

Return, beauty, and desire

References use Stephanus pagination; temperance translates sophrosyne.

1. 153a-153c How does the return from battle frame the inquiry into temperance?
2. 153d Why does Socrates ask about philosophy, wisdom, and beauty together?
3. 154a-154c How does the crowd shape our first impression of Charmides?
4. 154b What does Socrates admit by calling himself a white measuring-line?
5. 154c What does the comparison of Charmides to a statue suggest?
6. 154d-154e Why call a good soul the one small thing Charmides still needs?
7. 154e-155a What would it mean to strip and examine a soul?
8. 155a Does family reputation help us judge a person's character?
9. 155b What does the pretence of a headache cure make possible?
10. 155c What does the scramble for seats reveal about these men?
11. 155d How does Socrates' desire complicate his role as examiner?
12. 155e Why might the leaf be powerless without the charm?

The charm and the care of the soul

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13. 156a What role does consent play in the offer of the charm?
14. 156b-156c How strong is the analogy between treating a part and a whole?
15. 156d Why does Charmides' agreement restore Socrates' confidence?
16. 156d-156e What authority does the Thracian physician lend the argument?
17. 156e What supports the claim that bodily good and evil begin in the soul?
18. 157a How might beautiful words produce temperance?
19. 157b-157c Why must wealth, birth, and beauty not alter the terms of treatment?
20. 157c-157d Why does Critias welcome an illness as an opportunity?
21. 157e-158b How does the praise of Charmides' ancestry affect the inquiry?
22. 158b-158c What follows from saying a temperate person needs no charm?
23. 158c-158d What makes an honest self-assessment difficult for Charmides?
24. 158e How does a joint inquiry change the relation of doctor and patient?

Quietness and modesty

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25. 159a Does possessing a virtue mean one can explain what it is?
26. 159b Why might orderly, quiet conduct seem to be temperance?
27. 159c Why must temperance count as something fine?
28. 159c-159d Do examples of physical speed really refute quietness?
29. 159e-160a Is quick learning always better than slow learning?
30. 160a-160b Does good deliberation require speed?
31. 160b-160d What does the argument establish beyond rejecting quietness?
32. 160d-160e What can looking within oneself contribute to a definition?
33. 160e How does modesty differ from the earlier idea of quietness?
34. 160e-161a Why does the inquiry move from the fine to the good?
35. 161a What weight should Homer's words carry in this argument?
36. 161a-161b Must a virtue be good in every situation to count as a virtue?

Doing one's own business

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- 37. 161b What different meanings could doing one's own business have?

- 38. 161c Can we separate the truth of a claim from the person who makes it?

- 39. 161d-161e How does writing other people's names test the definition?

- 40. 161e-162a What does the imagined self-sufficient city reveal?

- 41. 162a-162b Why treat an unclear definition as a riddle rather than an error?

- 42. 162b What does Charmides achieve by teasing the author of the definition?

- 43. 162c-162d How does concern for reputation draw Critias into the discussion?

- 44. 162d What does the poet-and-actor comparison imply about Charmides?

- 45. 162e Does age give Critias a better claim to know what temperance is?

- 46. 163a-163b Can distinguishing making from doing rescue the definition?

- 47. 163b-163c Does Critias' reading of Hesiod clarify work or redefine it?

- 48. 163d-163e What is gained or lost by defining temperance as doing good?

Good action and self-knowledge

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- 49. 164a Why does Socrates ask whether temperate people know they are so?

- 50. 164b Can a doctor know a treatment without knowing whether it benefits?

- 51. 164b-164c Does an accidentally beneficial action show virtue?

- 52. 164c-164d What makes Critias withdraw an earlier admission?

- 53. 164d How does knowing oneself differ from doing good?

- 54. 164d-165a Why interpret Know thyself as a greeting rather than advice?

- 55. 165a What connects the Delphic sayings in Critias' interpretation?

- 56. 165b-165c Can Socrates examine a definition while claiming not to know?

- 57. 165c-165d What would self-knowledge have as its object?

- 58. 165d-166a Must every kind of knowledge produce something useful?

- 59. 166a-166b What distinguishes a kind of knowledge from its object?

- 60. 166b-166c Why does Critias make temperance an exceptional kind of knowledge?

Can knowledge know itself?

