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Plato

Charmides

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CharmidesCharmides · 174a–174d

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Charmides · 174a–174d

Ancient Greek

p. 68

οἶμαι τούτου γε ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;

Οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.

174bἈλλὰ ποία μάλιστα; ᾗ τί οἶδεν καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; ἆρά γε ᾗ τὸ πεττευτικόν;

Ποῖον, ἦ δ’ ὅς, πεττευτικόν;

Ἀλλ’ ᾗ τὸ λογιστικόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλ’ ᾗ τὸ ὑγιεινόν;

Μᾶλλον, ἔφη.

Ἐκείνη δ’ ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ᾗ τί;

Ἧι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν.

Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν 174c τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἐπεί, ὦ Κριτία, εἰ ’θέλεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἧττόν τι ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἡ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἠμφιέσθαι, ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ;

Οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ’, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι 174d καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ’ ἧς

68

Charmides

p. 69

think you would say that anyone lived still more knowledgeably than he.”

“Certainly not.”

“Then this is what I still long to know: which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?”

“Not alike at all,” he said.

174b“Then which, most of all? The one by which he knows what, of the things that are and have been and are going to be? Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?”

“Draughts?” said he. “What draughts?”1

“The one, then, by which he knows calculation?”

“Not at all.”

“The one by which he knows what is healthy?”

“More so,” he said.

“And the one I mean, the one that does it most of all,” I said, “is the one by which he knows what?”

“By which he knows good,” he said, “and bad.”

“You rascal!” I said. “All this time you’ve been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well 174c and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad.2 For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed, or will the pilot’s art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?”

“No less,” he said.

“But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well 174d and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent.”

“You’re right.”

“But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose

69

About This Reading Edition

Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.

Discussion Questions

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.

Rights

Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.