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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VIII · Chapter 2 · §§ 3–4

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Facing Pages · Branch 151 of 191

Book VIII · Chapter 2 · §§ 3–4

Latin

p. 296

Neque assentiendum est Epicureis opinantibus animam cum corpore coalescere, quia maiores vires sint in pueris grandiusculis quam infantibus, atque inde adolescentes in dies viribus praestent, virique similiter, donec rursus senescente corpore minuantur. Siquidem ea est animae ad membra comparatio quae artis ad instrumenta. Ars autem saepe eadem permanens atque similis, modo facilius instrumenta movet, modo difficilius, quoniam haec alias aptiora sunt, alias ad motum ineptiora. Sic, quamvis eadem semper vis sit in anima, membra tamen propter nimiam aut mollitiem aut ariditatem neque constant aeque neque flectuntur. Atque ipsa vis quae videtur in corpore esse non tam carnis sequitur pondus quam proportionem membrorum naturalem conformationemque artificiosam, quae duo ad spiritum potius pertinent quam ad molem. Vis etiam quae inest animae non corporis acquiritur incremento—quod patet in iis qui torpent ignavia, in quibus crescente corpore nihil proficit animus—sed ex ipsa animi industria comparatur ingenio, usu, affectu. Quis neget tempore vires corporis comparari? Animo autem saepe momento fortitudo praestatur, quando vel ratio aliquid monstrat imperatque magnificum, vel furor arma ministrat; et saepe pusillus homo superat grandiorem, et qui non crescit corpore crescit tamen saepe virtute animi. Immo dum decrescimus corpore, saepe animo crescimus. Scientiam magnanimitatemque saepissime acquirit subito animus.

Corpus autem neque dare quicquam potest neque accipere nisi tempore. Denique virtus animi est aequalitas quaedam, ut Magi tradunt, per quam animus et sibimet et ipsi vero bonoque consonat. Si quo pacto quadrangularis quaedam linea circularis efficiatur, perfectior evadet, non tamen quod longior fiat, sed quod aequalior. Rursus, si temperetur lyra, perfectior erit, non quod grandior fiat, sed consonantior. Ita cum adolescens aliquis virtute adolescit, tunc anima non quantitate crescit, sed spiritali quadam aequalitate et consonantia proficit.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VIII

p. 297

Nor should we agree with the Epicureans, who suppose that the soul grows together with the body because somewhat larger boys have greater strength than infants, adolescents then excel more each day in strength, and men do likewise until their strength in turn diminishes as the body ages. The relation of soul to limbs is that of an art to its instruments. The art often remains the same and unchanged, though at one time it moves its instruments more easily and at another with greater difficulty, because sometimes they are better fitted for motion and sometimes less fitted. Thus, although the same power always remains in the soul, excessive softness or dryness prevents the limbs from either holding firm or bending equally well. Even the strength which appears to lie in the body depends not so much upon the weight of the flesh as upon the limbs’ natural proportion and skillful formation, both of which pertain more to the vital spirit than to bulk. Nor is the power within the soul acquired by an increase of body—as is plain in those who lie sluggish in idleness, whose bodies grow while their souls make no progress. It is acquired instead through the soul’s own industry—by native ability, practice, and ardor. Who denies that bodily strength is acquired over time? Yet courage is often granted to the soul in a moment, whether reason shows and commands something noble and magnificent or a frenzy supplies the weapons. A small man often overcomes a larger one; and someone who does not grow in body often grows in power of soul. Indeed, while we diminish in body, we often grow in soul. Knowledge and greatness of soul are very often acquired by the soul in an instant.

A body, however, can neither give nor receive anything except over time. Finally, the soul’s virtue is a certain equality, as the Magi teach, through which the soul accords both with itself and with the true and the good. If by some means a four-angled line were made circular, it would become more perfect—not because it became longer, but because it became more equal. Again, if a lyre were tuned, it would be more perfect, not because it grew larger, but because it became more harmonious. So when a young man matures in virtue, the soul does not grow in quantity; it advances in a certain spiritual equality and harmony.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.