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Charmides · 159d–160b
Ancient Greek
p. 22Οὐ τοίνυν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ’ ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη.
Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
159eΤί δέ; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία;
Εὐμαθία.
Ἔστιν δέ γ’, ἔφην, ἡ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνειν, ἡ δὲ δυσμαθία ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως;
Ναί.
Διδάσκειν δὲ ἄλλον οὐ ταχέως [καὶ] κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως;
Ναί.
Τί δέ; ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι καὶ μεμνῆσθαι ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως;
Σφόδρ’, ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως.
160aἩ δ’ ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία;
Ἀληθῆ.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα ἀλλ’ ὡς τάχιστά ἐστι κάλλιστα;
Ναί.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡσυχιώτατος, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, καὶ μόγις βουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι, 160b ἀλλ’ ὁ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν.
Ἔστιν ταῦτα, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος καλλίω φαίνεται ἢ τὰ τῆς βραδυτῆτός τε καὶ ἡσυχιότητος;
Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ’ ἡσύχιος
Charmides
p. 23“Then as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine.”
“It seems so,” he said.
159e“And what about this?” I said. “Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?”
“Learning easily.”
“And learning easily,” I said, “is learning quickly, isn’t it, and learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?”
“Yes.”
“And teaching someone else: isn’t it finer to do it quickly and vigorously than quietly and slowly?”
“Yes.”
“And what about recollecting and remembering? Is it finer to do them quietly and slowly, or vigorously and quickly?”
“Vigorously,” he said, “and quickly.”
160a“And isn’t quick-wittedness a kind of sharpness of the soul, and not a quietness?”
“True.”
“And understanding what is said, at the writing-master’s and the lyre-master’s and everywhere else: isn’t that finest when it is done not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?”
“Yes.”
“And again, in the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty, who is thought to deserve praise, 160b but the one who does it most easily and most quickly.”
“That is so,” he said.
“So in everything, Charmides,” I said, “in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?”
“It looks that way,” he said.
“Then temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor would
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 159d–160b
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.