter's terminal boundary.

VIII.3.8 - note
Ficino's contrast is exact: contemplative virtue flees mortal things, moral virtue drives them away; the concluding distinction between the soul as subject and as principle is preserved.

VIII.4.1 - note
The chapter begins at the decorated initial Id on M1482 c.230. This unit states the point-or-extension dilemma and carries the first point argument through the conclusion that reception in a point would make the species divisible.

VIII.4.1 - note
Species remains "species" where Ficino names the technical intelligible form; scientia is "knowledge" here because the sentence defines the mind's settled account of what a thing is.

VIII.4.2 - variant
M1482 originally reads alioquin nos disiungeret invicem. Its authorial correction list, Car. c, fa. i, replaces nos with non; the correction is applied. G1559 and P1641 agree with non.

VIII.4.2 - note
Editorial division within the M1482 paragraph beginning Id sentiunt, at Praeterea si dicatur. The complete source paragraph exceeds one synchronized spread; this second unit tests an independently actual point and carries the three-point demonstration through the impossibility of infinitely many simultaneous acts of understanding.

VIII.4.2 - note
Proprie existit actu and proprio existet actu retain the act-language on which the proposed point's independence depends; intelligentiae at the close denotes plural acts of understanding, not a plurality of intellectual substances.

VIII.4.3 - variant
M1482 originally reads lata fit et dividua. Its authorial correction list, Car. c, fa. ii, directs lata fit to fit; the corrected reading fit et dividua is applied. G1559 and P1641 retain the uncorrected lata fit et dividua.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.4.3 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Per haec on c.232. The complete source paragraph turns from a point to bodily extension, tests like parts, and concludes that the resulting form would belong to imagination and phantasy rather than mind.

VIII.4.3 - note

Ratio integra is the complete intelligible account preserved in each drop; imaginatio and phantasia remain “imagination” and “phantasy,” preserving Ficino’s faculty distinction.

VIII.4.4 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Ex his on c.233. The complete paragraph tests unlike parts as genus and difference, then drives their supposed bodily extension into infinite regress and an actually innumerable multitude.

VIII.4.4 - note

The imperatives Sint hae duae and Sint extensae deliberately grant the opponent’s hypothesis; certa discurrendi potentia remains “a certain power of discursive reasoning,” the ultimate difference paired with substance as supreme genus.

VIII.4.4 - note

The punctuation after sunt follows the logical syntax confirmed by G1559 and P1641: infinita modifies talia (“infinitely many such constituents”), not genus et differentia.

VIII.4.5 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Rursus percontamur on c.234. This unit forces the Epicureans from a bodily right-and-left placement of genus and difference to their union, then asks whether chance or mind produces it.

VIII.4.5 - note

Ne ex partibus amentibus fiat mens remains Ficino’s prohibition against making mind from mindless parts. Habitus is the incorporeal condition into which received forms are brought, while figmentum is opposed to scientia as invention to knowledge.

VIII.4.6 - note

Editorial division within the M1482 paragraph beginning Rursus percontamur, at Si enim figmento mentis. The complete paragraph exceeds one synchronized spread; this final unit tests fiction and bodily position and ends with the mind’s contrivance.

VIII.4.6 - note

Communia is rendered “universals” in this technical context; the opposed images dilaniatio and resolutio remain “mangling” and “analysis.”

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.4.7 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Forsitan Epicurei on c.235. This complete source paragraph tests unspecified parts after genus and difference have failed.

VIII.4.7 - note

The two comparisons are kept distinct: genus or difference as constituents of a species, and one species as contrasted with another species such as figure and color.

VIII.4.8 - variant

M1482 originally reads situm where the object of knowledge is named and siti for the whole thing known. Its authorial correction list, Car. cii, fa. ii, changes both to scitum and sciti. Both corrections are applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.4.8 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Forsitan ut speciem on c.236. The source paragraph is complete and uses number as a final model for supposed parts of knowledge.

VIII.4.8 - note

Scientia shifts between knowledge as a whole and its alleged component sciences; ‘body of knowledge’ and ‘branches of knowledge’ make the levels readable without erasing Ficino’s repeated term.

VIII.4.9 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Verum sic iterum procedamus on c.236. This unit distinguishes intelligible essences from intellectual forms, then tests all three possible ways in which the parts of such a form might regard its essence.

VIII.4.9 - note

Ficino’s terminology remains exact: essences are intelligible, while the forms possessed by the mind are more properly intellectual. The alternatives of no regard, partial regard, and universal regard are preserved through the final same-regard/different-regard dilemma.

VIII.4.10 - variant

M1482 originally reads non dispartit in the sentence about the species communicating itself wholly. Its authorial correction list, Car. ciii, fa. i, changes this to non dispertit. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.4.10 - note

Editorial division within the M1482 paragraph beginning Verum sic iterum procedamus, at Opinamur autem. The human-being and number examples together explain why knowledge of composites does not make the species known composite.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.4.10 - note

The compressed wording Talis autem forma simplex esse simplicis fundamentum species est is retained conservatively in the Latin; the English makes its apposition explicit without adding a new claim.

VIII.4.11 - note

Editorial division within the M1482 paragraph beginning Verum sic iterum procedamus, at Differunt autem. The complete source paragraph requires three synchronized spreads; this final unit completes the argument from the fixed species to the simplicity of knowledge.

VIII.4.11 - note

The closing crescendo is preserved: simple touch of a simple form, indivisible beholding of indivisible truth, sudden light of intelligence.

VIII.4.12 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Sed ex hoc on c.238. The paragraph is complete and its descending chain of analysis is preserved through the point at which resolution and division cease.

VIII.4.13 - note

A genuine painted M1482 paraph begins Quamobrem concludendum est on c.239. This is the final paragraph of VIII.4; the heading of VIII.5 was checked immediately after it on the same canvas.

VIII.4.13 - note

The final order is preserved exactly: intelligence follows life; the highest simplicity precedes indissoluble nature; life therefore secures the indissoluble degree that follows simplicity.

VIII.5.1 - variant

M1482 originally reads forma diffusa corporis magnitudinem and ad cognoscendum indiget actu. Its authorial correction list, Car. ciiii, fa. i, directs per corporis and tactu; both corrections are applied. G1559 and P1641 agree with the corrected readings.

VIII.5.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Si on M1482 c. 239. Direct full-resolution inspection found two genuine source paragraphs in VIII.5; this unit is the first and ends immediately before the painted paraph Sed hanc argumentationem on c. 240.

VIII.5.1 - note

The deliberately accumulating language of infinity and innumerability is retained rather than compressed. This complete first source paragraph fits one synchronized spread without editorial division.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.5.2 - note

A genuine painted paraph before Sed hanc argumentationem on M1482 c. 240 begins the second of VIII.5's two source paragraphs; this is a source boundary, not an editorial intervention.

VIII.5.2 - note

Resolutionem is rendered 'analysis' in its technical sense of resolving a composite into simple constituents. The closing opposition infectis/infectionem is preserved through 'tainted/taint.' The complete second source paragraph fits without editorial division.

VIII.6.1 - variant

M1482 originally reads Intellectus in hoc pacto res ipsas capit. Its authorial correction list, Car. cv, fa. i, replaces in with non; the corrected reading Intellectus non hoc pacto is applied. G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.6.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Nullum on M1482 c.241. Direct inspection found one painted source paragraph, and the complete chapter fits one synchronized spread without editorial division.

VIII.6.1 - note

Adaequari/adaequatur is consistently rendered by 'matched' or 'commensurate'; Ficino's ascent from measured bodies to equality itself remains explicit.

