Philosophy

Why Not an Opinion of Opinions?

Critias doubts that an opinion can be only about opinions. A moment later he gives knowledge a different answer.

Socrates puts two nearly identical questions side by side. A distinction from the Theaetetus helps explain what Critias would still have to show.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Two questions side by sideCritias rejects an opinion confined to opinions and accepts knowledge confined to kinds of knowledge.
  • The missing reasonSocrates calls the proposal strange and investigates it, leaving Critias’s different answers without an explanation.
  • A proposal from the TheaetetusIf knowledge required an account, explaining why we hold a view might help us assess what we know about its subject.
  • What the KK principle would allowKnowing that you know a medical fact would add awareness of your knowledge while leaving the medical fact in view.

Charmides 167c–e, 167e–168b, 169a–d, 170b–d · Republic 477a–b, 478d–479d · Theaetetus 201c–d, 210a–b · Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits §5.1

Socrates builds his challenge to Critias as a list. Is there a sight that sees itself and the other sights but no colors, a hearing that hears no sounds, a desire for no pleasure, a love of nothing beautiful, a fear that fears none of the dreadful things? Critias waves them away, once with an oath. Then Socrates asks about “an opinion of opinions and of itself” that has no opinion about anything ordinary opinions are about. “Not at all,” Critias says. Are they saying there is a kind of knowledge with the same restriction, “knowledge of no subject of learning,” only of itself and other kinds of knowledge? “We are.”

Opinion is the comparison that makes me stop. Sight, hearing, desire, and fear are different enough from knowledge that Critias might say the analogy doesn’t hold. An opinion and a piece of knowledge can both seem to tell us how things are, and we can ask whether a judgment we took for knowledge was only an opinion. If Critias thinks the proposed kind of opinion is impossible, it’s hard to see why the equivalent kind of knowledge should get a yes unless something about knowing makes a difference.

Nobody in the dialogue says what that difference would be. Critias gives opposite answers to the two questions. Socrates calls their proposal strange and says they should keep looking into whether it’s possible. Later he admits he can’t say with confidence whether there could be such a kind of knowledge. The two replies stay on the page, and it’s worth asking what Critias might have said to explain them.

Plato’s other dialogues offer some places to look. In the Republic, Socrates treats knowledge and opinion as different powers with different objects. Knowledge is directed at what is, and opinion at what falls between being and nonbeing. In the Theaetetus, one proposal is that knowledge is true opinion with an account. The dialogue tests that proposal and ends without accepting it. Still, it gives us an idea to try here. If knowing something requires being able to give an account of it, perhaps I have a way of taking stock of my own knowledge that I lack when I simply hold an opinion.

There’s a related question in modern philosophy. The KK principle says that if you know something, you know that you know it. Timothy Williamson argues that you can know something without even being in a position to know that you know it. Suppose the principle were true all the same. If you knew a fact about medicine, you’d also know that you knew it. That would give you some knowledge of your own knowing, and it would still start with a fact about medicine. Critias needs a kind of knowledge that can leave such facts behind entirely.

Now consider the opinion Critias rejects. I might suspect that my view of a colleague is unfair, or wonder whether I still believe something I used to say with conviction. Those are ordinary ways of having an opinion about an opinion. Socrates’ version is more peculiar. Think of a critic who has views about everyone’s opinions and none about the world. The same restriction applies to the knowledge Critias accepts. The question is what happens when opinions or kinds of knowledge are all you can take an interest in.

That’s what I hear when Socrates puts the opinion just before the knowledge. Both proposals ask for a power that turns on itself and others of its kind, and both take away its usual objects. We can accept the first idea in ordinary life and still be puzzled by the second. Later Socrates makes the cost visible. A person with the sort of knowledge Critias describes might be able to tell that someone knows something and still have no idea what they know.

My verdict is that Critias owes the argument a reason for changing his answer. The ability to explain why you hold a view might give you some insight into your own knowing. It also gives you more to say about the matter you started with. That’s a long way from the special knowledge Critias wants. By putting the two questions together, Socrates lets us hear the point where the definition asks for more than the comparison has earned.

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Why does the article argue that even the KK principle would not establish the special kind of knowledge Critias accepts?

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