One comprehension and indivisible sensation

Use in the book

Chapter 4 asks whether inward sight can be spread through bodily bulk. If it is, each part receives only a corresponding part of the color, and nothing knows the whole. Invoking a common form of the composite restarts the question: if that form is divided, the problem remains; if undivided, the required indivisible knower has already been conceded. Large, small and intermediate sizes each fail to suit all objects; assigning finite natural minima does not recover one comprehension.

Ficino then presses mathematical division into indefinitely divisible magnitude. Each portion of sight acquires a corresponding portion of color, generating countless senses, colors and visions rather than a single perception. He examines two escapes. A sensing whole made of entirely non-sensing parts would need an explanation of how those parts produce sentience. Parts each sensing through one whole vision do not explain the unity either. The species is a means of seeing the color, and aggregation of distinct parts proceeds through accumulated moments, whereas sensing, he says, occurs at once.

The final alternative again exposes a concealed unifier: if a superior sentient power gathers the parts, that power is better called the soul and sense. The conclusion concerns both power and its source or subject. Its premise of instantaneous sensation is Ficino’s philosophical claim; it is not a report of experimentally measured neural processing.

The governing demand is repeated with unusual precision: one comprehension of one thing must come from one comprehender. The three occurrences of unity are not merely rhetorical. The object can have visible parts, but the question is how its parts are grasped as belonging to that single object. A collection of local apprehensions would leave the very relation required by the whole comprehension unexplained. Ficino’s appeal to a form common to the composite tests whether unity has been supplied in substance or only renamed.

The size argument is distinct from that first partition problem. Suppose the sensitive power has one fixed magnitude. A large power would contact a small object only through a matching portion, leaving its remainder outside the act; a small power would not contain the large object; an intermediate one would fail at either extreme. The relevant verbs of fitting and correspondence expose the cost of insisting on equal quantitative portions. The soul’s successful cognition of varied sizes is therefore evidence, in Ficino’s reasoning, against making its capacity an ordinary magnitude. This does not mean that the source’s visible object must physically enter the organ at full size; that is the very material picture under examination.

The question of how many parts there are then produces two further versions. Natural minima might supply a determinate finite division, but still no single whole grasp. Mathematical division removes even that stopping point. The accumulating “countless” senses, colors and visions dramatizes the consequence of granting an independent act to each corresponding part. It should not be read as Ficino endorsing actual infinitely many perceivers within an eye. It is what follows if the proposed explanation keeps replicating the same part-to-part relation instead of supplying a knower of the whole.

The two proposed rescues address different problems. Giving sensation only to the whole makes all its constituent parts non-sensing and leaves the origin of sentience unexplained. Giving each part a complete share in the same total vision instead removes the need for the others: if one already suffices, plurality adds nothing. If each does not suffice, an additional source must make their union sentient. The higher sentient unifier thereby conceded has the explanatory role Ficino assigns to soul. The point is not merely that one component is numerically enough, but that the explanans must already possess the unity and sensing absent from the proposed aggregate.

The temporal comparison supplies yet another reason. Assembly from distinct parts involves accumulation of moments, whereas sensation is asserted to occur immediately. The conclusion therefore relies on a relation between quantitative division, temporal succession and conscious unity. A contemporary reader may dispute one of those premises without changing what the text argues. The lexicon preserves their separation so that accepting the phenomenological demand for one perception does not automatically entail accepting every physical and temporal claim used to defend it.

Places to read

1. VII.4.1A single object requires one comprehending power; magnitude and finite partition fail to supply it.
2. VII.4.2Infinite partition, non-sentient parts, temporal aggregation and a superior unifier are tested.

Translation in this edition

The two comparison units divide one source paragraph at the move to mathematical infinity. “Form” for species must be read with the explicit distinction between what is seen and that through which it is seen. Subiectum at the end means the bearer of the power, not its perceived object.

collocare

collocare. Printed forms: collocabimus.

