Philosophy

The Doubt, Remembered Sharper

Socrates leaves the possibility of knowledge knowing itself open. In his closing review, the same argument sounds as though it gave him less room.

Two concessions receive almost the same wording at the end of the dialogue. Following their separate histories shows what the inquiry had grounds to reject and what it had set aside.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The first question stays openSocrates provisionally grants that knowledge of knowledge is possible after saying he can’t confidently decide the question.
  • The doctor test goes furtherSocrates argues that judging a doctor’s work requires medical knowledge, even if someone can recognize that the doctor has some expertise.
  • One phrase covers two concessionsThe final review says the argument did not allow either claim. One had been left open, and the other had met a specific objection.
  • What Socrates calls impossibleHis strongest objection concerns knowing particular things that are wholly unknown to a person. The broader possibility of knowledge knowing itself is still open.

Charmides 168c–169a, 169a–d, 170a–b, 171a–c, 171c–172a, 172a–d, 175b–c · Liddell–Scott–Jones, Greek–English Lexicon ἐάω

Socrates remembers giving Critias a point “though the argument did not allow it or say that there was” such a thing as knowledge of knowledge. That’s the wording of the final review. Earlier, he had said he couldn’t confidently tell whether there could be any such knowledge. He granted it for the moment and promised to look into the matter again another time. Put those two moments beside each other and the tone changes. The man who was willing to leave the question open now talks as if the argument had some say in what he could grant.

What would it mean for an argument to allow something? The Greek form eōntos comes from a verb that can mean to let or permit. The Liddell–Scott–Jones lexicon also records its use for allowing a point in an argument. In the closing review, Plato gives the argument the role of someone who could grant permission or say that something exists. That makes Socrates’s description sound pointed. The word alone leaves some room, though. An argument can fail to authorize a claim simply because the speakers have given it too little support.

It helps to look back at the examples that first made Socrates doubtful. He considers whether something can be double itself, and whether sight or hearing can take itself as its object. Some cases seem impossible to him, and others seem doubtful. Knowledge of knowledge is the one he says he can’t confidently settle. He has examined enough to see the difficulty. His decision to grant the point temporarily lets the speakers ask a further question before they know how to resolve that difficulty.

The further question gets a more definite answer. Even if a kind of knowledge can tell that someone knows something, Socrates asks whether it could identify what that person knows. Take a doctor. Someone could know that the doctor has some expertise and still lack the medical understanding needed to judge what the doctor says or does about health and disease. Socrates argues that the ability to make that second judgment belongs to the doctor’s craft. He and Critias agree that a person who is temperate would need medical knowledge in addition to temperance to examine a doctor as a doctor.

Then Socrates deliberately gives Critias more than the doctor test had given him. He asks to grant both that knowledge can know knowledge and that it can tell people what they know and what they don’t. With both claims allowed for the moment, they can ask what good such a faculty would do. In the final review, he remembers the second concession as giving the proposed knowledge access to the works of other kinds of knowledge. Here the argument’s resistance is easier to see. They had already made a case for why inspecting a doctor’s work calls for medicine.

That helps explain what gets compressed in the final review. Socrates says the argument “did not allow” the first claim and “did not allow this either” about the second. The same phrase sums up two different routes to a concession. In the first case, they could see why someone might doubt whether the thing exists and left the question open. In the second, they had a particular reason to question the powers they were about to grant it. Both claims carried more weight in the discussion than the argument had earned for them.

There’s a sharper verdict just after those two. Socrates says they hadn’t considered that it is “impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all.” The object of that sentence matters. He’s talking about knowing the very thing that is wholly unknown to you. That’s a narrower claim than saying that knowledge can never have itself as an object. The strongest word in the review lands on the proposed knowledge of particular things one doesn’t know. The earlier question about whether a kind of knowledge could take knowledge as its object remains harder to settle.

The review has made the debts easier to see and their histories easier to forget. We can hear Socrates counting what they let through and go back to see when each claim was granted. One is waiting for the second look he promised. The other had to be granted again after the doctor test called it into question. Once you’ve traced both, the sharper language at the end starts to do something useful. It sends you back to see where the argument has a case and where it still has a question.

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What is the key difference between the two concessions compressed by Socrates’s statement that the argument “did not allow” them?

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