STOBAEUS

Anthology

Volume Two

Greek and English on facing pages

INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY FOOTNOTES

Greek and English edition

Complete surviving anthology text

Through Book II, chapter 46, excerpt 22

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About this edition

This Greek and English translation of Stobaeus's Anthology, Volume Two, follows Curt Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, volumen II (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), the companion to Volume One's source. It includes the Greek title and all surviving anthology text through II.46.22.

Chapters 1–9, 15, 31, 33 and 46 are complete. Chapters 10–14, 16–30, 32 and 34–45 retain headings only. This edition covers printed p. 1 and pp. 3–264 in full. The translation is complete. The full-volume editorial review is complete.

The PDF places Greek on the even-numbered left page and English on the facing right page. Shared passage identifiers align the two languages. Explanatory footnotes accompany the English, and printed source pages appear below each spread.

The Greek has been transcribed from the scanned pages. The scan's defective machine-readable text is not used as the textual authority. Spacing, apostrophes, and line wrapping are regularized; significant supplements, rejected wording, and the reconstructed joins within the Didymus and Epictetus passages remain visible.

The translation scope is the surviving Greek anthology text. Wachsmuth's full Latin apparatus, his catalogue of manuscript scholia, and his scholarly indexes are not translated as part of the anthology. His notes are consulted and explained where they affect the reading or its interpretation.

The second book and its readers

The second volume resumes the education in reading that shaped the first. Stobaeus places brief sayings beside extended arguments and excerpts from poetry beside philosophical prose. Their proximity invites comparison. It does not make their speakers agree. The reader must attend both to a passage's particular claim and to the question under which the compiler has placed it.

"Book Two" and "Volume Two" happen to coincide here, but they name different things. The book is an ancient division of the Anthology. The volume is a physical part of the nineteenth-century edition. Its title page explicitly identifies it as containing the second book, edited by Curt Wachsmuth. The ancient contents list reproduced in Volume One describes forty-six chapters; the surviving text has losses, and Wachsmuth preserves a number of headings without the passages that once followed them.[1]

The book moves from divine knowledge, dialectic, rhetoric, speech, letters and poetry to ethical philosophy. Extended accounts of virtue and the good sit beside arguments about choice, responsibility, appearance and character. Later sections turn to education, friendship, concord, kindness and gratitude. These topics belong to a broad inquiry into how a person should learn, judge, speak and live.

The opening makes this variety immediately visible. A tragic fragment doubts that wise speakers know more than others. A maxim counsels reverence without investigation. Plutarch allows thought a dim, dreamlike contact with the divine. Plato asks for explanatory examples and for a likely account proportioned to human capacities. Such differences are part of what the collection gives us to read.

1. For the physical volume, see its two Latin title pages and the Greek Book II title on printed p. 1. For the ancient plan of forty-six chapters, see Photius's testimony as printed in Wachsmuth I, pp. 6–8. Examples of headings with missing text occur near the end of Wachsmuth II, pp. 255 and 258–259. The existence of a heading does not imply that its chapter survives.

Knowledge and the ethical life

The opening chapter tests claims to knowledge of the divine. In the Timaeus excerpt, finding the maker and father of the universe is difficult, and speaking of him to everyone is impossible. In the Hermetic address to Tat, the distinction falls between conceiving and expressing: the incorporeal cannot be apprehended by bodily senses. These qualifications matter. The excerpts do not make interchangeable claims about what human beings can know or say.[2]

Chapter 7 preserves extended accounts of ethical teaching. Its Stoic account distinguishes goods from things preferred for their value without counting those preferred things as goods. The Peripatetic account gives bodily and external advantages a different place in the good life. The translation keeps these categories distinct, even where ordinary English might use one word for several of them.

The chapters on choice and responsibility bring together arguments about what depends on us, the influence of circumstances, and the relation between judgment and conduct. The heading “That no one is bad willingly” frames a collection of particular accounts; it does not erase their differences. A claim about a natural capacity for virtue, for example, is not a claim that everyone has already become virtuous.

Education supplies another test of the relation between knowing and living. The excerpts ask how natural gifts, instruction, habit and practice contribute to character. They also question whether verbal skill or extensive learning is enough. The short sequences on friendship and gratitude bring the inquiry into relations with others: likeness can unite friends, while kindness calls for a response whose meaning depends on the speaker and context.

2. Compare II.1.15 (Timaeus 28C) with II.1.26 (Hermes, To Tat), Wachsmuth II, pp. 6 and 9. The former prints ποιητής, “maker”; the latter opens with νοῆσαι and φράσαι, “to conceive” and “to express.” The comparison in this introduction is interpretive, not a claim that the excerpts have the same historical source.

The text and the translation

The base text is the Greek printed by Wachsmuth. The English is newly worded from that text. Where an excerpt differs from a familiar passage in an edition of its original author, the facing Greek governs the translation. A source name or a dialogue reference helps to locate an excerpt; it does not license replacing the anthology's wording with a different text.

Verse remains visibly distinct from prose, without an imposed English meter. Long lines may wrap differently from the nineteenth-century setting. In mixed passages the narrative frame and the quoted verse are distinguished. An attribution to a playwright does not turn a character's speech into the playwright's own philosophical profession.

The notes explain consequential vocabulary, textual decisions, and the limits of an attribution. One example is the supplied negative in the Hermetic passage: without it, the comparison between mortal and divine would read differently. Another is the rejected phrase in the Bion anecdote. The Greek retains its brackets, while the English follows the editor's deletion and the note tells the reader what has been omitted.[3]

Textual recovery also affects the sequence itself. At the words "philosophy is a hunt for truth and a desire for it," Wachsmuth explains a join between portions transmitted in different parts of the collection. The vertical stroke is retained and explained. Reconstructed placement is therefore visible as an editorial decision; it is not passed off as an uninterrupted manuscript text.

The text and notes have received a full-volume editorial reread for meaning, terminology, attributions, references and qualifications. The Greek was checked against the source images during preparation; this review retains those checks and revisits specific readings where needed. All forty-six headings are represented, and missing texts are marked.

3. See the notes to II.1.20 and II.1.26, corresponding to Wachsmuth II, pp. 7 and 9. These examples explain why retaining editorial signs matters even when the full critical apparatus is outside the translation scope.

How to use the edition

Facing pages

Greek occupies the even-numbered left page and English the odd-numbered right page. Both sides carry the same passage identifiers. Open the PDF in a two-page view with the cover shown separately.

Passage numbers

II.1.15 means Book II, chapter 1, excerpt 15. Letters retain subdivisions such as 5a–c. II.1.17–18 keeps the Didymus material together. Added final numbers, as in II.1.29.1–3, divide a long excerpt for layout only; they do not create new ancient excerpts.

Source pages

References identify Wachsmuth's printed pages. In this scan, printed p. 1 is scan p. 4; p. 3 is scan p. 6; p. 9 is scan p. 12. Add three to a printed page number to locate the corresponding scanned page.

Editorial signs

Angle brackets mark words supplied by the editor. Square brackets retain rejected Greek wording; the notes identify its omission from the English. Vertical strokes mark editorial joins in the Didymus and Epictetus passages. Supplied particles expressed through English grammar are explained in notes.

Scope of this edition

All surviving anthology text is included: printed p. 1 and pp. 3–264 in full, ending at II.46.22. Chapters 10–14, 16–30, 32 and 34–45 retain headings only, with the missing texts marked. Wachsmuth's Latin apparatus and scholarly appendices fall outside the anthology translation.

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Surviving anthology text complete; missing chapters retain headings only.

Source: Wachsmuth II (1884), pp. 3–264 complete.

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ἰωάννου Στοβαίου II.title

Ἐκλογῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων ὑποθηκῶν βιβλίον δεύτερον

Κεφάλαιον Α′ II.1.heading

Περὶ τῶν τὰ θεῖα ἑρμηνευόντων, καὶ ὡς εἴη ἀνθρώποις ἀκατάληπτος ἡ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλήθεια.

Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ Ταντάλου II.1.1

Καὶ ταῦτ’ ἴσον μὲν εὖ λέγειν, ἴσον δὲ μή·
ἴσον δ’ ἐρευνᾶν, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι.
πλεῖον γὰρ οὐδὲν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν μὴ σοφῶν
εἰς ταῦτα γιγνώσκουσιν. Εἰ δ’ ἄλλου λέγει
ἄμεινον ἄλλος, τῷ λέγειν ὑπερφέρει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 1-3

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

John Stobaeus

II.title

Extracts, Sayings, and Precepts

Book Two[4]

Chapter 1

II.1.heading

On those who interpret divine things, and how the truth of intelligible things in their essence is beyond human comprehension.[5]

From the Tantalus of Aristarchus

II.1.1

On these matters too, it is all one to speak well or not;
inquiring and not knowing come to the same.
For in these matters the wise know no more
than those who are not wise. If one speaks better
than another, it is in speaking that he excels.[6]

4. The Greek title stands on printed p. 1 (scan p. 4). Book II is the ancient division of the Anthology; Volume II is the physical volume of Wachsmuth's edition. All surviving anthology text in this volume is included, through II.46.22; missing chapters are represented by their preserved headings.

5. "Intelligible" means apprehended by thought, as distinct from what is perceived by the senses; "in their essence" renders κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. The heading states the topic under which the excerpts are collected. It should not be taken as a single conclusion endorsed equally by every speaker.

6. The repeated ἴσον and ἐξ ἴσου express equality: neither eloquence nor inquiry establishes greater knowledge here. The Greek contrasts speaking well with not doing so, without an explicit word for "badly." In the last sentence, ἄλλου means "than another," and τῷ λέγειν specifies speaking as the respect in which one excels. The lost dramatic setting prevents us from simply identifying the speaker's view with Aristarchus's own.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 1-3

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Εὐριπίδου Φιλοκτήτῃ II.1.2

Τί δῆτα θάκοις ἀρχικοῖς ἐνήμενοι
σαφῶς διόμνυσθ’ εἰδέναι τὰ δαιμόνων;
οἱ τῶνδε χειρώνακτες ἄνθρωποι λόγων.
ὅστις γὰρ αὐχεῖ θεῶν ἐπίστασθαι πέρι,
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οἶδεν, ἢ πείθειν λέγων.

Ἀναξανδρίδου Κανηφόρῳ II.1.3

Ἅπαντές ἐσμεν πρὸς τὰ θεῖ’ ἀβέλτεροι,
κοὐκ ἴσμεν οὐδέν.

Σοφοκλέους II.1.4

Ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὰ θεῖα κρυπτόντων θεῶν
μάθοις ἄν, οὐδ’ εἰ πάντ’ ἐπεξέλθοις σκοπῶν.

Φιλήμονος II.1.5a

Θεὸν νόμιζε καὶ σέβου, ζήτει δὲ μή·
πλέον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔχεις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 3-4

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Euripides in Philoctetes

II.1.2

Why then, seated in seats of authority,
do you swear that you know the gods' affairs clearly?
Human beings are the craftsmen of these speeches.
Whoever boasts of knowing about the gods
knows nothing more than how to persuade with words.[7]

Anaxandrides in The Basket Bearer

II.1.3

We are all foolish when it comes to divine things,
and we know nothing.[8]

Sophocles

II.1.4

You could not learn divine things while the gods conceal them,
even if you went through everything in your search.[9]

Philemon

II.1.5a

Acknowledge God and revere him, but do not inquire;
you gain nothing beyond the inquiry itself.[10]

7. The excerpt questions human claims to divine knowledge. The printed ἀρχικοῖς describes seats of authority; its apparatus records an earlier reading ἀρχαῖοις, "ancient." "Craftsmen" renders χειρώνακτες, a pointedly human image of making and working. The final line follows the printed infinitive πείθειν, "to persuade," rather than the manuscript πείθει, "he persuades."

8. The attribution and play title follow the printed heading. The comic register is retained: ἀβέλτεροι is blunt, not a technical term for a philosophical suspension of judgment.

9. The condition matters: the gods' concealment defeats the investigation. The fragment does not itself deny the possibility of divine disclosure.

10. Νόμιζε can mean acknowledge, recognize, or hold in customary regard. The capitalized English "God" follows the singular expression without assigning the maxim a particular theology. The heading attributes it to Philemon.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 3-4

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.1.5b

Εἴτ’ ἔστιν εἴτ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ βούλου μαθεῖν·
ὡς <δ’> ὄντα τοῦτον καὶ παρόντ’ ἀεὶ σέβου.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.1.5c

Τί ἐστιν, ὁ θεὸς οὐ θέλει σε μανθάνειν.

Μενάνδρου Ὑποβολιμαίῳ II.1.6

Δυσπαρακολούθητόν τι πρᾶγμ’ ἐστὶν τύχη.

Ἡσιόδου II.1.7

Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισι.

Πινδάρου Παιάνων II.1.8

Τί ἔλπεαι σοφίαν ἔμμεναι, ᾗ τ’ ὀλίγον τοι
ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἰσχύει;
οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅπως τὰ θεῶν βουλεύματ’ ἐρευνάσαι βροτέᾳ φρενί.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 4-5

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

<From the same author>

II.1.5b

Do not wish to learn whether he exists or not;
<but> revere him as existing and always present.[11]

<From the same author>

II.1.5c

What he is, God does not wish you to learn.[12]

Menander in The Suppositious Child

II.1.6

Fortune is a thing that is hard to follow.[13]

Hesiod

II.1.7

For the gods keep people's livelihood hidden.[14]

Pindar from the Paeans

II.1.8

What do you expect wisdom to be, by which one man
has but little advantage over another?
There is no way to search out the gods' counsels with a mortal mind.[15]

11. Angle brackets retain the editor's supplied author-heading and connective δ'. "The same author" refers to the preceding Philemon attribution; it is not a new attribution independently furnished by this extract.

12. The question now concerns what God is, rather than whether he exists. The supplied attribution continues the preceding sequence.

13. "Hard to follow" means difficult to trace or comprehend. Τύχη can name fortune, chance, or what befalls someone; the single line does not define a systematic doctrine of chance.

14. Works and Days 42. Βίος here is livelihood or the means of living, not simply biological life. In its new setting the line contributes an image of divine concealment.

15. The question and the qualification "but little" are retained. The Greek line wrapping is regularized here; the excerpt crosses printed pp. 4–5. "Counsels" renders βουλεύματα, the gods' deliberations or purposes.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 4-5

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ἰοφῶντος Βακχῶν II.1.9

Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ τόδ’, οὖσά περ γυνή,
ὡς μᾶλλον ὅστις εἰδέναι τὰ τῶν θεῶν
ζητεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἧσσον εἴσεται.

Σιμωνίδου II.1.10

Ῥεῖα θεοὶ κλέπτουσιν ἀνθρώπων νόον.

Δημώνακτος II.1.11

<Δημῶναξ> ἐξεταζόντων τινῶν, εἰ ὁ κόσμος ἔμψυχος, καὶ αὖθις εἰ σφαιροειδής, Ὑμεῖς, ἔφη, περὶ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου πολυπραγμονεῖτε, περὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀκοσμίας οὐ φροντίζετε;

Δημοκρίτου II.1.12

Μὴ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι προθύμεο, μὴ πάντων ἀμαθὴς γένῃ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 5

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Iophon from the Bacchae

II.1.9

This too I know, woman though I am:
the more someone seeks to know the gods' affairs,
the less, by that much more, he will know.[16]

Simonides

II.1.10

Easily the gods steal away the human mind.[17]

Demonax

II.1.11

When some people were investigating whether the world is ensouled, and again whether it is spherical, <Demonax> said: "You busy yourselves with the order of the world, but take no thought for your own disorder?"[18]

Democritus

II.1.12

Do not be eager to know everything, lest you become ignorant of everything.[19]

16. The feminine participle οὖσα marks a female dramatic speaker. The poem is attributed to Iophon in the heading; this Bacchae must not silently be substituted with Euripides's surviving play of that name.

17. The metaphor is retained. "Steal away" suggests that people can be deprived of their judgment or deceived, without specifying a physical mechanism.

18. The personal name in angle brackets is supplied in the text; it also appears in the heading. The joke turns on κόσμος, "world" or "order," and ἀκοσμία, "disorder." "Ensouled" means possessing a soul; the anecdote redirects inquiry toward the inquirers' conduct.

19. The second μή is read as the warning or feared outcome: indiscriminate ambition may defeat learning. The maxim counsels a limit to one's pursuit, not a refusal to learn anything.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 5

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Πλουτάρχου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ἴσιδος II.1.13

Ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαῖς ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν ὑπὸ σωμάτων καὶ παθῶν περιεχομέναις οὐκ ἔστι μετουσία θεοῦ, πλὴν ὅσον ὀνείρατος ἀμαυροῦ θιγεῖν νοήσει διὰ φιλοσοφίας.

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Πολιτικοῦ II.1.14

Χαλεπόν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξασθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἕκαστα, πάντα αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν.

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου II.1.15

Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς II.1.16

Πόσῳ δὴ οὖν βέλτιον Ἡράκλειτος παίδων ἀθύρματα νενόμικεν εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 5-6

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Plutarch from On Isis

II.1.13

For human souls, enclosed here in bodies and passions, there is no participation in God beyond touching a dim dream in thought through philosophy.[20]

Plato from the Statesman

II.1.14

It is difficult, my good friend, to explain any of the greater matters adequately without using examples. For each of us seems to know particular things as though in a dream, yet then to be ignorant of them all again as though awake.[21]

Plato from the Timaeus

II.1.15

To find the maker and father of this universe is a difficult task; and having found him, it is impossible to speak of him to everyone.[22]

Iamblichus from On the Soul

II.1.16

How much better, then, Heraclitus judged human opinions to be children's playthings.[23]

20. On Isis and Osiris 79, 382F. The exception is essential: thought through philosophy affords a limited, dreamlike contact. Μετουσία is participation or a share in; the excerpt does not make it equivalent to ordinary sensory perception.

21. Statesman 277D. Παράδειγμα here is an explanatory example or model. The dream comparison exposes an unstable grasp of what one knows; it is not presented as evidence that dreams reliably disclose truth.

22. Timaeus 28C. The noun printed here is ποιητής, "maker," not δημιουργός, "craftsman" or "demiurge," although the passage concerns the same cosmological context. The qualification "to everyone" must not be omitted: this sentence does not simply say that nothing at all can be said.

23. This is Iamblichus's report of Heraclitus, with Iamblichus's approving comparison "how much better." The report should not be presented as an unmediated quotation from a surviving book by Heraclitus.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 5-6

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Διδύμου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ αἱρέσεων

II.1.17-18

Ξενοφάνους πρῶτον λόγος ἦλθεν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἄξιος γραφῆς, ἅμα παιδιᾷ τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων τόλμας ἐπιπλήττοντος καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ παριστάντος εὐλάβειαν, ὡς ἄρα

θεὸς μὲν οἶδε τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφία θήρα τῆς ἀληθείας ἐστὶ καὶ ὄρεξις. | Τῶν δὲ φιλοσοφησάντων ἔνιοι εὑρεῖν φασι τὸ θήραμα, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ Στωικοί· οἱ δὲ ἀκμὴν ἔτι ζητεῖν ὡς που παρὰ θεοῖς ὄν, καὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνου χρήματος ὄντος· οὕτως ἔλεγε Σωκράτης καὶ Πύρρων.

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου

II.1.19

Ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντῃ πάντως αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπᾶν χρὴ μεμνημένους, ὡς ὁ λέγων ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν· ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 6-7

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Didymus from On Schools

II.1.17-18

A saying of Xenophanes first came among the Greeks that was worth recording: with a touch of playfulness he rebuked the boldness of others while showing his own caution, to the effect that

God knows the truth,
but opinion is fashioned over all.[24]
For philosophy is a hunt for truth and a desire for it. | Some who have pursued philosophy say that they have found the quarry, as Epicurus and the Stoics do; others say that they are still searching, since it is somewhere among the gods and wisdom is no human possession. Socrates and Pyrrho spoke in this way.[25]

Plato from the Timaeus

II.1.19

If, then, Socrates, after the many things that many people have said about the gods and the coming into being of the universe, we cannot give accounts that are completely consistent with themselves and exact in every respect, do not be surprised. But if we offer accounts no less likely than anyone else's, we must be content, remembering that both the speaker and you who judge have a human nature. So, accepting the likely story about these matters, we ought to seek nothing beyond it.[26]

24. The words are transmitted within Didymus's report. Δόκος is opinion or seeming; the statement is not treated here as an independently preserved, complete poem of Xenophanes. The English retains the report's caution about human claims to truth.

25. This combined locator preserves the passage's continuity under Didymus. Wachsmuth prints a concordance to earlier numbering, "17 H. 18 G. M.," before "For philosophy," rather than a fresh author-heading. The vertical stroke after "desire" marks his reconstruction of the join: his note explains that two leaves missing from the Eclogae tradition were preserved in the Florilegium. The following material is part of his restored text, not an addition invented for this translation.

26. Timaeus 29C–D. The translation follows the form of the excerpt printed by Wachsmuth, including its reference to what many people have said. Εἰκώς is "likely" or "plausible"; μῦθος is "story" or "account." Their combination expresses the account's qualified status, not a license to replace its claims with arbitrary invention.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 6-7

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Βίωνος II.1.20

Βίων ἔλεγε γελοιοτάτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστρονομοῦντας, οἳ [τοὺς πὰρ ποσὶ] τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἰχθῦς οὐ βλέποντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φάσκουσιν εἰδέναι.

Πινδάρου II.1.21

Τοὺς φυσιολογοῦντας ἔφη Πίνδαρος

ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν.

Ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου Ἀπομνημονευμάτων II.1.22

Θαλῆν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὁρῶντα καὶ ἐμπεσόντα εἰς βόθρον ἡ θεράπαινα, Θρᾷττα οὖσα, δίκαια παθεῖν ἔφη, ὃς τὰ παρὰ ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐσκόπει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 7-8

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Bion

II.1.20

Bion said that those who study the stars are utterly ridiculous: they cannot see the fish on the shores, yet claim to know the fish in the sky.[27]

Pindar

II.1.21

Pindar said that those who inquire into nature

reap an unripe fruit of wisdom.[28]

From Serenus's Recollections

II.1.22

When Thales, looking toward the sky, fell into a pit, his servant, a Thracian woman, said that he had got what he deserved: he was studying what was in the sky while unaware of what lay at his feet.[29]

27. The fish in the sky supply the joke's celestial counterpart to ordinary fish. Wachsmuth brackets τοὺς πὰρ ποσὶ, "those at their feet," as wording rejected from the text; it remains visible in the Greek but is omitted from the English sentence. His apparatus notes its apparent intrusion from the Thales anecdote on the next page.

28. The first line frames the reported saying; the second carries its poetic image. Ἀτελής can mean unfinished or incomplete; "unripe" gives the agricultural force of a fruit that has not reached maturity.

29. The heading attributes this version to Serenus's Recollections. Wachsmuth's note compares Plato, Theaetetus 174A, where the object is a well; the facing Greek here reads βόθρον, "pit," and that is the word translated.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 7-8

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Διογένους II.1.23

Ἀστρολόγου δέ τινος κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐπιδεικνύοντος ἔν τινι πινακίῳ καταγράφους τοὺς ἀστέρας, καὶ φάσκοντος ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι τῶν ἀστέρων, ἐπακούσας, „Μὴ ψεύδου", εἶπεν, „ὦ ἑταῖρε· οὐ γὰρ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ οὗτοι", δείξας αὐτῷ τοὺς παρακαθεζομένους.

Ἀρίστωνος II.1.24

Ἀρίστων ἔφη τῶν ζητουμένων παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. Πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰ ἠθικά, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου· ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατα γὰρ ἐγνῶσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν.

Εὐσεβίου II.1.25

Θεοὶ οἷοι ἔασιν οὐ χρὴ δίζησθαι· αὐτόθεν δὲ ἄριστον πεπιστευκέναι. Ζητήσιος γὰρ προϊούσης καὶ ὁ τῷ ἀνοσιωτάτῳ τῶν λόγων τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτοὺς συνιστάμενος ἐθέλει κρατεῖν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 8-9

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Diogenes

II.1.23

A student of the stars was displaying in the marketplace a little tablet on which the stars were drawn, and saying that these were the wandering stars. On hearing him, Diogenes said: “Do not lie, my friend. These are not the wanderers; those are,” pointing to the people seated beside him.[30]

Ariston

II.1.24

Ariston said that, of the things philosophers investigate, some concern us, some have nothing to do with us, and some are beyond us. Ethical questions concern us. Dialectical questions do not concern us, because they contribute nothing to setting life right. Questions about nature are beyond us, because they cannot be known and do not even afford any use.[31]

Eusebius

II.1.25

One should not inquire what the gods are like; it is best to have belief from the outset. For as inquiry proceeds, even the person who takes the side of the most impious of arguments, that they do not exist, wants to prevail.[32]

30. The Greek plays on πλανώμενοι: planets “wander,” while people can “go astray” or be misled. “Student of the stars” leaves ἀστρολόγος broad enough for the activity actually described; the passage does not specify a modern division between astronomy and astrology. The name Diogenes is supplied in the English sentence from the heading.

31. The threefold classification belongs to the position reported under Ariston’s name. “Dialectical questions” concern argument and reasoning; “questions about nature” renders τὰ φυσικά, not only the modern discipline of physics. The anthology preserves the claim that these studies lack practical benefit without requiring every other excerpt to agree.

32. The heading supplies only the name Eusebius. The opening follows Wachsmuth’s οἵοι, “what sort,” rather than turning the question into whether gods exist. The last clause concerns a disputant’s desire to win; it does not say that the argument has been proved.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 8-9

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Πρὸς Τάτ

II.1.26

Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον. Τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον σώματι σημῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ τὸ τέλειον τῷ ἀτελεῖ καταλαβέσθαι οὐ δυνατόν· καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον τῷ ὀλιγοχρονίῳ συγγενέσθαι δύσκολον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ παρέρχεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ φαντασίας σκιάζεται. Τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον τοῦ κρείττονος <οὐ> διέστηκε τοσοῦτον, ὅσον τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου. Ἡ δὲ μέση τούτων διάστασις ἀμαυροῖ τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ θέαν. Ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ σώματα θεατά, γλώττῃ δὲ τὰ ὁρατὰ λεκτά· τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀφανὲς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ μηδὲ ἐξ ὕλης ὑποκείμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰσθήσεων καταληφθῆναι οὐ δύναται.

Ἐννοοῦμαι, ὦ Τάτ, ἐννοοῦμαι, ὃ ἐξειπεῖν ἀδύνατον, τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεός.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 9

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Hermes from To Tat

II.1.26

To conceive God is difficult; to express him is impossible. For it is impossible to signify the incorporeal through a body, and the incomplete cannot apprehend the complete; it is difficult for what lasts only a short time to come into fellowship with the everlasting. The one always is, while the other passes away; the one exists in truth, while the other is shadowed by appearance. The weaker is <not> so far removed from the stronger, nor the lesser from the better, as the mortal is from the divine.[33] The distance between them dims the vision of the beautiful. Bodies can be seen by the eyes, and visible things can be spoken by the tongue; but what is incorporeal, unseen, without shape, and not constituted from matter cannot be apprehended by our senses.

I conceive, Tat, I conceive what it is impossible to utter: this is God.[34]

33. The supplied οὐ, credited to Usener in Wachsmuth's apparatus, makes the comparison negative: ordinary differences of strength or rank do not equal the distance between mortal and divine. The English brackets "not" so this consequential editorial intervention remains visible.

34. The attribution is to Hermes and the address is to Tat, as printed. Compare II.1.15: the Platonic excerpt speaks of finding the maker and communicating to everyone, whereas this passage distinguishes intellectual conception from bodily signification and sensory apprehension. The repeated "I conceive" preserves the emphatic repetition of ἐννοοῦμαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 9

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου

II.1.27

Τὴν δὴ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως, πυρός ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς φύσιν, θεατέον αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτου πάθη. Νῦν γὰρ οὐδείς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεμήνυκεν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδόσι πῦρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι, στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, οὐδ' <ἂν> ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδει μόνον εἰκότως ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονοῦντος ἀπεικασθῆναι. Νῦν δ' οὖν τό γε παρ' ἡμῶν ὧδε ἐχέτω· τὴν μὲν οὖν ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ, τούτων πέρι τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον· δι' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα. Μήτε οὖν ὑμεῖς οἴεσθε δεῖν ἐμὲ λέγειν, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὖ πείθειν ἐμαυτὸν ἂν εἴην δυνατός, ὡς ὀρθῶς ἐγχειροῖμ' ἂν τοσοῦτον ἐπιβαλλόμενος ἔργον. Τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς ῥηθὲν διαφυλάττων, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων λόγων δύναμιν, πειράσομαι μηδενὸς ἧττον εἰκότα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς περὶ ἑκάστου καὶ ξυμπάντων λέγειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 9-10

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Plato from the Timaeus

II.1.27

We must examine the nature of fire, water, air, and earth before the coming into being of the heavens: their nature itself and their states before that time. For no one has yet disclosed how they came into being. We speak of fire and each of the others as though our hearers knew what they are, setting them up as principles, elements of the universe, although anyone with even a little understanding could not reasonably liken them even to the form of a syllable.[35] For the present, then, let our account stand as follows. Whether there is one principle of everything, or several, or whatever view one takes, we must not speak of these matters now. The sole reason is the difficulty of explaining our views within the present manner of exposition. You must not suppose that I ought to speak of them; nor could I persuade myself that I would be proceeding rightly in undertaking so great a task. Keeping to what was said at the outset—the scope of likely accounts—I shall try to speak no less plausibly than anyone else, indeed more so, starting again from an earlier beginning, about each thing and about them all together.[36]

35. Timaeus 48B–D. Στοιχεῖα means both elements and letters. The comparison with a syllable challenges the supposed simplicity of the four familiar substances. The supplied ἄν contributes to the qualified expression rendered “could”; it does not add a separate English word.

36. Compare II.1.19. Timaeus limits what this exposition will attempt; he does not say here that no account of first principles could ever be given. The recurring εἰκώς describes a likely or plausible account.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κριτίου ἢ Ἀτλαντικοῦ II.1.28

Περὶ θεῶν γάρ, ὦ Τίμαιε, λέγοντά τι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δοκεῖν ἱκανῶς λέγειν ῥᾷον, ἢ περὶ θνητῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια τῶν ἀκουόντων, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσι, πολλὴν εὐπορίαν παρέχεσθον τῷ μέλλοντι λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν.

Ξενοφῶντος ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς Πρὸς Αἰσχίνην II.1.29.1

Συντυχών μοι Ἑρμογένης τά τε ἄλλα διεξῄει, καὶ περὶ σοῦ δὲ πυνθομένῳ, ἤν τινα ἔχοις φιλοσοφίας ἐπιμέλειαν, ἀπεκρίνατο, τὴν αὐτὴν Σωκράτει. Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ ἡνίκα Ἀθήνῃσι διέτριβον, τῆς γνώμης σε ἠγάσθην. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἠρξάμην σε θαυμάζων, οὕτω καὶ νῦν παρ’ ὀντινοῦν τῶν σοφίαν ἀσπασαμένων τεθαύμακα τὸ ἀμετάκλαστόν σου τῆς γνώμης (μέγιστον γάρ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, τεκμήριον ἀρετῆς) ἀλόντος ὑπὸ τἀνδρὸς ἐκείνου, εἴπερ θνητοῦ καλεῖν τὸν Σωκράτους οἷόντε βίον.

Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τὰ θεῖα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, παντὶ δῆλον· ἀπόχρη δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοὺς σέβειν. Οἷοι δ’ εἰσιν, οὔτε εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον οὔτε ζητεῖν θεμιτόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεσποτῶν φύσιν ἢ πρᾶξιν δούλους δεῖ εἰδέναι, οἷς οὐδὲν πλέον ὑπηρεσίας προσήκει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 10-11

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Plato from Critias, or Atlantis

II.1.28

For when speaking to human beings about gods, Timaeus, it is easier to seem to speak adequately than when speaking to us about mortals. The hearers' inexperience and utter ignorance of subjects about which they are in this condition give great latitude to anyone about to speak of them.[37]

Xenophon from the Letter to Aeschines · 1

II.1.29.1

Hermogenes met me and spoke about various matters. When I also asked about you and your devotion to philosophy, he answered that it was the same as Socrates'. Even when I was living in Athens, I admired your resolve. As I began by admiring you, so now I admire, beyond that of anyone who has embraced wisdom, the steadfastness of your resolve—for this, I think, is the greatest evidence of virtue—since you were won over by that man, if indeed one can call Socrates' life the life of a mortal.[38]

That divine matters are beyond us is clear to everyone; it is enough to revere the gods for their superiority in power. What they are like is neither easy to discover nor lawful to investigate. For slaves should not know the nature or conduct of their masters, since nothing beyond service belongs to their role.[39]

37. Critias 107A–B. Critias addresses Timaeus. The claim concerns how easily an account can seem adequate to an uninformed audience; it does not establish that divine matters are easier to know. The alternative title follows the anthology's heading.

38. The heading attributes the letter to Xenophon. A parallel is quoted in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.12; Gifford's edition identifies it as Pseudo-Xenophon (note 29). The attribution is therefore retained as transmitted, not treated as proof of authentic correspondence. Parts 1–3 divide this single excerpt only for facing-page layout.

39. The wording about superior power is compressed and textually unsettled; Wachsmuth records variant readings. The slave-and-master comparison belongs to the letter's argument for religious restraint and should not be mistaken for a neutral description of every ancient view.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ξενοφῶντος · συνέχεια II.1.29.2

Πότε γάρ, ὦ Αἰσχίνη, Σωκράτους ἀκήκοέ τις οὐρανίων πέρι λέγοντος ἢ γραμμὰς εἰς ἐπανόρθωσιν παραινοῦντος μανθάνειν; Μουσικῆς <μὲν> γὰρ ἴσμεν αὐτὸν μέχρις ὥτων ξυνιέντα. Διετέλει δὲ ἑκάστοτε αὐτὸς λέγων τί καλὸν καὶ τί ἀνδρεία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί. Ἀνθρώπινα γοῦν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἐκάλει· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἢ ἀδύνατα ἀνθρώποις ἁλῶναι ἔφασκεν ἢ μύθων εἶναι συγγενῆ, μετὰ ὀφρῦος σοφιστῶν <παίγνια> διεξιόντων.

Ξενοφῶντος · συνέχεια II.1.29.3

Καὶ οὐκ ἔλεγε μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ᾔδει δὲ πράττειν. Παυσάσθωσαν οὖν ἐλεγχόμενοι <ἢ> πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς ἴτωσαν, οἷς Σωκράτης οὐκ ἤρεσκεν, ᾧ ζῶντι μὲν ὁ θεὸς σοφίαν ἐμαρτύρησεν· οἱ δὲ ἐκτείναντες τῆς μετανοίας ἀποκάθαρσιν οὐχ εὗρον. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἄρα, Αἰγυπτίου ἠράσθησαν, καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας, ὧν τὸ μὲν περιττὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μόνιμον ἐπὶ Σωκράτει ἤλεγχεν ἔρως τυραννίδος καὶ ἀντὶ λιτῆς διαίτης Σικελιῶτις γαστρὸς ἀμέτρου τράπεζα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 11

BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Xenophon, Letter to Aeschines · 2

II.1.29.2

For when, Aeschines, has anyone heard Socrates speaking about heavenly things, or urging people to learn geometrical figures as a means of improvement? As for music, we know that his understanding extended as far as his ears. But he himself constantly discussed what is noble, and what courage, justice, and the other virtues are. These, at any rate, he called human goods. The other subjects, he said, were either beyond human reach or akin to myths—<playthings> that sophists expounded with an air of lofty importance.[40]

Xenophon, Letter to Aeschines · 3

II.1.29.3

Nor did he say these things without knowing how to put them into practice. Let those who were dissatisfied with Socrates stop, then, when they are refuted, <or> turn to what is reasonable. While he was alive, the god bore witness to his wisdom; those who killed him found no cleansing from their remorse. Yet here is the fine thing: they fell in love with an Egyptian and with the monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras. Their excess and their failure to remain constant to Socrates were exposed by a love of tyranny and, in place of a simple way of life, a Sicilian table for a boundless appetite.[41]

40. Γραμμαί here are geometrical lines or figures. “Improvement” translates ἐπανόρθωσις without inserting Usener’s proposed βίου, “of life,” which Wachsmuth records but does not print. Understanding music “as far as the ears” contrasts hearing with further theoretical inquiry. The supplied μὲν marks a contrast conveyed by the English sentence structure.

41. The closing praise is sarcastic. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.12, interprets the attack as aimed at Plato, although this excerpt does not name him. The printed Αἰγυπτίου is “an Egyptian,” not “Egypt.” The letter contrasts Socratic restraint with the pursuits and luxurious dining it condemns; these are polemical allegations.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ξενοφῶντος ἐκ α′ Σωκρατικῶν Ἀπομνημονευμάτων II.1.30.1

Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει, καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἐπεδείκνυεν. Ἐθαύμαζε δ’ εἰ μὴ φανερόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν, εἴ γε καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Ξενοφῶντος · συνέχεια II.1.30.2

Τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ’ ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δ’ οὐκ ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὔθ’ ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, τοῖς δ’ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ’ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δ’ οὔτ’ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτέ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Xenophon from Memorabilia, Book I · 1

II.1.30.1

For he did not discuss the nature of the universe in the way most others did, examining the condition of what the sophists call the cosmos and the necessities by which each heavenly event occurs. Indeed, he showed that those who concern themselves with such matters were acting foolishly. He wondered whether it was not clear to them that these things are impossible for human beings to discover, since even those who take the greatest pride in speaking about them do not hold the same opinions as one another, but stand in relation to one another much as madmen do.[42]

Xenophon, Memorabilia · 2

II.1.30.2

For among madmen, some fear nothing, even when it is terrible, while others fear even what is not terrible. Some think it no disgrace to say or do anything, even in a crowd, while others think they must not go out among people. Some honor neither sanctuary nor altar nor anything else divine, while others revere even random stones, pieces of wood, and wild animals. In the same way, among those who concern themselves with the nature of the universe, some think that what exists is only one, others that existing things are infinite in number; some that everything is always moving, others that nothing could ever move; some that everything comes into being and passes away, others that nothing could ever either come into being or perish.[43]

42. Memorabilia I.1.11–14; the subject is Socrates. The anthology abbreviates the passage, as Wachsmuth's apparatus notes: the omitted material is not silently restored from a separate Xenophon text. Parts 1–2 preserve one continuous excerpt. "Madmen" renders the ancient comparison, a polemical illustration rather than a modern clinical classification.

43. The repeated pairs compare opposed behaviors with opposed accounts of nature: one or many, motion or rest, generation and destruction or their denial. No individual natural philosopher is named in this excerpt. The translation therefore preserves the contrast without inserting identifications that the passage itself does not supply.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου Πρὸς τὸν περὶ οὐσίας <διαλεγόμενον>

II.1.31.1

Τί μοι μέλει, φησί, πότερον ἐξ ἀτόμων, ἢ ἐξ ἀμέτρων, ἢ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῶν ὀρέξεων καὶ ἐκκλίσεων, καὶ ἔτι ὁρμῶν καὶ ἀφορμῶν, καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ κανόσι χρώμενον διοικεῖν τὰ τοῦ βίου, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ταῦτα χαίρειν ἐᾶν, ἅ τινα τυχὸν μὲν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα θείη τις εἶναι καταληπτά, ἀλλ’ οὖν τί ὄφελος καταληφθέντων; οὐχὶ δὲ διακενῆς πράγματα ἔχειν φατέον τοὺς ταῦτα ὡς ἀναγκαῖα τῷ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγῳ προσνέμοντας;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Arrian's Epictetan discourse: To one <discussing> substance · 1

II.1.31.1

"What concern is it of mine," he says, "whether existing things are composed of atoms, of immeasurables, or of fire and earth?[44] Is it not enough to learn the nature of good and evil, the proper measures of desire and aversion, and also of impulses toward action and away from it, and to use these as standards for managing one's life? Can we not leave these matters beyond us alone? Perhaps they cannot be comprehended by human understanding; and even if one fully granted that they could be comprehended, what benefit would there be in comprehending them? Must we not say that those who assign these matters a necessary place in philosophical discourse are troubling themselves to no purpose?"[45]

44. The printed ἀμέτρων is literally "immeasurables." Wachsmuth records competing readings, including "without parts" and a conjecture referring to similar parts. The English retains his printed reading rather than substituting a more familiar physical theory. The supplied word in the heading is also retained.

45. The four terms distinguish desire and aversion from impulses toward or away from action. This opening speech is followed by questions that challenge the exclusion of natural inquiry. Read with its continuation, it should not be quoted as an unqualified rejection of that inquiry by Epictetus.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου · συνέχεια II.1.31.2

Μή τι οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς παράγγελμα παρέλκον ἐστί, τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν; — Τοῦτο δὲ μὲν οὔ φησι. — Τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; Εἰ χορευτῇ τις παρήγγελλε τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ τῇ προστάξει προσείχε, τὸ ἐπιστραφῆναι | καὶ τῶν συγχορευτῶν καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμφωνίας φησίν; εἰ δὲ ναύτῃ; εἰ δὲ στρατιώτῃ;

Πότερον οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς ἐφ' αὑτοῦ πεποιῆσθαί σοι δοκεῖ ζῷον, ἢ πρὸς κοινωνίαν; — <Πρὸς κοινωνίαν.> — Ὑπὸ τίνος; — Ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως. — Τίνος οὔσης καὶ ποίας; — Διοικούσης τὰ ὅλα. — Καὶ πότερον <καταληπτοῦ> οὔσης ἢ μή; — Ταῦτα οὐκέτι ἀναγκαῖον πολυπραγμονεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Arrian's Epictetan discourse · 2

II.1.31.2

"Then is the injunction at Delphi, 'Know yourself,' also superfluous?"

He says it is not.

"What, then, is its force? If someone instructed a dancer in a chorus to know himself, would that not mean, if he attended to the instruction, paying attention | also to his fellow dancers and to his harmony with them? And what if the instruction were given to a sailor? Or to a soldier?[46]

"Do you think, then, that a human being has been made a creature for himself alone, or for community?"

"<For community.>"

"By whom?"

"By nature."

"What is nature, and what is it like?"

"It governs the whole."

"And is it <comprehensible> or not?"

"There is no further need to investigate these matters."[47]

46. The chorus, crew, and army make self-knowledge depend on understanding one's relations to others. The vertical stroke preserves Wachsmuth's join where his text returns from the Florilegium material to the Eclogae tradition. It is not an interruption invented by this translation.

47. The dashes mark an exchange, not a list of propositions all asserted by one speaker. The final reply resists the demand to investigate nature; the excerpt supplies no further answer. The angle brackets mark the editor's supplied reply "For community" and the supplied word "comprehensible."

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Πορφυρίου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ Στυγός

II.1.32

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοῦ ποιητοῦ δόξα οὐχ ὡς ἄν τις νομίσειεν εὔληπτος. Πάντες μὲν γὰρ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων δι’ αἰνιγμῶν ἐσήμαναν, Ὅμηρος δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ περὶ τούτων ἀπέκρυψε, τῷ μὴ προηγουμένως περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι, καταχρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις εἰς παράστασιν ἄλλων. Τῶν οὖν ἀναπτύσσειν ἐπιχειρησάντων τὰ δι’ ὑπονοίας παρ’ αὐτῷ λεγόμενα ἱκανώτατα δοκῶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Κρόνιος ταῦτ’ ἀπεργάσασθαι, ὅμως ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἄλλα τε ἐφαρμόζει ταῖς τεθείσαις ὑποθέσεσι, τὰ Ὁμήρου μὴ δυνάμενος, οὔ<τε τοῖς> παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰς δόξας, τοῖς δὲ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσάγειν τὸν ποιητὴν πεφιλοτίμηται.

Ξενοφῶντος

II.1.33

Δαίμονες οἱ τὰ μέγιστα διαπρασσόμενοι ἥκιστα ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιφαίνονται. Ὁ γοῦν πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων ὡς μὲν μέγας τις καὶ δυνατός, φανερός· ὁποῖος δὲ τὴν μορφήν, ἀφανής. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ παμφαὴς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐδ’ οὗτος αὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικεν ὁρᾶν ἐπιτρέπει, ἀλλ’ ἤν τις ἀναιδῶς αὐτὸν θεάσηται, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 1

Porphyry from On the Styx

II.1.32

The poet's view is not as easy to grasp as one might suppose. All the ancients indicated matters concerning gods and divine spirits through riddles; Homer concealed these matters still more, since he did not discuss them as his principal subject, but used what was said about them to present other things.[48] Of those who have attempted to unfold what he says through hidden meanings, the Pythagorean Cronius seems to have accomplished this most capably. Nevertheless, in most cases he fits other material to his proposed interpretations, being unable to fit Homer's words to them. He has been intent on bringing the poet into line with his own ideas, rather than his opinions into line with the poet's words.[49]

Xenophon

II.1.33

The divine spirits who accomplish the greatest things appear least to human beings. Thus the one who shakes all things and brings them to rest is manifest as a great and powerful being, but invisible as to what his form is like. Even the sun, which seems to be all-radiant—even he, it seems, does not permit himself to be looked upon: if someone gazes at him brazenly, he takes away that person's sight.[50]

48. Δαίμονες, here "divine spirits," does not by itself imply evil beings. Ὑπόνοια is an underlying or implied sense. Porphyry's account allows such meanings in Homer while insisting that an interpretation answer to the words being interpreted.

49. The difficult closing construction follows Wachsmuth's supplied τε τοῖς. The English reverses the order of its two clauses for clarity: Cronius adapts Homer to his own views. The criticism is of this interpretive practice, not a blanket rejection of every search for an underlying meaning.

50. The attribution follows the heading. Wachsmuth notes that this wording does not occur in the surviving Memorabilia, though IV.3.13–14 offers a close parallel; he also records an alternative attribution to Aristobulus. The passage distinguishes evident power from unseen form. "Divine spirits" retains the broad sense of δαίμονες.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Κεφάλαιον Β′ · Μέρος πρῶτον II.2.heading

<Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς>

Πλάτωνος περὶ Πολιτείας II.2.1

Οὐκοῦν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, ξυνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐνεργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δ’ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. Διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα.

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.2.2

Ἆρ’ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἄλλο τούτου ἀνωτέρω μάθημα ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2 · First part

II.2.heading

<On Dialectic>[51]

Plato from the Republic

II.2.1

Does not the dialectical method alone proceed in this way, doing away with hypotheses as it advances toward the first principle itself, to establish itself securely? It gently draws the eye of the soul, truly buried in a kind of barbarous mud, and leads it upward, using the arts we have discussed as fellow workers and helpers in turning it around.[52] We have often called these arts sciences out of habit, but they need another name, for something more effective than opinion and less clear than knowledge. Earlier, at any rate, we defined it somewhere as “discursive thought.”[53]

In the same work

II.2.2

“Then does it seem to you,” I said, “that dialectic lies above our studies like a coping stone, that no further study could rightly be placed above it, and that our course of studies has now reached its completion?”[54]

51. Wachsmuth supplies the Greek title from Photius’s account of the anthology. The chapter and part labels render his Latin Caput II and Pars prior. This first sequence commends dialectic; the contrasting sequence begins with “On the contrary” before II.2.8.

52. Republic 533. Hypotheses are provisional starting points; dialectic is presented as moving beyond them toward a secure principle. The eye’s upward movement and turning express the soul’s education. “Arts” renders τέχναι, the organized disciplines previously discussed in the dialogue.

53. Wachsmuth prints ἐνεργεστέρου, “more effective” or “more active,” while his apparatus records Plato’s ἐναργεστέρου, “clearer.” The translation follows the printed anthology. Διάνοια, here “discursive thought,” names an intermediate cognitive condition, distinguished from both opinion and knowledge.

54. Republic 534E; Socrates speaks. A θριγκός is the coping or crowning course of a wall. The architectural image places dialectic at the completion of the educational sequence. The excerpt ends with the question, without the interlocutor’s reply.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου II.2.3.1

Τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνην λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

— Τίνοιν δή;

— Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. Ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν δὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος, ὃ ἔστιν, ὁρισθέν, εἴτε εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη. Τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Plato from the Phaedrus · 1

II.2.3.1

“Two procedures happened to be mentioned in what we said. It would be no unpleasing thing if someone could grasp their power as an art.”

“What two?”

“To bring things scattered in many places into a single form by seeing them together, so that, by defining each subject, one may make clear whatever one wishes to teach. Take what was just said about Love, when it was defined as to what it is, whether the account was good or bad. At any rate, this enabled the discourse to express itself clearly and consistently.”[55]

55. Phaedrus 265C–266C spans parts 1–3 of this excerpt; the divisions are for layout. Socrates speaks with Phaedrus. This first procedure is collection: seeing scattered instances together under a single form. The Greek here prints τέχνην, “as an art,” rather than the τέχνῃ recorded for Plato in the apparatus.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια

II.2.3.2

— Τὸ δ’ ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

— Τὸ πάλιν κατ’ εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν, κατ’ ἄρθρα, ᾗ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματι ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα· οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς παροινίας ὡς ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἀνῆκε, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ’ ἐν δίκῃ· ὁ δ’ εἰς τὸ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ’ αὖ τινα ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινόμενος ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Plato from the Phaedrus · 2

II.2.3.2

“And what is the other procedure you mean, Socrates?”

“The ability, in turn, to divide according to forms, at the joints where they naturally lie, without trying to break any part as a bad butcher would. Our two speeches just now took the irrational element in thought as one common form. Just as in a body paired parts with the same names grow from a single whole, some called left and others right, so the two speeches treated drunken frenzy as a form naturally present in us.[56] The one cut off the part on the left and divided it again, never stopping until it discovered among those divisions a love called left-handed, which it reproached with every justice. The other led us to the right-hand part of madness, discovered a love bearing the same name as the first but divine in character, held it before us, and praised it as the cause of our greatest blessings.”[57]

56. Wachsmuth prints παροινίας, “drunken frenzy,” where his apparatus records Plato’s παρανοίας, “derangement,” and the manuscripts’ παρονοίας. The English retains the printed word. The comparison concerns the two speeches’ division of a common category; it does not define every form of madness as intoxication.

57. Σκαιός means both left or left-handed and awkward or base. The translation keeps the bodily image; its unfavorable implication explains the rebuke. The two kinds of love share a name but are distinguished by division.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια II.2.3.3

— Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

— Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τινα ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθεν μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. Καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε· καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς.

Ἀρχύτου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος II.2.4.1

Παντᾷ μοι δοκέοντι ἁμαρτάνειν οἱ λέγοντες δύο λόγως περὶ παντὸς λέγεσθαι ἀντίως ἀλλάλοις καὶ ναμαρτέας ἀμφοτέρως. Ἐγὼ δὲ πρᾶτον τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον νομίζω, ἀμφοτέρων πιστῶν ἐόντων ἀντίως εἶμεν ἀλλάλοις, τὸ καλὸν τῷ καλῷ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ λευκῷ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· ἀλλὰ ἔστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ <τὸ> αἰσχρὸν ἀντία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ναμαρτὲς τῷ ψεύδει φαμές, οὐδὲ ναμαρτέας <ἀντίως> δύο λόγως λέγεσθαι ἢ δύο ψευδέας, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἀλαθέα, τὸν δὲ ψεύσταν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Plato from the Phaedrus · 3

II.2.3.3

“What you say is entirely true.”

“I myself am a lover of these divisions and collections, Phaedrus, so that I may be able to speak and think. And if I judge someone else naturally able to look toward a unity and toward a plurality, I follow behind him, in his footsteps, as though he were a god.[58] As for those who can do this, whether the name I give them is right or wrong, a god knows; at any rate, so far I call them dialecticians.”

Archytas from On Being · 1

II.2.4.1

Those who say that two statements can be made about everything, opposed to one another and both true, seem to me entirely mistaken. First, I hold it impossible for them to be opposed to one another while both are trustworthy—as though the beautiful were opposed to the beautiful, and the white to the white. That is not how it is: the beautiful and the ugly are opposites, as are the white and the black. Likewise, we say, truth is opposed to falsehood. Two true statements cannot be made <in opposition>, nor two false ones: one must be true, the other false.[59]

58. The language of following a god’s footsteps adapts Homeric phrasing; compare Odyssey 5.193. “Collections” (συναγωγαί) gather what is scattered, while “divisions” distinguish its kinds. Socrates preserves a qualification about the correctness of the name “dialecticians.”

59. The heading attributes On Being to Archytas; that attribution alone does not establish authorship. The Greek retains the printed Doric forms. This argument opposes the claim that two contrary accounts of the same subject can both be true. The supplied article before “ugly” is conveyed by normal English grammar.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Ἀρχύτου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος · συνέχεια II.2.4.2

Ὁ γὰρ τὰν ψυχὰν ἐπαινέων τῶ ἀνθρώπω καὶ <ὁ> τὸ σῶμα μεμφόμενος οὐχ ὑπὲρ τωὐτῶ λέγοντι· αἰ μὴ καὶ αἴ τι περὶ τᾶς γᾶς λεγοίεν καὶ τῶ οὐρανῶ, τωὐτόν. Ταῦτα γὰρ δύο ἐντί, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἕν. Ὀνομαστὶ δὲ θέλω καὶ τοῦτο δεῖξαι. Ὁ γὰρ λέγων περὶ Ἀθαναίων ὡς ἐντὶ κατὰ λόγον ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, καὶ ὁ λέγων ὡς ἐντὶ περὶ χάριτας φαῦλοι, οὐκ ἀντία λέγοντι· τὰ γὰρ ἀντία περὶ τωὐτῶ πράγματος ἀντικέαται ἀλλάλοις, ταῦτα δὲ δύο ἐντὶ πράγματα.

Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Δέξιππον περὶ διαλεκτικῆς II.2.5.1

Θεὸς ἦν τις ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ καταδείξας τὴν διαλεκτικὴν καὶ καταπέμψας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ὡς μὲν λέγουσί τινες, ὁ λόγιος Ἑρμῆς, ὁ φέρων ἐν ταῖν χεροῖν τὸ σύνθημα αὐτῆς <τὸ> τῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀποβλεπόντων δρακόντων· ὡς δ’ οἱ δεδοκιμασμένοι καὶ πρόκριτοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατείνονται, ἡ τῶν Μουσῶν πρεσβυτάτη Καλλιόπη τὴν ἄπταιστον ἀσφάλειαν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀνέλεγκτον ‘αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ’ διαπρέπουσαν παρέσχηκεν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Archytas from On Being · 2

II.2.4.2

For someone who praises a person's soul and <someone> who finds fault with the body are not speaking about the same thing—unless speaking about the earth and the heavens would also concern the same thing. These are two things, not one. I wish to show this also by naming a particular case. Someone who says that the Athenians are good men in matters of speech, and someone who says that they are poor in matters of gratitude, are not making opposed statements. For opposites stand opposed to one another concerning the same matter, whereas these are two different matters.[60]

From Iamblichus's Letter to Dexippus on Dialectic · 1

II.2.5.1

It truly was a god who revealed dialectic and sent it down to human beings: according to some, Hermes, lord of eloquence, who carries in his hands its emblem of serpents looking toward one another.[61] But the most approved and eminent among philosophers maintain that Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, bestowed the unfailing and irrefutable assurance of discourse, distinguished by "gentle reverence."[62]

60. The examples require sameness of subject and respect before two claims count as opposed. Κατὰ λόγον is rendered "in matters of speech"; χάριτες can denote favors and the gratitude or return they call for. The example contrasts abilities in discourse with conduct concerning favors, rather than praising and condemning the Athenians in precisely the same respect.

61. The facing serpents are read here as a symbol of dialectic; the divine attribution is part of Iamblichus's praise of the discipline. The supplied article τὸ introduces the emblem's description and needs no separately bracketed English word.

62. The quoted phrase is identified in the source as Odyssey 8.172. Its placement describes the assurance of discourse as dignified and gentle as well as resistant to refutation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Δέξιππον · συνέχεια II.2.5.2

Ὡς δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτὰ δείκνυσιν, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεὸς οὔτε λέγων καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὔτε κρύπτων ἀλλὰ σημαίνων τὰς μαντείας, ἐγείρει πρὸς διαλεκτικὴν διερεύνησιν τοὺς ἐπηκόους τῶν χρησμῶν, ἀφ' ἧς ἀμφιβολία τε καὶ ὁμωνυμία ἐκρίθησαν καὶ διττὸν πᾶν ἀνερευνηθὲν φῶς ἐπιστήμης ἀνῆψεν· ὃ κατιδὼν καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς καλῶς καὶ διερευνήσας δεξιῶς τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος, αἴτιος ἀναμφισβητήτως κατέστη τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Ἀδελφὰ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἐν Βραγχίδαις θεὸς ἐκφαίνει τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἔργα, περιφανῆ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν παραδηλῶν, ὅταν λέγῃ· „οὔτ' ἂν ὠκυπέτης ἰὸς οὔτε λύρη οὔτε νηῦς οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἄνευ ἐπιστημονικῆς χρήσιος γένοιτ' ἄν κοτε ὠφέλιμον".

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Iamblichus to Dexippus · 2

II.2.5.2

As the deeds themselves show, the god at Delphi, neither declaring nor concealing, as Heraclitus says, but giving signs through his oracles, rouses their hearers to dialectical investigation. Through it, ambiguity and sameness of name have been sorted out, and every double meaning, when investigated, has kindled the light of knowledge. Themistocles too understood this well: by skillfully investigating the "wooden wall," he became indisputably responsible for the Greeks' deliverance.[63] The god at Branchidae likewise displays related works of dialectic, making induction quite evident when he says: "Neither a swift-flying arrow, nor a lyre, nor a ship, nor anything else could ever be useful without knowledgeable use."[64]

63. The god is Apollo. The "wooden wall" recalls the oracle interpreted by Themistocles as referring to the fleet (Herodotus VII.143). Iamblichus presents the interpretation of an ambiguous oracle as an achievement of dialectic.

64. Ὁμωνυμία is sameness of name despite different meanings. Ἐπαγωγή, "induction," here moves through particular examples toward the general claim that useful employment requires knowledge. The oracle's wording is retained as prose, as printed.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Σώπατρον περὶ διαλεκτικῆς

II.2.6.1

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, ἔμφυτον ἐκ νέων ἔχοντες τήνδε τὴν δύναμιν καὶ μέχρι τινός, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δὲ ἧττον αὐτῆς μετέχοντες. Τὸ δὴ τῶν θεῶν δῶρον οὐδένα τρόπον δεῖ προΐεσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν μελέταις καὶ ἐμπειρίαις καὶ τέχναις αὐτὸ κρατύνειν ἄξιον. Ὅρα γὰρ ὅτι καὶ παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον διατελεῖ χρησιμώτατον ὂν διαφερόντως, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐντεύξεσι προσομιλοῦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας καὶ δόξας· ἐν δὲ ταῖς εὑρέσεσι τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν ἀνευρίσκον· λογιζόμενον δὲ πρὸ τῶν ἔργων, ὅπως αὐτὰ χρὴ πράττειν· προγυμνασίᾳ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας θαυμασίας οἵας μεθόδους παρεχόμενον.

Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Σώπατρον · συνέχεια

II.2.6.2

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ἐννοεῖν, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μόριον φιλοσοφίας ἄνευ τοῦ κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν λόγου παραγιγνόμενον· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τι φυσικὸν δόγμα ἀνευρίσκομεν, λογικῶς αὐτὸ βεβαιούμεθα, καὶ ὅσα περὶ θεῶν σκεπτόμεθα, λόγος διαλεκτικός ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάζων· ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε ἀκοῦσαι δυνατὸν ἀπαλλαγέντας τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ διδάσκειν διαλεκτικὴν διαλεκτικῶς ἐπιχειροῦντας δεῖ καταμανθάνειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 19-20

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

From Iamblichus's Letter to Sopater on Dialectic · 1 II.2.6.1

All human beings engage in discussion. They possess this capacity innately from youth and share in it to some degree, some more, some less. We must in no way surrender this gift of the gods; rather, it deserves to be strengthened through practice, experience, and systematic skill.[65] Observe how exceptionally useful it remains throughout life: in our encounters, it converses with people on the basis of common conceptions and opinions; in the discovery of the arts, it finds their first principles; before actions, it reasons about how they should be performed; and through preliminary training it supplies wonderfully effective methods for the philosophical sciences.

Iamblichus to Sopater · 2 II.2.6.2

If we should also consider what is prior to these uses, no part of philosophy comes into being without dialectical reasoning. Even if we discover some doctrine about nature, we establish it by reasoning; and whatever we investigate concerning the gods, dialectical argument helps to establish it. In general, we can neither say nor hear anything once we dispense with this method. Even the claim that dialectic is not to be taught must itself be learned by arguing dialectically.[66]

65. Διαλέγεσθαι begins with the ordinary activity of discussion or reasoned conversation. Iamblichus argues from this shared capacity to the value of cultivating dialectic as a disciplined art. Its uses include practical deliberation as well as philosophical inquiry.

66. The closing sentence follows the printed διδάσκειν, "to teach," whose wording is disputed in the apparatus. The argument is that rejecting dialectic still requires dialectical reasoning. The passage asserts its necessity for establishing claims, without promising that every argument will be sound.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 19-20

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Σώπατρον · συνέχεια II.2.6.3

Εἴτε οὖν ἐπιτηδευτέον, εἴτε μή, διαλεκτικὴν ἀσκεῖν <ἄξιον>· καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντα λόγῳ κρίνομεν, αὐτὴν <δὲ> ἀφήσομεν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην τοῦ λόγου θεωρίαν· καὶ λόγῳ προέχοντες τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαίρετον ἀγαθὸν κεκτημένοι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐνεργήσομεν· καὶ τὴν συμμεμιγμένην διάσκεψιν τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ὅλα πράγματα ἀγαπήσομεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνῶσιν τοῦ λόγου, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀφείμενος τῶν ἄλλων τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην κατεστήσατο σεμνοτάτην οὖσαν καὶ τιμιωτάτην, ὡς μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐν Πυθοῖ γράμμα, ἀποδοκιμάσομεν ὡς ἀπόβλητον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 20

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Iamblichus to Sopater · 3

II.2.6.3

Whether, then, it ought to be pursued or not, practicing dialectic is <worthwhile>. For it is absurd to judge everything by reason <yet> abandon the most exact study of reason itself; to surpass the other animals through reason, possessing this distinctive good of human nature, yet exercise it casually and at random; and to be content with reason's investigation when it is intermingled with things in general, yet reject as worthless reason's knowledge of itself. In that knowledge, reason turns away from other things and establishes the science of itself as supremely august and precious—as the inscription at Pytho also bears witness.[67]

67. Pytho is Delphi; the allusion is to "Know yourself," also quoted in II.1.31.2. Here self-knowledge is specifically reason's knowledge of its own activity. Λόγος shifts between reasoning, argument, and reason as a capacity; the English follows these contextual differences.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 20

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ

II.2.7

Μετίωμεν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν διατριβάς. Πασῶν πρῶταί εἰσιν αἱ πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἀναγόμεναι· ταύτας δὴ οὖν, <ὡς> καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιδείκνυει τῷ Μένωνι, διὰ τοῦ καλῶς ἐρωτᾶν ὁρῶμεν ἐκφαινομένας. Δεύτεραι δ’ ἂν εἶεν αἱ μαιείας ἕνεκα προσαγόμεναι καὶ τὰ γεννηθέντα εἰς φῶς προάγουσαι καὶ διακρίνουσαι τίνα μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ, τίνα δὲ ψευδῆ· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὗται πᾶσαι διὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν· ἐπειδὴ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ διὰ τῶν ἐλέγχων καθάρσεις τῆς διανοίας, παρατιθεῖσαι τἀναντία δοξάσματα τῶν προσδιαλεγομένων καὶ συγκρούουσαι αὐτὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα. Ἄλλαι δὲ πείρας ἕνεκα καὶ γυμνασίας προσφερόμεναι τοῖς ἐπηκόοις, ἢ ὅσαι εἰς θέσιν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἢ εἴ τινες ἐξετάζουσι τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀκροάσεις· ὧν οὐδεμία <δίχα> διαλεκτικῆς περαίνει τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον. Ὅλως δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε λόγον διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν δεόντως, εἰ μή τις κτήσαιτο ταύτην τὴν περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμην.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 20-21

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

In the same letter

II.2.7

Let us turn, then, to philosophical exercises. First of all are those directed toward recollection: we see these brought to light through skillful questioning, <as> Socrates also demonstrates to Meno. Second would be those employed as midwifery, bringing what has been born into the light and distinguishing which of the offspring are true and which false.[68] These too all derive their authority from dialectic, since they are purifications of thought through refutations: they set the interlocutors' opposing opinions side by side and bring them into collision. Other exercises are offered to hearers for testing and training, or argue about a thesis, or examine the teachings of the ancients. None completes its own task <without> dialectic. In general, one cannot properly give and receive an account unless one has acquired this science of arguments.[69]

68. The first example refers to Plato's Meno, where questioning is used to illustrate recollection. "Midwifery" treats emerging thoughts as offspring whose truth must be tested; bringing an idea to birth does not itself guarantee its truth.

69. Refutation (ἔλεγχος) exposes conflicts between beliefs. Giving and receiving an account means participating in reasoned exchange, not merely producing and hearing sounds. This is the last excerpt before the chapter's contrasting sequence.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 20-21

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Κεφάλαιον Β′ · συνέχεια

II.2.contrary

Εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον.