VIII.7.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Solent on M1482 c.242. Direct inspection found one painted source paragraph, and the complete chapter fits one synchronized spread without editorial division.

VIII.7.1 - note

The repeated clothing verbs induet/exuerit are preserved as 'put on/put off'; composition and resolution remain paired technical movements, and the all-in-each formulation is not reduced to a summary.

VIII.8.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Corpus on M1482 c. 242. Direct full-resolution inspection found two genuine source paragraphs in VIII.8; this unit is the first and ends immediately before the painted paraph Si mens etiam on c. 243.

VIII.8.1 - note

Angustius/amplius retains the spatial metaphor 'narrower/more ample'; saltem is retained explicitly as 'at least.' This complete source paragraph fits without editorial division.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.8.2 - note

A genuine painted paraph before Si mens etiam on M1482 c. 243 begins the second of VIII.8's two source paragraphs; this is a source boundary, not an editorial intervention.

VIII.8.2 - note

Quotidie keeps its temporal force ('day after day'), and materiae insidiis retains the closing image of matter's snares. The complete source paragraph fits without editorial division.

VIII.9.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Duo on M1482 c.243 and is one genuine painted source paragraph; it fits a single synchronized spread and is not divided editorially.

VIII.9.1 - note

Capere, complecti, amplexus, and claudi sustain a single containing-and-embracing image. Actus reflexus (cognition) and actus rectus (life) remain explicitly distinct.

VIII.10.1 - variant

M1482's authorial correction list, Car. cvi, fa. ii, replaces the corrupt effici gerere in sed alia infinite plura et varia prout libet effici gerere with effingere. The corrected reading prout libet effingere is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.10.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated initial Quoniam on M1482 c.243. Direct inspection found one painted source paragraph in VIII.10; one editorial division is the minimum required because the complete paragraph exceeds the 496.08 pt synchronized-page capacity.

VIII.10.1 - note

The sole division falls after the warning not to make an operation more sublime than its substance and before the counterfactual application Esset autem mentis operatio sublimior quam substantia.

VIII.10.1 - note

Genus and species remain distinct as 'kind' and 'species'; accipere, concipere, and parturire retain the sequence of receiving, conceiving, and bringing forth.

VIII.10.1 - note

In aut quodlibet corpus aut incorporalia, the second horn is climactic in light of multo minus supra naturam; the English therefore reads 'every kind of body, still less anything incorporeal,' preserving the scope without the misleading literalism 'either any body whatever.'

VIII.10.2 - note

Editorial division within the source paragraph beginning Quoniam forma operandi principium est, at Esset autem mentis operatio sublimior quam substantia, where Ficino applies the substance-operation hierarchy and then excludes both body and a form mixed with body.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.10.2 - note
G1559 PDF scans 331–332 duplicate scans 329–330 and are excluded from the sequential locator; the text continues on scan 333.

VIII.10.2 - note
The mixed/pure distinction, abstraction and reflexive return, Epicurean objection, extended hand and childbirth metaphors, and the five exclusions of length, breadth, depth, quality, and figure are all preserved.

VIII.10.2 - note
In et capit sola summa cum voluptate, sola modifies the mind as subject: ‘the mind ... alone grasps them with supreme delight.’ Taking it with the incorporeal objects would wrongly imply that mind grasps only incorporeals, contrary to the chapter’s argument.

VIII.11.1 - variant
M1482 and G1559 print the erroneous chapter label Cap. x/Cap. 10 while the rubric itself says Undecima ratio and the item stands between VIII.10 and VIII.12. The production metadata silently indexes it as VIII.11.

VIII.11.1 - note
The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial near the foot of c.245 and continues onto c.246. No separate painted paraph occurs within it; the complete source paragraph fits one synchronized spread.

VIII.11.1 - note
Status and motus are kept as repose or stillness and motion so that Ficino’s contrast between the mind’s contemplative stability and the body’s development through change remains audible.

VIII.12.1 - note
The chapter begins with the decorated M1482 initial on c.246. No separate painted paraph appears before VIII.13, so its single source paragraph is preserved as one capacity-safe unit.

VIII.12.1 - note
The paired contraries and both proposed modes of corruption—destruction by a contrary and separation from preservative causes—are retained in full.

VIII.13.1 - variant
M1482 c.24 directs that the printed attribuitur be corrected to tribuitur; G1559 and P1641 agree. The corrected reading is adopted.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.13.1 - variant

M1482, G1559, and P1641 all print invisibilis after effusa longius. The reading would make the light remain invisible while the next clause says that the soul becomes conspicuous in it and the following sentence defines light as visible soul. The reading text therefore makes the minimal contextual emendation visibilis and records the unanimous witness error here.

VIII.13.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated initial on M1482 c.246. Its one long source paragraph requires one disclosed editorial division; this first unit carries the optical argument through the mind's true reception of bodily forms and ends with the contrast between form in mind and form in matter.

VIII.13.1 - note

Spiritalis is rendered 'spiritual' throughout this optical analogy, preserving Ficino's contrast between the corporeal object and the incorporeal image borne in light.

VIII.13.1 - note

Reviviscunt is rendered directly as 'revive'; Ficino then completes the reciprocal image by naming the soul invisible light.

VIII.13.2 - note

Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Igitur, si ipsa. The final movement tests the bodily hypothesis, then infers incorporeality and immortality from the mind's undiminished reception even of privations, defects, and evils.

VIII.13.2 - note

The sequence receive, judge, advance, and transform evil into intellectual good is kept clause by clause; the translation does not turn Ficino's account into a merely psychological claim.

VIII.14.1 - note

The chapter begins at the decorated M1482 initial and contains no separate painted paraph before VIII.15. The full source paragraph remains within the synchronized-page limit.

VIII.14.1 - note

Every member of Ficino's ascent from composite operation to the mind's simplifying gaze is preserved: matter and form, purity, unity, stability, temporal and spatial union, life, perpetuity, and the concluding exclusions.

VIII.15.1 - variant

M1482 originally prints vel eandem in se replicatur. Its correction list, Car. cviiii, fa. i, directs vel eandem to eadem; the correction is applied, and G1559 and P1641 agree.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.15.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial. Its single source paragraph requires two disclosed editorial divisions; this opening movement contrasts bodily outward action, sensation, and the mind's limitless reflexion.

VIII.15.1 - note

Essentia–vita–mens and status–motus–reflexio remain a threefold sequence. The recursive acts of understanding and willing are not compressed into a general claim about self-consciousness.

VIII.15.2 - variant

M1482's correction list, Car. cviiii, fa. i, directs proficit to perficit in se format semper et perficit. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.15.2 - note

Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Hinc patet. The unit carries the first immortality inference from self-perfecting intellectual generation, the argument from well-being to being and its qualified appeal to Proclus, and the next self-operation proof through its culminating rhetorical question.

VIII.15.2 - note

Rationes is rendered 'principles' here because Ficino means the intelligible accounts the mind conceives of itself and of other things, not merely verbal explanations.

VIII.15.2 - note

Sed hoc ipse viderit preserves Ficino's reservation about the Proclean claim as "But let him see to that himself"; the translation neither endorses the claim nor adds a demand that Proclus answer for it.

VIII.15.2 - note

The repeated ex se, in se, and per se is preserved as 'from itself,' 'upon itself,' and 'through itself' because the three relations carry the proof.

VIII.15.3 - note

Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Sed hoc ita planius explicabitur. The explicit transition completes the argument from mind as the principle and end of its own operation, then proceeds from inward operation to self-sustaining life and the complete-motion argument.

