Charmides

Outline

The divisions follow the argument, not the blocks in which the edition was made. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. Prologue: the return from Potidaea (153a–154b)

153a–d Socrates, back from the army, goes to the wrestling-school of Taureas. Chaerephon runs to meet him: “how did you come out of the battle alive?” “Like this, as you see.” He gives the news from the camp, then asks his own questions: how is philosophy doing, and has any young man turned out outstanding “in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both”?

154a–b Critias points to the crowd coming in, the “advance guard and the lovers” of the most beautiful boy of the moment: his cousin Charmides.

II. The beautiful boy and the charm (154b–158c)

154b–155a Charmides enters, and the boys all gaze at him “as if he were a statue”. Socrates is “a white measuring-line on white stone” where the beautiful are concerned. If the boy stripped he would seem to have no face; Socrates proposes to strip his soul first.

155b–e Critias’ ruse: Socrates is to pose as a doctor with a remedy for the boy’s morning headache. Everyone on the bench shoves along to make room for him, until one man at the end is made to stand up and another is tipped off sideways; Socrates sees inside his cloak and is “on fire”. The remedy is a leaf, with a charm to go with it.

156a–157c The charm and its doctrine. Good doctors treat the part with the whole; Zalmoxis, the Thracian god-king, teaches that the body cannot be cured without the soul, and that the soul is treated with charms, which are “beautiful words”, from which temperance comes to be. No one is to persuade Socrates to treat anyone’s head with the remedy unless he first hands over his soul to the charm.

157c–158c Critias vouches that Charmides is the most temperate of his age. Socrates praises the boy’s ancestry and asks him directly: has he temperance already, or does he need the charm?

III. The question put (158c–159a)

158c–e Charmides blushes and cannot answer either way without boasting or calling Critias a liar. Socrates proposes to “look into it together”.

158e–159a The method: if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, from which he has an opinion about what it is; “since you know how to speak Greek”, he can say it.

IV. Charmides’ three answers (159b–162b)

159b–160d Temperance is “a kind of quietness”. But temperance is fine, and in body and soul quick things are at least as often fine as quiet ones.

160d–161b Temperance is modesty. But temperance is good, and Homer says that “modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need”.

161b–162b Temperance is “doing one’s own business”, a phrase Charmides has heard from someone. Taken literally it would mean writing only one’s own name and making only one’s own shoes; it must be “a riddle”. Charmides laughs slyly and looks at Critias.

V. Critias takes over (162c–164d)

162c–e Critias, angry “as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet’s own verses”, takes the argument over.

163a–e Hesiod’s “work is no disgrace”: making is not doing or working, and only the making of good things is doing. Socrates recalls Prodicus’ distinctions and asks for a plain definition: temperance is “the doing of good things”.

164a–d The doctor who benefits a patient acts temperately, yet may not know that he has; so a man could be temperate without knowing himself. Critias would sooner take back some of what he has agreed than grant it.

VI. Know thyself (164d–167a)

164d–165b Critias’ new definition: temperance is knowing oneself, the god’s greeting at Delphi in place of “Rejoice!”. Socrates answers that he inquires because he does not himself know.

165c–166b If temperance is knowledge, what is its work, as health is the work of medicine? Critias: it has no product, like calculation and geometry. Socrates: but they have objects distinct from themselves.

166b–e Critias: temperance alone is knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself, and Socrates is only trying to refute him. Socrates: he refutes others for the same reason he examines himself, “for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don’t”.

166e–167a Knowledge of knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge: the temperate man alone knows what he knows and what he does not know, and can examine others.

VII. Is knowledge of knowledge possible? (167a–169d)

167a–c “The third time, for the Savior”: two questions, whether it is possible and whether it would benefit us. Socrates can find “no way through”.

167c–168a The parallels: a sight that sees no color, a hearing that hears no sound, a sense of senses, a desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful, a fear of nothing dreadful, an opinion about nothing.

168b–169a Relations: a greater than itself would be smaller than itself, a double of itself half of itself. Hearing that hears itself must have a sound. “It needs a great man” to decide.

169b–d Socrates’ “prophetic hunch” that temperance is beneficial and good. Critias catches his perplexity like a yawn and covers it up. The existence of knowledge of knowledge is granted for now.

VIII. What would it be good for? (169d–172d)

169d–170d Even granted, knowledge of knowledge would know only that one knows, not what: the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.

170d–171c So the temperate man could not tell a real doctor from a pretender; only another doctor could.

171d–172a What temperance would have given if it were what was first supposed: a life without error, households and cities well run, and those who do well are happy.

172b–d What is left: learning more easily and examining others better. Perhaps the search “has been to no useful purpose”; and they agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to do only what he knew.

IX. The dream, and the knowledge of good and bad (172e–175a)

172e–173d “By the dog”: Socrates tells his “dream”, through horn or ivory. Temperance rules; no impostor deceives us; we are healthier, safer and better shod; the true prophets tell us the future. We would live knowledgeably, but would we do well and be happy?

173d–174b Knowledgeably about what? Not cutting leather or working bronze. The prophet; the man who knows past, present and future. Which knowledge makes him happy: draughts? calculation? health? Critias: the knowledge by which one knows good and bad. “You rascal!”

174b–d Without this knowledge the other crafts still work, but nothing is done “well and beneficially”. It, not temperance, is the knowledge whose work is to benefit us.

174d–175a Critias: temperance, ruling over all knowledge, rules this too. Socrates: temperance was agreed to be knowledge of knowledge only; it will not make us healthy, and it is “the craftsman of no benefit”.

X. The verdict (175a–176a)

175a–b Socrates’ fear was justified; “we are beaten on every side”, and cannot find what the lawgiver gave this name to.

175b–d The recapitulation: they conceded, though the argument did not allow it, that there is knowledge of knowledge and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge; even so temperance comes out of no benefit. The inquiry “has made such a mockery of the truth”.

175d–176a Socrates is grieved for Charmides and for the Thracian charm. He is “a poor inquirer”; temperance is a great good; if Charmides has it, he is blessed.

XI. Epilogue: the charm, and force (176a–d)

176a–b Charmides does not know whether he has temperance, is “not altogether persuaded” by Socrates, and asks to be charmed every day.

176b–d Critias orders it as proof of his temperance; Charmides obeys his guardian. “What are you plotting to do?” “We’ve finished plotting.” “So you’ll use force … and won’t even give me a preliminary hearing?” “Count on force.” “Then I won’t oppose you.”