Εὐριπίδου Ἱππολύτῳ

II.2.8

Φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ μὴ τὰ πράγματ’ ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν
φωνήν, ἵν’ ἦσαν μηδὲν οἱ δεινοὶ λέγειν.
νῦν δ’ εὐρύθμοισι στόμασι τἀληθέστατα
κλέπτουσιν, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἃ χρὴ δοκεῖν.

Εὐριπίδου Ἀντιόπῃ

II.2.9

Ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων
ἀγῶνα θεῖτ’ ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2 · Contrasting views

II.2.contrary

On the contrary.[70]

Euripides in Hippolytus

II.2.8

Alas, alas, that facts have no voice for people!
If they did, clever speakers would count for nothing.
But now, with rhythmic speech, they steal away the plainest truths,
so that people do not believe what they ought.[71]

Euripides in Antiope

II.2.9

On any matter one could set up a contest
between two arguments, if one were skilled in speaking.[72]

70. This heading introduces the collection of contrasting views. Wachsmuth takes the heading and II.2.8–23 from chapter 82 of the Florilegium, as his apparatus explains on pp. 21 and 24. The sequence collects criticisms of verbal display, contentiousness, and useless subtlety; it need not make every contributor an opponent of all reasoned inquiry.

71. The wish is that the facts could speak for themselves and deprive eloquent speakers of their power to mislead. “With rhythmic speech” renders the bodily image εὐρύθμοισι στόμασι, literally “with rhythmical mouths,” following Wachsmuth’s printed reading. The final δοκεῖν concerns what people believe or take to be the case. Wachsmuth cites the fragment as 442 in the Nauck numbering he uses.

72. The two arguments are opposing sides in a contest. The lines say that a skilled speaker can construct such a contest; they do not establish that both sides are true. Compare the distinction made in the Archytas excerpt at II.2.4. As with other dramatic fragments, the speaker’s claim cannot simply be treated as Euripides’ own doctrine.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 21-22

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Εὐήνου II.2.10

Πολλοῖς ἀντιλέγειν μὲν ἔθος περὶ παντὸς ὁμοίως,
ὀρθῶς δ’ ἀντιλέγειν οὐκέτι τοῦτ’ ἐν ἔθει.
καὶ πρὸς μὲν τούτους ἀρκεῖ λόγος εἷς ὁ παλαιός·
“σοὶ μὲν ταῦτα δοκοῦντ’ ἔστω, ἐμοὶ δὲ τάδε.”

Ἀρκεσίλαος II.2.11

Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη, Τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις, οἵ τινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται.

Ζήνωνος II.2.12

Ζήνων τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας εἴκαζε τοῖς δικαίοις μέτροις οὐ πυρὸν οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν σπουδαίων μετροῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἄχυρα καὶ κόπρια.

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Evenus

II.2.10

Many make a habit of contradicting on every matter alike;
contradicting rightly, however, is not their habit.
For these people a single old saying is enough:
“Let those be your opinions, and these mine.”[73]

Arcesilaus

II.2.11

The philosopher Arcesilaus said that dialecticians resemble conjurers with pebbles, who deceive with cleverness.[74]

Zeno

II.2.12

Zeno compared the arts of dialecticians to accurate measures used to measure neither wheat nor anything else of value, but chaff and dung.[75]

73. The repeated ἀντιλέγειν distinguishes habitual contradiction from justified disagreement. The closing saying offers a way to leave an unproductive dispute; in context it need not imply that every opinion is equally true.

74. Ψηφοπαῖκται are performers of tricks with pebbles or counters. The comparison concerns ingenious deception, not simply skill at a board game. Παραλογίζονται can describe misleading someone by false reasoning as well as cheating or trickery; the analogy transfers the conjurer’s sleight of hand to argument.

75. “Accurate” follows the printed δικαίοις, describing measures that give a fair or proper quantity. The comparison allows correctness in the instrument while denying value to what it measures. It does not say that the dialecticians’ methods are necessarily inaccurate.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 22

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Πυθαγόρου II.2.13

Κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφ' οὗ μηδὲν ἀνθρώπου πάθος θεραπεύεται. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐκ ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους ἐκβαλλούσης ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων· οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κακὸν ἐκβάλλοι.

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρίστωνος Ὁμοιωμάτων II.2.14

Οἱ ἐν διαλεκτικῇ βαθύνοντες ἐοίκασι καρκίνους μασωμένοις, οἳ δι' ὀλίγον τρόφιμον περὶ πολλὰ ὀστᾶ ἀσχολοῦνται.

Ἀντισθένους II.2.15

Οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Pythagoras II.2.13

Empty is a philosopher's discourse that heals no human affliction. For just as medicine is of no use if it does not drive diseases out of bodies, so philosophy is of no use if it does not drive evil out of the soul.[76]

From Ariston's Comparisons II.2.14

Those who go deep into dialectic resemble people chewing crabs: they busy themselves with many shells for a little nourishment.[77]

Antisthenes II.2.15

One should put an end to a person's contradiction by teaching, not by contradicting in return. No one cures a madman by going mad in return.[78]

76. The attribution "Pythagoras" is retained from the printed heading. Wachsmuth notes a closely related saying in Porphyry, Letter to Marcella 31; the parallel does not warrant silently changing the anthology's attribution. Πάθος, here "affliction," acquires its force from the medical comparison. The final clause speaks of the soul's κακόν, "evil," rather than repeating the word for disease.

77. The printed βαθύνοντες means going deep or probing deeply. "Shells" renders ὀστᾶ, literally "bones," in the crab comparison. Its point is the disproportion between the labor of extracting something and the small amount of nourishment obtained.

78. The repeated ἀντι- links answering contradiction with answering madness. The saying recommends instruction as a remedy for the dispute. "Madman" retains the ancient comparison's language; the practical distinction is between helping someone and reproducing the behavior one opposes.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 22-23

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Κλεάνθους II.2.16

Κλεάνθης ἐρωτώμενος διὰ τί παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐ πολλῶν φιλοσοφησάντων ὅμως πλείους διέλαμψαν ἢ νῦν, Ὅτι, εἶπε, τότε μὲν ἔργον ἠσκεῖτο, νῦν δὲ λόγος.

Ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων· Ἀρκεσιλάου. II.2.17

Διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω.

Ἀρίστωνος II.2.18

Ἀρίστων ἔλεγεν ἐοικέναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τῷ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς πηλῷ· πρὸς οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνον χρήσιμον ὄντα καταβάλλειν τοὺς βαδίζοντας.

Θεοκρίτου II.2.19

Θεόκριτος πρός τινα διαλεκτικὸν συντεταμένως αὐτῷ καὶ ἐριστικῶς ἀποκρινόμενον ἔφη,

“Ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο”

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Cleanthes II.2.16

Cleanthes was asked why, although few people in earlier times had practiced philosophy, more had nevertheless become distinguished than now. “Because,” he said, “then it was deeds that were practiced, but now it is words.”[79]

From Serenus’s Recollections · Arcesilaus II.2.17

But avoid dialectic: it turns things upside down.[80]

Ariston II.2.18

Ariston said that dialectic resembles the mud in the roads: it too is useful for nothing, yet brings down those who walk through it.[81]

Theocritus II.2.19

To a dialectician who answered him in a strained and contentious manner, Theocritus said:

“Would that strife might perish from among gods and human beings!”[82]

79. Ἔργον and λόγος set action against discourse. The verb ἀσκεῖν, used of practice or training, gives the answer its point: philosophical training has shifted from what one does to what one says. The Greek does not specify a particular quality in which the earlier philosophers excelled.

80. The heading places this saying of Arcesilaus within Serenus’s Recollections. Συγκυκᾷ suggests mixing up or throwing into confusion, reinforced by “upside down.” Wachsmuth detects verse behind the wording but prints no reconstructed meter; the translation likewise adds none.

81. Καταβάλλειν means to throw or bring down. The image turns the defeat of an opponent in argument into a pedestrian’s fall in mud. The charge is that the method obstructs progress without providing a useful result.

82. The quotation is Iliad 18.107, as Wachsmuth’s reference indicates. Ἔρις, “strife,” answers the description ἐριστικῶς, “contentiously”: a Homeric wish is applied to the interlocutor’s argumentative manner. The narrative frame and the quoted verse remain distinct.

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Καρνεάδου II.2.20

Καρνεάδης τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἔλεγε πουλύποδι ἐοικέναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον αὐξηθείσας τὰς πλεκτάνας κατεσθίειν, καὶ τούτους προϊούσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὰ σφέτερα ἀνατρέπειν.

Κλειτομάχου II.2.21

Κλειτόμαχος εἴκαζε τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τῇ σελήνῃ· καὶ γὰρ ταύτην οὐ παύεσθαι φθίνουσαν καὶ αὐξομένην.

Ἀρίστωνος II.2.22

Ἀρίστων τοὺς λόγους τῶν διαλεκτικῶν εἴκαζεν τοῖς τῶν ἀραχνίων ὑφάσμασιν οὐδὲν μὲν χρησίμοις, λίαν δὲ τεχνικοῖς.

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρίστωνος Ὁμοιωμάτων II.2.23

Ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 23-24

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Carneades

II.2.20

Carneades said that dialectic resembles an octopus: the octopus eats its tentacles when they have grown, and dialecticians, as their ability develops, overturn their own arguments as well.[83]

Clitomachus

II.2.21

Clitomachus compared dialectic to the moon: it too never ceases to wane and wax.[84]

Ariston

II.2.22

Ariston compared the arguments of dialecticians to spiders' webs: useful for nothing, but exceedingly skillfully made.[85]

From Ariston's Comparisons

II.2.23

Hellebore, taken in a coarser form, purges; ground into very fine particles, it chokes. So too with excessive subtlety in philosophy.[86]

83. The Greek shifts from the singular "dialectic" to the plural τούτους, "these people," understood here as dialecticians. "Arguments" makes explicit the sense of τὰ σφέτερα, "their own things." The comparison turns growing argumentative power back against the positions of those who possess it.

84. The image is one of continual diminution and increase. The excerpt leaves the comparison brief; it does not identify particular arguments or schools with the moon's different phases.

85. Τεχνικός here praises the skill displayed in making something. The criticism depends on separating that skill from usefulness, much as the Zeno saying at II.2.12 separates an accurate measure from the worth of what it measures.

86. The medical image plays on fineness: the finely ground substance corresponds to λεπτολογία, discourse carried into minute distinctions. In this context "excessive subtlety" conveys the criticism. The contrast is between a treatment that purges and refinement that defeats its purpose.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 23-24

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Πλάτωνος II.2.24

Τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.2.25

Ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσι, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλ’ ἐξαπατῶσι καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν <τοῖς> ἄλλοις ἅπασι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 24

BOOK II CHAPTER 2

Plato

II.2.24

But anyone who would be secure must be especially on guard where resemblances are concerned;[87] for this is a most slippery kind of thing.[88]

The same author

II.2.25

But I know that arguments which construct their proofs from probabilities are impostors;[89] unless one guards against them, they deceive one thoroughly, both in geometry and in everything else.[90]

87. Sophist 231A. “Secure” and “slippery” preserve the physical contrast in ἀσφαλής and ὀλισθηρότατον. The warning concerns the danger of being misled by resemblance; it does not say that every comparison is false.

88. Wachsmuth explains that this excerpt and II.2.25 survive in the Eclogae manuscripts F and P at the end of Chapter 1, a position he judges mistaken. His edition places them here, after the material recovered from the Florilegium. Their position is an editorial reconstruction, not a newly supplied passage of Greek.

89. Phaedo 92D; Simmias speaks. In the dialogue he is reconsidering his account of the soul as a harmony. Here εἰκότα are plausible considerations offered as the basis of proofs, and ἀλαζόνες calls the arguments pretenders or impostors. The warning preserves the distinction between plausibility and demonstration.

90. Wachsmuth supplies the article <τοῖς> from Plato’s text. English expresses the resulting phrase naturally as “in everything else,” without an added standalone word to bracket. The supplied Greek article remains visible opposite the translation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 24

BOOK II CHAPTER 3

Κεφάλαιον Γ′ II.3.heading

<Περὶ ῥητορικῆς>

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου β′ II.3.1

Ποίαν οὖν οἴει πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμιγμένων ἐν τούτοις οὓς ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν, τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικὸν φύσημα φυσώντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ὁπότε βέλτιστον ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων χρῆσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα;

— Φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

BOOK II CHAPTER 3

Chapter 3

II.3.heading

<On Rhetoric>[91]

Plato from Alcibiades II

II.3.1

“What sort of state, then, do you think there would be, consisting of good archers and flute players, and also athletes and other skilled practitioners, with those we just mentioned mixed among them—people who know warfare itself and killing itself—and, besides these, rhetorical men puffing out political bluster, if all of them lacked knowledge of what is best, and lacked anyone who knew when it was best to employ each of these skills and against whom?”[92]

“A poor sort of state, I should say, Socrates.”

91. The chapter title is supplied in Wachsmuth’s edition from Photius’s account of the anthology. The sequence considers the use of expertise, persuasion as the product of rhetoric, and the conduct of public speakers.

92. Alcibiades II 145E–146A; Socrates questions Alcibiades. Technical ability requires judgment about its use. The phrase φύσημα φυσώντων repeats the image of blowing or puffing; “political bluster” preserves its disparaging force. The printed βέλτιστον, “best,” is retained rather than the comparative βέλτιον recorded for Plato in the apparatus.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 25

BOOK II CHAPTER 3

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Γοργίου II.3.2

Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα, τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. Ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι, ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

— Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίσασθαι.

Πλάτωνος II.3.3a

ἂν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ
εἷς τις πονηρός, δύ’ ἀνέφυσαν ῥήτορες·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῖν Ἰόλεως ἐν τῇ πόλει,
ὅστις ἐπικαύσει τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ῥητόρων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 25

BOOK II CHAPTER 3

Plato from the Gorgias

II.3.2

“Now, Gorgias, you seem to me to have explained very nearly what sort of art you take rhetoric to be. If I understand you at all, you say that rhetoric is a maker of persuasion, and that its entire activity and its chief purpose come to this. Or can you say that rhetoric has any further power beyond producing persuasion in the souls of its hearers?”[93]

“Not at all, Socrates; you seem to me to have defined it adequately.”

Plato the comic poet

II.3.3a

For if one scoundrel dies,
two orators spring up.
There is no Iolaus in our city
to burn away the orators’ heads.[94]

93. Gorgias 452E–453A; Socrates speaks first and Gorgias replies. Δημιουργός, “maker,” describes rhetoric by what it produces: persuasion. It carries no implication of a cosmic creator here. The excerpt ends at the agreed definition, before the dialogue further distinguishes kinds of persuasion and their relation to knowledge.

94. Wachsmuth identifies these verses as belonging to Plato the comic poet, distinct from the philosopher whose dialogues precede them. Iolaus helped Heracles defeat the Hydra by burning the severed necks to prevent new heads from growing (Apollodorus, Library 2.5.2). The orators multiply like the Hydra’s heads. The English name Iolaus renders the printed form Ἰόλεως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 3

<Incerti comici> II.3.3b

Κεκολλόπευκας· τοιγαροῦν ῥήτωρ ἔσῃ.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.3.4

Ἰδών τινα Πλάτων φαῦλα μὲν πράττοντα, δίκας δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων λέγοντα, εἶπεν, Οὗτος νοῦν “ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ φέρει”.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 3

<An unidentified comic poet> II.3.3b

You have been a passive sexual partner; so you will be an orator.[95]

The same author II.3.4

Seeing a man who acted badly but pleaded cases for others, Plato said: “This man carries his understanding on his tongue.”[96]

95. The supplied Latin heading means “of an unidentified comic poet.” Wachsmuth separates this line from the preceding verses, although it has also been printed with the comic Plato’s fragment. Κολλοπεύω is a coarse sexual taunt about taking the receptive role in sex. The translation states its sense directly; the insult belongs to the comic speaker.

96. The printed heading is “The same author”; the anecdote itself names Plato. “On his tongue” contrasts the man’s ability to speak for others with his own conduct. Wachsmuth refers to the proverb in Eustathius’s commentary on Iliad 2, p. 252. The attribution is preserved without treating the preceding unidentified comic line as a philosophical saying.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Κεφάλαιον Δ′ II.4.heading

<Περὶ λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων>

<Ἡσιόδου> II.4.1

Πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν· ὁ δ’ ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
αἶψά τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε.
τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὔνεκα λαοῖς
βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῇφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι,
ῥηιδίως μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν.
ἐρχόμενον δ’ ἀνὰ ἄστυ θεὸν ὡς ἱλάσκονται
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ· μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν.

Αἰσχύλου Προμηθέως II.4.2

Καὶ μὴν ἀριθμὸν ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων
ἐξηῦρον αὐτοῖς γραμμάτων τε σύνθεσιν,
μνήμην ἁπάντων μουσομήτορ’ ἐργάνην.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 26-27

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Chapter 4

II.4.heading

<On Speech and Letters>[97]

<Hesiod>

II.4.1

All look to him as he settles matters of right
with straight judgments; speaking with assurance,
he swiftly and skillfully brings even a great dispute to an end.
For this is why kings are wise: for people who have suffered harm
they set matters right in the assembly,
easily persuading them with gentle words.
As he passes through the city, they honor him like a god
with kindly reverence; he stands out among the assembled people.[98]

Aeschylus in Prometheus

II.4.2

And I invented number for them, foremost of ingenious devices,
and the joining of letters:
the memory of all things, the Muses' mother, a craftswoman.[99]

97. Wachsmuth supplies the title from Photius. His apparatus explains that only II.4.18–19 survive here in the Eclogae manuscripts F and P; he reconstructs the preceding sequence from the Florilegium. Λόγος ranges across speech, discourse, an account, and reason; γράμματα can mean letters or writing. The English follows each passage's use.

98. Theogony 85–92. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution, since the Florilegium transmission joins these verses to preceding material without a separate heading. The king's authority is shown in just judgment and the settling of disputes through speech. Μετάτροπα ἔργα, rendered "set matters right," describes acts that reverse the harm; "straight" preserves the image in ἰθείῃσι.

99. Prometheus Bound 459–461; Prometheus speaks of his gifts to human beings. The joining of letters is writing. The feminine "craftswoman" renders ἐργάνην, and "the Muses' mother" preserves μουσομήτορα: memory makes the arts possible. Wachsmuth prints the singular σύνθεσιν, "joining," and the reading ἐργάνην rather than the alternative ἐργάτιν noted in his apparatus.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Φιλήμονος II.4.3

Ἆρ’ ἔστι τοῖς νοσοῦσι χρήσιμος λόγος.
ὡς σπληνίον πρὸς ἕλκος οἰκείως τεθὲν
τὴν φλεγμονὴν ἔπαυσεν, οὕτω καὶ λόγος.

Εὐριπίδου II.4.4

Καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν πόλλ’ ἔπη καλῶς ἔχει·
λόγοι γὰρ ἐσθλοὶ φάρμακον φόβου βροτοῖς.

Φιλητᾶ Παιγνίων II.4.5

Οὔ μέ τις ἐξ ὀρέων ἀποφώλιος ἀγροιώτης
αἱρήσει κλήθρην, αἱρόμενος μακέλην·
ἀλλ’ ἐπέων εἰδὼς κόσμον καὶ πολλὰ μογήσας,
μύθων παντοίων οἶμον ἐπιστάμενος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Philemon

II.4.3

Speech is indeed useful to those who are ill.
As a dressing properly placed on a wound
stops the inflammation, so does speech.[100]

Euripides

II.4.4

Many sayings of the ancients, too, are well said:
for good words are a remedy for mortals' fear.[101]

Philetas from Playthings

II.4.5

No foolish rustic, lifting his mattock,
will take me, an alder, from the mountains;
but one who knows the ordering of words and has labored much,
who understands the path of every kind of tale.[102]

100. Σπληνίον is a small dressing or compress. The comparison gives speech the soothing function of a physical treatment. Wachsmuth keeps the first line with the two that follow; his apparatus records an earlier separation and competing attributions in the transmission.

101. The printed φόβου means "of fear." Wachsmuth's apparatus records proposed alternatives, but the English follows the text he prints. Φάρμακον is a remedy here, continuing the medical comparison of speech in the preceding excerpt.

102. The alder speaks as an object fit for a learned reader rather than an unlettered woodcutter. Wachsmuth favors an interpretation involving wooden writing tablets used by a poet; the object's precise identity remains debated. The translation retains the literal alder and mattock instead of inserting "book" or "tablet." Παίγνια, the collection title, means playthings or playful pieces.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Εὐριπίδου Ἡρακλέους II.4.6

Οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας
Μούσαις συγκαταμιγνὺς
ἀδίσταν συζυγίαν.
μὴ ζῴην μετ' ἀμουσίας.

Εὐριπίδου Ἀνδρομέδας II.4.7

Ὦ τλῆμον, ὥς σοι τὰς τύχας μὲν ἀσθενεῖς
ἔδωχ' ὁ δαίμων· μέγα φρονοῦσι δ' οἱ λόγοι.

Εὐριπίδου Παλαμήδῃ II.4.8

Τὰ τῆς γε λήθης φάρμακ' ὀρθώσας μόνος
ἄφωνα καὶ φωνοῦντα συλλαβάς τε θεὶς
ἐξηῦρον ἀνθρώποισι γράμματ' εἰδέναι,
ὥστ' οὐ παρόντα ποντίας ὑπὲρ πλακὸς
τἀκεῖ κατ' οἴκους πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς,
παισίν τ' ἀποθνῄσκοντα χρημάτων μέτρον
γράψαντας εἰπεῖν, τὸν λαβόντα δ' εἰδέναι.
ἃ δ' εἰς ἔριν πίπτουσιν ἀνθρώποις κακά,
δέλτος διαιρεῖ, κοὐκ ἐᾷ ψευδῆ λέγειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Euripides in Heracles II.4.6

I shall not cease to mingle the Graces
with the Muses,
in sweetest union.
May I never live without the Muses' arts.[103]

Euripides in Andromeda II.4.7

Poor soul, how feeble a fortune the divine power
has given you! Yet your words think highly of themselves.[104]

Euripides in Palamedes II.4.8

I alone devised remedies against forgetfulness,
voiceless and yet speaking, and arranged syllables:
I invented letters for human beings to learn,
so that, though absent across the sea's expanse,
they might know clearly all that happens at home,
and, when dying, tell their children the extent of their property
by writing it down, and the recipient might know.
The troubles that fall into dispute among people
a tablet settles, and does not allow falsehoods to be spoken.[105]

103. Heracles 673–676. The Graces and Muses unite beauty or charm with artistic cultivation. Ἀμουσία is the absence of the Muses' arts, especially music and song, rather than merely silence. "Sweetest" follows the Doric ἀδίσταν printed here.

104. The contrast is between the person's weak circumstances and the pride expressed in speech. The English retains the personification in μέγα φρονοῦσι δ' οἱ λόγοι, literally "the words have high thoughts." Δαίμων here names the divine power responsible for the allotment of fortune.

105. Palamedes describes the invention of writing. The paradox "voiceless and yet speaking" characterizes written signs; the following examples concern communication at a distance, inheritance, and the settling of disputes. The Greek shifts between singular and plural constructions in the inheritance clause. The English supplies the people doing the writing without changing the examples or silently adopting the apparatus's proposed wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Καλλιμάχου <αἰτίων> β′ II.4.9

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ὅσα καρήατι τῆμος ἔδωκα
ξανθὰ σὺν εὐόδμοις ἀβρὰ λίπη στεφάνοις,
ἄπνοα πάντ’ ἐγένοντο παραχρῆμ’· ὅσσα τ’ ὀδόντων
ἔνδοθι νεαίρην τ’ εἰς ἀχάριστον ἔδυ,
καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν ἔμεινεν ἐς αὔριον· ὅσσα δ’ ἀκουαῖς
εἰσεθέμην, ἔτι μοι μοῦνα πάρεστι τάδε.

Φιλήμονος ἐξ Ἀπόλιδος II.4.10

Οὐχὶ μόνον οὗτος εὗρε πῶς λαλήσομεν
αὐτοῖς, ἀπέχοντες πολὺν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων χρόνον,
οὐδ’ ὃν τρόπον μηδέποτε μηδὲ εἷς πάλιν
ἐπιλήσεθ’ ἡμῶν μηδέν, ἐμβλέψας δέ που
τἀκ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παντὸς εἴσετ’· ἀλλὰ καὶ
ψυχῆς ἰατρὸν κατέλιπεν τὰ γράμματα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Callimachus from <Causes> Book Two

II.4.9

For all the delicate golden oils I put on my head then,
along with fragrant garlands,
immediately lost their scent; and whatever slipped inside my teeth
and down into my ungrateful belly—
none of that remained until tomorrow. But what I took in through my ears,
that alone is still with me.[106]

Philemon from The Man without a City

II.4.10

This man discovered not only how we might speak
to one another, though separated by a long stretch of time,
and how none of us would ever again
forget anything, but by looking at what is written
would know the events of all time; he also
left us writing as a physician for the soul.[107]

106. Wachsmuth supplies the work's title, Αἴτια or Causes. The speaker contrasts the fleeting pleasures of perfume and food with the lasting possession acquired through hearing. Ἄπνοα, literally "without breath," refers here to the loss of scent; the belly is "ungrateful" because it retains none of what was given to it.

107. The inventor is not named within this excerpt. Wachsmuth prints χρόνον, "time," in the second line, although his apparatus discusses proposed readings involving place or distance. The English retains the temporal separation. "What is written" makes explicit what the reader looks at, while "physician for the soul" preserves the final medical metaphor.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Ἰσοκράτους Εὐαγόρα II.4.11

Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Νικόκλεις, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν εἶναι καλὰ μνημεῖα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων εἰκόνας· πολὺ μέντοι πλείονος ἀξίας <τὰς> τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, ἃς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄν τις μόνον τοῖς τεχνικῶς ἔχουσι θεωρήσειεν.

Δημοκρίτου II.4.12

Ἰσχυρὸν ἐς πειθὼ λόγος γίνεται.

Σωκράτους II.4.13

Ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν σίδηρος χρυσοῦ κρείττων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ζῆν ὁ λόγος τοῦ πλούτου.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.4.14

Ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πλάστης ἀγαθὸς καλὸν τῇ ψυχῇ περιτίθησι σχῆμα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Isocrates from Evagoras

II.4.11

I think, Nicocles, that likenesses of bodies too are fine memorials. Yet likenesses of deeds and thought are worth much more; these one could behold only in discourses composed with art.[108]

Democritus

II.4.12

Speech becomes a powerful means of persuasion.[109]

Socrates

II.4.13

As a safeguard in war, iron is better than gold; in life, reason is better than wealth.[110]

The same author

II.4.14

Reason, like a good sculptor, gives the soul a beautiful form.[111]

108. Evagoras 73. The comparison is between bodily portraits and representations of action and thought in discourse. Wachsmuth supplies <τὰς> from Isocrates, carrying forward "likenesses" as the understood noun. Τεχνικῶς refers to the skill or art of the composition, rather than to a technical subject matter.

109. The attribution and the neuter ἰσχυρόν, "a powerful thing," follow the printed text. Wachsmuth discusses a longer parallel and a comparison with gold in his apparatus; neither the comparative form nor "gold" is added to this brief excerpt.

110. Iron represents the means of defense, as against possession of gold. Λόγος in the corresponding clause can mean reason or intelligent discourse. The comparison makes it a safeguard for living, rather than simply a means of acquiring wealth.

111. The printed "same author" refers back to Socrates. Πλάστης is a modeler or sculptor; λόγος now shapes the soul as an artisan shapes material. The image continues the favorable account of reason in the preceding saying.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φιλήβου II.4.15.1

Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν, εἴτε τις θεός, εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὁ λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεὺθ τινὰ τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν, οὐχ ἓν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πλείω· καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα, φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντα τινός, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν <αὐτὸν> τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε.

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φιλήβου · συνέχεια II.4.15.2

Καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἓν πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Philebus · 1

II.4.15.1

When vocal sound was recognized as unlimited, whether by a god or a divine man—whom the Egyptian story calls a certain Theuth—he first discerned that the vowels within this unlimited range were more than one. He also discerned others which partook not of voice but of a certain sound, and that these too had a definite number. As a third class of letters he distinguished what we now call mutes. Next he divided the soundless, voiceless letters down to each individual one, and the vowels and the intermediate sounds in the <same> way, until, having grasped their number, he gave each and all the name "element."[112]

Plato from the Philebus · 2

II.4.15.2

Seeing that none of us could learn even one of them by itself without all the others, and reckoning in turn that this bond was one and somehow made all of them one, he declared that there was a single art concerned with them, and named it the art of letters.[113]

112. Philebus 18B–D spans parts 1–2; Socrates speaks. The account distinguishes vowels, an intermediate class, and mute letters according to ancient phonetic categories. "Element" renders στοιχεῖον, also the word for an individual letter. The supplied <same> follows Wachsmuth's <αὐτόν>. Theuth's work turns an unlimited field into a finite, articulated system.

113. Γραμματικὴ τέχνη here is the organized knowledge of letters and their relations, wider than grammar understood only as rules of syntax. The point is the interdependence of the elements: their number alone does not constitute the art without the bond that makes them a system.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Θεαιτήτου

II.4.16

Ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. Οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ’ οὔ. Τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον, ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελέως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Theaetetus

II.4.16

For a combination of names, it is said, is the essence of an account. Thus the elements have no account and cannot be known, though they can be perceived; syllables, however, can be known, expressed, and made the objects of true opinion. When someone acquires a true opinion of something without an account, his soul is right about it, but he does not know it. For whoever cannot give and receive an account is without knowledge of that thing; once he adds an account, he becomes capable of all these things and fully attains the condition of knowledge.[114]

114. Theaetetus 202B–C. Socrates is reporting a theory he presents as a dream, which the dialogue subsequently examines; the excerpt is not its final verdict. “Account” renders λόγος. “Elements” and “syllables” preserve the letter analogy used to distinguish constituents from combinations, alongside the distinction between true opinion and knowledge.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ

II.4.17.1

Φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα· φαίνεται γὰρ πῃ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

— Τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον;

— Εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις ξυναρμόττει, εἴτε μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.

— Δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δ’ οὔ.

— Τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι ξυναρμόττει· τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.

— Πῶς τί τοῦτ’ εἶπας;

— Ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σὲ προσομολογεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.

— Πῶς;

— Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Sophist · 1

II.4.17.1

“Come, then: just as we spoke about forms and letters, let us examine names again in the same way. What we are now seeking seems to lie somewhere in this direction.”

“What question about names are we to consider?”

“Whether all fit together with one another, or none do, or some are willing to and others are not.”

“It is clear that some are willing to, and others are not.”

“Perhaps you mean that those which, when spoken in sequence, make something clear fit together, while those whose sequence signifies nothing fail to fit.”

“What do you mean by that?”

“What I thought you understood when you agreed. There are, I take it, two kinds of indications about being made by the voice.”

“How so?”

“One is called names, the other verbs.”[115]

115. Sophist 261D–262E spans parts 1–4; the Eleatic Stranger speaks with Theaetetus. The passage compares the combination of words with earlier discussions of forms and letters. “Names” renders ὀνόματα, initially words in general and then the class distinguished from verbs. The verbs “fit” and “are willing” personify their capacity to combine meaningfully.

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ · συνέχεια II.4.17.2

— Εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον.

— Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα, ῥῆμά που λεγόμενον.

— Ναί.

— Τὸ δέ γε ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτιθὲν ὄνομα.

— Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

— Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτέ λόγος, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

— Ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἔμαθον.

— Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι ξυνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ξυνεχῶς ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

— Πῶς;

— Οἷον, βαδίζει, τρέχει, καθεύδει, καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.

— Πῶς γάρ;

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 31-32

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Sophist · 2 II.4.17.2

“Explain each.”

“The indication applied to actions is, I take it, called a verb.”

“Yes.”

“And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions is a name.”

“Quite so.”

“Then names alone, spoken in sequence, never make a statement; nor do verbs spoken without names.”

“I did not understand that.”

“Clearly you were looking at something else when you agreed just now. For this was precisely what I meant: these things spoken in sequence in this way are not a statement.”

“How?”

“For example, ‘walks,’ ‘runs,’ ‘sleeps,’ and all the other verbs that signify actions—even if someone says them all in succession, he still produces no statement.”

“How could he?”[116]

116. Λόγος is rendered “statement” in this analysis of the smallest meaningful combination. A verb indicates an action; a name identifies the agent. A mere list of verbs lacks the combination required here, even though each item has a meaning.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 31-32

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ · συνέχεια II.4.17.3

— Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται, λέων, ἔλαφος, ἵππος, ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὖ πραττόντων ὠνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδείς πω ξυνέστη λόγος. Οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν, οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν, οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ· τότε δ' ἥρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ τοιαύτη συμπλοκὴ σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων, ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος.

— Πῶς ἄρ' ὧδε λέγεις;

— Ὅταν εἴπῃ τις, ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῂς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;

— Ἔγωγε.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 32

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Sophist · 3

II.4.17.3

"Likewise, when someone says 'lion,' 'deer,' 'horse,' and the other names given to those who perform actions, this sequence too has not yet formed a statement. For neither way of speaking makes clear any action or inaction, or the being of what is or is not, until someone mixes verbs with names. Then they fit, and such a combination at once becomes a statement—virtually the first and smallest of statements."

"What do you mean by that?"

"When someone says 'a human being learns,' do you call this the smallest and first statement?"

"I do."[117]

117. The example combines an agent with an action, rather than merely placing names or verbs beside one another. "A human being learns" preserves the general ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει. The preceding distinction between being and not being prepares the dialogue's wider inquiry into meaningful and false statements.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 32

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ · συνέχεια II.4.17.4

— Δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων· καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλά τι περαίνει συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. Διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐπεφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

— Ὀρθῶς.

— Οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἥρμοττε, τὰ δ’ οὔ· καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἁρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπειργάσατο.

— Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Plato from the Sophist · 4

II.4.17.4

“For it now makes something clear about things that are, are coming to be, have come to be, or will be. It does not merely name, but accomplishes something by combining verbs with names. That is why we said that the person speaks, rather than merely names; and we gave this weaving the name ‘statement.’”

“Rightly.”

“Thus, just as some things fitted together with one another and others did not, so with vocal signs: some do not fit, while those among them that do fit produce a statement.”

“Entirely so.”[118]

118. Συμπλέκειν and πλέγμα develop the image of weaving or interlacing. The result does more than name its separate constituents: it says something about them. The sequence closes by returning to the capacity of things, and then of their signs, to fit together.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου

II.4.18.1

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

— Τί μήν;

— Τὸ δ’ εὐπρεπείας <δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας>, τῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν, ἦ γάρ;

— Ναί.

— Οἶσθ’ οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων;

— Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δέ;

— Ἀκοήν γ’ ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων· τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὕρομεν αὐτοί, ἆρά γ’ ἂν ἔθ’ ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

— Γελοῖον ἥρου· ἀλλ’ ἃ φῂς ἀκηκοέναι, λέγε.

— Ἤκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινα θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον ἱερόν, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν Ἶβιν· αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεὺθ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 32-33

BOOK II CHAPTER 4

The same author from the Phaedrus · 1

II.4.18.1

“Let that suffice, then, for the question of art and the lack of art in discourse.”

“Certainly.”

“There remains the question of propriety <in writing, and of impropriety>: in what circumstances it would be well done, and in what circumstances improperly. Is that so?”[119]

“Yes.”

“Do you know how, in acting or speaking about discourse, you will most please a god?”

“Not at all. Do you?”

“I can tell a story heard from earlier people; they themselves know its truth. But if we discovered this ourselves, would we still care at all about human opinions?”

“An absurd question! But tell me what you say you have heard.”

“I heard, then, that near Naucratis in Egypt there lived one of that country’s ancient gods, to whom the bird they call the ibis was sacred. The name of the divine being himself was Theuth.”

119. Phaedrus 274B–275D spans parts 1–5; Socrates speaks with Phaedrus. Wachsmuth supplies <δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας> from Plato. The English brackets its substantive content, with the particle conveyed through the sentence’s transition. Socrates introduces the Egyptian story as something heard, preserving the distinction between a received tale and knowledge of its truth.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια

II.4.18.2

Τοῦτον δὴ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν, καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. Βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ἣν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἄμμωνα, παρὰ τοῦτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεὺθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξε, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. Ὁ δὲ ἤρετο ἣν δὴ ἑκάστη ἔχει ὠφέλειαν. Διεξιόντος δέ, ὅτι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοίη λέγειν, τὸ μὲν ἔψεγε, τὸ δ' ἐπῄνει. Πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεὺθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς μὲν ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, Τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἔφη ὁ Θεὺθ, σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει, μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον εὑρέθη.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

The same author from the Phaedrus · 2

II.4.18.2

"He was the first to discover number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, board games and dice, and also writing. At that time Thamus was king of all Egypt, living near the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; they call its god Ammon. Theuth came to him, displayed his arts, and said that they ought to be distributed to the other Egyptians. The king asked what benefit each possessed. As Theuth explained, the king criticized some things and praised others, according to whether he thought the account good or bad. Thamus is said to have made many comments to Theuth for and against each art, which would take a long discourse to recount. When they came to writing, Theuth said: 'This subject of learning, King, will make the Egyptians wiser and better at remembering; for a remedy for memory and wisdom has been discovered.'"[120]

120. The story gives invention and the judgment of an invention's benefit to different figures. Theuth claims writing as a φάρμακον, "remedy," for memory and wisdom; Thamus's reply will contest that claim. Compare the favorable accounts of writing and memory at II.4.2 and II.4.8, and the same inventor's analysis of letters in II.4.15.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια II.4.18.3

Ὁ δ’ εἶπεν, Ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεὐθ, ἄλλος μὲν δυνατὸς τεκεῖν τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι, τίν’ ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρήσθαι. Καὶ νῦν σὺ πατὴρ ὢν γραμμάτων δι’ εὔνοιαν τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. Τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει, μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἀναμιμνησκομένους. Οὐκοῦν οὐ μνήμης ἀλλ’ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὗρες, σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις. Πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ πλῆθος ὄντες καὶ χαλεποὶ ξυνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια II.4.18.4

— Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.

— Οἱ δέ γ’, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἱερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν μαντικοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσι σοφοῖς, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ’ εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν· σοὶ δ’ ἴσως διαφέρει, τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδαπός. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

The same author from the Phaedrus · 3

II.4.18.3

"But he replied: 'Theuth, master of invention, one person can give birth to the products of an art, another can judge the share of harm and benefit they bring to those who will use them. And now, because you are the father of writing, your affection has made you say the opposite of what it can do. It will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn it, through neglect of the exercise of memory: trusting in writing, they will recall things from outside, through marks belonging to others, rather than from within, by themselves. You have therefore discovered a remedy for reminding, rather than for memory. And you provide your pupils with the appearance of wisdom, rather than its truth. Having heard much without instruction, they will seem to know much, while for the most part being ignorant; they will be difficult to live with, having become seemingly wise instead of wise.'"[121]

The same author from the Phaedrus · 4

II.4.18.4

"Socrates, how easily you make up Egyptian stories—or stories from any country you please!"

"But people have said, my friend, that the first prophetic discourses were those of an oak in the sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona. The people of that time, who were not wise as you young people are, were simple enough to be content to listen to an oak or a stone, provided only that it spoke the truth. Perhaps it matters to you who the speaker is and where he comes from. For you do not consider only whether the matter is as he says or otherwise."[122]

121. The contrast is between μνήμη, an exercised power of memory, and ὑπόμνησις, a reminder or external prompt. Δόξα is appearance or reputation in this context; δοξόσοφοι closes the reply with people who seem wise. These are Thamus's claims within Socrates' story. The English follows the printed ἀγνώμονες, here "ignorant," without turning the passage into a claim that all readers lack knowledge.

122. Phaedrus questions the provenance of the story, and Socrates replies with the oak of Dodona. The compliment to the wisdom of the young is ironic. The issue is whether a speaker's identity and origin should displace attention to the truth of what is said.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου · συνέχεια II.4.18.5

— Ὀρθῶς ἐπέπληξας. Καί μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ᾗπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

— Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλείπειν, καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεξάμενος, ὡς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν Ἄμμωνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους καὶ τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

— Ὀρθότατα.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου II.4.19

Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ’ ἔχει γραφὴ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκεν μὲν ὡς ζῶντα· ἐὰν δὲ ἔρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. Ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν· ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 4

The same author from the Phaedrus · 5

II.4.18.5

"You were right to rebuke me. And I think the matter of writing is as the Theban says."

"Then anyone who thinks he leaves an art behind in writing, and anyone who receives it believing that something clear and secure will come from writing, would be full of simplicity and would truly fail to understand Ammon's prophecy, if he thought written discourses were anything more than a means of reminding someone who already knows about the subjects of the writing."

"Entirely right."[123]

The same author from the Phaedrus

II.4.19

"For writing has this strange feature, Phaedrus, and in this it is truly like painting. The offspring of painting stand there as though alive; but if you ask them anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of discourses: you might think they speak with some understanding, but if you ask about anything they say because you want to learn, they signify just one thing, always the same. Once it is written, every discourse rolls about everywhere, alike among those who understand."[124]

123. The Theban is Thamus, whose judgment the dialogue now calls Ammon's prophecy. The limitation concerns writing's capacity to impart an art as clear and secure knowledge; the final clause still allows it to remind someone who knows. The English retains that qualification rather than making the passage an absolute rejection of writing.

124. Phaedrus 275D–E. Socrates compares the apparent life of a picture with a written discourse's inability to answer a new question. This anthology excerpt stops after "among those who understand"; Plato's dialogue continues the comparison with readers to whom the discourse is not suited. That further wording is not added to Stobaeus's Greek or to the English.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Κεφάλαιον Ε′ II.5.heading

<Περὶ ποιητικῆς>

Πλάτωνος Νόμων δ′ II.5.1

Παλαιὸς μῦθος, ὦ νομοθέτα, ὑπό τε αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἀεὶ λεγόμενός ἐστι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ξυνδεδογμένος, ὅτι ποιητὴς ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν, οἷον δὲ κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιὸν ῥεῖν ἑτοίμως ἐᾷ· καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως ἀναγκάζεται, ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν διατιθεμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῷ πολλάκις· οἶδε δὲ οὔτ’ εἰ ταῦτα οὔτ’ εἰ θάτερα ἀληθῆ τῶν λεγομένων.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου II.5.2

Ὃς δ’ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ἄρα ὡς ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις.

BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Chapter 5

II.5.heading

<On Poetry>[125]

Plato from Laws Book Four

II.5.1

There is an old story, lawgiver, which we ourselves are always telling and which everyone else accepts as well: whenever a poet sits on the Muse's tripod, he is then not in his right mind, but, like a spring, freely lets whatever comes to him flow. Since his art is imitation, he is often compelled to contradict himself when he portrays people whose dispositions oppose one another; and he does not know whether one set of things he says or the other is true.[126]

The same author from the Phaedrus

II.5.2

Whoever comes to the gates of poetry without the Muses' madness, persuaded that art will make him an adequate poet, remains unfulfilled, both he himself and his poetry.[127]

125. Wachsmuth's apparatus credits Heeren with supplying the title from Photius. Ποιητική denotes the poetic art. The chapter brings together three Platonic accounts of inspiration; their language of divine possession should be read within the particular arguments from which they are excerpted.

126. Laws IV 719C. The Athenian Stranger imagines a speech to the lawgiver on behalf of the poets. Their contrasting characters explain the contradictions in their utterances; the excerpt does not say that every utterance is false. The tripod associates the poet with an inspired oracular speaker, while the spring presents speech as an unimpeded flow. Μίμησις, "imitation," here includes portraying people and their different dispositions.

127. Phaedrus 245A; Socrates speaks. Μανία is the divinely inspired madness associated here with the Muses, and τέχνη is art understood as an acquired skill. Ἀτελής means incomplete or unfulfilled, with a possible resonance of being uninitiated at the poetic gates. Stobaeus's excerpt ends here; the following comparison in Plato between inspired and merely skillful poetry is not appended.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἴωνος II.5.3.1

Ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνην μὲν οὐκ ἂν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις ἥ σε κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ, ἣν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἡρακλείαν· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις, ὥστε δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους· ὥστ’ ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς πάνυ μακρὸς σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται, πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται.

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἴωνος · συνέχεια II.5.3.2

Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλος ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται. Πάντες γὰρ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης, ἀλλ’ ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα· καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες <ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες> τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὰν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι ὥσπερ ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμενοι, ἔμφρονες δὲ οὔ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 35-36

BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Plato from the Ion · 1

II.5.3.1

Your speaking well about Homer is not a matter of art, as I was just saying; rather, a divine power moves you, like the power in the stone which Euripides called the Magnesian stone, but most people call the Heraclean. For this stone not only attracts the iron rings themselves, but also puts a power into the rings, so that they can do the very same thing as the stone: attract other rings. Thus a very long chain of pieces of iron and rings sometimes hangs one from another, while the power of all of them hangs from that stone.[128]

Plato from the Ion · 2

II.5.3.2

In the same way, the Muse herself makes people divinely inspired, and through these inspired people another chain of those possessed by inspiration is suspended. For all good epic poets utter all these beautiful poems through divine inspiration and possession, rather than through art. Good lyric poets do likewise: just as those in Corybantic frenzy, while not in their right minds, <dance, so too lyric poets, while not in their right minds,> compose these beautiful songs. Once they enter into melody and rhythm, they are in Bacchic frenzy and possessed, like those who draw honey and milk from rivers when possessed, but not when in their right minds; and the soul of the lyric poets does what they themselves describe.[129]

128. Ion 533D–534D spans parts 1–4; Socrates addresses Ion, a performer and interpreter of Homer. Wachsmuth corrects the transmitted dialogue title “Hippias” to “Ion.” The English follows the sense of the printed, syntactically awkward opening rather than replacing its Greek with a modern Platonic text. Magnesian and Heraclean are names for the lodestone; “hangs” retains the link between the suspended chain and its dependence on a single source of power.

129. Ἔνθεος and ἐνθουσιάζειν describe divine inspiration or possession, rather than ordinary enthusiasm. Corybantic dancing and Bacchic frenzy provide ritual comparisons for the poet’s state. Angle brackets preserve the phrase restored from Plato after its omission in manuscripts F and P. In the river comparison Wachsmuth prints an uneven construction and the repeated masculine κατεχόμενοι; the English makes the comparison readable without adding the explicit “Bacchants” found in the parallel Platonic text.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἴωνος · συνέχεια II.5.3.3

Λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταί, ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἢ ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. Κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεος γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ μηκέτι ᾖ .....

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἴωνος · συνέχεια II.5.3.4

Ἐπεὶ εἰ περὶ ἑνὸς τέχνῃ καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν, κἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, τὰ οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεός ἐστιν αὐτὸς ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 36-37

BOOK II CHAPTER 5

Plato from the Ion · 3

II.5.3.3

For surely the poets tell us that they bring us their songs, gathering them from honey-flowing springs or from certain gardens and glades of the Muses, like bees, themselves flying in the same way; and what they say is true. For a poet is a light, winged, sacred thing, unable to compose until he becomes divinely inspired and out of his mind, and understanding is no longer within him. …[130]

Plato from the Ion · 4

II.5.3.4

For if they knew by art how to speak well on one subject, they would know how to speak on all the others as well. For these reasons the god takes away their understanding and uses them as his servants, along with singers of oracles and divinely inspired seers, so that we who hear may know that these people, whose understanding is absent, are not the ones who utter these things of such great worth. Rather, it is the god himself who says these things and speaks to us through them.[131]

130. The poet's comparison with a bee extends the preceding image of honey. Ποιεῖν means to make or compose poetry here. The dots reproduce a break already marked in Wachsmuth's text, rather than an omission made for this translation: his apparatus says that Stobaeus apparently omitted about eight lines of Plato deliberately. Parts 3–4 remain one ancient excerpt; their division serves the bilingual layout.

131. Socrates contrasts a systematic art with the inspired poet's restricted ability. "Understanding" renders νοῦς, connecting this conclusion with the poet's loss of understanding before the marked omission. The god's use of poets as servants or instruments is a claim within the dialogue's argument, not an editorial assertion about every work of poetry. Χρησμῳδοί are singers or chanters of oracles; μάντεις are seers.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 36-37

BOOK II CHAPTER 6

Κεφάλαιον Ϛ′ II.6.heading

<Περὶ χαρακτῆρος τῶν παλαιῶν>

Πλάτων II.6.1

Πλάτων τὰ πολλὰ ὧν τινες συγγράφουσι τοῖς Ἀδωνιακοῖς κήποις εἴκασεν, οἳ τὴν χάριν ἐφήμερον ἔχοντες ῥᾳδίως μαραίνονται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 37

BOOK II CHAPTER 6

Chapter 6

II.6.heading

<On the Style of the Ancients>[132]

Plato

II.6.1

Plato compared most of what some people write to the gardens of Adonis, which, possessing a charm that lasts only a day, quickly wither.[133]

132. Wachsmuth supplies the heading from Photius. Χαρακτήρ can mean a distinctive character or stamp; the comparison of writers in this chapter makes “style” appropriate here. Only one short item appears under the heading in this edition.

133. This is a report about Plato, not a direct quotation assigned to a named dialogue. Compare Phaedrus 276B–D, where the gardens of Adonis, with their rapid growth, are contrasted with serious cultivation and related to written discourse. The ritual gardens were short-lived plantings. Wachsmuth’s apparatus also compares Epictetus, Discourses IV.8.36. Ἐφήμερον makes their charm fleeting; the English retains the literal image “only a day” rather than assigning a measured botanical lifespan.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 37

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κεφάλαιον Ζ′ II.7.heading

Περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἴδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

<Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> II.7.1.1

Ἠθική ἐστι δύναμις ψυχῆς, δι’ ἧς ἀσκηθείσης καλῶς ἡ πρακτικὴ κατασκευάζεται ἀρετή, ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν χρησόμεθα ἐθιστῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ἦθος δέ ἐστι ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποτακτικῶς ἔχειν ἐθιζομένου τῷ λόγῳ.

Ἄλλως· Ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λόγῳ· ἢ πάθος ἢ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λογικῷ.

Ἄλλως· Πάθος ἢ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τοῦ λογικοῦ.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Chapter 7

II.7.heading

On the Ethical Branch of Philosophy.[134]

<From the Epitome of Didymus> · 1

II.7.1.1

Ethics is a capacity of the soul through whose proper exercise virtue in action is formed; or an account according to which we shall employ virtue acquired by habituation.[135]

Character is a quality of the nonrational part of the soul as it is habituated to be subject to reason.

Alternatively: a nonrational part of the soul habituated to obey reason; or an affection, or the affective part of the soul, habituated to obey the rational part.

Alternatively: an affection, or the desiring part of the soul, habituated to obey the rational part.[136]

134. Wachsmuth restores this heading from Photius and a Florilegium witness, although he prints it without angle brackets. The ethical branch concerns character and conduct. The introductory material compares definitions and divisions from different philosophical schools; it should not be read as a single doctrine shared by all of them.

135. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Didymus's Epitome, drawing on a parallel Florilegium attribution and earlier scholarship. The name is commonly associated with Arius Didymus, but the extent and authorship of this ethical compilation are debated. "Introductory definitions" corresponds to Wachsmuth's Latin section label Prolegomena. Ἠθική can name ethics as a discipline or the capacity cultivated by it; ἐθιστῇ connects the virtue with habituation.

136. Ἦθος is character, while ἐθίζειν means to habituate. "Nonrational" distinguishes a part lacking reason in itself from the rational part it can obey. Πάθος is rendered "affection" in these broad definitions: it need not yet mean the specifically excessive emotion defined below. The repeated alternatives are retained rather than combined into one definition.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 37-38

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

<Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · συνέχεια II.7.1.2

Πάρεστι δὲ κἀκείνως ὁρίζεσθαι· ὁρμὴ ψυχῆς πρακτικὴ ἢ κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν ἢ ποιότης ἀλόγου μορίου ψυχῆς ἢ ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους ποιότης καθ' ὑποτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένη τῷ λογικῷ ἐπακολουθεῖν.

Οὕτως μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁρίζονται· οἱ δὲ κατὰ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωϊκὸν τροπικῶς· ἦθός ἐστι πηγὴ βίου, ἀφ' ἧς αἱ κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ῥέουσι.

<Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · συνέχεια II.7.1.3

Πάθος δ' ἐστίν, ὡς μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἄλογος ψυχῆς κίνησις πλεοναστική. Τὸ μὲν οὖν 'ἄλογον' κατὰ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος τὸν ἀρχικὸν λόγον τάττει, τὸν γὰρ ὑποτακτικὸν ἔχει, καθ' ὃν ὑπακούειν πέφυκε τοῦ λογικοῦ· τὸ δὲ 'πλεοναστικὸν' κατὰ τοῦ πεφυκότος ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλεονασμόν, οὐ κατὰ τοῦ ἤδη πλεονάζοντος· ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ πλεονάζει, ποτὲ δ' ἐλλείπει.

Κἀκείνως δὲ ὁρίζεται· πάθος ἐστὶ κίνησις τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς πλεοναστικὴ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἡδέος ἢ λυπηροῦ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 38-39

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

<From the Epitome of Didymus> · 2 II.7.1.2

It may also be defined in this way: an impulse of the soul toward action; or a movement of the soul in accordance with impulse; or a quality of a nonrational portion of the soul; or a quality of the soul's nonrational part capable, through a subordinate relation, of following the rational part.

This, then, is how those who follow Plato define it. Those who follow Zeno the Stoic define it figuratively: character is a spring of life, from which particular actions flow.[137]

<From the Epitome of Didymus> · 3 II.7.1.3

An affection, according to Aristotle, is a nonrational movement of the soul capable of excess. He applies "nonrational" to what does not possess reason in a ruling role; for it possesses a subordinate relation through which it is naturally able to obey the rational part. He applies "capable of excess" to what is naturally able to admit excess, rather than to what is already excessive; for sometimes it exceeds, and sometimes it falls short.

It is also defined in this way: an affection is a movement of the soul's nonrational part, capable of excess, in response to an impression of something pleasant or painful.[138]

137. The subject remains character. The report contrasts a Platonic family of definitions with a Stoic metaphor, rather than attributing every formulation directly to Plato or Zeno. Ὁρμή is an impulse toward action. The spring and flowing actions preserve the water imagery. "Subordinate relation" renders καθ' ὑποτακτικὸν λόγον, not an additional reasoning faculty in the nonrational part.

138. The report's explanation of πλεοναστική is decisive: it describes a capacity for excess, not excess already occurring. Accordingly πάθος is "affection" here, while the specifically excessive Stoic state in the next unit is "passion." Wachsmuth notes Aristotelian parallels but cautions that πλεοναστική is not Aristotle's own term; the heading reports an interpretation of his position, not a verbatim quotation. Φαντασία is an impression or presentation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 38-39

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

<Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · συνέχεια II.7.1.4

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Περιπατητικὸς οὕτως· ὡς δ’ ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὡρίσατο Ζήνων, πάθος ἐστὶν ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. Οὐ λέγει ‘πεφυκυῖα πλεονάζειν’, ἀλλ’ ἤδη ἐν πλεονασμῷ οὖσα· οὐ γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ὡρίσατο δὲ κἀκείνως· πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πτηνῶν φορᾶς τὸ εὐκίνητον τοῦ παθητικοῦ παρεικάσας.

Ἠθοποιία δ’ ἐστὶν ἤθους ἐμποίησις.

<Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · συνέχεια II.7.1.5

Ἠθικὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ μεσότης παθῶν, ἢ ἕξις ὁρίζουσα τοῦ πάθους τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως λόγῳ· ἢ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτάρκη περὶ τῶν ὅρων, πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγοι παρεμπεσοῦνται. Χωρητέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου, εὐθὺς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἐνδεικνύμενον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 39

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

<From the Epitome of Didymus> · 4 II.7.1.4

So much for the Peripatetic definition. As Zeno the Stoic defined it, however, passion is an excessive impulse. He does not say "naturally capable of excess," but already in a state of excess: not potentially, but rather actually. He also defined it in this way: passion is a fluttering of the soul, comparing the affective part's readiness to move with the movement of winged creatures.[139]

The formation of character is the implanting of character.[140]

<From the Epitome of Didymus> · 5 II.7.1.5

Ethical virtue is a mean among affections; or a disposition that sets the limits of an affection's excess and deficiency by the account supplied by practical wisdom; or a disposition to choose what is noble in matters of pleasure and pain.[141]

These definitions will suffice, since discussions of them will often arise along the way. We must move on to the division of the ethical field, showing its distinctions from the field itself at the outset.

139. The difference from the preceding definition lies in actual excess. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.110 for Zeno's definition of passion as an excessive impulse. "Fluttering" renders πτοία, the reading Wachsmuth establishes and connects with birds in his apparatus; it preserves the image instead of replacing it with the more general "disturbance."

140. Ἠθοποιία combines character with making or forming. Wachsmuth prints ἤθους, "of character," although his apparatus asks whether ἔθους, "of habit," might have been intended. The translation retains the printed reading, including its apparent repetition.

141. Ἕξις is a settled disposition, προαίρεσις deliberate choice, and φρόνησις practical wisdom. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106B36–1107A2. The excerpt gives several formulations rather than reproducing Aristotle's complete definition. "Noble" renders καλόν in its ethical sense; "mean" concerns the fitting measure of affections, not mere numerical averaging.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου

II.7.2.1

Φίλων ἐγένετο Λαρισαῖος, φιλόσοφος Ἀκαδημιακός, ἀκουστὴς Κλειτομάχου, τῶν ἱκανὴν εἰσενεγκαμένων προκοπὴν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς. Οὗτος ὁ Φίλων τά τε ἄλλα πεπραγμάτευται δεξιῶς καὶ διαίρεσιν τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, ἣν ἐγὼ προχειριοῦμαι περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος. Ἐοικέναι δή φησι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἰατρῷ. Καθάπερ οὖν ἔργον ἰατροῦ πρῶτον μὲν πεῖσαι τὸν κάμνοντα παραδέξασθαι τὴν θεραπείαν, δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς τῶν ἀντισυμβουλευόντων λόγους ὑφελέσθαι, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Κεῖται τοίνυν ἑκάτερον τούτων ἐν τῷ προσαγορευομένῳ προτρεπτικῷ λόγῳ, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ προτρεπτικὸς ὁ παρορμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετήν. Τούτου δ’ ὁ μὲν ἐνδείκνυται τὸ μεγαλωφελὲς αὐτῆς, ὁ δὲ τοὺς ἀνασκευάζοντας ἢ κατηγοροῦντας ἢ πως ἄλλως κακοηθιζομένους <εἰς> τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀπελέγχει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 39-40

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 1

II.7.2.1

Philo was a native of Larissa, an Academic philosopher and a pupil of Clitomachus, one of those who made considerable progress in other matters. This Philo treated other subjects skillfully and also a division of philosophical discourse, which I shall take up as the subject under discussion.[142] He says that the philosopher resembles a physician. Just as a physician's task is first to persuade the sick person to accept treatment, and second to remove the arguments of those advising against it, so too is the philosopher's. Both tasks belong to what is called exhortatory discourse, since exhortation urges one toward virtue. One part shows its great benefit; the other refutes those who reject philosophy, accuse it, or otherwise behave maliciously <toward> it.[143]

142. Philo is Philo of Larissa, the Academic philosopher named in the Greek, not Philo of Alexandria. The first-person "I" belongs to the source's narrator, who reports Philo's division. Wachsmuth retains the difficult phrase περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος and the reading λοιποῖς, "other matters"; the English does not silently replace either with a proposed reading from the apparatus.

143. Προτρεπτικός means exhortatory or encouraging a turn toward a way of life. The physician comparison explains why demonstrating philosophy's benefit and answering its opponents belong to the same preliminary stage. The supplied <toward> follows <εἰς>. In "its great benefit," the immediate Greek antecedent is virtue; the surrounding argument concerns the benefit of philosophical cultivation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.2

Δεύτερος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ <τῇ> πρὸς τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἀναλογίᾳ δευτέραν ἔχων τάξιν. Ὡς γὰρ ἰατροῦ μετὰ τὸ πεῖσαι παραδέξασθαι τὴν θεραπείαν τὸ προσάγειν ἐστὶ ταύτην [τοῦ μὲν θεραπευτικοῦ] τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ προεκκροῦσαι τὰ νοσοποιὰ τῶν αἰτίων, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ τὰ παρασκευαστικὰ τῆς ὑγιείας ἐνθεῖναι, οὕτως αὖ κἀπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔχει· μετὰ γὰρ τὰ προτρεπτικὰ πειρᾶται τὰ θεραπευτικὰ προσάγειν, ἐφ' ὃ καὶ τοῖς παρορμητικοῖς κέχρηται διμερῶς· τὸ μὲν ὑπεξαιρετικὸν τῶν ψευδῶς γεγενημένων δοξῶν, δι' ἃς τὰ κριτήρια νοσοποιεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς, προσάγει λόγον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὑγιῶς ἐχουσῶν ἐνθετικόν. Δεύτερος οὖν ὁ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπος, ἐφ' ὃν καὶ δι' ὃν ἡ προτροπή.

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.3

Τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ πάλιν ὁ τρίτος ἀναλογήσει. Καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἰατρικῇ σπουδὴ πᾶσα περὶ τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγίεια, καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Συνάπτεται δὲ τῷ περὶ τελῶν λόγῳ λόγος <ὁ> περὶ βίων. Ἐπί τε γὰρ τῆς ἰατρικῆς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐμποιῆσαι, χρεία δὲ καὶ τοῦ παρασχεῖν παραγγέλματα περὶ τῆς ὑγιείας, οἷς προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν τὴν εὐεξίαν τοῦ σώματος διαφυλάξουσι· καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὸν βίον θεωρημάτων τινῶν ἐστι χρεία, δι' ὧν ἡ φυλακὴ γενήσεται τοῦ τέλους.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 2

II.7.2.2

After this comes a second division, occupying second place in the analogy with medicine. Once the physician has persuaded the patient to accept treatment, his task is to administer it: partly by first eliminating the causes of disease, partly by introducing what produces health. So too with philosophical knowledge: after exhortation, it attempts to apply the treatment for which it also employed encouragement, in two parts. It applies one discourse to remove falsely formed opinions, through which the soul's standards of judgment become diseased, and another to implant sound opinions. Thus the second topic concerns good and evil, toward which and for the sake of which the exhortation is directed.[144]

Division of the Ethical Field · 3

II.7.2.3

The third division will in turn correspond to the third stage of medicine. For medicine's whole concern is with its end, which is health, and philosophy's with happiness. To discourse about ends is joined discourse about ways of life. In medicine it is not enough to produce health: instructions about health must also be supplied, by attending to which people will preserve the body's good condition. Likewise, in life certain principles are needed through which the end will be preserved.[145]

144. The physician analogy now distinguishes removing causes of disease from introducing health, and removing false opinions from implanting sound ones. Κριτήρια are the soul's criteria or standards of judgment. The supplied <τῇ> completes the construction "in the analogy" and is conveyed grammatically in English. Wachsmuth deletes [τοῦ μὲν θεραπευτικοῦ], "of the therapeutic part"; it remains in the Greek brackets but is omitted from the English.

145. Τέλος is an end or goal, and εὐδαιμονία is happiness or living well. The medical parallel distinguishes reaching the goal from preserving it. Βίοι are ways or forms of life, not biographies. Wachsmuth's supplied article <ὁ> identifies the discourse about ways of life and is expressed by the English construction.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 40-41

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.4

Διττὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ βίων λόγος, ὁ μὲν ἴδιος, ὁ δὲ κοινός· ὧν τὸν μὲν ἴδιον ἐπισκοπεῖν δέον ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς ἕκαστον, οἷον εἰ τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι πολιτευτέον ἢ τοῖς ἡγεμονικοῖς συμβιωτέον, ἢ γαμητέον τῷ σοφῷ· τὸν δὲ κοινὸν <τὰ> πρὸς ἅπαντας, οἷόν ἐστι· τίς ἀρίστη πολιτεία; εἰ κοινὰς ποιητέον τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ τιμητάς; Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν κοινὸν προσαγορευτέον μὲν πολιτικόν, τακτέον δὲ καθ' αὑτὸν καίπερ ὄντα μέρος τοῦ περὶ βίων διά τε τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν κοινότητα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐνεδέχετο πάντας εἶναι σοφούς, οὐκ ἂν ἐδέησε πλειόνων ἔτι τόπων· οἱ γὰρ κατὰ λεπτὸν διαιρούμενοι παραφυάδες εἰσὶ τῶν προκειμένων.

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.5

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν μέσως διακειμένων ἀνθρώπων πρόνοιαν ποιητέον, οὕς τινας ἐκ τῶν παραινετικῶν λόγων ὠφελεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, μὴ δυναμένους προσευκαιρεῖν ταῖς διεξόδοις πλάτεσιν ἢ διὰ χρόνου στενοχωρίας ἢ διά τινας ἀναγκαίας ἀσχολίας, ἐπεισενεκτέον τὸν ὑποθετικὸν λόγον, δι' οὗ τὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ἑκάστου χρήσεως ὑποθήκας ἐν ἐπιτομαῖς ἕξουσιν.

Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἡ Φίλωνος ἔχει διαίρεσις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 41

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 4

II.7.2.4

Discourse about ways of life is also twofold: one part is individual, the other communal. The individual part must examine questions concerning each person, such as whether a person of understanding should take part in politics or associate with rulers, or whether the wise person should marry. The communal part examines <questions> concerning everyone, such as: what is the best constitution? Should public offices be open to all, or subject to a property qualification? This communal part should be called political, and should be arranged separately, although it is part of discourse about ways of life, because of its extent and common concern. If everyone could be wise, no further topics would be needed; for the finer subdivisions are offshoots of those already set out.[146]

Division of the Ethical Field · 5

II.7.2.5

But care must also be taken for people of middling condition, who may benefit from advisory discourses but cannot devote time to the full expositions, either because time is short or because of necessary occupations. Discourse giving precepts must therefore be introduced, through which they will have concise instructions for the security and correctness of their use of each thing.

Such, then, is Philo's division.[147]

146. The contrast is between individual decisions and the shared ordering of a community. Τιμητάς refers to offices subject to an assessment or property qualification, contrasting with offices open in common. The supplied <questions> represents <τὰ> with the understood matters to be examined. The questions about politics and marriage are examples for inquiry, not conclusions that the wise person must pursue or avoid them.

147. Μέσως διακειμένων describes people who have not attained the wisdom just envisaged. Ὑποθετικὸς λόγος gives precepts or practical instructions; it does not mean hypothetical reasoning here. Ὑποθήκαι, the plural noun from the same family, is also one of the three terms in Stobaeus's title. The concise advice supplements the fuller expositions for readers whose circumstances limit their time.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια

II.7.2.6

Ἐγὼ δ’ εἰ μὲν ἀργοτέρως διεκείμην, ἀρκεσθεὶς ἂν αὐτῇ συνείρον ἤδη τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων, τῇ τῆς ἐξαμερείας ἐπικουφιζόμενος περιγραφῇ· ἡγούμενος δ’ ἐμαυτῷ πρέπειν πρὸ παντὸς τὴν οὐσίαν δεῖν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὗ τις πραγματεύεται, κἄπειτα ποιότητα τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ ποσότητα, καὶ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρός τι, νομίζω προσεπιπονητέον [τε] εἶναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖν, καθάπερ οὐ πάντων, οὕτως τῶν περὶ ταῦτα διενεγκάντων.

Ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως, Ἀκαδημιακοῦ φιλοσόφου, διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσαν ἐπεξελήλυθε προβληματικῶς τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἧς ἐγὼ διαιρέσεως ἐκθήσομαι τὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς οἰκεῖον. Ἔχει δ’ οὕτως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 41-42

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 6

II.7.2.6

If I were less industrious, I would be content with this division and would already proceed to set out the doctrines, finding relief in the outline of its sixfold arrangement. But I consider it proper first of all to examine the essence of the subject under treatment, then its quality and quantity, and next its relations. I therefore think I must take further pains and examine the accounts of others as well: even if not everyone's, at least those of people distinguished in these matters.[148]

Now there is a division of philosophical discourse by Eudorus of Alexandria, an Academic philosopher, a book worth possessing, in which he has gone through the whole field of knowledge by way of problems. I shall set out the part of that division belonging to ethics. It runs as follows.

148. The source's narrator now moves from Philo to Eudorus. The "sixfold arrangement" includes the separately discussed ends, ways of life, politics, and precepts, alongside exhortation and treatment. Essence, quality, quantity, and relation describe the proposed inquiry's order. Wachsmuth retains the difficult final comparison about examining others' accounts; the English gives its apparent contrast without claiming a secure word-for-word construction. His rejected [τε], "and," is not added to the translation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 41-42

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.7

Τριμεροῦς ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου τὸ μέν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. Τοῦ δ’ ἠθικοῦ τὸ μὲν περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀξίας, <τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ὁρμήν>, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

¶ Ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀδρομερῆ τῆς ἠθικῆς εἴδη, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ θεάσασθαι τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πράγματος ὅπερ αἱρεῖσθαι μέλλομεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε γενέσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν εὔλογον, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· ἡ θεωρία δ’ ἐστὶ περίσκεψις τοῦ πράγματος καὶ οἷον ἐπίκρισις κατὰ τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ λογισμόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ περινοηθέντι καλῶς ἐπιβαλεῖν· τρίτον τὸ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῖς ἐπισυνάψαι. ¶ Ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου θεωρητικόν, ὁρμητικόν, πρακτικόν.

Τούτων δ’ ἕκαστον ὑποδιαιρεῖται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 42

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 7

II.7.2.7

Philosophical discourse has three parts: ethical, physical, and logical. Of the ethical part, one division concerns the consideration of the value of each thing, <another concerns impulse>, and another concerns action.

¶ These are the broad branches of ethics. First, we must consider the value of the thing we are going to choose, since impulse cannot become reasonable unless consideration precedes it. Consideration is an examination of the thing and a kind of judgment based on reasoning about it. Second, we must properly direct impulse toward what has been considered; third, we must attach action to these. ¶ These are the primary parts of ethical discourse: consideration, impulse, and action.

Each of these is subdivided.[149]

149. Wachsmuth supplies the middle division, <another concerns impulse>, to complete the threefold scheme. The account orders considered value, impulse, and action; it does not treat impulse as inherently irrational. “Physical” means concerned with nature, and “logical” with reasoning and related matters. The source’s break marks before the two summaries are represented here by ¶. Wachsmuth explicitly cautions against deleting the second summary as an interpolation simply because it repeats the division.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 42

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.8

Τοῦ γὰρ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀξίας τὸ μὲν περὶ τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ τῶν λεγομένων τελῶν τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν τῶν τελῶν περιποίησιν. <Καὶ τὸ μὲν περὶ τῶν τελῶν διαιρεῖται εἵς τε τὸ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τὸ ..... τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν τῶν τελῶν περιποίησιν> τὸ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ποιῶν (ὅπερ καὶ καλεῖται χαρακτηριστικόν), τὸ δὲ περὶ τεχνῶν, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.9

Τοῦ μὲν περὶ ἀρετῶν τὸ μὲν ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ κοινόν· ἴδιον μέν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, περὶ ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης, φρονήσεως, τῶν ἄλλων· κοινὸν δὲ τὸ προτρεπτικόν, τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὸ μόνως ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν. Καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀξίας λόγος εἰς τοσούτους τόπους γενικοὺς τέμνεται· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν πολλὰς περιέχει διαιρέσεις, αὐτίκα τὸν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων προηγμένων, τὸν περὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐφυΐας. Τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλίας κατὰ γενίκευσιν ὑπάγει τὸν περὶ ἔρωτος τόν <τε> περὶ συμποσίων. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως τούσδε σύμπαντας εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὡς γενικώτατον ὑπέταξε λόγον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 43-44

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 8

II.7.2.8

Of the division considering the value of each thing, one part concerns aims and what are called the ends of life, the other what contributes to attaining those ends. <The part concerning ends is divided into that about good and evil and that about …; of the part concerning what contributes to attaining the ends,> one division concerns virtues and vices, another the kinds of people characterized by the virtues—which is also called the description of character—another the arts, and another pursuits.[150]

Division of the Ethical Field · 9

II.7.2.9

Of the division concerning virtues, one part is particular, the other general. The particular part concerns, for example, justice, courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and the others. The general part is exhortatory, since it aims simply to display virtue and vice. Discourse considering the value of each thing is divided into this many general topics; for the division about good and evil contains many subdivisions, such as those about so-called preferred things, friendship, pleasure, reputation, and natural aptitude. Under friendship, treated as a general category, he places love <and> drinking parties. Nevertheless, he likewise subordinates all these to discourse about good and evil as the most general category.[151]

150. The long bracketed passage is Wachsmuth's reconstruction of wording he considers lost through a repeated ending. Its dots leave an unrecovered subdivision unfilled. The translation preserves both the supplement and the gap. Σκοπός is an aim or target; τέλος the end sought. Χαρακτηριστικόν concerns the description of character-types, while ἐπιτηδεύματα are pursuits or occupations. The gap belongs to the transmitted division, not to an omitted portion of this translation.

151. The general exhortatory treatment of virtue is distinguished from accounts of particular virtues. "Preferred things" renders προηγμένα, a technical term especially associated with Stoic accounts of things selected without being moral goods. Its presence does not by itself make the whole division exclusively Stoic. Δόξα here, alongside friendship and pleasure, is reputation; earlier it meant opinion. Συμπόσια are drinking parties or symposia, treated as a setting for social relations.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 43-44

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.10

Τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῆς ὁρμῆς λόγου ὁ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ὁρμῆς, ὁ δὲ περὶ παθῶν. Ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν πάθος ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, ἢ τὰ γε πλεῖστα μεθ' ὁρμῆς καὶ [τὰ] ἀρρωστήματα.

Τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῆς πράξεως λόγου ὁ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν οἰκειούντων πρός τινας πράξεις, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτριούντων ἀπό τινων πράξεων, ὁ δὲ τῶν αἰτίων ἀποδοτικὸς τῶν ἐπιτελούντων τινὰς σχέσεις ἢ κινήσεις, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀσκήσεως, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἰδίως καὶ ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λεγομένης πράξεως.

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.11

Καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν οἰκειούντων πρός τινας πράξεις διαιρεῖται εἵς τε τὸν ὑποθετικὸν καὶ τὸν προτρεπτικόν· ἔνιοι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον ὑπὸ τόνδε τάττουσιν. Ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων καλεῖται παραμυθητικός, ὃς καλούμενός ἐστι πρός ἐνίων παθολογικός· τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῆς ὁμωνύμως λεγομένης πράξεως καὶ εἰδικῆς ὁ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 44

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 10

II.7.2.10

Of discourse concerning impulse, one part concerns impulse in the specific sense, the other passions. For either every passion is an excessive impulse, or at any rate most passions, and also disorders, involve impulse.

Of discourse concerning action, one part concerns what inclines us toward certain actions, another what alienates us from certain actions, another gives an account of the causes that bring about certain dispositions or movements, another concerns practice, and another action in the specific sense, which bears the same name as the general category.[152]

Division of the Ethical Field · 11

II.7.2.11

The division concerning what inclines us toward certain actions is divided into preceptive and exhortatory discourse; for some place exhortation under this heading as well. The division concerning what turns us away is called consolatory, and some call it discourse about passions. Of action in the specific sense, which bears the same name as the general category, one part concerns appropriate actions, the other completely right actions.[153]

152. The first sentence places passions within the broader treatment of impulse, allowing the alternative formulations printed in the Greek. Ἀρρωστήματα are disorders or infirmities of the soul; the preceding [τὰ] is rejected by the editor and omitted from English. Action then names both a general field and a specific subdivision within it, a distinction expressed by ἰδίως and ὁμωνύμως. Ἄσκησις here is practice or training.

153. Καθήκοντα are appropriate or befitting actions; κατορθώματα are completely right actions, the stronger term in Stoic ethical classification. The translation keeps them distinct. “Discourse about passions” renders παθολογικός in an ethical sense, rather than modern medical pathology. The source notes that some classify exhortation here, whereas the preceding scheme also placed it under the general treatment of virtue.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 44

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.12

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἃ μέν ἐστι καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον σχέσιν, συνέστη τόπος ὁ περὶ τῶν χαρίτων ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον σχέσιν ὑπάρχων. Πάλιν δ’ ἐπεὶ τῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἃ μὲν λέγεται σύνθετα, ἃ δὲ ἀσύνθετα, συνέστη <ἐκ τοῦ> κατὰ τὰ σύνθετα ὁ περὶ βίων λόγος, οὗ μέρος ὢν ὁ περὶ γάμου κατ’ ἰδίαν ἐτάχθη διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζητημάτων.

Διαίρεσις ἠθικοῦ τόπου · συνέχεια II.7.2.13

Ὥστ’ εἶναι τοὺς πάντας τόπους κατὰ τὸν <περὶ> τῆς πράξεως λόγον, <ὑποθετικόν, προτρεπτικόν>, παραμυθητικὸν <ἢ> παθολογικόν, <αἰτιολογικόν>, περὶ ἀσκήσεως, περὶ καθηκόντων, περὶ κατορθωμάτων, περὶ χαρίτων, περὶ βίων, περὶ γάμου.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἠθικὸς λόγος εἰς ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα τέμνοιτ’ ἄν· ἀρκτέον δὲ τῶν προβλημάτων, προτάττοντα τὰ γένη κατὰ τὴν ἐμοὶ φαινομένην διάταξιν, ἥν τινα πείθομαι πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον διηνεγκέναι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 44-45

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Division of the Ethical Field · 12

II.7.2.12

Some appropriate and completely right actions concern individual matters, while others concern our relations with those around us. Hence the topic of gratitude has arisen from the account of our relations with others. Again, since some appropriate and completely right actions are called composite and others noncomposite, discourse about ways of life has arisen <from> the treatment of composite actions. Marriage, as part of that discourse, has been arranged separately because of the number of questions it contains.[154]

Division of the Ethical Field · 13

II.7.2.13

Thus all the topics in discourse <concerning> action are: <precepts, exhortation>, consolation <or> passions, <causal explanation>, practice, appropriate actions, completely right actions, gratitude, ways of life, and marriage.

Ethical discourse, then, may be divided into these parts and this number of them. We must begin the problems, placing the general categories first according to the arrangement that seems best to me, which I am persuaded has an advantage in clarity.[155]

154. Χάριτες concerns gratitude or the reciprocal giving and returning of favors, not the mythological Graces. Composite actions are considered in their combination into a way of life, which explains the move from individual acts to βίοι. The supplied <from> follows <ἐκ τοῦ>. The Greek source gives marriage its own heading because of the questions it raises, without answering those questions here.

155. The summary contains ten headings, with consolation and the treatment of passions offered as alternative names for one heading. Wachsmuth supplies “precepts, exhortation,” the alternative “or,” and “causal explanation” so that the list corresponds to the preceding exposition; the angle brackets preserve those interventions. The final first-person statement belongs to the narrator, who now proceeds from the division of ethics to its problems. The next heading is “On the End.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 44-45

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους

II.7.3a.1

Τέλος λέγεται πολλαχῶς· ὡς τὸ πέρας, ᾧ ἀντιδιαιρεῖται ἀρχὴ καὶ μέσον· καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλεσμα <τὸ> φορικόν· ὡς τὸ ἀνάλωμα, καθὸ λέγεται αὐτοτελής τε καὶ εὐτελής· ὡς ὁ γάμος παρὰ τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν, ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα τῆς νεότητος, ἢ διὰ τὸ τελειοῦν τὸν ἄνδρα τῇ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα συνόδῳ, καθὸ τὴν γαμήλιον Ἥραν <ἢ> συζυγίαν καὶ τελείαν ἐπονομάζουσι· τέλος δὲ καὶ γνώσεως καὶ πράξεως καὶ ποιήματος τὸ ἀποβαῖνον, ὡς παρ’ Εὐριπίδῃ

Ἀχαλίνων στομάτων
ἀνόμου τ’ ἀφροσύνας
τὸ τέλος δυστυχία.

Περὶ τέλους · συνέχεια

II.7.3a.2

Τέλη δὲ λέγονται καὶ αἱ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρχαί, τὰ τέλη Λακεδαιμονίων εἰ τύχοι. Παρὰ δ’ Ὁμήρῳ ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἰλιάδος δεκάτῳ

Αἶψα δ’ ἐπὶ Θρηικῶν ἀνδρῶν τέλος ἶξον ἰόντες·
τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἔναρχον τάγμα.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · 1

II.7.3a.1

"End" is said in many senses: as the limit, distinguished from beginning and middle; as a payment of tribute; as expense, in the sense in which one speaks of being self-supporting or inexpensive; as marriage among the Dorians, either because it brings youth to its conclusion or because it completes the man through union with the woman, which is why they call Hera "Marital" <or> "Of Union" and "Of Completion." "End" also means the outcome of knowledge, action, or a work, as in Euripides:[156]

Of unbridled mouths
and lawless folly
the end is misfortune.[157]

On the End · 2

II.7.3a.2

The ruling offices of constitutions are also called "ends," for example the authorities of the Lacedaemonians. In Homer, in the tenth book of the Iliad:

Swiftly, as they went, they reached the company of Thracian men.
Here it means a formation under command.[158]

156. Τέλος can mean an end, completion, tax, or expense. No single English word reproduces the whole range. The compounds αὐτοτελής and εὐτελής illustrate the financial sense. Hera's epithets συζυγία and τελεία connect marriage with union and completion; "of completion" keeps the connection with τέλος visible. The supplied article <τὸ> is expressed through English grammar; <ἢ> is retained as <or>.

157. Euripides, Bacchae 386–388. The lyric form ἀφροσύνας is genitive singular, coordinated with "of unbridled mouths." The quotation illustrates an outcome, not yet the philosophical definition of the end of life.

158. The plural τέλη can denote civic authorities; the Homeric singular denotes a military company (Iliad X.470). These are additional meanings of the same word, not claims that political office or military service is life's final good. Wachsmuth retains ἔναρχον, "under command," although his apparatus questions the reading and suggests ἐναργῶς, "plainly." The English follows the printed text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 45-46

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · ὅροι

II.7.3b.1

Λέγεται δ’ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὁρικῶς “τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα”· κἀκείνως “οὗ χάριν τἆλλα, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα” καὶ πάλιν “ἐφ’ ὃ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πραττόμενα καθηκόντως τὴν ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνει, αὐτὸ δ’ ἐπ’ οὐδέν”. Ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων Περιπατητικῶν τῶν ἀπὸ Κριτολάου “τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν συμπεπληρωμένον” (τοῦτο δὲ ἦν “τὸ ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν”), οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Οὐ γὰρ πάντα τἀγαθὰ μέρη γίνεται τοῦ τέλους· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ σωματικά, οὔτε τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργήματα μόνης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 46

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Definitions 1

II.7.3b.1

The Stoics give this definition: “The end is that for the sake of which everything is appropriately done, while it itself is done for the sake of nothing else.” Also: “That for whose sake the other things are, while it itself is for the sake of nothing else.” And again: “That to which everything appropriately done in life is referred, while it itself is referred to nothing else.”

The later Peripatetics, those following Critolaus, define it as “that which is made complete out of all goods” (that is, “out of the three kinds”), incorrectly. For not all goods become parts of the end: neither bodily goods nor goods from external things do so, but only the activities of the soul’s virtue.[159]

159. Καθηκόντως means appropriately, corresponding to καθήκοντα, the “appropriate actions” of II.7.2. The three kinds of goods are those of the soul, the body, and external circumstances. The objection to Critolaus’s followers belongs to the source’s argument; it is not an editorial verdict added by this translation. The sequence distinguishes goods that enter into the end from other goods.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 46

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · ὅροι · συνέχεια

II.7.3b.2

Κρεῖττον οὖν ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ “συμπληρούμενον” “ἐνεργούμενον”, ἵνα τὸ χρηστικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐμφαίνηται. Τοῦτο δ’ οἱ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν “ἐνεργούμενον”, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν (ἡδονὴ γάρ)· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀποδιδόασι τοῦ τέλους “τὸ οἰκείως διατιθέναι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι ἀπάσης ἐπιβολῆς”.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 46

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Definitions 2

II.7.3b.2

It would therefore have been better to say “actualized” instead of “made complete,” so that virtue’s exercise might be made apparent.[160] Those who follow Epicurus do not accept the expression “actualized,” because they posit the end as something experienced, rather than something enacted (for it is pleasure). Hence they also give this account of the end: “To bring about of itself a congenial disposition toward itself, without any application toward something else.”[161]

160. The contrast is between being composed of goods and being put into activity. Χρηστικόν points to the exercise or use of virtue. “Something experienced” renders παθητικόν in opposition to πρακτικόν, “something enacted”; it does not mean a pathological condition.

161. The final definition is compressed and its wording is disputed. Wachsmuth prints the active infinitive διατιθέναι and πρὸς αὐτό; his apparatus records alternatives to the latter and to ἀπάσης. The English retains the end as the implicit referent of “itself” and preserves the reference to application toward something else, rather than replacing the sentence with a familiar general statement of Epicurean ethics.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 46

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · σκοπὸς καὶ τέλος

II.7.3c.1

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα τοῦ τέλους εὑρίσκεται καὶ παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ·

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ τι φημὶ τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι.
Ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν δημοτελὲς εἰσήγαγε τὸ τέλος, Πλάτων δὲ διέστιξε πρῶτος τὸ κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ βίον ἰδιάζον ἔν τε τῷ Τιμαίῳ κἂν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ.

Καὶ <σημειωτέον> γε τὴν τοῦ σκοποῦ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Καὶ ἔστι σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἷον ἀσπὶς τοξόταις· τέλος δ’ <ἡ> τοῦ προκειμένου τεῦξις. Βούλονται γὰρ ἐνέργημα ἡμέτερον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 47

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Target and End

II.7.3c.1

The word “end” is found also in Homer:

For I say there is no more delightful end.
But he introduced the end as something shared by the people, whereas Plato first distinguished the end particular to an individual and a life, both in the Timaeus and in the Protagoras.[162]

We must also <note> the difference between the target and the end. The target is what is set before one to be hit, as a shield is for archers; the end is <the> attainment of what is set before one. For they require an activity of ours in relation to the end.[163]

162. Odyssey IX.5; compare the fuller quotation in II.7.3e. Δημοτελές is rendered “shared by the people,” in contrast to the individual end. The references printed here are Timaeus 90D and Protagoras 354D. This is the source’s account of philosophical priority, not an independently established chronology.

163. Σκοπός is the object aimed at; τέλος is its attainment in this distinction. Wachsmuth supplies <σημειωτέον> and separates the paragraph from the preceding reference to Plato. His apparatus attributes the distinction to Stoics and tentatively to Chrysippus. Accordingly the English retains the indefinite “they,” rather than assigning the claim to Plato.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 47

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · ὑποτελίς

II.7.3c.2

Ὑποτελὶς δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ’ οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστάσεως αὐτοῦ, οὔπω λογικὸν <ὂν> ἀλλ’ ἄλογον, κατὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον ῥίζης τόπον ἐπέχει, οὐδέπω φυτοῦ· γενόμενον γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ᾠκειώθη τινὶ πάντως εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑποτελίς, κεῖται δ’ ἐν τινι τῶν τριῶν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἡδονῇ ἢ ἐν ἀοχλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις κατὰ φύσιν.

Περὶ τέλους · ὑποτελίς · συνέχεια

II.7.3c.3

Πρῶτα δ’ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν περὶ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἕξις, κίνησις, σχέσις, ἐνέργεια, δύναμις, ὄρεξις, ὑγίεια, ἰσχύς, εὐεξία, εὐαισθησία, κάλλος, τάχος, ἀρτιότης, αἱ τῆς ζωτικῆς ἁρμονίας ποιότητες· περὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐσυνεσία, εὐφυΐα, φιλοπονία, ἐπιμονή, μνήμη, τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, ὧν οὐδέπω τεχνοειδὲς οὐδέν, σύμφυτον δὲ μᾶλλον. Τὴν δ’ ὑποτελίδα τῶν ἀρχαίων οὐδεὶς ὠνόμασε καίτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα γιγνωσκόντων.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Preliminary End 1

II.7.3c.2

A preliminary end is the living creature's first congenial affection, from which it began to be aware of its own constitution, <being> not yet rational but nonrational, in accordance with natural and seminal principles, as are the nutritive and perceptive faculties. Each of these occupies the place of a root, not yet of a plant. For on coming into being the creature was necessarily attached to something immediately from the beginning; this is the preliminary end. It lies in one of three things: pleasure, freedom from disturbance, or the primary things in accordance with nature.[164]

On the End · Preliminary End 2

II.7.3c.3

The primary things in accordance with nature are, for the body, condition, movement, posture, activity, capacity, desire, health, strength, good bodily state, acuity of sense, beauty, speed, soundness, and the qualities of vital harmony; for the soul, quickness of understanding, natural aptitude, love of effort, perseverance, memory, and similar things. None of these yet has the character of an art; they are rather innate. None of the ancients named the preliminary end, although they knew the thing itself.[165]

164. Ὑποτελίς names an end at an initial or subordinate stage. "Preliminary end" follows the developmental account here: the creature's first attachment precedes mature rational life. Οἰκεῖον and ᾠκειώθη express congeniality and attachment; they do not yet assert a deliberate choice. The nutritive and perceptive faculties are compared to roots rather than a developed plant. "Seminal principles" renders σπερματικοὶ λόγοι. The three alternatives report competing accounts of the creature's first orientation.

165. The list includes rudimentary faculties as well as desirable bodily conditions. "Art" renders τέχνη as a developed skill or organized expertise; the contrast is with what is innate. The source expressly distinguishes possessing the concept from having a name for it. This limits its earlier claims about philosophical priority.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 47-48

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · εὐδαιμονία

II.7.3d

Τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμονίαν συνωνυμεῖν τῷ τέλει λέγουσιν. Εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἢ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τὸ κράτιστον. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοημάτων ἁπλούστερα. Κἂν λέγῃ δέ τις μακαριότητα καὶ τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν, εἰς ταὐτὸ συνδραμεῖται τοῖς τελικοῖς. Προσδιαιρετέον οὖν.

Τῶν περὶ τέλους διαλεχθέντων οἱ μὲν ψυχικὸν εἶναι διενοήθησαν, οἱ δὲ σωματικόν, οἱ δὲ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Φράσω δὲ παραδείγματος χάριν· ὁ μὲν τοίνυν ἀρετὴν λέγων τουτέστιν ἐν ἀρετῇ κείμενον ψυχικὸν ὑπείληφεν· ὁ δ’ ἡδονὴν σωματικόν· ὁ δὲ τὸ καλῶς καὶ ἡδέως ζῆν κοινόν. Εἴποι δ’ ἄν τις αὖ κἀκείνως· οἱ μὲν λογικόν, οἱ δ’ ἄλογον, οἱ μὲν διανοητικόν, οἱ δὲ παθητικόν. Πάντα δὲ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ὀνόμασιν ἔχοντα διαφορὰν εἰς ταὐτὸ συντρέχει. Ἐκ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τἀνθρώπου συνεστῶτος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν αὐτοῦ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τούτων συνίστασθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 48

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Happiness

II.7.3d

They say that happiness is synonymous with the end. Happiness is the best thing in life, or the greatest of goods, or the most excellent. These are among the simpler conceptions of it. Even if someone speaks of blessedness or living blessedly, he will arrive at the same point as those who discuss ends. We must therefore make a further division.[166]

Of those who have discussed the end, some conceived it as belonging to the soul, others to the body, and others as a mixture of both. I shall give examples. Whoever says virtue, that is, an end lying in virtue, has taken it to belong to the soul; whoever says pleasure, to the body; whoever says living nobly and pleasantly, to both. One might also put it this way: some say rational, others nonrational; some intellectual, others a matter of feeling. All the distinctions expressed in these terms converge on the same point. For since the human being is constituted of body and soul, a good life must also be constituted in relation to these and through them.

166. Εὐδαιμονία is translated “happiness,” here defined as the best condition or good of a life, not merely a passing feeling. The sentence about “those who discuss ends” follows the unusual printed τελικοῖς; Wachsmuth questions it in his apparatus and considers λόγοις, “accounts.” The ensuing bodily, psychic, and mixed classifications are the source’s way of sorting positions, rather than exhaustive descriptions of every school.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Ὅμηρος

II.7.3e

Λέγωμεν οὖν περὶ τῶν πρώτων εὐθύς, ὁποῖοι ἦσαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀναγόμενοι. Ὅμηρος, δεδόσθω γὰρ τῇ ἀρχαιότητι προνομία, ψυχικὸν ἀπεφήνατο τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τέλος, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ παρεισαγομένου προσώπου σοφωτάτου παρ' αὐτῷ· πεποίηται γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀναφωνῶν·

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ τι φημὶ τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι
ἢ ὅταν εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα.
Ἡ δ' εὐφροσύνη ψυχική τίς ἐστι διάθεσις, ἣν ἄν τις ἐξηγήσαιτο καλὴν φρόνησιν, τοῦτο δ' ἂν ἐκδέξαιτο τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς φρόνησιν. Ὁμήρῳ μὲν ἀρκέσει προμετρηθὲν τὸ τῆς τιμῆς διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἰτέον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 48-49

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Homer

II.7.3e

Let us speak at once of the first group, those whose starting point was the goods of the soul. Homer, for let antiquity be given precedence, declared the end of happiness to belong to the soul, and did so through the character he presents as the wisest: for Odysseus is made to exclaim:

For I say there is no more delightful end
than when gladness possesses the whole people.
Gladness is a certain disposition of the soul, which one might explain as noble understanding, taking this to mean understanding directed toward noble things. Let the honor already allotted to Homer for his antiquity suffice; we must proceed to the philosophers.[167]

167. Odyssey IX.5–6. The source explicitly interprets εὐφροσύνη, “gladness,” through φρόνησις, understanding or practical wisdom. The translation preserves this interpretive step without making it the ordinary lexical meaning of the Homeric word. It also retains the distinction between Homer and the character Odysseus. The quotation follows the anthology’s μὲν ἔχῃ, not the wording of a different Homeric edition.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων II.7.3f.1

Σωκράτης, Πλάτων ταὐτὰ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ, τέλος ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ. Σαφέστερον δ' αὐτὸ διήρθρωσε Πλάτων προσθεὶς τὸ 'κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν', φρονήσει δ' ἐστὶ μόνως δυνατόν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν <ζῆν>. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ θεῷ τὸ κοσμοποιὸν καὶ κοσμοδιοικητικόν· ἐν δὲ τῷ σοφῷ βίου κατάστασις καὶ ζωῆς διαγωγή· ὅπερ αἰνίξασθαι μὲν Ὅμηρον εἰπόντα

κατ' ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο·
Πυθαγόραν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· Ἕπου θεῷ· δῆλον ὡς οὐχ ὁρατῷ καὶ προηγουμένῳ, νοητῷ δὲ καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς εὐταξίας ἁρμονικῷ.

Περὶ τέλους · Πλάτων · συνέχεια II.7.3f.2

Εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι κατὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τριμερές, ἐν Τιμαίῳ μὲν φυσικῶς (προσθήσω δὲ καὶ Πυθαγορικῶς), σημάναντος ἀφθόνως τὴν ἐκείνου προεπίνοιαν· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἠθικῶς· ἐν δὲ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ λογικῶς· περιπέφρασται δὲ κἂν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Νόμων ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ θεοῦ σαφῶς ἅμα καὶ πλουσίως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 49

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Socrates and Plato 1

II.7.3f.1

Socrates and Plato, agreeing with Pythagoras, take assimilation to god as the end. Plato articulated this more clearly by adding “as far as possible.” It is possible only through practical wisdom, and this means <living> according to virtue. For in god there is the making and governing of the cosmos; in the wise person, the ordering of life and the conduct of living.[168] Homer is said to have hinted at this when he said:

Walk in the god’s footsteps.

Pythagoras is said to have stated it alongside him: “Follow god,” clearly meaning a god who is not visible and leading the way, but intelligible and the harmonizer of cosmic order.[169]

On the End · Plato 2

II.7.3f.2

Plato has expressed it according to the threefold division of philosophy: in the Timaeus in terms of nature (and I shall add, in Pythagorean terms), amply indicating Pythagoras’s prior conception; in the Republic in ethical terms; and in the Theaetetus in logical terms. It is also set out, clearly and fully, in the fourth book of the Laws, in the discussion of following god.[170]

168. The Platonic reference is Theaetetus 176B. “Assimilation” renders ὁμοίωσις, becoming like; the qualification “as far as possible” is essential. The following explanation compares divine ordering of the cosmos with the wise person’s ordering of a life. The supplied <ζῆν> is shown as <living>.

169. Odyssey V.193. The Homeric line originally describes walking behind a god; the present argument gives it a philosophical interpretation. The injunction attributed to Pythagoras is reported by this source, not independently authenticated here. The contrast between visible guidance and an intelligible model belongs to the source’s explanation.

170. Wachsmuth prints these references: Timaeus 90A–D; Republic IX, 585B onward, and X, 608C onward; Theaetetus 176D–E; Laws IV, 716A onward. “Prior conception” renders the unusual προεπίνοια, which Wachsmuth defends in his apparatus. The division into natural, ethical, and logical treatments is the source’s interpretation of Plato. The first-person “I shall add” belongs to the ancient narrator.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Πλάτων · συνέχεια

II.7.3f.3

Τὸ δέ γε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος <οὐ πολύδοξον>. Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ τέλους αὐτῷ πολλαχῶς. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ποικιλίαν τῆς φράσεως ἔχει διὰ τὸ λόγιον καὶ μεγαλήγορον, εἰς δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον τοῦ δόγματος συντελεῖ. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Τοῦτο δ’ αὖ κτῆσις ἅμα καὶ χρῆσις τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς. Ὅτι δὲ τέλος αὐτὴν ἡγεῖται, τέταχεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ <εἰπὼν> καὶ τοὔνομα· φράσω δὲ καὶ τἀκροτελεύτιον τῆς περιοχῆς· ἔχει δ’ οὕτως· “ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα”.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Plato 3

II.7.3f.3

Plato's many voices <do not amount to many doctrines>. He has also spoken about the end in many ways. His variety of expression arises from his eloquence and grandeur of speech, but converges on one consistent doctrine. This is living according to virtue; and this, in turn, is both the possession and the exercise of complete virtue.[171] That he regards it as the end is shown by his use of the very word in the Timaeus, <saying> it expressly. I shall give the conclusion of the passage as well; it runs as follows: "Having made oneself like it, to attain the end of the best life set before human beings by the gods, both for the present and for the future."[172]

171. The supplied <οὐ πολύδοξον> supplies the explicit denial that Plato's varied expression entails varied doctrine. The assertion of doctrinal unity is the source's interpretation. Κτῆσις, possession, is distinguished from χρῆσις, exercise or use, a distinction developed in the following Aristotelian account.

172. Timaeus 90D. The quotation follows Wachsmuth's text of Stobaeus, including its ending "for the present and for the future." The supplied <εἰπών> is retained as <saying>. The object of "made oneself like it" is not restated in the quotation; the preceding Platonic discussion concerns the assimilation of the understanding to what it contemplates.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 49-50

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Ἀριστοτέλης

II.7.3g.1

Ἀριστοτέλης χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν <βίῳ τελείῳ> χορηγουμένην. Ἡ μὲν οὖν χρῆσίς ἐστι πλέον τῆς κτήσεως· ἐνέργειαν γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἡμετέραν <πρᾶξιν>. Ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἡ βελτίστη ψυχῆς· ‘τελεία’ δὲ τριχῶς, καὶ γὰρ ἡ σύνθετος ἐκ τῶν θεωρητικῶν καὶ πρακτικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν (τρία γὰρ ὑποτίθεται γένη), ἣν ἂν εἴποις ἀρετὴν κατὰ σύνθεσιν· καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων συμπεπληρωμένη, φύσεως, λόγου, ἔθους (ταύτην κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐρεῖ τις)· καὶ ἡ κατὰ συμφωνίαν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους πρὸς τἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς, περὶ ὧν ὑποβὰς διαρθρώσω.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 50-51

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Aristotle 1

II.7.3g.1

Aristotle takes the end as the exercise of complete virtue, furnished with resources in <a complete life>. Exercise is more than possession: for he holds that happiness is an activity, and the end an <action> of ours.[173] Virtue is the soul's best disposition. It is "complete" in three ways: as a composite of theoretical, practical, and ethical virtues (for he posits three kinds), which one might call virtue complete by composition; as made complete from its proper powers, nature, reason, and habit (one might call this completeness by number); and as the harmony of the rational part of the soul with the nonrational part. I shall explain these matters further as I proceed.[174]

173. Wachsmuth supplies <βίῳ τελείῳ>, "a complete life," and <πρᾶξιν>, "action." Χορηγουμένην, "furnished with resources," is a consequential editorial correction repeated throughout this account; the next unit explains that the resources must be good. The formulation is the source's summary of Aristotle, not presented as a verbatim sentence from the Nicomachean Ethics.

174. The three explanations of "complete" are retained separately, including the source's threefold classification into theoretical, practical, and ethical virtues. The second concerns the three contributing powers, nature, reason, and habit; the third concerns the relation between the soul's rational and nonrational parts. Neither the classification nor the forward-looking first person is an addition by the translator.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 50-51

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Ἀριστοτέλης · συνέχεια II.7.3g.2

Πολλαχῶς δ’ ἔξεστι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁρίσασθαι κατ’ αὐτόν· “ἐνέργειαν κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ χορηγουμένην” καὶ “βίος καλὸς καὶ τέλειος χορηγούμενος”· καὶ τὸ πάντων σαφέστατον “χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ χορηγουμένη”. ‘<Ἐν> βίῳ δὲ τελείῳ’ λέγει πρὸς τὴν διάστασιν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ‘χορηγουμένην’ δὲ χάριν τοῦ τὴν χρῆσιν ἐν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ἐν κακοῖς. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ τέλος· τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ συνωνύμως εὐδαιμονία παρὰ Πλάτωνος μετηνιγμένον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 51

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Aristotle 2

II.7.3g.2

Happiness can be defined in several ways according to him: “An activity in accordance with complete virtue, furnished with resources in a complete life”; “a noble and complete life furnished with resources”; and, clearest of all, “the exercise of complete virtue, furnished with resources in a complete life.” He says “<in> a complete life” with reference to the duration of the exercise of goods, and “furnished with resources” so that the exercise takes place amid good things, not bad.[175] This, then, is the end; the same thing is also called happiness, a synonymous term taken over from Plato.[176]

175. Διάστασις here concerns duration, as Wachsmuth explains in his apparatus. The complete life provides the temporal extent for exercising goods; “furnished with resources” adds the surrounding good conditions. The supplied <ἐν> is retained as <in>. The shift between activity, life, and exercise belongs to the source’s three alternative formulations.

176. Wachsmuth refers to Plato, Gorgias 470E. The claim that the term was taken over from Plato belongs to this account; the translation does not assert that Plato invented the word εὐδαιμονία.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 51

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · τρεῖς σκοποί

II.7.3g.3

Σκοποὺς δ’ ὑποτίθεται τῆς ἐφέσεως τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὀρέξεων τρεῖς, τὸν τοῦ καλοῦ, τοῦ συμφέροντος, τοῦ ἡδέος. Καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ μέτοχον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς ἔργον· καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν [τὸ] καλόν, καθὸ ἐπαινετὸν ἤτοι παρέχον ἐπαινετούς· συμφέρον δὲ <τὸ> πρὸς τὸ ζῆν εὔχρηστον· συμπαρατείνοι δ’ ἂν ἡ ἔννοια καὶ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, περὶ ὧν προείρηται. Ἡδὺ δ’ ἐστὶν οἰκεῖον ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος πάθος, εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν ἀγωγόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ ὡρίσατο.

Περὶ τέλους · Εὔδοξος

II.7.3h

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νικομαχείων Εὔδοξον τὸν ἀστρολόγον οἴεται τέλος δογματίζειν τὴν ἡδονήν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 51-52

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Three Targets

II.7.3g.3

He posits three targets for the striving of human desires: the noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant. Noble are virtue and what participates in virtue, such as the worthy person himself, and the deed that proceeds from virtue. The good is noble insofar as it is praiseworthy or produces praiseworthy people. The advantageous is <what is> useful for living; the conception might also extend to living well. These are the primary things in accordance with nature for soul and body, discussed earlier. The pleasant is a congenial affection of soul and body, leading from a condition contrary to nature to one in accordance with nature, as Plato defined it in the Timaeus.[177]

On the End · Eudoxus

II.7.3h

Aristotle, in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, thinks that Eudoxus, the student of the stars, maintained that pleasure is the end.[178]

177. Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric I.6, 9, and 10, for the subjects of the advantageous, noble, and pleasant; the last reference is Plato, Timaeus 64D. Wachsmuth notes that the formulation about virtue and what participates in it has Stoic parallels, so this report need not reproduce Aristotle's own terminology throughout. The rejected article [τὸ] is retained in Greek and omitted in English; the supplied <τὸ> before "useful" is expressed as <what is>. "Leading" preserves the movement from an unnatural to a natural condition in the account of pleasure.

178. Nicomachean Ethics X.2, opening. The person is Eudoxus, not Eudorus of the earlier division of ethics. Ἀστρολόγος is rendered broadly as "student of the stars," as in II.1.23. The report preserves οἴεται, "thinks," rather than removing the qualification or presenting a direct quotation from Eudoxus.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 51-52

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων II.7.3i.1

Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων κοινῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τίθενται. Γέγραφε δ’ ὁ μὲν οὕτως· “Εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίη.” “Εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασι οἰκεῖ, οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος”. Τὴν δ’ <εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ> εὐθυμίαν καὶ εὐεστὼ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀταραξίαν καλεῖ· συνίστασθαι δ’ αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ διορισμοῦ καὶ τῆς διακρίσεως τῶν ἡδονῶν· καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ κάλλιστόν τε καὶ συμφορώτατον ἀνθρώποις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 52-53

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Democritus and Plato 1

II.7.3i.1

Democritus and Plato both place happiness in the soul. The former wrote as follows: “Happiness is of the soul, and so is unhappiness.” “Happiness dwells neither in herds nor in gold; the soul is the dwelling of a divine spirit.”[179] He also calls it <happiness and> cheerfulness, well-being, harmony, proportion, and freedom from disturbance. He says that it is constituted by setting limits to and distinguishing among pleasures, and that this is what is noblest and most advantageous for human beings.[180]

179. The first two sayings are attributed here to Democritus. Βοσκήματα means livestock or herds. Δαίμων is rendered “divine spirit,” retaining the connection with εὐδαιμονίη and κακοδαιμονίη; the words do not imply the later Christian sense of “demon.” The following comparison turns to the ruling part of the soul in Plato.

180. Wachsmuth retains the supplement <εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ>. Εὐθυμία is cheerfulness or a settled good state of mind; εὐεστώ is well-being; ἀταραξία freedom from disturbance. The several names are preserved. The definition concerns limits and discrimination among pleasures, rather than an indiscriminate pursuit of every pleasure.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων · συνέχεια II.7.3i.2

Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τῷ Δημοκρίτῳ κατὰ τοῦτο συνᾴδων γράφει περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δεῖν ὑπολαβεῖν “ὡς ἄρ’ αὐτὸ δαίμονα ἡμῖν δέδωκεν ὁ θεός” καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εὔδαιμον. Λέγει δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν τινὰ ποιὰν καὶ διάθεσιν· τούτου δὲ τἀγαθοῦ τὰ μὲν πάθη κατάρχειν, ὅρον δὲ καὶ πέρας εἶναι τὸν λογισμόν. Ἀκούειν γοῦν πάρεστι· “Δύο γὰρ αὗται φύσει πηγαὶ μεθεῖνται ῥεῖν (ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη), ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυόμενος <ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπῇ καὶ ὅπως> εὐδαιμονεῖ, ὁ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον”.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 53

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Democritus and Plato 2

II.7.3i.2

Plato, agreeing with Democritus on this point, writes that we must suppose of the most authoritative thing within us "that god has given it to us as a divine spirit," and places happiness in it. He describes this as a disposition and state of a certain kind in the soul's ruling part: the affections provide the beginning of this good, while reasoning is its limit and boundary.[181] We can hear him say: "For these two springs are naturally allowed to flow (pleasure and pain); whoever draws from them <from the source he should, in the direction and manner he should> is happy, while whoever does not is the opposite."[182]

181. The reference is Timaeus 90A. The English follows Stobaeus's wording of the quotation. The subsequent explanatory phrase reads κατάρχειν, "provide the beginning," not κατάγειν, "bring down" or "derive." Its counterpart is reasoning as ὅρος and πέρας, limit and boundary. The two roles are explained again in the next unit.

182. Laws I, 636D. Wachsmuth restores the words <ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπῇ καὶ ὅπως> from the following explanation and the Platonic parallel; their supplied status remains visible in English. The parenthetical identification of the two springs as pleasure and pain is already in the printed text. The translation does not expand the quotation to the longer wording of another edition of Plato.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τέλους · Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων · συνέχεια II.7.3i.3

Ἐν μὲν τοίνυν τῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λύπην ὀνομάσαι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν συνίστησι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχήν· ἐν δὲ τῷ τὸν ἀρυόμενον ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπῇ καὶ ὅπως εὐδαιμονεῖν, τὸ τῷ λογιστικῷ διοριστικὸν εἴρηκε τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀλλήλοις συμφέρονται· καθὰ δὲ Πλάτων ἐν μὲν τῇ εὐλογιστίᾳ τίθεται τὸ προηγούμενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ αἱρετόν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἡδονῇ τὸ ἐπιγεννηματικόν, ὅπερ οἴεται καὐτὸς εἶναι χαράν τε καὶ ἀταραξίαν συνωνύμως, ἐξ ἐπακολουθήματος <ἀλλήλοις διαφέρονται>.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On the End · Democritus and Plato 3

II.7.3i.3

By naming pleasure and pain, then, he establishes the beginning of happiness in the affections. By saying that the person who draws from the proper source, in the proper direction and manner, is happy, he has stated that the rational part sets happiness's limits.[183] On this point, therefore, they agree with each other. But insofar as Plato places the primary good, desirable for its own sake, in sound reasoning, and the derivative good in pleasure, which he too considers synonymous with joy and freedom from disturbance, <they differ from each other> as a consequence.[184]

183. The explanation assigns complementary roles to affections and reasoning: the former supply a beginning, while the latter determine the fitting source and manner of enjoyment. The agreement under discussion is between Plato and Democritus. Λογιστικόν is the rational part, not a separate mathematical faculty.

184. The concluding <ἀλλήλοις διαφέρονται> is supplied by Meineke following Canter's interpretation, as Wachsmuth records. It makes the contrast with the preceding agreement explicit. Προηγούμενον is "primary"; ἐπιγεννηματικόν marks what arises subsequently. The passage reports a distinction between the roles assigned to sound reasoning and pleasure, rather than denying every place to pleasure in Plato's account.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 53

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν

II.7.4a.1

Ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἀφ’ οὗ συμβαίνει τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα προηγουμένως· καὶ ὃ ἤτοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, ἢ ποιητικὸν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης ὀρέξεως, καὶ καθ’ ὃ ἕκαστον εὖ ἔχει ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ, ἢ ποιητικόν ἐστι τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ὃ ἤτοι δι’ αὐτό ἐστιν αἱρετόν, ἢ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ ποιητικόν· καὶ ὃ ἤτοι εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν, ἢ συμβαλλόμενον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ καθάπερ Στράτων, τὸ τελειοῦν τὴν δύναμιν, δι’ ἣν τῆς ἐνεργείας τυγχάνομεν· καὶ τὸ συστατικὸν τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας, καθ’ ὃ κριθήσεται τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως· καὶ πολλαχῶς ἄλλως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 53-54

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Goods and Evils · 1

II.7.4a.1

A good is that from which being benefited results; that which all rational beings primarily desire; that which either accords with nature or produces what accords with nature; what naturally arouses desire; what moves desire when desire is in accordance with nature; that through whose presence each thing is in a good condition, insofar as that presence is concerned, or what produces such a condition; that which is either choiceworthy for its own sake or productive of what is choiceworthy; and that which either is happiness or contributes to happiness.[185]

Also, as Strato puts it, that which completes the capacity through which we attain activity; and that which constitutes each thing's essence, by which the particular things sharing in such a capacity will be judged. It is also defined in many other ways.[186]

185. The heading concerns goods and evils, but the present sequence begins with definitions and classifications of the good. These are alternative formulations; they should not be combined into a single definition belonging to one school. "Choiceworthy" renders αἱρετόν, distinguishing being worthy of choice from actually being chosen. Προηγουμένως means primarily or in the first instance. "What naturally arouses desire" renders the printed ὀρεκτικόν; the Greek has not been changed to ὀρεκτόν, "desired."

186. The attribution to Strato explicitly introduces the definition in terms of completing a capacity. The subsequent definition concerning essence and the judgment of particulars remains in the sequence without a new attribution. Wachsmuth connects that formulation with Plato's Form of the Good in his apparatus. The English retains the printed κριθήσεται, "will be judged," rather than substituting another proposed wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · Πλάτων II.7.4a.2

Πλάτων δὲ τοιαύτῃ χρῆται διαιρέσει, θήσω δὲ κατὰ λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Νόμων καὶ διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς φράσεως καὶ διὰ τὴν σαφήνειαν· “Διττὰ δ’ ἀγαθά ἐστι, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα, ἤρτηται δ’ ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα, παρίσταται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα· εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα, ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι. τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός, ἀλλ’ ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἄν περ ἅμα ἕπηται φρονήσει.

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · Πλάτων · συνέχεια II.7.4a.3

Ὁ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις· δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦ σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις· ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ’ ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον ἀνδρεία. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκείνων ἔμπροσθεν τέτακται φύσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τακτέον οὕτως.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 54-55

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Goods and Evils · Plato 1

II.7.4a.2

Plato uses the following division. I shall set it down word for word from the first book of the Laws, both for the beauty of its expression and for its clarity:[187] "Goods are of two kinds, human and divine, and the former depend upon the divine. If someone receives the greater goods, the lesser are present as well; otherwise he is deprived of both. The lesser goods are these: health leads, beauty is second, and third is strength for running and every other movement of the body. Fourth is wealth, which is not blind but sees keenly, provided that it follows practical wisdom.

On Goods and Evils · Plato 2

II.7.4a.3

The first leader among the divine goods is practical wisdom; second is a temperate disposition of the soul accompanied by intelligence. From these, blended with courage, justice would be third, and courage fourth. All these are naturally ranked before the former goods, and the lawgiver too must rank them in this way."[188]

187. Laws I, 631B–D; the quotation continues in the next unit. The narrator's "word for word" is retained, but the translation follows the Greek quoted by Stobaeus where it differs from another edition of Plato. Wealth is personified as sighted when guided by practical wisdom. The condition "provided that" is part of the text, not an assurance that wealth is invariably good.

188. This completes the Laws quotation. The four divine goods are practical wisdom, temperance with intelligence, justice, and courage. The text makes justice arise from a blend that includes courage, although courage is fourth in the ranking. The "former goods" are the human goods just listed. Νοῦ is the contracted genitive of νοῦς, intelligence; it is not an additional fifth virtue.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · διαιρέσεις II.7.4a.4

Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτον ἐνδιαστελοῦμαι τὸν τρόπον· Πλάτων πολύφωνος ὢν, οὐχ ὥς τινες οἴονται πολύδοξος, πολλαχῶς διῄρηται τἀγαθόν. Διχῶς μὲν τῷ γένει· τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν θεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα· θεῖα μὲν τὰς περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὰς λέγων, ἀνθρώπινα δὲ τὰς περὶ τὸ σωματικὸν μέρος εὐεξίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων εὐπορίας. Τριχῶς δὲ τοῖς τόποις. Τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰς μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰς δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰς δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀρετὰς εἴποις ἂν καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ εὐπορίας.

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · διαιρέσεις · συνέχεια II.7.4a.5

Πενταχῶς δὲ τοῖς εἴδεσι. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ θεῖον καὶ χωριστόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ κατ’ αὐτὸν εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φρόνησιν· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. Ταύταις κέχρηται ταῖς διαστολαῖς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Νόμων μάλιστα κἂν τῷ Φιλήβῳ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 55

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Goods and Evils · Divisions 1

II.7.4a.4

I shall also make the distinction in this way. Plato, who speaks with many voices but does not hold many doctrines, as some suppose, has divided the good in many ways. By kind, he divides goods into two: divine and human. He calls the virtues of the soul divine, and the good conditions of the bodily part and the resources derived from what are called external things human. By their fields, he divides them into three: one might describe goods of the soul as virtues, those of the body as good conditions, and those in external things as resources.[189]

On Goods and Evils · Divisions 2

II.7.4a.5

By forms, the division is fivefold. First, he declares the good to be the Form itself, which is divine and separate; second, the composite of practical wisdom and pleasure, which some believe to be, according to him, the end of human life; third, practical wisdom itself on its own; fourth, the composite of sciences and arts; fifth, pleasure itself on its own. He uses these distinctions especially in the first book of the Laws and in the Philebus.[190]

189. The narrator distinguishes a twofold division by kind from a threefold division by field or location: soul, body, and external circumstances. Εὐεξία means a good condition, especially bodily condition; εὐπορία means having resources or means available. The claim that Plato's varied expression is doctrinally consistent repeats the source's interpretation in II.7.3f; it is not a conclusion added by the translator.

190. The first item is the Form of the Good itself; "forms" in the introductory classification translates εἴδη more generally as the divisions being listed. The qualification ἐνίοις δοκεῖ, "some believe," is retained for the mixture of practical wisdom and pleasure. The source does not present all five items as equally good or equally final. "Sciences and arts" renders ἐπιστῆμαι and τέχναι as organized knowledge and skills.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · ἄλλως

II.7.4a.6

Ἄλλως· Μόνον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν· καθότι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ μή τι μεταλάβοι τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ ὁ δαλὸς καὶ ὁ σίδηρος τοῦ πυρός, οὗ χωρὶς οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς θερμόν· μετὰ δ’ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν τριῶν γενῶν, ὅσον μετείληφεν αὐτῆς τὰ δύο, τὰ σωματικὰ σὺν τοῖς ἐκτός. Ὡς γὰρ τῆς σελήνης ἀφώτιστος μὲν ἡ οὐσία καθ’ αὐτήν, μεταλήψει δὲ τῆς ἡλιακῆς αὐγῆς φωτίζεται, οὕτως οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθόν. Τοῖς γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνοις τὸ δύνασθαι ὠφελεῖν ἐκ τῶν θείων πάρεστιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 55-56

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Goods and Evils · Another Account

II.7.4a.6

Another account: only the noble is good, since nothing that exists is good unless it shares in virtue, as the firebrand and iron share in fire, without which nothing is hot in an unqualified sense.[191] It is likewise with the other goods of the three kinds, to the extent that the two, bodily goods together with external ones, have shared in virtue.[192] For just as the moon's substance is unlit in itself but is illuminated by sharing in the sun's radiance, so nothing that does not participate in virtue is good. Human goods derive their capacity to benefit from the divine goods.

191. Καλόν is rendered "noble" in its ethical sense. Wachsmuth warns against changing it to θεῖον, "divine," and notes the Stoic character of the formula. The fire and moon comparisons explain a dependence: bodily and external things receive their beneficial character through virtue, as heated things or the moon receive heat or light.

192. Wachsmuth marks the words μετὰ δ' ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, "and with other goods," as corrupt in his apparatus. The English gives a tentative connective sense while preserving the three kinds and the two dependent classes specified in the printed Greek. It follows the surrounding explanation of participation in virtue; no conjectural replacement is inserted into the Greek.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 55-56

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · Ἀριστοτέλης II.7.4a.7

Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν μὲν τριάδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὐτὸς ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους. Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι δι’ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα. Δι’ ἑαυτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αἱρετά, ὅσα πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν οὐ δι’ ἄλλο τι κινεῖ ἢ προτρέπεται· τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἥ τ’ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ τὸ γένος τῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ τὰ σωματικὰ τῶν <πρώτων> κατὰ φύσιν, ὑγίεια, εὐεξία, εὐαισθησία, κάλλος, τάχος, ἀρτιότης, ἰσχύς, τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις, καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μηδεμίαν βλάβην ἐπιφέρουσαι. Ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ νοῦν ἔχων ἕλοιτ’ ἂν <δι’> αὐτά, κἂν μηδὲν ἄλλο κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν περιποιῇ.

Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν · Ἀριστοτέλης · συνέχεια II.7.4a.8

Δι’ ἄλλα δ’ ἐστὶν αἱρετὰ τὰ δι’ ἕτερόν τι κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν προκαλούμενα πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν, περίπατος, γυμνασία, μάθησις, ἀνάγνωσις, ἰατρεῖαι, θεραπεῖαι, τροφαί, σκέπαι. Τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν δι’ αὐτὸ ληπτόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀναφορὰν τὴν ἐφ’ ἃ παρέχεται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 56

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Goods and Evils · Aristotle 1

II.7.4a.7

Aristotle too adopts the threefold division of goods by their fields, similarly to Plato. Further, some goods are choiceworthy for their own sakes, others for the sake of other things. Choiceworthy for their own sakes are those that move or encourage one toward choosing them without some further thing as the reason. Such are happiness, the class of virtues, the bodily <primary> things in accordance with nature, health, good bodily condition, acuity of sense, beauty, speed, soundness, strength, and things like these, together with those bodily pleasures that bring no harm.[193] For a person of understanding would choose these <for> themselves, even if they procure nothing else distinct from them.[194]

On Goods and Evils · Aristotle 2

II.7.4a.8

Choiceworthy for other things are those that invite choice because of something else distinct from themselves: walking, exercise, learning, reading, medical treatments, care, nourishment, and coverings. None of these is to be taken for its own sake, but with reference to the things for which it is provided.[195]

193. The three fields are soul, body, and external circumstances. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1098B. The supplied <πρώτων> links the bodily list to the primary things in accordance with nature listed in II.7.3c. The qualification “that bring no harm” applies to the bodily pleasures included here; the report does not include every bodily pleasure without distinction.

194. The supplied <δι’> is retained as <for>. Being choiceworthy for its own sake need not mean never being chosen for any further purpose: the immediate test is whether a person would still choose the good if nothing distinct from it resulted. The distinction between possessing virtue and exercising it is taken up in II.7.4b.

195. This is the source’s list of things chosen as means to further results. Μάθησις is learning, distinct here from reading; ἰατρεῖαι and θεραπεῖαι distinguish medical treatments from care more broadly. Σκέπαι denotes coverings or protection and can include what clothes or shelters the body. The translation retains the list’s categorical claim rather than adding exceptions not expressed in this passage.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 56

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εἰ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν; II.7.4b.1

Κατὰ μὲν Πλάτωνα πᾶν. Καὶ γὰρ ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ἑκάστην ἕξιν σπουδαίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἥτις ἐστὶ πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου. Ὠνομάσθαι γοῦν καλόν, ὅτι κλητικόν ἐστιν ἐφ’ αὑτό.

Εἰ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν; · συνέχεια II.7.4b.2

Τῷ δ’ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ τὰς μὲν ἕξεις οὐκ εἶναι δι’ αὑτὰς αἱρετάς, δι’ ἄλλο γάρ τι, τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἕξις διὰ ταύτην ὡς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦτο <δὲ> δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὑπάρχει, ὡς χρῆσις καὶ τέλος τοῦ βίου. Καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὗτος μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως ἀναφωνεῖ, Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως. Ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν πρεσβύτερος ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ καί τισιν ἄλλοις ταῦτα κατακεχώρικεν, ὁ δὲ νεώτερος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 56-57

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Is Everything Noble Choiceworthy for Itself · 1

II.7.4b.1

According to Plato, everything is. This includes every virtue, the worthy disposition corresponding to each, and its activity, which is action accompanied by reason.[196] It is called “noble” because it calls one toward itself.[197]

Is Everything Noble Choiceworthy for Itself · 2

II.7.4b.2

Aristotle, however, holds that dispositions are not choiceworthy for their own sakes, since they are chosen for something else, their activity. Every disposition is for this activity as its purpose; <but> the activity is choiceworthy for its own sake, as exercise and the end of life. Accordingly, he speaks of happiness in terms of exercise, whereas Plato does so also in terms of possession. The older philosopher has recorded these things in the Laws, the Timaeus, and some other works; the younger in his ethical works.[198]

196. The question appears at the foot of printed p. 56 and the answer begins p. 57. Ἕξις is a settled disposition; ἐνέργεια is its activity. Wachsmuth cautions in his apparatus that the terminology of activity here is foreign to Plato’s own wording. The passage is a later report of the position attributed to Plato, not a direct quotation from him.

197. The explanation plays on καλόν, “noble” or “beautiful,” and κλητικόν, “calling” or “summoning.” English cannot reproduce the verbal resemblance with “noble.” Wachsmuth compares Plato, Cratylus 416C. The translation preserves the argument as an ancient account of the name, not as an established modern etymology.

198. The older philosopher is Plato and the younger Aristotle. The contrast develops the distinction between possession and exercise in II.7.3f–g. The supplied <δὲ> is shown as <but>. “Ethical works” preserves the general plural Ἠθικοῖς rather than restricting the reference to one named treatise. The statements summarize the positions as this source understands them; they are not newly added claims that every use of the terms in Plato or Aristotle fits this contrast.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 56-57

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ζήνωνος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Στωϊκῶν δόγματα περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας

II.7.5

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἑξῆς ποιήσομαι τὸν ὑπομνηματισμὸν τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν ἀναγκαίων δογμάτων ἀναλαβών. Ἄρξομαι δ’ ἐντεῦθεν·

Ζήνων · ἀγαθά, κακά, ἀδιάφορα

II.7.5a

Ταῦτ’ εἶναί φησιν ὁ Ζήνων, ὅσα οὐσίας μετέχει· τῶν δ’ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἢ μετέχον ἀρετῆς· κακὰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κακία ἢ μετέχον κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν ἀδοξίαν, ἡδονὴν πόνον, πλοῦτον πενίαν, ὑγίειαν νόσον, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Doctrines of Zeno and the Other Stoics on the Ethical Part of Philosophy

II.7.5

I shall next set down an account of ethical matters, taking up the main points of the essential doctrines. I shall begin here.[199]

Zeno on Goods Evils and Indifferents

II.7.5a

Zeno says that the things that exist are those which partake of substance. Of existing things, some are goods, some evils, and some indifferents.[200] Goods are such things as practical wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and everything that is virtue or partakes of virtue. Evils are such things as folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, and everything that is vice or partakes of vice. Indifferents are such things as life and death, reputation and disrepute, pleasure and pain, wealth and poverty, health and disease, and things like these.[201]

199. This heading introduces a sustained report of Stoic ethics within Chapter 7. The narrator's first person belongs to the ancient account being excerpted; it is not the modern translator's voice. Zeno is the Stoic founder, Zeno of Citium. The heading includes other Stoics, and the following material should not all be read as a verbatim quotation from a single work of Zeno.

200. "Substance" renders οὐσία in this statement about what exists; it is not the sense "property" or "wealth." The sentence precedes an ethical division of existing things. Its wording is retained without expanding it into a full account of Stoic ontology. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.101–102 for the division into goods, evils, and indifferents.

201. "Indifferents" means things placed in neither the good nor the evil class, not things about which a person must feel no concern. Life and death, health and disease are classified together in this respect; the sentence does not say that every practical choice between them is equivalent. Δόξα here means reputation, not opinion. Πόνος is pain or hardship, paired here with pleasure.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ζήνων · ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἄλλα ἀγαθά II.7.5b.1

Τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀρετάς, τὰ δ’ οὔ. Φρόνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην <καὶ δικαιοσύνην> καὶ ἀνδρείαν <καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ ἰσχὺν ψυχῆς> ἀρετάς· χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ θάρσος καὶ βούλησιν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια οὐκ εἶναι ἀρετάς.

Ζήνων · ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ τέχναι II.7.5b.2

Τῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν ἐπιστήμας τινῶν καὶ τέχνας, τὰς δ’ οὔ. Φρόνησιν μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμας εἶναι τινῶν καὶ τέχνας· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ καὶ ῥώμην καὶ ἰσχὺν ψυχῆς οὔτ’ ἐπιστήμας τινῶν εἶναι οὔτε τέχνας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 58

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Zeno on Virtues and Other Goods

II.7.5b.1

Of goods, some are virtues and some are not. Practical wisdom, temperance, <and justice>, courage, <and greatness of soul, vigor, and strength of soul> are virtues. Joy, gladness, confidence, wish, and similar things, however, are not virtues.[202]

Zeno on Knowledge and Arts

II.7.5b.2

Of virtues, some are forms of knowledge of certain things and arts, and some are not. Practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage are forms of knowledge of certain things and arts. Greatness of soul, vigor, and strength of soul, however, are neither forms of knowledge of certain things nor arts.[203]

202. The subject remains goods: the second list contains goods that are not themselves virtues, rather than things rejected as evils. “Wish” renders βούλησις in this positive classification; the text does not call every ordinary desire good. Angle brackets retain Wachsmuth’s supplements of justice and the three further virtues, supplied from the parallel structure of the following sentences. Vigor and strength of soul preserve the two terms ῥώμη and ἰσχύς.

203. Ἐπιστήμη denotes knowledge, while τέχνη denotes an organized art or expertise, rather than fine art alone. The distinction follows the account introduced under Zeno. Wachsmuth observes that greatness of soul is subsequently defined as knowledge at II.7.5b2, printed p. 61; he retains the discrepancy and relates it to differing accounts associated with Zeno and Chrysippus. The present translation likewise preserves both formulations.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 58

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ζήνων · κακίαι καὶ ἄλλα κακά II.7.5b.3

Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ’ οὔ. Ἀφροσύνην μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ μικροψυχίαν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν κακίας εἶναι· λύπην δὲ καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια οὐκ εἶναι κακίας. Τῶν δὲ κακιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι ἀγνοίας τινῶν καὶ ἀτεχνίας, τὰς δ’ οὔ. Ἀφροσύνην μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἀγνοίας εἶναι τινῶν καὶ ἀτεχνίας· μικροψυχίαν δὲ καὶ ἀδυναμίαν <καὶ ἀσθένειαν> οὔτε ἀγνοίας τινῶν οὔτε ἀτεχνίας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 58-59

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Zeno on Vices and Other Evils

II.7.5b.3

Correspondingly, of evils some are vices and some are not. Folly, injustice, cowardice, smallness of soul, and incapacity are vices; distress, fear, and similar things are not vices.[204] Of vices, some are forms of ignorance of certain things and lack of art, and some are not. Folly, intemperance, injustice, and cowardice are forms of ignorance of certain things and lack of art. Smallness of soul, incapacity, <and weakness>, however, are neither forms of ignorance of certain things nor lack of art.[205]

204. Distress and fear remain in the evil class even though they are distinguished from vices. Λύπη, "distress," is distinguished here from the πόνος, "pain" or "hardship," listed among indifferents in II.7.5a. The first list of vices does not include intemperance, whereas the next does; the printed lists have not been silently made identical.