VIII.15.3 - note

The four failures of outwardly effluent life remain separately numbered, and Ficino's opposed water imagery—flowing out, ebbing away, flowing back, and overflowing—is deliberately retained.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.15.3 - note

The threefold implet, implet, and implere is preserved through the repeated phrase “brings to fullness,” maintaining the link between fuller motion and fuller life rather than reducing the claim to static containment.

VIII.16.1 - variant

M1482’s correction list, Car. cx, fa. i, orders praesertim elementalem inserted after formam corporalem esse; the insertion is applied, and G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.16.1 - variant

The same direction corrects in eadem to in eandem in intellectio eius … in eandem revolvitur. The correction is applied; G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.16.1 - variant

M1482 originally prints non solis odoribus ut visus. Its correction list, Car. cx, fa. ii, directs odoribus to coloribus; the correction is applied, and G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.16.1 - note

The chapter opens at the decorated M1482 initial and contains one long source paragraph. Three disclosed editorial divisions are required; this first unit joins the endless inward revolution of understanding and willing to the first outward catalogue of the mind’s unbounded range.

VIII.16.1 - note

The higher-order sequence—understanding, understanding that one understands, noticing that one notices, willing, and willing that one wills—is preserved rather than summarized.

VIII.16.1 - note

The outward catalogue remains complete: division, number, figure, line, time, place, quality, every sensory class, actuality, possibility, and impossibility.

VIII.16.1 - note

The repeated per omnia is retained as Ficino’s emphatic hinge from sensory limitation to the reach of mind.

VIII.16.2 - variant

M1482 originally prints Sub qualibet autem universali. Its correction list, Car. cx, fa. ii, directs qualibet to quolibet; the correction is applied, and G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.16.2 - note

Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Quamquam. The unit moves from things fashioned inwardly through the ascent across celestial spheres and finite angels to the infinite spirit, then continues through infinite act and potency and the return from divine unity to infinite multitude.

Substantive variants and editorial notes, continued

VIII.16.2 - note
Ficino's three closing questions remain separate so that the rhetorical pressure of the ascent is preserved.

VIII.16.2 - note
Actus and potentia remain 'act' and 'potency' because the Aristotelian contrast is doing essential work in Ficino's Platonic argument.

VIII.16.3 - variant
M1482 originally prints currit per immensum at the close of this movement. Its correction list, Car. cxi, fa. i, directs percurrit immensum; the correction is applied, and G1559 and P1641 agree.

VIII.16.3 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Huic formae. The unit joins the mind's unrestricted rank, place, and power to the proportional knowledge of infinity, the passage between nonbeing and being, and the mind's unsatisfied desire for human and divine things.

VIII.16.3 - note
Aequatio and aequatur are kept as 'equality' and 'made equal' so that Ficino's inference to a proportionate knower remains explicit.

VIII.16.3 - note
The paired examples—creation and destruction, then human ambition and divine knowledge—remain in their original order and culminate in the infinite God as the only adequate object.

VIII.16.4 - note
Editorial subdivision: M1482 has no paraph before Quae si finita esset. The unit preserves the acceleration images of fire and stone, locates the mind's qualified infinity in the absolute infinity of God, and completes Book VIII by deriving unbounded duration from communicated infinity and from the priority of life to intelligence.

VIII.16.4 - note
Capiendi is rendered 'receiving' to echo the chapter's earlier account of the mind taking in forms; ambiendi and percurrendique retain the spatial force of encompassing and traversing.

VIII.16.4 - note
Talem quandam alicubi aut talem infinitatem is awkward in all three witnesses. The English preserves its distributive force as 'some infinity of one kind or another' without silently inventing a more specific class of infinity.

Comparison unit locator register

V.1.1
M1482 c.136, fol. 52v–c.137, fol. 53r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liii, f.i) | G1559 PDF pp.207–208, fols. 58v–59r | P1641 PDF p.137, printed p.132 | source division

V.1.2
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r | G1559 PDF p.208, fol. 59r | P1641 PDF p.137, printed p.132 | source division

V.1.3
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r | G1559 PDF p.208, fol. 59r | P1641 PDF p.137, printed p.132 | source division

V.1.4
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r | G1559 PDF p.208, fol. 59r | P1641 PDF p.137, printed p.132 | source division

V.1.5
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liii, f.i) | G1559 PDF p.208, fol. 59r | P1641 PDF p.137, printed p.132 | source division

V.2.1
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r | G1559 PDF p.209, fol. 59v (heading on p.208, fol. 59r) | P1641 PDF p.138, printed p.133 | source division

V.3.1
M1482 c.137, fol. 53r–c.138, fol. 53v | G1559 PDF p.209, fol. 59v | P1641 PDF p.138, printed p.133 | source division

V.4.1
M1482 c.138, fol. 53v–c.139, fol. 54r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liii, f.ii) | G1559 PDF pp.209–210, fols. 59v–60r | P1641 PDF p.138, printed p.133 | source division

V.4.2
M1482 c.139, fol. 54r | G1559 PDF pp.210–211, fols. 60r–60v | P1641 PDF pp.138–139, printed pp.133–134 | source division

V.4.3
M1482 c.139, fol. 54r | G1559 PDF p.211, fol. 60v | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | source division

V.4.4
M1482 c.139, fol. 54r | G1559 PDF p.211, fol. 60v | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | source division

V.4.5
M1482 c.139, fol. 54r–c.140, fol. 54v | G1559 PDF p.211, fol. 60v | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | source division

V.4.6
M1482 c.140, fol. 54v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liiii, f.ii) | G1559 PDF pp.211–212, fols. 60v–61r | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | source division

V.4.7
M1482 c.140, fol. 54v | G1559 PDF p.212, fol. 61r | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | source division

V.4.8
M1482 c.140, fol. 54v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liiii, f.ii) | G1559 PDF p.212, fol. 61r | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | editorial division

V.4.9
M1482 c.140, fol. 54v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. liiii, f.ii) | G1559 PDF pp.212–213, fols. 61r–61v | P1641 PDF p.139, printed p.134 | editorial division

V.4.10
M1482 c.140, fol. 54v–c.141, fol. 55r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lv, f.i) | G1559 PDF p.213, fol. 61v | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | editorial division

V.5.1
M1482 c.141, fol. 55r | G1559 PDF p.213, fol. 61v | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.2
M1482 c.141, fol. 55r | G1559 PDF pp.213–214, fols. 61v–62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.3
M1482 c.141, fol. 55r–c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.214, fol. 62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.4
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.214, fol. 62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.5
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.214, fol. 62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.6
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.214, fol. 62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.7
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.214, fol. 62r | P1641 PDF p.140, printed p.135 | source division

V.5.8
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v | G1559 PDF p.215, fol. 62v | P1641 PDF pp.140–141, printed pp.135–136 | source division

V.5.9
M1482 c.142, fol. 55v–c.143, fol. 56r | G1559 PDF p.215, fol. 62v | P1641 PDF p.141, printed p.136 | source division

V.6.1
M1482 c.143, fol. 56r–c.144, fol. 56v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lvi, f.i) | G1559 PDF pp.215–216, fols. 62v–63r | P1641 PDF p.141, printed p.136 | source division

V.7.1
M1482 c.144, fol. 56v | G1559 PDF p.217, fol. 63v | P1641 PDF pp.141–142, printed pp.136–137 | source division

V.7.2
M1482 c.144, fol. 56v–c.145, fol. 57r | G1559 PDF pp.217–218, fols. 63v–64r | P1641 PDF p.142, printed p.137 | editorial division

