Indivisibility extension place and whole presence

Place, coincidence and painless penetration

locus; loculus; aequari; porrigere; infundere; offensio; frangere

Coincidence here is exact occupation of one place by two bodies.

From the book

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordCoincidence here is exact occupation of one place by two bodies.
  • In the Platonic TheologyVI.9 first argues that two bodies cannot entirely coincide.
  • In this editionVI.9 is one source paragraph divided editorially into four comparison units.
  • A place to readThe impossibility of bodily coincidence is applied to essential whole presence.

Meaning

Coincidence here is exact occupation of one place by two bodies. Loculus is a little place, part of the conclusion that intermingled bodies still occupy distinct sites. Infundere and porrigere express soul’s inward presence, not automatically liquid pouring or spatial stretching of a substance.

Use in the book

VI.9 first argues that two bodies cannot entirely coincide. If their parts are indivisible, they cannot add up to bodily magnitude; if divisible, each remains a body with its own position. Intermingling yields many little bodies in many little places, not two entire bodies in one place. Soul, however, gives substantial being throughout the living body and thus must be inward to the whole and each part. Its presence cannot be a second occupying body.

The later painless-motion argument adds a concrete test. A solid soul-body either fails to fill the organism, leaving some parts unanimated, or breaks and is broken by the body it penetrates, causing continual pain. A fluid unstable soul-body cannot bind the organism firmly and needs another stabilizer. Actual soul’s own manner of movement causes no such continual disruption. “Motion through body” must consequently be read alongside the later account of psychic motion, not as a tiny object physically travelling inside every member.

Places to read

  1. VI.9.1, VI.9.2The impossibility of bodily coincidence is applied to essential whole presence.
  2. VI.9.4Solid and fluid soul-body hypotheses fail different causal tests.

Translation in this edition

VI.9 is one source paragraph divided editorially into four comparison units. The apparatus preserves the chapter number IX from M1482 against later printings’ assimilation to “sixth argument.” The lexical label offensio means injury or disturbance here; it is not modern offence at a statement.

aequaliter; aeque; aequare

aequaliter; aeque; aequare. Printed forms: aequans; aequari; aeque.

Equally, matching or coinciding, with the respect specified by context. Equal relation to all parts concerns the unlocated point, exact coincidence concerns bodies in place, and matching size belongs to the rejected quantitative soul hypothesis. References: VI.2.19, VI.9.1, VI.13.3. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

aequare in loco

aequare in loco. Printed forms: in eodem loco; invicem aequari.

To coincide entirely in the same place. The proof denies exact bodily co-occupation, not merely ordinary mixing of parts. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

essentia; esse; virtus; operatio

essentia; esse; virtus; operatio. Printed forms: a virtute operatio; ab essentia fluit esse.

Being proceeds from essence and operation from power. The causal distinction grounds the inference that giving each member being and activity requires presence of the soul’s essence and power there. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

fluxus; labilis; solidare

fluxus; labilis; solidare. Printed forms: fluxum et labile; solidaret.

Fluid and unstable; to consolidate. A fluid soul-body fails to bind firmly and therefore requires another stable principle. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

frangere

frangere. Printed forms: frangeret frangereturque.

To break and be broken reciprocally. A solid soul filling the whole body would injure it and itself, the opposed side of the painless-presence test. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

individua; magnitudo

individua; magnitudo. Printed forms: individua; magnitudinem.

Indivisibles and extended magnitude. Ficino denies that adding dimensionless indivisibles yields an extended body, one branch of the coincidence argument. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

intimus; absque medio

intimus; absque medio. Printed forms: absque medio; intima.

Inward or intimate; without an intermediary. The source of substantial being must be immediately united to the body and parts it animates. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

loculus; corpusculum

loculus; corpusculum. Printed forms: corpuscula; loculis.

Little places and little bodies. Divisible mixed parts remain separate bodies at separate sites, not two whole bodies in one position. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

mutare speciem

mutare speciem. Printed forms: mutant speciem.

To change the kind or substantial character. The members’ change upon removal of soul is offered as evidence that soul imparts substantial being. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

offensio; dolor

offensio; dolor. Printed forms: dolor; offensione.

Disturbance or injury and pain. The bodily hypothesis predicts continual painful disruption from a soul-body’s penetration, which the argument rejects. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.