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English Page · Branch 33 of 44
Charmides · 170b–170e
Ancient Greek
p. 56Ὅτι δὲ γιγνώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται; 170c γιγνώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ’ ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ’ οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλ’ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω πάντα· ἢ οὔ;
Φαίνεται.
Σωφροσύνῃ δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γιγνώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὃ οἶδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον.
Ἔοικεν.
170dΟὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον.
Κινδυνεύει.
Οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἷός τε ἔσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὅ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται· ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἔοικεν, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν.
Οὐ φαίνεται.
170eΟὔτε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἷός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή. σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε· εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὁστισοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἆρ’ οὐχ ὧδε ποιήσει· περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαΐει, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες—ἢ οὔ;
Ναί, οὕτως.
Περὶ δέ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν.
Charmides
p. 57“But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows? 170c For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance, and so on for everything. Isn’t that so?”
“So it appears.”
“But by temperance, if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, how will he know that he knows the healthy, or what belongs to house-building?”
“In no way.”
“Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.”
“It seems so.”
170d“Then being temperate, and temperance, would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know.”
“It looks that way.”
“Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know.”1
“Apparently not.”
170e“Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not. Let us look into it from this angle. If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won’t he proceed like this? He will surely not discuss medicine with him — for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased. Isn’t that so?”
“Yes, that’s so.”
“But about knowledge the doctor knows nothing; that, we assigned to temperance alone.”
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 170b–170e
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.