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Stobaeus, Volume II
Greek and English with an introduction and explanatory footnotes.
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Book II Chapter 31 · II.31.129.2
Ancient Greek
p. 980Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια
Τί δ’; ὅσα κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενον πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνει, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν; — Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν. — Σφόδρα γε. — Τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου ξυνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον. — Ἔοικεν. — Ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν. — Ναί. — Τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν. — Κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ δὴ νῦν λέξαντος ἠμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ξύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον.
Stobaeus, Volume II: Book II Chapter 31
p. 981Plato continued
What of things that move, set themselves a target and try to reach it, yet at every impulse go astray and miss it? Shall we say that they suffer this through proportion in their relations to one another, or, on the contrary, through lack of proportion? — Clearly through lack of proportion.1448 — Yet we know that every soul is unwillingly ignorant of whatever it does not know. — Certainly. — And ignorance, when the soul strives for truth but its understanding goes off course, is nothing other than a derangement of the mind. — Quite so. — Then an uncomprehending soul must be regarded as ugly and lacking proportion. — It seems so.1449 — Thus there are, it appears, these two kinds of evil in it: one called vice by most people, most clearly a disease of the soul. — Yes. — The other they call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge it as badness when it alone occurs in the soul. — We must fully concede what I questioned when you said it just now: that there are two kinds of badness in the soul. Cowardice, intemperance and injustice must all be regarded as disease in us, while the condition of much and varied ignorance must be regarded as ugliness.1450
Socrates
Reading Stobaeus, Volume II · Book II Chapter 31 · II.31.129.2
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete surviving text of Stobaeus’s second book, through II.46.22, in Ancient Greek and English, with an introduction and 1,541 explanatory notes. All forty-six chapter headings remain, including the notices for chapters whose texts are missing.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Curt Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, volumen II (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), printed p. 1 and pp. 3–264. The supplied edition preserves consequential editorial signs, reconstructed joins, qualified attributions, and missing-text notices. English translation, introduction, and explanatory notes: Diotimos Editions, 2026.
About Diotimos Editions
This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.
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Stobaeus’s ancient Greek work and Wachsmuth’s 1884 edition are in the public domain. The supplied English translation, introduction, and explanatory notes are published with the site owner’s authorization.