Small and great · Lexicon

From the book

Hipparchus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordΣμικρός means small and μέγας great or large.
In HipparchusThe companion’s revised description at 226d–e attacks people who, through insatiability, crave even very small things worth little or nothing.
In this editionThe edition uses “small and great” rather than consistently modernizing μέγας to “large.”
A place to readπάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς — The companion describes craving tiny, low-worth or worthless things.

Meaning

Σμικρός means small and μέγας great or large. Ὀλίγος means little or few, while πολύς means much or many; their genitives can qualify worth, as in “worth little” and “worth much.” These pairs overlap in ordinary comparisons but do not give one interchangeable scale. A physically small acquisition can possess great worth.

The actual endings vary: σμικρά and μεγάλα are neuter plurals at the close, matching gains; σμικρόν and μέγα are singulars in the statement about what is gainful. Ὀλίγου and πολλοῦ in expressions of worth specify valuation, not necessarily the dimensions of an object. Translating every term as “amount” would erase that distinction.

Use in the book

The companion’s revised description at 226d–e attacks people who, through insatiability, crave even very small things worth little or nothing. The excess belongs to the craving in relation to its object. A small object can therefore expose a large failure of restraint. Socrates responds that such people cannot know the object is worthless; they must think it worth much. The account shifts from disproportionate appetite to mistaken assessment.

At 231e size is detached from gainfulness in a different way. Following the gold-and-silver exchange, what has worth is gainful “whether it is small or great.” The physical contrast cannot determine the result: a small weight of valuable material can exceed a larger weight in worth. The statement reverses any easy expectation that getting more stuff necessarily means gaining more.

At 232b–c the pair becomes comprehensive. All gains, both small and great, are said to be good; decent people wish for all good things; base people are recalled as loving gains both small and great. The inclusiveness of the pair helps close the argument by leaving no quantity-based exception. The moral distinction the companion wanted cannot be restored merely by pointing to the smallness of a gain.

The retrospective description of the base requires care. The earlier speech expressly dwells on craving even very small, low-worth things. “Even” suggests that smallness does not deter them, but the final formula “both small and great” is a broader recapitulation, not a verbatim repetition of that speech. The edition’s note points back to 226d–e and identifies the movement. A lexicon should record what was actually said at each place.

Finally, being indifferent to size because genuine benefit is desirable differs from being unable to resist the slightest profit. Those can share the words small and great while describing unlike dispositions. That difference remains relevant to the ending’s attempt to remove the reproach of loving gain.

Places to read

226d–eπάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς — The companion describes craving tiny, low-worth or worthless things.
226eπολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι — Socrates proposes mistaken high valuation.
231eἐάντε σμικρὸν ᾖ ἐάντε μέγα — Worth makes size irrelevant to gainfulness.
232bκαὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα — The conclusion explicitly includes both sizes of gain.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “small and great” rather than consistently modernizing μέγας to “large.” Its “worth little or nothing” is a value qualification and should not be folded into “small.” The same distinction keeps the later gold example intelligible: more weight can mean less worth.