Philosophy
A Course Title With No Syllabus
Critias finally names the knowledge that makes people happy. The dialogue explains what it would do and leaves a student wondering where to begin.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesThe Charmides gives knowledge of good and bad a central place. The Laches and Republic help distinguish identifying a question from teaching someone how to answer it.
Orientation
At a Glance
- Critias finally names itAsked which knowledge makes the imaginary all-knowing man happy, Critias names knowledge of good and bad.
- Socrates assigns it a jobMedicine would still heal and cobbling would still produce shoes. Socrates assigns knowledge of good and bad the work of making those results beneficial.
- The syllabus is missingThe speakers leave open how anyone would acquire this knowledge or recognize it in another person. They also leave open how a better account of temperance might relate to it.
- Other dialogues take up related questionsThe Laches tests whether knowing all good and bad would cover all virtue. The Republic sketches a course of study and still leaves the good itself difficult to explain.
Charmides 156e–157a, 163d–164a, 174b–d, 174d–175a · Laches 199c–e · Republic 504d–505b, 506e, 537b–d, 539e–540a
When Critias finally names the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy, it’s the one “By which he knows good,” he says, “and bad,” and Socrates responds as if a long-hidden card had finally been played. He accuses Critias of dragging him round in a circle while hiding that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, “but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad.” For a few lines the dialogue seems to have found what it was looking for. Then Socrates points out that this knowledge isn’t temperance as Critias defined it, the argument turns back to Critias’ definition, and within a page the conversation is over.
It’s worth collecting everything the dialogue actually tells us about this knowledge, because the list is short and precise. It makes a person happy more than any other knowledge does, and its objects are good and bad. Its work, in Socrates’ phrase, is “to benefit us.” Without it the crafts still achieve their own results, since medicine heals and cobbling still supplies shoes, but those results are no longer done “well and beneficially.” It is distinct from the knowledge of knowledge that Critias had proposed, and so, on Critias’ definition, distinct from temperance itself. Each item is a claim about what the knowledge does or how it stands to other things, and none of them says what the knowledge actually contains.
We also learn something from where the phrase has appeared before. Critias had defined temperance as “the doing of good things,” and the Thracian doctor at the start of the dialogue taught that everything “bad and good alike” flows from the soul, so the pair good and bad has been running through the conversation from the beginning. When the knowledge of good and bad is finally named, it gathers up those earlier threads, and a careful reader can feel the dialogue’s different parts converging on it, as if the target had been visible from the start and the arguments had been circling it.
Now for what the dialogue doesn’t tell us, which is nearly everything a student would want in a syllabus. We’re not told how this knowledge is acquired, whether by teaching, practice, examination or something else, and we’re not told what it studies, whether particular cases, general principles or something like the nature of the good itself. We’re not told who has it, or how anyone could recognize it in another person, or whether it’s one knowledge or many. Above all we’re not told how it relates to temperance, since the dialogue separates them on Critias’ definition and never says whether a better definition might bring them back together. A student handed this course would know it was required, and know that every other course depends on it, and still have no idea what to read on the first day.
The Laches shows how quickly the question can become difficult. Nicias’ account of courage expands under examination from knowledge of what to fear or dare to knowledge of good and bad in the past, present, and future. Socrates observes that this would cover the whole of virtue, though they had agreed that courage was one part of it. The Charmides leaves us to wonder what would happen if someone tried to define temperance just as broadly.
The Republic offers something like the missing syllabus. There Socrates calls the form of the good the greatest thing to learn and doubts the usefulness of knowing everything else without it. The education he sketches includes years of mathematical studies and dialectic, with further responsibilities in the city. Even there Socrates sets aside a direct account of the good and offers an analogy. Readers get some idea of how to approach the subject, and the subject itself stays difficult.
So the right way to read the ending is as a promising direction rather than a delivered account. The dialogue has shown why this knowledge matters, since it is the only one whose work is benefit, and it has distinguished knowing good and bad from Critias’ knowledge of knowledge. That’s a real result, the sort of thing a good research team reports when it has narrowed the search to one region of the map. But reading the closing pages as if they contained a theory of the good would be like reading a course catalog entry and thinking you had taken the class.
My verdict is that the Charmides tells us a great deal about the importance of knowledge of good and bad and leaves its contents largely open. The cases of the crafts and the man who knows everything show what the speakers need this knowledge to explain. Other dialogues take that investigation further. In this one, the most the reader gets is a direction and a reason to follow it.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What distinction does the article draw between craft knowledge and knowledge of good and bad?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- If knowledge of good and bad makes the products of every craft beneficial, what kind of judgment would it need to contribute beyond the expertise internal to each craft?→
- Does the Charmides accomplish enough by identifying the importance and function of knowledge of good and bad without explaining its contents? Why or why not?→
- If a definition of temperance as knowledge of good and bad risked expanding temperance into the whole of virtue, how might one preserve temperance as a distinct virtue?→