Philosophy

Afraid of Being Afraid

People fear their own fear all the time. Socrates’ example adds a condition that makes it much harder to find a match, and that condition is what connects it to Critias’ definition.

Roosevelt, Montaigne and a speaker who dreads losing his nerve all give fear something to fear. The puzzle in the Charmides takes that something away.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • Critias’ answer sounds too quickFear of fear is a recognizable experience. A speaker can dread losing his nerve even when the occasion itself gives him little reason to worry.
  • A condition changes the questionSocrates excludes everything dreadful from his imagined fear. Actual fear of fear treats fear itself as the dreadful thing and so keeps the very object he removes.
  • Fear anticipates a bad thingIn the Laches, Socrates and Nicias link what is dreadful to evils still to come. The Protagoras also connects dread or fear with an expectation of something bad.
  • The restriction reaches CritiasThe proposal being tested excludes the ordinary subjects of learning from its kind of knowledge. If those subjects were still allowed, the analogy with everyday fear of fear would work differently.

Charmides 167b–d, 167e–168b, 169e–170b, 170b–e · Laches 198b–c · Protagoras 358d–e · Montaigne, Essays On Fear · Franklin D. Roosevelt First Inaugural Address

Socrates’ question sounds easy to answer. “And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?” Critias replies, “I haven’t come across one.” A reader might think he gave up too quickly. You can dread losing your nerve before a public speech, and the thought of freezing at the lectern can be much worse than the thought of the speech itself. The example seems to have an obvious answer until you pay attention to the last part of the question.

Franklin Roosevelt told Americans at his first inauguration that the only thing they had to fear was fear itself. He meant the sort of terror that keeps people from acting when they need to. Montaigne says that what he fears most is fear. A person about to speak may dread the moment his heart races and his voice goes. Each example points to fear and gives us a reason someone could find it frightening.

Socrates’ imagined fear has an extra condition. It fears itself and the other fears, and it “fears not one of the things that are dreadful.” Roosevelt and Montaigne have found something dreadful in fear itself. The speaker has found it in what might happen to him when he feels afraid. These examples show how unusual fear’s target can be without leaving it with nothing dreadful to fear.

Two other dialogues make sense of the restriction. In the Laches, Socrates and Nicias agree that what is dreadful concerns bad things still to come, and Nicias connects courage with knowing what to dread or dare. In the Protagoras, Socrates asks whether dread or fear is an expectation of something bad. His companions mostly agree, with Prodicus reserving a distinction between the words. If a feeling gets its character from what the person expects, Socrates has given Critias a good reason to wonder what would be left after taking that expectation away.

Think of the speaker again. He can be afraid of trembling at the lectern, or he can calmly observe that his hands are trembling. Both direct his attention toward much the same thing. In the first he takes the trembling as something he dreads. In the second he might be no more alarmed than if he’d noticed his tie was crooked. The fact that his attention is directed inward can’t by itself explain which of the two states he is in.

That is what the restriction contributes to the challenge facing Critias. The two men consider a “knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.” Later, Socrates asks whether this would tell someone that another person knows something while leaving him unable to identify the subject. Treating knowledge as one more thing a person can know would give him much less to object to. His question is what the proposed power could do after its other subjects have been taken away.

If Critias had said that a person could know medicine and could also consider how he knows it, the fear-of-fear example might have helped him. It shows that turning attention back on something you feel can be quite ordinary. The stronger proposal needs a further answer. Critias wants this kind of knowledge to differ from the other kinds, and the difference means giving up the very objects that normally tell us what a kind of knowledge is about.

My verdict is that fearing fear leaves Socrates’ question standing. The person at the lectern can tell you what he dreads, even if what he dreads is his own fear. Socrates asks Critias to imagine a fear in which there is nothing dreadful to point to. Holding that last condition in view is what makes the strange case a fair test of the equally strange kind of knowledge under discussion.

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Why do Roosevelt’s and Montaigne’s examples fail to satisfy the full condition in Socrates’ imagined case?

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