From the book
Centuries of Meditations
Thomas Traherne · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Aristotle
Aristotle; perfect exercise of perfect virtue
Aristotle appears as a named authority for the relation of felicity to the exercise of virtue.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordAristotle appears as a named authority for the relation of felicity to the exercise of virtue.
- In TraherneThe quotation becomes intelligible through Traherne's preceding account of faculties and objects.
- In this editionThe wording is Traherne's English citation and interpretation.
- A place to beginAristotle’s account of felicity is explained as the perfected exercise of knowing and loving objects.
Meaning
Aristotle appears as a named authority for the relation of felicity to the exercise of virtue. Traherne gives an English formulation of that relation, not an extended exposition of Aristotle's ethical system.
Use in the book
The quotation becomes intelligible through Traherne's preceding account of faculties and objects. Knowledge, life, and love do not fulfil their purpose by remaining idle capacities. A perfect life extends to its objects, sees them, and loves them; virtue is their right exercise. Traherne therefore reads the inherited formula through his own universal account of enjoyment. The appeal to Aristotle supports activity rather than the withdrawal of happiness into a possession no one uses. It does not establish that Aristotle endorsed all of Traherne's Christian claims about eternity or the world as a personal inheritance.
Places to read
- III.68Aristotle’s account of felicity is explained as the perfected exercise of knowing and loving objects.
In this edition
The wording is Traherne's English citation and interpretation. No Greek original or exact ancient locator is supplied by this article from the meditation alone.
Source note
Primary text: III.68. Aristotle is explicitly named in III.68; other possible Aristotelian echoes require separate attribution and are not counted here.
From the book
Heinrich Khunrath’s Magnesia Catholica Philosophorum
Heinrich Khunrath · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Aristotle
Aristotele; In Proœmio Metaphysices; Aristot: 4 Meteor:
Aristotle supports two different claims: teaching through causes and the alleged necessity of reducing metals into first matter.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordAristotle supports two different claims: teaching through causes and the alleged necessity of reducing metals into first matter.
- In KhunrathPage 36 cites his authority for causal teaching, with the proem of the Metaphysics identified in the margin.
- In this editionThe modern apparatus disputes the Meteorologica attribution.
- A reading distinctionKhunrath's hostile comparison with alleged biblical tampering on p. 94 is part of his polemic, not independent evidence that Aristotle's text was altered.
Meaning
Aristotle supports two different claims: teaching through causes and the alleged necessity of reducing metals into first matter.
Use in the book
Page 36 cites his authority for causal teaching, with the proem of the Metaphysics identified in the margin. Page 94 gives a more problematic attribution to the fourth book of the Meteorologica, through Avicenna and other Philosophers. Khunrath admits that the dictum cannot be found in contemporary Aristotle texts but asserts that it belongs there and alleges hostile alteration.
The distinction between those uses matters. The first provides a general epistemic standard; the second is a contested textual proof within a technical argument. Respect for Aristotle does not eliminate the gap between an attributed saying and the available book. Khunrath's own acknowledgement allows the reader to see that gap.
Places to read
- 1599 p. 36Aristotle underwrites knowledge through causes and principles.
- 1599 p. 36 · margin2The proem of the Metaphysics is supplied as locator.
- 1599 p. 94The Meteorologica dictum is defended despite its acknowledged absence from the available text.
Translation in this edition
The modern apparatus disputes the Meteorologica attribution. This article records both the primary allegation and its evidential limitation without treating suppression as a verified event.
Source note
Khunrath's hostile comparison with alleged biblical tampering on p. 94 is part of his polemic, not independent evidence that Aristotle's text was altered.
From the book
Empedocles’ The Testimonia, Volume II
Empedocles of Acragas · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Aristotle
Aristotle is both a witness to Empedocles and an author arguing for his own explanations.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordAristotle is both a witness to Empedocles and an author arguing for his own explanations.
- In this workThe collection makes this double role unusually visible.
- In this editionThe introduction’s superlatives about the best or most treacherous witness are editorial judgments.
- A place to readSeparates natural inquiry from Homeric poetry despite their shared metre.
Meaning
Aristotle is both a witness to Empedocles and an author arguing for his own explanations. Terms such as matter, form, cause, nature and principle often belong to the structure of that later argument. Their occurrence in an account of Empedocles does not by itself show that Empedocles used them with Aristotle’s distinctions.
Use in the book
The collection makes this double role unusually visible. Aristotle can credit an insight into the ratio of a mixture while asking questions that threaten the account’s extension to soul and different tissues. He can discuss Love and Strife as causes while criticizing the consistency of their assigned functions. His judgment that Empedocles and Homer share metre does not simply classify a physical doctrine; it intervenes in a theory of poetry. These are different contexts, and the lexicon does not flatten them into a single verdict that Aristotle either understood or distorted everything. A useful reading asks what he quotes, what he paraphrases, and what premise his objection needs. Where the source gathers several Aristotelian passages beneath one A number, the work named above each passage remains important: a criticism in a discussion of soul need not answer exactly the same question as a passage about animal parts or generation.
Places to read
- A 22–A 23 (polemical)Aristotle, Poetics. Separates natural inquiry from Homeric poetry despite their shared metre.
- A 42 (polemical)Aristotle, De caelo Γ 2; De gen. et corr. B 7. Reports an omitted formation under Love and compares the present cosmos with its former condition, passages central to rival readings of the cycle.
- A 78 (polemical)2Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals and On the Soul. Recognizes the explanatory role of ratio while testing its relation to soul and tissue differences.
- A 91 (polemical)Aristotle, On Sense and Sense-Objects. Uses the lantern comparison in a question about why an eye made of fire would not see in darkness.
Translation in this edition
The introduction’s superlatives about the best or most treacherous witness are editorial judgments. The safer procedure is passage-specific. Works explicitly marked Pseudo-Aristotle in the supplied edition must not be cited as secure works of Aristotle.
Source note
Attribution to Aristotle and attribution to an Aristotelian school compilation are different claims. A work circulating under a famous name can still preserve useful evidence, but its authorship should remain qualified.