Potency, possibility and the lion

Use in the book

V.1223456789101112131415 begins with the premise that corruption requires a potency not to be. Such a potency belongs neither to being itself nor to soul's complete simple essence. In a bodily substance it lies instead in the prime matter beneath the determinate form: fire cannot receive cold while remaining fire, but its matter can receive a replacement form. The remainder of the chapter explains material possibility and distinguishes it from the power responsible for soul's creation.

The modal trilemma is expressly relative to a standpoint. Ficino asks what follows “as far as matter is concerned,” not what the completed whole will do under every cause. Matter does not necessitate the finished work because it cannot form itself and needs a superior form-giver. It does not render the work impossible because it can be brought to the appropriate completion. The remaining possibility is two-sided. If it permitted only being, it would be necessity; if only nonbeing, impossibility. This context explains why possibile is narrower here than a broad modern use in which necessary propositions also count as possible.

Because matter is simple, the two opposed capacities are not assigned to two separately composed departments within it. The same material nature is open to both. The agent determines that nature to be a lion, but does not replace prime matter with another underlying principle. If its native indifference vanished at formation, prime matter would vanish just when a material object was made, contradicting the material constitution of the product. The continuing openness therefore permits later departure from lionhood.

V.12.7 adds a stronger claim: what is equally open to the extremes either turns to neither or turns by turns to both. This is the step by which potential corruptibility becomes an account of eventual bodily corruption. It is Ficino's natural-philosophical premise, not merely the logical meaning of the word possible. The argument's force should not be exaggerated by hiding that step. Rational soul is excluded because it is the simple source of the movement found in composites and because its judging ranges both above and below matter, supposedly demonstrating independence from a material base.

The question of prior possibility then prevents a loose appeal to creation from nothing. The fact that soul was made entails that it could be made, yet its prior possibility cannot be a part of an as-yet nonexistent soul. The soul is made whole, not piece by piece. Nothing cannot be the foundation of being's potentiality because the two contradict one another. The only remaining ground is the creator's stable power. God's active ability to make and soul's ability to be made are the same power viewed from opposite sides of the production relation, not a passive potency within God awaiting perfection.

Places to read

1. V.12.1, V.12.2Corruptibility requires a specifically opposed potency, absent from separate soul.
2. V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5, V.12.6, V.12.7Modal alternatives lead to prime matter’s enduring two-sided capacity and the lion example.
3. V.12.8, V.12.9, V.12.10, V.12.11The soul’s capacity to be created is located in God’s active power.

Translation in this edition

The apparatus preserves quodammodo in the claims that matter precedes formation: the priority is qualified. V.12.6 applies secundaque, distinguishing secondary/proximate from primary matter. Exstat at V.12.7 is construed as being brought forth from matter in contrast with constat, being constituted from it.

aptus / ineptus

aptus / ineptus. Printed forms: apta; inepta; ineptior.

Suited or unsuited to a proposed work. Different material readiness establishes nearer or farther potency-to-act transitions, with correspondingly different demands on agency. References: V.12.4, V.13.5. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

inchoatio

inchoatio. Printed forms: inchoatione.

An initial beginning or seed-stage of formation. Ficino denies that soul consists of a material beginning completed by an added act. References: V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

indifferens

indifferens. Printed forms: indifferens; indifferens ad utrumque.

Undetermined between opposed outcomes. Prime matter remains open to other forms after becoming this lion's matter; the forming agent determines it to an act. References: V.12.6, V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

integra / perfecta

integra / perfecta. Printed forms: integra; integritatem; perfecta.

Whole or complete in its defining form, not assembled from incomplete material pieces. Soul is called a complete simple form; the completion contrasts with prime matter's openness to replacement forms. References: V.12.1, V.12.2, V.13.18. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

leo

leo. Printed forms: leo; leone; leonem; leonis.

A lion, the generated animal used to distinguish determinate form from underlying prime matter. The lion's actuality does not abolish prime matter's capacity to receive a nonlion form later. References: V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

materia propinqua / secunda

materia propinqua / secunda. Printed forms: materia non propinqua leoni; prima; secundaque.

Proximate or secondary matter, distinguished from primary matter beneath the determinate organism. The capacity relevant to later corruption is retained at the prime-matter level, not assigned indiscriminately to every already formed organ. References: V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

necessarium / impossibile

necessarium / impossibile. Printed forms: impossibile; necessarium.

Necessary and impossible, the two extremes excluded in the material-production trilemma. Matter neither imposes a finished work by itself nor makes it impossible, so the work remains possible relative to it. References: V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

possibile

possibile. Printed forms: possibile; Possibile; potuisset.

Possible or capable of occurring; V.1223456789101112131415 defines the modal possibility at issue as open to being and nonbeing. The inference concerns a work viewed from matter before determination, not every use of can throughout the book. References: V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5, V.12.9. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

potentia ad non esse

potentia ad non esse. Printed forms: potentia ad esse pariter atque non esse; potentia ad non esse; potentiam ad non esse.

Capacity not to be, or material openness to both being and nonbeing as a given thing. The retained potency of prime matter explains a lion's corruptibility; the soul lacks that kind of material ground. References: V.12.1, V.12.2, V.12.5, V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

quodammodo

quodammodo. Printed forms: quodammodo.

In a certain respect or manner, explicitly qualifying a proposition. It limits claims about matter's priority, soul's inclination and the mode in which contraries or analogies are predicated. References: V.5.5, V.12.2, V.12.3, V.14.3. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

In a certain manner or respect, limiting an identification. Soul is called subtle heaven only under the comparison, not asserted to be literally an extended celestial body. References: VI.2.24. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

vicissim

vicissim. Printed forms: vicissim.

In turn or by alternating succession. Matter receives and loses opposing forms by turns; circular renewal and spiritual persistence must not be confused with such material exchange. References: V.4.1, V.4.4, V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.