Philosophy

Does Temperance Always Look Good?

A well-executed movement and an admirable choice can both be fine in different senses.

Socrates and Charmides agree that temperance is fine. The arguments about quietness and modesty test that agreement in different ways, and the difference matters to anyone trying to recognize the virtue.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A shared premiseSocrates and Charmides agree that temperance is fine before testing either of the boy’s first two definitions.
  • Skill and appearanceSocrates compares fast and slow performances, while the example of someone declining a drink asks whether temperance needs to look impressive.
  • Admirable choicesAristotle treats the nobility of an action as a reason for choosing it.
  • What temperance doesThe discussion of modesty asks whether temperance makes people good, and the dialogue returns to the question of benefit near its close.

Charmides 154d–e, 159c–d, 160d–e, 160e–161b, 174b–d, 174d–175b · Gorgias 474d–475a · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1115b20–24, 4.1

Before either of the first two definitions gets refuted, Socrates secures one small agreement. He asks, “Tell me: temperance is one of the fine things, isn’t it?” and Charmides answers “Certainly.” When the second definition comes along, Socrates goes back to the same well, asking, “Weren’t you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?” Then he upgrades it, getting the boy to agree that temperate men are good men and that temperance is “not only fine, but good as well.” The two refutations both turn on what they take that agreement to mean, so it’s worth asking what the two of them think they’ve agreed to, because the word “fine” can carry more than one meaning, and the two arguments lean on different ones.

The Greek word is kalos, and its range is huge. It’s the word at the heart of Chaerephon’s praise of Charmides’ physique at the start of the dialogue, and its opposite, aischros, means both ugly and shameful, so the same pair of words covers how something looks and how admirable it is. In the Gorgias, Socrates himself explains that we call bodies, colors, sounds, laws and ways of life fine on grounds of benefit or pleasure or both, so kalos stretches all the way from the beauty of a face to the value of a good law. When Charmides grants that temperance is fine, he probably means something like admirable, but the word leaves the argument room to mean any of these.

That gives three ways to read the premise, and they differ a lot in strength. Read weakly, it says that temperance as a trait of character is admirable, which almost everyone accepts, while a middle reading says that every action coming from temperance is admirable, which is stronger but still plausible. Read strongly, it says that every outward expression of temperance looks fine, graceful and impressive to anyone watching, and that’s a very different claim, because it makes the virtue answerable to how it appears to an audience.

The quietness argument gives the strong reading a foothold, and you can hear it in the wording. Socrates’ examples are all performances, and he asks whether in running and jumping the actions “done nimbly and quickly” are the fine ones and the ones “done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones,” which is a judgment about how well an action is performed, the way a coach judges form. For those examples to settle the question of temperance, the same standards would have to tell us which actions are temperate. But from the outside, temperance can look pretty lame. Think of the guy leaving early or turning down a third drink while everybody else is staying for another round.

The middle reading is much easier to defend, and Aristotle held it. Actions that come from virtue, he says, are fine and done for the sake of the fine. A brave person faces the right danger because facing it is the fine thing to do. By the same reasoning, the temperate person has a good reason to turn down that third drink. But Aristotle’s “fine” means admirable, worthy of praise from someone who understands what’s going on, and it’s perfectly compatible with looking awkward or dull to a crowd that doesn’t. The temperate person leaving the party early is doing something fine in Aristotle’s sense, and it’s entirely possible that nobody at the party thinks so.

When Socrates refutes the second definition, he adds a different test. He asks whether anything could be good “that does not make men good.” That recalls the benefit Socrates discusses in the Gorgias, though here the question is specifically what temperance does for the person who has it. That’s a fair demand to make of a virtue, and it’s the demand the dialogue keeps returning to all the way to its final pages, where the question becomes whether temperance does anyone any good.

There’s one more twist in the passage that’s worth noticing before we leave it. When Socrates puts slow, laborious actions on the side of the ugly or shameful, using a form of aischros, he hands Charmides a word, and the boy’s very next answer, after he has been told to look within himself, is that temperance “makes a person feel shame,” using a verb from the same root. It’s as if the argument had taught him that what matters about conduct is how it would look to others, so that when he goes looking inside himself he finds exactly that, a sense of being watched. On that reading, the way Socrates tests the first answer may help steer the boy toward a second one that turns on how people see him.

My verdict is that a temperate choice can be admirable and beneficial even when it looks unimpressive. The first refutation moves too quickly from what counts as a fine performance to what counts as a fine choice. The second asks whether temperance makes people good, which is closer to the kind of praise Charmides probably meant in the first place. That’s a useful thing to catch early in the dialogue, because temperance, more than any other virtue, is the one that tends to look unimpressive while it’s doing its job, and any definition that judges it by how it looks is going to miss it every time.

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What key distinction does the article claim the first refutation moves past too quickly?

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