Philosophy
I Knew Him When He Was a Kid
A reunion in the wrestling school tests the difference between recognizing a face and knowing a person.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesSocrates and Charmides each think they already know the other, one from childhood memories and the other from gossip. The dialogue’s first quiet joke is how little that kind of knowing turns out to be worth.
Orientation
At a Glance
- An old acquaintanceSocrates remembers Charmides as a child and wonders what kind of young man he has become.
- Recognition goes both waysCharmides knows Socrates from childhood and from what his peers say about him. That familiarity lets Socrates speak more frankly.
- Putting an impression into wordsSocrates asks Charmides to say what temperance seems to be, so they can examine his own account of it.
- An honest uncertaintyAt the end, Charmides admits he’s unsure whether he’s temperate. The conversation moves from easy recognition to a question about himself.
When Critias announces that the most beautiful boy in town is on his way in, Socrates asks the natural questions, who he is and whose son, and Critias answers that Socrates already knows him, though “he wasn’t yet grown up when you went away,” before naming him as Charmides, the son of his uncle Glaucon. Socrates says “Of course I know him, by Zeus,” adds that the boy “was nothing to sniff at even then, when he was still a child,” and guesses that “by now, I should think, he must be quite the young man,” at which point Critias promises that he’ll “know in a moment” how big the boy has grown and how he’s turned out.
Count the knowing in those few lines, because it’s doing a lot of quiet work. Critias says “You know him,” Socrates says “Of course I know him,” and Critias says Socrates will “know in a moment,” and every one of those uses is the easy, everyday sense of the word, recognition and family connection, a face you remember and a face you’re about to see. It’s the kind of knowing you mean when you come home after a long time away and somebody says you remember my little brother, and you do, sort of, except the little brother is now taller than you and has opinions.
Socrates is honest about how thin his own knowledge is. He’s been away at Potidaea long enough for a child to become “quite the young man,” and his “I should think” admits that his picture of Charmides is out of date and that he’s guessing. Critias’ promise is revealing too, because what he says Socrates will know “in a moment” is how big the boy has grown and how he’s turned out, and only one of those can be settled by looking. Size you can see from across the room, but how somebody has turned out, what sort of person he’s become, is exactly what a glance can’t tell you, and in a sense the rest of the dialogue is one long argument with Critias’ promise.
The best part is that the knowing runs both ways, and it comes right after the first moment when the actual Charmides peeks out from behind his reputation. Socrates says there’s a charm that goes with the remedy, the boy says he’ll copy it down, Socrates asks whether he means to do that “if you persuade me” or “even if you don’t,” and Charmides laughs and says “If I persuade you, Socrates,” which is the first time the statue everyone was staring at cracks a joke. Then Socrates checks whether the boy even knows who he is, and Charmides says he’d be doing Socrates an injustice if he didn’t, because “You’re talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here.” So the kid has a file on Socrates built from exactly the same two things Socrates has on him, a childhood memory and a reputation, which means both of them walk into the conversation thinking they already know who they’re talking to.
Socrates handles this smartly, saying “Good for you” and adding that this means he “can speak to you more frankly about this charm and what it is like,” which treats the old acquaintance as a kind of permission slip rather than real knowledge. Memory and gossip don’t tell either of them who the other one is now, but they do make it okay to start talking, and Socrates uses them the way you’d use a mutual friend’s name to open a conversation with a stranger, as an introduction and nothing more.
The actual getting-to-know-you happens through questions, and Socrates’ first real move is to say that if temperance is in Charmides, it must give him “some sense” of it, from which he’d have an opinion about what it is, and since the boy knows “how to speak Greek,” he ought to be able to put that opinion into words. That’s Socrates’ method for finding out how someone has turned out, and it’s a lot more demanding than Critias’ promise, since it asks the boy to show what’s inside him by saying it out loud, in front of people, where he can be wrong.
By the end, the easy knowing of the opening has given way to something more honest. Critias’ big definition says temperance is knowing oneself, and the argument can’t make that hold up, while Charmides, the boy everyone was so sure they knew, says he doesn’t even know whether he has the virtue they all credited him with. The arc runs from “Of course I know him” to “I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t,” from a man recognizing a face to a young man admitting he can’t see inside himself, and that’s a better place to end up, even though it sounds like a loss.
The scene works because everyone has been in it. We all carry around versions of people we knew years ago, and those versions feel like knowledge right up until we sit down with the actual person and find out how much has changed, and the same goes, awkwardly, for the versions of ourselves we carry around. Plato starts his dialogue on knowing oneself with a man saying “Of course I know him” about a boy he hasn’t seen in years, and the quiet joke is that nobody in the room, Socrates included, really knows the boy yet, which is exactly why they need to talk.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author treat Critias’ promise that Socrates will soon know how Charmides has “turned out” as questionable?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does familiarity with someone become genuine knowledge of that person, and what would bridge the gap?→
- Why might Charmides’ admission that he does not know whether he possesses temperance count as progress rather than failure?→
- How does questioning reveal a person differently from appearance, memory, or reputation, and what limits might questioning itself have?→