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Plato

Charmides

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CharmidesCharmides · 174d–175b

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Charmides · 174d–175b

Ancient Greek

p. 70

ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ· ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη [ἡ ὠφελίμη] ἡμῖν.

Τί δ’, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ; εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ 174e δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς.

Ἦ κἂν ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ ἰατρική; καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἑκάστη; ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός· οὐχ οὕτω;

Φαίνεταί γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός;

Οὐ δῆτα.

175aἌλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια· ἢ οὔ;

Ἄλλης.

Οὐδ’ ἄρα ὠφελίας, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νυνδή· ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

Πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός;

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέν γε.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ᾐτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων 175b ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφ’ ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων

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Charmides

p. 71

work is to benefit us. For it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad. So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us.”

“Why couldn’t it benefit us?” said he. “For if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge, and presides 174e over the other kinds of knowledge too, then surely, since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us.”

“Would it also make us healthy,” I said, “and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work? Or didn’t we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Isn’t that so?”

“It seems so.”

“Then it will not be the craftsman of health?”

“Certainly not.”

175a“For health belonged to another craft, didn’t it?”

“To another.”

“Nor of benefit either, then, my friend; for we just now assigned this work in turn to another craft, didn’t we?”

“Certainly.”

“How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?”

“It seems it can’t be, Socrates, in any way.”

“So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose? For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have 175b turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well. As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are

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About This Reading Edition

Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.

Discussion Questions

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.

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Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.