V.8.1
M1482 c.145, fol. 57r–c.146, fol. 57v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lvii, fa.i) | G1559 PDF pp.218–219, fols. 64r–64v | P1641 PDF pp.142–143, printed pp.137–138 | source division

V.8.2
M1482 c.146, fol. 57v | G1559 PDF pp.219–220, fols. 64v–65r | P1641 PDF p.143, printed p.138 | editorial division

Comparison unit locator register continued

V.8.3
M1482 c.146, fol. 57v–c.147, fol. 58r | G1559 PDF pp.220–221, fols. 65r–65v | P1641 PDF pp.143–144, printed pp.138–139 | editorial division

V.8.4
M1482 c.147, fol. 58r | G1559 PDF p.221, fol. 65v | P1641 PDF p.144, printed p.139 | editorial division

V.9.1
M1482 c.148, fol. 58v | G1559 PDF pp.221–222, fols. 65v–66r | P1641 PDF p.144, printed p.139 | source division

V.9.2
M1482 c.148, fol. 58v–c.149, fol. 59r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lviiii, f.i) | G1559 PDF pp.222–223, fols. 66r–66v | P1641 PDF pp.144–145, printed pp.139–140 | editorial division

V.9.3
M1482 c.149, fol. 59r–c.150, fol. 59v | G1559 PDF pp.223–224, fols. 66v–67r | P1641 PDF p.145, printed p.140 | editorial division

V.9.4
M1482 c.150, fol. 59v; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lviiii, fa.ii) | G1559 PDF p.224, fol. 67r | P1641 PDF p.145, printed p.140 | editorial division

V.10.1
M1482 c.150, fol. 59v–c.151, fol. 60r | G1559 PDF pp.224–225, fols. 67r–67v | P1641 PDF pp.145–146, printed pp.140–141 | source division

V.10.2
M1482 c.151, fol. 60r; authorial correction list c.23 (Car. lx, fa.i) | G1559 PDF pp.225–226, fols. 67v–68r | P1641 PDF p.146, printed p.141 | editorial division

V.10.3
M1482 c.151, fol. 60r–c.152, fol. 60v | G1559 PDF p.226, fol. 68r | P1641 PDF p.146, printed p.141 | editorial division

V.11.1
M1482 c.152, fol. 60v | G1559 PDF p.226, fol. 68r | source division

V.11.2
M1482 c.152, fol. 60v | G1559 PDF pp.226–227, fols. 68r–68v | source division

V.11.3
M1482 c.152, fol. 60v | G1559 PDF p.227, fol. 68v | source division

V.11.4
M1482 c.152, fol. 60v–c.153, fol. 61r | G1559 PDF p.227, fol. 68v | source division

V.11.5
M1482 c.153, fol. 61r | G1559 PDF p.227, fol. 68v | source division

V.11.6
M1482 c.153, fol. 61r | G1559 PDF pp.227–228, fols. 68v–69r | source division

V.11.7
M1482 c.153, fol. 61r | G1559 PDF p.228, fol. 69r | source division

V.11.8
M1482 c.153, fol. 61r–c.154, fol. 61v | G1559 PDF p.228, fol. 69r | source division

V.12.1
M1482 c.154, fol. 61v | G1559 PDF p.228, fol. 69r | source division

V.12.2
M1482 c.154, fol. 61v | G1559 PDF pp.228–229 | source division

V.12.3
M1482 c.154, fol. 61v | G1559 PDF p.229 | source division

V.12.4
M1482 c.154, fol. 61v–c.155, fol. 62r | G1559 PDF p.229 | source division

V.12.5
M1482 c.155, fol. 62r | G1559 PDF pp.229–230 | source division

V.12.6
M1482 c.155, fol. 62r | G1559 PDF p.230 | source division

V.12.7
M1482 c.155, fol. 62r | G1559 PDF p.230 | source division

V.12.8
M1482 c.155, fol. 62r–c.156, fol. 62v | G1559 PDF p.230 | source division

V.12.9
M1482 c.156, fol. 62v | G1559 PDF p.230 | source division

V.12.10
M1482 c.156, fol. 62v | G1559 PDF pp.230–231 | source division

V.12.11
M1482 c.156, fol. 62v | G1559 PDF p.231 | source division

V.12.12
M1482 c.156, fol. 62v | G1559 PDF p.231 | source division

V.12.13
M1482 c.156, fol. 62v–c.157, fol. 63r | G1559 PDF pp.231–232 | source division

V.12.14
M1482 c.157, fol. 63r | G1559 PDF p.232 | source division

V.12.15
M1482 c.157, fol. 63r | G1559 PDF p.232 | source division

V.13.1
M1482 c.157, fol. 63r–c.158, fol. 63v | G1559 PDF pp.232–233 | source division

V.13.2
M1482 c.158, fol. 63v | G1559 PDF p.233 | source division

V.13.3
M1482 c.158, fol. 63v | G1559 PDF p.233 | source division

V.13.4
M1482 c.158, fol. 63v | G1559 PDF p.233 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

V.13.5
M1482 c.158, fol. 63v–c.159, fol. 64r | G1559 PDF pp.233–234 | source division

V.13.6
M1482 c.159, fol. 64r | G1559 PDF p.234 | source division

V.13.7
M1482 c.159, fol. 64r | G1559 PDF p.234 | source division

V.13.8
M1482 c.159, fol. 64r | G1559 PDF p.234 | source division

V.13.9
M1482 c.159, fol. 64r–c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF pp.234–235 | source division

V.13.10
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF p.235 | source division

V.13.11
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF p.235 | source division

V.13.12
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF p.235 | source division

V.13.13
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF p.235 | source division

V.13.14
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v | G1559 PDF pp.235–236 | source division

V.13.15
M1482 c.160, fol. 64v–c.161, fol. 65r | G1559 PDF p.236 | source division

V.13.16
M1482 c.161, fol. 65r | G1559 PDF p.236 | source division

V.13.17
M1482 c.161, fol. 65r | G1559 PDF p.236 | source division

V.13.18
M1482 c.161, fol. 65r–c.162, fol. 65v | G1559 PDF pp.236–237 | source division

V.14.1
M1482 c.162, fol. 65v | G1559 PDF pp.237–238 | source division

V.14.2
M1482 c.162, fol. 65v | G1559 PDF p.238 | source division

V.14.3
M1482 c.162, fol. 65v–c.163, fol. 66r | G1559 PDF p.238 | source division

V.14.4
M1482 c.163, fol. 66r | G1559 PDF p.238 | source division

V.14.5
M1482 c.163, fol. 66r | G1559 PDF pp.238–239 | source division

V.14.6
M1482 c.163, fol. 66r | G1559 PDF p.239 | source division

V.14.7
M1482 c.163, fol. 66r–c.164, fol. 66v | G1559 PDF pp.239–240 | source division

V.14.8
M1482 c.164, fol. 66v–c.165, fol. 67r | G1559 PDF pp.240–241 | source division

V.14.9
M1482 c.165, fol. 67r | G1559 PDF p.241 | source division

V.15.1
M1482 c.165, fol. 67r | G1559 PDF p.241 | source division

V.15.2
M1482 c.165, fol. 67r | G1559 PDF p.241 | source division

V.15.3
M1482 c.165, fol. 67r–c.166, fol. 67v | G1559 PDF pp.241–242 | source division

V.15.4
M1482 c.166, fol. 67v | G1559 PDF p.242 | source division

V.15.5
M1482 c.166, fol. 67v | G1559 PDF p.242 | source division

V.15.6
M1482 c.166, fol. 67v–c.167, fol. 68r | G1559 PDF pp.242–243 | source division

