Philosophy
Seeing Without Color
Socrates asks what sight would have to see if it could see itself.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThere’s a difference between noticing that you see and imagining a sight with no colors in it. A reflection in another person’s pupil gives the difference a shape.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Sight without its objectsSocrates asks whether sight could see itself and other sights while seeing none of the colors ordinary sight sees.
- Awareness that we seeAristotle asks whether sight can make us aware that we’re seeing, and Socrates leaves the broader issue of powers acting on themselves open.
- An eye in a pupilIn Alcibiades I, the eye sees its reflection in another person’s eye, an ordinary object of vision.
- A demand on Critias’s definitionCritias needs knowledge to turn on itself while leaving out the subjects of the kinds of knowledge it would examine.
Charmides 167c–d, 168d–169a, 169a–b · Aristotle, On the Soul III.2, 425b12–25 · Alcibiades I 132d–133a, 133a–c
Socrates’ first example of a strange power that turns on itself is a peculiar kind of eyesight. Could it see itself, other kinds of sight, and even failures of sight, while having no access to the things that eyes ordinarily see? He asks whether there’s a power that, “though it is sight, sees no color.” Critias answers, “By Zeus, I don’t.” The example sets the pattern for the list that follows, so it’s worth slowing down over what the sight is supposed to do.
Two ideas are packed into the example. One is that seeing might come with an awareness that you see. The other is that there could be a sight that sees itself and other sights while excluding everything ordinary sight sees. It’s this stronger proposal that Socrates puts to Critias. You can grant that you notice yourself looking at something and still wonder how there could be a sight with no colors in it at all.
Aristotle takes up the first idea in On the Soul. Is it through sight that we perceive that we see, or through another sense? If every sense required another to notice it, there would be no end to the series. Aristotle argues for allowing the original sense to be aware of itself and then considers what this requires of sight. Socrates, too, leaves the wider question open. Some powers acting on themselves seem impossible to him, while others invite doubt. He says he can’t settle which cases really are possible.
The stronger proposal has a difficulty of its own. If sight is to see itself, Socrates says, it “must have some color.” His reason is that “sight will never see anything that has no color.” A hearing that hears itself would likewise have to have a sound. On that account, the sight in his example would have to see a colored thing, itself, while seeing no colors. You can see why Critias has trouble imagining it.
A camera can photograph itself in a mirror because it’s an object that reflects light. Its self-portrait is one more picture of something visible. A camera that was supposed to photograph itself while registering none of its visible features would have no picture of itself to show you. Even a video camera aimed at its own monitor, making the familiar tunnel of screens within screens, has to pick up the light from an actual screen.
There’s another dialogue that gives the eye a way to see itself. In Alcibiades I, Socrates asks whether you’ve noticed the tiny reflection of your face in someone else’s pupil. The eye sees itself by looking into another eye, at the part with which it sees. He goes on to suggest that a soul might know itself by looking into a soul, especially at the part in which wisdom arises. The reflection gives him an example of self-knowledge that takes something we can ordinarily see as its starting point.
That’s the distinction that makes the example troublesome for Critias. His definition requires a knowledge that knows itself and other kinds of knowledge while leaving their subjects out. What would such a knowledge be aware of, if it could never attend to the things people actually know? The advantage of starting with sight is that we can picture the problem. Take the colors away and it’s difficult to say what would be left for the proposed sight to see.
My verdict is that the colorless sight shows how much the claim about temperance asks us to imagine. You might notice yourself seeing, and the dialogue leaves open how powers like sight can relate to themselves. Critias wants knowledge to do its work without any of its ordinary subjects. The eye that sees itself in another’s pupil suggests a different way of getting to know yourself. It gives you something to look at.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What makes Socrates’ stronger proposal about sight more puzzling than ordinary awareness of seeing?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- Is being aware that you are seeing enough to count as sight seeing itself, or does genuine self-perception require sight to become one of its own objects? Why?→
- If knowledge knew only itself and other kinds of knowledge but never their subjects, what meaningful content, if any, could that knowledge retain?→
- Does the reflection model in Alcibiades I suggest that self-knowledge always depends on another person or an external object? What are the strengths and limits of that model?→