205. Μικροψυχία is literally smallness of soul, the counterpart to greatness of soul. Incapacity and weakness translate the distinct terms ἀδυναμία and ἀσθένεια; the latter is supplied by the editor. Ἀτεχνία is lack of the art or expertise, corresponding to τέχνη in the preceding classification.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 58-59

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁρισμοὶ ἀρετῶν

II.7.5b1.1

Φρόνησιν δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἢ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει πολιτικοῦ <λογικοῦ> ζῴου (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἀκούειν παραγγέλλουσι)· σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 59

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Definitions of the Virtues

II.7.5b1.1

Practical wisdom is knowledge of what should be done, what should not be done, and what is neither; or knowledge of things good, evil, and neither for a creature that is by nature social and <rational>. They direct us to understand the other virtues in this way as well.[206] Temperance is knowledge of what is choiceworthy, what is to be avoided, and what is neither. Justice is knowledge that assigns each their due worth. Courage is knowledge of things terrible, things not terrible, and things neither.[207]

206. Wachsmuth relocates the following extended exposition of virtues to this position, identifying it with a Chrysippean account. He explains that it stood later in the manuscript sequence between divisions of goods and evils, and argues for the displacement of a leaf. The source's raised locator 5b¹ is written 5b1 here; added final numbers divide it only for layout. "Social" renders πολιτικοῦ, and "rational" is his supplement, not a replacement of the printed social qualification.

207. Each definition makes a virtue a kind of knowledge, in contrast with the preceding account's exceptions. "Neither" retains the repeated third class in the practical wisdom, temperance, and courage definitions. Justice concerns assignment according to worth; the wording does not simply define it as giving everybody an identical share. "Terrible" retains δεινόν without replacing it by a list of external dangers.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 59

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁρισμοὶ κακιῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς

II.7.5b1.2

ἀφροσύνην δὲ <ἄγνοιαν> ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἢ ἄγνοιαν ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων· ἀκολασίαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· <ἀδικίαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν μὴ ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ>· δειλίαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας ὁρίζονται, τῶν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενοι. Κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

Πρῶται καὶ ὑποτεταγμέναι ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.1

Τῶν δ’ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταῖς πρώταις ὑποτεταγμένας· πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην. Καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. Τῶν δὲ ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταύταις τὰς μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ὑποτετάχθαι, τὰς δὲ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, τὰς δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ, τὰς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 59-60

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Definitions of the Vices and of Virtue

II.7.5b1.2

Folly is <ignorance> of things good, evil, and neither; or ignorance of what should be done, what should not be done, and what is neither. Intemperance is ignorance of what is choiceworthy, what is to be avoided, and what is neither. <Injustice is ignorance that fails to assign each their due worth.> Cowardice is ignorance of things terrible, things not terrible, and things neither.[208] They define the other virtues and vices similarly, following what has been said. More generally, they say that virtue is a disposition of the soul in agreement with itself throughout the whole of life.[209]

Primary and Subordinate Virtues

II.7.5b2.1

Of virtues, some are primary and others subordinate to the primary virtues. The primary virtues are four: practical wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. Practical wisdom concerns appropriate actions; temperance, human impulses; courage, acts of endurance; and justice, assignments of what is due. Of the virtues subordinate to these, some fall under practical wisdom, some under temperance, some under courage, and some under justice.[210]

208. The supplied "ignorance" completes the definition of folly. Wachsmuth also brackets the whole definition of injustice, with the negative μή supplied within the restoration to oppose justice's assignment of worth. The English retains the scope of those brackets. The definitions of vices mirror those of virtues without turning ignorance into morally neutral lack of information.

209. "Disposition" renders διάθεσις. The agreement is with itself, αὑτῇ, and extends throughout life. This general definition should not be reduced to feeling calm at a particular moment. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.89 for a parallel statement about virtue and consistency.

210. Καθήκοντα are appropriate actions, the term used earlier in the divisions of ethics. Ὁρμαί are impulses toward action; ὑπομοναί concern enduring or standing firm; ἀπονεμήσεις concern assigning or distributing. The four fields anticipate the natural starting points at II.7.5b3. The order courage then justice follows the source here, even though some earlier lists place justice before courage.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 59-60

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱ ὑποτεταγμέναι ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.2

Τῇ μὲν οὖν φρονήσει ὑποτάττεσθαι εὐβουλίαν, εὐλογιστίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, νουνέχειαν, <εὐστοχίαν,> εὐμηχανίαν· τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξίαν, κοσμιότητα, αἰδημοσύνην, ἐγκράτειαν· τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ καρτερίαν, θαρραλεότητα, μεγαλοψυχίαν, εὐψυχίαν, φιλοπονίαν· τῇ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ εὐσέβειαν, χρηστότητα, εὐκοινωνησίαν, εὐσυναλλαξίαν.

Αἱ ὑπὸ φρόνησιν ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.3

Εὐβουλίαν μὲν οὖν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως· εὐλογιστίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνταναιρετικὴν καὶ συγκεφαλαιωτικὴν τῶν γινομένων καὶ ἀποτελουμένων· ἀγχίνοιαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα· νουνέχειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην <τῶν χειρόνων καὶ βελτιόνων· εὐστοχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην> ἐπιτευκτικὴν τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ σκοποῦ· εὐμηχανίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὑρετικὴν διεξόδου πραγμάτων·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 60-61

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Subordinate Virtues

II.7.5b2.2

Under practical wisdom fall good deliberation, sound calculation, quickness of mind, discernment, <sound aim,> and resourcefulness. Under temperance fall orderliness, propriety, modesty, and self-control. Under courage fall endurance, confidence, greatness of soul, stoutheartedness, and love of effort. Under justice fall piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing.[211]

The Virtues under Practical Wisdom

II.7.5b2.3

They say that good deliberation is knowledge of what to do, and how to do it, so that we shall act advantageously. Sound calculation is knowledge that weighs against one another and sums up what is happening and being accomplished.[212] Quickness of mind is knowledge that finds the appropriate action at once. Discernment is knowledge <of what is worse and better; sound aim is knowledge> that attains the target in each case. Resourcefulness is knowledge that finds a way through difficulties.[213]

211. The following definitions determine the senses of these compact names. “Sound aim,” εὐστοχία, is supplied in the list by Wachsmuth in view of the definition he restores below. The list preserves several distinct virtues that ordinary English might group together as courage or good sense. In particular, confidence and stoutheartedness render θαρραλεότης and εὐψυχία, while greatness of soul renders μεγαλοψυχία.

212. “Weighs against one another” renders the difficult printed ἀνταναιρετικήν, paired with συγκεφαλαιωτικήν, “summing up.” Wachsmuth’s apparatus records competing readings and conjectures; the English follows his printed pair as a process of comparative reckoning and summation. “Act advantageously” renders συμφερόντως; it does not by itself restrict the advantage to private financial gain.

213. The angle brackets contain both the missing object of discernment and the beginning of the definition of sound aim, restored from a parallel cited in the apparatus. They do not enclose the whole final definition. “At once” renders ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, and “target” renders σκοπός; the latter remains distinct from τέλος, “end.” Resourcefulness concerns finding a way through a difficult situation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 60-61

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνην ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.4

εὐταξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε πρακτέον, καὶ τί μετὰ τί, καὶ καθόλου τῆς τάξεως τῶν πράξεων· κοσμιότητα δὲ <ἐπιστήμην> πρεπουσῶν καὶ ἀπρεπῶν κινήσεων· αἰδημοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐλαβητικὴν ὀρθοῦ ψόγου· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον φανέντων·

Αἱ ὑπὸ ἀνδρείαν ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.5

καρτερίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐμμενετικὴν τοῖς ὀρθῶς κριθεῖσι· θαρραλεότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην καθ' ἣν οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὐδενὶ δεινῷ μὴ περιπεσούμεν· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε γίνεσθαι καὶ φαύλοις· εὐψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ψυχῆς παρεχομένης ἑαυτὴν ἀήττητον· φιλοπονίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐξεργαστικὴν τοῦ προκειμένου, οὐ κωλυομένην διὰ πόνον·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Virtues under Temperance

II.7.5b2.4

Orderliness is knowledge of when to act, what should follow what, and, in general, the ordering of actions. Propriety is <knowledge> of fitting and unfitting movements. Modesty is knowledge that guards against justified reproach. Self-control is knowledge that admits no transgression of what has appeared in accordance with right reason.[214]

The Virtues under Courage

II.7.5b2.5

Endurance is knowledge that abides by what has been correctly judged. Confidence is knowledge through which we know that we shall encounter nothing terrible.[215] Greatness of soul is knowledge that raises one above the things that naturally occur among both the virtuous and the base. Stoutheartedness is knowledge belonging to a soul that renders itself unconquerable. Love of effort is knowledge that carries out the task at hand and is not hindered by toil.[216]

214. Orderliness concerns the timing and sequence of actions. Propriety's "knowledge" is supplied in the Greek. The definition of modesty concerns justified reproach, ὀρθὸς ψόγος, rather than every adverse opinion. Self-control retains the force of ἀνυπέρβατον, "not to be overstepped": the knowledge holds firm concerning what right reason has shown. Compare the related, but differently worded, account in Diogenes Laertius VII.93.

215. The emphatic negative οὐδενὶ ... μή is retained as the assurance that nothing terrible will be encountered. In this ethical classification, the statement should not be expanded into a promise that no bodily danger or hardship can occur. Endurance concerns remaining with correct judgments; it does not commend holding to every previous decision regardless of its truth.

216. Here greatness of soul is expressly knowledge, whereas the Zeno sequence at II.7.5b denies that classification; the difference is retained. "Virtuous" and "base" render σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι as ethical types. Love of effort is not a wish for suffering: its definition concerns completing the task despite toil. The printed διὰ πόνον is followed; Wachsmuth's apparatus records a correction and another suggestion for its wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱ ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνην ἀρεταί

II.7.5b2.6

εὐσέβειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας· χρηστότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐποιητικήν· εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἰσότητος ἐν κοινωνίᾳ· εὐσυναλλαξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ συναλλάττειν ἀμέμπτως τοῖς πλησίον.

Τὸ κοινὸν τέλος τῶν ἀρετῶν

II.7.5b3

Πασῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἑκάστην δὲ τούτου διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἔχειν γὰρ ἀφορμὰς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπομονὰς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. Καὶ <κατὰ> τὸ σύμφωνον καὶ τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρετῶν πράττουσα παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῶντα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Virtues under Justice

II.7.5b2.6

Piety is knowledge of service to the gods. Kindness is knowledge that does good. Good fellowship is knowledge of equality in a community. Fair dealing is knowledge of how to conduct dealings blamelessly with one's neighbors.[217]

The Common End of the Virtues

II.7.5b3

The end of all these virtues is living in accordance with nature. Each makes the human being attain this through what is proper to it. For human beings have starting points from nature toward finding the appropriate action, toward steadiness of impulses, toward acts of endurance, and toward assignments of what is due.[218] Each virtue, by acting <in accordance with> their agreement and what is its own, makes the human being live in accordance with nature.[219]

217. "Service" renders θεραπεία in its religious sense, not medical treatment. Εὐποιητική describes doing good, rather than merely having a pleasant manner. Good fellowship is defined through equality within a community; fair dealing concerns blameless transactions or dealings with others, not commercial exchange alone. These definitions complete the subordinate-virtue list.

218. The four natural starting points, ἀφορμαί, correspond to the four fields of the primary virtues: practical wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. They are starting points for virtue, not a claim that every person already possesses complete virtue. The common τέλος is the end or aim of life; each virtue contributes through its particular field.

219. The supplied κατά is represented by the bracketed "in accordance with." Τὸ σύμφωνον names their agreement or harmony, while τὸ ἑαυτῆς names what belongs to each virtue. The sentence brings their common orientation and their particular work together without making their definitions identical. The following source paragraph, II.7.5b4, begins a further distinction between the complete virtues and capacities arising from them.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τέλειαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ δυνάμεις ψυχῆς

II.7.5b4.1

Ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγινομένας, οἷον τὴν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν ἀρτιότητα καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ κάλλος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δογμάτων.

Ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος ψυχῆς

II.7.5b4.2

Καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή. Ὥσπερ τε τὸ κάλλος τοῦ σώματός ἐστι συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν καθεστώτων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος ἐστὶ συμμετρία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς <τὸ> ὅλον τε αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Complete Virtues and Capacities of the Soul

II.7.5b4.1

They say that the virtues just mentioned are complete in relation to life and are constituted from principles. Others follow upon these, being no longer arts but certain capacities that arise from exercise: for example, the soul's health, soundness, strength, and beauty.[220] For just as the body's health is a good blending of the hot, cold, dry, and moist constituents in the body, so the soul's health is a good blending of the beliefs within it.[221]

Strength and Beauty of the Soul

II.7.5b4.2

Similarly, just as bodily strength is sufficient tension in the sinews, so strength of soul is sufficient tension in judging and acting, or not doing so.[222] And just as bodily beauty is the proportion of its limbs to one another and to the whole, so beauty of soul is the proportion of reason and its parts both to <the> whole of the soul and to one another.[223]

220. "Complete" renders τέλειαι, and "principles" renders θεωρήματα. The text distinguishes virtues constituted as arts from capacities resulting from exercise; it does not simply rename each capacity as another art. Ἀρτιότης is soundness or intactness. Four capacities are named, although the following comparisons separately explain health, strength, and beauty rather than giving a fourth comparison for soundness.

221. Εὐκρασία is a good or balanced blending. The bodily comparison names the qualities hot, cold, dry, and moist, not four named bodily fluids. The corresponding constituents in the soul are δόγματα, beliefs or judgments. The passage presents an ancient explanatory analogy; its account of bodily health belongs to that context.

222. Τόνος is tension or firmness, applied in parallel to bodily sinews and the soul's judging and acting. Νεῦρα here means sinews, rather than the modern nervous system. Wachsmuth prints ἢ μή, "or not," where his apparatus records καὶ μή, "and not"; the English retains the printed alternative without supplying a further phrase such as "as one ought."

223. Συμμετρία is proportion among parts and between parts and the whole. The printed αὐτοῦ makes the parts those of reason; Wachsmuth records alternatives in his apparatus, but they have not replaced his text. The following αὐτῆς refers to the soul. The supplied article before "whole" remains bracketed in English.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὸ ἀχώριστον τῶν ἀρετῶν

II.7.5b5.1

Πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι, κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ αὐτό, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν. Διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. Φρονήσεως μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν, ὃ ποιητέον, προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν <καὶ ἃ δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν>, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Inseparability of the Virtues

II.7.5b5.1

All the virtues that are forms of knowledge and arts have principles in common and, as has been said, the same end. They are therefore inseparable: whoever has one has them all, and whoever acts in accordance with one acts in accordance with them all.[224] They differ from one another in their principal concerns. The principal concerns of practical wisdom are, primarily, considering and doing what should be done; and, secondarily, considering also what should be assigned, <what should be chosen, and what should be endured>, so as to do without error what should be done.[225]

224. The qualification “that are forms of knowledge and arts” retains the preceding distinction from the capacities arising through exercise. The common end refers back to living in accordance with nature at II.7.5b3. Wachsmuth’s parenthetical printed-page cross-reference is an editorial locator and is not reproduced as part of the ancient Greek sentence. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.125–126 for a parallel account of the virtues’ mutual implication.

225. Κεφάλαια here are the principal concerns that distinguish the virtues, not separate ultimate ends. Προηγουμένως and κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον mark primary and secondary consideration. The supplied clauses about choosing and enduring bring the other virtues’ concerns into the account of practical wisdom; the brackets remain visible in both languages.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱ ἴδιαι καὶ κοιναὶ θεωρίαι

II.7.5b5.2

τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι· καὶ ὁμοίως τὴν ἀνδρείαν προηγουμένως μὲν πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας· καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προηγουμένως μὲν τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ σκοπεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον καὶ τὰ λοιπά. Πάσας γὰρ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὰ πασῶν βλέπειν καὶ τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα ἀλλήλαις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Particular and Shared Concerns

II.7.5b5.2

Temperance's particular principal concern is to make the impulses steady and to consider them primarily; secondarily, it considers what falls under the other virtues, so as to conduct oneself without error in one's impulses.[226] Similarly, courage considers primarily everything that should be endured, and secondarily what falls under the others. Justice considers primarily what accords with each person's worth, and secondarily the remaining concerns as well. For all the virtues have in view the concerns of all, including what falls under the other virtues.[227]

226. The object of temperance's primary consideration is the impulses themselves, αὐτάς. "Steady" renders εὐσταθεῖς; the account does not define temperance as the absence of all impulses. Its secondary consideration of the other virtues' fields enables error-free conduct in its own field.

227. The compressed Greek carries "considering" forward into the descriptions of courage and justice. The translation makes that shared construction explicit. The repeated primary and secondary distinction explains how the virtues can remain distinguishable while sharing knowledge; it does not place one virtue above all the others in value.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Παναίτιος · τοξόται καὶ σκοπός

II.7.5b5.3

Ὅμοιον γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι ὁ Παναίτιος τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὡς εἰ πολλοῖς τοξόταις εἷς σκοπὸς εἴη κείμενος, ἔχοι δ’ οὗτος ἐν αὑτῷ γραμμὰς διαφόρους τοῖς χρώμασιν· εἶθ’ ἕκαστος μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἤδη δ’ ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ πατάξαι εἰς τὴν λευκὴν εἰ τύχοι γραμμήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν, ἄλλος <δὲ> διὰ τοῦ εἰς ἄλλο τι χρῶμα γραμμῆς. Καθάπερ γὰρ τούτους ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτω τέλος ποιεῖσθαι τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἤδη δ’ ἄλλον κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον προτίθεσθαι τὴν τεῦξιν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας ποιεῖσθαι μὲν τέλος τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅ ἐστι κείμενον ἐν τῷ ζῆν ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει, τούτου δ’ ἄλλην κατ’ ἄλλον τυγχάνειν.

Διογένης · τὰ δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετά

II.7.5b6

Διττῶς δέ φησιν ὁ Διογένης λέγεσθαι τὰ δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετά, <τὰ> καὶ τελικῶς αἱρετά, ὡς ἔχει τὰ ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ διαιρέσει κατατεταγμένα, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ αἱρετὰ εἶναι, ὅπερ παντὶ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Panaetius on the Archers and the Target

II.7.5b5.3

Panaetius said that what happens with the virtues is like this: suppose a single target were set before several archers, with lines upon it differing in color. Each would aim to hit the target, but one would do so by striking the white line, for example; another, the black; <and> another, a line of some other color.[228] Just as these archers make hitting the target their highest end, while each proposes a different way of hitting it, so all the virtues make happiness their end, which consists in living in agreement with nature, while each attains it in a different way.[229]

Diogenes on What Is Choiceworthy for Itself

II.7.5b6

Diogenes says that "choiceworthy for themselves" is used in two ways: <things> that are also choiceworthy as ends, as are those classified in the foregoing division; and things that contain within themselves the reason for being choiceworthy, which belongs to every good.[230]

228. The comparison is explicitly attributed to Panaetius. It has one target, with differently colored lines; the translation does not replace it with several separate targets. Wachsmuth's bibliographical reference after the name is editorial and is omitted from the ancient text. The supplied connective δέ is represented by the bracketed "and."

229. The shared end is happiness, explained here through living in agreement with nature. The differing lines illustrate differing ways of attaining that end. The comparison thus preserves both a common orientation and distinct principal concerns; it does not give each virtue a different final good. Σκοπός remains "target," while τέλος remains "end."

230. Wachsmuth's bibliographical reference identifies the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, not Diogenes Laertius or Diogenes the Cynic. The reference is omitted from the ancient Greek sentence. The distinction concerns being chosen as an end and having the reason for one's choiceworthiness within oneself. The latter is said of every good; the two senses should not be collapsed. The editor's supplied article is represented by the bracketed "things."

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν

II.7.5b7.1

Ἀρετὰς δ’ εἶναι πλείους φασὶ καὶ ἀχωρίστους ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν, καθ’ ὃ δὴ καὶ σῶμα πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν εἶναί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι, τὴν γὰρ διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ συμφυὲς πνεῦμα ἡμῖν ἔνθερμον ὂν ψυχὴν ἡγοῦνται.

Ἀρετὴ ὡς ζῷον

II.7.5b7.2

Βούλονται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχὴν ζῷον εἶναι, ζῆν τε γὰρ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ μάλιστα τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς, ὃ δὴ καλεῖται διάνοια. Διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ζῷον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ αὐτὴ διανοίᾳ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. Κατὰ τοῦτο γάρ φασι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν φρονεῖν, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ οὕτως λέγειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Virtues and the Ruling Part of the Soul

II.7.5b7.1

They say that there are several virtues, inseparable from one another, and that in their underlying reality they are the same as the ruling part of the soul. In this respect every virtue both is a body and is called one, for the intellect and the soul are a body.[231] They regard as soul the warm breath naturally united with us.[232]

Virtue as a Living Creature

II.7.5b7.2

They also hold that the soul within us is a living creature, since it both lives and perceives; and especially its ruling part, which is called intellect. Every virtue is therefore a living creature too, since in substance it is the same as the intellect.[233] On this basis they say that practical wisdom itself thinks wisely, for speaking in this way follows from their position.[234]

231. “Ruling part” renders ἡγεμονικόν, and “underlying reality” renders ὑπόστασις. The assertion that virtue is a body follows the report’s identification of the virtues with the soul’s ruling part and its corporeal account of soul and intellect. It has not been softened into a claim that virtue merely affects the body. The several virtues remain distinguishable as the preceding account explains.

232. Πνεῦμα is breath, here expressly warm and naturally united with us, συμφυές. In this physical account it should not be read as an independently immaterial spirit. The source’s claims about soul and body belong to its Stoic explanation of how the virtues exist.

233. Ζῷον is a living creature or animal. The striking claim is retained: it follows from the soul’s living and perceiving and from the virtues’ identity in substance with the intellect. It should not be replaced by the weaker metaphor that virtue is lively or vigorous. Οὐσία here concerns substance, not personal possessions.

234. “Practical wisdom itself thinks wisely” preserves the connection between φρόνησις and φρονεῖν. The narrator presents this way of speaking as a consequence of the preceding position, not merely as decorative personification. The English does not silently change the subject to the person who possesses practical wisdom.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία

II.7.5b8

Ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ. Πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν, καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸν τῶν ἡμιαμβείων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους.

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν <κατὰ> πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς. Πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολελείφθαι ἀρετῆς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Virtue and Vice

II.7.5b8

There is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice. For all human beings have natural starting points toward virtue and, according to Cleanthes, are, as it were, like half-lines of iambic verse. Hence, while incomplete they are base, but when brought to completion they are virtuous.[235]

They also say that the wise person does everything <in accordance with> all the virtues. Every action of his is complete, and therefore falls short of no virtue.[236]

235. The image of half-lines renders Wachsmuth's printed ἡμιαμβείων; his apparatus records a different manuscript form and another proposed reading. The brief comparison associates natural starting points with incompleteness that requires completion. Its full original setting is not preserved here. The denial of an intermediate state is the report's classification of virtue and vice; compare Diogenes Laertius VII.127.

236. The supplied κατά is bracketed through "in accordance with." The claim concerns every action of the wise person and the inseparability of the virtues, rather than an action's displaying just one virtue while lacking another. The translated subject of "falls short" is each complete action; the Greek infinitive construction is compressed.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σοφὸς καὶ ἐρωτικός

II.7.5b9.1

Ἀκολούθως γὰρ τούτοις δογματίζουσι καὶ ὅτι καὶ νουνεχόντως καὶ διαλεκτικῶς ποιεῖ καὶ συμποτικῶς καὶ ἐρωτικῶς. Τὸν δὲ ἐρωτικὸν καὶ διχῇ λέγεσθαι, τὸν μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιοῦν σπουδαῖον ὄντα, τὸν δὲ κατὰ τὴν κακίαν ἐν ψόγῳ, ὡς ἂν ἐρωτομανῆ τινα. εἶναι δ' ἔρωτα * *· τόν τ' ἀξιέραστον ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι τῷ ἀξιοφιλήτῳ, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀξιαπολαύστῳ· τὸν γὰρ ἄξιον σπουδαίου ἔρωτος, τοῦτον εἶναι ἀξιέραστον.

Συμποτικὴ καὶ ἐρωτική

II.7.5b9.2

Ὁμοίως δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ τὴν συμποτικὴν παραλαμβάνουσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὴν μὲν περὶ τὸ ἐν συμποσίῳ καθῆκον ἀναστρεφομένην ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν· τὴν δ' ἐπιστήμην νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, προτρεπτικὴν οὖσαν ἐπὶ τὴν κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ καθόλου ἐπιστήμην τοῦ καλῶς ἐρᾶν· διὸ καί φασιν ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Wise Person and the Lover

II.7.5b9.1

In keeping with these doctrines, they also maintain that he acts with understanding, with dialectical skill, with skill at symposia, and with skill in love. “Lover,” however, is spoken of in two ways: one who acts in accordance with virtue is virtuous; one who acts in accordance with vice is blamed as a person mad with love.[237] Love is [text missing]. And “worthy of love” is spoken of in the same way as “worthy of affection,” not “worthy of being enjoyed”; for the person worthy of a virtuous person’s love is worthy of love.[238]

The Arts of the Symposium and of Love

II.7.5b9.2

Like the art of love, they include the art of the symposium among the virtues. The latter concerns appropriate conduct at a symposium and is knowledge of how drinking gatherings should be conducted and how people should drink together. The art of love is knowledge of the pursuit of young men with good natural gifts, encouraging them toward virtue, and, in general, knowledge of loving nobly. They therefore say that the person with understanding will fall in love.[239]

237. The subject of the opening sentence is the wise person carried forward from II.7.5b8. The adverbs concern intelligent and skilled conduct in dialectic, the symposium, and love. The subsequent distinction prevents “lover” from being treated as uniformly a term of praise. The symposium is a drinking gathering, rather than a modern academic conference.

238. The asterisks mark a gap after “love” in Wachsmuth’s Greek. His apparatus offers possible restorations, but none is inserted here; the English explicitly marks the loss. The following distinction separates being worthy of a virtuous person’s love from being an object of enjoyment. Ἀξιοφίλητος is rendered “worthy of affection” to preserve its relation to friendship without making the two Greek compounds identical.

239. The Greek balances the symposium and love with τὴν μέν and τὴν δέ; the English names the arts again to keep their referents clear. Θήρα literally means a hunt or pursuit, and νέων here denotes young men in the ancient erotic and educational setting; it does not specify an exact age. The printed προτρεπτικήν and the compressed ἐπὶ τὴν κατ’ ἀρετήν connect the pursuit with encouragement toward virtue. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.129 for the related Stoic report.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 65-66

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἔρως καὶ φιλοποιία

II.7.5b9.3

Τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γίνεται ποτὲ καὶ περὶ φαύλους. Τὸν δὲ ἔρωτα οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι οὔτε τινὸς φαύλου πράγματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν.

Πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν

II.7.5b10

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν, ἃ ποιεῖ· δῆλον. Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ λέγομεν πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν αὐλητὴν ἢ κιθαρῳδόν, συνεπακουομένου τοῦ ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὔλησιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κιθαρῳδίαν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καὶ ὅσα ποιεῖ ναὶ [οὐ] μὰ Δία, καὶ ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ. Τῷ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἐπιτελεῖν πάντα καὶ οἷον κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, περὶ ὅλον οὖσαν τὸν βίον τέχνην, ἀκόλουθον ᾠήθησαν τὸ περὶ τοῦ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν δόγμα. Κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τὸν φαῦλον πάντα ὅσα ποιεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ κατὰ πάσας τὰς κακίας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 66-67

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Love and the Making of Friendship

II.7.5b9.3

Loving by itself, however, is indifferent, since it is sometimes found among the base as well. Love is neither appetite nor directed toward anything base, but an undertaking to make friendship on account of the appearance of beauty.[240]

Doing Everything Well

II.7.5b10

They also say that the wise person does everything well—what he does, obviously. For just as we say that the flute player or the singer to the lyre does everything well, with the understanding that the former's actions concern flute playing and the latter's singing to the lyre, so the practically wise person does everything well, both what he does—yes, by Zeus—and what he does not do.[241] Because he accomplishes everything according to right reason and, as it were, according to virtue, an art extending over the whole of life, they thought the doctrine that the wise person does everything well followed consistently. Correspondingly, the base person does everything he does badly and in accordance with all the vices.[242]

240. The text distinguishes loving considered by itself from the definition of love directed toward friendship. "Indifferent" retains the ethical classification, rather than expressing emotional coldness. Ἐπιθυμία is appetite or desire in the technical discussion; φιλοποιία is the making of friendship, and ἔμφασις the appearance or manifestation of beauty. The two statements are preserved together without silently removing their tension.

241. The comparison qualifies "everything" by the relevant art. Αὐλητής is a player of the aulos, conventionally called a flute; κιθαρῳδός sings to a stringed instrument. The source's emphatic and paradoxical extension to what the wise person does not do is retained. Wachsmuth brackets the rejected οὐ after ναί; it remains in the Greek but is omitted from the English, as his deletion requires.

242. Virtue's art concerns the whole of life, which explains the wider scope of its "everything." The following passage on particular professions also requires additional principles in some cases; the present statement should not be expanded into automatic mastery of every specialized craft. The final counterpart expressly concerns all the vices, matching the earlier inseparability claim for virtues.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 66-67

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι II.7.5b11

Φιλομουσίαν δὲ καὶ φιλογραμματίαν καὶ φιλιππίαν καὶ φιλοκυνηγίαν καὶ καθόλου ἐγκυκλίους λεγομένας τέχνας ἐπιτηδεύματα μὲν καλοῦσιν, ἐπιστήμας δ’ οὔ, ἐν <τε> ταῖς σπουδαίαις ἕξεσι ταῦτα καταλείπουσι, καὶ ἀκολούθως μόνον τὸν σοφὸν φιλόμουσον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ φιλογράμματον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Τό τε ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦτον ὑπογράφουσι τὸν τρόπον· ὁδὸν διὰ τέχνης ἢ μέρους ἄγουσαν ἐπὶ <τὰ> κατ’ ἀρετήν.

Σοφὸς καὶ αἱ ἰδίαι τέχναι II.7.5b12.1

Μόνον δέ φασι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάντιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ ῥήτορα καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καὶ κριτικόν, οὐ πάντα δέ, διὰ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι ἔτι τινὰ τούτων καὶ θεωρημάτων τινῶν ἀναλήψεως. Εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν φασὶν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῆς μαντικῆς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 67

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Pursuits and Knowledge

II.7.5b11

They call love of music, love of letters, love of horses, love of hunting, and, in general, the so-called general educational arts "pursuits," but not forms of knowledge. They <also> leave these among worthy states, and accordingly say that only the wise person is a lover of music and of letters, and similarly in the other cases.[243] They describe a pursuit in this way: a path through an art or a part of one that leads to <things> in accordance with virtue.[244]

The Wise Person and Particular Arts

II.7.5b12.1

They say that only the wise person can be a good diviner, poet, orator, dialectician, or critic; but he is not all of these, since some of these pursuits also require acquiring certain principles.[245] They say that divination is knowledge that considers signs from gods or divine beings bearing upon human life. The kinds of divination are understood similarly.[246]

243. Ἐπιτηδεύματα are cultivated pursuits or occupations; they are distinguished from ἐπιστῆμαι. Ἐγκύκλιοι τέχναι are the arts of general education, not an encyclopedia in the modern sense. Φιλομουσία can extend to cultivated engagement with the arts of the Muses, while φιλογραμματία concerns letters or literary study. The supplied τε is represented by "also." The printed καταλείπουσι, "leave," is retained rather than another proposed verb of enumeration.

244. The positive ethical qualification governs calling these worthy states and attributing them properly to the wise person; the report need not be read as denying that other people ever play music or study letters. The supplied article in ἐπὶ τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν is represented by the bracketed "things." "A part of one" retains the alternative ἢ μέρους, referring back to the art.

245. The qualification οὐ πάντα δέ, "but not all," is essential. The report's restriction to the wise person does not mean that every wise person already possesses every specialized competence. Some require the further acquisition of θεωρήματα, principles. Κριτικός here denotes a critic or expert judge, particularly in the literary setting of poetry and rhetoric, rather than simply a habit of criticizing others.

246. Μαντική is divination, interpreted here as knowledge concerning divine signs. Δαίμονες are divine beings; translating them as "demons" in a uniformly hostile sense would impose a later association. The passage states the reported doctrine and its definition, rather than supplying evidence that any particular act of divination succeeded.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἱερεὺς καὶ εὐσέβεια

II.7.5b12.2

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἱερέα μόνον εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα. Τὸν γὰρ ἱερέα εἶναι δεῖν ἔμπειρον νόμων τῶν περὶ θυσίας καὶ εὐχὰς καὶ καθαρμοὺς καὶ ἱδρύσεις καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἁγιστείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ἐμπειρίας τῆς τῶν θεῶν θεραπείας, καὶ <τοῦ> ἐντὸς εἶναι τῆς φύσεως τῆς θείας. Μηδ’ ἓν <δέ τ>ι τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ φαύλῳ, διὸ καὶ πάντας εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονας ἀσεβεῖς. Τὴν γὰρ ἀσέβειαν κακίαν οὖσαν, ἄγνοιαν εἶναι θεῶν θεραπείας, τὴν δ’ εὐσέβειαν, ὡς εἴπομεν, ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 67-68

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Priest and Piety

II.7.5b12.2

They also say that only the wise person is a priest, and no base person is. For a priest must be experienced in the laws concerning sacrifices, prayers, purifications, consecrations, and all such matters; he also needs religious purity, piety, experience in service to the gods, and inward acquaintance with the divine nature.[247] Not a single one of these belongs to the base person; hence all the foolish are impious. For impiety, being a vice, is ignorance of service to the gods, while piety, as we have said, is knowledge of service to the gods.[248]

247. The priesthood is defined through ethical and religious competence, rather than the mere possession of an office. Ἱδρύσεις concerns establishing or consecrating sacred objects or cults; ἁγιστεία concerns religious purity or holy observance. “Inward acquaintance” renders the expression literally meaning being within the divine nature; it does not assert a particular initiation ceremony. The supplied τοῦ introduces that infinitive construction and is expressed through English grammar.

248. The supplement δέ τ restores the connective and the beginning of τι in the compressed negative expression; English renders its force in “not a single one” without adding a separate bracketed noun. The opposition of ignorance and knowledge repeats the earlier definition of piety at II.7.5b2.6, printed p. 62. Wachsmuth’s parenthetical page reference is omitted from the ancient sentence. The universal description of the foolish as impious is the report’s claim.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 67-68

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁσιότης καὶ ἑορτή

II.7.5b12.3

Ὁμοίως δὲ μηδ’ ὁσίους εἶναί φασι τοὺς φαύλους. Τὴν γὰρ ὁσιότητα ὑπογράφεσθαι δικαιοσύνην πρὸς θεούς· τοὺς δὲ φαύλους παρεκβαίνειν πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς θεοὺς δικαίων, παρ’ ὃ καὶ ἀνοσίους εἶναι καὶ ἀκαθάρους καὶ ἀνάγνους καὶ μιαροὺς καὶ ἀνεορτάστους.

Τὸ γὰρ ἑορτάζειν ἀστείου φασὶν εἶναι, τῆς ἑορτῆς οὔσης χρόνου τινὸς ἐν ᾧ χρὴ περὶ τὸ θεῖον γίγνεσθαι τιμῆς χάριν καὶ καθηκούσης ἐπισημασίας, ὅθεν καὶ τὸν ἑορτάζοντα συγκαθεικέναι δεῖ μετ’ εὐσεβείας εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν.

Ἄγνοια καὶ μανία

II.7.5b13

Ἔτι δὲ λέγουσι πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεσθαι, ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μανία. Τὴν δ’ ἄγνοιαν εἶναι ἐναντίαν κακίαν τῇ φρονήσει· ταύτην δὲ πρός τί πως ἔχουσαν ἀκαταστάτους καὶ πτοιώδεις παρεχομένην τὰς ὁρμὰς μανίαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὑπογράφουσι τὴν μανίαν οὕτως· ἄγνοιαν πτοιώδη.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 68

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Holiness and the Festival

II.7.5b12.3

Similarly, they say that the base are not holy. For they describe holiness as justice toward the gods. The base transgress many obligations of justice toward the gods, and are therefore unholy, unclean, impure, polluted, and without true festival observance.[249]

For they say that celebrating a festival belongs to the virtuous person, a festival being a time in which one should attend to the divine for the sake of honor and fitting commemoration. Hence the celebrant must join piously in such an observance.[250]

Ignorance and Madness

II.7.5b13

They further say that every base person is mad, being ignorant of himself and of what concerns him, which is madness. Ignorance is the vice opposed to practical wisdom; when it stands in a certain relation to something and makes the impulses unsettled and fluttering, it is madness.[251] They therefore describe madness in this way: fluttering ignorance.[252]

249. Ὁσιότης is holiness or justice toward the gods, distinguished in wording from the preceding εὐσέβεια, piety. The accumulation of negative descriptions is retained; "without true festival observance" renders ἀνεορτάστους in light of the following ethical definition of celebrating. The report does not merely list who is physically present at public festivities.

250. Ἀστεῖος means the virtuous or morally excellent person here, not simply someone from a city or someone witty. Ἐπισημασία is a marking or commemoration, qualified as fitting. The concluding συγκαθεικέναι is difficult, and Wachsmuth records conjectures; "join ... in such an observance" conveys participation in the prescribed order without silently altering the printed Greek.

251. This is the report's ethical use of μανία, madness, within the opposition between wisdom and vice; it is not a retrospective clinical diagnosis of individuals. Αὐτοῦ and καθ' αὑτόν refer to oneself and what concerns oneself. The compressed πρός τί πως ἔχουσαν leaves the particular relation unspecified, and the translation does not invent a more precise cause.

252. "Fluttering" preserves πτοιώδης, connected with πτοία, the fluttering of the soul in the earlier definition of passion at II.7.1.4. Here the word describes unstable impulses and then qualifies ignorance itself. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.124 for the related claim about folly and madness. The next source passage, II.7.5c, returns to divisions of goods and evils.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχοντα II.7.5c.1

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ αἰεί, τὰ δὲ οὔ. Ἀρετὴν μὲν πᾶσαν καὶ φρονίμην αἴσθησιν καὶ φρονίμην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ· χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρονίμην περιπάτησιν οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί.

Κακὰ ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχοντα II.7.5c.2

Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ αἰεί, τὰ δ’ οὔ. Κακίαν μὲν οὖν πᾶσαν καὶ ἄφρονα αἴσθησιν καὶ ἄφρονα ὁρμὴν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια πᾶσι τοῖς ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν <καὶ> αἰεί· λύπην δὲ καὶ φόβον καὶ ἄφρονα ἀπόκρισιν οὔτε πᾶσι τοῖς ἄφροσιν ὑπάρχειν οὔτ’ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 68-69

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods That Are Always Present and Those That Are Not II.7.5c.1

Again, of goods, some belong to all wise people and always, while others do not. Every virtue, wise perception, wise impulse, and similar things belong to all wise people and at every time.[253] Joy, gladness, and wise walking, however, belong neither to all wise people nor always.[254]

Evils That Are Always Present and Those That Are Not II.7.5c.2

Correspondingly, of evils, some belong to all foolish people and always, while others do not. Every vice, foolish perception, foolish impulse, and similar things belong to all foolish people <and> always. Distress, fear, and a foolish reply, however, belong neither to all foolish people nor at every time.[255]

253. The distinction concerns whether a good belongs to every wise person at every time. “Wise perception” and “wise impulse” preserve the source’s repeated φρόνιμος, rather than reducing the examples to virtue alone. Compare the shorter parallel classification in Diogenes Laertius VII.98.

254. “Wise walking” renders φρονίμη περιπάτησις, a particular activity qualified by wisdom. It is not an assertion that ordinary walking is itself a moral good, nor a reference to membership in the Peripatetic school. The two qualifications, “all” and “always,” are retained separately.

255. The evil series mirrors the good series but gives “a foolish reply,” ἄφρων ἀπόκρισις, as its example of a particular activity. The English does not substitute foolish walking to make the lists symmetrical. Λύπη here is distress, alongside fear. The supplied conjunction before “always” remains bracketed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 68-69

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν κατηγορήματα

II.7.5d.1

Πάντα δὲ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι καὶ εὔχρηστα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ λυσιτελῆ καὶ σπουδαῖα καὶ πρέποντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα· τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων πάντα βλαβερὰ καὶ δύσχρηστα καὶ ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀλυσιτελῆ καὶ φαῦλα καὶ ἀπρεπῆ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀνοίκεια.

Τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα

II.7.5d.2

Τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαί φασι πλεοναχῶς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οἷον πηγῆς ἔχον χώραν, ὅπερ οὕτως ἀποδίδοσθαι· ἀφ’ οὗ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι ἢ ὑφ’ οὗ (τὸ δὲ πρώτως εἶναι αἴτιον)· τὸ <δὲ> δεύτερον, καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι· κοινότερον δὲ καὶ διατεῖνον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, τὸ οἷον ὠφελεῖν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀναλογίαν ὑπογράφεσθαι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀφ’ οὗ συμβαίνει βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὑφ’ οὗ· τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει βλάπτεσθαι· κοινότερον δὲ τούτων τὸ οἷον βλάπτειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 69-70

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Descriptions of Goods and Evils

II.7.5d.1

All goods are beneficial, useful, advantageous, profitable, worthy, fitting, noble, and congenial. All evils, by contrast, have the opposite descriptions: harmful, difficult to use, disadvantageous, unprofitable, base, unfitting, shameful, and uncongenial.[256]

The Several Senses of Good and Evil

II.7.5d.2

They say that “good” has several senses. The first occupies, as it were, the place of a source, and is defined thus: that from which, or by which, one comes to be benefited (the latter being a cause in the primary sense). <And> the second is that in accordance with which one comes to be benefited. A more general sense, extending also to the foregoing, is what is such as to benefit.[257] Evil is likewise defined by analogy with good: that from which, or by which, one comes to be harmed; that in accordance with which one comes to be harmed; and, more generally than these, what is such as to harm.[258]

256. The eight descriptions and their eight opposites retain the order of the Greek. Several English terms overlap, as do the Greek expressions; they are not separate classes of good. Εὔχρηστα and δύσχρηστα concern use, while οἰκεῖα and ἀνοίκεια express congeniality or its opposite. Καλόν retains its ethical sense, “noble,” beside αἰσχρόν, “shameful.”

257. The definition distinguishes ἀφ’ οὗ, “from which,” ὑφ’ οὗ, “by which,” and καθ’ ὅ, “in accordance with which.” The compressed parenthesis is read as specifying the causal force of “by which.” Wachsmuth rearranges transmitted wording in this difficult sentence; the English follows his printed order and preserves the parenthesis. The image is of a source or spring, πηγή.

258. The general formulation, τὸ οἷον ὠφελεῖν, describes what is such as to benefit and includes the preceding senses. The evil series repeats the distinctions using harm, but has no corresponding causal parenthesis. The English does not add one. The supplied δέ is represented by bracketed “and.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 69-70

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ἐκτός

II.7.5e.1

Τῶν δ’ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός, τὰ δ’ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός. Περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ <τὰς> σπουδαίας ἕξεις καὶ καθόλου τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἐνεργείας· ἐκτὸς δὲ τούς τε φίλους καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός, τοὺς σπουδαίους καὶ καθόλου <τοὺς> τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχοντας.

Κακὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ἐκτός

II.7.5e.2

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός, τὰ δ’ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός· περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν τὰς τε κακίας σὺν ταῖς μοχθηραῖς ἕξεσι καὶ καθόλου τὰς ψεκτὰς ἐνεργείας· ἐκτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς σὺν ταῖς εἴδεσιν· οὔτε <δὲ> περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ πάντας τοὺς τὰς κακίας ἔχοντας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 70

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods Concerning the Soul and External Goods II.7.5e.1

Of goods, some concern the soul, some are external, and some neither concern the soul nor are external. Those concerning the soul are the virtues, <the> worthy states, and, generally, praiseworthy activities. External goods are friends, acquaintances, and similar things.[259] Goods that neither concern the soul nor are external are virtuous people and, generally, <those> who possess the virtues.[260]

Evils Concerning the Soul and External Evils II.7.5e.2

Similarly, of evils, some concern the soul, some are external, and some neither concern the soul nor are external. Those concerning the soul are the vices together with depraved states and, generally, blameworthy activities. External evils are enemies together with their kinds. <And> those that neither concern the soul nor are external are base people and all who possess the vices.[261]

259. “Concerning the soul” translates περὶ ψυχήν without changing it into “within the soul.” Friends and acquaintances appear in the external class; the passage does not reclassify health or wealth as moral goods. The supplied article before “worthy states” remains visible in English.

260. The third class names the possessors of virtue, rather than adding bodily goods. It distinguishes a person from virtues, states, and activities concerning that person’s soul. The supplied article before the participial expression is rendered by bracketed “those.” Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.95–96 for the parallel threefold division.

261. The unusual printed σὺν ταῖς εἴδεσιν is retained as “together with their kinds”; it is not silently replaced by a conjectural expression about malicious people. The English preserves the source’s three classes and its move from vices to their possessors. Wachsmuth’s supplied connective is represented by bracketed “and.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 70

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαθέσεις καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν

II.7.5f.1

Τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι διαθέσεις, τὰ δὲ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ’ οὔ, τὰ δ’ οὔτε ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. Διαθέσεις μὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς πάσας, ἕξεις δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐ διαθέσεις τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ὡς τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις τὰς κατ’ ἀρετὰς ἐνεργείας, οἷον φρονίμευμα καὶ τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης κτῆσιν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

Διαθέσεις καὶ ἕξεις τῶν κακῶν

II.7.5f.2

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι διαθέσεις, τὰ δ’ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ’ οὔ, τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. Διαθέσεις μὲν τὰς κακίας πάσας, ἕξεις δὲ μόνον τὰς εὐκαταφορίας, οἷον τὴν φθονερίαν, τὴν ἐπιλυπίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἔτι τὰ νοσήματα καὶ ἀρρωστήματα, οἷον φιλαργυρίαν, οἰνοφλυγίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Οὔτε <δ’> ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις τὰς κατὰ κακίας ἐνεργείας, οἷον ἀφρόνευσιν, ἀδίκευσιν καὶ τὰ ταύταις παραπλήσια.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Dispositions and States among Goods

II.7.5f.1

Of goods concerning the soul, some are dispositions, some are states but not dispositions, and some are neither states nor dispositions. All the virtues are dispositions. Pursuits, such as divination and similar things, are states only, and not dispositions.[262] Activities in accordance with the virtues, such as an act of practical wisdom and the acquisition of temperance, are neither states nor dispositions.[263]

Dispositions and States among Evils

II.7.5f.2

Similarly, of evils concerning the soul, some are dispositions, some are states but not dispositions, and some are neither states nor dispositions. All the vices are dispositions. Pronenesses, such as a tendency to envy, a tendency to distress, and the like, are states only, as are diseases and infirmities, such as love of money, drunkenness, and similar things.[264] <And> activities in accordance with the vices, such as acting foolishly, acting unjustly, and similar acts, are neither states nor dispositions.[265]

262. Διάθεσις is rendered “disposition” and ἕξις “state” to keep this particular division visible. The wording “states but not dispositions” implies that the first class is not simply excluded from the broader category of states. The scheme concerns the Stoic exposition here; it should not be imposed on every earlier use of ἕξις in the anthology. “Pursuits” continues ἐπιτηδεύματα from II.7.5b11.

263. The printed φρονίμευμα is an act of practical wisdom. Wachsmuth prints κτῆσιν, “acquisition,” for temperance, although his apparatus discusses “use” and “exercise” as alternatives. The translation follows the printed text and does not turn the acquisition into the continuing possession of temperance.

264. Εὐκαταφορίαι are pronenesses or tendencies to fall into affections. The examples φθονερία and ἐπιλυπία are therefore rendered as tendencies, rather than as isolated episodes of envy or distress. “Diseases” and “infirmities” preserve νοσήματα and ἀρρωστήματα as terms of this ancient ethical classification.

265. The act nouns ἀφρόνευσις and ἀδίκευσις mark particular activities, as distinct from the vices and pronenesses already listed. The bracketed “and” represents the supplied δ’. The account does not identify these three categories with modern clinical classifications.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 70-71

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ τελικὰ καὶ ποιητικά

II.7.5g.1

Τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν φρόνιμος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος ποιητικὰ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθά· χαρὰ δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ θάρσος καὶ φρονίμη περιπάτησις τελικὰ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθά· αἱ δ’ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι καὶ ποιητικά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τελικά, καὶ γὰρ ἀπογεννῶσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ συμπληροῦσι, μέρη αὐτῆς γινόμεναι.

Κακὰ τελικὰ καὶ ποιητικά

II.7.5g.2

Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι ποιητικὰ τῆς κακοδαιμονίας, τὰ δὲ τελικά, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄφρων ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐχθρὸς ποιητικὰ μόνον ἐστὶ κακά· λύπη δὲ καὶ φόβος καὶ κλοπὴ καὶ ἄφρων ἐρώτησις καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τελικὰ <μόνον ἐστὶ κακά>· αἱ δὲ κακίαι καὶ ποιητικὰ καὶ τελικά ἐστι κακά· ἀπογεννῶσι γὰρ τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν καὶ συμπληροῦσι, μέρη αὐτῆς γινόμεναι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 71-72

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods as Ends and Goods That Produce Happiness II.7.5g.1

Of goods, some are final, some productive, and some both. The wise person and the friend are productive goods only. Joy, gladness, confidence, and wise walking are final goods only.[266] All the virtues are both productive and final goods: they both bring happiness into being and complete it by becoming parts of it.[267]

Evils as Ends and Evils That Produce Unhappiness II.7.5g.2

Correspondingly, of evils, some produce unhappiness, some are final, and some both. The foolish person and the enemy are productive evils only. Distress, fear, theft, a foolish question, and similar things <are evils only> of the final kind.[268] The vices are both productive and final evils: they bring unhappiness into being and complete it by becoming parts of it.[269]

266. “Final” renders τελικά, goods that belong to the end; “productive” renders ποιητικά, goods that bring happiness about. The examples are those of this source. In particular, θάρσος is confidence, not the virtue ἀνδρεία, courage, and walking retains the qualification “wise.”

267. The virtues have both roles: they produce happiness and constitute parts of its completion. “Productive” therefore does not mean that every productive good is merely an external instrument. Compare the corresponding classification in Diogenes Laertius VII.96–97, while retaining the examples printed here.

268. The supplied μόνον ἐστὶ κακά completes the predication after τελικά. Its English equivalent remains bracketed, although English word order places it before “of the final kind.” The source lists theft, κλοπή, and a foolish question, ἄφρων ἐρώτησις; neither has been replaced by an example from the good series.

269. Κακοδαιμονία is unhappiness or a wretched condition of life, the counterpart of εὐδαιμονία. “Final” concerns a constitutive role in that condition; it does not say that unhappiness is an end one should seek. The source repeats the productive and constitutive roles when explaining the vices.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετὰ καὶ τὰ ποιητικά

II.7.5h

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά. Ὁπόσα μὲν οὖν οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκεν εἰς εὔλογον αἵρεσιν ἔρχεται, δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρετά· ὁπόσα δὲ τῷ ἑτέρων τινῶν παρασκευαστικὰ γίνεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν λέγεσθαι.

Αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀρεστόν

II.7.5i

Καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἶναι· ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν φευκτόν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καθ’ ὃ μὲν αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ, αἱρετόν ἐστι· καθ’ ὃ δὲ ἀνυπόπτως εἰς αἵρεσιν ἔρχεται, ἀρεστόν· <καθ’ ὃ δὲ . . . , δοκιμαστόν>· καθ’ ὃ δὲ πάλιν εὐλόγως ἄν τις περὶ αὐτοῦ καθυπολαμβάνοι τῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς εἶναι, <ἐπαινετόν>.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 72

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

What Is Choiceworthy for Itself and What Is Productive

II.7.5h

Again, of goods, some are choiceworthy for themselves and some productive. Whatever enters into reasonable choice for the sake of nothing else is choiceworthy for itself. Whatever does so by furnishing certain other things is described in respect of its productive role.[270]

Choiceworthy and Pleasing

II.7.5i

Every good is choiceworthy, for it is pleasing, approvable, and praiseworthy; every evil is to be avoided. A good is choiceworthy insofar as it moves reasonable choice; pleasing insofar as it enters into choice without misgiving; <and insofar as [text missing], approvable>.[271] Again, insofar as one might reasonably judge it to be among the things that proceed from virtue, it is <praiseworthy>.[272]

270. The Greek leaves the second clause compressed; “does so” carries forward entering into reasonable choice. The distinction concerns why a good is chosen. Compare Diogenes’s two senses of “choiceworthy for themselves” at II.7.5b6. Wachsmuth removes a transmitted heading on choiceworthy and avoidable things here; it is not restored as ancient running text.

271. The near-sounding αἱρετόν and ἀρεστόν are distinguished as “choiceworthy” and “pleasing.” The latter is explained through choice without misgiving, ἀνυπόπτως, rather than through a sensation of pleasure. Wachsmuth supplies the frame of the “approvable” clause while leaving its defining words missing. The English preserves both the supplied frame and the gap.

272. The printed καθυπολαμβάνοι is retained in the sense “might judge,” and τῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς as “among the things that proceed from virtue.” The source makes the judgment reasonable, rather than claiming that any praise establishes goodness. Wachsmuth’s supplied final predicate remains bracketed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 72

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἐν σχέσει

II.7.5k.1

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἐν κινήσει, τὰ δὲ ἐν σχέσει. Ἐν κινήσει μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, χαράν, εὐφροσύνην, σώφρονα ὁμιλίαν· ἐν σχέσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὔτακτον ἡσυχίαν, μονὴν ἀτάραχον, προσοχὴν ἔπανδρον. Τῶν δὲ ἐν σχέσει τὰς μὲν καὶ ἐν ἕξει εἶναι, οἷον τὰς ἀρετάς· τὰς δ’ ἐν σχέσει μόνον, ὡς τὰ ῥηθέντα. Ἐν ἕξει δὲ οὐ μόνας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίνεσθαι.

Τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος

II.7.5k.2

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἕξει ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλούμενα, οἷον φιλομουσίαν, φιλογραμματίαν, φιλογεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Εἶναι γὰρ ὁδόν τινα ἐκλεκτικὴν τῶν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς τέχναις οἰκείων πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀναφέρουσαν αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 73

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods in Activity and Goods in a Condition

II.7.5k.1

Again, of goods, some are in activity and some in a condition. Those in activity include joy, gladness, and temperate association. Those in a condition include orderly quiet, undisturbed repose, and manly attentiveness.[273] Of those in a condition, some are also in a state, such as the virtues; others are in a condition only, like the examples just given. Not only the virtues are in a state, but also the arts that have been transformed by virtue in the virtuous person and have become unalterable, for they become, as it were, virtues.[274]

Cultivated Pursuits and the End of Life

II.7.5k.2

They say that the so-called pursuits also belong among goods in a state: for example, love of music, love of letters, love of geometry, and similar things. For a pursuit is a certain way of selecting what in these arts is congenial to virtue and referring it to the end of life.[275]

273. Κίνησις is rendered “activity” in this classification, while σχέσις is “condition,” distinguished from ἕξις, “state.” Ὁμιλία can include intercourse or association; the Greek does not specify a narrower setting here. Προσοχὴ ἔπανδρος is rendered “manly attentiveness,” retaining the printed noun despite Wachsmuth’s doubt about it in the apparatus.

274. The examples just given belong to the condition-only class, while the virtues also belong to the state class. The statement about arts has two qualifications: transformation by virtue in the virtuous person and becoming unalterable. The concluding οἱονεί, “as it were,” is retained; the text does not simply identify every art with a virtue.

275. The definition specifies selection, ἐκλεκτική, and direction toward the end of life. It does not declare every element of every cultivated art good. The printed αὐτά refers back to the selected things congenial to virtue. Compare the earlier definition of a pursuit at II.7.5b11.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 73

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ πρός τι

II.7.5l.1

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθ’ ἑαυτά, τὰ δὲ πρός τί πως ἔχειν. Καθ’ ἑαυτὰ μὲν ἐπιστήμην, δικαιοπραγίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· πρός τι δὲ τιμήν, εὔνοιαν, φιλίαν, <συμφωνίαν>.

Ἐπιστήμη καὶ κατάληψις

II.7.5l.2

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλως δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον, ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλως δὲ ἕξιν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥν τινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει κεῖσθαι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods in Themselves and Goods in Relation

II.7.5l.1

Again, of goods, some are in themselves, while others stand in a certain relation to something. Knowledge, just action, and the like are goods in themselves; honor, goodwill, friendship, and <concord> are goods in relation to something.[276]

Knowledge and Apprehension

II.7.5l.2

Knowledge is a secure apprehension, unalterable by argument. In another sense, knowledge is a system of such apprehensions, as is logic, one of the particular branches, existing in the virtuous person.[277] In another sense, it is a system of technical forms of knowledge that has its certainty from itself, as the virtues do. In another, it is a state receptive of impressions and unalterable by argument, which they say consists in tension and power.[278]

276. This division concerns whether a good is described in itself or in relation to something; it differs from the preceding question of why a good is chosen. "Concord," συμφωνία, is supplied by Wachsmuth in view of its definition on the following printed page. The bracketed term is retained here.

277. Κατάληψις is apprehension, and λόγος here is argument. The compressed example names logic as a particular branch existing in the virtuous person. The repeated "in another sense" distinguishes definitions; it does not require them to be successive stages of learning. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.47 for the apprehension and receptive-state formulations.

278. The system's certainty is described by the reflexive ἐξ αὐτοῦ, "from itself." Wachsmuth prints ἐπιστημῶν, "forms of knowledge," although he questions that word in his apparatus; the English retains it. The final definition brings the receptive state into the account of tension and power, recalling the soul's tension at II.7.5b4.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 73-74

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φιλία καὶ συμφωνία

II.7.5l.3

Φιλίαν δ’ εἶναι κοινωνίαν βίου· συμφωνίαν δὲ ὁμοδογματίαν περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. Τῆς δὲ φιλίας εἶναι γνωριμότητα μὲν φιλίαν ἐγνωσμένων· συνήθειαν δὲ φιλίαν συνειθισμένων· ἑταιρείαν δὲ φιλίαν καθ’ αἵρεσιν, ὡς ἂν ὁμηλίκων· ξενίαν δὲ φιλίαν ἀλλοδαπῶν. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ συγγενικήν τινα φιλίαν ἐκ συγγενῶν· καὶ ἐρωτικὴν ἐξ ἔρωτος.

Ἀρετῶν ὀνόματα πρός τι

II.7.5l.4

Ἀλυπίαν δὲ καὶ εὐταξίαν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, νοῦν δὲ καὶ φρένας φρονήσει, μεταδοτικὴν δὲ καὶ ἐπιδοτικὴν χρηστότητι· τῷ μέντοι γε πρός τί πως ἔχειν ὠνομάσθησαν· ὅπερ καθήκει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν παρατηρεῖν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 74

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Friendship and Concord

II.7.5l.3

Friendship is a sharing of life; concord is agreement in beliefs about the affairs of life.[279] Among forms of friendship, acquaintance is friendship between people known to one another; familiarity, friendship between people accustomed to one another; companionship, friendship by choice, as between people of the same age; and guest-friendship, friendship between people of different lands. There is also a kind of kinship friendship arising from kin, and erotic friendship arising from love.[280]

Names of Virtues in Relation

II.7.5l.4

Freedom from distress and good order are the same as temperance; intellect and understanding, the same as practical wisdom; readiness to share and readiness to give, the same as kindness. They have received these names, however, because they stand in a certain relation to something. This should also be observed in the case of the other virtues.[281]

279. Κοινωνία βίου is a sharing of life, while ὁμοδογματία specifies agreement in beliefs or judgments. The definition of concord therefore concerns agreement about life, rather than musical harmony. Its presence here explains Wachsmuth's supplied συμφωνία in the preceding list.

280. The terms distinguish relationships by acquaintance, habitual association, choice, foreign origin, kinship, and erotic love. Ξενία carries the sense of guest-friendship between people from different lands. The same-age example qualifies companionship; it is not added as a requirement for every form of friendship.

281. The Greek predicates sameness while explaining the different names through relation. "Freedom from distress" renders ἀλυπία, and "readiness to share" and "readiness to give" render the substantivized adjectives μεταδοτική and ἐπιδοτική. Wachsmuth relocates this paragraph from after II.7.5m to the discussion of relations; that placement is followed here.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἄμικτα καὶ μεμιγμένα ἀγαθά

II.7.5m

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἄμικτα, οἷον ἐπιστήμην, τὰ δὲ μεμιγμένα, οἷον εὐτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, εὐζωίαν. Ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν εὐτεκνία κτῆσις τέκνων κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα σπουδαία, ἡ δὲ εὐγηρία χρῆσις σπουδαία γήρους κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἡ εὐζωία.

Αἱ ἀνάλογοι διαιρέσεις τῶν κακῶν

II.7.5n

Φανερὸν δὲ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ τῶν κακῶν αἱ ὅμοιαι διαιρέσεις ἔσονται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Unmixed and Mixed Goods

II.7.5m

Again, of goods, some are unmixed, such as knowledge, and some mixed, such as flourishing in one's children, a good old age, and a good life.[282] Flourishing in one's children is a worthy possession of children in accordance with nature; a good old age is a worthy use of old age in accordance with nature; and a good life is similar.[283]

The Corresponding Divisions of Evils

II.7.5n

In these cases it is always clear that evils too will have the corresponding divisions.[284]

282. "Mixed" and "unmixed" retain μεμιγμένα and ἄμικτα. The following definitions combine having children or old age with worthy possession or use. The translation does not silently turn the examples into the bare possession of numerous children, longevity, or prosperity.

283. Wachsmuth prints κτῆσις, "possession," in the children definition and χρῆσις, "use," in the old-age definition; the distinction is preserved. The final "similar" leaves the good-life definition compressed, as in the Greek, rather than supplying a full sentence not printed in the source.

284. This brief sentence extends the preceding classifications to evils without spelling out another set of examples. The English follows Wachsmuth's printed wording and does not manufacture the omitted lists.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 74

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτόν

II.7.5o

Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτόν. Αἱρετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς κινητικόν, <ληπτὸν δὲ ὃ εὐλογίστως ἐκλεγόμεθα>. Ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ ληπτοῦ, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸ <καθ’> αὑθ’ αἱρετὸν τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ληπτοῦ, καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 75

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choiceworthy and To Be Taken

II.7.5o

They say that what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be taken. What is choiceworthy moves an impulse complete in itself; <what is to be taken is what we reasonably select>.[285] As what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be taken, so what is choiceworthy <for> itself differs from what is to be taken for itself, and, in general, the good differs from what has value.[286]

285. Αἱρετόν is “choiceworthy,” while ληπτόν is “to be taken.” The distinction is expressed through impulse and reasonable selection, not merely through two English synonyms for desire. The whole definition of what is to be taken is supplied by Wachsmuth and remains bracketed in both languages. “Complete in itself” renders αὐτοτελής without adding a separate object for the impulse.

286. The passage extends the distinction to what is choiceworthy for itself and what is to be taken for itself, then to good and value. The supplied καθ’ in the first expression is represented by bracketed “for.” Wachsmuth suspects missing material before this paragraph in his apparatus, but prints no gap marker in the running text; no invented continuation is inserted here.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 75

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐδαιμονία κατὰ φύσιν II.7.6

Τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ζῴου λογικοῦ θνητοῦ, φύσει πολιτικοῦ, φασὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ζωὴν ἀκόλουθον ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην φύσει.

Ζήνωνος καὶ Κλεάνθους ὅροι τοῦ τέλους II.7.6a.1

Τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· ‘τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν’· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων. Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον προσδιαρθροῦντες οὕτως ἐξέφερον ‘ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν’ ὑπολαβόντες ἔλαττον εἶναι κατηγόρημα τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ῥηθέν. Κλεάνθης γὰρ πρῶτος διαδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν αἵρεσιν προσέθηκε ‘τῇ φύσει’ καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· ‘τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν’.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Virtue and Happiness in Accordance with Nature II.7.6

Since a human being is a mortal rational animal, social by nature, they say that all human virtue and happiness are a life of consistency and agreement with nature.[287]

Zeno and Cleanthes on the End II.7.6a.1

Zeno defined the end thus: “to live in agreement.” This means living according to a single, harmonious rational principle, since those who live in conflict are unhappy.[288] Those after him made the formulation more explicit: “to live in agreement with nature,” taking the predicate stated by Zeno to be incomplete. For Cleanthes, the first to succeed him in the school, added “with nature” and defined it thus: “The end is to live in agreement with nature.”[289]

287. Πολιτικός describes the human being as social or fitted for civic life. The compressed sentence predicates a consistent life, in agreement with nature, of human virtue and happiness. It does not introduce bodily health, wealth, or success as additional requirements for happiness. The following formulations explain the agreement in different ways.

