From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →- English renderings
- εἴπερ, eiper, “if … really”, “if”
Meaning
Attested: εἴπερ (eiper; 159a, 161a twice, 161e, 166e, 167a, 168b, 168c, 168d twice, 170c, 175e). “If indeed”, “if really”: εἰ, “if”, strengthened by περ. It states a condition that the speaker takes to hold, or insists must hold, and so it carries the premises of arguments. It begins the inquiry: temperance, “if it really is in you”, must give rise to some sense (159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι). It carries the steps against modesty, that temperance is good “if it makes good those it is present with” (161a), and against doing one’s own business, “if writing and reading are doing something” (161e). In the argument about relatives it states the condition that makes each case absurd: a greater is greater than something smaller, “if it is to be greater” (168b); a greater than itself would be smaller than itself (168c); hearing, “if hearing is to hear itself”, must have a sound (168d; see ἀκοή), and sight, “if it is to see itself, must have some color” (168d–e). Twice it carries Critias’ definition itself, “if it is knowledge of knowledge” (166e) and “if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge” (170c). At 167a it names the case in which the man examined knows what he thinks he knows, “if he does know it” (167a), and at the end Socrates’ hope for the boy: “if you have it you are blessed” (175e–176a; see μακάριος). The particle states conditions; those that concern temperance itself, at 159a, 166e, 170c and 175e, the dialogue leaves unsettled.