V.15.7
M1482 c.167, fol. 68r | G1559 PDF p.243 | source division

V.15.8
M1482 c.167, fol. 68r | G1559 PDF p.243 | source division

V.15.9
M1482 c.167, fol. 68r–c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF pp.243–244 | source division

V.15.10
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF p.244 | source division

V.15.11
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF p.244 | source division

V.15.12
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF p.244 | source division

V.15.13
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF p.244 | source division

V.15.14
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v | G1559 PDF pp.244–245 | source division

V.15.15
M1482 c.168, fol. 68v–c.169, fol. 69r | G1559 PDF p.245 | source division

V.15.16
M1482 c.169, fol. 69r | G1559 PDF p.245 | source division

V.15.17
M1482 c.169, fol. 69r | G1559 PDF p.245 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

V.15.18
M1482 c.169, fol. 69r | G1559 PDF pp.245–246 | source division

V.15.19
M1482 c.169, fol. 69r–c.170, fol. 69v | G1559 PDF p.246 | source division

V.15.20
M1482 c.170, fol. 69v | G1559 PDF p.246 | source division

V.15.21
M1482 c.170, fol. 69v | G1559 PDF p.246 | source division

V.15.22
M1482 c.170, fol. 69v–c.171, fol. 70r | G1559 PDF pp.246–247 | source division

V.15.23
M1482 c.171, fol. 70r | G1559 PDF p.247 | source division

V.15.24
M1482 c.171, fol. 70r | G1559 PDF p.247 | source division

V.15.25
M1482 c.171, fol. 70r–c.172, fol. 70v | G1559 PDF pp.247–248 | source division

V.15.26
M1482 c.172, fol. 70v | G1559 PDF p.248 | editorial division

V.15.27
M1482 c.172, fol. 70v | G1559 PDF pp.248–249 | editorial division

VI.1.1
M1482 c.173, fol. 71r | G1559 PDF pp.249–250, fols. 79v–80r | P1641 PDF p.157, printed p.152 | source division

VI.1.2
M1482 c.173, fol. 71r | G1559 PDF p.250, fol. 80r | P1641 PDF p.157, printed p.152 | source division

VI.1.3
M1482 c.173, fol. 71r | G1559 PDF p.250, fol. 80r | P1641 PDF p.157, printed p.152 | source division

VI.1.4
M1482 c.173, fol. 71r | G1559 PDF p.250, fol. 80r | P1641 PDF p.158, printed p.153 | source division

VI.1.5
M1482 cc.173–174, fols. 71r–71v | G1559 PDF p.250, fol. 80r | P1641 PDF p.158, printed p.153 | source division

VI.1.6
M1482 c.174, fol. 71v | G1559 PDF pp.250–251, fols. 80r–80v | P1641 PDF p.158, printed p.153 | source division

VI.2.1
M1482 cc.174–175, fols. 71v–72r | G1559 PDF pp.251–252, fols. 80v–81r | P1641 PDF pp.158–159, printed pp.153–154 | source division

VI.2.2
M1482 cc.175–176, fols. 72r–72v | G1559 PDF pp.252–253, fols. 81r–81v | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.3
M1482 c.176, fol. 72v | G1559 PDF p.253, fol. 81v | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.4
M1482 c.176, fol. 72v | G1559 PDF p.253, fol. 81v | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.5
M1482 c.176, fol. 72v | G1559 PDF p.253, fol. 81v | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.6
M1482 cc.176–177, fols. 72v–73r | G1559 PDF pp.253–254, fols. 81v–82r | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.7
M1482 c.177, fol. 73r | G1559 PDF p.254, fol. 82r | P1641 PDF p.159, printed p.154 | source division

VI.2.8
M1482 c.177, fol. 73r | G1559 PDF p.254, fol. 82r | P1641 PDF pp.159–160, printed pp.154–155 | editorial division

VI.2.9
M1482 cc.177–178, fols. 73r–73v | G1559 PDF pp.254–255, fols. 82r–82v | P1641 PDF p.160, printed p.155 | editorial division

VI.2.10
M1482 cc.178–179, fols. 73v–74r | G1559 PDF pp.255–256, fols. 82v–83r | P1641 PDF p.160, printed p.155 | source division

VI.2.11
M1482 c.179, fol. 74r | G1559 PDF p.256, fol. 83r | P1641 PDF p.160, printed p.155 | source division

VI.2.12
M1482 c.179, fol. 74r | G1559 PDF p.256, fol. 83r | P1641 PDF pp.160–161, printed pp.155–156 | source division

VI.2.13
M1482 cc.179–180, fols. 74r–74v | G1559 PDF pp.256–257, fols. 83r–83v | P1641 PDF p.161, printed p.156 | editorial division

VI.2.14
M1482 cc.180–181, fols. 74v–75r | G1559 PDF pp.257–258, fols. 83v–84r | P1641 PDF p.161, printed p.156 | source division

VI.2.15
M1482 c.181, fol. 75r | G1559 PDF p.258, fol. 84r | P1641 PDF p.161, printed p.156 | source division

VI.2.16
M1482 cc.181–182, fols. 75r–75v | G1559 PDF p.258, fol. 84r | P1641 PDF pp.161–162, printed pp.156–157 | source division

VI.2.17
M1482 cc.181–182, fols. 75r–75v | G1559 PDF pp.258–259, fols. 84r–84v | P1641 PDF p.162, printed p.157 | source division

VI.2.18
M1482 c.182, fol. 75v | G1559 PDF p.259, fol. 84v | P1641 PDF p.162, printed p.157 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

VI.2.19
M1482 cc.182–183, fols. 75v–76r | G1559 PDF pp.259–260, fols. 84v–85r | P1641 PDF p.162, printed p.157 | source division

VI.2.20
M1482 c.183, fol. 76r | G1559 PDF p.260, fol. 85r | P1641 PDF p.162, printed p.157 | source division

VI.2.21
M1482 c.183, fol. 76r | G1559 PDF p.260, fol. 85r | P1641 PDF p.162, printed p.157 | editorial division

VI.2.22
M1482 cc.183–184, fols. 76r–76v | G1559 PDF pp.260–261, fols. 85r–85v | P1641 PDF pp.162–163, printed pp.157–158 | source division

VI.2.23
M1482 c.184, fol. 76v | G1559 PDF p.261, fol. 85v | P1641 PDF p.163, printed p.158 | editorial division

VI.2.24
M1482 c.184, fol. 76v | G1559 PDF p.261, fol. 85v | P1641 PDF p.163, printed p.158 | source division

VI.2.25
M1482 cc.184–185, fols. 76v–77r | G1559 PDF pp.261–262, fols. 85v–86r | P1641 PDF p.163, printed p.158 | source division

VI.2.26
M1482 cc.184–185, fols. 76v–77r | G1559 PDF p.262, fol. 86r | P1641 PDF p.163, printed p.158 | editorial division

VI.2.27
M1482 c.185, fol. 77r | G1559 PDF p.262, fol. 86r | P1641 PDF p.163, printed p.158 | source division

VI.3.1
M1482 c.185, fol. 77r | G1559 PDF pp.262–263, fols. 86r–86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.3.2
M1482 c.185, fol. 77r | G1559 PDF p.263, fol. 86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.1
M1482 c.185, fol. 77r | G1559 PDF p.263, fol. 86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.2
M1482 c.185, fol. 77r | G1559 PDF p.263, fol. 86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.3
M1482 cc.185–186, fols. 77r–77v | G1559 PDF p.263, fol. 86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.4
M1482 c.186, fol. 77v | G1559 PDF p.263, fol. 86v | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.5
M1482 c.186, fol. 77v | G1559 PDF pp.263–264, fols. 86v–87r | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.4.6
M1482 c.186, fol. 77v | G1559 PDF p.264, fol. 87r | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.5.1
M1482 c.186, fol. 77v | G1559 PDF p.264, fol. 87r | P1641 PDF p.164, printed p.159 | source division

