Reading, experience and concordance · Lexicon

From the book

Centrum Naturae Concentratum

Attributed to Ali Puli · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordConcordance is the reconciliation of apparently contrary philosophical writings. Reading, working, seeing and understanding are different activities, not interchangeable proofs of knowledge.
In the bookDelle’s host has read many books yet cannot reconcile them. His visitor teaches him to interpret both books and ordinary appearances, but the narrator’s failure to record the lesson limits what he can later transmit.
In this edition“As well as I understood it” qualifies the claim to faithful reporting. The J. J. F. speaker’s “I can”, “I hope” and “I take this to be” retain distinct degrees and kinds of assertion.
A place to readDiscourse on the Universal · Passage 2–Discourse on the Universal · Passage 4 and Discourse on the Universal · Passage 9–Discourse on the Universal · Passage 10: the question about work, the correction of sight without understanding, and the admission of incomplete recollection.

Meaning

Concordance means the reconciliation of apparently contrary philosophical writings. Working, seeing, interpreting and demonstrating are distinct tests of understanding in the companion texts. Anatomia extends beyond dissection of a corpse to an analytic disclosure of a body’s principles. Signatura naturalis names a natural signature or expression of what a thing is; in its immediate passage, it concerns the retention of a vegetable’s colour, taste and smell in its salt, not a general catalogue of resemblances between plants and bodily organs.

The vocabulary asks how a reader knows, not merely how much a reader has read. Concordantiam Philosophorum is what the host wants to learn; demonstriren is what the later discourse’s speaker claims he can do. Between those claims lie acts of interpretation and reports of experience. Their grammatical form matters: a question, a capacity, a recollection and a hope do not give the reader the same kind of evidence.

Use in the book

The Delle narrative begins with a book left open. Returning to the room, the host finds his visitor holding it and is asked whether he understands what he reads. He has read many works and wants the philosophers’ agreement, but their apparent contradictions have only increased his perplexity. The visitor replies, “Have you also worked?” (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2). The question exposes a gap between accumulated reading and understanding of the art; it does not establish that books are worthless.

Indeed, the visitor promptly examines the host’s books with curiosity, lingers over one small volume and promises to reconcile contrary philosophers. Later he demonstrates agreement among named authorities (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 3, Discourse on the Universal · Passage 9). Reading and experience are intended to illuminate one another. The walk outside the town gives the point another form. The host correctly sees glittering sand and sunlight, but the visitor tells him that he does not understand what he sees (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 4). Mere eyesight is not the interpretation the visitor claims to teach.

Domestic and social interruptions keep the lesson from becoming a complete initiation. The host’s wife calls him away; the guest refuses the first offered brandy; a later gathering ends in drinking. Expecting another day together, the host fails to write down the practice ex ore ipsius, from the visitor’s own mouth. By morning the guest has left, and pursuit fails to recover him (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 3, Discourse on the Universal · Passage 9). The formula introducing the ensuing work consequently promises faithfulness only “as well as I understood it” (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 10). The surviving report presents remembered instruction, neither a verbatim transcript nor a claim that the host successfully completed everything described.

The initial J. J. F. discourse offers another posture of knowledge. Its speaker claims the ability to demonstrate in actual fact and says plain nature taught him something only recently (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 1, Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4). His “anatomy” of matter is opposed to costly cadaver dissection, which he judges of little benefit. The polemic concerns what he regards as useful, nature-preserving disclosure; it is not the lexicon’s assessment of the value of anatomical study.

The local account of natural signature is similarly specific. The salt is said to retain its vegetable’s colour, taste and smell (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4). These sensory qualities are the evidence invoked here. They should not be replaced by an unrelated general theory of resemblance between the shape of a plant and the organ it heals.

The discourse also varies its assertions. “I can” claims a capacity; “I have seen” reports an observation; “I hope” marks a projected result; “I take this to be” identifies a judgement (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 1, Philosophical Discourse · Passage 3–Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4, Philosophical Discourse · Passage 6). None is authenticated simply by being in the first person, but their differences are part of the evidence the text offers. Its final pairing of practice and theory presents operation and explanation as companions, not rival ways of knowing.

Places to read

Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2German“Habt ihr denn auch gearbeitet?” The visitor asks about work, not simply additional reading.
Discourse on the Universal · Passage 4German“Siehestu recht / aber nicht verstehestu es” Correct sight is distinguished from the claimed understanding of what appears.
Discourse on the Universal · Passage 9German“die Practicam nicht ex ore ipsius auffschriebe” The narrator explicitly records the missed opportunity for direct recording.
Discourse on the Universal · Passage 10German“als gut ich von ihm verstanden / treulich” The account’s claim of fidelity is limited by the narrator’s understanding.
Philosophical Discourse · Passage 1German“alles reipsa demonstriren kan” The discourse speaker asserts a capacity for actual demonstration.
Philosophical Discourse · Passage 3German“& spero” Hope, not achieved completion, qualifies part of the account.
Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4German“Farbe / Geschmack und Geruch” The local signature argument concerns these sensory qualities.
Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4German“dieses halte ich sey” The concluding formulation is expressly the speaker’s judgement.

Translation in this edition

“Have you also worked?” keeps the also in auch gearbeitet: the visitor asks for something alongside reading, not necessarily instead of it (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2). “You see correctly, but do not understand it” likewise preserves the opposition within Siehestu recht / aber nicht verstehestu es (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 4). Neither sentence says that the host’s reading or sight is wholly false.

The fidelity formula in Discourse on the Universal · Passage 10 contains its own restriction, als gut ich von ihm verstanden. “Faithfully” must therefore remain joined to “as well as I understood it”. In the later discourse, & spero is “and hope”, not a past-tense assertion of success, while dieses halte ich sey becomes “This I take to be” (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 3–Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4). These small verbal differences protect the reported limits of knowledge.

“Anatomy” remains an important historical metaphor and practice-word. Where flesh, blood, bone or urine are being considered through separation, the edition’s “analyse” helps distinguish that activity from cadaver dissection (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4). This explains the speaker’s terminology without endorsing either his polemic or his medical claims.

Printed forms

Attested forms: Concordantiam Philosophorum (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2 — 1682 pp. 39–40); Concordantzen (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 9 — 1682 pp. 45–46); verborgene Reden (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 3 — 1682 pp. 40–41); gearbeitet (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2 — 1682 pp. 39–40); speculirete (Discourse on the Universal · Passage 2 — 1682 pp. 39–40); Anatomia (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 3 — 1682 pp. 50–51); anatomirte (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4 — 1682 pp. 51–53); Signatura naturalis (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4 — 1682 pp. 51–53); demonstriren (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 1 — 1682 pp. 49–50); reipsa demonstriren (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 1 — 1682 pp. 49–50); Praxi & Theoriâ (Philosophical Discourse · Passage 4 — 1682 pp. 51–53). Their local senses and relationships are explained above; inflected forms and historical signs are retained.