From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordLawful and skilled in law distinguish carrying out law’s commands from interpreting it, within the Stoic identification of law with right reason rather than mere familiarity with enacted rules.
- In StobaeusThe account assigns both capacities to the wise person but defines them separately, keeping a relation between rational conduct and explanation without making the adjectives synonyms for holding a legal position.
- In this editionPreserve the conduct and interpretation distinction, and do not translate both adjectives simply as legal when that would hide the different capacities the passage explicitly sets out.
- A place to readChapter 7 · Excerpt 11i · Passage 5 Read the renewed definition of law and the two linked capacities together; carries out and can interpret supply distinct reasons for describing the wise person with the two adjectives.
- English renderings
- lawful; law-abiding; skilled in law
Meaning
Nomimos and nomikos distinguish following and performing what law commands from being able to explain law. Both receive a moral basis through law as right reason.
Use in the book
The Stoic exposition calls only the virtuous person lawful and capable of interpreting law. Its later restatement preserves the conduct/interpretation distinction. The claim is not that anyone holding a legal office is wise, nor that an unwise person cannot remember a statute’s wording. It depends on the ideal of consistent rational activity. Keeping the adjectives apart prevents an English word such as “legal” from concealing the difference between living in accordance with the command and having competence to explain it.
The restatement starts by recalling that law is right reason. It then explains lawfulness through carrying out commands and skill in law through interpreting them. The two capacities belong to the same wise person, but their combination does not erase their different functions. The contrary characterization of foolish people likewise depends on this moral definition, not on a test of whether someone can remember a statute. Read beside the earlier separate definitions, the passage makes explanation and consistent conduct mutually relevant without treating either as a mere civic title.
“he carries out what the law commands and alone can interpret it” (Chapter 7 · Excerpt 11i · Passage 5).
Places to read
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 11d · Passage 62The two adjectives have separate definitions.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 11i · Passage 52The account restates both capacities.
Translation in this edition
“Lawful” and “skilled in law” preserve the distinction.
νόμιμον
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 11d · Passage 6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96.
ἀστείου ὄντος καὶ ὁ νόμιμος ἀστεῖος ἂν ⟨εἴη⟩· νόμιμον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἄνδρα καὶ ἀκολουθητικὸν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν
νομικὸν
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 11d · Passage 6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96.
νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ προσταττομένων· νομικὸν δὲ τὸν ἐξηγητικὸν τοῦ νόμου. Μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων μήτε νόμιμον
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 96, 102. These ethical definitions are not modern professional qualifications.