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Charmides · 165c–166a
Ancient Greek
p. 40165cεἰδέναι. σκεψάμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε μή. ἀλλ’ ἐπίσχες ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι.
Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς.
Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός· ἢ οὔ;
Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ;
Πάνυ γε.
Εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ· “Ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶν καὶ τί ἀπεργάζεται,” 165d εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν· τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο.
Ἀποδέχομαι.
Καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὅτι οἰκήσεις· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῂς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα, “Ὦ Κριτία, σωφροσύνη, 165e ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος;” ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ.
Ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὕτη πέφυκεν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀλλήλαις· σὺ δ’ ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγε μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς ἢ ἄλλα τοιαῦτ’ ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν τεχνῶν 166a δεῖξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιοῦτόν τι ἔργον δεῖξαι; ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἕξεις.
Charmides
p. 41165cknow. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have.”
“Look into it, then,” said he.
“I am looking,” I said. “If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn’t it?”
“It is,” he said, “knowledge of oneself.”1
“And medicine,” I said, “is knowledge of the healthy?”
“Certainly.”
“Then if you were to ask me,” I said, “‘Medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, what use is it to us and what does it produce?’ 165d I would say, ‘No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us,’ if you accept that.”
“I do.”
“And if you asked me about house-building, which is knowledge of how to build, what work I say it produces, I would say, ‘Houses’; and the same with the other crafts. So you too, on behalf of temperance, since you say it is knowledge of oneself, ought to be able to answer if you are asked, ‘Critias, temperance, 165e being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?’ Come on, then, tell me.”
“But Socrates,” he said, “you are not inquiring correctly. This knowledge is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge, any more than they are like each other; and yet you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me,” he said, “what work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving, or the many other works of the kind that one could 166a point to for many crafts? Can you, for your part, point me to any such work of these? No, you can’t.”2
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 165c–166a
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.