Philosophy
Questioning the Questioner
Critias challenges Socrates’ assumptions and accuses him of trying to win. Socrates has to explain why he is asking the questions before the two men can go on.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesWhen the person answering questions stops to challenge the method, what happens next can show whether the exchange is an inquiry or a contest.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias challenges the comparisonHe objects that temperance may differ from every other sort of knowledge. An analogy can steer an inquiry wrong if it starts by assuming the resemblance it needs to establish.
- Critias questions the motiveHe also asks whether Socrates is trying to defeat him in argument. Socrates says he examines others for the same reason he examines his own claims.
- A person can ask for timeWhen Critias presses for agreement, Socrates asks to examine the proposal before deciding. A pause lets the inquiry take the proposal seriously.
- Charmides is offered a choiceSocrates offers to examine temperance with Charmides and says they can leave it if he prefers. That offer gives the younger speaker a way to take part without having to endorse the company’s judgment.
Imagine a public forum where a city official is being questioned by a panel about a controversial decision. Halfway through, the official stops answering and challenges a panelist, saying the question assumes something false, asking what the panelist means by a key term, and requesting a minute to look at the figures before replying. Some in the audience see evasion, while others see a reasonable person refusing to be rushed into a trap. The question for discussion is whether a cooperative inquiry allows its participants to question its own procedure. Most people have watched some version of this scene, on television or in a meeting, and found it hard to tell from the outside which way to read it.
Critias makes a comparable challenge in the Charmides. Socrates has been comparing temperance with other kinds of knowledge, calculation, weighing and the like, and asking what temperance is knowledge of in the way calculation is knowledge of the odd and the even. Critias objects that the method is wrong, saying, “Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others. It isn’t so.” He is challenging the analogy on which the whole line of questioning depends, and since Socrates had been reasoning by analogy for several pages, the objection lands on something real.
He also challenges Socrates’ motives, telling him, “I think you are doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing,” and adding, “You are trying to refute me, and letting go of what the argument is about.” That is a charge about procedure in the broadest sense, the claim that the questioner has turned an inquiry into a contest, and it is the kind of objection the official in the forum might make to a panel more interested in scoring points than in understanding the decision. Critias may sound irritated. His objection still gives Socrates a question worth answering.
Socrates answers the charge about motive. He examines arguments “for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don’t.” He says he does it for his own sake first and also for his friends. Then he asks Critias to look at what happens to the argument regardless of whose view is refuted. Socrates goes on to test the unusual kind of knowledge Critias proposes. He gives the objection enough room to change the course of the inquiry.
The dialogue offers two other models of legitimate resistance. When Critias pressed Socrates to agree on the spot, Socrates asked for time, saying, “So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have,” and Critias granted it. And at the very start of the examination, Socrates offered Charmides a free choice, proposing to look into the matter together so that the boy “won’t be forced to say what you don’t want to,” and adding that if he didn’t want to, they could leave it. A pause and a refusal are treated as legitimate moves, not as failures to cooperate. The free exit is offered before any argument begins, which makes it a condition of the inquiry rather than a concession extracted from it.
So the Charmides suggests that cooperative inquiry not only permits questioning its own procedure but needs it. A method that can’t be challenged can lead an inquiry wherever the questioner likes, and a questioner whose motives can’t be questioned has a power that no honest inquiry should grant. Critias’ objections, whatever their flaws, keep the examination honest, and Socrates’ willingness to answer them is part of what distinguishes his questioning from an interrogation. It also protects the examiner, since a questioner who never hears his method challenged can mistake his own habits for the shape of the truth.
What the examiner owes someone whose resistance may be reasonable comes, on the dialogue’s evidence, to at least four things. He owes an explanation of what he is doing and why, as Socrates gives one when accused of trying to win. He owes a willingness to change course when an objection about method has force, as Socrates does when he accepts Critias’ point about the uniqueness of temperance. He owes time when time is honestly asked for. Socrates also offers a way to decline when he first invites Charmides to talk. None of these duties is a matter of politeness alone, since each one protects the chance of reaching the truth.
The questioner is part of the inquiry too. He can be asked what he means, why he is making a comparison, and whether there is time to think. Critias’ objections show how much depends on what the examiner does next. Socrates explains himself and then gives the revised proposal a hearing.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the article regard Critias’ objection to Socrates’ analogy as substantial rather than merely evasive?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- How can participants distinguish a reasonable procedural objection from an attempt to avoid answering, especially when motives are uncertain?→
- If questioning the examiner helps keep an inquiry honest, should there be any limits on such questioning? What might justify those limits?→
- How does allowing time to think or permission to refuse change the relationship between cooperation and truth-seeking?→