Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact · Lexicon

From the book

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordTactus can be bodily contact or the metaphorical “touch” of intellectual grasp.
In the Platonic TheologySuppose mind were a body, or a form spread through a body.
In this editionAt VIII.5.1 the source correction tactu, replacing actu, is decisive: the hypothesis requires contact, not merely actuality.
A place to readSimple intellectual touch is a positive metaphor, distinct from the rejected bodily mechanism.

Meaning

Tactus can be bodily contact or the metaphorical “touch” of intellectual grasp. Transcurrere is traversing; admovere is bringing one thing up to another. Impartibilis means without separable parts. The argument depends on not importing the bodily sense of touch into understanding.

Use in the book

Suppose mind were a body, or a form spread through a body. To reach its object it would have to touch and traverse it by points, by extent, or by both. A point reaches points rather than magnitude; an accumulation of points could never complete a traversal of the hypothesized infinitely many components. Extent alone reaches only other extended things, leaving simple objects unexplained. A mixed point-and-extent model inherits both difficulties.

The traversal hypothesis also generates an absurd multiplication of cognition. Each mental part would have to approach each part of the object in turn, producing endlessly repeated apprehensions instead of one understanding of the whole. These suppositions are the opponent's proposed bodily mechanism, not Ficino's positive description of an actual intellect assembled from points.

A Plotinian reply then cuts through the model: if only an indivisible component performs the knowing, that component alone deserves the name mind; the alleged nonknowing bodily remainder is irrelevant. Mind's ability to apprehend points without length, lines without breadth, surfaces without depth, numbers without position and beauty without deformity displays the contrast. It also actively separates intelligible features from their material admixtures, rather than merely receiving purified objects ready-made.

Places to read

VIII.4.11Simple intellectual touch is a positive metaphor, distinct from the rejected bodily mechanism.
VIII.5.1Point, extent and their combination all fail to explain knowledge by physical traversal.
VIII.5.2The Plotinian sufficiency argument removes the nonknowing remainder and emphasizes abstraction.

Translation in this edition

At VIII.5.1 the source correction tactu, replacing actu, is decisive: the hypothesis requires contact, not merely actuality. “Infinitely,” “almost innumerably” and “so to speak” preserve the deliberately excessive reductio rather than asserting a completed physical infinity.

attingere

attingere. Printed forms: attingat; attingere; attinget; attingit.

Reaching or apprehending, literal or cognitive according to its object. Sight reaches an image without the object's matter; intellect reaches common principles, so the verb alone does not imply bodily contact. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.

impartibilis

impartibilis. Printed forms: impartibile; impartibili.

Indivisible or without separable parts, naming the sufficient knower in the Plotinian reply. If this alone performs understanding, the alleged remainder of a bodily intellect has no explanatory role in being mind. References: VIII.5.2. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.

transcurrere

transcurrere. Printed forms: transcurrendo; transcurrere.

To run or pass across a stretch, here to traverse a magnitude bodily. Traversal belongs to the hypothesis that mind is a body or a form extended through bodily magnitude. Ficino tests the successive contact of parts and the resulting repetition of cognition; he does not endorse bodily traversal as the actual mechanism of understanding. References: VIII.5.1. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.