Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

7Moreover, although there are many acts of understanding in the soul of a wise man, each of them is found whole in each of the others. One who is skilled in geometry or theology possesses a first proposition of that discipline, a second, a third, and all the rest, and proceeds from knowledge of one to knowledge of another. If the first teaches the second and the second the third, and whoever teaches something possesses within himself what he teaches, it follows that every preceding proposition contains all that follow. Indeed, every later proposition similarly contains those that precede it, for we often investigate earlier things by the signs found in what follows. Rightly so, since the images of causes shine in their effects. Through this order of things, once a wise man has conceived any one proposition, he passes with the greatest speed through many, and so beholds many—indeed all—within one. Every act of intelligence therefore exists in every other, and each is contained whole in each. The same occurs among the moral virtues. Once one of them has been acquired, all are immediately possessed. Who will distribute things justly if he either fears threats or serves desire? Who will courageously overcome fear if he is softened by desire? Who will master his desires if he succumbs to fear? Finally, who will lead an honorable life unless through prudence he has set the best end of life before himself and chosen the straighter paths to that end? Or who will see prudently if the eye of his mind is clouded by the darkness of vice? These virtues, then, are so bound together that all are present in one and every virtue is contained whole in each. In the same way, the whole power of geometry lies hidden in its chief proposition—indeed, in any proposition—since the sagacity of an acute mind can elicit all of them from any one. Yet a divisible quality cannot be present whole and at once in many things. It is present in one thing only, that is, in one body; it extends different parts of itself through different parts of the body, and its whole quantity is not present in each bodily part. These acts of intelligence and these moral dispositions are therefore altogether indivisible.