From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe infinitives contrast appearing good or just with actually possessing that quality. The passage tests reputation through the difference between seeming competent and performing well.
- In StobaeusTeles uses acting and kithara playing to challenge the preference for mere appearance, then applies the distinction to being good and living well.
- In this editionPreserve the dialogue’s questions and supplied answers. The argument compares appearance with the reality relevant to a task, not every possible use of reputation or presentation.
- A place to readChapter 15 · Excerpt 47 · Passage 1 Read the professional examples before the ethical conclusion, keeping the supplied dialogue spans visible and noting that the final claim remains expressed as what would appear better.
- English renderings
- to seem; to be reputed; to be
Meaning
Dokein can concern seeming or being regarded as something. In Teles’s argument it is opposed to actually being good or competent, not used as a technical definition of an optical appearance.
Use in the book
The dialogue begins with a preference for seeming just and tests it against acting and playing an instrument. Good performance depends on being capable, not merely on a reputation. The discussion then turns to ordinary goods and courage. When the interlocutor prefers the honor earned by apparent courage, the reply exposes the duties and dangers the reputation may bring: front-rank service, single combat and harsher treatment in captivity. Being praised is thus separated from possessing what would make the assigned task bearable.
The opening preference for seeming just is tested by a sequence of performances. Actors act well and kithara players play well because they possess the relevant ability, not because an audience merely attributes it to them. Repeating the answer makes the proposed dependence explicit before the discussion turns to living well. The ethical conclusion draws its force from that comparison. It does not deny that appearances can affect treatment by others, a possibility the later examples explore; it asks what supplies the capacity on which good performance depends.
Places to read
- Chapter 15 · Excerpt 47 · Passage 12Real competence is used to test the preference for seeming good.
- Chapter 15 · Excerpt 47 · Passage 22The interlocutor introduces public honor as a reason to prefer appearance.
- Chapter 15 · Excerpt 47 · Passage 32The costs of a false reputation for courage are made explicit.
Translation in this edition
Seem and be reputed both fit, depending on whether the contrast emphasizes appearance or other people’s judgment. Preserve the opposition with being rather than translating both sides as belief.
δοκεῖν
Attested. Chapter 15 · Excerpt 47 · Passage 1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 194-195.
τὸ δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 194–196. The heading identifies Theodorus’s epitome of Teles. The opening preference for appearance is the challenged position, not the conclusion endorsed by the whole excerpt.