From the book
Hipparchus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordὈνειδίζειν means to reproach, taunt or cast something against someone as a fault.
- In HipparchusThe dialogue began with a loaded social category.
- In this editionThe translation’s “even the one who casts this reproach” preserves καί’s sting: the condemning speaker is himself caught.
- A place to readκατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον — The universal result is attributed to the companion’s argument.
Meaning
Ὀνειδίζειν means to reproach, taunt or cast something against someone as a fault. Ὀρθῶς means rightly or correctly. Τυγχάνειν, when joined to a participle as here, marks a fact about someone: the reproacher turns out to be, or is in fact, the same sort of person. Its function is not to describe a lucky chance occurrence.
The final sentence repeats the reproach verb three times in different forms, keeping the act of accusation before the reader. It distinguishes whether someone can be called a lover of gain from whether that description is correctly used as a reproach. A universal classification is not automatically an ethical vindication.
Use in the book
The dialogue began with a loaded social category. The companion called lovers of gain unscrupulous, base and shameless, and later distinguished their willingness to profit from conduct decent people would refuse. Socrates repeatedly broadens gain into something good or beneficial, then derives love of gain from the shared desire for good things. By 232c both decent and base people fall under the description.
The conclusion is explicitly framed “by your argument.” This assigns the result to the companion’s concessions rather than presenting it as an unsupported authorial maxim. The companion says only “It appears so.” Socrates then states that reproaching another for loving gain is not right, because even the reproacher is such a person.
Two interpretive routes need distinguishing. If love of gain has been shown to mean an ordinary wish for genuine benefit, the term has lost the special vice implied by the opening reproach. Calling someone a lover of gain would then fail to identify the alleged fault. On that reading, the final turn exposes imprecise moral language. But if the original vice of graspingness remains, the fact that everyone shares it does not alone prove that reproach is incorrect. A shared fault could still be a fault. The final sentence therefore depends on more than universality.
The companion’s charge of deception and last admission of compulsion complicate any simple reading of the ending as settled wisdom. The dialogue closes before he gives a fully persuasive alternative account, but also before Socrates demonstrates that his resistance has vanished. The reader is left to examine whether the argument clarifies gain or changes its sense at decisive points.
The repeated ὀνειδίζειν turns scrutiny back on the accuser. That dramatic reversal need not be reduced to the slogan that only flawless people may criticize others. The specific question is whether this particular description can distinguish the blamed person from the person blaming him under the accepted account. The text tests the vocabulary of blame along with the logic of desire.
Places to read
- 232cκατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον — The universal result is attributed to the companion’s argument.
- 232cΟὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει — Socrates denies the correctness of the reproach.
- 232cεἴ τίς τῳ ὀνειδίζει φιλοκερδεῖ εἶναι — The charge is specifically being a lover of gain.
- 232cτυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων — The accuser is included in the class he invokes.
Translation in this edition
The translation’s “even the one who casts this reproach” preserves καί’s sting: the condemning speaker is himself caught. “Rightly” should not be silently replaced with “politely” or “legally”; the question concerns the justification of the accusation. The edition ends with this reversal and supplies no final reconciliatory speech.