Criticism and method

Concrete terms

concrete terms; concrete

Defining beauty by its instances

From the book

The Renaissance

Walter Pater · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordIn logic a concrete term names a thing, an abstract term a quality taken apart from things; "concrete" comes from the Latin for grown together, solid.
  • In The RenaissanceThe Preface asks for beauty to be defined "not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible" (PRE §1). The word returns where something general is found in a particular: "concrete works of art" (PRE §7), "some brief and wholly concrete moment" (GIO §20), Winckelmann solving a theoretical question "in the concrete" (WIN §9).
  • In this editionThe edition has no note on the word; the note at WIN §9 says that Pater's "finding" of Greek art "makes the encounter active and concrete".
  • A place to readPRE §1.

Meaning

The Latin concretus is grown together, condensed, as a solid is. Logicians took the pair concrete and abstract for two kinds of name. John Stuart Mill put it so in his System of Logic (1843): a concrete name stands for a thing, as "white" for white things, and an abstract name for an attribute of a thing, as "whiteness".1 To define beauty "in the most concrete terms possible" is to define it by the beautiful things themselves, and not by beauty as a quality drawn off from them.

Use in the book

The phrase stands at the turn of the first paragraph, where beauty is to be defined "not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible" (PRE §1; see Universal formula). The reason is given just before: beauty "is relative" (PRE §1; see Relative). The Preface does not give up definition. It asks for many definitions, each as concrete as its object allows, and the essays can be taken as attempts at them (see Beauty).

The other places show what the concrete is good for. The fifteenth century in Italy is to be studied "not merely for its positive results in the things of the intellect and the imagination, its concrete works of art, its special and prominent personalities", but also for its general spirit (PRE §7): the concrete is the first object, though not the only one. In the School of Giorgione the highest sort of dramatic poetry presents "some brief and wholly concrete moment—into which, however, all the motives, all the interests and effects of a long history, have condensed themselves", and Giorgione's school selects such instants (GIO §20; see Ideal instant). The concrete moment holds the general, as the word's root, grown together, would have it.

Winckelmann is the concrete critic. Kant's influence on Goethe, by Goethe's own account, "consisted in a severe limitation to the concrete", and Goethe adds that in born antiquaries like Winckelmann, the eighteenth-century historian of ancient art, a constant handling of the antique "maintains that limitation as effectually as a critical philosophy" (WIN §7; see Limitation to the concrete). Where Lessing had theorised on poetry and sculpture, "By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete" (WIN §9). The Preface's demand can be read as fulfilled there: the question is answered not by a better definition but by the objects themselves, seen and handled.

Places to read

Every paragraph in which the word occurs, in the order of the book.

  1. PRE §1Beauty is to be defined not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible.
  2. PRE §7The fifteenth century is to be studied for its concrete works of art and its personalities, and for its general spirit.
  3. GIO §20The highest dramatic poetry presents some brief and wholly concrete moment into which a long history has condensed itself; Giorgione's school selects such instants.
  4. WIN §7Kant's influence on Goethe was a severe limitation to the concrete, which the handling of the antique maintained in Winckelmann.
  5. WIN §9Winckelmann solves in the concrete the question of poetry and sculpture on which Lessing had theorised.

Source note

1. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (1843), book 1, chapter 2, §4.