VI.5.2
M1482 cc.186–187, fols. 77v–78r | G1559 PDF pp.264–265, fols. 87r–87v | P1641 PDF pp.164–165, printed pp.159–160 | source division

VI.5.3
M1482 c.187, fol. 78r | G1559 PDF p.265, fol. 87v | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.5.4
M1482 c.187, fol. 78r | G1559 PDF p.265, fol. 87v | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.5.5
M1482 c.187, fol. 78r | G1559 PDF p.265, fol. 87v | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.6.1
M1482 c.187, fol. 78r | G1559 PDF p.265, fol. 87v | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.6.2
M1482 c.187, fol. 78r | G1559 PDF p.265, fol. 87v | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.6.3
M1482 cc.187–188, fols. 78r–78v | G1559 PDF pp.265–266, fols. 87v–88r | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.6.4
M1482 c.188, fol. 78v | G1559 PDF p.266, fol. 88r | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.6.5
M1482 c.188, fol. 78v | G1559 PDF p.266, fol. 88r | P1641 PDF p.165, printed p.160 | source division

VI.7.1
M1482 cc.188–189, fols. 78v–79r | G1559 PDF p.267, fol. 88v | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.7.2
M1482 c.189, fol. 79r | G1559 PDF p.267, fol. 88v | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.7.3
M1482 c.189, fol. 79r | G1559 PDF pp.267–268, fols. 88v–89r | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.7.4
M1482 c.189, fol. 79r | G1559 PDF p.268, fol. 89r | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.8.1
M1482 cc.189–190, fols. 79r–79v | G1559 PDF p.268, fol. 89r | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

VI.8.2
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF p.268, fol. 89r | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.8.3
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF p.268, fol. 89r | P1641 PDF p.166, printed p.161 | source division

VI.8.4
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF pp.268–269, fols. 89r–89v | P1641 PDF pp.166–167, printed pp.161–162 | source division

VI.8.5
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF p.269, fol. 89v | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | source division

VI.8.6
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF p.269, fol. 89v | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | source division

VI.8.7
M1482 c.190, fol. 79v | G1559 PDF p.269, fol. 89v | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | source division

VI.9.1
M1482 c.191, fol. 80r | G1559 PDF pp.269–270, fols. 89v–90r | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | source division

VI.9.2
M1482 c.191, fol. 80r | G1559 PDF p.270, fol. 90r | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | editorial division

VI.9.3
M1482 c.191, fol. 80r | G1559 PDF p.270, fol. 90r | P1641 PDF p.167, printed p.162 | editorial division

VI.9.4
M1482 cc.191–192, fols. 80r–80v | G1559 PDF pp.270–271, fols. 90r–90v | P1641 PDF pp.167–168, printed pp.162–163 | editorial division

VI.10.1
M1482 c.192, fol. 80v | G1559 PDF p.271, fol. 90v | P1641 PDF p.168, printed p.163 | source division

VI.11.1
M1482 c.193, fol. 81r | G1559 PDF p.272, fol. 91r | P1641 PDF p.168, printed p.163 | source division

VI.11.2
M1482 cc.193–194, fols. 81r–81v | G1559 PDF pp.272–273, fols. 91r–91v | P1641 PDF pp.168–169, printed pp.163–164 | editorial division

VI.12.1
M1482 c.194, fol. 81v | G1559 PDF p.273, fol. 91v | P1641 PDF p.169, printed p.164 | source division

VI.12.2
M1482 cc.194–195, fols. 81v–82r | G1559 PDF pp.273–274, fols. 91v–92r | P1641 PDF p.169, printed p.164 | editorial division

VI.12.3
M1482 c.195, fol. 82r | G1559 PDF p.274, fol. 92r | P1641 PDF p.169, printed p.164 | editorial division

VI.12.4
M1482 c.195, fol. 82r | G1559 PDF pp.274–275, fols. 92r–92v | P1641 PDF p.169, printed p.164 | source division

VI.12.5
M1482 c.195, fol. 82r | G1559 PDF p.275, fol. 92v | P1641 PDF p.169, printed p.164 | editorial division

VI.12.6
M1482 cc.195–196, fols. 82r–82v | G1559 PDF p.275, fol. 92v | P1641 PDF pp.169–170, printed pp.164–165 | editorial division

VI.12.7
M1482 c.196, fol. 82v | G1559 PDF pp.275–276, fols. 92v–93r | P1641 PDF p.170, printed p.165 | editorial division

VI.12.8
M1482 c.196, fol. 82v | G1559 PDF p.276, fol. 93r | P1641 PDF p.170, printed p.165 | editorial division

VI.12.9
M1482 cc.196–197, fols. 82v–83r | G1559 PDF p.276, fol. 93r | P1641 PDF p.170, printed p.165 | source division

VI.12.10
M1482 c.197, fol. 83r | G1559 PDF pp.276–277, fols. 93r–93v | P1641 PDF p.170, printed p.165 | editorial division

VI.12.11
M1482 c.197, fol. 83r | G1559 PDF p.277, fol. 93v | P1641 PDF p.170, printed p.165 | editorial division

VI.12.12
M1482 cc.197–198, fols. 83r–83v | G1559 PDF p.277, fol. 93v | P1641 PDF pp.170–171, printed pp.165–166 | editorial division

VI.12.13
M1482 c.198, fol. 83v | G1559 PDF pp.277–278, fols. 93v–94r | P1641 PDF p.171, printed p.166 | source division

VI.12.14
M1482 cc.198–199, fols. 83v–84r | G1559 PDF p.278, fol. 94r | P1641 PDF p.171, printed p.166 | source division

VI.12.15
M1482 c.199, fol. 84r | G1559 PDF pp.278–279, fols. 94r–94v | P1641 PDF p.171, printed p.166 | editorial division

VI.12.16
M1482 c.199, fol. 84r | G1559 PDF p.279, fol. 94v | P1641 PDF p.171, printed p.166 | source division

VI.12.17
M1482 c.199, fol. 84r | G1559 PDF p.279, fol. 94v | P1641 PDF pp.171–172, printed pp.166–167 | source division

VI.12.18
M1482 cc.199–200, fols. 84r–84v | G1559 PDF pp.279–280, fols. 94v–95r | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | editorial division

VI.12.19
M1482 c.200, fol. 84v | G1559 PDF p.280, fol. 95r | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

VI.12.20
M1482 c.200, fol. 84v | G1559 PDF p.280, fol. 95r | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | editorial division

VI.13.1
M1482 c.200, fol. 84v | G1559 PDF pp.280–281, fols. 95r–95v | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | source division

VI.13.2
M1482 cc.200–201, fols. 84v–85r | G1559 PDF p.281, fol. 95v | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | source division

VI.13.3
M1482 c.201, fol. 85r | G1559 PDF p.281, fol. 95v | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | source division

VI.13.4
M1482 c.201, fol. 85r | G1559 PDF p.281, fol. 95v | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | source division

VI.13.5
M1482 c.201, fol. 85r | G1559 PDF p.281, fol. 95v | P1641 PDF p.172, printed p.167 | editorial division

VI.13.6
M1482 c.201, fol. 85r | G1559 PDF p.281, fol. 95v | P1641 PDF pp.172–173, printed pp.167–168 | editorial division

