Philosophy

A Tie Goes to Socrates

Even if quiet actions turn out to be just as fine as quick ones, Socrates says, quietness can’t tell us what makes a person temperate. His fallback puts more pressure on the definition than on the examples.

A feature can be common among good examples without explaining what makes them good. The argument over pace puts that difference to work.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The stronger claim and the fallbackSocrates first says that quick actions often come out finer than quiet ones. He then asks what follows even if the quiet ones do just as well.
  • Why a tie mattersThe definition gives quietness a special place. If fine actions can be quick or quiet, their fineness gives Socrates no reason to award the virtue to one pace.
  • A definition should hold across casesIn the Laches, Socrates asks what quickness in a race and quickness in speech share. The Meno makes the same kind of request by asking what all bees have in common.
  • The objection that remainsThe Statesman gives us reason to ask whether different virtues could make different actions fine. Even on that view, a definition still has to distinguish temperate quiet from quiet that comes from fear or indifference.

Charmides 159b–d, 159d–160b, 160b–e, 160e–161b · Laches 192a, 192b · Meno 72b, 72c · Statesman 306e, 307a

After a string of examples, Socrates does something lawyers do when they aren’t sure the jury bought their main argument, which is to make a second argument that works even if the first one fails. He says one of two things is true, and the first is that quiet actions have proved finer than quick ones “either nowhere or in very few places,” which is where his examples were meant to lead. Then he adds a fallback, supposing “at the very most” that the fine quiet actions are no fewer than the fine quick ones, and he says that even then temperance “would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly,” and “nor would the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet one.” He grants Charmides a draw and still thinks the definition gives too much weight to quietness.

The fallback is the more interesting of the two arguments, because it changes what Socrates has to prove. The first argument leans on quickness coming out ahead. The fallback needs only a tie. If quiet and quick actions can both be fine, the fact that quietness is sometimes fine gives it no special claim to the virtue. A tie is enough to challenge a definition that points to one pace and asks us to see temperance there.

The logic is easier to see with an everyday case, so suppose someone tells you that what makes a great teacher is strictness and you want to show they’re wrong. You can point to good teachers of both kinds. A lenient teacher who does the job well is enough to show that a great teacher can get there without strictness. It turns out to be a feature some great teachers happen to have, the way some great teachers happen to have beards, and the definition has to tell us what the good ones have in common.

That’s the standard the fallback sets for any definition of a virtue, and it’s a demanding one. A feature that shows up in some fine actions isn’t enough if you can find it in the bad cases too. A definition has to pick out something that belongs to the virtue across the cases. Tempo can’t do that, because the fine and the ugly come in both speeds, with the reader who rushes and garbles the lines failing just as surely as the reader who stumbles through them, and the good reader sometimes brisk and sometimes deliberate. Whatever temperance is, the definition has to tell us how to recognize it when a person acts quickly and when a person acts quietly.

Plato gives us a model of the kind of definition Socrates is after. The example, fittingly enough, is quickness itself. In the Laches, when the general Laches can’t say what courage is, Socrates offers him a model, saying that if someone asked what quickness is, in running and playing the lyre and speaking and learning and all the rest, he would answer that it’s the power that gets a lot done in a short time. The example names one thing running through every case, whether the quickness lives in legs, fingers, tongue or mind. It shows what Socrates is asking Charmides to find for temperance. The Meno makes the same demand when Socrates asks for the one form all the virtues share, the way all bees share whatever makes them bees in spite of their differences.

There’s a real objection to the fallback, and it deserves a serious hearing. Maybe the fine quick actions are fine because of some other virtue, so that quickness in battle belongs to courage and quickness in learning belongs to wisdom, while the fine quiet actions are the ones that belong to temperance, and in that case a tie between quick and quiet tells you nothing about temperance in particular. In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger notices how we praise vigorous actions as courageous and quiet, gentle ones as restrained. That leaves a gap in the argument. Saying that temperance is fine doesn’t by itself tell us that every fine action shows temperance.

The objection still leaves Charmides with a problem. Even if temperance shows mostly in quiet actions, some people are quiet because they’re sulking, frightened or simply checked out. We still need something that tells the temperate kind of quiet apart from the rest. The pace alone leaves those cases looking alike. A definition has to give us a way to tell them apart. Charmides’ next answer runs straight into the same wall, since Socrates shows that modesty is sometimes good and sometimes not, which gives him a reason to question whether modesty and temperance are the same thing.

My verdict is that the fallback is the real argument in this passage, and a stronger one than the page of examples that comes before it. It puts pressure on the feature Charmides has chosen. Quietness can go with temperance, and it can go with a very different sort of behavior. Socrates can leave quickness and quietness tied and still ask the harder question. What does the temperate person bring to an action that a quiet manner by itself can’t tell us?

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