From the book
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Marsilio Ficino · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordLaesio is an injury; loosening and contraction count as harmful when they corrupt the affected substance.
- In the Platonic TheologyThe cut in flesh and spirit threatens their substance.
- In this edition“Affection” translates a passive bodily modification in the regress.
- A place to readThe surgical example distinguishes the levels affected and aware.
Meaning
Laesio is an injury; loosening and contraction count as harmful when they corrupt the affected substance. A judge “free from affection” is free from the bodily modification it judges. This does not mean that the soul is indifferent to pain or incapable of sympathetic distress.
Use in the book
The cut in flesh and spirit threatens their substance. Ficino argues through the ordered dependence of substance, power and operation: damaging the underlying substance would impair its power and consequently its activity. If the same cut passed into soul, its sensing and judging should be obstructed just when it must recognize the injury, locate it and direct a remedy. Yet the soul does perform those activities. The inference separates knowledge of a bodily lesion from undergoing that lesion in the same manner.
Whole presence yields another objection. If the whole soul itself suffered the lesion at the wounded part, the same whole soul, present throughout the body, would suffer it everywhere. It could then no longer report it as localized there rather than elsewhere. This builds upon the distinction between a painful awareness and the original bodily injury; it does not deny that the person experiences pain.
Finally, a passive judgement would require a further judgement of its affected state. If this further judge were equally passive, another would be needed without resolution. Ficino terminates the sequence in a judge that receives no bodily affection or bodily form. A subtle body, bodily affection, or point of an affection cannot fulfill this role. The positive active account of sensation follows from this conclusion, rather than leaving sensation as a bare absence of being affected.
Places to read
Translation in this edition
“Affection” translates a passive bodily modification in the regress. It must not be confused with the compassion and shared pain assigned to imagination. The edition’s three comparison units divide one continuous source paragraph, preserving this connection.
condolere / compassio / condolentia
condolere / compassio / condolentia. Printed forms: compassio; condolentia; condolet.
To share pain, with the related names for shared suffering. The account assigns these responses to imagination while reserving bodily injury for flesh and spirit. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere
frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere. Printed forms: contractio; contrahatur; contrahitur; discindi; dissolvitur; frangitur; soluta; solutio; solvatur; suffusus.
To break, sever, loosen and contract. Flesh is cut and bodily spirit loosens or retreats inward; these material alterations are not passed unchanged into soul’s substance. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
iudex liber passione
iudex liber passione. Printed forms: iudex; iudicem; iudicem quendam liberum passione; liberum.
A judge free of the bodily affection it knows. The regress terminates in such a judge, excluding a subtle body, bodily affection and a point of an affection. References: VII.6.3. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
iudicium passionis
iudicium passionis. Printed forms: iudicio; iudicium; iudicium passionis; passivum iudicium.
Judgement of an affection, distinguished from the affection itself. A judgement passively altered in the same way would require another judge; repeating passivity recreates the regress. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
laesio / noxius
laesio / noxius. Printed forms: laesio; laesione; laesionem; noxiam.
Injury that harms or corrupts a substance. Ficino asks whether the same harmful alteration can pass from flesh and spirit into the soul. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
medicus / cutis / caro
medicus / cutis / caro. Printed forms: carne; caro; cutem; medicus.
Physician, skin and flesh in the example of a cut. The concrete surgery separates physical severing from the soul’s sensing and judgement of it. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis
mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis. Printed forms: affectio; mersum; punctum quoddam affectionis.
An immersed fine body, a bodily condition, or a point of such a condition. All three candidates are rejected as unable to supply the unmodified judging power. References: VII.6.3. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
passio / affectio
passio / affectio. Printed forms: affectiones; afficiunt; passio; passionem; passiones; passionibus; patitur.
A condition undergone or an affection, especially bodily modification. Ficino distinguishes being bodily affected from judging that affection, and both from the soul’s sympathetic distress. References: VII.6.1, VII.6.2, VII.6.3, VII.13.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
perdere / laedere
perdere / laedere. Printed forms: laederetur; perdit.
To destroy or impair. If the soul were cut as the flesh is cut, its power and operation would be impaired when they should be accurately perceiving the cut. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
pernicies / diligere opus
pernicies / diligere opus. Printed forms: diligunt; perniciem.
Destruction or ruin, and loving one’s own work. The soul grieves at damage to body and spirit because they are its work; impassibility does not mean emotional indifference. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.
substantia / virtus / operatio
substantia / virtus / operatio. Printed forms: operationem; substantia; substantiae; substantiaeque; substantiam; virtus; virtutem; virtutis.
Substance, its power, and the exercise of that power. The dependence runs in order: destroying substance undermines power and then activity, which would obstruct sensing and judging injury. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.