288. The first formula is simply ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, “to live in agreement.” “With nature” is not silently inserted into Zeno’s words. The explanatory λόγος is rendered “rational principle”; ἕνα and σύμφωνον qualify its unity and harmony. The opposing condition is living in conflict, μαχομένως, not merely disagreement in conversation.

289. The account explicitly attributes the addition τῇ φύσει to Cleanthes and presents it as making an incomplete predicate more explicit. This is the history given by the source. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.87, whose report associates the fuller formula with Zeno; that parallel has not replaced the wording or attribution printed here.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 75-76

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χρυσίππου Διογένους καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου ὅροι II.7.6a.2

Ὅπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ‘ζῆν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων’. Διογένης δέ· ‘εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ’. Ἀρχέδημος δέ· ‘πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν’.

Ἀντιπάτρου ὅροι τοῦ τέλους II.7.6a.3

Ἀντίπατρος δέ· ‘ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηνεκῶς’. Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδιδον· ‘πᾶν τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν’.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Chrysippus Diogenes and Archedemus on the End

II.7.6a.2

Chrysippus, wishing to make this clearer, expressed it thus: “to live in accordance with experience of what happens by nature.” Diogenes said: “to reason well in selecting and rejecting things in accordance with nature.”[290] Archedemus said: “to live carrying out all appropriate actions.”[291]

Antipater on the End

II.7.6a.3

Antipater said: “to live continually selecting what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to nature.”[292] They also frequently defined it thus: “continually and unswervingly to do everything in one’s power toward obtaining the things preferred in accordance with nature.”[293]

290. Diogenes is the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, as at II.7.5b6. In his formula, both selection and rejection govern “things in accordance with nature.” The English does not replace this with selecting natural things and rejecting unnatural things, the explicit contrast in Antipater’s following formula. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.88 for the related formulations.

291. Καθήκοντα are appropriate actions, the term used in the earlier divisions of ethics at II.7.2. Archedemus’s formula is preserved separately from reasoning well in selection and from living according to experience. The shared subject does not make the three statements identical quotations.

292. The placement of διηνεκῶς, “continually,” makes the selection and rejection an ongoing manner of life. Both sides of the contrast, κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν, are explicit here. The wording therefore differs from the preceding Diogenes formula.

293. The following verb is plural, ἀπέδιδον, “they defined,” rather than a singular naming Antipater again. The English retains that shift. “Everything in one’s power” renders πᾶν τὸ καθ’ αὑτόν. The aim is obtaining naturally preferred things, but the formula defines the end through one’s continual, unswerving effort toward them; it does not state that every desired external result must be attained.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τρεῖς σημασίαι τοῦ τέλους

II.7.6b

Τὸ δὲ τέλος λέγεσθαι τριχῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης· τό τε γὰρ τελικὸν ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι τέλος ἐν τῇ φιλολόγῳ συνηθείᾳ, ὡς τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλος εἶναι· λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν τέλος, οἷον τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον ἀναφορικῶς λέγοντες ἐπὶ τὸ παρακείμενον κατηγόρημα· κατὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον σημαινόμενον λέγουσι τέλος τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν, ἐφ’ ὃ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι.

Τέλος καὶ σκοπός

II.7.6c

Διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ σκοπὸν ἡγοῦνται· σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκείμενον σῶμα, οὗ τυχεῖν ἐφίεσθαι * * * τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας στοχαζομένους, διὰ τὸ πάντα μὲν σπουδαῖον εὐδαιμονεῖν, πάντα δὲ φαῦλον ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων κακοδαιμονεῖν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 76-77

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Three Senses of the End

II.7.6b

Those of this school use “end” in three senses. In learned usage the final good is called an end, as when they say that agreement is the end.[294] They also call the target an end, for example the life in agreement, speaking by reference to the corresponding predicate. In the third sense they call the end the ultimate among the objects of desire, to which all the others are referred.[295]

End and Target

II.7.6c

They hold that end and target differ. The target, they say, is the body set before one, which those who aim at happiness strive to attain [text missing],[296] since every virtuous person is happy and, conversely, every base person is unhappy.[297]

294. Φιλόλογος συνήθεια is learned usage here, rather than a modern discipline of literary criticism or merely an educated conversation. The first sense concerns the final good; its example is agreement, ὁμολογία. The paragraph describes three uses of a word rather than positing three different ultimate ends.

295. The target example is the life in agreement, ὁμολογούμενος βίος, related to the predicate “to live in agreement.” The third sense concerns the ultimate object to which the other objects of desire are referred. Compare the earlier target/end distinction at II.7.3c and the explicit attainment distinction below at II.7.6e.

296. The printed word is σῶμα, “body”; Wachsmuth records a conjectural σῆμα, “mark,” but does not print it. The English therefore preserves the corporeal expression instead of replacing it with an ordinary archery target. The asterisks mark a gap after ἐφίεσθαι, “strive,” before the Greek subject “those who aim at happiness.” English word order moves the subject before the verb while retaining the gap after “attain.”

297. The surviving explanation is incomplete. No missing definition of the end is reconstructed here. The closing contrast between every virtuous and every base person is the claim of this Stoic exposition; it concerns happiness in the ethical sense of a good life, not a guarantee that every virtuous person continually feels gladness.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 76-77

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ ἀναγκαῖα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν II.7.6d.1

Καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, τὰ δὲ μή. Καὶ ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τάς τε ἀρετὰς πάσας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς χρηστικὰς αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ χαράν τε καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα.

Κακὰ ἀναγκαῖα πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν II.7.6d.2

Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ὡς ἂν κακὰ πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα· ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τάς τε κακίας πάσας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ τά τε πάθη πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀρρωστήματα καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια.

Τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὡς τέλος II.7.6e.1

Τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, ἔτι, ταὐτοῦ ὄντος, ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. Τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ Ζήνων ὡρίσατο τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὔροια βίου.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods Necessary for Happiness II.7.6d.1

Of goods, some are necessary for happiness and some are not. All the virtues and the activities that exercise them are necessary; joy, gladness, and cultivated pursuits are not necessary.[298]

Evils Necessary for Unhappiness II.7.6d.2

Similarly, of evils, some are necessary, as evils, for unhappiness, and some are not necessary. All the vices and the activities based on them are necessary; all the passions, the infirmities, and similar things are not necessary.[299]

Being Happy as the End II.7.6e.1

They say that the end is being happy, for the sake of which everything is done, while it itself is done for the sake of nothing else. This consists in living in accordance with virtue, in living in agreement, and further, since it is the same thing, in living in accordance with nature.[300] Zeno defined happiness thus: "Happiness is a good flow of life."[301]

298. Χρηστικαὶ ἐνέργειαι are activities that put the virtues to use. The distinction between necessary and unnecessary goods retains joy, gladness, and pursuits as goods while denying that they are requirements of happiness. Compare their earlier classifications at II.7.5a, 5c, and 5g.

299. "Necessary" specifies what constitutes the unhappy condition in this ethical account; it does not recommend acquiring an evil. The qualification ὡς ἂν κακά is retained as "as evils." The source lists passions and infirmities among the unnecessary evils without replacing them by particular examples such as distress or fear. Ἐπ' αὐτῶν is rendered "based on them," referring to the vices.

300. The subject of the definition is τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, the activity expressed by "being happy," rather than simply the noun "happiness." The three formulations explain the same activity through virtue, agreement, and nature. The Greek explicitly states their identity; the English does not add further conditions to the definition.

301. Εὔροια is a good or favorable flow, and βίου means "of life." The image describes the course of a life rather than an isolated pleasant feeling. The following sentence reports that Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors also used this definition.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ τυχεῖν αὐτῆς

II.7.6e.2

Κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὅρῳ τούτῳ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντες, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἑτέραν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίου, καίτοι γε λέγοντες, τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι, τέλος δ' εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν

II.7.6e.3

Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι ἰσοδυναμεῖ 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν' καὶ 'τὸ καλῶς ζῆν' καὶ 'τὸ εὖ ζῆν' καὶ πάλιν 'τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν' καὶ 'ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ μέτοχον ἀρετῆς'· καὶ ὅτι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶν αἰσχρὸν κακόν· δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ Στωϊκὸν τέλος ἴσον δύνασθαι τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν βίῳ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 77-78

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Happiness and Its Attainment

II.7.6e.2

Cleanthes too used this definition in his own writings, as did Chrysippus and all their successors. They say that happiness is no different from the happy life, although they also say that happiness is set before one as the target, while the end is attaining happiness, which is the same as being happy.[302]

Living in Accordance with Nature and Virtue

II.7.6e.3

It is therefore clear from these points that "living in accordance with nature," "living nobly," and "living well" are equivalent; and likewise "the noble and good" and "virtue and what participates in virtue."[303] Every good is noble, and similarly every shameful thing is evil. Hence the Stoic end is equivalent to the life in accordance with virtue.[304]

302. The source distinguishes happiness as the target from attaining it as the end, while identifying attainment with being happy. Καίτοι γε marks the qualification, retained as "although." The English preserves the distinction without treating it as a second, competing definition of the happy life. Compare the earlier formulation of target and attainment at II.7.3c.

303. The paired expressions distinguish virtue from what participates in virtue, rather than identifying virtue alone with every instance of good. The printed κἀγαθόν contracts καὶ ἀγαθόν. The English follows this source's formulation and keeps the ethical sense of καλόν, "noble," visible beside "good."

304. The printed assertion is "every shameful thing is evil," πᾶν αἰσχρὸν κακόν. It has not been silently reversed to "every evil is shameful." The conclusion is an equivalence in meaning between the Stoic end and the life in accordance with virtue, expressed by ἴσον δύνασθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 77-78

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱρετὸν καὶ αἱρετέον

II.7.6f.1

Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετέον. Αἱρετὸν μὲν εἶναι <ἀγαθὸν> πᾶν, αἱρετέον δὲ ὠφέλημα πᾶν, ὃ θεωρεῖται παρὰ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Δι’ ὃ αἱρούμεθα μὲν τὸ αἱρετέον, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, ὃ θεωρεῖται παρὰ τὸ ἔχειν φρόνησιν· τὸ δὲ αἱρετὸν οὐχ αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἔχειν αὐτὸ αἱρούμεθα.

Ὑπομονὴ καὶ ἐμμονή

II.7.6f.2

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ καὶ ἀνάλογον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατωνόμασται· τὰ δὲ ὠφελήματα πάντα ὑπομενετέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα. Καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς κακίας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 78

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choiceworthy and To Be Chosen

II.7.6f.1

They say that what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be chosen. Every <good> is choiceworthy; every benefit is to be chosen, and is considered in connection with having the good.[305] We therefore choose what is to be chosen, for example thinking wisely, which is considered in connection with having practical wisdom. We do not choose what is choiceworthy; if anything, we choose to have it.[306]

Endurance and Adherence

II.7.6f.2

Similarly, all goods are worthy of being endured and held to, and the same analogy applies to the other virtues, even if they have not been named. All benefits, however, are to be endured and held to.[307] The same account applies to the other cases concerning the vices.[308]

305. The distinction is between αἱρετόν, "choiceworthy," and the verbal adjective αἱρετέον, "to be chosen." It differs from the αἱρετόν / ληπτόν distinction at II.7.5o. Ὠφέλημα is a benefit, distinguished here from ἀγαθόν, a good. The supplied ἀγαθόν remains bracketed in English.

306. The example makes the distinction concrete: practical wisdom is the good one has, while thinking wisely is the activity chosen in connection with having it. The apparently paradoxical final sentence is retained, including εἰ ἄρα, "if anything." It does not silently become the simpler claim that all goods are chosen.

307. The pairs ὑπομενετά / ὑπομενετέα and ἐμμενετά / ἐμμενετέα extend the preceding distinction between what is choiceworthy and what is to be chosen. The translation uses "worthy of being" and "to be" to keep the verbal-adjective contrast visible. The Greek applies the first pair of descriptions to all goods, not just to hardships.

308. Wachsmuth prints ἀρετῶν, "virtues," where his apparatus records αἱρετῶν, "choiceworthy things." The English follows the printed reading, and retains the compressed concluding reference to the vices without inventing a list of opposite activities. His apparatus also notes that the discussion recurs later, on printed pp. 97–98.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 78

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων

II.7.7.1

Διειληλυθότες δ’ ἱκανῶς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ τέλους καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγησάμεθα καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν ἐπελθεῖν.

Δύο σημασίαι τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου

II.7.7.2

Ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν, καθ’ ὃ καὶ λέγεσθαί τινα καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα εἶναι, οἷον τὸ <ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ τὸ> προτεῖναι τὸν δάκτυλον ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδί, ἢ τὸ ἀνελέσθαι τι τῶν ἐμποδών, κάρφος ἢ φύλλον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 79

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

On Indifferent Things

II.7.7.1

Having discussed sufficiently goods and evils, choiceworthy and avoidable things, and the end and happiness, we considered it necessary also to go through what is said about indifferent things in its proper order.[309]

Two Senses of Indifferent

II.7.7.2

They say that indifferent things lie between goods and evils, explaining that "indifferent" is understood in two senses. In one sense it means what is neither good nor evil, and neither choiceworthy nor avoidable. In the other it means what stimulates neither impulse nor aversion; in this sense some things are also said to be altogether indifferent.[310] Examples are <having an even number of hairs on one's head or an odd number, or> extending a finger this way or that, or picking up something lying in the way, a piece of straw or a leaf.[311]

309. The first-person "we" belongs to the exposition preserved in the anthology. Wachsmuth questions whether "and choiceworthy and avoidable things" was added by a copyist from an earlier heading, but prints the words without deletion brackets; they are therefore translated here. "Indifferent" is a technical classification, explained in the following sentences, rather than an instruction to feel unconcerned.

310. Ὁρμή and ἀφορμή are rendered "impulse" and "aversion." The first sense concerns good and evil, and the corresponding choiceworthy/avoidable distinction. The second concerns whether something stimulates movement toward or away from it. The following paragraph expressly denies that everything indifferent in the first sense is also indifferent for selection.

311. The angle brackets preserve Wachsmuth's supplement, including the alternative connecting the hair example to the finger example. His apparatus cites Diogenes Laertius VII.104 and Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians XI.59–61 as parallels. The repeated ὡδί means "in this way"; "this way or that" expresses the contrast between the two gestures.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐκλογὴ καὶ ἀπεκλογή

II.7.7.3

Κατὰ τὸ πρότερον δὴ λεκτέον τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, οὐ μὴν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογήν· δι’ ὃ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀξίαν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἔχειν, τὰ δ’ ἀπαξίαν ἀπεκλεκτικήν, συμβλητικὴν δ’ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον.

Κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν

II.7.7a.1

Καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν. Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὑγίειαν, ἰσχύν, αἰσθητηρίων ἀρτιότητα, καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, πήρωσιν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οὔτε δὲ παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν· ψυχῆς κατάστασιν καὶ σώματος, καθ’ ἣν ἡ μέν ἐστι φαντασιῶν ψευδῶν δεκτική, τὸ δὲ τραυμάτων καὶ πηρώσεων δεκτικόν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 79-80

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Selection and Rejection II.7.7.3

It must therefore be said that, according to those of this school, things between virtue and vice are called indifferent in the former sense, but not with regard to selection and rejection. Hence some have value for selection and others disvalue for rejection, but no value that contributes to the happy life.[312]

In Accordance with and Contrary to Nature II.7.7a.1

Some are in accordance with nature, others contrary to nature, and others neither contrary to nor in accordance with nature. In accordance with nature are such things as health, strength, soundness of the sense organs, and things like these. Contrary to nature are such things as disease, weakness, impairment, and the like. Neither contrary to nor in accordance with nature is the condition of soul and body in which the soul is receptive to false impressions and the body susceptible to wounds and impairments, and things like these.[313]

312. The former sense is explicitly the one defined through neither good nor evil. Ἐκλογή and ἀπεκλογή, “selection” and “rejection,” remain distinct from the technical choiceworthiness and avoidability of goods and evils. Value among indifferent things can guide selection without becoming an additional constituent of happiness. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.105.

313. The third class concerns receptivity or susceptibility, not an actual false judgment or an actual wound. The Greek first names a condition of soul and body, then differentiates what each can receive. Πήρωσις denotes impairment or disablement; the examples classify bodily conditions without identifying them as moral vice.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 79-80

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πρὸς τί ἐστιν ἀδιάφορα II.7.7a.2

Ποιεῖσθαι δὲ λέγουσι τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον <ἀπὸ> τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. Τὸ γὰρ διαφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων εἶναι. Διότι κἂν, φασί, λέγωμεν ἀδιάφορα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως ζῆν (ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὸ εὐδαιμόνως) ἀδιάφορά φαμεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμήν.

Προηγμένα καὶ ἀποπροηγμένα II.7.7b.1

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν πλείο ἀξίαν ἔχειν, τὰ δ’ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά· καὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα, τὰ δ’ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δ’ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα. Προηγμένα μέν, ὅσα ἀδιάφορα ὄντα πολλὴν ἔχει ἀξίαν, ὡς ἐν ἀδιαφόροις· ἀποπροηγμένα δέ, ὅσα πολλὴν ἔχει ἀπαξίαν ὁμοίως· οὔτε δὲ προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, ὅσα μήτε πολλὴν ἔχει <ἀξίαν μήτε> ἀπαξίαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 80

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

In What Respect They Are Indifferent

II.7.7a.2

They say that the account of these things is to be made <from> the primary things in accordance with and contrary to nature. For what makes a difference and what is indifferent belong among things spoken of in relation to something.[314] Thus, they say, even when we call bodily and external things indifferent, we say they are indifferent in relation to living becomingly, in which living happily consists; by Zeus, not in relation to being in a condition in accordance with nature, nor in relation to impulse and aversion.[315]

Preferred and Dispreferred Things

II.7.7b.1

Further, among indifferent things some have more value and others less. Some have it in themselves, others through what they produce. Some are preferred, others dispreferred, and others neither.[316] Preferred things are those which, though indifferent, have much value, as value is reckoned among indifferent things. Dispreferred things are those which similarly have much disvalue. Neither preferred nor dispreferred are those which have neither much <value nor> disvalue.[317]

314. “From” preserves the supplied ἀπό. The claim that these terms are relative requires the reader to ask “indifferent in relation to what?” It explains why the same bodily or external thing can be indifferent in one respect and make a difference in another.

315. Εὐσχημόνως ζῆν is living becomingly or properly; the parenthesis identifies this with living happily. Κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν concerns being in a natural condition here, including bodily conditions. It is not silently substituted for the ethical end, “living in accordance with nature,” defined in II.7.6. The emphatic oath “by Zeus” is retained.

316. The compressed καθ’ αὐτά / ποιητικά distinguishes value in itself from value through production of something else. The English supplies “have it” from the preceding reference to value; it does not call the indifferent things goods. Προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα are the terms rendered “preferred” and “dispreferred.”

317. “As value is reckoned among indifferent things” preserves ὡς ἐν ἀδιαφόροις, the explicit limit on this valuation. In the third class the supplied ἀξίαν μήτε remains bracketed. “Much” qualifies both sides of the comparison; the text need not be read as denying every small degree of value. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.105–106.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Προηγμένα περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐκτός II.7.7b.2

Τῶν δὲ προηγμένων τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός. Περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα· εὐφυΐαν, προκοπήν, μνήμην, ὀξύτητα διανοίας, ἕξιν καθ’ ἣν ἐπίμονοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τέχνας ὅσαι δύνανται συνεργεῖν ἐπιπλέον πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον· περὶ σῶμα δ’ εἶναι προηγμένα ὑγίειαν, εὐαισθησίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· τῶν δ’ ἐκτὸς γονεῖς, τέκνα, κτῆσιν σύμμετρον, ἀποδοχὴν παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.

Ἀποπροηγμένα II.7.7b.3

Τῶν δ’ ἀποπροηγμένων περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς εἰρημένοις· περὶ σῶμα δὲ καὶ ἐκτὸς τὰ ὁμοίως ἀντιτιθέμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις περί τε σῶμα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς προηγμένοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 80-81

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Preferred Things of Soul Body and Externals

II.7.7b.2

Of preferred things, some concern the soul, others the body, and others are external. Those concerning the soul include natural aptitude, progress, memory, sharpness of thought, a state in which people persevere in appropriate actions, and such arts as can contribute further to a life in accordance with nature.[318] Preferred things concerning the body include health, keenness of perception, and the like; external ones include parents, children, moderate possessions, and acceptance among people.[319]

Dispreferred Things

II.7.7b.3

Of dispreferred things, those concerning the soul are the opposites of the things just mentioned. Those concerning the body and external things are likewise the opposites of the bodily things just mentioned and of the external preferred things.[320]

318. Progress, προκοπή, and natural aptitude are listed among preferred indifferents, rather than identified with completed virtue. The arts are qualified: only those able to contribute to the natural life are included here. Καθήκοντα retains the translation “appropriate actions.”

319. Κτῆσις σύμμετρος means possessions in due or moderate measure; the source does not simply list unlimited wealth. Ἀποδοχή is acceptance or favorable reception among people. These items are still classified as preferred indifferents, despite the importance of family and social relations in ordinary life.

320. The source refers back to its preceding list rather than spelling out each opposite. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records a longer list in scholia on Lucian; it is not incorporated into the facing Greek or translated as though it belonged to this passage.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 80-81

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα

II.7.7b.4

Οὔτε δὲ προηγμένα οὔτ’ ἀποπροηγμένα περὶ ψυχὴν <μὲν> φαντασίαν καὶ συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· περὶ δὲ σῶμα λευκότητα καὶ μελανότητα καὶ χαροπότητα καὶ ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο. Τῶν δ’ ἐκτὸς οὔτε προηγμένα <οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα> εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα εὐτελῆ ὄντα καὶ μηδὲν χρήσιμον προσφερόμενα μικρὰν παντελῶς ἔχει τὴν ἀφ’ αὑτῶν χρείαν.

Ἡ ἀξία τῶν περὶ ψυχήν

II.7.7b.5

Τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὔσης κυριωτέρας τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν φασὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ φύσιν ὄντα καὶ προηγμένα πλείονα τὴν ἀξίαν ἔχειν τῶν περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον εὐφυΐαν ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεράγειν τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐφυΐας καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 81-82

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Neither Preferred nor Dispreferred

II.7.7b.4

Neither preferred nor dispreferred among things concerning the soul are impression, assent, and the like. Among bodily things are whiteness, blackness, brightness of the eyes, all pleasure and pain, and anything else of this kind.[321] Among external things, neither preferred <nor dispreferred> are such things as, being of little worth and offering nothing useful, provide altogether little service in themselves.[322]

The Value of Things Concerning the Soul

II.7.7b.5

Since the soul has greater authority than the body also in relation to living in accordance with nature, they say that preferred things concerning the soul and in accordance with nature have more value than bodily and external things. For example, the soul's natural aptitude for virtue surpasses the body's natural aptitude, and the same holds in the other cases.[323]

321. The source lists impression and assent without further qualification, and prints "all pleasure," ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν. Those expressions are retained rather than narrowed to selected kinds. Χαροπότης denotes brightness or a light coloring of the eyes; "brightness of the eyes" keeps the bodily example distinct from joy or gladness. See Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, s.v. χαροπότης.

322. The supplied μέν structures the contrast between soul and body and is expressed by the parallel English sentences. The more substantial supplement "nor dispreferred" remains bracketed. The final description distinguishes trivial external things from the family relations and possessions just listed as preferred.

323. The comparison ranks preferred indifferents; it does not turn aptitude for virtue into virtue itself. Wachsmuth prints "value," ἀξίαν, where his apparatus records εὐεξίαν, "good condition." The translation follows the printed comparison of value.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 81-82

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ ὁρμῆς καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά

II.7.7c

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι ὁρμῆς κινητικά, τὰ δὲ ἀφορμῆς, τὰ δὲ οὔτε ὁρμῆς οὔτε ἀφορμῆς. Ὁρμῆς μὲν οὖν κινητικά, ἅπερ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν· ἀφορμῆς δὲ ὅσα παρὰ φύσιν· οὔτε δὲ ὁρμῆς οὔτε ἀφορμῆς τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷά ἐστι τὸ περιττὰς ἢ ἀρτίας ἔχειν τὰς τρίχας.

Πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ μετοχήν

II.7.7d

Τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. Πρῶτα μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη, οἷον <ἀρτιότης καὶ> ὑγίεια καὶ αἴσθησις (λέγω δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν) καὶ ἰσχύς. Κατὰ μετοχὴν δέ, ὅσα μετέχει κινήσεως καὶ σχέσεως κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιεινὸν καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 82

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

What Stimulates Impulse and Aversion II.7.7c

Further, they say that some indifferent things stimulate impulse, others aversion, and others neither impulse nor aversion. What stimulates impulse is precisely what we said was in accordance with nature; what stimulates aversion is what is contrary to nature. What stimulates neither impulse nor aversion is what is neither, such as having an odd or an even number of hairs.[324]

Primarily Natural and Natural by Participation II.7.7d

Of indifferent things that are in accordance with nature, some are primarily in accordance with nature and others by participation. Primarily in accordance with nature is an activity or condition arising in accordance with the seminal principles, such as <soundness and> health, perception (I mean apprehension), and strength.[325] In accordance with nature by participation are things that participate in activity and condition in accordance with the seminal principles, such as a sound hand, a healthy body, and unimpaired senses. The same holds by analogy for things contrary to nature.[326]

324. This restates the threefold distinction in terms of impulse and aversion. The hair example returns to the second sense of “indifferent” at II.7.7.2, where it was supplied by the editor; here it occurs in the unbracketed printed text. The order is now odd or even, as in the Greek.

325. Σπερματικοὶ λόγοι are the seminal principles already mentioned at II.7.3c: formative rational principles, not spoken arguments. Κίνησις and σχέσις retain “activity” and “condition,” as at II.7.5k. The parenthesis “I mean apprehension” belongs to the source and specifies its use of αἴσθησις; it is not an intervention by the translator. The supplied “soundness and” remains bracketed.

326. The distinction is illustrated by health and a healthy body, or soundness and a sound hand: the latter possess or participate in the former. The printed ὑγιεινόν is retained in the Greek. The closing analogy is not expanded into an invented list of contrary conditions.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ληπτὰ καθ’ αὑτά

II.7.7e.1

Πάντα δὲ <τὰ> κατὰ φύσιν ληπτὰ εἶναι καὶ πάντα τὰ <παρὰ> φύσιν ἄληπτα. Τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὰ ληπτὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα. Καθ’ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁρμῆς κινητικὰ προτρεπτικῶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτὰ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀντέχεσθαι αὐτῶν, οἷον ὑγίειαν, εὐαισθησίαν, ἀπονίαν καὶ κάλλος σώματος.

Ληπτὰ δι’ ἕτερα

II.7.7e.2

Ποιητικὰ <δέ>, ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁρμῆς κινητικὰ ἀνετικῶς ἐφ’ ἕτερα καὶ μὴ προτρεπτικῶς <ἐφ’ ἑαυτά>, οἷον πλοῦτον, δόξαν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθ’ αὑτὰ ἄληπτα, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τῶν καθ’ αὑτὰ ἀλήπτων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 82-83

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Things To Be Taken in Themselves II.7.7e.1

All things in accordance with nature are to be taken, and all things <contrary to> nature are not to be taken. Of things in accordance with nature, some are to be taken in themselves, others for the sake of other things.[327] Those to be taken in themselves stimulate impulse by urging us toward themselves or toward holding on to them, such as health, keenness of perception, freedom from pain, and bodily beauty.[328]

Things To Be Taken for the Sake of Others II.7.7e.2

Productive things, in contrast, stimulate impulse by allowing movement toward other things, rather than by urging it <toward themselves>, such as wealth, reputation, and the like.[329] Similarly, of things contrary to nature, some are not to be taken in themselves, and others because they produce things that are not to be taken in themselves.[330]

327. Ληπτά and ἄληπτα are “to be taken” and “not to be taken,” distinct from the choiceworthiness of goods at II.7.5o. The supplied article τὰ is expressed by “things”; the consequential supplied παρά, “contrary to,” remains bracketed. Without that supplement, the opening contrast would be lost.

328. Προτρεπτικῶς describes impulse urged directly toward the things themselves or their retention. Ἀπονία is freedom from pain, distinct from freedom from distress, ἀλυπία. These are still natural indifferents; “in themselves” does not reclassify them as the final good.

329. Ἀνετικῶς marks the permissive or enabling relation to other things, contrasted with the directly urging προτρεπτικῶς. The supplied δέ is expressed by “in contrast”; the supplied ἐφ’ ἑαυτά remains bracketed. Δόξα means reputation here, alongside wealth, rather than a belief or opinion.

330. The final distinction parallels things taken in themselves and things taken for what they produce. Wachsmuth does not print an explanatory expansion found in scholia on Lucian after the wealth/reputation examples; it has not been added to the translation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 82-83

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τρεῖς σημασίαι τῆς ἀξίας

II.7.7f.1

Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τήν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ· καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ὁ Ἀντίπατρος ἐκλεκτικὴν προσαγορεύει, καθ’ ἣν διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τάδε τινὰ μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρούμεθα, οἷον ὑγίειαν ἀντὶ νόσου καὶ ζωὴν ἀντὶ θανάτου καὶ πλοῦτον ἀντὶ πενίας. Κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπαξίαν τριχῶς φασὶ λέγεσθαι, ἀντιτιθεμένων τῶν σημαινομένων τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τρίτης ἀξίας εἰρημένοις.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Three Senses of Value

II.7.7f.1

All things in accordance with nature have value, and all things contrary to nature have disvalue. “Value” is used in three senses: contribution and worth in itself; an exchange equivalent determined by an appraiser; and the third, which Antipater calls “selective” value. In accordance with this third sense, as circumstances allow, we choose certain things rather than others, for example health rather than disease, life rather than death, and wealth rather than poverty.[331] By analogy, they say that “disvalue” too is used in three senses, the meanings being opposed to what was said concerning the third sense of value.[332]

331. The compressed first expression is δόσις καὶ τιμὴ καθ’ αὐτό, “contribution and worth in itself.” The following paragraph explains δόσις and the appraiser. The third sense is explicitly attributed to Antipater and concerns selection among indifferents. “As circumstances allow” preserves διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων; the examples do not state that health, life, or wealth must be selected under every possible condition.

332. Wachsmuth prints τρίτης, “third,” in the concluding comparison, correcting the transmitted πρώτης, “first,” recorded in his apparatus. The English retains the printed wording, including its compressed reference from the three senses of disvalue to the third sense of value. Diogenes’s following classification is not identical to Antipater’s.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 83-84

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διογένους περὶ δόσεως καὶ δοκιμαστοῦ II.7.7f.2

Τὴν δὲ δόσιν φησὶν ὁ Διογένης κρίσιν εἶναι, ἐφ’ ὅσον κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐφ’ ὅσον χρείαν τῇ φύσει παρέχεται. Τὸ δὲ δοκιμαστόν, οὐχ ὡς λέγεται τὰ πράγματα δοκιμαστὰ παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡς δοκιμαστὴν φαμεν εἶναι τὸν τὰ πράγματα δοκιμάζοντα· τῆς οὖν ἀμοιβῆς τὸν τοιοῦτόν φησι δοκιμαστὴν εἶναι.

Ἀξία καὶ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἑκάστῳ II.7.7f.3

Καὶ ταύτας μὲν τὰς δύο ἀξίας καθ’ ἃς λέγομέν τινα τῇ ἀξίᾳ προῆχθαι, τρίτην δέ φησιν εἶναι, καθ’ ἣν φαμεν ἀξίωμά τινα ἔχειν καὶ ἀξίαν, ἥπερ περὶ ἀδιάφορα οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνα τὰ σπουδαῖα. Χρῆσθαι δ’ ἡμᾶς φησιν ἐνίοτε τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς ἀξίας ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος· ὡς ἐν τῷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὅρῳ παρείληπται, ὅταν λέγηται εἶναι ἕξις ἀπονεμητικὴ τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ἑκάστῳ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 84

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Diogenes on Contribution and the Appraiser

II.7.7f.2

Diogenes says that contribution is an assessment of how far something is in accordance with nature or of how far it provides a service to nature.[333] "Appraiser" is to be understood, not in the sense in which things are said to be approved, but as we call the person who tests things an appraiser. He says, then, that such a person appraises the exchange equivalent.[334]

Value and What Is Due to Each

II.7.7f.3

These are the two senses of value in accordance with which we say that certain things have been advanced in value. He says there is a third, in accordance with which we say that someone has standing and worth; this does not concern indifferent things, but only things of moral excellence.[335] He says that we sometimes use the word "value" for what is due, as in the definition of justice, when it is called a state that distributes to each according to worth. For this means, as it were, what is due to each.[336]

333. Diogenes is the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. The text defines δόσις through κρίσις, an assessment or judgment, and relates it to naturalness and service to nature. The awkwardness of the terminology is not removed by replacing this definition with the different threefold account in Diogenes Laertius VII.105.

334. The explanation distinguishes the person who tests or assesses, δοκιμαστής, from the adjective δοκιμαστός applied to an approved or tested thing. It thus explains the personal sense of the preceding genitive τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ. Ἀμοιβή concerns an equivalent in exchange here, rather than an emotional reward or moral recompense.

335. The singular "he says" continues the report of Diogenes. His third sense concerns moral worth, whereas Antipater's preceding third sense concerned selection among indifferents. Both reports remain distinct. Ἀξίωμα here is standing or dignity, not the logical "proposition" encountered below at II.7.9b.

336. Ἐπιβάλλον is what falls to or is due to someone. The closing sentence explains the use of ἀξία in the definition of justice rather than introducing a further preferred indifferent. Compare the earlier discussion of justice at II.7.5b1 and the related definition in the Platonic Definitions, 411E, cited in Wachsmuth's apparatus.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πολλὴ καὶ βραχεῖα ἀξία

II.7.7g.1

Τῶν δ’ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν. Τὰ μὲν <οὖν> πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς πράγμασι. Προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον <ὂν> ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον. Τὸν δ’ ὅμοιον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ταὐτά.

Ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτόν

II.7.7g.2

Οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. Τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τῶν προηγμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένους.

Προτίμησις καὶ εὐδαιμονία

II.7.7g.3

Προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι, οὐ τῷ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ συμβάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ ἀποπροηγμένα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 84-85

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Much and Little Value

II.7.7g.1

Of things that have value, some have much value and others little. Similarly, of things that have disvalue, some have much disvalue and others little. <Therefore> those with much value are called preferred and those with much disvalue dispreferred, Zeno having been the first to give these names to the things. They say that a preferred thing is something which, <being> indifferent, we select on the basis of a predominant reason. The same account applies to a dispreferred thing, and the examples correspond by analogy.[337]

The King and Those Ranked After Him

II.7.7g.2

None of the goods is preferred, because goods have the greatest value. A preferred thing, occupying the second place and rank in value, comes in some way close to the nature of goods. For at a royal court the king is not among those preferred, but those ranked after him are.[338]

Preference and Happiness

II.7.7g.3

They are called preferred, not because they make some contribution to happiness and help to bring it about, but because it is necessary to select them in preference to dispreferred things.[339]

337. Προηγούμενος λόγος is a leading or predominant reason for selection, not necessarily a reason stated earlier in the exposition. The supplied οὖν and ὄν remain bracketed. The source credits Zeno with the terminology. The following royal-court analogy explains why “preferred,” literally advanced in rank, does not name the highest good.

338. The apparent paradox depends on the technical sense of προηγμένον. The king occupies the highest position; those “advanced” or “preferred” stand below him. Thus preferred indifferents have a subordinate rank, while goods are not merely preferred. Compare Cicero, On Ends III.16.52–53, which preserves the same analogy.

339. The necessity concerns selection in the comparison with dispreferred things. The text explicitly denies a contribution to happiness; it has not been softened into saying that preferred things make a small contribution. Circumstances were already acknowledged at II.7.7f.1.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 84-85

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὅρος τοῦ καθήκοντος II.7.8.1

Ἀκόλουθος δ’ ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος. Ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον· ‘τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει’· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως. Τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται· ‘τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ’.

Κατορθώματα καὶ μέσα καθήκοντα II.7.8.2

Τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. Κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν. Οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 85-86

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Definition of Appropriate Action II.7.8.1

Following the account of preferred things comes the topic of appropriate action. Appropriate action is defined as "what is consistent in life and, when done, admits of a reasonable defense"; what is contrary to appropriate action is the opposite.[340] This extends also to nonrational animals, for they too do something consistently with their own nature. For rational animals it is formulated thus: "what is consistent in a way of life."[341]

Correct Actions and Intermediate Appropriate Actions II.7.8.2

Some appropriate actions, they say, are complete, and these are also called correct actions. Correct actions are activities in accordance with virtue, such as thinking wisely and acting justly. Those which are not of this kind are not correct actions; they call them intermediate appropriate actions, rather than complete ones, such as marrying, serving as an ambassador, engaging in discussion, and the like.[342]

340. Καθῆκον retains "appropriate action," used earlier in this edition. Its definition includes both consistency in life and a reasonable defense of what is done. Ἀπολογία means a defense or justification, not an expression of regret. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.108 and Cicero, On Ends III.17.58.

341. The source first uses ζωή and then βίος in its formulation for rational animals; "life" and "a way of life" preserve that shift. The extension to nonrational animals is stated explicitly. The supplied δέ structures the contrast and is expressed through the English sentence division.

342. Κατόρθωμα is a correct action in the technical Stoic sense of an activity in accordance with virtue. The intermediate examples name kinds of activity without themselves specifying the agent's virtue. Πρεσβεύειν is serving on an embassy, rather than simply being older. Compare Cicero, On Ends III.18.59, on correct action as appropriate action perfectly performed.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κατορθώματα καὶ κατηγορούμενα ὠφελήματα II.7.8a.1

Τῶν δὲ κατορθωμάτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ὧν χρή, τὰ δ’ οὔ. Ὧν χρὴ μὲν εἶναι κατηγορούμενα ὠφελήματα, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ σωφρονεῖν· οὐκ εἶναι δὲ ὧν χρὴ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον τὴν αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι τεχνολογίαν.

Ἁμάρτημα καὶ τελείωσις τοῦ καθήκοντος II.7.8a.2

Πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον ἐν λογικῷ <ζῴῳ> γινόμενον ἁμάρτημα εἶναι· τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισί, ἐκλεγομένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ’ εὐθηνίαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθοίμεθα ἀπεριστάτως, μὴ ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Correct Actions and Benefits Expressed as Predicates II.7.8a.1

Of correct actions, some belong among things one ought to do, and others do not. What one ought to do consists of benefits expressed as predicates, such as thinking wisely and exercising temperance. Things not of this kind do not belong among what one ought to do.[343] The same technical classification applies similarly to things contrary to appropriate action.[344]

Error and the Completion of Appropriate Action II.7.8a.2

Everything contrary to appropriate action that occurs in a rational <animal> is an error; appropriate action, when brought to completion, becomes a correct action.[345] Intermediate appropriate action is measured against certain indifferent things, selected from among things contrary to and in accordance with nature, which afford such prosperity that, if we did not take or reject them when no special circumstances intervene, we could not be happy.[346]

343. The compressed ὧν χρή distinction is preserved rather than omitted because it seems unexpected after “correct actions.” Wachsmuth explains κατηγορούμενα as “being predicates.” The examples are infinitival activities, and the source calls them benefits, ὠφελήματα. Compare the good/benefit and choiceworthy/to-be-chosen distinctions at II.7.6f.

344. Τεχνολογία here is a systematic or technical classification, not modern technology. The source refers to an analogous classification of actions contrary to what is appropriate without spelling out the corresponding examples.

345. The supplied ζῴῳ, “animal,” remains bracketed. Ἁμάρτημα is an error or wrong action, not a physical impairment. “Brought to completion” preserves τελειωθέν and connects the correct action with the complete appropriate actions just defined.

346. This difficult sentence retains Wachsmuth’s printed conjecture εὐθηνίαν, “prosperity” or abundance. His apparatus records several alternative reconstructions. It uses “selected” of the two natural classes and then specifies taking or rejecting them. Ἀπεριστάτως is understood as the absence of special circumstances, not an obligation to pursue externals at any cost; compare Diogenes Laertius VII.109 on actions with and without special circumstances. The conditional claim concerns taking and rejecting, not a promise of happiness from possessing wealth or health.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 86

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φαντασία καὶ ὁρμή

II.7.9.1

Τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ’ ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν, τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπί τι κατὰ τὸ γένος. Ταύτης δ’ ἐν εἴδει θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γινομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις· οὐ κατωνομασμέναι δ’ εἰσίν. Ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις οὐκ ἔστι λογικὴ ὁρμή, ἀλλὰ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς εἶδος.

Λογικὴ ὁρμὴ καὶ ἀφορμή

II.7.9.2

Τὴν δὲ λογικὴν ὁρμὴν δεόντως ἄν τις ἀφορίσαιτο, λέγων εἶναι φορὰν διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν· ταύτῃ δ’ ἀντιτίθεσθαι ἀφορμήν, φοράν τινα <διανοίας ἀπό τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ μὴ πράττειν>.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 86-87

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Impression and Impulse

II.7.9.1

They say that what sets impulse in motion is nothing other than an impression of what is appropriate that directly prompts impulse; impulse, considered generically, is a movement of the soul toward something.[347] Under this genus are considered, as species, both the impulse occurring in rational animals and that in nonrational animals; these do not have names of their own. For desire is not rational impulse itself, but a species of rational impulse.[348]

Rational Impulse and Aversion

II.7.9.2

One could properly define rational impulse as a movement of thought toward something in the sphere of action. Opposed to it is aversion, a movement <of thought away from something in the sphere of not acting>.[349]

347. Φαντασία is an impression, and ὁρμητική describes its capacity to move impulse. The adverb αὐτόθεν is rendered "directly," describing how the impression prompts impulse. The general definition concerns movement toward something; the next paragraph distinguishes rational impulse and its opposite.

348. The statement about unnamed species refers to the rational and nonrational divisions under generic impulse. Ὄρεξις, "desire," is expressly a species of rational impulse rather than an interchangeable name for the whole. This broad term should also be distinguished from ἐπιθυμία, the passion discussed in the following section.

349. The substantial supplement after φοράν τινα remains bracketed. It supplies both "of thought" and the contrasting movement away, with the reference to not acting. The English preserves the printed formulation's asymmetry rather than replacing it with a simpler symmetrical definition of attraction and repulsion.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὄρουσις καὶ ἕξις ὁρμητική

II.7.9.3

Ἰδίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρουσιν ὁρμὴν λέγουσι τῆς πρακτικῆς ὁρμῆς οὖσαν εἶδος· εἶναι δὲ τὴν ὄρουσιν φορὰν διανοίας ἐπί τι μέλλον. Ὥστε μέχρι μὲν τούτων τετραχῶς ὁρμὴν λέγεσθαι, διχῶς δ’ ἀφορμήν· προστεθείσης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἕξεως τῆς ὁρμητικῆς, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἰδίως ὁρμὴν λέγουσιν, ἀφ’ ἧς συμβαίνει ὁρμᾶν, <ὁρμὴν> πενταχῶς.

Εἴδη τῆς πρακτικῆς ὁρμῆς

II.7.9a.1

Τῆς δὲ πρακτικῆς ὁρμῆς εἴδη πλείονα εἶναι, ἐν οἷς καὶ ταῦτα· πρόθεσιν, ἐπιβολήν, παρασκευήν, ἐγχείρησιν, <αἵρεσιν,> προαίρεσιν, βούλησιν, θέλησιν. Πρόθεσιν μὲν οὖν εἶναι λέγουσι σημείωσιν ἐπιτελέσεως· ἐπιβολὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν πρὸ ὁρμῆς· παρασκευὴν δὲ πρᾶξιν πρὸ πράξεως· ἐγχείρησιν δὲ ὁρμὴν ἐπί τινος ἐν χερσὶν ἤδη ὄντος·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Impulsion and the Impulsive State

II.7.9.3

They also call impulsion, which is a species of practical impulse, “impulse” in a special sense; impulsion is a movement of thought toward something future.[350] Thus, up to this point, “impulse” is used in four senses and “aversion” in two. With the addition of the impulsive state, which they also call “impulse” in a special sense and from which acting on impulse results, <“impulse”> is used in five senses.[351]

Kinds of Practical Impulse

II.7.9a.1

Practical impulse has several species, including intention, initiative, preparation, undertaking, <choice,> choice in advance, wish, and willingness.[352] They say that intention is a marking out of what is to be accomplished; initiative is an impulse before an impulse; preparation is an action before an action; undertaking is an impulse concerning something already in hand.[353]

350. “Impulsion” renders ὄρουσις, a particular movement toward something future, distinguished from the broader πρακτικὴ ὁρμή, practical impulse. The source explicitly counts different senses of the term ὁρμή, not five separate faculties introduced without relation to the definitions.

351. The added fifth sense is a state, ἕξις, from which impulsive activity occurs; it differs from the movement itself. The final supplied ὁρμήν remains bracketed in English. The count includes the generic use, the rational and nonrational species, and the special future-directed use before adding the state.

352. The supplied αἵρεσιν, “choice,” remains bracketed in the list, which the source presents as including these species rather than necessarily exhausting them. The following definitions distinguish terms which ordinary English can treat as near synonyms.

353. The compressed definitions are retained, especially “impulse before an impulse” and “action before an action.” They describe preliminary movement and preparation without supplying an unstated psychological sequence. “In hand” renders ἐν χερσίν, indicating an undertaking already before the agent.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἵρεσις βούλησις καὶ θέλησις

II.7.9a.2

Αἵρεσιν δὲ βούλησιν ἐξ ἀναλογισμοῦ· προαίρεσιν δὲ αἵρεσιν πρὸ αἱρέσεως· βούλησιν δὲ εὔλογον ὄρεξιν· θέλησιν δὲ ἑκούσιον βούλησιν.

Συγκατάθεσις καὶ κατηγορήματα

II.7.9b

Πάσας δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν. Ἤδη δὲ ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπ’ ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμάς· καὶ συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιώμασί τισιν, ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα, τὰ περιεχόμενά πως ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν, οἷς συγκατατίθεσθαι. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν εἴδει τὸ πάθος τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐστι, λέγωμεν ἑξῆς περὶ παθῶν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 87-88

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choice Wish and Willingness

II.7.9a.2

Choice is wish arising from reflection; choice in advance is choice before a choice; wish is reasonable desire; willingness is voluntary wish.[354]

Assent and Predicates

II.7.9b

All impulses are assents, but practical impulses also contain the element that moves to action. Assents are directed to one thing, impulses toward another: assents to certain propositions, impulses toward predicates somehow contained in the propositions to which assent is given.[355] Since passion is a species of impulse, let us next speak about passions.[356]

354. Βούλησις is "wish," defined here by εὔλογος ὄρεξις, "reasonable desire"; compare Diogenes Laertius VII.116. Θέλησις adds voluntariness, and προαίρεσις adds the explicit relation of one choice preceding another. The definitions are not collapsed into a single modern term such as will or decision.

355. Ἀξίωμα is a proposition here, distinct from "standing" in II.7.7f.3. Κατηγόρημα is a predicate, the practical content toward which impulse moves. As an illustrative paraphrase, assenting to "it is appropriate for me to walk" differs in object from an impulse toward "to walk." The example explains the distinction and is not added to the translated source.

356. The closing first-person exhortation belongs to the exposition. It marks the transition to the account of passions in II.7.10. The classification of passion as a species of impulse is retained without anticipating its fuller definition.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 87-88

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πάθος καὶ πτοία

II.7.10.1

Πάθος δ’ εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς), διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι, <καὶ> πάλιν <πᾶν> πάθος πτοίαν.

Τὰ τέσσαρα πρῶτα πάθη

II.7.10.2

Τοῦ δὲ πάθους τοιούτου ὄντος ὑποληπτέον, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἶναι καὶ ἀρχηγά, τὰ δ’ εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν. Πρῶτα δ’ εἶναι τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν. Ἐπιγίνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἡδονὴν μὲν ὅταν τυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ ἐκφύγωμεν ἃ ἐφοβούμεθα· λύπην δέ, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνωμεν ὧν ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ περιπέσωμεν οἷς ἐφοβούμεθα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 88

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Passion and Agitation

II.7.10.1

They say that passion is an excessive impulse disobedient to reason which chooses, or an <irrational> movement of the soul contrary to nature. (All passions belong to the ruling part of the soul.) Hence every agitation is a passion, <and> conversely <every> passion is an agitation.[357]

The Four Primary Passions

II.7.10.2

Since passion is of this kind, we must understand that some passions are primary and fundamental, while the others are referred to these. The four primary genera are craving, fear, distress, and pleasure.[358] Craving and fear come first: craving is directed toward an apparent good, fear toward an apparent evil. Pleasure and distress follow upon them: pleasure when we attain what we craved or escape what we feared; distress when we fail to attain what we craved or encounter what we feared.[359]

357. Πάθος is “passion” in the technical sense defined here. Πτοία, literally a fluttering or agitation, describes the soul’s disturbed movement, not every bodily tremor. The printed αἱροῦντι describes reason as choosing or deciding; II.7.10a explains disobedience to it. The supplied ἄλογον, καί, and πᾶν remain bracketed. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.110–111 for the general definition and fourfold division.

358. Ἐπιθυμία is rendered “craving” in this classification, to distinguish the passion from ὄρεξις, “desire,” of which it is a disobedient form (II.7.10b). Earlier “appetite” likewise rendered ἐπιθυμία, for example at II.7.5b9. Here λύπη is the broad genus “distress,” which includes mourning and other specific forms of grief.

359. The source speaks of what appears good or evil, not what truly is so. It first orders craving and fear before pleasure and distress, then explains the latter through attainment, escape, failure, and encounter. Pleasure here is the passion; the earlier listing of pleasure among bodily indifferents at II.7.7b does not supply its present definition.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Δόξα καὶ τὸ πρόσφατον II.7.10.3

Ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν, ἐπεὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι, παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως, τὸ δὲ πρόσφατον ἀντὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου <ἢ> ἐπάρσεως.

Τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ὁ ἀπειθὴς ἵππος II.7.10a.1

Τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν οὐ κοινῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ‘ἄλογον’ ἴσον τῷ ἀπειθὲς τῷ λόγῳ. Πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπό τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό, παρ’ ὃ καὶ πολλάκις τινὰς ἐξομολογεῖσθαι λέγοντας τὸ θρυλούμενον τοῦτο:

Γνώμην δ’ ἔχοντά μ’ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται·
γνώμην γὰρ λέγει νῦν τὴν εἴδησιν καὶ γνῶσιν τῶν ὀρθῶν πραγμάτων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 88-89

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Opinion and Freshness

II.7.10.3

In the case of all the soul's passions, since they say that these are opinions, "opinion" is to be understood as a weak supposition, and "fresh" as capable of bringing about an irrational contraction <or> uplift.[360]

Irrationality and the Disobedient Horse

II.7.10a.1

"Irrational" and "contrary to nature" are not used in their ordinary sense: "irrational" is equivalent to "disobedient to reason." For every passion exerts force. Often people in the grip of passions see that it is advantageous not to do something, yet are carried away by the passion's intensity, as by a disobedient horse, and driven to do it. Hence people often acknowledge this by repeating the familiar saying:[361]

Though I have judgment, my nature compels me.
For "judgment" here means awareness and knowledge of what is right.[362]

360. "Fresh," πρόσφατον, is explained by its continuing power to move the soul. It need not mean merely recent in time. "Weak supposition" preserves ἀσθενὴς ὑπόληψις rather than replacing it with knowledge. Contraction and uplift anticipate the definitions of distress and pleasure below; the connecting ἤ, "or," is supplied by the editor.

361. The analogy explains a failure to obey reason despite seeing what is advantageous. "Irrational" does not mean that the person lacks the rational faculty altogether. The source itself immediately glosses the verse's γνώμη as knowledge of what is right.

362. Wachsmuth identifies the verse as Euripides, fragment 837 in Nauck's numbering, in an editorial parenthesis transferred here to the note. The quotation does not name a play or speaker. "My nature compels me" retains the verse's φύσις; this is a dramatic saying used in the argument, not a redefinition of the Stoic norm "according to nature."

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὸ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς τῶν παθῶν

II.7.10a.2

Καὶ τὸ ‘παρὰ φύσιν’ δ’ εἴληπται ἐν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ὑπογραφῇ, ὡς συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. Πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὀτῳοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠπατημένοι, λόγου χάριν περὶ <τοῦ> τὰς ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς εἶναι, διδαχθέντες ὅτι οὐκ εἰσιν, ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι, κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος.

Ἐπιθυμία καὶ δόξα ἀγαθοῦ

II.7.10b.1

Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἐπιθυμίαν λέγουσιν ὄρεξιν εἶναι ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ· αἴτιον δ’ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, οὗ παρόντος εὖ ἀπαλλάξομεν, τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς ἐχούσης τὸ ἀτάκτως κινητικὸν <πρόσφατον τοῦ ὄντως αὐτὸ ὀρεκτὸν εἶναι>.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 89-90

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Contrary to Nature and the Tyranny of Passions

II.7.10a.2

"Contrary to nature" too is used in the description of passion because passion occurs contrary to reason that is right and in accordance with nature. All who are in the grip of passions turn away from reason, but in a distinctive manner, unlike people mistaken about just anything. For those who are mistaken, for example about <the claim> that atoms are principles, abandon their judgment when taught that they are not.[363] But those in the grip of passions, even if they learn, even if they are taught otherwise—that they ought not to feel distress or fear, or in general to be subject to the soul's passions—still do not abandon these. Rather, the passions lead them into subjection to their tyranny.[364]

Craving and the Opinion of a Good

II.7.10b.1

They say, then, that craving is desire disobedient to reason. Its cause is the opinion that a good is approaching, in whose presence we shall fare well, the opinion itself possessing a <freshness arising from the belief that it really is to be desired> that stirs one in a disorderly way.[365]

363. The supplied τοῦ makes the following infinitival clause a noun phrase; <the claim> expresses its grammatical work in English. Atoms as principles are the example of a philosophical belief relinquished on instruction. The sentence is not a statement about modern atomic science.

364. The contrast concerns how people respond to correction: mistaken judgment yields to teaching in the example, whereas passion persists despite instruction. The text's strong imagery of disobedience and tyranny is retained without adding a separate irrational part of the soul.

365. The final bracketed phrase is supplied in Wachsmuth's Greek. It connects the opinion's "freshness" with the conviction that its object really is to be desired. The English keeps the reconstruction visible. The cause specified is the person's opinion about an approaching good; the passage does not affirm that the object actually is good.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φόβος καὶ δόξα κακοῦ

II.7.10b.2

Φόβον δ’ εἶναι ἔκκλισιν ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ δοξάζειν κακὸν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, τῆς δόξης τὸ κινητικὸν [καὶ] πρόσφατον ἐχούσης τοῦ ὄντως αὐτὸ φευκτὸν εἶναι.

Λύπη καὶ ἡδονή

II.7.10b.3

Λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ’ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον κακὸν παρεῖναι, ἐφ’ ᾧ καθήκει <συστέλλεσθαι. Ἡδονὴν δ’ εἶναι ἔπαρσιν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ’ αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν πρόσφατον ἀγαθὸν παρεῖναι, ἐφ’ ᾧ καθήκει> ἐπαίρεσθαι.

Τὰ ὑπὸ τὰ τέσσαρα πάθη

II.7.10b.4

Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς, (θυμὸς καὶ χόλος καὶ μῆνις καὶ κότος καὶ πικρία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,) ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ καὶ πόθοι καὶ ἵμεροι καὶ φιληδονίαι καὶ φιλοπλουτίαι καὶ φιλοδοξίαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι καὶ ἀσμενισμοὶ καὶ γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν φόβον ὄκνοι καὶ ἀγωνίαι καὶ ἐκπλήξεις καὶ αἰσχύναι καὶ θόρυβοι καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαι καὶ δέος καὶ δείματα· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν λύπην φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἔλεος, πένθος, ἄχθος, ἄχος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη, ἄση.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 90-91

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Fear and the Opinion of an Evil

II.7.10b.2

Fear is aversion disobedient to reason. Its cause is the opinion that an evil is approaching, the opinion possessing the stimulating freshness of the belief that it really is to be avoided.[366]

Distress and Pleasure

II.7.10b.3

Distress is a contraction of the soul disobedient to reason. Its cause is the fresh opinion that an evil is present, at which it is appropriate <to contract. Pleasure is an uplift of the soul disobedient to reason. Its cause is the fresh opinion that a good is present, at which it is appropriate> to be uplifted.[367]

Forms under the Four Passions

II.7.10b.4

Under craving, then, fall such things as anger and its species (wrath, rage, rancor, grudge, bitterness, and the like), intense loves, longings, yearnings, loves of pleasure, wealth, and reputation, and similar things. Under pleasure fall malicious joys, delights, enchantments, and the like. Under fear fall hesitations, anxieties, consternations, shames, alarms, superstitions, dread, and frights. Under distress fall envy, rivalry, jealousy, pity, mourning, heaviness, anguish, vexation, pain, and disquiet.[368]

366. Ἔκκλισις retains “aversion,” as at II.7.9.2. The parallel with craving concerns the supposed value of an approaching object and the opinion’s power to move us. Wachsmuth brackets καί, “and,” as rejected wording between “stimulating” and “fresh”; it remains visible in Greek and is omitted in English.

367. Wachsmuth’s supplement begins with the end of the distress definition and includes almost the whole pleasure definition; the English retains that single span across the sentence boundary. “Fresh” follows the functional explanation at II.7.10.3. The judgment that contraction or uplift is appropriate belongs within the opinion causing the passion, not to the narrator’s endorsement of it.

368. The English names are kept distinct to allow comparison with the definitions that immediately follow. Familiar English synonyms do not by themselves reproduce these technical differences. “Intense” qualifies loves in this list. The Greek mostly uses plurals for the forms under craving, pleasure, and fear, then singulars for those under distress; the English preserves that change.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 90-91

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς

II.7.10c.1

Ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον· θυμὸς δὲ ὀργὴ ἐναρχομένη· χόλος δὲ ὀργὴ διοιδοῦσα· μῆνις δὲ ὀργὴ εἰς παλαίωσιν ἀποτεθειμένη ἢ ἐναποκειμένη· κότος δὲ ὀργὴ ἐπιτηροῦσα καιρὸν εἰς τιμωρίαν· πικρία δὲ ὀργὴ παραχρῆμα ἐκρηγνυμένη·

Ἔρως καὶ αἱ συγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίαι

II.7.10c.2

ἔρως δὲ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον· πόθος δὲ ἐπιθυμία κατ᾽ ἔρωτα ἀπόντος· ἵμερος δὲ ἐπιθυμία φίλου ἀπόντος ὁμιλίας· φιληδονία δὲ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν· φιλοπλουτία δὲ πλούτου· φιλοδοξία δὲ δόξης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 91

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Anger and Its Species

II.7.10c.1

Anger, then, is a craving to punish someone thought to have done an injury contrary to what is fitting. Wrath is anger beginning; rage is anger swelling; rancor is anger laid aside to grow old, or stored within; a grudge is anger watching for an opportunity for revenge; bitterness is anger erupting immediately.[369]

Love and Related Cravings

II.7.10c.2

Love is an initiative toward forming friendship because of manifest beauty.[370] Longing is a craving for someone absent, in the context of love; yearning is a craving for the company of an absent friend. Love of pleasure is a craving for pleasures; love of wealth, for wealth; love of reputation, for reputation.[371]

369. These definitions distinguish the onset, swelling, persistence, timing, and eruption of anger. "Wrath" renders θυμός, "rage" χόλος, "rancor" μῆνις, "grudge" κότος, and "bitterness" πικρία. The apparent injury is qualified by "thought," δοκοῦντα; the definition does not establish that the person truly committed it. Both descriptions joined by ἤ in the definition of μῆνις are retained.

370. Ἐπιβολή retains "initiative," used in the preceding account of impulse. Compare II.7.5b9.3, where love is expressly said not to be appetite, and the very similar friendship-and-beauty formula occurs. Here love appears within the discussion of craving after the list of "intense loves." The wording and its tension with the earlier account are preserved without inserting a distinction the present definition does not explicitly make.

371. Πόθος and ἵμερος receive separate definitions: the former relates absence to love, the latter specifies the company of an absent friend. Δόξα in φιλοδοξία means reputation, not the "opinion" involved in the definitions of the primary passions.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ εἴδη τῆς ἡδονῆς

II.7.10c.3

Ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· ἀσμενισμὸς δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις· γοητεία δὲ ἡδονὴ δι᾽ ὄψεως κατὰ ἀπάτην.

Τὰ εἴδη τοῦ φόβου

II.7.10c.4

Ὄκνος δὲ φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας· ἀγωνία δὲ φόβος διαπτώσεως καὶ ἑτέρως φόβος ἥττης· ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐξ ἀσυνήθους φαντασίας· αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας· θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ φωνῆς κατεπείγων· δεισιδαιμονία δὲ φόβος θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων· δέος δὲ φόβος δεινοῦ· δεῖμα δὲ φόβος ἐκ λόγου.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 91-92

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Species of Pleasure

II.7.10c.3

Malicious joy is pleasure at the evils of others; delight is pleasure at unexpected things; enchantment is pleasure through sight involving deception.[372]

The Species of Fear

II.7.10c.4

Hesitation is fear of an impending activity; anxiety is fear of failure, or, in another formulation, fear of defeat; consternation is fear arising from an unfamiliar impression; shame is fear of ill repute; alarm is pressing fear accompanied by an outcry; superstition is fear of gods or divine spirits; dread is fear of something terrible; fright is fear arising from a report.[373]

372. Ἀσμενισμός is defined through the unexpected, without an explicit "good" in the Greek. Γοητεία here specifies sight and deception. The auditory form of enchantment in the related classification at Diogenes Laertius VII.114 has not been substituted for this source's visual definition.

373. The definition of anxiety gives two formulations joined by καὶ ἑτέρως, both retained. Φαντασία remains "impression." Δαίμονες are divine spirits, without the necessarily evil sense of modern "demons." Λόγος in the brief definition of fright is taken as a report or account; it need not mean the right reason which passion disobeys.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 91-92

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία

II.7.10c.5

Φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς· ζῆλος δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, αὐτὸν δὲ μή· λέγεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως ζῆλον, μακαρισμὸν ἐνδεοῦς καὶ ἔτι ἄλλως μίμησιν ὡς ἂν κρείττονος· ζηλοτυπίαν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ <καὶ> ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπεθύμει·

Ἔλεος καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ λῦπαι

II.7.10c.6

ἔλεον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι ἀναξίως κακοπαθεῖν· πένθος δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀώρῳ· ἄχθος δὲ λύπην βαρύνουσαν· ἄχος δὲ λύπην ἀφωνίαν ἐμποιοῦσαν· ἀνίαν δὲ λύπην κατὰ διαλογισμόν· ὀδύνην δὲ λύπην εἰσδύνουσαν καὶ καθικνουμένην· ἄσην δὲ λύπην μετὰ ῥιπτασμοῦ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 92

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Envy, Rivalry, and Jealousy

II.7.10c.5

Envy is distress at the goods of others; rivalry is distress at another's attaining what one craves while one does not. "Rivalry" is also used in another sense for the admiration felt by someone in want, and in yet another for imitation of someone regarded as superior.[374] Jealousy is distress at another's <also> attaining what one oneself desired.[375]

Pity and the Remaining Forms of Distress

II.7.10c.6

Pity is distress at someone who seems to suffer undeservedly; mourning is distress at an untimely death; heaviness is distress that weighs one down; anguish is distress that produces speechlessness; vexation is distress in reflection; pain is distress that penetrates and reaches deep; disquiet is distress accompanied by restless tossing.[376]

374. Ζῆλος can name both the distress defined first and other forms of admiration or emulation. The compressed μακαρισμὸν ἐνδεοῦς is understood here as pronouncing someone fortunate on the part of a person who lacks; "felt by someone in want" expresses that reading of the genitive. In the final alternative, ὡς ἂν κρείττονος presents the imitated person as superior.

375. The distinctions turn on another's goods, another's success without one's own, and another's also attaining the desired object. The supplied καί, <also>, makes the last contrast explicit. The Greek changes from present ἐπιθυμεῖ in the rivalry definition to past ἐπεθύμει in the jealousy definition; the English follows it.

376. The definition of mourning specifies an untimely death, ἀώρῳ, rather than death without qualification. Ἄχθος and ἄχος are distinct despite their similar spelling: the first weighs down, the second produces speechlessness. Κατὰ διαλογισμόν connects vexation with reflection or reckoning. The final definitions describe how distress is felt and moves the sufferer, not further external objects of distress.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὸ ἐφ’ ᾧ καὶ ἡ ἰδιότης τῆς κινήσεως II.7.10d

Τούτων δὲ τῶν παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐμφαίνει τὸ ἐφ’ ᾧ γίνεται, οἷον ἔλεον, φθόνον, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, αἰσχύνην· τὰ δὲ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς κινήσεως, οἷον ὀδύνην, δεῖμα.

