Symposium

“‘Holding right opinions even without being able to give an account — do you not know,’ she said, ‘that it is neither knowing — for how could a thing without an account be knowledge? — nor ignorance — for how could what hits upon what is be ignorance? — but right opinion is, surely, something of this kind, between intelligence and ignorance.’¹

“‘What you say is true,’ I said.

202b“‘Then do not compel what is not beautiful to be ugly, nor what is not good to be bad. So too with Love: since you yourself agree that he is neither good nor beautiful, do not think any the more that he must be ugly and bad, but something,’ she said, ‘between these two.’

“‘And yet,’ I said, ‘it is agreed by everyone that he is a great god.’

“‘By all who do not know, do you mean,’ she said, ‘or by those who know as well?’

“‘By all together, of course.’

“And she laughed and said, ‘And how, Socrates, could he 202c be agreed to be a great god by those who say he is not even a god?’

“‘Who are these?’ I said.

“‘One is you,’ she said, ‘and one is I.’

“And I said, ‘How do you mean this?’ I said.

“And she said, ‘Easily. For tell me, do you not say that all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you dare to say that any one of the gods is not beautiful and happy?’

“‘By Zeus, not I,’ I said.

“‘And do you not call happy those who possess good things and beautiful things?’

“‘Certainly.’

202d“’But you have agreed that Love, through lack of the