Philosophy
First, Could It Exist?
Socrates asks whether knowledge of knowledge could exist and whether it would help anyone. A proposal can make a good impression before either question has been answered.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesWhen the first question stalls, Socrates sets it aside and asks what the capacity would actually do. The order of the questions matters, and so does his willingness to keep going.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Two questions at the restartAt 167b Socrates first asks whether knowledge of what one knows and doesn’t know is possible. He then asks what benefit we could get if we had it.
- An open question about possibilitySocrates gives examples of capacities and relations that are hard to imagine applying to themselves. He leaves open whether knowledge can take knowledge as its object.
- A trial run for the proposalSocrates provisionally grants that knowledge of knowledge could exist. He can then examine what a city run by it would gain without settling the question he set aside.
- What makes expertise beneficial?The imagined city uses genuine experts. Socrates still asks whether living knowledgeably makes anyone happy, and the argument turns to knowing what is good and bad.
Socrates lays out the plan when he restarts the inquiry for the third time. They should look, he says, “first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know,” and “second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it.” A few pages later he repeats the demand to Critias, asking him to show “that what I just mentioned is possible; and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too.” It’s a simple plan, and it does a great deal of work in the second half of the dialogue.
The two questions are genuinely independent, and the easiest way to see it is with inventions. A machine that promised to run forever without fuel or any other energy input might sound wonderfully useful. The promise gives us no reason to think it can work. Plenty of real machines have the opposite problem. They work perfectly, and nobody needs them. A proposal for a valuable capacity owes us two separate accounts, one of how the thing could exist and one of what it would help us do.
Critias’ definition is attractive, which is a common way for ideas to escape scrutiny. A knowledge that would let you know your own limits and tell who else knows what sounds so desirable that it’s easy to think the hard questions have been answered. At 169a, Socrates is still wondering how to show that a capacity can turn upon itself. The pitch has made its impression before the work has been done. Advertising works on the same principle. A description of what the product will do for you can be so vivid that you forget to ask whether it can do it.
Attractiveness can also mislead us about benefit. The usefulness of a capacity depends on how it connects with everything else in a life. Socrates first pictures a well-run household and city where people leave each task to those who know how to do it. Later he pictures people recognizing genuine experts and asks what follows for their happiness. They might get better treatment or better shoes. The speakers still have to ask whether living knowledgeably makes anyone happy, and Critias eventually singles out knowledge of good and bad.
The order of the questions matters. If the thing can’t exist, asking about its benefits as if it were already available is idle, like debating the best color for a square circle. But Socrates never says that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. When Critias can’t establish possibility, Socrates grants it for the time being and keeps going. The second question can be asked hypothetically while the first remains unsettled.
That flexibility lets the investigation find out more than it could by stopping at a difficulty. Even if Critias’ proposed knowledge could exist, it still owes us an account of the benefits promised for it. It’s the difference between asking whether a bridge can be built and asking where the bridge would take you. For a while, Socrates gives Critias the bridge. They can see how far it gets them, and that question has an answer even while its construction remains in doubt.
The two-stage plan is worth borrowing well beyond Plato. Whenever someone proposes a capacity as the answer to a problem, a technology that will fix education, a policy that will end poverty, a habit that will make you happy, the same two questions apply, can it actually be done, and if it can, would it actually help. People often skip one or both because the description is appealing, and the Charmides is a careful demonstration of what happens when they’re asked properly. Investors call this kind of checking due diligence, and it’s the first thing to go when a pitch is exciting enough.
My verdict is that Socrates’ split between possibility and benefit guards against the trap of defining a virtue through an appealing capacity. His questions keep the attractive picture from doing all the work. By granting possibility for a while, he finds that there is still something to learn about benefit. The Charmides can make that much progress and leave the first question open.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author treat possibility and benefit as genuinely independent questions?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When, if ever, is it reasonable to investigate the benefits of something before establishing that it can exist?→
- How can we distinguish a genuinely valuable capacity from one whose attractive description merely distracts us from questions about feasibility and benefit?→
- If recognizing genuine experts improves particular outcomes but does not necessarily produce happiness, what further connection would need to be shown?→