Philosophy

From the Mirror to the Throne

The argument begins with looking into what you know and ends with rulers telling other people what they may do. The steps in between are worth slowing down for.

The move from self-examination to choosing an expert is easy to follow. The move from choosing an expert to governing other people takes another argument.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Start with self-examinationSocrates describes temperance as knowing what one knows and doesn’t know. He asks whether that capacity could extend to examining other people.
  • Rely on the people who knowThe next proposal is to hand a task to someone with the skill to carry it out. Choosing a good cook illustrates how that can work in one’s own affairs.
  • Other people’s affairs raise a further questionThe imagined rulers go on to forbid people under them from doing certain tasks. The earlier account of examination has yet to show where that authority comes from.
  • The comparison with the RepublicThe Republic explicitly explains why Socrates looks for justice in a city before looking for it in a person. The Charmides lets the shift in scale pass much more quickly.

At 167a the definition is still personal, since only the temperate man, Socrates says, “will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not,” and he will also “be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows.” By 171d the same definition has produced a household and a city, with “we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us,” and a set of rules about who may do what. Between those two passages the scale has changed completely, from the mirror to the throne, and the dialogue never stops to remark on it. It’s the kind of shift that happens in conversation all the time, when a point about how one person should live turns, without anyone noticing, into a program for how everyone else should be governed.

The first step is from examining yourself to examining others. Socrates already puts the two together at 167a. When someone knows enough about a subject, questions can help him find out what another person understands. The dialogue will later test how far that ability extends across different fields. At this stage, the work of examining someone is finding out what the person knows.

The second step is from examining others to relying on those who know. “We would find those who did know and hand things over to them,” the picture says, and this too is reasonable as a personal policy. If I know I’m a bad cook and can tell who’s a good one, it makes sense to hire the good one, and nothing about that requires any power over anyone. This is still the private life of a sensible person, using self-knowledge to manage his own affairs well, and most of us do it every time we choose a doctor or a mechanic.

The third step is the big one, and it comes in a single clause. “Nor would we allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly,” the picture continues, and suddenly the sensible person has become a ruler who forbids other people to act. Hiring a good cook is a decision about my kitchen, while forbidding my neighbors to cook unless they pass my test is a decision about theirs. That step isn’t supported by anything in the personal argument, since knowing what others know doesn’t give you a right to stop them from acting on what they don’t, and the passage simply takes it.

Plato made a similar move elsewhere, but out loud. In the Republic, Socrates proposes to look for justice in the city first, because it will be written there in larger letters, and then read the smaller letters in the individual soul. That is a deliberate method, announced and defended, and readers can argue about whether city and soul really match. In the Charmides the move from person to city happens without announcement, inside a single long sentence, and a reader has to catch it for himself.

The dialogue gives the shift another twist. The rule that each person should do what he knows recalls doing one’s own business, the proposal Charmides put forward earlier. The Republic also takes up that phrase in its inquiry into justice. In the Charmides the first proposal is revised, and the idea reappears here in a different form. Socrates will say they “too easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew.” The resemblance gives us a reason to ask how much the revived proposal has really gained.

What does the personal argument support? A person who recognizes his limits has reason to look for help, and there’s a sensible way to rely on someone who really knows. The step from reliance to forbidding someone else to act changes who gets to decide. The sentence moves quickly over it, though the case for the earlier steps has yet to answer that question.

My verdict is that the change of scale from 167a to 171d is real progress for the first two steps and an unearned leap for the third. Self-examination plausibly extends to examining others and to relying on genuine experts, but nothing in it licenses a ruling class that forbids others to act outside their competence. Socrates’ later admission that they agreed “too easily” to the principle of each doing what he knows suggests he saw the trouble, and a reader who checks the steps one at a time can see exactly where the mirror turned into a throne.

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Question 1 of 3

According to the article, where does the argument make its crucial unsupported transition?

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