Philosophy

From One Patient to the Whole of Virtue

A doctor may be good at medicine and still be unsure whether a particular treatment helped. Critias takes that small uncertainty and turns it into a claim about what it means to know yourself.

Two words carry the argument from a patient’s outcome to the inscription at Delphi. Watch what happens when Critias drops the phrase that made Socrates’ question so specific.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • One treatmentThe doctor in Socrates’ example may know medicine without knowing whether his treatment helped this patient. His uncertainty concerns an action he’s already taken.
  • The missing qualificationSocrates’ doctor fails to know himself in respect of how he acted. Critias keeps the idea of knowing oneself and drops the qualification that gave it a particular subject.
  • From Delphi to knowledge itselfCritias ties self-knowledge to the Delphic inscription. When Socrates asks what such knowledge is about, the proposal becomes a knowledge of other kinds of knowledge and of itself.
  • What the case can showReviewing a particular decision can improve the next one. Its value gives Critias a reason to take self-scrutiny seriously and leaves him with work to do if he wants it to define temperance.

The phrase that will dominate the rest of the dialogue sneaks in through a back door. Socrates has just got Critias to admit that a doctor may not know whether his treatment helped. Sometimes, Socrates says, the doctor acts beneficially or harmfully and “does not know himself — how he has acted.” The Greek also makes the doctor himself the object of knowing and adds the qualification about his action. A moment later Critias picks up “knowing oneself,” and the inscription at Delphi enters the conversation riding on the back of that little turn of phrase.

It’s worth slowing down on what the doctor actually lacks. He can know medicine well and still need to find out what happened after he treated a particular patient. Following up might tell him the patient got better. Whether the treatment helped bring that about is a further question, and the case may leave it open. Even an incomplete answer can change what the doctor does on Monday morning. He may find out, for example, that next time he’ll want a better record of what the patient was experiencing before the treatment began.

At Stanford’s neurology morbidity, mortality and improvement conference, residents present hospital or clinic cases that could have gone better. The point of going over a case with colleagues is to give it a second look with information and perspectives that weren’t available to the person making decisions the first time around. A doctor can bring real competence to the room and still hear a question about her own case that she hadn’t thought to ask. There’s a very unglamorous version of the Delphic command in that.

That’s a good candidate for part of temperance. A person who regularly asks how she acted, and is willing to hear that she acted badly, is less dependent on her first impression of herself. There’s a difference between knowing that the patient is doing well and being ready to ask whether you took a needless chance on the way there. If Critias had stayed with the doctor, he might have defended a more specific account of virtue in which a temperate person takes an honest look at her own conduct.

Instead, Critias generalizes. He refuses to concede that a person who doesn’t know himself could be temperate, and calls temperance “knowing oneself.” The words sound almost the same as Socrates’ description of the doctor, but the rest of the sentence has fallen away. Once the question is about yourself without qualification, you need to say what counts as answering it. Socrates starts to find out by treating it as a kind of knowledge and asking what it’s about and what it does for us.

By 166c, Critias calls temperance “knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.” There’s a real question here. A doctor ought to be able to tell when a problem exceeds her expertise, and the dialogue goes on to ask how anyone could know the limits of what they know. But that’s a different inquiry from whether a treatment helped a patient. Asking a doctor to examine knowledge in general is a little like asking her to review the idea of reviewing cases. It might be worth doing. There’s still a case to review afterward.

Critias takes a valuable tool and declares it to be the whole workshop. It’s easy to see why. The doctor really does have something to learn about herself through what she’s done, and it matters whether she’s willing to learn it. The larger claim inherits the appeal of that smaller discovery. Yet the fact that we’d be glad to have a doctor who reviews her work tells us very little about whether the habit could explain everything we mean by temperance.

My verdict is that the doctor gives the Delphic formula a practical starting point. The general definition has to earn its own way from there. If it’s going to explain how someone governs herself, it still owes us a story about what she can find out about her conduct and how that changes the next decision. Otherwise we’ll have worked out a great deal about knowledge in general and left the doctor with exactly the same question about her patient.

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Why does the article distinguish learning that a patient improved from learning that a treatment helped?

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