VI.13.7
M1482 c.201, fol. 85r | G1559 PDF pp.281–282, fols. 95v–96r | P1641 PDF p.173, printed p.168 | editorial division

VI.13.8
M1482 cc.201–202, fols. 85r–85v | G1559 PDF p.282, fol. 96r | P1641 PDF p.173, printed p.168 | editorial division

VI.13.9
M1482 c.202, fol. 85v | G1559 PDF p.282, fol. 96r | P1641 PDF p.173, printed p.168 | source division

VI.13.10
M1482 c.202, fol. 85v | G1559 PDF p.282, fol. 96r | P1641 PDF p.173, printed p.168 | editorial division

VI.13.11
M1482 c.202, fol. 85v | G1559 PDF pp.282–283, fols. 96r–96v | P1641 PDF p.173, printed p.168 | source division

VII.1.1
M1482 c.203, fol. 86r | G1559 PDF pp.283–284, fols. 96v–97r | P1641 PDF p.174, printed p.169 | source division

VII.1.2
M1482 cc.203–204, fols. 86r–86v | G1559 PDF p.284, fol. 97r | P1641 PDF pp.174–175, printed pp.169–170 | source division

VII.1.3
M1482 c.204, fol. 86v | G1559 PDF pp.284–285, fols. 97r–97v | P1641 PDF p.175, printed p.170 | source division

VII.2.1
M1482 cc.204–205, fols. 86v–87r | G1559 PDF pp.285–286, fols. 97v–98r | P1641 PDF p.175, printed p.170 | source division

VII.2.2
M1482 cc.205–206, fols. 87r–87v | G1559 PDF p.286, fol. 98r | P1641 PDF pp.175–176, printed pp.170–171 | editorial division

VII.3.1
M1482 c.206, fol. 87v | G1559 PDF p.287, fol. 98v | P1641 PDF p.176, printed p.171 | source division

VII.4.1
M1482 cc.206–207, fols. 87v–88r | G1559 PDF pp.287–288, fols. 98v–99r | P1641 PDF p.176, printed p.171 | source division

VII.4.2
M1482 c.207, fol. 88r | G1559 PDF pp.288–289, fols. 99r–99v | P1641 PDF pp.176–177, printed pp.171–172 | editorial division

VII.5.1
M1482 cc.207–208, fols. 88r–88v | G1559 PDF p.289, fol. 99v | P1641 PDF p.177, printed p.172 | source division

VII.5.2
M1482 cc.208–209, fols. 88v–89r | G1559 PDF pp.289–290, fols. 99v–100r | P1641 PDF p.177, printed p.172 | editorial division

VII.5.3
M1482 c.209, fol. 89r | G1559 PDF pp.290–291, fols. 100r–100v | P1641 PDF pp.177–178, printed pp.172–173 | editorial division

VII.5.4
M1482 cc.209–210, fols. 89r–89v | G1559 PDF pp.291–292, fols. 100v–101r | P1641 PDF p.178, printed p.173 | source division

VII.6.1
M1482 cc.210–211, fols. 89v–90r | G1559 PDF p.292, fol. 101r | P1641 PDF p.178, printed p.173 | source division

VII.6.2
M1482 c.211, fol. 90r | G1559 PDF pp.292–293, fols. 101r–101v | P1641 PDF pp.178–179, printed pp.173–174 | editorial division

VII.6.3
M1482 cc.211–212, fols. 90r–90v | G1559 PDF pp.293–294, fols. 101v–102r | P1641 PDF p.179, printed p.174 | editorial division

VII.7.1
M1482 cc.212–213, fols. 90v–91r | G1559 PDF pp.294–295, fols. 102r–102v | P1641 PDF p.179, printed p.174 | source division

VII.8.1
M1482 c.213, fol. 91r | G1559 PDF p.295, fol. 102v | P1641 PDF pp.179–180, printed pp.174–175 | source division

VII.9.1
M1482 cc.213–214, fols. 91r–91v | G1559 PDF pp.295–296, fols. 102v–103r | P1641 PDF p.180, printed p.175 | source division

VII.9.2
M1482 c.214, fol. 91v | G1559 PDF p.296, fol. 103r | P1641 PDF p.180, printed p.175 | editorial division

VII.10.1
M1482 cc.214–215, fols. 91v–92r | G1559 PDF p.297, fol. 103v | P1641 PDF pp.180–181, printed pp.175–176 | source division

Comparison unit locator register continued

VII.11.1
M1482 c.215, fol. 92r | G1559 PDF pp.297–298, fols. 103v–104r | P1641 PDF p.181, printed p.176 | source division

VII.12.1
M1482 cc.215–216, fols. 92r–92v | G1559 PDF pp.298–299, fols. 104r–104v | P1641 PDF p.181, printed p.176 | source division

VII.13.1
M1482 cc.216–217, fols. 92v–93r | G1559 PDF pp.299–300, fols. 104v–105r | P1641 PDF pp.181–182, printed pp.176–177 | source division

VII.14.1
M1482 c.217, fol. 93r | G1559 PDF p.300, fol. 105r | P1641 PDF p.182, printed p.177 | source division

VII.15.1
M1482 cc.217–218, fols. 93r–93v | G1559 PDF pp.300–301, fols. 105r–105v | P1641 PDF p.182, printed p.177 | source division

VIII.1.1
M1482 cc.218–219, fols. 93v–94r | G1559 PDF pp.301–302, fols. 105v–106r | P1641 PDF pp.183–184, printed pp.178–179 | source division

VIII.1.2
M1482 cc.219–220, fols. 94r–94v | G1559 PDF pp.302–303, fols. 106r–106v | P1641 PDF p.184, printed p.179 | editorial division

VIII.1.3
M1482 cc.220–221, fols. 94v–95r | G1559 PDF pp.303–304, fols. 106v–107r | P1641 PDF p.184, printed p.179 | editorial division

VIII.1.4
M1482 c.221, fol. 95r | G1559 PDF p.304, fol. 107r | P1641 PDF p.184, printed p.179 | source division

VIII.1.5
M1482 cc.221–222, fols. 95r–95v | G1559 PDF pp.304–305, fols. 107r–107v | P1641 PDF pp.184–185, printed pp.179–180 | editorial division

VIII.2.1
M1482 c.222, fol. 95v | G1559 PDF pp.305–306, fols. 107v–108r | P1641 PDF p.185, printed p.180 | source division

VIII.2.2
M1482 c.222, fol. 95v | G1559 PDF p.306, fol. 108r | P1641 PDF p.185, printed p.180 | source division

VIII.2.3
M1482 cc.222–223, fols. 95v–96r | G1559 PDF pp.306–307, fols. 108r–108v | P1641 PDF pp.185–186, printed pp.180–181 | source division

VIII.2.4
M1482 c.223, fol. 96r | G1559 PDF p.307, fol. 108v | P1641 PDF p.186, printed p.181 | source division

VIII.2.5
M1482 cc.223–224, fols. 96r–96v | G1559 PDF pp.307–308, fols. 108v–109r | P1641 PDF p.186, printed p.181 | source division

VIII.2.6
M1482 c.224, fol. 96v | G1559 PDF p.308, fol. 109r | P1641 PDF p.186, printed p.181 | source division

VIII.2.7
M1482 cc.224–225, fols. 96v–97r | G1559 PDF pp.308–309, fols. 109r–109v | P1641 PDF pp.186–187, printed pp.181–182 | source division

VIII.2.8
M1482 cc.226–227, fols. 97v–98r | G1559 PDF pp.309–310, fols. 109v–110r | P1641 PDF p.187, printed p.182 | editorial division