Εὐεμπτωσία εἰς πάθος II.7.10e.1

Εὐεμπτωσίαν δ’ εἶναι εὐκαταφορίαν εἰς πάθος, ὥς τι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔργων, οἷον ἐπιλυπίαν, ὀργιλότητα, φθονερίαν, ἀκροχολίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Γίνεσθαι δὲ εὐεμπτωσίας καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον εἰς κλοπὰς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ὕβρεις, καθ’ ἃς κλέπται τε καὶ μοιχοὶ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ λέγονται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Object and the Character of the Movement II.7.10d

Of these passions, some indicate what they arise in response to, such as pity, envy, malicious joy, and shame; others indicate the distinctive character of the movement, such as pain and fright.[377]

Susceptibility to Passion II.7.10e.1

Susceptibility is a ready tendency to fall into a passion, as one of the activities contrary to nature—for example proneness to distress, irascibility, enviousness, quick temper, and the like.[378] There are also susceptibilities to other activities contrary to nature, such as thefts, adulteries, and acts of outrage; in accordance with these people are called thieves, adulterers, and perpetrators of outrage.[379]

377. This comments on what the names disclose. Some identify an object or occasion, such as another's undeserved suffering or one's ill repute; others characterize the movement of the soul. Both examples in the second group, ὀδύνη and δεῖμα, are retained even though the preceding short definition of δεῖμα refers to a report.

378. Εὐεμπτωσία concerns readiness to fall into a passion, rather than the occurrence of a particular passion itself. The examples name tendencies: ἐπιλυπία, ὀργιλότης, φθονερία, and ἀκροχολία. The phrase ὥς τι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔργων places passion among activities contrary to nature.

379. The account extends susceptibility beyond the named passions to habitual kinds of wrongdoing. Ὕβρις is rendered "outrage" here, covering abusive or insulting conduct; the English avoids reducing it to the inward feeling of pride.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Νοσήματα καὶ ἀρρωστήματα

II.7.10e.2

Νόσημα δ’ εἶναι δόξαν ἐπιθυμίας ἐρρηγυῖαν εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρωμένην, καθ’ ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι, οἷον φιλογυνίαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαν· εἶναι δέ τινα καὶ ἐναντία <τούτοις> τοῖς νοσήμασι κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν. Τὰ δὲ νοσήματα μετ’ ἀσθενείας συμβαίνοντα ἀρρωστήματα καλεῖσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 93

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Diseases and Infirmities

II.7.10e.2

A disease is an opinion associated with craving that has developed into a settled state and become hardened, in accordance with which people suppose that things not choiceworthy are exceedingly choiceworthy—for example love of women, love of wine, and love of money.[380] There are also conditions opposite to <these> diseases, arising through aversion, such as hatred of women, hatred of wine, and hatred of humanity.[381] Diseases occurring together with weakness are called infirmities.[382]

380. The account distinguishes a susceptibility, a passion, and an opinion hardened into a settled state, ἕξις. “Disease” translates its ethical and psychological term νόσημα, not a modern diagnostic category. The defining error is to suppose something not choiceworthy to be exceedingly choiceworthy; the examples are governed by that qualification.

381. The supplied τούτοις remains bracketed as <these>. Προσκοπή denotes aversion or repugnance here. The opposite hatreds are included in the account, rather than offered as remedies for the corresponding loves.

382. Ἀρρώστημα retains “infirmity,” as at II.7.6d. The final distinction adds weakness to disease. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.115, which also distinguishes diseases, infirmities, and tendencies to passions.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κατόρθωμα καὶ ἁμάρτημα

II.7.11a

Κατόρθωμα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἢ καθάπερ προείπομεν, τέλειον καθῆκον· ἁμάρτημά τε τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ᾧ παραλέλειπταί τι καθῆκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζῴου.

Κοινὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁμόνοια

II.7.11b.1

Τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα τῶν σπουδαίων εἶναι <κοινὰ> λέγουσι, καθ’ ὃ καὶ τὸν ὠφελοῦντά τινα τῶν πλησίον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὠφελεῖν. Τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, δι’ ὃ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον· τοὺς δὲ φαύλους διαφωνοῦντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι καὶ κακοποιητικοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ πολεμίους.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 93-94

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Correct Action and Error

II.7.11a

They say that a correct action is an appropriate action complete in every detail, or, as we said before, a complete appropriate action.[383] An error is what is done contrary to right reason, or an act in which a rational animal has omitted something appropriate.[384]

Common Goods and Concord

II.7.11b.1

They say that all the goods of virtuous people are <common>, in accordance with which a person who benefits someone close to him also benefits himself.[385] Concord is knowledge of common goods. Hence all virtuous people are in concord with one another, because they agree about the affairs of life; base people, disagreeing with one another, are hostile, harmful to one another, and at enmity.[386]

383. Πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς is literally "having all the numbers," an expression for completeness in every detail. The cross-reference points back to the complete appropriate actions at II.7.8.2, Wachsmuth p. 85, line 19; the editor's parenthetical page reference is transferred to this note.

384. The two formulations cover acting contrary to right reason and omitting something appropriate. The qualification "rational animal" is explicit. Ἁμάρτημα retains "error," used earlier for a wrong action; the passage does not restrict error to a mistake in factual information.

385. Κοινά, "common," is supplied by Wachsmuth. The following sentence and II.7.11d explain the reciprocity through benefiting and virtue. "Someone close to him" renders τῶν πλησίον; it need not denote a person living in the adjoining house. The claim concerns goods in this ethical account, rather than an explicit scheme for distributing property.

386. Ὁμόνοια is defined here as knowledge of common goods. Compare the earlier definition of συμφωνία as agreement in beliefs about life at II.7.5l.3. The general contrast between virtuous and base people is the source's own claim, not a description of particular historical communities.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 93-94

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι

II.7.11b.2

Τό τε δίκαιον φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. Ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ’ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας·

Νομοθεσία παιδεία καὶ πατρίς

II.7.11b.3

καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι δὲ συγγράφειν τὰ δυνάμενα ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς γράμμασιν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τοῖς σπουδαίοις καὶ τὸ συγκαταβαίνειν καὶ εἰς γάμον καὶ εἰς τεκνογονίαν καὶ αὐτοῦ χάριν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ὑπομένειν περὶ ταύτης, ἐὰν ᾖ μετρία, καὶ πόνους καὶ θάνατον.

Δημοκοπία καὶ βλαβερὰ συγγράμματα

II.7.11b.4

Παρακεῖσθαι δὲ τούτοις φαῦλα, τό τε δημοκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ σοφιστεύειν καὶ τὸ συγγράφειν ἐπιβλαβῆ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, ἅπερ εἰς σπουδαίους οὐκ ἂν πέσοι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 94

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Justice and Participation in Public Life

II.7.11b.2

They say that what is just exists by nature and not by convention.[387] It follows from these claims that the wise person participates in public life, especially in constitutions that show some progress toward complete constitutions.[388]

Legislation Education and Country

II.7.11b.3

Legislating, educating people, and writing works capable of benefiting their readers are proper to virtuous people. So too are consenting to marriage and to having children, both for one's own sake and for one's country, and enduring toil and death on its behalf, if it is moderate.[389]

Demagoguery and Harmful Writings

II.7.11b.4

Alongside these stand base counterparts: acting as a demagogue, practicing sophistry, and writing things harmful to their readers. Such things would not befall virtuous people.[390]

387. Φύσει / θέσει contrasts nature with convention or enactment. The claim about justice precedes the account of civic participation; it is not merely a claim that whatever has been enacted is just. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.128.

388. Πολιτεύεσθαι is participation in civic or political life, and πολιτεία here is a constitution or political order. "Especially" and "some progress" preserve the qualifications. The text refers to constitutions approaching completeness without naming a particular existing state.

389. Συγκαταβαίνειν expresses willingness to enter into marriage and procreation. The final condition, ἐὰν ᾖ μετρία, is feminine and refers to the country, πατρίς. Its moderation qualifies the willingness to endure toil and death on its behalf; the condition is not omitted or transferred to the amount of toil. Compare the civic and family activities at Diogenes Laertius VII.121.

390. The contrast pairs civic participation, education, and beneficial writing with their base counterparts. Δημοκοπεῖν denotes courting popular favor as a demagogue; it does not mean simply participating in a democracy. The closing claim concerns the virtuous people of the account.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τρεῖς σημασίαι τῆς φιλίας

II.7.11c

Τριχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς φιλίας, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τῆς κοινῆς ἕνεκ’ ὠφελείας, καθ’ ἣν φίλοι εἶναι λέγονται, ταύτην μὲν οὔ φασι τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κατ’ αὐτούς· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον λεγομένην φιλίαν, κατάσχεσιν οὖσαν φιλικὴν πρὸς τῶν πέλας, τῶν ἐκτὸς λέγουσιν ἀγαθῶν· τὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν φιλίαν, καθ’ ἣν φίλος ἐστὶ τῶν πέλας, τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνουσιν ἀγαθῶν.

Κοινὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἴση ὠφέλεια

II.7.11d.1

Εἶναι δὲ καὶ θάτερον τρόπον κοινὰ τὰ ἀγαθά. Πάντα γὰρ τὸν ὀντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα ἴσην ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν νομίζουσι παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, μηδένα δὲ φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. Εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Three Senses of Friendship

II.7.11c

Friendship is spoken of in three senses. In one sense it is friendship for common benefit, in accordance with which people are said to be friends. They say that this is not among goods, because according to them nothing composed of separate parts is a good.[391] Friendship in the second sense, a friendly disposition on the part of those close to one, is counted among external goods. Friendship concerning oneself, in accordance with which one is a friend to those close to one, they declare to be among goods concerning the soul.[392]

Common Goods and Equal Benefit

II.7.11d.1

Goods are common in another sense too. For they hold that anyone who benefits anyone at all receives an equal benefit by that very fact, while no base person either receives or confers benefit.[393] For to benefit is to hold in accordance with virtue, and to be benefited is to be moved in accordance with virtue.[394]

391. The first sense concerns the relationship for common benefit. The reason given invokes what is composed of separate parts, ἐκ διεστηκότων, rather than denying every ethical value to friends. The next two senses classify the friendly attitudes belonging to the respective persons.

392. Πρὸς τῶν πέλας uses the genitive to locate the friendly disposition on the side of the other people; περὶ αὐτόν locates the third sense in oneself. The distinction explains why one is an external good and the other a good concerning the soul. Compare the earlier classification of relational goods and the definition of friendship at II.7.5l.

393. This resumes the supplied “common” at II.7.11b.1. The equal return follows “by that very fact,” not from a further bargain or repayment. The exclusion of base people depends on the technical account of benefit through virtue; it does not say that a base person cannot receive money or practical assistance.

394. Wachsmuth prints ἴσχειν, “to hold,” in the active definition and κινεῖσθαι, “to be moved,” in the passive one. His apparatus considers adding “to move or” before ἴσχειν by comparison with Diogenes Laertius VII.104. The English follows the printed text, preserving its compressed formulation rather than silently supplying the proposed words.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 94-95

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Οἰκονομικὴ καὶ χρηματιστική

II.7.11d.2

Οἰκονομικὸν δ’ εἶναι μόνον λέγουσι τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον, ἔτι δὲ χρηματιστικόν. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν ἕξιν καὶ πρακτικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων· τὴν δ’ οἰκονομίαν διάταξιν περὶ ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων καὶ κτήσεως ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων· τὴν δὲ χρηματιστικὴν ἐμπειρίαν περιποιήσεως χρημάτων ἀφ’ ὧν δέον καὶ ἔξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἀναστρέφεσθαι ποιοῦσαν ἐν συναγωγῇ χρημάτων καὶ τηρήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει πρὸς εὐπορίαν·

Χρηματισμὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος

II.7.11d.3

τὸ δὲ χρηματίζεσθαί τινες μὲν μέσον εἶπον εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ ἀστεῖον. Φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα προστάτην ἀγαθὸν οἴκου γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ δύνασθαι οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκονομουμένην παρασχεῖν. Μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα χρηματιστικὸν εἶναι, γινώσκοντα ἀφ’ ὧν χρηματιστέον καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πότε.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 95

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Household Management and Acquiring Money

II.7.11d.2

They say that only the virtuous person is skilled in household management and a good household manager, and also skilled in acquiring money. For the art of household management is a state concerned with the theory and practice of what benefits a household. Household management itself is the ordering of expenditure and work, and care of property and of those working in the fields.[395] The art of acquiring money is expertise in obtaining money from the sources one ought, and a state that makes one act consistently in collecting, preserving, and spending money with a view to having ample resources.[396]

Acquiring Money and the Virtuous Person

II.7.11d.3

Some said that acquiring money is intermediate, others that it is morally excellent.[397] No base person becomes a good head of a household or can provide a well-managed home. Only the virtuous man is skilled in acquiring money, knowing from what sources it is to be acquired, when, how, and until when.[398]

395. Οἰκονομική names the art or capacity, whereas οἰκονομία names the management or arrangement itself. The household includes property, work, and agricultural workers, not merely a private spending budget. The source does not specify the workers' legal status in this sentence.

396. Χρηματιστική concerns acquiring and managing money from proper sources, not obtaining the greatest possible sum by any means. Ὁμολογουμένως retains the ethical sense of acting consistently; εὐπορία is ample resources or means. Wealth remains an indifferent in the earlier account; the present claim concerns the agent's expertise and conduct.

397. The report records a difference of classification and leaves the speakers unnamed. Μέσον is "intermediate," while ἀστεῖον is "morally excellent" here. The disagreement is retained rather than resolved by making all acquisition of money virtuous.

398. The final knowledge includes limits of source, timing, manner, and duration. "Until when" preserves μέχρι πότε; the text does not simply endorse continued accumulation. The strong claim that only the virtuous person has the expertise is part of the account's ethical use of skill.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Συγγνώμη καὶ ἰδία κακία

II.7.11d.4

Φασὶ <δὲ> μηδὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν <μηδενὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ συγγνώμην τε ἔχειν> καὶ νομίζειν τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὐτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι, πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν· διὸ καὶ δεόντως λέγεσθαι τὸ μηδὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

Ἐπιείκεια καὶ κόλασις

II.7.11d.5

Οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ παραιτητικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατ’ ἀξίαν κολάσεως καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἐπιεικῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένας κολάσεις τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι σκληροτέρας εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν τὰς κολάσεις τὸν νομοθέτην.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Pardon and One's Own Vice

II.7.11d.4

They say <further> that pardon is not granted <to anyone by a person who has understanding; for it belongs to the same person both to grant pardon> and to think that the person who erred did not err through his own fault, whereas all who err do so through their own vice. Hence the refusal to grant pardon to those who err is appropriately stated.[399]

Leniency and Punishment

II.7.11d.5

They say that the good man is not lenient. For the lenient person seeks to set aside punishment according to desert; being lenient, supposing that the punishments prescribed by law for wrongdoers are too harsh, and thinking that the lawgiver assigns punishments contrary to desert belong to the same person.[400]

399. The supplied δέ and the larger supplied passage remain bracketed. Wachsmuth restores the latter from the parallel Florilegium passage, as his apparatus explains. Συγγνώμη is pardon or allowance for an offense. The argument links granting it with judging that the offender's error was not due to himself, then rejects that judgment by locating error in the offender's own vice. The following paragraph turns to leniency in punishment.

400. Ἐπιεικής is "lenient" in the particular definition given here: setting aside punishment according to desert, κατ' ἀξίαν. The paragraph argues against this leniency through its judgment about the lawgiver's penalties. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.123. "According to desert" preserves the role of what is due; the text has not been rewritten as a recommendation to impose the greatest possible penalty.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Νόμος νόμιμος καὶ νομικός

II.7.11d.6

Τόν τε νόμον σπουδαῖον εἶναί φασι, λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον. Τοῦ δὲ νόμου ἀστείου ὄντος καὶ ὁ νόμιμος ἀστεῖος ἂν <εἴη>· νόμιμον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἄνδρα καὶ ἀκολουθητικὸν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προσταττομένων· νομικὸν δὲ τὸν ἐξηγητικὸν τοῦ νόμου. Μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων μήτε νόμιμον εἶναι μήτε νομικόν.

Κατορθώματα καὶ ἁμαρτήματα

II.7.11e.1

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ' οὐδέτερα. Κατορθώματα μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, δικαιοπραγεῖν, χαίρειν, εὐεργετεῖν, εὐφραίνεσθαι, φρονίμως περιπατεῖν, πάνθ' ὅσα κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττεται· ἁμαρτήματα δ' εἶναι, τό τε ἀφραίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ κλέπτειν καὶ καθόλου ὅσα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττεται·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Law the Law-Abiding and the Interpreter of Law

II.7.11d.6

They say that law is excellent, being right reason that commands what is to be done and prohibits what is not to be done.[401] Since law is morally excellent, the law-abiding person too would <be> morally excellent. For a law-abiding man is one who follows law and performs what it commands; a person versed in law is one capable of explaining law. No base person is either law-abiding or versed in law.[402]

Correct Actions and Errors

II.7.11e.1

Again, they say that some activities are correct actions, some errors, and some neither. Correct actions include thinking wisely, exercising temperance, acting justly, rejoicing, doing good, feeling glad, walking wisely—everything done in accordance with right reason.[403] Errors include acting foolishly, acting intemperately, acting unjustly, feeling distress, feeling fear, stealing, and in general everything done contrary to right reason.[404]

401. The opening defines νόμος by right reason, not simply by the existence of an enacted rule. Its commands and prohibitions concern what is and is not to be done. The printed προστακτικόν, "commanding," is retained.

402. Νόμιμος concerns following law and acting on its commands, whereas νομικός concerns explaining it. The source's distinction has not been reduced to two interchangeable labels for a professional lawyer. The supplied εἴη is expressed by <be>. The preceding ἄν supplies the potential force "would."

403. The list includes rejoicing and gladness, χαίρειν and εὐφραίνεσθαι; these are not replaced by ἡδονή, the passion of pleasure defined above. The qualification "wisely" belongs to walking in this first list and matters for the contrast with unqualified walking below.

404. Distress and fear are included as passions in the strict sense of the preceding account. The classification is the source's, grounded in conformity or opposition to right reason. Wachsmuth's apparatus records a proposed gap after "stealing," but his printed Greek does not mark one or insert the suggested additional examples; none are added here.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ οὐδέτερα ἐνεργήματα

II.7.11e.2

οὔτε δὲ κατορθώματα οὔτε ἁμαρτήματα τὰ τοιαῦτα· λέγειν, ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περιπατεῖν, ἀποδημεῖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια.

Αἱ προσηγορίαι τῶν κατορθωμάτων

II.7.11e.3

Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνομήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα καὶ εὐεπιτηδεύματα καὶ εὐτυχήματα καὶ εὐδαιμονήματα καὶ εὐκαιρήματα καὶ εὐσχημονήματα· οὐκ ἔτι μέντοι γε φρονιμεύματα, ἀλλὰ μόνα τὰ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὠνόμασται, οἷον σωφρονήματα μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ σωφροσύνης, δικαιώματα δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης. Τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικοπραγήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Activities of Neither Kind

II.7.11e.2

Activities such as speaking, asking questions, answering, walking, traveling abroad, and similar things are neither correct actions nor errors.[405]

Names Applied to Correct Actions

II.7.11e.3

All correct actions are just actions, lawful actions, orderly actions, good pursuits, successful actions, acts of living happily, timely actions, and seemly actions.[406] They are not, however, all acts of practical wisdom: only those proceeding from practical wisdom are such. The same applies to the other virtues, even if they have not been named—for example acts of temperance proceed from temperance, and acts of justice from justice. Errors, by the opposite descriptions, are unjust actions, unlawful actions, and disorderly actions.[407]

405. These name activities without specifying their virtuous or vicious manner. “Walking” here differs from “walking wisely” in the preceding list. The classification does not make every instance of speech or travel morally beyond assessment, regardless of how it is performed.

406. The series gives several general names for every correct action. “Successful actions” renders εὐτυχήματα in this ethical series; it should not be read as a promise of material good fortune. Εὐδαιμονήματα concerns living happily. The terms name acts, rather than changing the earlier distinction between an activity and the virtue one possesses.

407. The source then restricts φρονιμεύματα to acts proceeding from practical wisdom and applies an analogous restriction to the other virtues. It thus distinguishes the general δικαιοπραγήματα, “just actions,” from δικαιώματα as acts proceeding from justice in this particular terminology. Both claims are retained, despite their apparent tension in ordinary English.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱρετὸν ὀρεκτὸν βουλητὸν καὶ ἀποδεκτόν

II.7.11f.1

Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱρετὸν καὶ αἱρετέον, οὕτω καὶ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ὀρεκτέον καὶ βουλητὸν καὶ βουλητέον καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν καὶ ἀποδεκτέον. Αἱρετὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ βουλητὰ καὶ ὀρεκτὰ <καὶ ἀποδεκτὰ τἀγαθά· τὰ δ' ὠφελήματα αἱρετέα καὶ βουλητέα καὶ ὀρεκτέα> καὶ ἀποδεκτέα, κατηγορήματα ὄντα, παρακείμενα δ' ἀγαθοῖς.

Τὸ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ κατηγορήματα

II.7.11f.2

Αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὰ αἱρετέα καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ βουλητέα καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τὰ ὀρεκτέα. Κατηγορημάτων γὰρ αἵ τε αἱρέσεις καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ βουλήσεις γίνονται, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ὁρμαί· ἔχειν μέντοι αἱρούμεθα καὶ βουλόμεθα καὶ ὁμοίως ὀρεγόμεθα τἀγαθά, διὸ καὶ αἱρετὰ καὶ βουλητὰ καὶ ὀρεκτὰ τἀγαθά ἐστι. Τὴν γὰρ φρόνησιν αἱρούμεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορήματα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choice Desire Wish and Acceptance

II.7.11f.1

They say that, just as what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be chosen, so what is worthy of desire differs from what is to be desired, what is worthy of wish from what is to be wished for, and what is worthy of acceptance from what is to be accepted.[408] For <goods> are choiceworthy, worthy of wish and desire <and acceptance; benefits, however, are to be chosen, wished for, and desired> and accepted, being predicates associated with goods.[409]

Having and Predicates

II.7.11f.2

For we choose what is to be chosen, wish for what is to be wished for, and desire what is to be desired. Choices, desires, and wishes concern predicates, just as impulses do.[410] We do, however, choose, wish, and likewise desire to have goods; hence goods are choiceworthy, worthy of wish, and worthy of desire. For we choose to have practical wisdom and temperance—not, by Zeus, to have "thinking wisely" and "exercising temperance," which are incorporeal and predicates.[411]

408. The verbal-adjective contrast, -τός / -τέος, extends the distinction at II.7.6f.1. "Worthy of" and "to be" keep it visible without merging the four kinds of orientation. Βούλησις remains "wish," as in II.7.9a.2, rather than the passion "craving."

409. Wachsmuth's long supplement runs from καὶ ἀποδεκτά through ὀρεκτέα, including τἀγαθά, "goods." English requires the subject earlier, so that supplied word is separately bracketed at its translated position; the rest of the supplied span follows. Benefits are called predicates associated with goods. They are not simply identified with the goods themselves.

410. Compare II.7.9b, where impulses are directed toward predicates and assents toward propositions. This paragraph explains why one chooses an activity associated with a good, while choosing to have the good itself.

411. The contrast concerns having. As Wachsmuth explains in the apparatus, ἔχειν, "to have," is understood again with "thinking wisely" and "exercising temperance." Those activities are predicates, whereas practical wisdom and temperance are the virtues one has. The sentence therefore does not prohibit choosing virtuous activity, which II.7.6f.1 explicitly presents as chosen. "By Zeus" retains the source's emphatic μὰ Δία.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὑπομενετὰ ἐμμενετὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία

II.7.11f.3

Λέγουσι δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ τἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ καὶ ἀνάλογον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατωνόμασται· τὰ δὲ ὠφελήματα πάντα ὑπομενετέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Ὡσαύτως δὲ διαφέρειν ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ τὰ εὐλαβητὰ καὶ τὰ εὐλαβητέα καὶ ἀνυπομενετὰ καὶ ἀνυπομενετέα. Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς κακίας ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Enduring Holding To and Their Opposites

II.7.11f.3

Similarly, they say that all goods are worthy of being endured and held to, and the analogy applies to the other virtues, even if they have not been named. All benefits are to be endured and held to, and the like.[412] They likewise understand a difference between what is worthy of caution and what is to be guarded against, and between what is unworthy of being endured and what is not to be endured. The same account applies to the other cases concerning the vices.[413]

412. This closely repeats II.7.6f.2, with the same "worthy of being" / "to be" distinction. Wachsmuth again prints ἀρετῶν, "virtues," although his apparatus records a reading concerning "choiceworthy things." The reference to all goods is retained rather than restricted to hardships.

413. Εὐλαβητά / εὐλαβητέα extends the distinction to caution, and ἀνυπομενετά / ἀνυπομενετέα to what is not to be endured. The final reference to the vices is compressed; no further examples are invented. This closes II.7.11f. The next source subdivision, II.7.11g, turns to the completeness and happiness of the virtuous person.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τελειότης καὶ θεία εὐδαιμονία

II.7.11g.1

Πάντα δὲ τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα τέλειον εἶναι λέγουσι διὰ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀρετῆς· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον τοὐναντίον ἀτελῆ διὰ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς μετέχειν ἀρετῆς. Δι’ ὃ καὶ πάντως εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους κακοδαιμονεῖν. καὶ <ἐκείνων> τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μὴ διαφέρειν τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας, μηδὲ τὴν ἀμεραίαν ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι διαφέρειν τῆς τοῦ Διὸς εὐδαιμονίας, <καὶ> κατὰ μηδὲν αἱρετωτέραν εἶναι μήτε καλλίω μήτε σεμνοτέραν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Completeness and Divine Happiness

II.7.11g.1

They say that every noble and good man is complete, because he falls short of no virtue; the base person, on the contrary, is incomplete, because he participates in no virtue.[414] Hence good people are always happy in every respect, while base people are unhappy. And <their> happiness does not differ from divine happiness. Chrysippus says that even happiness lasting a single day does not differ from the happiness of Zeus, <and> that Zeus's happiness is in no respect more choiceworthy, nobler, or more august than that of wise men.[415]

414. "Complete" renders τέλειος: the reason given is lacking none of the virtues. Compare their mutual implication at II.7.5b5 and the account of happiness at II.7.6. The text makes an absolute contrast between virtue and vice; "always" and "in every respect" are explicit qualifications of the good person's happiness.

415. Wachsmuth supplies ἐκείνων, "their," and the connecting καί. He prints Madvig's correction ἀμεραίαν, "of a single day," in place of ἀμεριμνίαν, "freedom from care." The English follows the printed correction. The comparison is between happinesses, including their choiceworthiness and nobility; it does not identify a human being with Zeus or claim equality in every power.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων

II.7.11g.2

Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν. Καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πάντ᾽ εὖ ποιεῖν, καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον κατὰ τοὐναντίον κακῶς.

Μέγεθος ὕψος καὶ ἰσχύς

II.7.11g.3

Καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον μέγαν εἶναι καὶ ἁδρὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν. Μέγαν μέν, ὅτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων· ἁδρὸν δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ηὐξημένος πάντοθεν· ὑψηλὸν δ᾽, ὅτι μετείληφε τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ὕψους ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῷ· καὶ ἰσχυρὸν δ᾽, ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν ἰσχὺν περιπεποίηται, ἀήττητος ὢν καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Two Kinds of Human Beings

II.7.11g.2

For Zeno and the Stoic philosophers who follow him hold that there are two kinds of human beings, the virtuous and the base. Throughout life the virtuous employ the virtues, and the base the vices. Hence the former always act correctly in everything they undertake, while the latter err.[416] The virtuous person, employing his experience in the affairs of life, does everything well in his actions—that is, wisely, temperately, and in accordance with the other virtues; the base person, on the contrary, does things badly.[417]

Greatness Height and Strength

II.7.11g.3

The virtuous person is great, fully grown, lofty, and strong. Great, because he can reach the things that accord with his choice and lie before him; fully grown, because he has grown in every direction; lofty, because he possesses the height befitting a noble and wise man; and strong, because he has acquired the strength befitting him, being undefeated and unconquerable.[418]

416. Κατορθοῦν and ἁμαρτάνειν resume correct action and error at II.7.11a. The distinction concerns the ethical character of action; it does not guarantee attainment of every external object one undertakes to pursue.

417. The explanation “wisely, temperately, and in accordance with the other virtues” specifies the sense of doing everything well. Compare the qualification of ordinary activities by virtue at II.7.11e. The English retains the reference to experience in the affairs of life, rather than reducing the claim to abstract knowledge alone.

418. The explanations give these descriptions an ethical sense rather than referring to bodily dimensions. Ἀδρός is “fully grown” or mature; the following ηὐξημένος sustains the growth image. Κατὰ προαίρεσιν retains the reference to choice, without importing a further technical definition of προαίρεσις from another author. “Befitting” renders the repeated ἐπιβάλλων.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀναγκάζεσθαι βιάζεσθαι καὶ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι

II.7.11g.4

Παρ’ ὃ καὶ οὔτε ἀναγκάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει τινά, οὔτε κωλύεται οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε βιάζεται ὑπό τινος οὔτ’ αὐτὸς βιάζει τινά, οὔτε δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπόζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ τινα οὔτ’ αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς περιπίπτει <οὔτ’ ἄλλον ποιεῖ κακοῖς περιπίπτειν>, οὔτ’ ἐξαπατᾶται οὔτε ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον, οὔτε διαψεύδεται οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ οὔτε λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καθόλου ψεῦδος ὑπολαμβάνει·

Μακαριότης καὶ ἱκανότητες τοῦ σοφοῦ

II.7.11g.5

εὐδαίμων δ’ ἐστὶ μάλιστα καὶ εὐτυχὴς καὶ μακάριος καὶ ὄλβιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ θεοφιλὴς καὶ ἀξιωματικός, βασιλικός τε καὶ στρατηγικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ οἰκονομικὸς καὶ χρηματιστικός. Τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ἅπαντα τούτοις ἐναντία ἔχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Compulsion Force and Deception

II.7.11g.4

For this reason he is neither compelled by anyone nor compels anyone, is neither hindered nor hinders, is neither forced by anyone nor himself forces anyone, neither acts as master nor is mastered, neither does evil to anyone nor suffers evil himself, neither falls into evils <nor causes another to fall into evils>.[419] He is neither deceived nor deceives another, neither mistaken nor ignorant, neither unaware of himself nor, in general, believes anything false.[420]

Blessedness and the Wise Person's Capacities

II.7.11g.5

He is supremely happy, fortunate, blessed, prosperous, pious, loved by the gods, and of high standing; fitted for kingship, generalship, and public affairs, and skilled in household management and acquiring money.[421] Base people possess all the opposite qualities.[422]

419. The supplied clause "nor causes another to fall into evils" is Meineke's addition, printed by Wachsmuth. The reciprocal claims belong to this account of the virtuous person's ethical invulnerability. In particular, "evils" retains the strict moral vocabulary developed earlier; the wording is not a claim that a wise body cannot be physically restrained or injured. The translation nevertheless preserves the source's categorical assertions.

420. Διαψεύδεται is "is mistaken," distinct from deliberately deceiving another, ἐξαπατᾷ. Wachsmuth records a proposal to insert an additional active verb before it but does not print that addition; the Greek and English follow his text. The final clause broadens the series to holding a false belief in general.

421. The series retains the separate terms εὐδαίμων, εὐτυχής, μακάριος, and ὄλβιος rather than compressing them into a single "happy." Ἀξιωματικός concerns standing or dignity here, not the logical proposition. The following adjectives express capacities: their presence does not say that the wise person actually holds each office. The next passage explicitly distinguishes disposition from actual exercise of rule.

422. Οἰκονομικός and χρηματιστικός resume the skills defined at II.7.11d.2–3. The contrast with the base is the source's comprehensive ethical contrast. "Prosperous" in this series should be read with the subsequent distinction between true wealth and ordinary possessions at II.7.11i.2.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πάντα τἀγαθὰ καὶ τέλειος βίος

II.7.11g.6

Καθόλου δὲ τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πάντα τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς δὲ φαύλοις πάντα τὰ κακά. Οὐ νομιστέον δὲ λέγειν αὐτοὺς οὕτως, ὡς εἴ τινά ἐστιν ἀγαθά, ἐκεῖνα ὑπάρχει τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν· ἀλλὰ τοι τοὺς μὲν τοσαῦτα ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ ὥστε μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν εἰς τὸ τέλειον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν βίον <καὶ εὐδαίμονα>, τοὺς δὲ τοσαῦτα κακά, ὥστε τὸν βίον ἀτελῆ εἶναι καὶ κακοδαίμονα.

Ἀρετῆς ὀνόματα καὶ ἐτυμολογίαι

II.7.11h.1

Τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύουσιν. Ἀγαθόν τε γὰρ λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὅτι ἄγει ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον· καὶ ἀρεστόν, ὅτι δοκιμαστόν ἐστιν ἀνυπόπτως· καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, <ὅτι> ἀνυπέρβλητον ἔχει τὴν ἀξίαν· καὶ σπουδαῖον, ἄξιον γὰρ εἶναι πολλῆς σπουδῆς· καὶ ἐπαινετόν, εὐλόγως γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτὴν ἐπαινοίη· καὶ καλόν, ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καλεῖν πέφυκε τοὺς ὀρεγομένους αὐτῆς·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 100

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

All Goods and a Complete Life

II.7.11g.6

In general, all goods belong to virtuous people, and all evils to base people. But one should not suppose them to mean that, if certain things are goods, those things belong to virtuous people, and likewise with evils. Rather, the former have so many goods that nothing is lacking to make their life complete <and happy>; the latter have so many evils that their life is incomplete and unhappy.[423]

Names and Etymologies of Virtue

II.7.11h.1

They call virtue by many names. They call it good, because it leads us toward the right life; pleasing, because it is approvable without misgiving; of great worth, <because> its value is unsurpassable; worthy of earnest pursuit, because it deserves much earnest attention; praiseworthy, because one might reasonably praise it; and noble, because it naturally calls to itself those who desire it.[424]

423. The source itself qualifies “all goods”: the claim concerns sufficiency for a complete life rather than possession of every particular good that exists. The parallel qualification applies to evils. Meineke’s supplied καὶ εὐδαίμονα, “and happy,” remains visible. This clarification prevents the opening generalization from being expanded beyond its stated meaning.

424. The explanations sometimes connect similar-sounding Greek words: ἀγαθόν with ἄγει, “leads”; σπουδαῖον with σπουδή, “earnest attention”; καλόν with καλεῖν, “calls.” These are the source’s word associations, not claims about the historical derivation of the English words. “Pleasing” retains the sense distinguished from pleasure at II.7.5i. Wachsmuth’s supplied ὅτι, “because,” remains bracketed. Compare the earlier list of names for good at II.7.5d.1.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 100

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Συμφέρον χρήσιμον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον

II.7.11h.2

καὶ συμφέρον, φέρειν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἃ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν· καὶ χρήσιμον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστι· καὶ αἱρετόν, συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἃ εὐλόγως ἐστὶν αἱρεῖσθαι· καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτι παροῦσά τε ὠφελεῖ καὶ μὴ παρούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ λυσιτελές, τὰς γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ὠφελείας κρείττους εἶναι τῆς πραγματείας τῆς εἰς ταύτας συντεινούσης·

Αὔταρκες ἀνευδεὲς καὶ ἀποχρῶν

II.7.11h.3

καὶ αὔταρκες, ἐξαρκεῖν γὰρ τῷ ἔχοντι· καὶ ἀνευδεές, ὅτι ἐνδείας ἀπαλλάττει πάσης· καὶ ἀποχρῶν διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ χρήσει ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ διατείνειν εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 100-101

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Advantageous Useful and Necessary

II.7.11h.2

And advantageous, because it brings things that contribute to living well; useful, because it is beneficial in use; choiceworthy, because from it arise things that it is reasonable to choose; necessary, because when present it benefits, and when absent it is impossible to be benefited; and profitable, because the benefits arising from it outweigh the effort directed toward them.[425]

Self-Sufficient Without Need and Sufficient

II.7.11h.3

And self-sufficient, because it suffices for its possessor; without need, because it releases one from every need; and sufficient, because it is adequate in use and extends to every requirement of life.[426]

425. The account continues the names of virtue. Συμφέρον is associated with φέρειν, “to bring,” and χρήσιμον with χρεία, “use.” The choiceworthy virtue is distinguished from the activities arising from it that one chooses, as at II.7.11f. “Profitable” concerns benefit exceeding the effort expended, not an explicit calculation of monetary return.

426. The three predicates are retained separately: αὔταρκες, ἀνενδεές, and ἀποχρῶν. They conclude the account of virtue’s sufficiency for living well. “Every requirement of life” renders πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείαν; it does not silently change the subject from virtue to material supplies.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ ὠφελήματα καὶ βλάμματα

II.7.11i.1

Τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν μηδενὸς μετέχειν τοὺς φαύλους, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρετή ἐστιν ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς· τά τε παρακείμενα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ὧν χρή, ὠφελήματα ὄντα, μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις συμβαίνειν· καθάπερ καὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τοῖς κακοῖς, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ὧν οὐ χρή, μόνοις τοῖς κακοῖς· βλάμματα γὰρ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς ἀβλαβεῖς πάντας εἶναι κατ' ἀμφότερα, οὔτε βλάπτειν οἵους τε ὄντας οὔτε βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους κατὰ τοὐναντίον.

Ἀληθὴς πλοῦτος καὶ ἐλευθερία

II.7.11i.2

Τὸν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, καὶ τὴν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πενίαν κακόν. Καὶ τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν δουλείαν κακόν. Δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον πλούσιον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον τοὐναντίον πένητα, τῶν εἰς τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀφορμῶν ὑστερημένον καὶ δοῦλον διὰ τὴν ὑποπτωτικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 101

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods Benefits and Harms

II.7.11i.1

Base people participate in none of the goods, since the good is virtue or what participates in virtue. The things corresponding to goods, which belong among the things one should do, are benefits and occur only to virtuous people. Likewise, the things corresponding to evils, which belong among the things one should not do, occur only to the bad, for they are harms.[427] Hence all good people are free from harm in both senses, being capable neither of harming nor of being harmed; base people are the opposite.[428]

True Wealth and Freedom

II.7.11i.2

They say that true wealth is a good and true poverty an evil; true freedom a good and true slavery an evil. Hence only the virtuous person is rich and free; the base person, on the contrary, is poor, lacking the resources for being rich, and a slave because of the submissive disposition within him.[429]

427. The compressed ὧν χρή and ὧν οὐ χρή are rendered through what one should and should not do, in continuity with the goods/benefits distinction at II.7.11f. The goods are virtue and what participates in it; the corresponding benefits and harms belong to the account of activity.

428. Ἀβλαβής includes both causing no harm and suffering none, as the source immediately explains. The claim uses "harm" in this moral account; it does not deny the possibility of bodily damage, loss of property, or other dispreferred events. Compare the classifications of indifferents at II.7.7–7e.

429. The repeated κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν, "truly" or "in truth," marks the sense in which wealth and freedom are being claimed as goods. The closing explanation locates slavery in a disposition, διάθεσις. These ethical uses should not be confused with the ordinary holdings or legal status of particular people. Ὑποπτωτική describes susceptibility to submission; "resources" renders ἀφορμαί without reducing them to money.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κοινὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀμοιβαία ὠφέλεια II.7.11i.3

Τὰ δ’ ἀγαθὰ πάντα κοινὰ εἶναι τῶν σπουδαίων, τῶν δὲ φαύλων τὰ κακά. Δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸν ὠφελοῦντά τινα καὶ αὐτὸν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ βλάπτοντα καὶ ἑαυτὸν βλάπτειν.

Φιλικὴ διάθεσις πρὸς ἀγνοουμένους II.7.11i.4

Πάντας δὲ τοὺς σπουδαίους ὠφελεῖν ἀλλήλους, οὔτε φίλους ὄντας ἀλλήλων πάντως οὔτε εὔνους <οὔτε> εὐδοκίμους οὔτε ἀποδεχομένους παρὰ τὸ μήτε καταλαμβάνεσθαι μήτ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ κατοικεῖν τόπῳ, εὐνοητικῶς μέντοι γε πρὸς ἀλλήλους διακεῖσθαι καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ δοκιμαστικῶς καὶ ἀποδεκτικῶς· τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων ὑπάρχειν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Common Goods and Mutual Benefit II.7.11i.3

All goods are common to virtuous people, and evils to base people. Hence whoever benefits someone is himself also benefited, while whoever harms another also harms himself.[430]

A Friendly Disposition toward Those Unknown II.7.11i.4

All virtuous people benefit one another, without necessarily being one another's friends, well-disposed, <or> held in esteem, or accepting one another, because they neither know one another nor live in the same place. Nevertheless, they are disposed toward one another with goodwill, friendship, approval, and acceptance. Foolish people are in the opposite condition.[431]

430. This resumes II.7.11b.1 and II.7.11d.1. The printed αὐτόν in the first consequence is rendered "himself," while the second has the explicit reflexive ἑαυτόν. The reciprocity belongs to the ethical definitions of benefit and harm; it is not described as a subsequent repayment.

431. The passage distinguishes an existing personal relationship from a disposition toward another virtuous person. Πάντως is rendered "necessarily," and the reason given is lack of acquaintance and shared residence. The contrast between εὔνους and εὐνοητικῶς, and between acceptance and being disposed to accept, is preserved rather than collapsed into a contradiction or replaced with an assertion that all have met. Wachsmuth prints Heeren's supplied οὔτε before εὐδοκίμους; its English equivalent remains bracketed.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Νόμιμος καὶ νομικός

II.7.11i.5

Τοῦ δὲ νόμου ὄντος σπουδαίου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἐπειδὴ λόγος ὀρθός ἐστι προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον, μόνον τὸν σοφὸν εἶναι λέγουσι νόμιμον, πρακτικὸν ὄντα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου προσταττομένων καὶ μόνον ἐξηγητικὸν τούτου, δι' ὃ καὶ νομικὸν εἶναι· τοὺς δ' ἠλιθίους ἐναντίους ἔχειν.

Ἀρχὴ καὶ πειθαρχία

II.7.11i.6

Ἀστείοις δ' ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀρχικὴν κατανέμουσιν ἐπιστασίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης εἴδη, βασιλείαν, στρατηγίαν, ναυαρχίαν καὶ τὰς ταύταις παραπλησίους. Κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ μόνος ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρχει καὶ εἰ μὴ πάντως κατ' ἐνέργειαν, κατὰ διάθεσιν δὲ καὶ πάντως. Καὶ πειθαρχικὸς μόνος ὁ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν, ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ἄρχοντι. Τῶν δ' ἀφρόνων οὐδεὶς τοιοῦτος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄρχειν οὔτ' ἄρχεσθαι οἷός <τ'> ἐστιν ὁ ἄφρων, αὐθάδης τις ὢν καὶ ἀνάγωγος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Lawful and Skilled in Law

II.7.11i.5

Since law is virtuous, as we said, being right reason that commands what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done, they say that only the wise person is lawful: he carries out what the law commands and alone can interpret it, which is why he is also skilled in law. Stupid people have the opposite qualities.[432]

Rule and Obedience

II.7.11i.6

They also assign to the morally excellent the oversight belonging to rule and its kinds: kingship, generalship, naval command, and similar offices. In this respect only the virtuous person rules—even if not necessarily in actual exercise, certainly in disposition.[433] Only the virtuous person is also obedient, being capable of following a ruler. No foolish person is like this: the fool is capable neither of ruling nor of being ruled, being self-willed and undisciplined.[434]

432. The definition resumes II.7.11d.6, Wachsmuth p. 96, lines 10–12; the editor's parenthetical reference is transferred here. Νόμιμος, "lawful," and νομικός, "skilled in law," remain distinct. The definition of law as right reason governs the claim; it is not simply an assertion of obedience to every existing enactment. The source changes its designation of the unwise here to ἠλίθιοι, "stupid people."

433. Ἀστεῖοι retains "the morally excellent." The explicit distinction between ἐνέργεια, actual exercise, and διάθεσις, disposition, explains the claim to rule without requiring the wise person to hold office. The kinds named include ναυαρχία, command of a fleet.

434. The capacity to follow a ruler accompanies, rather than excludes, the capacity to rule. The Greek supplies τ' to complete οἷός τε, "capable"; the supplement is expressed in the English construction. The final ἀνάγωγος describes lack of discipline or training, paired with self-will.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὀρθὴ χρῆσις καὶ μεταμέλεια

II.7.11i.7

Πάντα τε εὖ ποιεῖ ὁ νοῦν ἔχων, καὶ γὰρ φρονίμως καὶ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ κοσμίως καὶ εὐτάκτως ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενος συνεχῶς. ὁ δὲ φαῦλος, ἄπειρος ὢν τῆς ὀρθῆς χρήσεως, πάντα κακῶς ποιεῖ καθ’ ἣν ἔχει διάθεσιν ἐνεργῶν, εὐμετάπτωτος ὢν καὶ παρ’ ἕκαστα μεταμελείᾳ συνεχόμενος. Εἶναι δὲ τὴν μεταμέλειαν λύπην ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις ὡς παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἡμαρτημένοις, κακοδαιμονικόν τι πάθος ψυχῆς καὶ στασιῶδες· ἐφ’ ὅσον γὰρ ἄχθεται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ὁ ἐν ταῖς μεταμελείαις ὤν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγανακτεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς αἴτιον γεγονότα τούτων·

Τιμὴ καὶ γέρας ἀρετῆς

II.7.11i.8

δι’ ὃ καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον, μήτε τιμῆς ἄξιον ὄντα μήτε τίμιον ὑπάρχοντα. Τὴν γὰρ τιμὴν εἶναι γέρας ἀξίουσιν, τὸ δὲ γέρας ἆθλον ἀρετῆς εὐεργετικῆς. Τὸ οὖν ἀρετῆς ἀμέτοχον ἄτιμον δικαίως λέγεσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 102-103

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Right Use and Regret

II.7.11i.7

The person of understanding does everything well, continually employing his experience in the affairs of life wisely, with self-control, decorously, and in good order. The base person, inexperienced in right use, does everything badly, acting according to his disposition; he is easily swayed and beset by regret at every turn.[435] Regret is distress over things done as errors of one's own, an unhappy and divided passion of the soul. For to the extent that a person in regret is troubled by what has happened, he is indignant with himself as having caused it.[436]

Honor and the Reward of Virtue

II.7.11i.8

Hence every base person is also without honor, being neither worthy of honor nor honorable. For they hold that honor is a reward, and a reward a prize for beneficent virtue. What has no share in virtue is therefore rightly called without honor.[437]

435. The source again locates doing well in the manner of using experience. Εὐμετάπτωτος describes being easily changed or swayed. Ἐγκρατῶς, "with self-control," remains distinct from the earlier σωφρόνως, "temperately." The generalized contrast is the account's own, not a judgment about every skill possessed by an ordinary person.

436. Μεταμέλεια is classified as λύπη, distress, and thus as a passion in the account already given at II.7.10. The definition concerns distress at one's own errors and anger against oneself. It does not expressly identify every recognition or correction of a past mistake with this passion. Στασιῶδες conveys inner division or conflict. Wachsmuth prints the reflexive αὑτοῦ in the definition.

437. Ἄτιμος, τιμῆς ἄξιος, and τίμιος form a linked series concerning honor, its desert, and honorable standing. "Without honor" preserves that relation without introducing the narrower legal meaning of civic disfranchisement. Wachsmuth prints εὐεργετικῆς, "beneficent," qualifying virtue, despite recording an alternative εὐεργετικῶν in the apparatus.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φυγὰς καὶ ἡ πόλις κατὰ φύσιν

II.7.11i.9

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον στέρεται νόμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλούσης. Τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. Ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοιοῦτον· Πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα, εἰς ὃ καταφυγόντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον· ἀστεῖον ἄρ’ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις.

Τρεῖς σημασίαι τῆς πόλεως

II.7.11i.10

Τριχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς πόλεως, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ οἰκητήριον καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σύστημα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τρίτον τῆς κατ’ ἀμφότερα τούτων, κατὰ δύο σημαινόμενα λέγεσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἀστείαν, κατά τε τὸ σύστημα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον διὰ <τὴν εἰς> τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας ἀναφοράν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Exile and the City According to Nature

II.7.11i.9

They also say that every base person is an exile, insofar as he is deprived of law and of the constitution appropriate by nature. For law, as we said, is virtuous, and likewise the city.[438] Cleanthes too aptly put forward the following argument, in question form, about the city's being virtuous: "<If> a city is a structure for habitation, on taking refuge in which it is possible to give and receive justice, is a city not therefore something morally excellent? But a city is indeed such a dwelling place. Therefore a city is something morally excellent."[439]

Three Senses of City

II.7.11i.10

"City" is spoken of in three senses: as the dwelling place, as the community of human beings, and thirdly as both together. The city is called morally excellent in two senses: as the community of human beings and as the two together, because of the reference <to> its inhabitants.[440]

438. The qualification "insofar as" gives the sense of exile: deprivation of law and the constitution appropriate by nature, rather than a statement that every base person has been physically expelled. Wachsmuth's parenthetical reference to p. 96, line 10, is transferred here; see II.7.11d.6.

439. This difficult argument follows the printed οἰκητήριον, "dwelling place," at both occurrences, and preserves the initial question and Heeren's supplied εἰ, "if." Wachsmuth records proposed δικαστήριον, "court of justice," readings but does not adopt them in the text. Δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν is rendered "give and receive justice"; the expression includes being answerable to justice and obtaining redress. The moral sense of ἀστεῖον connects the argument to the following distinction between a city's inhabitants and its physical site.

440. Σύστημα is an organized community or body of people, distinguished from the dwelling place. In the combined sense the moral description refers to the inhabitants; it does not make buildings virtuous. Wachsmuth supplies τὴν εἰς to complete "the reference to," and records an indication of a gap after the final word. No missing continuation is invented. Source lettering next passes from 11i to 11k; no passage 11j has been omitted.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγροικία καὶ ἀγριότης

II.7.11k.1

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἄγροικον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον· τὴν γὰρ ἀγροικίαν ἀπειρίαν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων· ᾗ πάντα φαῦλον ἔνοχον ὑπάρχειν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄγριον, ἐναντιωτικὸν ὄντα τῇ κατὰ νόμον διεξαγωγῇ καὶ θηριώδη καὶ βλαπτικὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Τυραννικὸς καὶ ἀχάριστος

II.7.11k.2

Τὸν δ’ αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἀνήμερον ὑπάρχειν καὶ τυραννικόν, οὕτως διακείμενον ὥστε δεσποτικὰ ποιεῖν, ἔτι δὲ ὠμὰ καὶ βίαια καὶ παράνομα καιρῶν ἐπιλαμβανόμενον. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀχάριστον, οὔτε πρὸς ἀνταπόδοσιν χάριτος οἰκείως ἔχοντα οὔτε πρὸς μετάδοσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε κοινῶς τι ποιεῖν μήτε φιλικῶς μήτ’ ἀμελετήτως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Rusticity and Wildness

II.7.11k.1

They also say that every base person is rustic. For rusticity is inexperience of a city's customs and laws, a condition to which every base person is subject.[441] He is also wild, being opposed to the conduct of life according to law, a beastlike and harmful human being.[442]

Tyrannical and Ungrateful

II.7.11k.2

This same person is also untamed and tyrannical, disposed to act as a despot and, when opportunities arise, to do cruel, violent, and unlawful things.[443] He is also ungrateful, being properly disposed neither toward returning a favor nor toward sharing, because he does nothing for the common good, in friendship, or in an unstudied manner.[444]

441. Ἀγροικία, "rusticity," is defined through civic customs and laws, rather than by residence in the countryside. Wachsmuth prints Meineke's relative ᾗ, "to which," where the apparatus records ἢ, "or." Its antecedent is rusticity, the condition to which the base person is subject.

442. The source distinguishes ἄγροικος, "rustic," from ἄγριος, "wild," and proceeds through opposition to lawful conduct to being beastlike and harmful. The preceding account defines law as right reason, II.7.11i.5. These are predicates of the ethical type described here, not a claim that rural inhabitants are inherently vicious.

443. Καιρῶν ἐπιλαμβανόμενον retains the qualification of seizing opportunities; the claim describes a disposition and its exercise when occasion offers. "Tyrannical" does not require the person to hold the office of tyrant.

444. Wachsmuth prints ἀμελετήτως, associated with lack of rehearsal or studied effort, although his apparatus records other readings and conjectures. "In an unstudied manner" understands it here as uncontrived action, alongside acting for the common good and in friendship. The interpretation is uncertain; the printed word has not been silently replaced by a conjecture meaning "carefully." Μετάδοσις is sharing, distinct from returning a favor.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φιλολογία φιληκοΐα καὶ προτροπή

II.7.11k.3

Μηδὲ φιλόλογον εἶναι τὸν φαῦλον μηδὲ φιλήκοον, παρὰ τὸ μηδ’ ἀρχὴν παρεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων παραδοχὴν διὰ τὴν ὑπείκουσαν ἐκ τῆς διαστροφῆς ἀφροσύνην, παρὰ τὸ μήτε προτετράφθαι τινὰ τῶν φαύλων μήτε προτρέπειν πρὸς ἀρετήν· τὸν γὰρ προτετραμμένον ἢ προτρέποντα ἑτέρους ἕτοιμον εἶναι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, τὸν δ’ ἕτοιμον ἀνεμποδίστως ἔχειν, μηδένα <δὲ> τῶν ἀφρόνων εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Love of Learning Listening and Exhortation

II.7.11k.3

The base person is neither a lover of learning nor a lover of listening, because he has not even begun to prepare himself to receive right accounts, owing to the folly arising from distortion.[445] No base person has been turned toward virtue or turns others toward it. For someone who has been turned toward it, or turns others, must be ready to practice philosophy, and someone ready must be unimpeded; <but> no foolish person is like this.[446]

445. Φιλόλογος and φιλήκοος describe love of learning or discourse and love of listening. The qualification that follows concerns receptivity to right accounts, not mere enjoyment of speeches. The printed ὑπείκουσαν in the phrase about folly is difficult; Wachsmuth records several alternatives, including ἀκολουθοῦσαν, "following." "Arising from distortion" expresses the apparent causal force of ἐκ τῆς διαστροφῆς, without treating the transmitted wording as secure.

446. Προτρέπειν is exhorting or turning someone toward virtue; the perfect προτετράφθαι expresses having been so turned. The source requires readiness to practice philosophy and then explains that readiness through deeds in the next paragraph. The supplied δέ remains bracketed as "but."

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φιλοσοφία ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις

II.7.11k.4

Οὐ γὰρ τὸν προθύμως ἀκούοντα καὶ ὑπομνηματιζόμενον τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἕτοιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἑτοίμως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ τὰ διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας παραγγελλόμενα μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ βιοῦν. Οὐδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων τοιοῦτον εἶναι, προκατειλημμένον τοῖς τῆς κακίας δόγμασιν. Εἰ γὰρ προετέτραπτό τις τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας ἂν ἐτέτραπτο. Οὐδεὶς δ' ἔχων τὴν κακίαν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τέτραπται, ὡς οὐδὲ νοσῶν πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Μόνον δὲ προτετράφθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μόνον προτρέπειν δύνασθαι, τῶν δ' ἀφρόνων μηδένα· κατὰ γὰρ <ἀρετῆς> παραγγέλματα βιοῦν μηδένα τῶν ἀφρόνων.

Λογοφιλία καὶ φιλοπονία

II.7.11k.5

Μηδ' εἶναι φιλόλογον, λογόφιλον δὲ μᾶλλον, μέχρι λαλίας ἐπιπολαίου προβαίνοντα, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκβεβαιούμενον τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον. Μηδὲ γὰρ φιλόπονόν τινα τῶν φαύλων εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ φιλοπονίαν διάθεσιν ἐξεργαστικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐπιβαλλόντων ἀνυπόπτως διὰ πόνου, οὐδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἀνυπόπτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν πόνον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Philosophy in Deeds

II.7.11k.4

For readiness to practice philosophy belongs, not to someone who listens eagerly and takes notes on what philosophers say, but to someone ready to carry philosophy's precepts into deeds and live according to them.[447] No base person is like this, being already possessed by the beliefs of vice. For if a base person had been turned toward virtue, he would also have been turned away from vice. No one who possesses vice has been turned toward virtue, just as no one who is ill has been turned toward health. Only the wise person has been turned toward virtue, and only he can turn others; no foolish person can, for no foolish person lives according to the precepts <of virtue>.[448]

Love of Talk and Love of Effort

II.7.11k.5

He is not a lover of learning but rather a lover of talk, going only as far as superficial chatter and failing to confirm the account of virtue in deeds.[449] Nor is any base person a lover of effort. For love of effort is a disposition to carry out what falls to one, without misgiving, through toil; no base person faces toil without misgiving.[450]

447. Ὑπομνηματιζόμενον includes making notes or memoranda. The contrast is explicitly between eager reception of philosophical discourse and readiness to put its precepts into practice; the English preserves both parts.

448. The illness analogy uses an accomplished turning, expressed by the perfect τέτραπται, rather than merely wishing to become healthy. The argument sets its criterion by actual life according to virtue. Wachsmuth supplies ἀρετῆς to identify whose precepts conclude the paragraph; its English equivalent remains bracketed.

449. The reversal φιλόλογος / λογόφιλος turns "loving discourse" into "loving talk." The explanation is practical: superficial speech does not establish the account of virtue through action. The English retains the repeated λόγος without turning the distinction into a criticism of literary study as such.

450. Φιλοπονία retains "love of effort," as at II.7.5b2.5, where the corresponding definition calls it knowledge. Here it is a διάθεσις, disposition, and the text prints διὰ πόνου, "through toil." The repeated ἀνυπόπτως, "without misgiving," qualifies both the definition and the denial concerning the base.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡ κατ’ ἀξίαν δόσις τῆς ἀρετῆς

II.7.11k.6

Μηδὲ γὰρ τὴν κατ’ ἀξίαν ποιεῖσθαι δόσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν φαύλων τινά, σπουδαῖον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν δόσιν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, καθ’ ἣν ἀξιόλογόν τι ἡγούμεθα περιποιεῖσθαι. Τῶν δὲ σπουδαίων μηδὲν εἰς φαύλους πίπτειν, ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς δόσιν ποιεῖσθαί τινα τῶν φαύλων. Εἰ γὰρ τὴν κατ’ ἀξίαν τις ἐποιεῖτο δόσιν τῶν ἀφρόνων τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐτίμα ταύτην, ἀπῳκονομεῖτο ἂν τὴν κακίαν.

Λόγος καὶ πράξεις τῶν φαύλων

II.7.11k.7

Πᾶς δέ τις ἄφρων σύνεστιν ἡδέως τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ. Σκοπεῖν γὰρ δεῖ μὴ τὸν ἐξώφορον αὐτῶν λόγον, φαῦλον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν πράξεων. Ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἀπελέγχονται [καὶ] μὴ περὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα παρωρμημένοι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις ἀμέτρους ἀπολαύσεις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Assigning Virtue Its Due Worth

II.7.11k.6

No base person assigns virtue its due worth. For such an assignment is a thing of moral excellence, being knowledge in accordance with which we judge something worth acquiring. Nothing of moral excellence falls to base people, so no base person makes an appraisal worthy of virtue.[451] For if a foolish person assigned virtue its due worth, to the extent that he honored it he would rid himself of vice.[452]

The Speech and Deeds of the Base

II.7.11k.7

Every fool gladly keeps company with his own vice. For one must examine the account given by their deeds, rather than their outward speech, which is base. For their deeds expose them as impelled toward slavish, immoderate enjoyments rather than toward noble and worthy things.[453]

451. Δόσις here concerns assigning or appraising worth, and the source calls it knowledge; it is not a material gift to virtue. The two phrases κατ' ἀξίαν δόσιν and ἀξίαν … δόσιν are retained as assigning due worth and making an appraisal worthy of virtue. Compare the earlier difficult definition through κρίσις, "assessment," at II.7.7f.2.

452. The condition is counterfactual and the extent clause, ἐφ' ὅσον, remains explicit. The inference connects honoring virtue with putting vice away; it does not identify merely saying that virtue is valuable with the knowledge just defined.

453. Ἐξώφορος is the account brought outward in speech; the contrasting "account of deeds" is the evidence of conduct. The adjective φαῦλον remains "base," following the print despite the apparatus's suggestion of a word meaning deceptive or fabricated. Wachsmuth brackets καί for deletion before μή; the rejected word remains in the Greek and is omitted in the English. "Their deeds" makes the antecedent of τούτων explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα

II.7.11k.8

Ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν βούλησίν τι πράττεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀσεβείας εἶναι τεκμήριον. Τῶν γὰρ θεῶν οἰκειουμένων μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τοῖς ταύτης ἔργοις, ἀλλοτριουμένων δὲ τῇ κακίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης συντελουμένοις, τοῦ δ' ἁμαρτήματος ὄντος ἐνεργήματος κατὰ κακίαν, κατεφαίνετο πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀπάρεστον θεοῖς ὑπάρχον (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀσέβημα)· [καὶ] καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἁμάρτημα ὁ φαῦλος ἀπάρεστόν τι ποιεῖ θεοῖς.

Ἀσέβεια ὡς ἕξις

II.7.11k.9

Ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ πᾶς φαῦλος ὅσα ποιεῖ κατὰ κακίαν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ὁ σπουδαῖος κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ μίαν ἔχων κακίαν πάσας ἔχει. Ἐν δὲ ταύταις ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσέβειαν, οὐ τὴν τεταγμένην κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ ἐναντίαν ἕξιν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἀσέβειαν πεπραγμένον ἀσέβημα εἶναι, πᾶν <οὖν> ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα εἶναι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Every Error as an Impious Act

II.7.11k.8

They also hold that every error is an impious act. For something's being done contrary to the will of god is evidence of impiety.[454] Since the gods are favorably disposed toward virtue and its deeds, and alienated from vice and what is accomplished through it, and since an error is an activity in accordance with vice, it followed that every error is displeasing to the gods—and that is an impious act. For in each error the base person does something displeasing to the gods.[455]

Impiety as a State

II.7.11k.9

Further, since every base person does whatever he does in accordance with vice, just as the virtuous person does in accordance with virtue, a person who has one vice has them all. Impiety too is found among these—not impiety classified in terms of activity, but the state opposed to piety.[456] What is done in accordance with impiety is an impious act; <therefore> every error is an impious act.[457]

454. Ἁμάρτημα retains "error," the wrong action defined at II.7.11a; ἀσέβημα is an impious act, distinguished from ἀσέβεια, impiety. The source first uses singular τοῦ θεοῦ, "of god," then plural "the gods"; the English preserves the change.

455. Οἰκειουμένων and ἀλλοτριουμένων contrast affinity and alienation toward virtue and vice. The inference proceeds from the ethical character of action to its displeasing the gods. Wachsmuth brackets καί before the final explanatory sentence for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek but is not translated.

456. The printed sentence is compressed: it moves from action according to vice to possession of all the vices. The distinction within impiety is explicit, between its classification by activity and the ἕξις, state, opposed to piety. The English keeps the state/activity distinction rather than making the second argument simply repeat the first.

457. Heeren's supplied οὖν, "therefore," marks the conclusion and remains bracketed. This is a second argument for the same claim: acting according to vice involves the vice of impiety, and hence produces an impious act.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἔχθρα πρὸς τοὺς θεούς

II.7.11k.10

Ἔτι δ’ ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς καὶ πάντ’ εἶναι τὸν ἄφρονα θεοῖς ἐχθρόν· τὴν γὰρ ἔχθραν ἀσυμφωνίαν εἶναι <περὶ> τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ διχόνοιαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συμφωνίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν. Διαφωνοῦσι δ’ οἱ φαῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, διόπερ πᾶς ἄφρων θεοῖς ἐχθρός ἐστιν. Ἔτι εἰ πάντες τοὺς ἐναντίους αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς εἶναι νομίζουσι, τῷ δὲ σπουδαίῳ ὁ φαῦλός ἐστιν ἐναντίος καὶ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ὁ φαῦλος θεοῖς ἐστιν ἐχθρός.

Ἴσα ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅμοια ἁμαρτήματα

II.7.11l.1

Ἴσα τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς τινος πηγῆς τῆς κακίας φέρεσθαι πέφυκε, τῆς κρίσεως οὔσης ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τῆς αὐτῆς· παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἔξωθεν αἰτίαν, τῶν ἐφ’ οἷς αἱ κρίσεις ἀποτελοῦνται μέσων διαλλαττόντων, διάφορα κατὰ ποιότητα γίνεσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Enmity toward the Gods

II.7.11k.10

They also hold that every foolish person is an enemy to the gods. For enmity is disagreement <about> the affairs of life and discord, just as friendship is agreement and concord. Base people disagree with the gods about the affairs of life; hence every fool is an enemy to the gods.[458] Again, if everyone considers those opposed to him to be enemies, and the base person is opposed to the virtuous person, while god is virtuous, the base person is an enemy to the gods.[459]

Errors Equal but Not Alike

II.7.11l.1

They say that all errors are equal, but not alike. For they naturally flow, as it were, from a single source, vice, the judgment being the same in every error. But because of the external cause, as the intermediate things about which the judgments are formed differ, the errors differ in quality.[460]

458. The definition of enmity uses ἀσυμφωνία and διχόνοια, disagreement and discord, opposed to συμφωνία and ὁμόνοια, agreement and concord. Meineke's supplied περί, "about," remains bracketed. The affairs of life are explicitly the subject of disagreement; compare the earlier accounts of friendship and concord at II.7.5l and II.7.11b.

