Philosophy
Two Doctors, One Patient
A headache remedy sets up a test for the dialogue’s theories of temperance.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates says his headache remedy is a leaf that’s useless without a charm sung over it. The combination raises a question the rest of the dialogue has to answer. What could temperance have to do with getting well?
Orientation
At a Glance
- A remedy in two partsSocrates offers a leaf for the headache and a charm to go with it. He says the leaf is useless on its own.
- Treating the whole personThe Thracian healer starts with the soul. His charm consists of words meant to bring about temperance before the body is treated.
- What medicine knowsSocrates asks how Critias’ knowledge of knowledge could recognize what makes a person healthy. Knowing how to treat illness still belongs to medicine.
- The test stays openThe dialogue ends without a settled definition of temperance. The leaf and charm leave the reader asking how the virtue could help the whole person.
Charmides 155a–b, 155e–156c, 156d–157b, 157b–c, 158b–c, 170b, 170b–c, 174c–d, 174d–e, 176a–b · Homer, Odyssey 19.455–458 · Pindar, Pythian Odes 3.47–53
When the boy asks what the remedy is, Socrates answers that “the thing itself was a leaf, but that there was a charm to go with the remedy; if one sang the charm while using it, the remedy made one perfectly healthy, but without the charm the leaf was no use at all.” The combination has a pedigree. In the Odyssey, the sons of Autolycus bind young Odysseus’ boar wound and stop the bleeding with a charm. Pindar has Asclepius heal some of his patients with soothing incantations, so Socrates is working with a familiar idea, and the interesting part is what he does with it next.
The two parts of the remedy are different kinds of thing. The leaf is physical and portable, the kind of item a pharmacist could hand across a counter, while the charm is made of words, sung over the patient, and Socrates soon explains that it works on the soul, consisting of “beautiful words,” from which “temperance comes to be in souls.” The order matters, too. Socrates says that once temperance is present, “it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too,” so the charm comes first and the leaf follows. That ordering is the heart of the Thracian’s teaching, which holds that everything good and bad for the body starts from the soul and flows outward from there, the way it flows from the head into the eyes.
The Thracian doctor who supposedly taught Socrates the charm puts the point as a diagnosis of his whole profession. The mistake made nowadays in treating human beings, he says, is that “some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health.” Anyone who has seen a specialist treat their migraines without ever asking how they’re sleeping, or a counselor who never thought to ask whether they’ve seen a doctor, will recognize the complaint, which is less about magic leaves than about a world of experts who each look after one part of a person and nobody looks after the whole. Socrates has already described good doctors treating the part along with the whole body, so the Thracian pushes their principle one step further, from the whole body to the whole person.
That gives the dialogue a standard to meet before the argument has even started. Whatever temperance turns out to be, it has to be the sort of thing that belongs with medicine rather than off in a separate department, something that makes a person whole and makes ordinary health easier to keep. The leaf and the charm set a test for every definition that follows, and the reader is entitled to hold each definition up against it and ask whether it could ever explain why the leaf needs the charm. It’s a high bar, and it’s set by a foreign doctor in a story Socrates tells while playing the doctor himself.
Then watch Critias’ final definition fail that test in exactly the way the Thracian predicted. On the account Critias is defending, temperance is knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and Socrates presses him on what such a knowledge would actually know, pointing out that a person knows “the healthy by medicine and not by temperance.” Near the end Socrates asks outright whether temperance would “also make us healthy,” doing medicine’s job for it, and the answer is plainly no, since on Critias’ account temperance knows only about knowledge and has nothing to say about health at all.
Put those two moments side by side and the shape of the dialogue becomes clear. Critias has defined temperance as something completely cut off from health, a doctor of temperance with no business treating the body, which is precisely the split the Thracian called the great mistake of the age. The leaf-and-charm story at the beginning works like a measuring rod held against the theory at the end, and the theory comes up short, which gives the reader a reason to question whether Critias has found the kind of virtue the opening led us to look for.
It’s worth resisting the urge to read the story as a literal prescription, as if the point were a particular herb and a particular chant. Socrates never names the leaf. He brings up the remedy again when he asks Charmides whether he already has temperance. Once the examination begins, the headache stops driving the story. Charmides still asks for the charm on the last page, and by then it’s the conversation he wants to continue. The story of the cure has opened a question about how to care for the whole person.
My verdict is that the leaf needs the charm because a human being isn’t a set of parts with separate repair shops. The Charmides opens with that conviction and ends without having found a definition of temperance worthy of it, and the reader who remembers the leaf can see exactly where the search went wrong, at the moment Critias tried to make temperance a specialist of its own, with nothing to say about the health of the person it was supposed to make whole. The dialogue’s failure to define temperance turns out to be a failure to put the person back together.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article emphasize that the charm must precede the use of the leaf?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If the opening remedy supplies a standard for defining temperance, what qualities must an adequate definition have besides logical consistency?→
- Does Critias’ definition fail because it is false in itself, or because it is too narrowly specialized to address the whole person? How might you distinguish those criticisms?→
- How does the shift from treating Charmides’ headache to continuing a philosophical conversation change what it means for Socrates to act as a doctor?→