To place or locate an explanatory function in a power. Conceding an indivisible common form places comprehension in an indivisible power; this is an argumentative allocation, not proof of a tiny anatomical seat. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

compositum / forma communis

compositum / forma communis. Printed forms: communem partibus; compositi; formam quandam.

A composite and the form alleged to be common to its parts. If that form is divisible the original problem returns; if indivisible, the required nonpartitioned power is conceded. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

concipere / comprehendere

concipere / comprehendere. Printed forms: comprehendat; comprehendens; comprehendente; comprehensionem; concipitve.

To conceive or grasp; an integrated comprehension and its grasper. A divided sensory apparatus would assign a different piece of color to each part without explaining one grasp of the whole. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

congregatio / momentum

congregatio / momentum. Printed forms: congregatione; congregationem; congregentur; momento; momentorum.

Assembling distinct parts and an accumulation of moments. Ficino associates composite production with temporal aggregation and contrasts it with supposedly immediate sensing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

congruere / quadrare / aptare

congruere / quadrare / aptare. Printed forms: aptabis; congruet; quadrabit.

To fit, correspond or match one thing to another. No fixed size of sensory power can match every sensible object; equal-part assignment therefore does not explain universal perception. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

distribuere / partiri / secare

distribuere / partiri / secare. Printed forms: distribues; dividitur; partiri; partiturum; secabis.

To distribute or divide into portions. Finite natural minima and mathematical infinite division are successive tests of a partitioned sensory image. References: VII.4.1, VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

fons / subiectum virtutis

fons / subiectum virtutis. Printed forms: fons; subiectum.

Source and bearer of a power. The soul is both the origin and the subject of indivisible sensory power; subject does not mean perceived object here. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

forsitan / forsan / fortasse

forsitan / forsan / fortasse. Printed forms: Forsan; forsitan; fortasse.

Perhaps, marking a proposed possibility rather than an endorsed conclusion. The surface-image account, partition escapes and divided-soul objection are entertained as possibilities to be examined. References: VII.1.3, VII.4.2, VII.5.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

hypothetical concession

hypothetical concession. Printed forms: Esto, si vis; forsitan; Si dixeris; Sint, si vis.

Granting a position for examination rather than affirming it. The divided-soul, line and harmony proposals are opponent positions or temporary suppositions; their rejected consequences must not be reported as doctrines. References: VII.2.1, VII.2.2, VII.4.1, VII.11.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

infinitus / innumerabilis

infinitus / innumerabilis. Printed forms: infinitas; infinite; infiniti; infinitos; innumerabiles.

Infinite or countless plurality generated by the partition hypothesis. The multiplication of senses, colors and visions is an unacceptable consequence, not Ficino’s accepted account of perception. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

moles / distendere

moles / distendere. Printed forms: distentus; mole.

Bodily bulk and being spread out through it. The hypothesis of an inward sight extended in bulk is granted temporarily so that its consequences can be tested. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

necessitas / oportet

necessitas / oportet. Printed forms: necessario; oportet; Oportet.

Necessity or what an argument says is required. The animal examples contest a necessary relation of size to capacity; the one-comprehension argument requires a unified grasper. References: VII.3.1, VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

pars

pars. Printed forms: partem; partes; partibus.

A part, especially one region of an extended body or a proposed partition of a sensory power. The account asks how individually bounded parts could yield one grasp of a whole. References: VII.1.1, VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

paulatim / subito

paulatim / subito. Printed forms: paulatim; subito.

Gradually and at once. The temporal opposition supports an indivisible sensing power in Ficino’s argument, not an experimentally established account of neural timing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

sentire / sentiens / expers sensus

sentire / sentiens / expers sensus. Printed forms: sentiendi expertes; sentiens; sentient; sentiente; sentientem.

To sense; a sensing subject; absence of sensing capacity. The question is whether non-sensing parts could produce a sensing whole without a superior unifying sentient source. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

visio

visio. Printed forms: visionem; visiones.

An act of seeing or complete vision. The proposed shared whole vision is tested as an attempted escape from fragmented sensing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.