459. The final argument retains its conditional opening, "if everyone considers," and its shift from singular god to plural gods. The conclusion is drawn from the opposition of virtue and vice, not from a reported conflict with a particular cult or community.

460. The source distinguishes equality from qualitative likeness. Its shared ground is vice and the same character of judgment; its difference lies in the external cause and the intermediate things judged. Μέσα retains "intermediate things," the category distinguished from goods and evils earlier. The argument does not erase differences among the objects or circumstances of wrong actions.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ψεύδους II.7.11l.2

Λάβοις δ’ ἂν εἰκόνα σαφῆ τοῦ δηλουμένου τῷδ’ ἐπιστήσας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπ’ ἴσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον διεψευσμένον· τὸ [τε] γὰρ νύκτ’ <ἀεὶ> εἶναι ψεῦδός ἐστι, καθάπερ τὸ ἱπποκένταυρον ζῆν· καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἔστι ψεῦδος εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου· ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὸ ψευδὲς ἐπίσης ψευδές ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ διεψευσμένοι ἐπίσης εἰσὶ διεψευσμένοι.

Οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον ἁμαρτάνειν II.7.11l.3

Καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐκ ἔστι, πᾶσαν γὰρ ἁμαρτίαν κατὰ διάψευσιν πράττεσθαι. Ἔτι οὐχὶ κατόρθωμα μὲν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον οὐ γίνεσθαι, ἁμάρτημα δὲ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον γίνεσθαι· πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’ ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Ἴσα τοίνυν ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Analogy of Falsehood

II.7.11l.2

You could obtain a clear illustration of the point by attending to this: every falsehood is equally a falsehood, for one is not more false than another. That it is <always> night is a falsehood, just as that a centaur is alive is a falsehood; neither can be said to be more a falsehood than the other.[461] But is not what is false equally false, and are not those who are mistaken equally mistaken?[462]

Neither More Nor Less in Error

II.7.11l.3

Nor is it possible to err more or less, for every error is committed through being mistaken. Further, it is not the case that a correct action cannot be greater or smaller while an error can. For all are complete, and hence could neither fall short of nor exceed one another. Therefore all errors are equal.[463]

461. Heeren supplies ἀεί, “always,” in the night example. The claim is therefore not that “it is night” is invariably false. Ἱπποκένταυρος is the horse-centaur. Wachsmuth brackets τε for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek and is omitted in English. The analogy concerns the status of a proposition as false, rather than degrees of resemblance between its subject and an existing thing.

462. The repeated οὐχί is read as introducing questions expecting affirmation; the English question marks make this interpretation explicit. Wachsmuth prints these words without question marks and records conjectures in the apparatus. Reading both as simple denials would conflict with the preceding assertion and the following inference. The Greek remains as printed, and the interpretive choice is not concealed.

463. The opening connects ethical error with διάψευσις, being mistaken. The next sentence denies an asymmetry between correct and erroneous acts: the absence of greater and lesser degree does not apply only to correct actions. Τέλεια is “complete” in this argument; when applied to an error it does not make it morally perfect. The conclusion repeats equality, while the preceding passage has already allowed differences in quality.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐφυΐα καὶ εὐγένεια II.7.11m.1

Περὶ δὲ εὐφυοῦς, ἔτι δὲ εὐγενοῦς οἱ μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἐπηνέχθησαν ἐπὶ τὸ λέγειν πάντα σοφὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἱ δ’ οὔ. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται οὐ μόνον εὐφυεῖς γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καί τινας ἐκ κατασκευῆς, καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπεδέξαντο

μελέτη χρονισθεῖσ’ εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται.

Οἱ ὅροι τῆς εὐφυΐας καὶ εὐγενείας II.7.11m.2

Τὸ δ’ ὅμοιον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας ὑπέλαβον, ὥστε εὐφυΐαν μὲν εἶναι κοινῶς ἕξιν ἐκ φύσεως ἢ ἐκ κατασκευῆς οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἣ ἕξιν καθ’ ἣν εὐανάληπτοι ἀρετῆς εἰσί τινες· τὴν δ’ εὐγένειαν ἕξιν ἐκ γένους ἢ ἐκ κατασκευῆς οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Aptitude and Good Birth

II.7.11m.1

As for being well endowed by nature, and also well born, some members of the school inclined to say that every wise person is such, while others did not.[464] The former think that aptitude for virtue arises not only by nature but, in some people, through training. They accepted this proverbial saying:

Practice, with time, becomes nature.[465]

Definitions of Aptitude and Good Birth

II.7.11m.2

They took the same view of good birth. Thus aptitude is, in general, a state arising by nature or through training that is congenial to virtue, or a state in virtue of which some people can readily acquire virtue; good birth is a state arising from lineage or through training that is congenial to virtue.[466]

464. Εὐφυής and εὐγενής are initially rendered through their ordinary associations with natural endowment and good birth. The following definitions extend both to acquired states. The source explicitly reports disagreement within the school; the view that every wise person has these qualities must not be attributed without qualification to all Stoics.

465. Κατασκευή is preparation or cultivation, here rendered "training." Wachsmuth identifies the verse as an unattributed tragic fragment, no. 227 in Nauck's collection; this editorial reference is recorded in the note rather than inserted into the ancient sentence. Χρονισθεῖσ' is the elided participle "continued over time." The quotation explains how practice can come to function as nature.

466. Both definitions use ἕξις, "state," and οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν, "congenial to virtue." The alternative origin through training remains explicit even in the definition of good birth, alongside lineage. The printed εὐανάληπτοι is understood as readily able to acquire virtue. These are the definitions of the group just described, rather than a resolution of the reported disagreement.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡ ὁμιλία τοῦ σπουδαίου

II.7.11m.3

Τὸν δὲ σπουδαῖον, ὁμιλητικὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδέξιον καὶ προτρεπτικὸν καὶ θηρευτικὸν διὰ τῆς ὁμιλίας εἰς εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν, ὡς δυνατὸν εὐάρμοστον εἶναι πρὸς πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων, παρ' ὃ καὶ ἐπαφρόδιτον εἶναι καὶ ἐπίχαριν καὶ πιθανόν, ἔτι δὲ αἰμύλον καὶ εὔστοχον καὶ εὔκαιρον καὶ ἀγχίνουν καὶ ἀφελῆ καὶ ἀπερίεργον καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἄπλαστον· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἔνοχον πᾶσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

Εἰρωνεία καὶ σαρκασμός

II.7.11m.4

Τὸ δ' εἰρωνεύεσθαι φαύλων εἶναί φασιν, οὐδένα γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ σπουδαῖον εἰρωνεύεσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ σαρκάζειν, ὅ ἐστιν εἰρωνεύεσθαι μετ' ἐπισυρμοῦ τινος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Virtuous Person in Company

II.7.11m.3

The virtuous person, being sociable and tactful, able to exhort others and to win goodwill and friendship through his company, is as adaptable as possible to a multitude of people.[467] Hence he is also charming, gracious, and persuasive; further, he is winning, apt, timely, quick witted, straightforward, free from meddlesomeness, simple, and unfeigned. The base person is subject to all the contrary qualities.[468]

Dissembling and Sarcasm

II.7.11m.4

They say that dissembling belongs to base people, for no free and virtuous person dissembles. The same holds of sarcasm, which is dissembling accompanied by a measure of ridicule.[469]

467. Ὁμιλία is social intercourse or company. Θηρευτικός literally evokes hunting, here directed toward winning goodwill and friendship. The qualification ὡς δυνατόν, "as far as possible," limits the claim about adaptability; it has not been turned into unlimited accommodation to others.

468. The succession of adjectives is retained rather than reduced to a general description of pleasantness. Αἰμύλος can have an unfavorable sense of wily or flattering, but here stands among the virtuous person's qualities and is rendered "winning." Εὔστοχος concerns hitting the mark, εὔκαιρος the right occasion, and ἄπλαστος being unfeigned.

469. Εἰρωνεύεσθαι here is dissembling or adopting a false pose, rather than every use of what modern English calls irony. Σαρκάζειν adds ἐπισυρμός, ridicule or mockery. The definition concerns a mode of treating others and should be read alongside the account of unfeigned company.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια

II.7.11m.5

Ἐν μόνοις τε τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπολείπουσι φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐν μόνοις τούτοις ὁμόνοια γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον· τὴν δ’ ὁμόνοιαν εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην. Φιλίαν γὰρ ἀληθινὴν καὶ μὴ ψευδώνυμον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς πίστεως καὶ βεβαιότητος ὑπάρχειν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀπίστοις καὶ ἀβεβαίοις οὖσι καὶ δόγματα πολεμικὰ κεκτημένοις, οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαν, ἑτέρας δέ τινας ἐπιπλοκὰς καὶ συνδέσεις ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκαις καὶ δόξαις κατεχομένας γίνεσθαι. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν μόνων εἶναι σπουδαίων.

Μόνος ὁ σοφὸς βασιλεύς

II.7.11m.6

Καὶ μόνον εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν βασιλέα τε καὶ βασιλικόν, τῶν δὲ φαύλων μηδένα· τὴν γὰρ βασιλείαν ἀρχὴν ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσαις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Friendship and Concord

II.7.11m.5

They reserve friendship for the wise alone, since among them alone is there concord about the affairs of life; concord is knowledge of common goods.[470] For true friendship, deserving its name, cannot exist without trust and constancy. Among base people, who are untrustworthy and inconstant and possess hostile beliefs, there is no friendship; instead, there arise other entanglements and connections, held together from outside by necessities and opinions. They also say that cherishing, welcoming, and loving belong to the virtuous alone.[471]

Only the Wise Person Is King

II.7.11m.6

Only the wise person is king and kingly; no base person is. For kingship is rule that answers to no higher authority, the highest rule and the one set over all the others.[472]

470. The restriction concerns friendship in the strict sense defined here through concord, trust, and constancy. Compare the accounts of friendship and concord at II.7.5l and II.7.11b. Κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν means common or shared goods; the definition is knowledge, not merely agreement of feeling.

471. The distinction between true friendship and other connections is explicit. Ἔξωθεν, "from outside," qualifies what holds the latter together. The final three verbs, ἀγαπᾶν, ἀσπάζεσθαι, and φιλεῖν, are rendered separately as cherishing, welcoming, and loving; the passage does not assign them later theological classifications of love.

472. The text distinguishes being βασιλεύς, a king, from being βασιλικός, kingly or fitted to rule. Ἀνυπεύθυνος is unaccountable or not subject to being called to account. "Answers to no higher authority" expresses its place in the hierarchy of rule specified here. This definition belongs to the ethical claim that only the wise person is properly king.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἰατρὸς ἑαυτοῦ II.7.11m.7

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄριστον αὐτοῦ ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα· ἐπιμελῆ γὰρ ὄντα τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως παρατηρητὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐπιστήμονα συμφερόντων.

Μέθη καὶ ἁμαρτία II.7.11m.8

Οὐχ οἷον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· τὴν γὰρ μέθην ἁμαρτητικὸν περιέχειν, λήρησιν εἶναι <γὰρ> παρὰ τὸν οἶνον, ἐν μηδενὶ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἁμαρτάνειν, δι’ ὃ πάντα κατ’ ἀρετὴν ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ ταύτης ὀρθὸν λόγον.

Τρεῖς προηγούμενοι βίοι II.7.11m.9

Τρεῖς δὲ προηγουμένους εἶναι βίους, τόν τε βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τρίτον τὸν ἐπιστημονικόν·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

His Own Physician

II.7.11m.7

They also say that the virtuous man is his own best physician. For, being attentive to his own constitution, he observes it and knows what is beneficial for health.[473]

Intoxication and Error

II.7.11m.8

It is not possible for the person of understanding to become drunk. For intoxication involves error, being rambling under the influence of wine; the virtuous person errs in nothing, and hence does everything according to virtue and the right reason that proceeds from it.[474]

Three Preferred Ways of Life

II.7.11m.9

There are three preferred ways of life: the kingly, the political, and, third, the life of knowledge.[475]

473. Ἰδία φύσις is the person's own nature or bodily constitution in this context. The explanation rests on attentive observation and knowledge of what benefits health. The source is describing the ideal wise person's care of himself; it does not here enumerate treatments or offer a general account of medical practice.

474. Λήρησις is rambling or delirious talk, and παρὰ τὸν οἶνον makes wine its cause. The inference rests on the definition of intoxication as involving error. Wachsmuth supplies γάρ, "for," within the explanation. The Greek preserves the supplied particle; its explanatory connection is expressed through "being" in the English sentence.

475. Προηγούμενος here is preferred or adopted in the first instance, rather than chronologically preceding. Ἐπιστημονικός is concerned with knowledge; "the life of knowledge" keeps its connection with ἐπιστήμη without limiting it to the modern natural sciences. The source continues directly into the corresponding means of acquiring money.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χρηματισμὸς καὶ κοινωνικὸς βίος

II.7.11m.10

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χρηματισμοὺς τρεῖς προηγουμένους, τόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλείας, καθ' ὃν ἢ αὐτὸς βασιλεύσει ἢ μοναρχικῶν χρημάτων εὐπορήσει· δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύσεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον· καὶ γὰρ γαμήσειν καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι, ἀκολουθεῖν <γὰρ> ταῦτα τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ καὶ φιλαλλήλου <φύσει>. Χρηματιεῖσθαι οὖν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς ὄντων.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Income and Social Life

II.7.11m.10

Likewise there are three preferred means of acquiring money. One is from kingship, by which he will either be king himself or have access to royal funds. The second is from political life, for he will engage in politics according to the course preferred in the first instance.[476] He will also marry and have children, <for> these follow from the <nature> of an animal that is rational, social, and affectionate toward its fellows. Thus he will acquire money both from political life and from friends who occupy positions of prominence.[477]

476. The subject remains the wise person. The first means of support includes two alternatives, personal kingship and access to a monarch's resources. Political participation is qualified by the preferred course of reason, rather than asserted without exception; the source returns to circumstances preventing participation below, II.7.11m.14.

477. The description λογικόν, κοινωνικόν, φιλάλληλον retains rationality, sociability, and affection toward others. Wachsmuth's supplied γάρ and φύσει remain bracketed in English. Friends in ὑπεροχαί are those in positions of prominence or superiority. The third means of acquiring money is taken up in the discussion of paid teaching that follows.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Μισθὸς καὶ σοφιστεία

II.7.11m.11

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστεύσειν καὶ ἀπὸ σοφιστείας εὐπορήσειν χρημάτων διέστησαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ χρηματιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ μισθούς ποτε λήψεσθαι παρὰ τῶν φιλομαθούντων διωμολογήσαντο· περὶ δὲ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐγένετό τις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμφισβήτησις, τῶν μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο λεγόντων σοφιστεύειν, τὸ ἐπὶ μισθῷ μεταδιδόναι τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας δογμάτων, τῶν δ' ὑποτοπησάντων ἐν τῷ σοφιστεύειν περιέχεσθαί τι φαῦλον, οἱονεὶ λόγους καπηλεύειν, οὐ φαμένων δεῖν ἀπὸ παιδείας παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων χρηματίζεσθαι, καταδέεστερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀξιώματος.

Ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος κατὰ τὸ καθῆκον

II.7.11m.12

Φασὶ δέ ποτε καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τοῖς σπουδαίοις καθηκόντως <γίγνεσθαι> κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, τοῖς <δὲ> φαύλοις μονὴν <τὴν> ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ οἳ μὴ μέλλοιεν ἔσεσθαι σοφοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον <παρα>μετρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 109-110

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Payment and the Meaning of Sophistry

II.7.11m.11

As to whether he will act as a sophist and obtain money from sophistry, members of the school differed over the meaning of the term. For they agreed that he will acquire money from educational activities and sometimes receive payment from those who love learning.[478] But a dispute arose among them about the meaning: some called precisely this "acting as a sophist"—imparting the doctrines of philosophy for payment. Others suspected that acting as a sophist involved something base, as though one were peddling arguments. They said that one should not earn money by education from whoever happened to come along, for this way of acquiring money fell below the dignity of philosophy.[479]

Life and Death Judged by Appropriate Action

II.7.11m.12

They say that departure from life too sometimes <occurs> appropriately for the virtuous in many ways; <but> for the base, remaining in life may be appropriate, even for those who are not going to become wise. For virtue does not keep one in life, nor does vice drive one out of it. Both life and death are measured by appropriate actions and by what is contrary to appropriate action.[480]

478. The source explicitly distinguishes agreement about receiving payment from disagreement over the meaning of σοφιστεύειν and σοφιστεία. "Sophistry" retains the disputed term; the first group defines it through paid instruction without necessarily assigning it a base character.

479. Καπηλεύειν is peddling or retailing, used here of λόγοι, arguments or discourses. The second group objects to taking money from indiscriminate customers, expressed by τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, rather than simply reversing the stated agreement about all educational payment. Ἀξίωμα is philosophy's dignity or standing in this sentence.

480. Ἔξαγωγὴ ἐκ τοῦ βίου is departure from life, the Stoic ethical topic of a deliberate exit. Ποτέ, "sometimes," is essential. The compressed following clause takes appropriate occurrence from the first clause and applies it to remaining alive, even without future wisdom. In the next sentence virtue and vice are understood as the subjects of "keep" and "drive out," with the person as the implied object. Mere possession of virtue or vice therefore does not settle the judgment. The supplied γίγνεσθαι and δέ remain bracketed in English; the supplied article τήν and prefix παρα- are expressed through ordinary grammar and "measured."

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 109-110

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὕβρις καὶ βλάβη

II.7.11m.13

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἀνύβριστον εἶναι· οὔθ’ ὑβρίζεσθαι γὰρ οὔθ’ ὑβρίζειν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὕβριν ἀδικίαν εἶναι καταισχύνουσαν καὶ βλάβην· μήτε δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι μήτε βλάπτεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον (ἀδικητικῶς μέντοι γέ τινας αὐτῷ προσφέρεσθαι καὶ ὑβριστικῶς) καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο δικαιοπραγεῖν. Πρὸς τούτῳ μηδὲ <τὴν> τυχοῦσαν ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕβριν, ἀλλὰ καταισχύνουσαν καὶ ὑβριστικὴν οὖσαν. Ἀπερίπτωτον δ’ ὑπάρχειν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα τούτοις καὶ μηδαμῶς καταισχύνεσθαι· ἐν ἑαυτῷ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν θείαν ἀρετήν, δι’ ὃ καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλάχθαι κακίας καὶ βλάβης.

Βασιλεία καὶ πολιτεία

II.7.11m.14

Καὶ βασιλεύσειν τέ ποτε τὸν νοῦν <ἔχοντα> καὶ βασιλεῖ συμβιώσεσθαι καὶ εὐφυΐαν ἐμφαίνοντι καὶ φιλομάθειαν. Ἔφαμεν δ’ ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἷόν ἐστι, μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι <κωλύῃ> καὶ μάλιστ’ ἂν μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν μέλλῃ τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 110-111

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Outrage and Harm

II.7.11m.13

They also say that the wise person is beyond outrage: he neither suffers nor commits it, because outrage is injustice that brings shame, and is harm. The virtuous person is neither wronged nor harmed—though some do treat him unjustly and outrageously—and in this too he acts justly.[481] Moreover, outrage is not just any injustice, but one that brings shame and is outrageous. The person of understanding is not subject to these things and is in no way put to shame. For he has the good and divine virtue within himself, and hence is free from every vice and harm.[482]

Kingship and Political Participation

II.7.11m.14

The person <possessed> of understanding will sometimes be king and will live with a king who displays both aptitude and love of learning.[483] We said that it is possible for him to engage in politics according to the course preferred in the first instance, but that he will not participate if something <prevents him>, especially if he is going to do his country no good and considers that great and grievous dangers will follow from political participation.[484]

481. Ὕβρις is outrage or humiliating treatment, rather than merely a spoken insult. The parenthesis admits that others can behave unjustly and outrageously toward the wise person, while denying that they achieve the harm defined here. In the printed punctuation the parenthesis ends after ὑβριστικῶς. The subject of δικαιοπραγεῖν, “acts justly,” therefore returns to the virtuous person, not to those mistreating him.

482. The claim rests on the location of good and virtue within the wise person. It is part of the source’s ethical account of harm and shame, not a denial that hostile treatment can occur. The supplied article τήν is preserved in the Greek and expressed in normal English grammar.

483. The supplied ἔχοντα is rendered by the bracketed “possessed.” The king with whom he lives is qualified by both aptitude and love of learning. “Sometimes” qualifies the wise person’s own kingship, rather than making it a necessary office held by every wise person.

484. Wachsmuth’s parenthetical reference is to printed p. 94, lines 8–11 and 15, translated at II.7.11b. The first-person “we said” belongs to the continuing account, not to this translator. The supplemented κωλύῃ, “prevents,” remains bracketed; absence of benefit to the country and anticipated serious dangers both remain explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι

II.7.11m.15

Λέγεσθαι δὲ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διεψευσμένως τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. Τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσεσθαι νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν <κατὰ> τῶν ἀντιπάλων καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος προόρασιν καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς.

Ψευδὴς ὑπόληψις καὶ ἄγνοια

II.7.11m.16

Ψεῦδος δ’ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτέ φασι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκαταλήπτῳ τινὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ δοξάζειν αὐτόν, μηδ’ ἀγνοεῖν μηδέν. Τὴν γὰρ ἄγνοιαν μεταπτωτικὴν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενῆ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 111

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Falsehood and Lying

II.7.11m.15

It is said that the wise person does not lie but speaks truth in everything. For lying consists not in saying something false, but in saying the falsehood while mistaken and with a view to deceiving one's neighbors.[485] Yet they think that he will sometimes employ falsehood in many ways without assenting to it: in military command <against> his opponents, in foreseeing what is beneficial, and in many other arrangements of life.[486]

False Belief and Ignorance

II.7.11m.16

They say that the wise person never believes a falsehood, nor assents at all to anything not apprehensible, since he neither holds an opinion nor is ignorant of anything. For ignorance is assent that is liable to change and weak.[487]

485. The source distinguishes ψεῦδος, a falsehood, from ψεύδεσθαι, lying. Its definition includes διεψευσμένως, being oneself mistaken, and the purpose of deceiving others. The English preserves these elements rather than replacing them with an ordinary modern definition of lying.

486. The qualification ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως, "without assent," is central: using a falsehood does not here mean accepting it as true. The text nevertheless includes its use against military opponents. The distinction should remain visible rather than be smoothed into a claim that the wise person never utters a false statement. The supplied κατά is "against"; προόρασις is foresight, and οἰκονομίαι are arrangements or management of life.

487. Συγκατάθεσις is assent, κατάληψις apprehension, and δόξα opinion in the technical distinctions developed below. The printed text defines ἄγνοια, ignorance, as weak and changeable assent. Wachsmuth discusses a reconstruction involving a definition of opinion in his apparatus, but does not insert it into the text. The English therefore retains "ignorance" and does not silently substitute that reconstruction. The assertions describe the school's ideal sage.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Δόξα καὶ προπέτεια

II.7.11m.17

Μηδὲν δ’ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. Διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας <δ’> ἀλλοτρίας εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸ προπιπτεῖν πρὸ καταλήψεως <καὶ> συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προπετῆ φαῦλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν εἰς τὸν εὐφυῆ καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ σπουδαῖον.

Λῆσις πίστις καὶ ἐπιστήμη

II.7.11m.18

Οὐδὲ λανθάνειν δὲ αὐτόν τι, τὴν γὰρ λῆσιν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν ἀποφαντικὴν πράγματος. Τούτοις δ’ ἀκολούθως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν, τὴν γὰρ ἀπιστίαν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν· τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀστεῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι γὰρ κατάληψιν ἰσχυράν, βεβαιοῦσαν τὸ ὑπολαμβανόμενον· Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· διὰ ταῦτά φασι μήτε ἐπίστασθαί τι τὸν φαῦλον μήτε πιστεύειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Opinion and Precipitate Assent

II.7.11m.17

He believes nothing weakly, but rather securely and firmly; hence the wise person does not hold opinions. For there are two kinds of opinion: assent to something not apprehensible, and weak belief. <But> these are alien to the wise person's disposition.[488] Hence rushing ahead before apprehension <and> assenting in the manner of a precipitate person is base, and does not befall the well endowed, complete, and virtuous man.[489]

Unawareness Conviction and Knowledge

II.7.11m.18

Nor does anything escape his notice; for unawareness is a belief in something false that makes an assertion about a matter.[490] In keeping with this, he does not lack conviction, for lack of conviction is belief in something false. Conviction is a thing of moral excellence, for it is a strong apprehension that confirms what is believed. Likewise knowledge cannot be overturned by argument. For these reasons, they say, the base person neither knows anything nor has conviction.[491]

488. The distinction is between two defective forms of assent or belief, not between every everyday use of "opinion" and knowledge. The first concerns the object as not apprehensible, the second the weakness of the belief. The supplied δ' remains "but."

489. Προπίπτειν, rushing ahead, and προπετής, precipitate, link the action with the agent's manner. Wachsmuth prints φαῦλον, "base," in the predicate, and supplies καί before assenting. The English retains this supplement and the temporal qualification "before apprehension."

490. The printed λῆσις, rendered "unawareness," is linked to λανθάνειν, escaping notice. The definition is compressed: Wachsmuth prints ἀποφαντικήν, "assertive," qualifying the belief, rather than a word meaning negative or denying. The English preserves this assertion about a matter without inventing an example of what escapes notice.

491. Πίστις here concerns firm conviction and is defined as strong apprehension; in the friendship paragraph its social context called for "trust." Ἀπιστία is its contrary. The definitions govern the categorical claims about wise and base people. The source calls knowledge ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, unable to be overturned by argument, a qualification retained in English.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀπάτη καὶ παραριθμός

II.7.11m.19

Ἐχομένως δὲ τούτων οὔτε πλεονεκτεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὔτε βουκολεῖσθαι οὔτε διαιτᾶσθαι οὔτε παραριθμεῖν οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου παραριθμεῖσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τὴν ἀπάτην περιέχειν καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ψεύδεσι πρόσθεσιν.

Αἴσθησις καὶ ψευδὴς συγκατάθεσις

II.7.11m.20

Οὐδένα δὲ τῶν ἀστείων οὔθ' ὁδοῦ διαμαρτάνειν οὔτ' οἰκίας οὔτε σκοποῦ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρορᾶν [ἀλλ'] οὐδὲ παρακούειν νομίζουσι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ σύνολον παραπαίειν κατά τι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχεσθαι νομίζουσι τῶν[δε] ψευδῶν συγκαταθέσεων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 112-113

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Deception and Miscounting

II.7.11m.19

Following from these points, the wise person is neither cheated, nor led astray, nor taken in; he neither miscounts nor is cheated in counting by someone else.[492] For all these involve deception and acceptance of the falsehoods belonging to the subject in question.[493]

Sense Perception and False Assent

II.7.11m.20

No morally excellent person misses a road, a house, or a target. They also think that the wise person neither sees nor hears amiss, nor errs at all in any of the senses, for they consider each of these failures to depend on false assents.[494]

492. The printed διαιτᾶσθαι is difficult: its ordinary association is with arbitration, which does not fit the list readily. “Taken in” provisionally follows the context of deception; it is an interpretation, not a secure lexical equivalent. Wachsmuth records several conjectures, including Heeren’s διαπατᾶσθαι, “be thoroughly deceived,” and himself asks whether a word for being lured is intended. The printed Greek is retained. The final counting clauses distinguish making an error from being cheated by another.

493. Βουκολεῖσθαι literally evokes being herded and here means being led astray or duped. Πρόσθεσις, “acceptance,” is directed toward the relevant falsehoods; this explains why the list follows the denial of mistaken assent. The passage’s assertions concern the ideal wise person under these definitions.

494. The concrete list of road, house, and target remains intact. The explanation relates sensory failures to false assent; it has not been replaced by a modern theory of perception. Wachsmuth brackets ἀλλ’ before “hears amiss” and the suffix δε in τῶνδε for deletion. Both remain visible in Greek; the English omits the rejected connective and renders τῶν as “the,” without the demonstrative force of “these.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 112-113

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὑπόνοια καὶ μετάνοια

II.7.11m.21

Οὐδ’ ὑπονοεῖν δέ φασι τὸν σοφόν, καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἀκαταλήπτῳ εἶναι τῷ γένει συγκατάθεσιν· οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ’ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, καὶ γὰρ τὴν μετάνοιαν ἔχεσθαι ψευδοῦς συγκαταθέσεως, <ὡς> ἂν προδιαπεπτωκότος.

Βεβαιότης τῶν δογμάτων

II.7.11m.22

Οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον, οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι, οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι πάντα τῶν τοῖς δόγμασι μεταπιπτόντων, ὅπερ ἀλλότριον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τι φασὶ παραπλησίως τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 113

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Conjecture and Changing One's Mind

II.7.11m.21

They also say that the wise person does not conjecture, for conjecture too is, in its kind, assent to something not apprehensible. Nor do they suppose that the person of understanding changes his mind, for a change of mind too depends on false assent, <as> in someone who had previously gone wrong.[495]

Firmness of Beliefs

II.7.11m.22

Nor does he change in any way, shift his position, or stumble; for all these belong to people who are unstable in their beliefs, a condition alien to the person of understanding. In keeping with what has been said, they also deny that anything merely seems true to him.[496]

495. Ὑπόνοια can mean conjecture or suspicion; here it is classified through its relation to assent and apprehension. Μετάνοια is a change of mind or repentance, explained by a prior error, rather than the earlier term μεταμέλεια, regret. The supplied ὡς remains bracketed. The source's categorical denial is retained, together with its stated reason; it has not been rewritten as a general recommendation against reconsideration.

496. The sequence μεταβάλλεσθαι, μετατίθεσθαι, σφάλλεσθαι is kept distinct as changing, shifting position, and stumbling. Its explanation concerns instability in δόγματα, beliefs or doctrines. The final δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τι is literally "something seems to him"; "merely seems true" expresses its connection here with opinion and the preceding discussion of firm assent, rather than treating it as a denial of all appearances. This concludes the source's II.7.11m; the numerical subdivisions in this edition serve layout only.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 113

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σοφία καὶ ἡ ταύτης διάληψις II.7.11n

Γίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους οὔτε ὀρεγόμενόν τινος οὔτε νομίζειν βουλόμενον ἔν τινι τῶν ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι εἰδικῶν ὄντων, διὰ τὸ μὴ κρίνοντι αὐτῷ παρεῖναι ὧν χρή. Οὐ μόνον δ' ἐπὶ τῆς φρονήσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τὰς τοιαύτας ἔσεσθαι διαλήψεις.

Ἰσότης καὶ διαφορὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων II.7.11o

[Ἐκ] πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι, τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, εἶναί τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, καθ' ὅσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίνεται, τὰ δ' οὔ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 113

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Wisdom and the Interval before Its Recognition II.7.11n

They think that someone can become wise without realizing it, at first neither desiring anything nor believing himself to be wishing in one of the specific forms of wish, because, in his judgment, what is required is not present to him.[497] Such intervals will occur not only in practical wisdom but also in the other arts.[498]

Equality and Difference among Errors II.7.11o

All errors are equal, and so are correct actions; all fools too are equally foolish, having the same and an equal disposition. Yet, although errors are equal, there are some differences among them, insofar as some arise from a hardened disposition that is difficult to cure, while others do not.[499]

497. The printed wording after “without realizing it” is difficult. The English takes νομίζειν βουλόμενον as believing oneself to be wishing, and ἔν τινι τῶν … εἰδικῶν as referring to a specific form of wish. It takes κρίνοντι αὐτῷ as “in his judgment.” The syntax and the connection between these clauses are uncertain. Wachsmuth records proposals to delete νομίζειν or replace it with ἐπιποθεῖν, to alter the phrase about specific forms, and to change the wording about judgment and presence. None has been silently substituted for the printed Greek.

498. Διάληψις is an interval or break, here understood as the interval between acquiring wisdom and recognizing the acquisition. The extension to the other arts remains explicit. Wachsmuth compares Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 19 and On Common Conceptions 9. In the latter, Plutarch criticizes the claim that someone can possess wisdom and happiness without yet recognizing the change. That parallel confirms the subject of the paradox without repairing this passage’s difficult wording.

499. Wachsmuth brackets the opening ἐκ for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek and is omitted in English. The passage again distinguishes equality of errors from differences among them, now through the hardened and difficult-to-cure disposition from which some arise. Compare II.7.11l for equality alongside qualitative differences. “So are correct actions” means that correct actions are equal to one another, not that errors and correct actions have equal moral value.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαφοραὶ τῶν σπουδαίων

II.7.11p

Καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ ἄλλους ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πειστικωτέρους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν.

Εὐτεκνία εὐγηρία καὶ εὐθανασία

II.7.11q

Εὐτεκνεῖν δὲ μόνον τὸν ἀστεῖον, οὔ τι μὴν πάντα ἀστεῖα τέκνα ἔχοντα, δεῖν γὰρ τὸν εὐτεκνοῦντα χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς ὡς τοιούτοις. Εὐγηρεῖν τε μόνον καὶ εὐθανατεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον· εὐγηρεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ γήρως διεξάγειν κατ’ ἀρετήν, εὐθανατεῖν δὲ τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ θανάτου κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελευτᾶν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Differences among the Virtuous

II.7.11p

Some virtuous people are more effective at exhortation and persuasion than others, and also quicker witted, as intensifications occur in the intermediate qualities involved.[500]

Children Old Age and Dying Well

II.7.11q

Only the morally excellent person is blessed in his children, though not simply by having children who are all excellent; for one who is blessed in his children must make use of them as such.[501] Only the virtuous person ages well and dies well. For aging well is passing through an old age of a certain quality in accordance with virtue; dying well is ending one's life in accordance with virtue with a death of a certain quality.[502]

500. The comparative forms retain differences in exhortation, persuasion, and quickness of mind among the virtuous themselves. The compressed qualification places the intensifications in τὰ μέσα, intermediate things, here understood as the qualities involved. It does not say that one virtuous person possesses more virtue than another. The participle ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα is rendered "involved"; the exact scope of what is included is not further specified in the source.

501. Εὐτεκνεῖν means being fortunate or blessed in one's children. The clause οὔ τι μὴν … ἔχοντα is compressed. The English interprets it as denying that possession of excellent children is by itself sufficient, in light of the following requirement to use them as such; "simply" makes that interpretation explicit. The Greek has no separate word meaning "merely." Χρήσασθαι is use or dealings with them; the source gives no further example of the conduct intended.

502. The repeated ποιοῦ, "of a certain quality," qualifies both old age and death. Both definitions expressly require accordance with virtue. Εὐθανατεῖν means dying well here; the sentence does not specify a method of death. The three claims concern how a person lives with children, old age, and death under the ethical definitions being reported.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 113-114

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον λεγόμενα

II.7.11r

Καὶ τά τε ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσερὰ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον λέγεσθαι καὶ ὡς τρόφιμα, καὶ τὰ λυτικὰ καὶ στατικὰ καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. Ὑγιεινὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ εὐφυῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ περιποιεῖν ὑγίειαν ἢ συνέχειν· νοσερὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα τούτοις. Παραπλήσιον δ’ εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων λόγον.

Μαντικὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς

II.7.11s.1

Καὶ μαντικὸν δὲ μόνον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον, ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα διαγνωστικὴν σημείων τῶν ἐκ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον τεινόντων. Δι’ ὃ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῆς μαντικῆς εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν καὶ θυτικὸν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλα τούτοις ἐστὶ παραπλήσια.

Αὐστηρότης

II.7.11s.2

Αὐστηρόν τε λέγεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον καθ’ ὅσον οὔτε προσφέρει τινὶ οὔτε προσίεται τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 114

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Descriptions Relative to a Human Being

II.7.11r

Things are called healthful and disease causing relative to a human being, and likewise nutritious, loosening, checking, and similar things. For healthful things are those naturally suited to producing or maintaining health; disease-causing things are those disposed in the contrary way. The account of the other descriptions is similar.[503]

Divination and Its Forms

II.7.11s.1

Only the virtuous person is skilled in divination, since he possesses knowledge that discerns signs from gods or divine beings bearing on human life. Hence the forms of divination also belong to him: interpretation of dreams, observation of birds, divination through sacrifice, and any other similar forms.[504]

Austerity

II.7.11s.2

The virtuous person is called austere insofar as he neither offers anyone nor admits speech intended to curry favor.[505]

503. The opening includes the compressed καὶ ὡς τρόφιμα, “and as nutritious,” which the English takes as a parallel relative description. Λυτικά and στατικά are literally loosening and stopping or checking; Wachsmuth explains that both have medical usage. They are retained as descriptions of bodily effects, rather than silently changing λυτικά to a proposed word for analysis. The definition distinguishes producing health from maintaining it and defines the contrary relationally.

504. The definition specifies knowledge of signs and their bearing on human life. Δαίμονες are divine beings in this context. The three named forms retain their distinct objects, and “any other similar forms” leaves the list open. Compare II.7.5b12, where the related account of specialized pursuits also requires the acquisition of additional principles in some cases; that earlier qualification has not been inserted into the present wording.

505. Πρὸς χάριν qualifies the speech as aimed at pleasing or gaining favor. The denial covers both offering and receiving it. This account of austerity should be read with the earlier description of the virtuous person as gracious and persuasive, II.7.11m.3: its stated object is speech aimed at favor, not every form of agreeable company.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κυνισμός

II.7.11s.3

Κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον <ὂν> τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντα ἐνάρξεσθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

Ἔρως καὶ φιλοποιία

II.7.11s.4

Τὸν δὲ ἔρωτά φασιν ἐπιβολὴν εἶναι φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον νέων ὡραίων· δι’ ὃ καὶ ἐρωτικὸν εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τῶν ἀξιεράστων, εὐγενῶν ὄντων καὶ εὐφυῶν.

Ἡ μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως ὁρμή

II.7.11s.5

Λέγουσι δὲ μήτε παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν μήτε παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν μήτε παρὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν γίνεσθαί τι περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον, διὰ τὸ μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀπρόληπτον προσπίπτειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 114-115

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Cynicism

II.7.11s.3

They say that the wise person will live as a Cynic, <this being> equivalent to persisting in Cynicism; yet, once wise, he will not begin the Cynic life.[506]

Love and the Formation of Friendship

II.7.11s.4

They say that love is an initiative toward forming friendship because of the beauty manifest in young men in their bloom. Hence the wise person is also inclined to love and will fall in love with those worthy of love, who are well born and well endowed by nature.[507]

Impulse with Reservation

II.7.11s.5

They say that nothing happens to the virtuous person contrary to his desire, impulse, or initiative, because he does all such things with reservation, and none of the things that oppose him comes upon him unforeseen.[508]

506. The distinction is between continuing in Cynicism and beginning it when already wise. “Once wise” expresses σοφὸν ὄντα, being wise, rather than a change added to the doctrine. Cynicism names the philosophical way of life. Wachsmuth supplies ὄν after ἴσον; its English equivalent remains bracketed. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.121 for the related report that the wise person will practice Cynicism; the present restriction on beginning it is retained.

507. The definition recalls II.7.5b9.2–3 and II.7.10c.2; ἐπιβολή retains “initiative,” as in the account of impulse. Νέων ὡραίων places the love in the ancient setting of young men in their bloom, without specifying an exact age. The final εὐγενῶν and εὐφυῶν repeat the terms discussed at II.7.11m.1–2, where the reported definitions admit acquired as well as inherited or natural qualifications.

508. Ὑπεξαίρεσις is reservation or an exception kept in view when acting. The explanation therefore qualifies the desire, impulse, and initiative themselves; it does not say that no external obstruction occurs. The final clause calls what opposes him ἀπρόληπτον when it is unforeseen or not anticipated. The English retains that qualification rather than changing it to a denial that anything can oppose him.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 114-115

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πραότης ἡσυχιότης καὶ κοσμιότης

II.7.11s.6

Εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρᾶον, τῆς πραότητος οὔσης ἕξεως καθ’ ἣν πράως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι εἰς ὀργὴν ἐν μηδενί. Καὶ ἡσύχιον δὲ καὶ κόσμιον εἶναι, τῆς κοσμιότητος οὔσης ἐπιστήμης κινήσεων πρεπουσῶν, ἡσυχιότητος δὲ εὐταξίας περὶ τὰς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεις καὶ μονὰς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ἐπὶ πάντων φαύλων γιγνομένων.

Διαβολὴ καὶ ἀληθινὴ φιλία

II.7.11s.7

Ἀδιάβολον δ’ εἶναι πάντα τὸν καλὸν κἀγαθόν, ἀπαράδεκτον ὄντα διαβολῆς, ὅθεν καὶ ἀδιάβολον εἶναι κατά τε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ μὴ διαβάλλειν ἕτερον. Εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαβολὴν διάστασιν φαινομένων φίλων ψευδεῖ λόγῳ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, μόνους δὲ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ διαβάλλεσθαι καὶ διαβάλλειν, δι’ ὃ καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν φίλους μήτε διαβάλλειν μήτε διαβάλλεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ δοκοῦντας καὶ φαινομένους.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 115

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Gentleness Quietness and Orderliness

II.7.11s.6

He is also gentle, gentleness being a state in virtue of which people are gently disposed toward doing what falls to them in every case, and are never carried away into anger. He is also quiet and orderly. Orderliness is knowledge of fitting movements; quietness is good order in the natural movements and rests of soul and body. The contrary qualities occur in all base people.[509]

Slander and True Friendship

II.7.11s.7

Every noble and good person is immune to slander, being unreceptive to it. Thus he is free from slander both in this sense and by not slandering another. Slander is the separation of apparent friends by a false account. This does not happen among good men; only base people are both slandered and slanderers. Hence true friends neither slander nor suffer slander, while those who are merely thought or appear to be friends do.[510]

509. The definitions distinguish gentleness as a ἕξις, state, orderliness as knowledge, and quietness as good order. Quietness includes both movements and rests, μονάς, of soul and body; it is not simply immobility. The qualifications “in every case” and “never” preserve the scope of the claim about the virtuous person, as does the final “all” concerning the base.

510. Ἀδιάβολος is explained in both a receptive and an active sense: not admitting slander and not slandering another. The definition gives slander a particular effect, separating apparent friends through a false account. The distinction between true and apparent friendship governs the denial; the text does not deny that someone can utter a false accusation against a good person. Compare the strict account of friendship at II.7.11m.5.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀναβολὴ καὶ ὑπέρθεσις

II.7.11s.8

Οὐδ’ ἀναβάλλεσθαι δέ ποτε τὸν σπουδαῖον οὐδέν, εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ὑπέρθεσιν ἐνεργείας δι’ ὄκνον, ὑπερτίθεσθαι δέ τινα μόνον ἀνεγκλήτου τῆς ὑπερθέσεως οὔσης. Ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὸν Ἡσίοδον ταῦτ’ εἰρηκέναι·

Μηδ’ ἀναβάλλεσθαι ἐς τ’ αὔριον ἐς τ’ ἔνηφι·
καὶ

Αἰεὶ δ’ ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ ἄτῃσι παλαίει·
τῆς [δ’] ἀναβολῆς ἔκπτωσίν τινα τῶν προσηκόντων ἔργων ἐμποιούσης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 116

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Procrastination and Postponement

II.7.11s.8

The virtuous person never procrastinates about anything, for procrastination is postponement of activity through reluctance. He puts some things off only when the postponement is blameless.[511] For it was about procrastination that Hesiod said:

Do not put things off till tomorrow or the day after;
and:

The man who delays his work is always wrestling with ruin.
Procrastination brings about a falling short in the tasks that fall to one.[512]

511. Ἀναβολή is defined here by ὄκνος, reluctance or shrinking from action, while ὑπέρθεσις is postponement more generally and can be blameless. The English reads τινα as some things postponed and retains the condition on permissible postponement. The distinction prevents the opening denial from becoming a ban on every change of timing.

512. Wachsmuth cites the verses as Hesiod, Works and Days 408 and 411; they correspond to 410 and 413 in the common modern numbering. His first quotation ends ἔνηφι, without the final ν recorded for Hesiod in the apparatus. Ἄτῃσι is ruin or destructive misfortune, retaining the wrestling image. The editorial references have been transferred from the Greek sentence to this note. The rejected δ’ remains bracketed in Greek and is omitted in English.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πέρας τῆς τῶν Στωικῶν ἐκθέσεως II.7.12

Ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. Περὶ γὰρ πάντων τῶν παραδόξων δογμάτων ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν καὶ ἄλλοις ὁ Χρύσιππος διελέχθη· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ δογμάτων καὶ ἐν τῇ Ὑπογραφῇ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ μέρος συγγραμμάτων. Ἐγὼ δ’ ὁπόσα προὐθέμην ἐπελθεῖν ἐν κεφαλαίοις τῶν ἠθικῶν δογμάτων <τῶν> κατὰ τὴν τῶν Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρεσιν διεληλυθὼς ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῦτον τὸν ὑπομνηματισμὸν αὐτόθι καταπαύσω.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Conclusion of the Stoic Account

II.7.12

Let that suffice for these matters. Chrysippus discussed all the paradoxical doctrines in many other places: in On Doctrines, in Outline of the Argument, and in many other writings on particular subjects.[513] Having now adequately covered in summary the ethical doctrines <that> accord with the school of the Stoic philosophers, so far as I proposed to go through them, I shall end this memorandum here.[514]

513. Παράδοξα are doctrines contrary to ordinary expectation or opinion; the word does not by itself declare them contradictions. The two named works belong to Chrysippus. Their titles are references to fuller discussions, not promises that those works will be reproduced in this volume.

514. The first-person speaker belongs to the ethical exposition preserved by Stobaeus; it is not this translator announcing the end of the book. Wachsmuth supplies τῶν to introduce the qualification of the ethical doctrines, expressed by bracketed "that" in English. Ἐν κεφαλαίοις is in summary or under principal heads, and ὑπομνηματισμός is a memorandum or written account. This concludes the Stoic account, not Chapter 7. The next section, II.7.13, turns to Aristotle and the other Peripatetics.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Περιπατητικῶν II.7.13.heading

Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν.

῎Ηθος καὶ ἔθος II.7.13.1

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἦθος τοὔνομα λαβεῖν φησὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ὧν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἀρχὰς ἔχομεν καὶ σπέρματα, τούτων τὰς τελειότητας περιποιεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ ταῖς ὀρθαῖς ἀγωγαῖς· δι’ ὃ καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἐθικὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μόνα τὰ ζῷα γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἄνθρωπον.

Τὸ πειθόμενον λόγῳ II.7.13.2

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ λοιπὰ ἐθισθέντα οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνάγκῃ γίνεσθαι ποιά ἄττα, τὸν δ’ ἄνθρωπον τῷ λόγῳ πλαττόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐθισμοῦ, <τοῦ ἀλόγου> μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς διακειμένου κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Ἄλογον δὲ λέγεσθαι ψυχῆς μέρος οὐ τὸ καθάπαξ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ τὸ οἷόν τε πείθεσθαι λόγῳ, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ παθητικόν, τοῦτο <δὲ> καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς δεκτικόν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Aristotle and the Other Peripatetics

II.7.13.heading

Aristotle and the other Peripatetics on ethics.[515]

Character and Habit

II.7.13.1

He says, then, that character takes its name from habit. For where we have beginnings and seeds from nature, we acquire their perfection through habits and right training. Hence ethics too concerns habit and has to do only with living creatures, and above all with the human being.[516]

What Can Obey Reason

II.7.13.2

The other creatures, when habituated, acquire a certain character through compulsion rather than reason. The human being, however, is shaped by reason through habituation, as the <nonrational> part of the soul comes to be disposed in accordance with reason. By a nonrational part of the soul is meant not what is wholly without reason, but what can obey reason, such as the part subject to feeling; <and> this is also receptive to virtue.[517]

515. This is the source heading introducing a new account after the Stoic exposition. It identifies the doctrines under discussion; it does not make the following epitome a continuous verbatim quotation from Aristotle. The opening φησίν, "he says," is rendered without supplying a further personal name. Numerical subdivisions within II.7.13 divide the long source account for layout only.

516. The Greek links ἦθος, character, with ἔθος, habit, and plays on ἠθική and ἐθική, ethical and habitual. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.1, 1103a17–25, where moral virtue is acquired through habit and its name is related to ἔθος. "Living creatures" renders ζῷα; the passage itself immediately distinguishes the other creatures from the human being. Natural beginnings and seeds are not identified with already perfected virtue.

517. Wachsmuth supplies τοῦ ἀλόγου and δέ; their English equivalents remain bracketed. The distinction is between what is altogether without reason and what can listen to reason without itself being the reasoning faculty. Παθητικόν names the part capable of being affected or feeling. Compare Nicomachean Ethics I.13, 1102b13–1103a3. The English retains the account's contrast between compulsion in the other creatures and rational formation in human habituation.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διαιρέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς

II.7.13.3

Τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δ’ ἄλογον· λογικὸν μὲν τὸ κριτικόν, ἄλογον δὲ τὸ ὁρμητικόν. Τοῦ δὲ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια καὶ τὰ θεῖα θεωρητικὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν καλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ τὰ <φθαρτὰ> πρακτικὸν βουλευτικόν. Καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν ὀρεκτικὸν τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιθυμητικόν· τὸ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον οἷον ἀμυντικὸν θυμικόν.

Ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ προαίρεσις

II.7.13.4

Ὥστε διττὸν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ εἶδος, τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δ’ ἄλογον, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ ταῦτα πεφυκέναι θεωρίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ εἶναι μὲν ἐπιστήμην, προαιρετικὴν δὲ τῶν καλῶν ὑπάρχειν <ἕξιν>.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Divisions of the Soul

II.7.13.3

One part of the soul is rational and the other nonrational: the rational is the faculty of judgment, the nonrational the faculty of impulse. Of the rational part, what contemplates eternal and divine things is called scientific; what acts concerning human and <perishable> things is called deliberative.[518] Of the nonrational part, what desires things within our power is called appetitive; what acts toward others as a sort of defensive faculty is called spirited.[519]

Moral Virtue and Choice

II.7.13.4

Thus the form of the virtues too is twofold, one rational and the other nonrational, since contemplation and action naturally fall along these divisions. Hence moral virtue is not knowledge, but a <state> disposed to choose noble things.[520]

518. The distinction within the rational part concerns contemplation of the eternal and divine, and practical deliberation about human and perishable things. "Perishable" renders the supplied φθαρτά. Compare Nicomachean Ethics VI.1, 1139a6–15, where the scientific and calculative parts are distinguished by their objects. "Scientific" here describes a kind of knowledge, not the methods of modern experimental science.

519. The source divides the nonrational part into appetitive and spirited functions. The qualifying οἷον, "a sort of," remains in the description of defense, and τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν remains "things within our power." Wachsmuth notes that this division is Platonic and that ὁρμητικόν, "faculty of impulse," is not Aristotle's own terminology. The heading's reference to the Peripatetics therefore does not warrant replacing these words with a different Aristotelian scheme.

520. The source prints λογικόν and ἄλογον, "rational" and "nonrational," qualifying the twofold form of virtue. Wachsmuth expressly warns against changing them to genitives meaning virtues "of the rational" and "of the nonrational." The connection of this distinction with contemplation and action is compressed; the English preserves it rather than silently reconstructing it. Wachsmuth supplies ἕξιν, "state." The definition of moral virtue through choice differs from the preceding Stoic definitions of virtues as kinds of knowledge; compare Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106b36–1107a2.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φύσις ἔθος λόγος

II.7.13.5

Ἐκ τριῶν δὲ συμβεβηκέναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τελειοῦσθαι, φύσεως, ἔθους, λόγου. Τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον διαφέροντα κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διὰ τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀθανάτων ὄντα καὶ τῶν θνητῶν κοινωνίαν ἐξηρτῆσθαι πρὸς ἄμφω, πρὸς μὲν τὰ λογικὰ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν θείῳ, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄλογα τῷ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα θνητῷ, κατὰ λόγον ἀμφοῖν τῆς τελειότητος ἐφίεσθαι.

Οἰκείωσις καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν

II.7.13.6

Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ εἶναι, φύσει γὰρ ᾠκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, δι’ ὃ καὶ προσηκόντως ἀσμενίζειν μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, δυσχεραίνειν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. Τήν τε γὰρ ὑγίειαν περιποιεῖσθαι σπουδάζειν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔφεσιν ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῷ ταῦτα μὲν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ <δι’> αὐθ’ αἱρετὰ καὶ ἀγαθά. Κατὰ δὲ τἀναντία τὴν νόσον καὶ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ τὴν φθορὰν διακρούεσθαι καὶ παρακλίνειν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δι’ αὐτὰ φευκτὰ καὶ κακά.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 118

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Nature Habit and Reason

II.7.13.5

Virtue comes to perfection through three things: nature, habit, and reason.[521] For the human being differs from the other creatures in both body and soul. Standing between immortals and mortals, he is linked in fellowship to both: to rational beings through what is divine in his soul, and to nonrational beings through what is mortal in his body. He therefore aims, in due proportion, at perfection in both.[522]

Affinity with Oneself and Natural Goods

II.7.13.6

First he desires to exist, for by nature he has an affinity with himself. Hence he fittingly welcomes things in accordance with nature and is distressed by things contrary to nature.[523] He strives to secure health, has a longing for pleasure, and lays claim to life, because these are in accordance with nature and choiceworthy <for> their own sakes and good. Conversely, he wards off and avoids disease, pain, and destruction because they are contrary to nature, to be avoided for their own sakes, and bad.[524]

521. The opening names three contributions to perfected virtue, rather than attributing it to nature alone. Wachsmuth compares Magna Moralia I.35, 1197b38 onward, and the earlier account in this chapter at printed p. 51. Nature, habit, and reason are retained as separate terms.

522. The English takes ἀμφοῖν as referring to body and soul, the two respects in which the human being has just been described, and κατὰ λόγον as “in due proportion.” The Greek also uses paired expressions for immortals and mortals and for rational and nonrational beings. The sentence presents human affinity with both sides; it does not identify the mortal body with immortality or supply a doctrine of the soul’s fate after death.

523. Ὠκειῶσθαι expresses being made akin or attached to oneself, the relation discussed as οἰκείωσις, affinity or appropriation. Wachsmuth notes the Stoic vocabulary and compares Diogenes Laertius VII.85 and Cicero, On Ends III.16 and V.21. Its appearance in this Peripatetic account is retained. The welcome and distress are expressly tied to what accords with or opposes nature.

524. The passage calls health, pleasure, and life good and choiceworthy for their own sakes, and the contrary things bad. This differs from the earlier Stoic classification of such things as indifferent; the translation preserves the difference. Wachsmuth supplies δι’ in the first “for their own sakes”; its English equivalent is bracketed. The terms for destruction and avoidance do not specify a particular medical or practical course of action.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 118

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φίλα καὶ ἡ ἄπταιστος ἐκλογή II.7.13.7

Φίλον γὰρ εἶναι ἡμῖν τὸ σῶμα, φίλην δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, φίλα δὲ τὰ τούτων μέρη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, <δι’> ὧν κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἀρχὴν γίνεσθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς καὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς τῶν εἰρημένων αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς μηδεμία συνέβαινε πλάνη καθάπαξ, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἐπήβολοι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄμοιροι διετέλουμεν ὄντες, οὐδέποτ’ ἂν τὴν ὀρθὴν καὶ ἄπταιστον ἐν τούτοις ἐπεζήτησαμεν ἐκλογήν.

Ἐπίκρισις καὶ ἀρετή II.7.13.8

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις δι’ ἄγνοιαν περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς ἠπατώμεθα καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ παρεπέμπομεν, τοῖς κακοῖς δ’ ὡς ἀγαθοῖς ἐνετυγχάνομεν, ἀναγκαίως τὴν τῆς ἐπικρίσεως βέβαιον εἴδησιν ἐπεζήτησαμεν, ἣν καὶ συνῳδὸν εὑρόμενοι τῇ φύσει διὰ τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας μεγαλοπρεπὲς ἀρετὴν προσηγορεύσαμεν καὶ δαιμονίως θαυμάσαντες ἐτιμήσαμεν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

What Is Dear and Unerring Selection

II.7.13.7

Our body is dear to us, and so is our soul; their parts, capacities, and activities are dear as well. <Through> these, in our concern for preservation, arise the beginnings of impulse, appropriate action, and virtue. For if no error whatever occurred in choosing and avoiding the things just mentioned, and we continually possessed the goods and were free of the bad things, we would never have sought correct and unerring selection among them.[525]

Judgment and Virtue

II.7.13.8

But since ignorance often deceived us in choosing and avoiding, and we passed over good things while encountering bad things as though they were good, we necessarily sought secure knowledge for making judgments. Finding this knowledge consonant with nature, we called it virtue because of the grandeur of its activity; and, marveling at it exceedingly, we honored it above everything else.[526]

525. The sentence moves from affection for body and soul to concern for their preservation, then to impulse, appropriate action, and virtue. “Through” renders the supplied δι’. The hypothetical freedom from error is a condition contrary to the failures described next, not an assertion that human beings already choose without error. Ἐκλογή is selection among the things in question; it is kept distinct from the preceding αἱρέσεις, choices.

526. The relative ἣν refers back to εἴδησιν, the knowledge sought for judgment, as Wachsmuth notes. The passage calls this knowledge virtue, although the earlier definition of moral virtue denies that it is ἐπιστήμη and calls it a state involving choice. The two formulations are preserved rather than made identical by changing the Greek. “Exceedingly” renders the emphatic δαιμονίως, without introducing a separate divine agent.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 118-119

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐκλογὴ καὶ τὰ καθήκοντα

II.7.13.9

Τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ἀπό τε τῆς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῆς καὶ τῆς ἀπεκλογῆς τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν συμβέβηκε καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καθήκοντα· δι' ὃ καὶ τάς τε κατορθώσεις καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τούτοις καὶ περὶ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. Σχεδὸν γὰρ τὴν ὅλην τῆς αἱρέσεως ὑπογραφὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ὡρμῆσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπιδείξω διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Τέκνα δι' ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά

II.7.13.10

Ὅτι γὰρ οὐ μόνον αἱρετὰ τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γενναμένοις ἐστὶ διὰ τὰς χρείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἑαυτά, γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας. Οὐδένα γοῦν οὕτως ὠμὸν εἶναι καὶ θηριώδη τὴν φύσιν, ὃς οὐκ ἂν σπουδάζοι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν εὐδαιμονεῖν τὰ τέκνα καὶ καλῶς ἔτι διάγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐναντίον. Ἀπὸ ταύτης γοῦν τῆς φιλοστοργίας καὶ διαθήκας τελευτᾶν μέλλοντας τίθεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἔτι κυοφορουμένων φροντίζειν, ἐπιτρόπους ἀπολείποντας καὶ κηδεμόνας καὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις παρατιθεμένους καὶ παρακαλοῦντας ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τινας μὴν ἀποθνῄσκουσι τοῖς τέκνοις συναποθνῄσκειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 119-120

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Selection and Appropriate Actions

II.7.13.9

Actions and what are called appropriate actions have their beginnings in the selection of things in accordance with nature and the rejection of things contrary to nature. Hence successful actions and errors occur among and concern these things. For almost the whole outline of the school takes its starting point from them, as I shall show very briefly.[527]

Children Valued for Their Own Sakes

II.7.13.10

That children are choiceworthy to their parents not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes is known from plain experience. No one, surely, is so cruel and beastlike by nature that he would not care that, after his own death, his children should be happy and continue to live well, rather than the contrary.[528] From this parental affection, those about to die make wills and care even for children still in the womb. They leave guardians and protectors, entrust the children to their dearest friends, and ask them to give assistance. Some, indeed, die along with their children when the children die.[529]

527. Ἀπεκλογή is rejection, paired with selection. Καθήκοντα, κατορθώσεις, and ἁμαρτίαι retain the vocabulary of appropriate actions, successful actions, and errors that also appeared in the Stoic account. Wachsmuth calls attention to that overlap. Αἵρεσις in "the school" means the philosophical school or position, rather than an individual act of choosing. The first-person promise belongs to the epitome's speaker.

528. The argument contrasts usefulness to parents with the children's own worth, using concern for their future after the parent's death as evidence. Wachsmuth's printed ἔτι διάγειν is rendered "continue to live"; his apparatus identifies it as his correction of the transmitted ἐπανάγειν and records Meineke's alternative ἐπιδιάγειν. The English follows the printed correction.

529. Φιλοστοργία is affectionate attachment, here parental affection. The subjects of making wills and leaving guardians are the parents approaching death; the final clause instead concerns some parents dying when their children die. The passage reports that extremity of affection as evidence. It does not state a cause or method of death, and the translation supplies none. Wachsmuth compares Cicero, On Ends III.65 for the concern extending beyond the parent's life.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 119-120

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκεῖοι

II.7.13.11

Τῶν δὲ τέκνων οὕτως ἀγαπωμένων κατὰ τὸ <δι’> αὐθ’ αἱρετόν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὴν τοῦ λέχους κοινωνίαν καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ὡς δι’ αὐτοὺς φιλίας τυγχάνειν· ἔχειν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τούτους τινὰς οἰκειότητας· φιλάλληλον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ κοινωνικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Φιλία πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους

II.7.13.12

Εἰ δὲ τῶν φιλιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πόρρω συμβέβηκε, τὰς δὲ προσεχεῖς ἡμῖν, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος· πᾶσαν γὰρ δι’ αὐτὴν αἱρετὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ μόνον διὰ <τὰς> χρείας. Εἰ δ’ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας φιλία δι’ αὐτὴν αἱρετή, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πρὸς ὁμοεθνεῖς καὶ ὁμοφύλους, ὥστε καὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 120

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Kinship and Affection

II.7.13.11

Since children are thus loved as choiceworthy <for> their own sakes, parents, brothers, the partnership of the marriage bed, relatives, other members of one's circle, and fellow citizens must also receive affection for their own sakes. For by nature we have certain affinities with them too: the human being is a creature that loves others and lives in community.[530]

Affection toward All Human Beings

II.7.13.12

If some affections are more distant and others closer to us, that makes no difference to the argument: every affection is choiceworthy for its own sake, and not only for its usefulness. If affection toward fellow citizens is choiceworthy for its own sake, affection toward those of the same nation and the same stock must be so too, and consequently affection toward all human beings.[531]

530. The sequence extends beyond children without reducing the other relationships to their usefulness. "Partnership of the marriage bed" retains τοῦ λέχους κοινωνίαν, the shared marital relation; "members of one's circle" renders οἰκείους, those belonging or close to one. Φιλάλληλον means disposed to love one another, and κοινωνικόν disposed to community. Wachsmuth supplies δι' in the opening formula, expressed by the bracketed "for."

531. Φιλία ranges here over affectionate relationships, not only intimate friendship. The difference in closeness is admitted while the intrinsic worth of each relation is asserted. The argument proceeds from fellow citizens through shared nation and stock to all human beings; the final extension remains explicit. The supplied article τὰς has no independent English equivalent here; the phrase about usefulness is rendered idiomatically. Wachsmuth's apparatus records substantial corrections in the preceding conditional sentence; the English follows the printed text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 120

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Βοήθεια πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον

II.7.13.13

Καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάντας τοὺς σῴζοντας οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον, ὥστε μὴ πρὸς ἀξίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ δι' αὑθ' αἱρετὸν τὰ πλεῖστα δρᾶν. Τίνα γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐξελέσθαι θεασάμενον ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ θηρίου καταδυναστευόμενον, εἰ δύναιτο; τίνα δ' οὐκ ἂν ὁδὸν πλανωμένῳ μηνύσειν; τίνα δ' οὐκ <ἂν> ἐπαρκέσειν ὑπ' ἐνδείας ἀπολλυμένῳ; τίνα δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἐρημίας ἀνύδρου νάματι περιτυχόντα γνωρίσμασι διαδηλώσειν τοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν βαδίζουσι;

Φωναὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν

II.7.13.14

Τίνα δ' οὐ τῆς μετὰ τὸν βίον εὐφημίας πολὺν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον; τίνα δ' οὐκ ἀποστυγεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας φωνάς, ὡς παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην οὔσας φύσιν,

Ἐμοῦ θανόντος γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί·
Οὐδέν μέλει μοι, τἀμὰ γὰρ καλῶς ἔχει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 120-121

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Helping Others

II.7.13.13

For all who save others are disposed toward their neighbors in such a way that they do most things not according to worth, but on the basis of what is choiceworthy for its own sake.[532] Who, seeing a human being overpowered by a wild beast, would not rescue him if he could? Who would not show the way to someone lost? Who <would> not assist someone perishing from want? Who, coming upon a spring in a waterless desert, would not mark it with signs for those traveling the same road?[533]

Sayings Contrary to Human Nature

II.7.13.14

Who does not care greatly for a good name after his life is over? Who does not loathe such sayings as these, as contrary to human nature:

When I am dead, let earth be mingled with fire.
Nothing concerns me, for my own affairs are well.[534]

532. Σῴζοντας is taken transitively as “who save others,” with the following examples specifying rescue and help. Πρὸς ἀξίαν is rendered “according to worth,” understood here as assessment of the recipient’s worth or desert. The precise force of the contrast is compressed. Wachsmuth prints this correction of the transmitted τὰς πράξεις, “the actions,” and records other proposals; the printed wording is retained.

