Growth, amputation and soul-size

Use in the book

The final chapter grants, for reductio, that a subtle soul-body fills the entire visible body. Dividing the body would then leave actual little souls in severed limbs, which should live, move and feel for a time. The surviving soul would be quantitatively reduced after amputation and should become correspondingly dull, forgetful and “small-souled.” These are consequences Ficino rejects, not descriptions he endorses of people with amputations.

The same quantitative model predicts a more magnificent and divine soul in a larger body and a soul growing as the adolescent body grows. Such growth would require adding more soul-like bodily material, which opens the nourishment dilemma. The issue is a mistaken proportionality between bodily size and psychic capacity, not the denial that cognition may be affected by bodily condition or develop with age. Earlier infant/adult distinctions and the present rejection of size as soul’s essence therefore need not be flattened into inconsistency.

Places to read

1. VI.13.1, VI.13.2Severance tests whole soul against quantitative partition and its absurd psychic consequences.
2. VI.13.3Growth extends the reductio from diminished members to increased bodily size.

Translation in this edition

The apparatus reads anima unius sit tota naturae as “the whole soul is of one nature,” explaining why it unites diverse members. “Small-souled” preserves the pun. The entire opening is conditional on si anima corpus est; dropping it reverses Ficino’s position.

agilis; agilitas; celeritas

agilis; agilitas; celeritas. Printed forms: agile; agilia; agilis; celeritas; celeriter; facillime.

Agile, swift or readily acting, and swiftness. The bodily soul hypothesis uses extreme subtlety and agility to explain permeation, then faces the objection that such a body would be too unstable for memory. References: VI.1.5, VI.13.1, VI.13.7. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

bracchium; crus

bracchium; crus. Printed forms: brachia et crura; brachiis et cruribus amputatis.

Arms and legs, including amputated members. The allegedly diminished soul’s dullness and forgetfulness are rejected consequences of materialism, not Ficino’s view of amputees. References: VI.13.1, VI.13.2. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

crescere; decrescere; adolescere

crescere; decrescere; adolescere. Printed forms: adolescat; adolescet; crescet; decrescet.

To grow, diminish and mature. The reductio falsely makes soul-size track body-size and asks what additional material would nourish it. References: VI.13.3. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

frustum; secare

frustum; secare. Printed forms: frusta; membris sectis.

A severed piece and cut members. The reductio assumes soul is body, then asks why each bodily piece would not retain a little soul. References: VI.13.1. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

magnificentior; divinior

magnificentior; divinior. Printed forms: divinior; magnificentior.

More magnificent and more divine. These comparative predicates expose the absurdity of treating a larger body as the measure of a better soul. References: VI.13.3. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus

pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus. Printed forms: hebes; obliviosa; pusillanimis.

Small-souled, dull and forgetful. Literal smallness of soul is made to yield absurd mental consequences under the bodily-quantity hypothesis. References: VI.13.2. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

unius naturae

unius naturae. Printed forms: anima unius sit tota naturae.

The whole soul is of one nature. The hyperbaton is read as one unifying nature capable of binding diverse members, not many heterogeneous soul-pieces. References: VI.13.1. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.