VIII.3.1
M1482 cc.227–228, fols. 98r–98v | G1559 PDF pp.311–312, fols. 110v–111r | P1641 PDF pp.187–188, printed pp.182–183 | source division

VIII.3.2
M1482 c.228, fol. 98v | G1559 PDF p.312, fol. 111r | P1641 PDF p.188, printed p.183 | source division

VIII.3.3
M1482 c.228, fol. 98v | G1559 PDF p.312, fol. 111r | P1641 PDF p.188, printed p.183 | source division

VIII.3.4
M1482 c.228, fol. 98v | G1559 PDF p.312, fol. 111r | P1641 PDF p.188, printed p.183 | source division

VIII.3.5
M1482 c.228, fol. 98v | G1559 PDF pp.312–313, fols. 111r–111v | P1641 PDF p.188, printed p.183 | source division

VIII.3.6
M1482 cc.228–229, fols. 98v–99r | G1559 PDF p.313, fol. 111v | P1641 PDF pp.188–189, printed pp.183–184 | source division

VIII.3.7
M1482 cc.229–230, fols. 99r–99v | G1559 PDF pp.313–314, fols. 111v–112r | P1641 PDF p.189, printed p.184 | editorial division

VIII.3.8
M1482 c.230, fol. 99v | G1559 PDF pp.314–315, fols. 112r–112v | P1641 PDF p.189, printed p.184 | source division

VIII.4.1
M1482 cc.230–231, fols. 99v–100r | G1559 PDF p.315, fol. 112v | P1641 PDF pp.189–190, printed pp.184–185 | source division

VIII.4.2
M1482 cc.231–232, fols. 100r–100v | G1559 PDF pp.315–317, fols. 112v–113v | P1641 PDF p.190, printed p.185 | editorial division

VIII.4.3
M1482 cc.232–233, fols. 100v–101r | G1559 PDF pp.317–318, fols. 113v–114r | P1641 PDF pp.190–191, printed pp.185–186 | source division

VIII.4.4
M1482 cc.233–234, fols. 101r–101v | G1559 PDF pp.318–319, fols. 114r–114v | P1641 PDF p.191, printed p.186 | source division

VIII.4.5
M1482 cc.234–235, fols. 101v–102r | G1559 PDF pp.319–320, fols. 114v–115r | P1641 PDF pp.191–192, printed pp.186–187 | source division

VIII.4.6
M1482 c.235, fol. 102r | G1559 PDF p.320, fol. 115r | P1641 PDF p.192, printed p.187 | editorial division

Comparison unit locator register continued

VIII.4.7
M1482 c.235, fol. 102r | G1559 PDF p.320, fol. 115r | P1641 PDF p.192, printed p.187 | source division

VIII.4.8
M1482 c.236, fol. 102v | G1559 PDF pp.320–321, fols. 115r–115v | P1641 PDF p.192, printed p.187 | source division

VIII.4.9
M1482 cc.236–237, fols. 102v–103r | G1559 PDF pp.321–322, fols. 115v–116r | P1641 PDF pp.192–193, printed pp.187–188 | source division

VIII.4.10
M1482 cc.237–238, fols. 103r–103v | G1559 PDF pp.322–323, fols. 116r–116v | P1641 PDF p.193, printed p.188 | editorial division

VIII.4.11
M1482 c.238, fol. 103v | G1559 PDF p.323, fol. 116v | P1641 PDF p.193, printed p.188 | editorial division

VIII.4.12
M1482 cc.238–239, fols. 103v–104r | G1559 PDF pp.323–324, fols. 116v–117r | P1641 PDF pp.193–194, printed pp.188–189 | source division

VIII.4.13
M1482 c.239, fol. 104r | G1559 PDF p.324, fol. 117r | P1641 PDF p.194, printed p.189 | source division

VIII.5.1
M1482 cc.239–240, fols.104r–104v | G1559 PDF pp.324–325, fols.117r–117v | P1641 PDF p.194, printed p.189 | source division

VIII.5.2
M1482 cc.240–241, fols.104v–105r | G1559 PDF pp.325–326, fols.117v–118r | P1641 PDF pp.194–195, printed pp.189–190 | source division

VIII.6.1
M1482 c.241, fol.105r | G1559 PDF pp.326–327, fols.118r–118v | P1641 PDF p.195, printed p.190 | source division

VIII.7.1
M1482 c.242, fol.105v | G1559 PDF pp.327–328, fols.118v–119r | P1641 PDF pp.195–196, printed pp.190–191 | source division

VIII.8.1
M1482 cc.242–243, fols.105v–106r | G1559 PDF p.328, fol.119r | P1641 PDF p.196, printed p.191 | source division

VIII.8.2
M1482 c.243, fol.106r | G1559 PDF pp.328–329, fols.119r–119v | P1641 PDF p.196, printed p.191 | source division

VIII.9.1
M1482 c.243, fol.106r | G1559 PDF p.329, fol.119v | P1641 PDF p.196, printed p.191 | source division

VIII.10.1
M1482 cc.243–244, fols.106r–106v | G1559 PDF pp.329–330, fols.119v–120r | P1641 PDF pp.196–197, printed pp.191–192 | source division

VIII.10.2
M1482 cc.244–245, fols.106v–107r | G1559 PDF pp.330 and 333–334, fols.120r–121r | P1641 PDF p.197, printed p.192 | editorial division

VIII.11.1
M1482 cc.245–246, fols.107r–107v | G1559 PDF p.334, fol.121r | P1641 PDF pp.197–198, printed pp.192–193 | source division

VIII.12.1
M1482 c.246, fol.107v | G1559 PDF p.334, fol.121r | P1641 PDF p.198, printed p.193 | source division

VIII.13.1
M1482 cc.246–247, fols.107v–108r | G1559 PDF pp.335–336, fols.121v–122r | P1641 PDF pp.198–199, printed pp.193–194 | source division

VIII.13.2
M1482 cc.247–248, fols.108r–108v | G1559 PDF p.336, fol.122r | P1641 PDF p.199, printed p.194 | editorial division

VIII.14.1
M1482 c.248, fol.108v | G1559 PDF pp.336–337, fols.122r–122v | P1641 PDF p.199, printed p.194 | source division

VIII.15.1
M1482 c.249, fol.109r | G1559 PDF pp.337–338, fols.122v–123r | P1641 PDF pp.199–200, printed pp.194–195 | source division

VIII.15.2
M1482 cc.249–250, fols.109r–109v | G1559 PDF pp.338–339, fols.123r–123v | P1641 PDF p.200, printed p.195 | editorial division

VIII.15.3
M1482 cc.250–251, fols.109v–110r | G1559 PDF pp.339–340, fols.123v–124r | P1641 PDF pp.200–201, printed pp.195–196 | editorial division

VIII.16.1
M1482 cc.251–252, fols.110r–110v | G1559 PDF pp.340–341, fols.124r–124v | P1641 PDF p.201, printed p.196 | source division

VIII.16.2
M1482 cc.252–253, fols.110v–111r | G1559 PDF pp.341–342, fols.124v–125r | P1641 PDF pp.201–202, printed pp.196–197 | editorial division

VIII.16.3
M1482 c.253, fol.111r | G1559 PDF pp.342–343, fols.125r–125v | P1641 PDF p.202, printed p.197 | editorial division

VIII.16.4
M1482 cc.253–254, fols.111r–111v | G1559 PDF pp.343–344, fols.125v–126r | P1641 PDF p.202, printed p.197 | editorial division