Philosophy
Learning From the Cheap Seats
Charmides listens while two adults try to define temperance. When he speaks again, he’s ready to say what the discussion has given him reason to doubt.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCan you learn philosophy by watching someone else get examined? Charmides’ turn as a listener invites the same question about anyone who reads Plato.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias becomes the answererCharmides offers the first definitions. After Critias takes over, Charmides listens while his guardian and Socrates explore the different kinds of knowledge that temperance might involve.
- Wisdom doesn’t rub offIn the Symposium, Socrates jokes about wisdom flowing through wool from one person to another like water between cups. Listening gives Charmides a chance to think, but the thinking is his to do.
- What Charmides has heardWhen Socrates returns to him, Charmides says he can hardly know whether he has temperance if the adults can’t say what it is. He follows that admission with a request to keep receiving the charm.
- The reader has a seat tooSocrates tells the story to an unnamed listener. Readers can take up that position and try out their own answers as they follow the exchange.
Charmides 153a–c, 158e–159b, 162e–163a, 175e–176a, 176a–b · Protagoras 331c · Symposium 175a–c, 175c–e · Theaetetus 150d
The boy’s role changes completely the moment his guardian takes over the argument. Up to then Charmides has been the one answering, offering definitions and watching them fall one after another, but once Critias announces “I agree entirely” and takes the argument over, the boy goes quiet for the whole long middle of the dialogue, page after page of increasingly abstract argument about knowledge, self-knowledge and knowledge of knowledge. The check-up on Charmides’ soul is what got the inquiry started, but for now he’s no longer the one answering, so the question is whether he’s still learning or just watching from the cheap seats.
There’s a strong case that he isn’t learning much, and it comes from Socrates himself. In the Protagoras, Socrates takes issue with a concession made for the sake of argument. He wants the two people speaking to put their own views to the test. On that view philosophy happens inside the person whose beliefs are on the line, the way a workout happens in the muscles of the person lifting, and a listener whose own beliefs are never tested can follow along closely and still miss that part of the exercise.
The Symposium has a famous joke that makes the same point from another angle. When Socrates finally shows up at the party, after lingering in a neighbor’s porch, the host Agathon asks him to come sit beside him so he can catch some of the wisdom Socrates has just found. Socrates replies that it would be lovely if wisdom flowed from the fuller of us to the emptier when we touch, the way water runs along a strand of wool from one cup into another. He jokes that Agathon would have more wisdom to give him. Sitting next to a brilliant argument no more pours its understanding into you than sitting courtside makes you good at basketball.
And yet Charmides’ last speech shows he has understood how the inquiry ended. When the argument ends without a definition and Socrates turns back to him, he says, “But by Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t,” and asks, “For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?” He’s heard enough to draw a conclusion about himself. If the two grown-ups who’ve been arguing can’t say what temperance is, he has little reason to certify that he has it.
That’s a real lesson, and it’s exactly the kind of lesson listening can teach. The boy has had a chance to watch a confident adult get tied in knots. He’s seen that a clever-sounding definition can collapse under a few patient questions. We can learn to recognize a good argument long before we can build one, by listening to a parent argue a point at dinner or watching a teacher take apart a sloppy claim in front of the class.
Socrates also thought that simply being around real inquiry could change a person. In the Theaetetus, describing himself as a kind of midwife for ideas, he says that some of the people who spend time with him make astonishing progress. He says they discover and bring forth things from within themselves. On that view the boy’s afternoon in the cheap seats isn’t wasted at all, since he’s had a chance to see what it takes to follow an inquiry all the way through. The midwife image still puts the birth inside the student. Seeing someone else think gives him something to work on.
There’s an even bigger reason to think listening can educate, and it’s us. A reader of the Charmides is in something like the boy’s position, watching other people get examined without having to answer. If listening couldn’t teach anything, Plato picked a strange format for getting his readers to think. The dialogue form only works if readers play along at home, answering silently with Critias, noticing the spot where he concedes too much, and testing their own beliefs against the questions even though nobody in the text is asking them. The Charmides is narrated by Socrates to an unnamed friend, too, so the whole story reaches us as something told to a listener, which makes listening the very situation the book was built for.
My verdict is that listening teaches what’s at stake and what failure looks like, which is no small thing, and that we get to see what Charmides made of it when he speaks again. Charmides is willing to say he doesn’t know, and he asks to be charmed every day. That sounds like a request to get back in the game. Listening can get a person ready for the conversation. Taking a turn lets him find out what he’s understood, which is as true for a reader with Plato open on her lap as it was for a boy on a bench in a wrestling school.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author treat Charmides’ final admission of uncertainty as evidence that he learned something while listening?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- What kinds of learning can observation provide that direct participation cannot, and what can participation provide that observation cannot?→
- When Charmides admits that he does not know, should this be considered philosophical progress? Why or why not?→
- How can a reader tell whether silently following a dialogue has genuinely tested their beliefs rather than merely made them feel involved?→