Philosophy
Critias Runs the Show
A staged introduction foreshadows the dialogue’s test of whether self-knowledge can spot a pretender.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesCritias stages his ward’s entrance like a manager hyping a client, then cooks up a fake doctor’s appointment to get the kid into the chair. The man who will define temperance as knowing what you know opens the dialogue by asking Socrates to pretend.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Managing the roomBefore Charmides speaks, his guardian vouches for his character and presents him as a philosopher and poet.
- A pretend doctorCritias asks Socrates to claim he has a headache remedy. Socrates turns the appointment into a conversation about caring for the soul.
- The expertise testSocrates asks whether knowledge about knowledge can distinguish a genuine doctor from a pretender. Judging a doctor requires knowledge of medicine itself.
- Covering up perplexityWhen Critias finds himself at a loss, the man who asked Socrates to pretend tries to hide his own uncertainty.
Critias is already sitting in the wrestling-school when Socrates walks in, and from the moment the boy’s admirers come through the door he’s running the room. He’s the one who glances toward the entrance and announces what’s coming, and he’s the one who tells Socrates who the boy is, “Charmides, our uncle Glaucon’s son. My cousin.” As cousin and guardian he has every right to talk the kid up, and he does it with the ease of a man who’s used to being the best-connected person in any room he enters.
The hype starts right away, because when Socrates says the boy would be unbeatable if his soul were well made too, Critias jumps in with “Oh, he’s thoroughly beautiful and good,” the stock phrase for a proper gentleman, and when Socrates suggests a conversation, Critias adds that the kid is a philosopher and, by his own account and everybody else’s, quite the poet. It’s exactly how a manager talks about a client before a meeting, every line a credential, and Socrates plays along by asking Critias to “call the youngster over and show him off to me,” as if Charmides were something Critias could put on display whenever he liked.
Then comes the move that tells you the most about him. Critias sends his attendant to fetch Charmides with a cover story, “Tell him I want to introduce him to a doctor about the complaint he was telling me about the other day,” and then turns to Socrates with the plan. The boy has been saying his head feels heavy in the mornings, so “What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?” The very first thing Critias asks of Socrates, in a dialogue about temperance, is to fake an expertise he doesn’t have, and he asks it casually, as if a little pretending were just how you get things done in Athens.
Keep that request in your pocket, because the dialogue comes back to it in a big way. When Critias finally settles on his favorite definition, temperance becomes a knowledge that knows itself and all the other kinds of knowledge, which he and Socrates spell out as the ability to examine “what he in fact knows and what he does not,” in yourself and in other people. The question the argument then hammers on is whether such a knowledge could tell a real expert from a fake, and the test case Socrates picks is a doctor. Temperance as Critias defines it, he concludes, could not tell “a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does.”
So the dialogue opens with Critias inventing a fake doctor and builds toward the discovery that Critias’ version of temperance would be useless for spotting one. Plato wants you to feel that rhyme, and it gives the opening a sting you mostly notice on a second read. The guardian who’s so good at arranging appearances, the right introduction, the right credentials and the right cover story, is about to propose that the highest virtue is knowing exactly what you know, and Plato has already shown him treating knowledge as something you can claim whenever it’s convenient.
Socrates goes along with the ruse, but he does something sneaky with it. He tells Charmides the remedy is a leaf that only works with a charm, and that he learned the charm on campaign from a Thracian doctor who served Zalmoxis, a king the Thracians worshipped as a god, which sounds like exactly the kind of improvised backstory a fake doctor would need. Then the charm turns out to be “beautiful words,” the kind of conversation that puts temperance into a soul, and the fake doctor is suddenly offering the one treatment he’s actually qualified to give. Critias set up a lie to get the boy into the chair, and Socrates quietly turns it into something true.
Critias, meanwhile, can’t stay in the producer’s booth for long. He’s the one who brags that his ward “is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays,” and when Charmides passes along a definition that turns out to be Critias’ own and starts fumbling it, the guardian can’t hold back and jumps into the argument himself, which is where the payoff arrives. When the questions get hard and he’s at a loss, Socrates tells us that “since he was used to being admired on every occasion, he was ashamed in front of the company,” and that he “kept covering up his perplexity.” The man who asked Socrates to pretend to know something at the door ends up pretending to know something himself, in front of the same crowd he was so good at managing.
None of this makes Critias a cartoon villain in the opening, where he’s charming, generous with introductions and genuinely proud of his family. Plato’s readers knew he’d go on to be the leading figure among the Thirty, the oligarchs who ran Athens by terror, and it’s hard not to see the same talents at work here in miniature, the stage management, the cover story and the comfort with getting people to play roles. The dialogue’s diagnosis is quieter than a political indictment, though, and I think more useful, because it grants that managing how things look is a real skill, one Critias has in spades, and then shows, from the first page to the cover-up, that it’s a different thing entirely from knowing what you know.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What central irony does the article identify between Critias’ opening scheme and his later account of temperance?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When, if ever, can managing appearances serve a legitimate purpose without becoming a substitute for knowledge?→
- Does Socrates’ decision to turn Critias’ deception toward a truthful philosophical purpose justify his participation in the original ruse? Why or why not?→
- How does Critias’ concern with being admired interfere with the self-knowledge that his own definition of temperance appears to require?→