Diotimos Library · Plato Collection · Bilingual Edition
Swipe or use the arrow keys.
English Page · Branch 32 of 44
Charmides · 169e–170b
Ancient Greek
p. 54169eγάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει· ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γιγνώσκων, ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γιγνώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται.
Οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, ἀλλ’ ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;
170aὍτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.
Ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ αὖ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστιν τὸ αὐτό, ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.
Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;
Ὧδε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὖσα ἆρα πλέον τι οἵα τ’ ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τόδε δ’ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη;
Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον.
Ταὐτὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ ὑγιει170bνοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ δικαίου;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἶμαι ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη.
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίστηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμην μόνον γιγνώσκῃ ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μέν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γιγνώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἦ γάρ;
Ναί.
Charmides
p. 55169esomeone has knowledge which knows itself, he himself would be of the same kind as what he has. Just as when someone has speed he is fast, and when he has beauty, beautiful, and when he has knowledge, knowing, so when he has knowledge that is knowledge of itself, then surely he will be knowing himself.”1
“That isn’t what I’m disputing,” I said, “that when someone has what knows itself, he will know himself. But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?”
170a“Because, Socrates, this is the same as that.”
“Perhaps,” I said, “but I’m afraid I’m my same old self: again I don’t understand how it is the same thing, to know what one knows and to know what one does not know.”
“What do you mean?” he said.
“This,” I said. “Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?”
“No, only that much.”
“Then is it the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, and 170b as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just?”
“Not at all.”
“No: the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge.”
“Of course.”
“So if someone does not also know what is healthy and what is just, but knows only knowledge, since that is all he has knowledge of, it stands to reason that he would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge, both about himself and about others, wouldn’t he?”
“Yes.”
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 169e–170b
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.