Philosophy
What Must a Power Find in Itself?
An ear would need a sound of its own to hear itself. Knowledge may already have what it needs.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates asks what a power must be like to act on itself. Aristotle and Plotinus help separate being knowable from actually knowing oneself.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A power’s proper objectSocrates asks whether anything that acts on itself must have the feature its power is directed at, such as sound for hearing.
- Knowledge as a subjectThe dialogue itself treats knowledge as something we can study, which helps distinguish being knowable from knowing oneself.
- Two accounts of thinkingAristotle limits the identity of thinker and object to things without matter, and Plotinus gives a more developed account of Intellect knowing itself.
- The question Critias still facesEven if his special knowledge could recognize that someone knows something, it would still have to show how to identify what the person knows.
Charmides 167c–d, 168d–169a, 169a–c, 169e–170b, 170b–d · Aristotle, On the Soul I.2, 404b8–18, III.4, 429b26–430a9 · Timaeus 35a–b, 37a–c · Plotinus, Enneads V.3.5
Socrates spells out the rule behind his examples in a single question. If something exercises its power on itself, will it have “the character toward which its power was directed”? Hearing, if it hears itself, “will hear itself as having a sound.” If sight sees itself, it must have a color. The Greek word rendered “character” is ousia. It can mean being or nature. Here the question is what sort of thing something has to be to count as a suitable object for its own power.
The principle is plausible for the senses, which is what gives it its force. A ringing ear gives you a sound to hear, and an eye in a mirror gives you something colored to see. Hearing and sight as capacities are harder to imagine as things that make a noise or have a color. Socrates puts sight and hearing in the company of motion moving itself and heat burning itself. He says these cases might make some people doubt and might seem possible to others.
Does knowledge face the same obstacle? If what knowledge is directed at is something knowable, then knowledge has to be knowable if it’s going to be its own object. That looks like a modest requirement. But it helps to say it out loud, because it’s a different question from whether a person can exercise any particular kind of knowledge on itself.
On the face of it, knowledge passes the first test. People study and argue about it. The Charmides itself is trying to learn something about a proposed kind of knowledge. You can learn what a doctor has to know without using medicine to investigate medicine. The fact that knowledge can be studied makes it a possible subject of learning and leaves open which powers can actually study it.
Aristotle takes up a related question in On the Soul. He says that intellect can be an object of thought and that in the case of things without matter the thinker and the object of thought are the same. Elsewhere in that work he reports Empedocles’ claim that we apprehend earth by earth and water by water. The Timaeus gives another picture of how a capacity can be fitted to what it meets. The world soul is made from Being, Same, and Different. When it encounters what comes to be and what always is, it can say what a thing is the same as and what it differs from. These are different accounts, but each gives us a way to ask what a power has in common with its object.
Plotinus takes the idea of self-thinking further. In the Enneads, he argues that Intellect knows itself because its act of thinking and what it thinks are identical with it. On his account, that includes the realities Intellect thinks. This is a stronger proposal than the simple claim that knowledge can be studied, and a different one from Critias’s definition of temperance. It gives us an example of a philosopher trying to show how genuine self-thinking might work.
Critias still owes an answer to a separate question. His proposed knowledge is confined to kinds of knowledge and their absence. It has nothing to say about health, houses, or the other things those kinds of knowledge concern. Later Socrates asks what such a power can actually tell us. Even if it could tell us that someone has some expertise, we’d need more to know whether that person understands medicine. Knowledge can be knowable and still fail that test.
My verdict is that Socrates’ principle gives us one thing to look for. A power that acts on itself has to be a suitable object of its own activity. The fact that knowledge can be studied gives Critias an opening there. He still has to explain how his special knowledge would recognize itself and what it could do for someone whose ordinary subjects it never reaches. Those questions are harder than whether knowledge can be an object of inquiry at all.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author think the study of knowledge gives Critias only an “opening,” rather than proving his full proposal?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If a power must be a suitable object of its own activity, what would make knowledge suitable as an object of knowledge rather than merely as a topic studied by some other power?→
- Does knowing that someone possesses expertise have practical value if one cannot determine what that person knows? Why or why not?→
- Which account in the article—Socrates’ principle, Aristotle’s identity of thinker and object, the Timaeus’s fitted capacity, or Plotinus’s self-thinking Intellect—best explains how self-knowledge could be possible, and what difficulty remains for that account?→