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61. 166c-166d Why does Critias suspect that Socrates wants only to refute him?
62. 166d Why fear thinking one knows what one does not know?
63. 166d-166e How can refutation benefit everyone present?
64. 166e-167a How does knowledge of ignorance alter Critias' definition?
65. 167a-167b Why separate the question of possibility from that of benefit?
66. 167c Can sight see itself without seeing any colour?
67. 167c-167d How well does the analogy with hearing illuminate knowledge?
68. 167d-167e Can desire have desire itself as its only object?
69. 168a Does opinion about opinion offer a better analogy?
70. 168b-168c Why can something not be greater or older than itself?
71. 168d Must something that acts upon itself have its object's qualities?
72. 168e-169a Do these analogies establish one rule for every kind of self-relation?

Knowing that and knowing what

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- 73. 169a-169b What does Socrates' admitted uncertainty contribute to the inquiry?

- 74. 169b Why would possibility alone fail to establish temperance?

- 75. 169c What does the image of contagious yawning reveal about perplexity?

- 76. 169c-169d How does Critias' shame affect his response to difficulty?

- 77. 169d What are the risks of granting a disputed premise for discussion?

- 78. 169e Must possessing self-knowing knowledge make its possessor self-knowing?

- 79. 170a-170b Can one recognise knowledge without knowing its subject?

- 80. 170b-170c How does knowing that one knows differ from knowing what one knows?

- 81. 170d What remains of self-knowledge after this distinction?

- 82. 170e Why is the false doctor a crucial test case?

- 83. 171a-171b What makes an examination relevant to a particular craft?

- 84. 171b-171c Must one be an expert to recognise another person's expertise?

Expertise and the well-governed life

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85. 171d What benefit was the stronger account of temperance meant to provide?
86. 171d-171e Would knowing our limits prevent us from acting beyond them?
87. 171e When should a person entrust a task to someone else?
88. 171e-172a Would rule by experts necessarily make a city well governed?
89. 172a Does freedom from error guarantee happiness?
90. 172b Could awareness of knowledge make learning easier?
91. 172b-172c Why might a modest benefit still matter?
92. 172c-172d Why restore a stronger definition after finding it doubtful?
93. 172d-172e What assumption about expertise does Socrates now question?
94. 173a Why present the imagined rule of knowledge as a dream?
95. 173b What would a society without false experts gain?
96. 173c Does adding reliable prophecy make this society complete?

Knowledge, goodness, and happiness

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97. 173d Why might living with knowledge fail to make us happy?
98. 173d-173e What is missing from the claim that knowledge ensures a good life?
99. 174a Would knowing every fact be enough for happiness?
100. 174a-174b Why ask which kind of knowledge contributes most to happiness?
101. 174b Why does knowledge of good and evil emerge as decisive?
102. 174c What can the crafts still achieve without knowledge of good and evil?
103. 174c-174d How does producing a result differ from making it beneficial?
104. 174d Why is knowledge of good and evil not the temperance defined earlier?
105. 174d-174e Could supervising knowledge benefit us without producing its results?
106. 174e-175a Does Socrates adequately answer Critias' argument about supervision?
107. 175a-175b Has temperance proved useless, or has its proposed definition failed?
108. 175b-175c How do the granted premises weaken the final argument?

The ending and the dialogue as a whole

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| 109. | 175c-175d | Why describe the inquiry as mocking the truth? |
| 110. | 175d-175e | Why does Socrates turn from Critias back to Charmides? |
| 111. | 175e-176a | What warrants Socrates' confidence that temperance is a great good? |
| 112. | 176a-176b | What has Charmides learned if he still cannot define temperance? |
| 113. | 176b | Why does Charmides want the charm after the inquiry has failed? |
| 114. | 176b-176c | Does obedience to Socrates prove temperance, as Critias claims? |
| 115. | 176c-176d | How does the language of force alter the ending's tone? |
| 116. | 156a; 176c | What happens to the earlier concern for consent at the end? |
| 117. | 155d; 176d | How does Socrates' final submission echo his earlier loss of composure? |
| 118. | 158d; 169c | How do Charmides and Critias respond differently to possible ignorance? |
| 119. | 157a; 176b | In what sense might the discussion itself have been a charm? |
| 120. | 159a; 176a | Does the ending challenge the claim that virtue entails self-knowledge? |