Philosophy
Learning to Disagree Better
A reading group finishes the Charmides with the same disagreement it started with. Socrates’ review of his own mistakes offers a way to tell whether anyone learned something.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA group can learn to read a passage better while its members still disagree. Socrates’ closing review suggests looking for clearer distinctions, fairer accounts of rival readings, and changes of mind people can explain.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Take stock of the concessionsSocrates goes back over what the inquiry granted too quickly. A group can make the same distinction between a conclusion, a provisional assumption, and a question it has left open.
- Give the other reading its dueTry explaining another reader’s view in terms they would accept. The test is whether they recognize their own argument in your account.
- Name what changed your mindA change in one judgment can be evidence of learning if the reader can point to the passage or objection that prompted it.
- A better question countsReaders can still disagree about temperance while asking each other more precise questions about what the dialogue says and where their interpretations differ.
Charmides 164a–d, 166c–d, 166d–e, 175a–b, 175b–d · Bryan Caplan An ITT I Cannot Pass · John Stuart Mill, On Liberty chapter 2
Imagine a reading group that meets once a month to discuss the Charmides. At the first meeting, each member writes a short account of a disputed passage, say the final pages where Socrates blames himself and calls the inquiry insolent. One member writes that the dialogue proves nothing and is just Plato showing off, another that Critias is obviously a villain and deserves everything he gets, and a third that the real answer is hidden in the knowledge of good and bad. At the last meeting, months later, each writes a new account of the same passage, and the group has to decide whether anything has improved. The question matters to anyone who has sat through a long discussion and wondered whether it got anywhere.
The obvious test would be agreement, and by that test the group has failed, since they still don’t agree on what the passage means or what temperance is. But the Charmides itself ends the same way, without a shared definition, and it would be strange to conclude that nothing happened in the wrestling school that afternoon. The dialogue suggests a different test, and its own last pages show what passing it looks like. The closing exchange gives Socrates time to name mistakes before the characters make their plans to meet again.
The first sign of learning is clearer distinctions, and in his closing review Socrates doesn’t just say they failed, he separates the different things they conceded, saying “we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was,” and that they conceded a further point “though the argument did not allow this either.” A group that began with broad verdicts and ends by distinguishing what was refuted, what was left open and what was granted too easily has learned something, even if each member still holds a different overall view.
The second sign is fairer reconstruction of opposing views. A member who began by calling Critias a villain might end by stating his strongest case, that temperance must involve self-knowledge and that a person who benefits others by accident isn’t truly temperate, in a way that a defender of Critias would accept. The economist Bryan Caplan proposed what he called an ideological Turing test, in which you try to state an opposing view so well that its holders can’t tell you don’t share it. A reading group that can pass that test with one another has learned to disagree about real positions rather than caricatures. Mill gives a related reason in On Liberty. Someone who knows only his own side has never had to test it against the case a thoughtful opponent would make.
The third sign is revision, and it’s the strongest evidence of all. Socrates models it throughout the dialogue, granting points, admitting perplexity and saying plainly that they “conceded many things that did not follow in the argument.” A member whose final account differs from his first in some definite respect, who can say what changed his mind and who changed it, has shown learning in the most convincing way, since clear distinctions can sometimes be mere jargon and fair reconstructions can be politeness, while a revision gives the group something specific to examine. The revision doesn’t have to be large, since a member who now thinks Critias was half right about one point has moved in a way the group can see and discuss.
There’s a reasonable objection that deserves a hearing, since someone might say these are only signs of better manners, not of learning about the passage, and that a group that never converges hasn’t learned what the passage means. The reply is that learning to see where a disagreement lies is itself knowledge about the passage, since it tells you which questions the text settles and which it leaves open. Socrates’ closing review shows how much there is to learn from seeing which concession led the inquiry astray.
Socrates gives the group its motto earlier in the dialogue. When Critias accuses him of just trying to win, Socrates asks whether it isn’t “a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is,” and he tells Critias to “say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.” A group that has stopped keeping score of who was right and started tracking what has become plain has made the change Socrates is asking of Critias in that exchange. A good test is whether members now ask each other different questions, aimed at what the other person actually thinks rather than at what would be easiest to knock down.
Return to the two accounts each reader wrote. The first may tell us which character they trusted or which answer they wanted Plato to give. The second can tell us what distinction the reader now sees, which objection they finally understood, or where a line made them change their mind. The group may still disagree when it puts those accounts side by side. It has something better to work on the next time it opens the book.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
A reading group still disagrees about the meaning of the passage, but its members can now identify which claims were refuted, left unresolved, or accepted without adequate support. How would the article assess this outcome?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If agreement is not necessary for learning, what evidence should persuade the group that its clearer distinctions reflect genuine understanding rather than merely more sophisticated language?→
- How could a reader test whether a reconstruction of an opposing interpretation is genuinely fair rather than simply more polite or persuasive?→
- When members revise their views, how should the group distinguish changes produced by better reasons from changes produced by pressure to appear open-minded?→