533. The questions appeal to ordinary acts of assistance. The condition “if he could” is explicit in the first example, and the signs make a discovered water source known to later travelers. Wachsmuth supplies ἄν in the third question, expressed by the bracketed “would.” The argument concerns help valued beyond expected usefulness to the helper; it does not require prior personal friendship with the person helped.

534. The two verse quotations are printed as anonymous tragic fragments, Nauck, fragmenta tragica adespota 430.1–2; their author and dramatic setting are not supplied here. They are examples rejected by the argument, not maxims endorsed by the epitome’s speaker. The preceding concern for posthumous good report continues the appeal to interests extending beyond one’s present advantage. The source’s references are transferred to this note rather than inserted into the verse.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 120-121

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὔνοια φυσικὴ καὶ φιλία

II.7.13.15

Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔνοια φυσικὴ καὶ φιλία, τὸ δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὸν ἐμφαίνουσα καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον·

ἓν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος·
ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι,
τῆς φύσεως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 121

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Natural Goodwill and Affection

II.7.13.15

It is clear, then, that we have natural goodwill and affection toward all, showing what is choiceworthy for its own sake and what accords with reason:

For one is the race of men, one the race of gods;
from one mother we both draw breath,
namely, nature.[535]

535. The quotation is from Pindar, Nemean VI.1–2. The final “namely, nature” belongs to the epitome’s prose explanation of the mother, not to Pindar’s quoted verse. The wording “one … one” is retained without changing it to “the same race.” The argument uses the common mother to support natural goodwill; its immediate conclusion concerns affection toward all human beings. The next paragraph resumes with the clearer intrinsic worth of familiar friends; II.7.13 continues.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φιλία ἔπαινος καὶ εὐδοξία

II.7.13.16

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κοινή τις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει φιλανθρωπία, πολὺ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν συνηθείᾳ φίλους τὸ δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὸν φανερώτερον· εἰ δ’ ὁ φίλος δι’ αὐτὸν αἱρετός, καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ εὔνοια καὶ ἡ παρὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ βίου κοινωνούντων καὶ <ἡ> παρὰ τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων· ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον εἶναι δι’ αὐτὸν αἱρετόν, οἰκειοῦσθαι γὰρ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας. Εἰ δ’ ὁ ἔπαινος δι’ ἑαυτὸν αἱρετός, καὶ ἡ εὐδοξία· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὴν εὐδοξίαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπογραφὴν παρειλήφαμεν, εἰ μὴ τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον.

Τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν

II.7.13.17

Ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν τὰ γινόμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔξωθεν ὅτι δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὰ πέφυκεν ἐπιδεδείχθαι σαφῶς· πῶς οὖν οὐ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν; λέγω δὴ τὰ περὶ σῶμά τε καὶ ψυχήν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 121-122

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Friendship Praise and Good Reputation

II.7.13.16

Since we have a shared love of humanity, it is far clearer that familiar friends are choiceworthy for their own sakes. If the friend is choiceworthy for his own sake, so too are friendship, goodwill, the goodwill of all who share our life, and <that> of most people. Hence praise too is choiceworthy for its own sake, for we feel an affinity with those who praise us.[536] If praise is choiceworthy for its own sake, so is good reputation. For in the outline we have accepted good reputation as nothing other than praise from the many.[537]

External Goods and What Is within Us

II.7.13.17

Thus it has been clearly shown in this way that the goods arising from outside are naturally choiceworthy for their own sakes. How much more, then, must this be true of what pertains to us and is within us? I mean what concerns body and soul.[538]

536. The argument moves from the common love of humanity, φιλανθρωπία, to familiar friends, then to friendship, goodwill, praise, and good reputation. The repeated article after εὔνοια is understood as continuing goodwill received from others; the supplied ἡ before "from most people" is expressed by the bracketed "that." Οἰκειοῦσθαι again expresses affinity or attachment. The English preserves "most people" and "the many" as distinct expressions.

537. Εὐδοξία is good reputation or being well spoken of. The speaker refers to a definition already accepted "in the outline." Wachsmuth notes that Stobaeus has not reproduced the earlier place in Didymus where this was stated. The reference therefore points back within the epitomist's fuller discussion; it does not mean that a preceding portion of this English installment has been accidentally omitted.

538. The opening construction τὰ γινόμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔξωθεν is compressed. The English takes it as the goods arising from outside, referring back to friendship, goodwill, praise, and reputation. Wachsmuth records uncertainty about the placement of τῶν ἀγαθῶν. The following body and soul clause identifies the subjects of the next comparison; the argument now moves from external goods to goods of the person.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 121-122

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σῶμα ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος

II.7.13.18

Εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δι᾽ αὐτὸν αἱρετός, καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δι᾽ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη αἱρετά. Μέρη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ὁλοσχερέστατα σῶμα καὶ ψυχή. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμα δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἂν αἱρετὸν εἴη. Πῶς γὰρ τὸ μὲν τοῦ πλησίον σῶμα δι᾽ αὐτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν, τὸ δ᾽ ἡμέτερον οὐκέτι; Ἢ πῶς ὁ μὲν πλησίον ἄνθρωπος δι᾽ αὐτὸν ἐστιν αἱρετός, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν αὑτῷ δι᾽ αὐτὸν αἱρετός;

Αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἀρεταί

II.7.13.19

Ἢ πῶς τοῦτο μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ αἱ τῶν μερῶν ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος ἂν εἶεν αἱρεταί; Ὥστε δι᾽ αὐτὰ αἱρετὰ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὴν ἰσχύν, τὸ κάλλος, τὴν ποδώκειαν, τὴν εὐεξίαν, τὴν εὐαισθησίαν, καθόλου πάσας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν <τὰς σωματικὰς ἀρετάς>.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 122-123

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Body Soul and the Human Being

II.7.13.18

For if the human being is choiceworthy for his own sake, the parts of the human being would also be choiceworthy for their own sakes. In the broadest division, the parts of a human being are body and soul. Hence the body too would be choiceworthy for its own sake. For how could another person's body be choiceworthy to us for its own sake, while our own was no longer so? Or how could another human being be choiceworthy for his own sake, while each of us was not also choiceworthy to himself for his own sake?[539]

The Excellences of the Body

II.7.13.19

Or how could this be so, while the parts of the body, the excellences of its parts, and the excellences of the whole body were not also choiceworthy? Hence health, strength, beauty, speed of foot, good bodily condition, and keenness of the senses are choiceworthy to us for their own sakes: in general, virtually all <the bodily excellences>.[540]

539. The questions extend the value acknowledged in another person to oneself and to body and soul. "In the broadest division" renders ὁλοσχερέστατα: the passage has not yet begun an anatomical enumeration. The repeated "for his own sake" or "for its own sake" preserves the argument's claim of intrinsic worth, rather than substituting usefulness or pleasure.

540. Ἀρεταί here names the excellences of the body and its parts, while the subsequent discussion uses the same word for virtues of the soul. The list retains speed of foot, ποδώκεια, and distinguishes good condition, εὐεξία, from keenness of sensation, εὐαισθησία. The qualifying ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν is rendered "virtually." Wachsmuth supplies the concluding τὰς σωματικὰς ἀρετάς; the English equivalent remains bracketed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 122-123

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος

II.7.13.20

Καὶ γὰρ ὅλως οὐδεὶς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν δέξαιτο ἄμορφος καὶ λελωβημένος εἶναι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, κἂν εἰ μηδεμία μέλλοι δυσχρηστία τὸ παράπαν ἐπακολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην εἰδέχθειαν. Ὥστε καὶ δίχα τῆς δυσχρηστίας εὔλογον φυγὴν φαίνεσθαι τοῦ αἴσχους. Εἰ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτόν ἐστι τὸ αἶσχος, καὶ τὸ κάλλος οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν χρείαν αἱρετὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' αὐτό· ὅτι γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ προσκλητικὸν <τι> ἔχει τὸ κάλλος, ἐμφανές· πάντας γοῦν φυσικῶς οἰκειοῦσθαι τοῖς καλοῖς χωρὶς πάσης χρείας, καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ εὐεργετεῖν ἑτοίμως ἔχειν, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ δοκεῖν εὐνοίας εἶναι παρασκευαστικόν· ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ μὲν κάλλος τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἱρετῶν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ αἶσχος τῶν δι' αὐτὰ φευκτῶν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 123

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Beauty and Ugliness

II.7.13.20

For, generally, no one thinking soundly would accept being ugly and disfigured in appearance, even if no difficulty of use whatever were going to follow from such unsightliness. Thus it seems reasonable to avoid ugliness even apart from difficulty of use.[541] If ugliness is to be avoided for its own sake, beauty too is choiceworthy not only for its usefulness but also for its own sake. For it is evident that beauty has <something> intrinsically attractive. Everyone, at any rate, naturally feels an affinity with beautiful people apart from any usefulness, and is readily disposed to treat them well and confer benefits on them. Hence beauty also seems productive of goodwill. On this account too, beauty belongs among things choiceworthy for their own sakes, and ugliness among things to be avoided for their own sakes.[542]

541. The argument expressly separates appearance from δυσχρηστία, difficulty or disadvantage in use. It asks whether the former would still be rejected if the latter did not follow. Εἰδέχθεια is unsightliness, and λελωβημένος describes being marred or disfigured. These are the physical descriptions used by the ancient argument; the passage is discussing bodily beauty, before turning to beauty of soul.

542. Προσκλητικόν describes an attractive or inviting quality; “something” renders the supplied τι. The appeal to others’ goodwill adds a social consequence to the preceding claim about beauty itself. The generalization about everyone’s response belongs to the epitome’s argument. Καλοῖς here refers to beautiful people in the bodily context, rather than silently changing its meaning to morally good people.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὰ σώματος καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς ἀγαθά

II.7.13.21

Τὸν δ’ αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ ὑγιείας εἶναι καὶ νόσου καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ ἀσθενείας καὶ ποδωκείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ πηρώσεως. Ὥστ’ εἰ καὶ τὰ σωματικὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν δέδεικται δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὰ καὶ τἀναντία τούτων κακὰ δι’ αὐτὰ φευκτά, καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον μέρη δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὰ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτῶν καὶ <τὰς> τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς.

Ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέφουσα

II.7.13.22

Τὴν γὰρ εἴσοδον ἡ ἀρετὴ λαβοῦσα, καθάπερ ὑπεδείξαμεν, ἀπὸ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέψασα καὶ θεασαμένη, διότι καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν, ᾠκειώθη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὡς πρὸς δι’ αὐτὴν αἱρετὴν καὶ μᾶλλον γε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἢ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς· ὥστε παρὰ πολὺ τιμιωτέρας εἶναι <τὰς> τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετάς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 123

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods of Body and Soul

II.7.13.21

The same account applies to health and disease, strength and weakness, speed of foot and slowness, sensation and impairment. Hence, if bodily goods too have been shown choiceworthy for their own sakes, and their contrary evils to be avoided for their own sakes, the parts of the soul must also be choiceworthy for their own sakes, along with their virtues and <those> of the soul as a whole.[543]

Virtue Turning toward Itself

II.7.13.22

For virtue, having taken its point of entry from bodily and external goods, as we indicated, turned toward itself. Seeing that it too accords with nature, far more than the excellences of the body, it came to feel an affinity with itself as choiceworthy for its own sake, and indeed a greater affinity with itself than with bodily excellences. Hence <the> virtues of the soul are far more worthy of honor.[544]

543. The opposed pairs carry the preceding argument into other bodily qualities. The source's αἴσθησις and πήρωσις pair sensation with impairment; it does not specify a particular sense or injury. The inference then extends to the parts of the soul, their virtues, and the virtues of the whole soul. "Those" expresses the supplied article τὰς with its repeated noun understood. Wachsmuth records proposals to insert an additional pair for bodily good and bad condition; no such pair is added to the printed text.

544. Virtue is personified as entering through concern for bodily and external goods, then recognizing its own naturalness and worth. The earlier indication points to the account beginning on printed p. 118, represented here by II.7.13.5–9; the editor's page reference is transferred to this note. The English takes the compressed τῶν κατὰ φύσιν as classing virtue among things in accordance with nature, to a greater degree than bodily excellences. The comparative valuation remains explicit. Wachsmuth supplies the final article τὰς, expressed by the bracketed "the."

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 123

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ψυχῆς ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχύς

II.7.13.23

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προεφωδευμένων τοῦτ’ ἄν τις ἐπιλογίσαιτο. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια αἱρετὴ δι’ αὐτήν, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς· <ὑγίεια δὲ ψυχῆς> σωφροσύνη τῆς σφοδρότητος ἀπολύουσα τῶν παθῶν ἡμᾶς. Καὶ εἰ ἡ ἰσχὺς ἡ σωματικὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχικὴ δι’ αὐτὴν ἂν εἴη αἱρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν· ψυχῆς δέ ἐστιν ἰσχὺς ἀνδρεία καὶ καρτερία, εὐρώστους τὰς ψυχὰς κατασκευάζουσα· διόπερ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία δι’ αὐτὴν αἱρετὴ καὶ ἡ καρτερία.

Κάλλος ψυχῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνη

II.7.13.24

Κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον εἰ τὸ κάλλος τὸ σωματικὸν δι’ αὐτὸ αἱρετόν, καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος εἴη ἂν δι’ αὐτὸ αἱρετόν, κάλλος δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη· τὸ γὰρ

μηθὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοὺς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 124

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Health and Strength of Soul

II.7.13.23

One could also infer this from the ground already covered. For if bodily health is choiceworthy for its own sake, health of the soul is so by far the more. <Health of the soul is> self-control, which releases us from the violence of the passions.[545] And if bodily strength is among the goods, strength of soul would be far more choiceworthy for its own sake and good. Strength of soul is courage and endurance, making souls robust. Hence courage and endurance too would be choiceworthy for their own sakes.[546]

Beauty of Soul and Justice

II.7.13.24

By analogy, if bodily beauty is choiceworthy for its own sake, beauty of soul would also be choiceworthy for its own sake. Beauty of soul is justice, for

Doing no injustice makes us beautiful as well.[547]

545. Wachsmuth supplies ὑγίεια δὲ ψυχῆς, “health of the soul,” completing the equation with self-control; the English equivalent is bracketed, with “is” supplied by English grammar. Σωφροσύνη retains “self-control,” as elsewhere in the edition. The qualification concerns release from the σφοδρότης, violence or vehemence, of the passions, rather than an express assertion that all feeling is abolished.

546. Ἀνδρεία and καρτερία are courage and endurance. The comparison treats them as strength of soul and expressly calls them choiceworthy for their own sakes. The singular participle κατασκευάζουσα follows the combined expression for courage and endurance as strength. Wachsmuth compares this paragraph with the further analogies on printed p. 125.

547. The source quotes a line attributed to Menander, from an unidentified play: fragmenta fabularum incertarum 34, in the older collection cited as Comici IV, p. 244. Its argument turns from bodily to moral beauty. Wachsmuth brackets no omission here and does not supply an additional prose conclusion; his apparatus records a suggestion that a statement about justice’s intrinsic worth may have dropped out. The translation follows the printed text and adds no conjectured sentence. This completes section II.7.13; section II.7.14 continues the Peripatetic account with analogies among bodily, psychic, and external goods.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 124

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀναλογία τῶν τριῶν γενῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν

II.7.14.1

[Ὅτι τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ ἐκτός, ἀναλογίαν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, καίτοι διαφέροντα.]

Τὸν παραπλήσιον δ’ εἶναι λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐκ πλείστης διαφορᾶς τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις ὅμως ἔχειν τινὰ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀναλογίαν, ἣν καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι σαφῶς.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Analogies among the Three Kinds of Goods

II.7.14.1

A similar account applies to the virtues too.[548] For the three kinds of goods, despite their very great differences from one another, nevertheless seem to bear some analogy in respect of their account, which I shall now try to make clear.[549]

548. The square-bracketed heading reads: “That the three kinds of goods, those concerning body, those concerning soul, and external goods, bear an analogy to one another, although they differ.” Wachsmuth judges the headings throughout this Peripatetic exposition to be later additions: brief marginal summaries devised by a scribe, referring to nearby sentences rather than surveying the whole argument. His rejected heading remains visible in the Greek and is translated here instead of being incorporated into the English main text. The paired labels and final numbered subdivisions in this edition serve the layout.

549. Πρὸς τὸν λόγον, rendered “in respect of their account,” is difficult. Wachsmuth retains the manuscript wording, while recording Spengel’s deletion and Usener’s tentative πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, “in relation to the whole.” Neither proposal is silently adopted. The first-person promise “I shall now try” belongs to the speaker of the epitome; the English preserves that change of voice.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 124-125

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ σώματος ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἐκτός II.7.14.2

Ὅπερ μὲν ἐν <τῷ> σώματί φαμεν ὑγίειαν, τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλεῖσθαι σωφροσύνην, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον· περιστέλλειν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τοῦτον.

Ὅπερ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι ἰσχύν, τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ [τὴν] ἀνδρείαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς [τὴν] ἀρχήν· ὅπερ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι εὐαισθησίαν, τοῦτ' ἐν <τῇ> ψυχῇ φρόνησιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς εὐτυχίαν· ὅ τι δ' ἐν <τῷ> σώματι κάλλος, τοῦτ' ἐν <τῇ> ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνην, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς [τὴν] φιλίαν·

Ἡ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν II.7.14.3

ὥστε τρία γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν δι' αὐθ' αἱρετὰ ὑπάρχειν, τά τε περὶ <τὴν> ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός· καὶ μακρῷ αἱρετώτερα τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡγεμονικώτερον καὶ αἱρετώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 125

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods of Body Soul and External Life

II.7.14.2

What we call health in the body is called self-control in the soul, and wealth among external goods; for wealth too checks most errors.[550]

What we call strength in the body is courage in the soul, and rule among external goods; what we call keenness of the senses in the body is practical wisdom in the soul, and good fortune among external goods; what we call beauty in the body is justice in the soul, and friendship among external goods.[551]

The Higher Worth of Goods of the Soul

II.7.14.3

Hence there are three kinds of goods choiceworthy for their own sakes: those concerning the soul, those concerning the body, and external goods. Goods of the soul are far more choiceworthy than the others, since soul is both more governing and more choiceworthy than body.[552]

550. The correspondence is analogical, rather than an assertion that the three goods are identical. Τοῦτον refers to wealth: the text claims that wealth too restrains most errors. It does not say that wealth prevents every error or necessarily makes its possessor virtuous. The comparison with self-control recalls II.7.13.23.

551. Ἀρχή is rule or authority, and εὐτυχία good fortune. Εὐαισθησία retains "keenness of the senses," distinguished from practical wisdom, φρόνησις. All four triples are preserved. Supplied articles before body or soul are expressed through ordinary English grammar; the three rejected instances of τὴν remain bracketed in Greek and have no separate English equivalent.

552. The claim of intrinsic worth applies to all three kinds; the higher ranking of psychic goods does not withdraw it from bodily or external goods. "More governing" preserves the comparative ἡγεμονικώτερον. The supplied article τὴν before soul is represented by the English article. The source's sentence continues the preceding analogies.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρετὴ κοινωνία καὶ θεωρία

II.7.14.4

Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρχουσιν αἱρετώτεραι, ὑπεροχὴν ὁμοίως φερόμεναι· στοχάζονται <δὲ> καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρῶτον μὲν ὡς δι' αὐθ' αἱρετῶν, ἔπειθ' ὡς χρησίμων πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν κοινωνικὸν βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεωρητικόν. Παραμετρεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς. Οὐ γὰρ φίλαυτον εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν ταύτην, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὴν καὶ πολιτικήν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ᾠκειῶσθαι μάλιστα πάντων ἔφαμεν τὴν ἀρετήν, δῆλον ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαίως ᾠκείωται φυσικῶς αὐτῇ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 125-126

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Virtue Community and Contemplation

II.7.14.4

It is clear, then, that the virtues of the soul are more choiceworthy than bodily excellences and external goods, alike having the advantage. <But> they also aim at the other goods, first as choiceworthy for their own sakes, and then as useful for political and social life, and indeed for the contemplative life too.[553] For life is measured by political, social, and contemplative actions. According to this school, virtue is not self-loving, but social and political. Since we said that virtue has the greatest affinity of all with itself, it is clear that it necessarily also has a natural affinity with knowledge of truth.[554]

553. The printed ὁμοίως, "alike," is uncertain: Wachsmuth regards it as scarcely sound and records possible replacements, none adopted here. The subject of "aim at" is the virtues of the soul. Their concern for the other goods includes both those goods' intrinsic worth and their usefulness. The supplied δὲ is represented by the bracketed connective. Θεωρητικός concerns contemplation, retained as a distinct activity alongside political and social action.

554. Αἵρεσις here names the philosophical school or position being reported. Φίλαυτος is literally self-loving; the following contrast concerns virtue's social and political character. The next clause nevertheless retains virtue's affinity with itself, recalling II.7.13.22, printed p. 123, lines 23–26. The editor's cross-reference is transferred to this note. Wachsmuth follows Usener in moving the final sentence here from its manuscript position after "the opposites" on printed p. 126, line 5. The final αὐτῇ continues the reference to virtue; the English takes the claim to be its natural affinity with knowledge of truth.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 125-126

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Μονὴ ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἄφοδος

II.7.14.5

Τούτοις δ’ ἀκολούθως καὶ τὰς μονὰς τὰς ἐν τῷ ζῆν παραμετρεῖσθαι ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς καὶ πολιτικαῖς καὶ θεωρητικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰς ἀφόδους ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥστε κακῶς τοῖς σοφοῖς εὔλογον ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις εὔλογον ἐν τῷ ζῆν μονήν· τοῖς γὰρ ἐκτελεῖν δυναμένοις τὰς κοινωνικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ θεωρητικὰς καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν φαύλων εὔλογον ἐν τῷ ζῆν εἶναι μονήν, τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις εὔλογον ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπαλλαγήν.

Τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθά

II.7.14.6

Ἐπεὶ δὴ μεγάλη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ὑπεροχὴ κατά τε τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὸν παρὰ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθά, κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ εἶναι συμπλήρωμα τὸ τέλος ἐκ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲ τὸ τυγχάνειν ἁπάντων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν ἐν τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 126

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Remaining in Life and Departing from It

II.7.14.5

In accordance with this, remaining in life too is measured by social, political, and contemplative actions, and departures by the opposites. Thus it is wrong to regard departure from life as reasonable for the wise and remaining in life as reasonable for the base.[555] For, among both the virtuous and the base, remaining in life is reasonable for those able to carry out social, political, and contemplative actions; for those unable to do so, release from life is reasonable.[556]

The End and the Other Goods

II.7.14.6

Since virtue greatly surpasses bodily and external goods both in productive power and in being choiceworthy for its own sake, according to this account the end is not an aggregate of bodily and external goods, nor the attainment of them all. It is rather living according to virtue amid bodily and external goods, either all of them or most and the most important.[557]

555. Κακῶς, "wrongly," is Wachsmuth's correction of the transmitted καί, "and." It makes the sentence reject the contrast that follows, rather than endorse it. His apparatus identifies the contrast as Stoic doctrine and refers back to printed p. 110, lines 9–15. The English follows the text he prints.

556. The Peripatetic account measures remaining or departing by the capacity for the listed activities, applying that measure to both moral classes. Μονή is remaining or staying; ἄφοδος, ἐξαγωγή, and ἀπαλλαγή give different expressions for departure or release from life. This paragraph reports the ancient school's ethical criterion and its disagreement with the preceding Stoic account.

557. Τέλος is the end or ultimate aim. Συμπλήρωμα describes a composite or aggregate; the next paragraph explains why goods that contribute to happiness do not themselves constitute its activity. The alternatives "all" and "most and the most important" remain explicit. The printed κατὰ τὸν λόγον is retained as "according to this account"; Wachsmuth records uncertainty about the article and a proposed τὸν αὐτόν, "the same," which is not inserted.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐδαιμονία ὡς ἐνέργεια

II.7.14.7

Ὅθεν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐν πράξεσι χορηγουμέναις κατ’ εὐχήν· τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ ποιητικὰ λέγεσθαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τῷ συμβάλλεσθαί τι παρόντα· τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπληροῦται. Τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἢ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πρᾶξιν εἶναι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ οὔθ’ ὅλως ἐνέργειαν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Happiness as Activity

II.7.14.7

Hence happiness is activity according to virtue in actions furnished as one would wish.[558] Bodily and external goods are called productive of happiness because their presence contributes something to it. But those who think that these goods constitute happiness fail to understand that happiness is a life, and life is constituted by action. None of the bodily or external goods is itself either an action or, at all, an activity.[559]

558. Χορηγουμέναις concerns being furnished with provision or support. “As one would wish” renders κατ’ εὐχήν. Wachsmuth prints χορηγουμέναις as his correction of προηγουμέναις, comparing printed p. 50, line 12. The English follows that printed correction and does not turn the sentence into an assertion that happiness consists merely in receiving whatever one desires.

559. Ποιητικά means productive or causally contributory. The distinction is between the contribution these goods make when present and the action or activity that constitutes the happy life. Πρᾶξις and ἐνέργεια remain distinct as “action” and “activity.” The source’s “or” between bodily and external goods is retained; the final sentence denies that an item in either class is itself an activity.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁ τῶν ἀρετῶν χορός

II.7.14.8

Τούτων δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐχόντων ἥ τε εὐεργεσία συστήσεται καὶ ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ εὐχαριστία καὶ φιλανθρωπία καὶ φιλοτεκνία καὶ φιλαδελφία καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τό τε φιλόπατρι καὶ φιλόπατορ καὶ φιλοίκεον καὶ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον ἥ τ᾽ εὐκοινωνησία καὶ ἡ εὔνοια καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἰσότης καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἀρετῶν θεῖος χορός, οὗ τοὺς κατολιγωρήσαντας ἁμαρτάνειν φανερῶς περί τε τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τῶν κακῶν καὶ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμολογουμένως τε διασφάλλεσθαι περὶ μὲν τὴν αἵρεσιν παρὰ τὴν κρίσιν, περὶ δὲ τὴν κτῆσιν παρὰ τὸν τρόπον, περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν παρὰ τὴν ἀμαθίαν.

Ἁμαρτήματα περὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ κτῆσιν

II.7.14.9

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅταν τὸ μηδ᾽ ὅλως ὂν ἀγαθὸν αἱρῶνται, ἢ τὸ ἧττον σφοδρότερον ἢ δεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ περὶ τοὺς πλείστους ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ τοῦ συμφέροντος, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον τοῦ καλοῦ προκρίνοντας καὶ ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀμέτρως προεκφοιτῶντας. Περὶ δὲ τὴν κτῆσιν, ὅταν μήτε ὅθεν μήθ᾽ ὅπως μήτε ἐφ᾽ ὅσον χρὴ περιποιεῖσθαι ταῦτα προδιαλάβωσι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Chorus of Virtues

II.7.14.8

With matters standing thus, beneficence, favor, gratitude, love of humanity, love of children, and brotherly love will be established; and besides these, love of country, love of one's father, and love of one's kin; and, as is fitting, good sociability, goodwill, friendship, equality, justice, and the whole divine chorus of virtues.[560] Those who neglect this chorus clearly err in their choices of goods and avoidance of evils, and in acquiring and using goods. They admittedly go astray in choice because of their judgment, in acquisition because of their character, and in use because of their ignorance.[561]

Errors in Choice and Acquisition

II.7.14.9

They err in choice, then, when they choose what is not good at all, or choose the lesser good more vehemently than they should. This happens to most people: they prefer the pleasant to the beneficial, and the beneficial to the noble, and go beyond measure in their impulses. They err in acquisition when they have not first determined from what sources, in what manner, or to what extent they should procure these goods.[562]

560. Χάρις and εὐχαριστία are distinguished as favor and gratitude. The printed neuter expressions φιλόπατρι, φιλόπατορ, and φιλοίκεον name attachment to country, father, and kin or one's own people. They are Wachsmuth's corrections of the transmitted forms; the Greek retains his unusual φιλόπατορ rather than silently normalizing it. Εὐκοινωνησία is a good disposition for shared life. The "divine chorus" is the source's image for the virtues together.

561. The three kinds of failure are distinguished by their causes: κρίσις, judgment; τρόπος, character or way of behaving; and ἀμαθία, ignorance. The next sentences specify what these failures consist in. Κτῆσις is acquiring or procuring goods, while χρῆσις concerns using them; neither is reduced to choosing them.

562. The first error concerns a false judgment of goodness; the second concerns excessive pursuit of a lesser good. The two preferences are kept in order: pleasant over beneficial, beneficial over noble. Προεκφοίτωντας describes going beyond bounds, with ταῖς ὁρμαῖς specifying their impulses. The acquisition clause separately asks about source, manner, and extent. The source's elliptical construction carries "they err" forward from choice to acquisition.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χρῆσις καὶ ὁδηγία τῆς ἀρετῆς

II.7.14.10

Περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶσα χρῆσις ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον, ἐν μὲν <τῇ> πρὸς ἑαυτήν, ὅταν μὴ προσφέρωνται τοῖς πράγμασι συμμέτρως· ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅταν τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν μὴ φυλάττωσι τοῦ πρέποντος. Εἰ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, περὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάντως κατορθοῦσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι, καθηγεμόνα τῶν πράξεων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀρετήν.

Κρίσις προαίρεσις καὶ πρᾶξις

II.7.14.11

Πάσαις γοῦν ὡς ἔοικε ταῖς ἀρεταῖς κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν τό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ <τὸ> πράττειν. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄκριτον οὔτ᾽ ἀπροαίρετον οὔτ᾽ ἄπρακτον εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν ἐξάρχειν ὥσπερ ἡγεμονικὴν οὖσαν καὶ τῶν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ πρακτῶν καὶ οὐ πρακτῶν καὶ τῶν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ἑκάστην ἀποτέμνεσθαι μόνα τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Use and the Guidance of Virtue

II.7.14.10

As for use, every use has reference either to itself or to another. In its relation to itself, they err when they do not deal with things proportionately; in its relation to another, when they do not preserve the due worth of what is fitting.[563] If the base err in these matters, the virtuous invariably act rightly in the opposite ways, having virtue as the guide of their actions.[564]

Judgment Choice and Action

II.7.14.11

At any rate, judging, choosing deliberately, and acting seem to be common to all the virtues. For virtue is neither without judgment, nor without deliberate choice, nor without action. Practical wisdom takes the lead, as though governing both the matters under itself and those under the other virtues: what is to be chosen or avoided, done or not done, and what is more or less so. Each of the other virtues marks off only the matters in its own sphere.[565]

563. The Greek construction is compressed. Wachsmuth prints feminine αὐτήν and ἑαυτήν, following Heeren's corrections of masculine manuscript forms; the English accordingly retains the reference of use to itself, rather than silently substituting "oneself." The supplied article τῇ is expressed through the grammatical phrase "in its relation." The clause τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν … τοῦ πρέποντος combines due worth with what is fitting; "the due worth of what is fitting" keeps that relation visible without supplying an unexpressed beneficiary.

564. Κατορθοῦσιν is acting rightly or succeeding in right action, opposed to the preceding errors. The statement gives virtue the role of guiding action; it does not merely credit the virtuous with possessing goods. The different errors in choice, acquisition, and use provide the opposites in which the virtuous are said to act rightly.

565. Προαιρεῖσθαι is deliberate choice, distinguished here from judging and acting; the supplied τὸ makes the final infinitive parallel to the others and needs no independent English word. Φρόνησις, practical wisdom, leads across the spheres of the other virtues as well as its own. The compressed "more and less" is taken to qualify the preceding distinctions, without adding a new list of objects. The other virtues each delimit their particular sphere. This completes source section II.7.14; II.7.15 next defines virtue.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀρίστη διάθεσις

II.7.15.1

[Περὶ ἀρετῆς.]

Ἀρετὴν δ’ ὠνομάσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην διάθεσιν ἢ καθ’ ἣν ἄριστα διάκειται τὸ ἔχον. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς δῆλον· σκυτοτόμου γὰρ ἀρετὴν λέγεσθαι καθ’ ἣν ἀποτελεῖν ἄριστον ὑπόδημα δύναται, καὶ οἰκοδόμου καθ’ ἣν ἄριστα διάκειται πρὸς οἰκοδόμησιν οἰκίας καλῆς. Ὅτι μὲν τὸ ἄριστα διατιθέναι ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Virtue and the Best Disposition

II.7.15.1

Virtue is the name given to the best disposition, or to that by which its possessor is in the best condition.[566] This is clear from induction: a shoemaker's excellence is said to be that by which he can produce the best shoe, and a builder's that by which he is best disposed to build a fine house. That disposing something in the best way belongs to excellence is agreed.[567]

566. The rejected heading reads "On virtue." Wachsmuth brackets it as one of the later summary headings discussed in the note to II.7.14.1. It remains in the Greek and is translated here rather than incorporated into the English main text. Διάθεσις is disposition or condition, as elsewhere in the edition. The alternative formulation introduced by ἢ, "or," is retained.

567. Ἀρετή is the common Greek term rendered "virtue" in the ethical definition and "excellence" in the examples of crafts. The shoemaker and builder illustrate being well disposed for a particular function. Ἐπαγωγή is induction, the move through such examples toward the general account. The final active διατιθέναι concerns disposing something well; it is not silently replaced by the passive διάκεισθαι of the opening. Wachsmuth compares Eudemian Ethics II.1, 1218b37–1219a2, and Nicomachean Ethics II.5, 1106a14–24.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Λόγος πάθος καὶ ἁρμονία

II.7.15.2

Δύο δ’ ὥσπερ ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀρετῶν ὑπάρχειν, τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ πάθος· ταῦτα δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ὁμονοητικῶς συμφωνεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ στασιαστικῶς διαφωνεῖν· τὴν δ’ ἀντίταξιν αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι δι’ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. Τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ λόγου νίκην ἀπὸ τοῦ κράτους παρωνύμως ἐγκράτειαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου διὰ τὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀπειθὲς ἀκρασίαν· τὴν δ’ ἀμφοῖν ἁρμονίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἀρετήν, τοῦ μὲν ἄγοντος ἐφ’ ὃ δεῖ, τοῦ δ’ ἑπομένου πειθηνίως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Reason Passion and Harmony

II.7.15.2

There are, as it were, two principles of the virtues: reason and passion. At times these agree with one another in concord, and at times they disagree in rebellion. Their opposition arises through pleasures and pains. Accordingly, reason's victory bears the name self-control, a name derived from mastery; the victory of the nonrational part is called lack of control, because of the disobedience of impulse.[568] But the harmony and concord of the two are virtue: reason leads toward what it should, and the other follows obediently.[569]

568. The source connects ἐγκράτεια, self-control, with κράτος, mastery or power. Its opposite here is ἀκρασία, lack of control, when the nonrational element prevails. The printed ὁμονοητικῶς and στασιαστικῶς give concord and rebellion as contrasting images. "As it were" preserves the qualification on calling reason and passion principles of the virtues.

569. Virtue is identified with harmony between reason and passion, whereas self-control describes reason's victory in a conflict. The leading and obediently following roles remain distinct within the harmony. Πάθος is passion or feeling in this account. Here ἐγκράτεια has the same English rendering as σωφροσύνη in some earlier passages, but it is a different Greek term with the specific definition just given. Compare the earlier Stoic definition of ἐγκράτεια at II.7.5b2.4; the anthology preserves the schools' different accounts.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱρετὸν φευκτὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν

II.7.16.1

[Περὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν.]

Αἱρετὸν δὲ λέγεσθαι, τὸ ὁρμὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, φευκτὸν δὲ τὸ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ὅταν ὁ λόγος σύμψηφος ᾖ. Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ βουλητὸν κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην, οὕτως καὶ τὸ αἱρετὸν κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν. Τὸ δὲ αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν ἐδόκει τοῖς ἀρχαίοις εἶναι. Τὸ γοῦν ἀγαθὸν ὑπογράφοντες οὕτως ἀφωρίζοντο· ‘ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται’.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choice Avoidance and the Good

II.7.16.1

What moves impulse toward itself is called choiceworthy; what moves impulse away from itself is to be avoided, when reason concurs.[570] For, just as the object of wish takes its name from wish, so the choiceworthy takes its name from choice.[571] The ancients held the choiceworthy and the good to be the same. In outlining the good, at any rate, they defined it thus: "The good is what all things desire."[572]

570. The rejected heading reads "On things to be chosen and avoided." It receives the same treatment as the heading of section 15. The second definition understands "moves impulse" from the first. Reason's concurrence, σύμψηφος, is an explicit qualification; the definition does not merely equate any attraction or aversion with a sound choice.

571. The Greek pairs βουλητόν with βούλησις, the object of wish with wish, and αἱρετόν with αἵρεσις, the choiceworthy with choice. The English retains both pairs, although it cannot reproduce their grammatical forms exactly. Αἵρεσις here means choice, rather than the philosophical school named by the same word at II.7.14.4.

572. "The ancients" is the source's attribution; no individual author is named here. Wachsmuth compares Nicomachean Ethics I.1, 1094a3, where this definition is already cited as traditional. Πάντα is retained as "all things"; it is not narrowed to rational beings. Compare the earlier definitions of good in II.7.3a.1.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Καλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἀγαθά

II.7.16.2

Τῶν δ’ ἀγαθῶν ἔλεγον τὰ μὲν δι’ ἡμᾶς αἱρετὰ ὑπάρχειν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοὺς πλησίον· τῶν δὲ δι’ ἡμᾶς τὰ μὲν καλά, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖα. Καλὰ μὲν τάς τε ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀναγκαῖα δὲ τό τε ζῆν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο συντείνοντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἔχοντα χώραν, οἷον τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μέρη καὶ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων εὐγένειαν, πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εἰρήνην, ἐλευθερίαν, φιλίαν, τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς χρῆσιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Noble and Necessary Goods

II.7.16.2

Of goods, they said that some are choiceworthy for our sake, and others for the sake of those around us. Of those that are for our sake, some are noble and others necessary.[573] Noble are the virtues and the activities proceeding from them: practical wisdom and exercising practical wisdom, justice and acting justly, and likewise for the rest.[574] Necessary are living and the things that contribute to it and serve a productive role: the body, its parts and their uses, and, among the things called external, noble birth, wealth, reputation, peace, freedom, and friendship. For each of these contributes something toward the exercise of virtue.[575]

573. The source announces goods chosen for our sake and for the sake of those around us, then subdivides only the former. Wachsmuth records a conjecture that a fuller account of the latter category has fallen out, but observes that even the former category is only subdivided, not fully described; he thinks such omissions are better attributed to Stobaeus than to the copyists. No conjectured paragraph is inserted into the Greek or English.

574. The paired examples distinguish a virtue from its exercise: φρόνησις and φρονεῖν, practical wisdom and exercising it; δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοπραγεῖν, justice and acting justly. Καλός is noble in this ethical classification. The same word described a fine house in the preceding craft example.

575. “Necessary” retains ἀναγκαῖα, while the explanation assigns these goods a productive or contributory role in the exercise of virtue. The body, its parts, and their uses remain separate, as do all six external items. Εὐγένεια concerns noble birth and δόξα reputation here. The printed καὶ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν follows Wachsmuth’s repair of the transmitted wording; no additional adjective describing the uses is inserted.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ ὑλικά

II.7.17.1

[Ἐκ τίνων ἡ εὐδαιμονία.]

Τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν γίνεσθαι καὶ προηγουμένων πράξεων· διὸ καὶ δι’ ὅλων εἶναι καλήν, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς ἐνέργειαν δι’ ὅλων ἔντεχνον. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκβιβάζειν τὴν παράληψιν τῶν ὑλικῶν τῆς εἰλικρινείας τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οὐδὲ τὴν τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔντεχνον δι’ ὅλων ἐνέργειαν τὴν τῶν ὀργάνων χρῆσιν. Πᾶσαν μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναί τινα ψυχῆς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Happiness and Material Means

II.7.17.1

Happiness arises from noble and preferred actions; hence it is noble throughout, just as performance on the pipes is skilled throughout.[576] For employing material things does not compromise the purely noble character of happiness, any more than using instruments compromises the wholly skilled character of medical activity. For every action is some activity of the soul.[577]

576. The rejected summary heading reads “From what things happiness arises.” Προηγουμένων is rendered “preferred,” as in II.7.11m.9–10: it concerns precedence in choice rather than actions that happened earlier in time. The repeated “throughout” preserves δι’ ὅλων. Wachsmuth records a proposed gap before the comparison with the pipes, but prints no additional wording or gap sign here; none is supplied in this edition.

577. Αὐλοί are musical wind instruments, rendered “pipes.” The argument then turns to medicine and its instruments. Ἐκβιβάζειν literally means to take outside; the English expresses the denial that employing material things removes happiness from the purity of the noble, or removes medical activity from the sphere of skill. Ὑλικά names material things or means, whereas ὄργανα names instruments. The distinction between activity and its means continues in the next paragraph. Wachsmuth notes that this section also survives in the Florilegium under an attribution to Didymus’s Epitome.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Μέρη ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ

II.7.17.2

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ πράττων συγχρῆταί τισι πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν τῆς προθέσεως, μέρη ταῦτα οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν τῆς ἐνεργείας, καίτοι γε ἐπιζητούσης ἑκατέρας τῶν εἰρημένων <τεχνῶν> ἑκάτερον, οὐ μὴν ὡς μέρος, ὡς δὲ ποιητικὸν τῆς τέχνης. Τὰ γὰρ ὧν ἄνευ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον, μέρη τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγειν οὐκ ὀρθόν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐπινοεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, τὰ δ’ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικόν, τῷ φέρειν καὶ συνεργεῖν εἰς τὸ τέλος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Parts of Activity and Its Necessary Conditions

II.7.17.2

Since the agent also uses certain things to complete the intended aim, these should not be regarded as parts of the activity, although each of the two <arts> mentioned requires its corresponding means, as something productive for the art rather than as a part.[578] For it is not correct to call the things without which any action is impossible parts of the activity. A part is conceived as a constituent of the whole; things without which it cannot be done are conceived as productive, because they promote and help achieve the end.[579]

578. Wachsmuth prints τελείωσιν, completion, as his correction of τελειότητα, completeness or perfection. The supplied τεχνῶν is preserved as the bracketed "arts." The distributive ἑκατέρα and ἑκάτερον refer to the two arts already mentioned and their corresponding means. Ποιητικόν assigns the means a productive role for the art; it does not make them constituent parts of the activity.

579. The distinction is between what constitutes a whole, συμπληρωτικόν, and what contributes causally toward the end, ποιητικόν. "Things without which" preserves the source's repeated formulation for necessary conditions. This continues the account at II.7.14.6–7 and II.7.16.2: dependence on other goods does not by itself make those goods parts of happiness. This completes section II.7.17. The next section divides the good into the noble, the beneficial, and the pleasant, then discusses the aim and definitions of happiness.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία

II.7.18.1

[Πόσα μέρη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ περὶ σκοποῦ.]

Διαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τἀγαθὸν εἰς τε τὸ καλὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ συμφέρον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδύ· καὶ τῶν μὲν κατὰ μέρος πράξεων τούτους εἶναι σκοπούς· τὸ δ’ ἐκ πάντων αὐτῶν εὐδαιμονίαν. Εὐδαιμονίαν δ’ εἶναι ‘χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ χορηγουμένην’ ἢ ‘ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργειαν κατ’ ἀρετήν’ ἢ ‘χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστον’. Τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τέλος ὑπάρχειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 130

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Good and Happiness

II.7.18.1

The good is divided into the noble, the beneficial, and the pleasant. These are the aims of particular actions; what arises from all of them is happiness.[580] Happiness is "the exercise of complete virtue, provided for in a complete life," or "the activity of a complete life in accordance with virtue," or "the unhindered exercise of virtue amid things in accordance with nature." The same thing is also the end.[581]

580. The rejected summary heading reads "How many parts there are of the good; and on the aim." As with the preceding later headings, the Greek brackets are retained and the heading is translated here. Καλόν, συμφέρον, and ἡδύ are the noble, beneficial, and pleasant respectively. The statement about their combination retains the compressed τὸ δ' ἐκ πάντων αὐτῶν; it does not supply a further list of goods.

581. The three formulations are alternatives introduced by ἤ, "or." Χρῆσις is exercise or use, whereas ἐνέργεια is activity. "Provided for" follows Wachsmuth's printed correction χορηγουμένην in place of προηγουμένην. It anticipates the explanation of supporting goods below, rather than making "complete" mean merely a lifetime that has ended. The expressions complete virtue, complete life, and provided for are unpacked in the following paragraphs. Τέλος is the end toward which action is directed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 130

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σκοπὸς καὶ τέλος

II.7.18.2

Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὐδαιμονεῖν τέλος, ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονία λέγεται σκοπὸς καὶ ὁ μὲν πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ πλουτεῖν ὧν χρή, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διορίζουσι τῆς ἀκριβείας τῶν ὀνομάτων χάριν· ἀκολουθητέον μέντοι τῇ τῶν ἀρχαίων συνηθείᾳ καὶ λεκτέον τέλος εἶναι ‘οὗ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενός’, ἢ ‘τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν’, ἢ ‘τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν ἐν ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις’.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 130-131

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Aim and End

II.7.18.2

If living happily is the end, while happiness is called the aim, and wealth is a good, while being wealthy … — for those who draw these distinctions for the sake of precision in names …[582] Nevertheless, one should follow the usage of the ancients and say that the end is "that for whose sake we do everything, while it is for the sake of nothing else," or "the ultimate object of desire," or "living in accordance with virtue amid bodily and external goods, either all of them or most of them and the most important."[583]

582. The opening sentence is damaged. Wachsmuth prints ὧν χρή, τοῖς after πλουτεῖν, and his apparatus records incompatible repairs and proposed gaps here and after χάριν. The English ellipses mark uncertain wording and connections, not deliberate abbreviation of sound Greek. The intelligible clauses and the reference to terminological precision are translated, but no conjectured completion is presented as the source. The Greek keeps every printed word. The secure contrast is between the noun happiness and living happily, and between wealth and being wealthy; Wachsmuth compares Stoic formulations earlier in the anthology.

583. The resumed prescription beginning ἀκολουθητέον is intelligible. All three definitions of the end are retained, including the final requirement for bodily and external goods. "Ultimate object of desire" renders τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. The last alternative allows either all the goods or most and the most important of them; it does not say that any amount of external prosperity is sufficient. The source's generic attribution to the ancients is retained.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 130-131

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀγαθὰ κακὰ καὶ ἀδιάφορα

II.7.18.3

Τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τελειότατον ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὑπηρετεῖσθαι. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενα πρὸς αὐτὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὁμολογουμένως χρὴ λέγειν, τὰ δ’ ἐναντιούμενα <αὐτῷ τῶν κακῶν, τὰ δὲ μήτε συμβαλλόμενα μήτε ἐναντιούμενα> οὔτε τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε <τῶν> κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων. Οὐ πᾶσαν δὲ καλὴν πρᾶξιν εὐδαιμονικὴν ὑπάρχειν.

Τελεία καὶ ἀτελὴς ἀρετή

II.7.18.4

‘Τελείας’ δ’ εἶπον ἀρετῆς χρῆσιν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὅτι τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν ἔλεγον εἶναι τελείας, τὰς δὲ ἀτελεῖς· τελείας μὲν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν· ἀτελεῖς δὲ τὴν εὐφυΐαν καὶ τὴν προκοπήν· τῷ δὲ τελείῳ τὸ τέλειον ἁρμόττειν. Τέλος οὖν εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν, ἧς οὐθὲν ἄπεστι μέρος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 131

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Goods Evils and Indifferents

II.7.18.3

This, being the greatest and most complete of goods, is served by all the others. For one must admittedly count the things that contribute to it among goods, and those that oppose <it among evils; things that neither contribute nor oppose> belong neither among goods nor among evils, but among indifferents.[584] Yet not every noble action belongs to happiness.[585]

Complete and Incomplete Virtue

II.7.18.4

They called happiness the exercise of "complete" virtue because they said that some virtues are complete and others incomplete. Complete are justice and nobility and goodness; incomplete are natural aptitude and progress.[586] What is complete fits what is complete. The end, therefore, is the activity of virtue of such a kind that no part of it is missing.[587]

584. The long supplement αὐτῷ τῶν κακῶν … ἐναντιούμενα is printed by Wachsmuth from Spengel and remains bracketed in both languages. The separately supplied τῶν is an article required by the Greek construction; its function is absorbed into "among evils." The classification is relative to contribution to or opposition to the end. The term indifferent therefore occurs within this Peripatetic account, without importing the Stoic restriction of good to virtue.

585. Εὐδαιμονικήν means belonging to or productive of happiness. The negative qualifies "every": the passage does not deny the nobility of an action that fails to make a life happy. The distinction becomes explicit in the subsequent examples of virtuous conduct amid misfortune and mistreatment.

586. Καλοκἀγαθία combines the noble and the good in one term, rendered "nobility and goodness." Εὐφυΐα is natural aptitude or good natural endowment, and προκοπή progress. Both are explicitly placed among incomplete virtues in this account. Wachsmuth observes that progress is Stoic terminology also taken up by Peripatetics; the anthology's terminology should not be flattened into one school's definitions.

587. The repeated τέλειος is complete in the sense of lacking no constituent part. The final relative clause describes the virtue whose activity is the end. This explains the first qualification in the initial definition of happiness; it does not equate an undeveloped aptitude or mere progress with the complete exercise of virtue.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 131

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τέλειος βίος καὶ χρόνος

II.7.18.5

Καὶ τὸ ‘ἐν βίῳ δὲ τελείῳ’ προσέθεσαν ἐνδείξασθαι βουληθέντες, ὅτι περὶ τοὺς ἤδη προήκοντας ἄνδρας ἡ εὐδαιμονία γίνεται· τὸ γὰρ μειράκιον ἀτελὲς καὶ ὁ τούτου βίος, δι’ ὃ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο περὶ τοῦτ’ εὐδαιμονία, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν ἀτελεῖ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ. Τέλειον δ’ εἶναι τοῦτον, ὅσον ὥρισεν ἡμῖν <τὸ> πλεῖστον ὁ θεός· ὥρισε δὲ κατὰ πλάτος, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος μέγεθος.

Χρόνος καὶ ὁλοκληρία

II.7.18.6

Ὡς οὖν ἕνα στίχον μὴ ἂν συστῆσαι ὑπόκρισιν μηδὲ μίαν χειρὸς ἔκτασιν ὄρχησιν, μηδὲ μίαν χελιδόνα ποιεῖν ἔαρ, οὕτως μηδὲ βραχὺν χρόνον εὐδαιμονίαν. Τελείαν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τελείου συνεστῶσαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ χρόνου καὶ δαίμονος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 131-132

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

A Complete Life and Its Duration

II.7.18.5

They also added “in a complete life” to indicate that happiness occurs in men who have already reached maturity. For a youth is incomplete, and so is his life; hence happiness could not occur in him, nor, in general, in an incomplete period, but in a complete one.[588] This period is complete when it extends as long as God has set for us at most. He has set it within a range, just as he has set bodily size.[589]

Duration and Completeness

II.7.18.6

Accordingly, just as a single verse could not constitute a dramatic performance, nor a single extension of the hand a dance, nor a single swallow make spring, so a short period could not constitute happiness.[590] For happiness must be complete, constituted from completeness in the man, the duration, and the fortune allotted to him.[591]

588. The passage explains completeness first by maturity rather than by a fixed number of years. Μειράκιον is a youth, contrasted with men who have already advanced in age. The claims are those of the ancient account. “In a complete life” translates the quoted phrase; the embedded δέ serves the connection of the Greek discussion rather than adding a new condition inside the definition.

589. Κατὰ πλάτος means within a breadth or range, here contrasted with one exact measure. The comparison is with bodily size. The supplied τὸ before πλεῖστον is retained in Greek; the English idiom “at most” absorbs its grammatical function. The source gives no numerical lifespan. Θεός is God; the later δαίμων is a separate word and is explained in the next note.

590. All three comparisons are retained. Ὑπόκρισις here is dramatic performance or acting, not hypocrisy. Each example distinguishes an isolated element from a complete activity or season. The spring comparison is printed as ἔαρ; the English does not replace it with the familiar modern form of the proverb about summer.

591. The single adjective τελείου governs the man, time, and δαίμων together. Here δαίμων is rendered “the fortune allotted to him,” expressing the governing lot or fortune in a life; the source has not introduced a separate doctrine about a personal demon. The translation preserves this third requirement alongside the person and duration, rather than reducing completeness to age alone.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χορηγία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν κακοῖς

II.7.18.7

‘Χορηγουμένην’ δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῇ χρήσαιτ’ ἂν καλῶς ὁ σπουδαῖος, οὐ μὴν γε μακάριος ἔσται καὶ ἐν αἰκίαις ἀποδείξαιτ’ ἂν τὸ γενναῖον, οὐ μὴν <γ’> εὐδαιμονήσει.

Τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά

II.7.18.8

Αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ καλῶν μόνον ἐστὶν ἀπεργαστικὴ καθ’ ἑαυτήν, ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονία καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγκαρτερεῖν βούλεται τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύειν πρὸς τῷ καὶ σῴζειν τὸ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ δίκαιον καὶ μήτε ἀποστερεῖν ἑαυτὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ καλῶν μήτε τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναγκαίων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 132

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Provision and Virtue amid Evils II.7.18.7

The activity of virtue is called “provided for” because it must necessarily occur amid goods in accordance with nature.[592] For even amid evils the virtuous person might exercise virtue nobly, yet he will not be blessed; and under mistreatment he might display his nobility, yet he will not <indeed> be happy.[593]

Noble Things and Good Things II.7.18.8

The reason is that virtue by itself produces only noble things, whereas happiness produces both noble and good things.[594] For happiness wishes to enjoy goods, rather than to endure terrible things, while also preserving justice in community and depriving herself neither of the noble things found in contemplation nor of the necessities of life.[595]

592. Χορηγουμένην repeats the word in the initial definition. Wachsmuth again prints it as a correction of προηγουμένην. It means furnished with provision or support, here expressly identified with natural goods. The account distinguishes the good conditions needed for happiness from the virtue that can still be exercised when those conditions fail.

593. Μακάριος is blessed, and εὐδαιμονήσει will be happy; the English retains the two expressions. Αἰκίαι are acts of mistreatment or abuse. Displaying nobility under such circumstances does not establish happiness in this argument. The supplied γ’ is represented by bracketed “indeed.” Wachsmuth notes that the passage is directed against Stoic positions; compare the preceding Stoic account, in which virtue suffices for happiness.

594. Καθ’ ἑαυτήν qualifies virtue: the comparison concerns what virtue produces by itself. Καλῶν κἀγαθῶν retains both the noble and the good. This passage depends on the Peripatetic recognition of bodily and external goods; it should not be read as saying that noble conduct is morally bad or that virtue is worthless.

595. Happiness is personified as the subject of wishing and of the feminine reflexive ἑαυτήν, hence “herself.” The English does not silently change the subject to the virtuous man. The goods of contemplation, θεωρία, and the necessities of ordinary life are both retained alongside justice in community. The account gives no warrant here for omitting social justice in favor of contemplation.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡδονὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀπώλεια

II.7.18.9

Ἥδιστον γάρ τι καὶ κάλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, οὔτε δ’ ἐπιτείνεσθαι καθάπερ τέχνην ὀργάνων πλήθει καὶ παρασκευῇ· οὔτε τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναπόβλητον ἔτι τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ παράπαν, δύνασθαι γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήθους καὶ μεγέθους ἀφαιρεθῆναι κακῶν.

Σόλων καὶ τέλος βίου

II.7.18.10

Ὅθεν ἐνδοιάσειεν ἄν τις, μήποτ’ οὐδὲ κυρίως εὐδαιμονιστέον τὸν ἔτι ζῶντα, διὰ τὸ τῆς τύχης ἄδηλον. Τὸ γὰρ τοῦ Σόλωνος εὖ ἔχειν· τέλος ὅρα μακροῦ βίου. Μαρτυρεῖν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸν βίον, εὐδαιμονίζοντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡνίκ’ ἂν θνῄσκωσι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 132-133

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Pleasure Virtue and Loss

II.7.18.9

For happiness is something most pleasant and most noble, yet it is not intensified like an art by the number and provision of instruments.[596] Nor is it the same for God and a human being. For even the virtue of the good is not altogether incapable of being lost: it can be taken away by the number and magnitude of evils.[597]

Solon and the End of Life

II.7.18.10

Hence one might doubt whether a person still living should even be pronounced happy in the proper sense, because of the uncertainty of fortune. For Solon's saying is sound: "Look to the end of a long life."[598] Life itself also bears witness to this, pronouncing people happy when they die.[599]

596. The printed negative οὔτε is retained. The dependence on supporting goods does not mean that accumulating instruments indefinitely intensifies happiness in the manner of a craft. "Number and provision of instruments" preserves both πλήθει and παρασκευῇ. Wachsmuth records a conjecture that would change the negative, but does not adopt it.

597. The Greek prints ἔτι, further or still, where the apparatus records transmitted ἐπί and a correction by Usener. The English treats it as an additional emphasis in the argument; it is not silently rewritten as an infinitive or restored to ἐπί. Ἀναπόβλητον means incapable of being lost, with the denial qualified by τὸ παράπαν, altogether. The argument concerns human vulnerability to many great evils and explicitly distinguishes divine from human happiness.

598. The opening is a doubt or question prompted by uncertain fortune, not an unqualified declaration that no living person is happy. Εὐδαιμονιστέον concerns pronouncing or counting someone happy. The maxim is attributed to Solon in the source and is translated as printed, including μακροῦ, long.

599. Wachsmuth prints τὸν βίον, life, as the subject of bearing witness and pronouncing people happy. His apparatus records Heeren's conjecture Βίαντα, Bias, which would instead name a person. That conjecture is not adopted here. The English retains the personification of life; it does not introduce a second named sage into the main text.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁ μέσος βίος

II.7.18.11

Τὸν <δ’> ἀφαιρεθέντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ εἶναι κακοδαίμονα, καθάπερ τὸν μηδ’ ὅλως ἔχοντα ταύτην, ἀλλ’ ἔσθ’ ὅτε μέσον. Βιοῦν γάρ ποτε καὶ σοφὸν καὶ μὴ σοφὸν τὸν μέσον λεγόμενον βίον, τὸν μήτε εὐδαίμονα μήτε κακοδαίμονα.

Ἐγρήγορσις κατὰ φύσιν

II.7.18.12

Περὶ δὲ τοὺς κοιμωμένους οὐκ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ γε. Τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τὴν ἐγρήγορσιν εἶναι, ταύτῃ δὲ προστίθεσθαι τὸ ‘κατὰ φύσιν’, διὰ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐγρήγορσιν τῶν σπουδαίων τελείας εἶναι χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν. Ταύτην δ’ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ μὴ μαινομένου μηδ’ ἐξεστηκότος, ἐπεὶ τήν τε μανίαν καὶ τὴν ἔκστασιν ὡς τὸν ὕπνον ἐξιστάνειν αὐτὸν ταύτης τῆς χρήσεως, τάχα δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσιν θηρίοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 133

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Intermediate Life

II.7.18.11

<But> a person deprived of happiness is not unhappy, just as a person who has never possessed it at all is not; sometimes he is intermediate.[600] For both a wise and an unwise person sometimes live what is called the intermediate life, one that is neither happy nor unhappy.[601]

Wakefulness in Accordance with Nature

II.7.18.12

Happiness does not occur in those who are asleep, or at least not in actuality.[602] For the soul's activity occurs in wakefulness, and "in accordance with nature" is added to this, because not every waking state of the virtuous is an exercise of complete virtue, but only the waking state in accordance with nature. This is the state of someone who is neither mad nor out of his mind, since madness and mental derangement, like sleep, remove him from this exercise, and perhaps also from the exercise of reason, as with all beasts.[603]

600. The supplied connective δ' is represented by bracketed "But." The comparison with someone who has never possessed happiness is compressed. The translation takes the negation with both cases in light of the following explicit intermediate state. It does not imply that every loss of happiness makes someone happy, or that unhappiness is impossible. The qualification "sometimes" remains.

601. Μέσος is intermediate between the two named states. Both σοφός and μὴ σοφός, wise and not wise, are said sometimes to live this life. The passage therefore distinguishes not being happy from being positively unhappy. Κακοδαίμων is unhappy here, with the later κακοδαιμονία rendered unhappiness.

602. The qualification "or at least not in actuality" preserves ἢ οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ γε. The argument concerns the present exercise of activity, rather than a claim that a good person loses every disposition whenever asleep. Ἐντελέχεια is actuality here, while ἐνέργεια is activity. The next sentence requires wakefulness to be qualified further; being awake by itself is not enough.

603. The ancient account groups μανία and ἔκστασις as states that interrupt the relevant exercise, and compares their effect with sleep. "Mental derangement" renders ἔκστασις here, rather than suggesting contemplative ecstasy. The closing reference to beasts is highly compressed: "as with" makes explicit the comparison understood in the English, not an added Greek phrase. Τῆς τοῦ λόγου understands χρῆσις, exercise of reason, from the preceding clause; τάχα, perhaps, is retained. The next paragraph restricts happiness to rational life.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Λογικὸν ζῆν καὶ χορηγία

II.7.18.13

Οἷς γὰρ λογικόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τούτοις, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε χορηγούμενον ἔχοιεν τὸ ζῆν.

Ἀρετὴ κακία καὶ αὐτάρκεια

II.7.18.14

Ὡς δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν λέγεσθαι χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν χρῆσιν κακίας· οὐ μὴν ὡς τὴν κακίαν αὐτάρκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Ὡς δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον τἀγαθὰ ἔχειν καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρειν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 133-134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Rational Life and Provision II.7.18.13

For those whose life is rational can also live happily. Yet not even they do so always, but only when their living is provided for.[604]

Virtue Vice and Sufficiency II.7.18.14

Just as happiness is called the exercise of virtue, so unhappiness is called the exercise of vice. Yet it does not follow that, because vice is sufficient for unhappiness, virtue is likewise sufficient for happiness.[605] The virtuous person possesses goods, and these benefit both himself and others.[606]

604. The repeated infinitives τὸ ζῆν and τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν concern living and living happily. Rationality marks those to whom happiness can belong; the subsequent restriction denies that it belongs to them at every time. Χορηγούμενον again means provided for, following Wachsmuth's correction of προηγούμενον. It recalls the supporting natural goods specified at II.7.18.7, rather than a mere preference for continuing to live.

605. The symmetry of the two definitions is explicitly denied for sufficiency. Αὐτάρκης means sufficient in relation to the stated result. The English spells out the compressed comparison: vice can suffice for unhappiness without virtue alone sufficing for happiness. This is consistent with the supporting conditions required earlier in the section.

606. The final Ὡς δέ introduces a compressed statement about the virtuous person's possession of goods and benefit to himself and others. The English takes the goods as the subject understood with συμφέρειν, benefiting both him and others. No additional list of goods or new claim that virtue alone secures them is supplied.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀτυχία καὶ εὐτυχία

II.7.18.15

Φευκτὸν δὲ τὸν βίον γίνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἄγαν ἀτυχίαις, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄγαν εὐτυχίαις. Πλεῖον γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν· δι’ ὃ καὶ μηδὲ κυρίως εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι [καὶ] τοῖς φαύλοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Misfortune and Good Fortune

II.7.18.15

Life becomes something to be avoided for the good in extreme misfortunes, and for the bad even in extreme good fortune. For they err more; hence, for the base, such fortunes are not even fortunate in the proper sense.[607]

607. The final inference concerns the bad: their apparent good fortune gives occasion for more wrongdoing. Εὐτυχία, good fortune, remains distinct from εὐδαιμονία, happiness. In the compressed final clause, “such fortunes” is understood from the preceding εὐτυχίαις, and τοῖς φαύλοις means for the base. The rejected καὶ, “and” or “also,” remains bracketed in Greek but is omitted from the English main text. The life-to-be-avoided claim belongs to the ancient ethical account; compare II.7.14.5. This completes source section II.7.18. The next section begins at printed p. 134, line 7 for its bracketed heading, and line 8 for the main discussion of the senses of good.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν

II.7.19.1

[Ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀγαθόν.]

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονία τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, διαιρετέον ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. Τριχῶς δή φασι λέγεσθαι τό τε γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι σωτηρίας αἴτιον καὶ τὸ κατηγορούμενον παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὸ δι' αὑτ' αἱρετόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν θεῖον εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ γένος τῶν ἀγαθῶν <τὸ δεύτερον>, τὸ δὲ <τρίτον τὸ> τέλος, ἐφ' ὃ πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Good in Three Senses

II.7.19.1

Since happiness is for us the greatest good, we must distinguish the senses in which "good" is used. They say that it is used in three senses: the cause of preservation for all existing things, what is predicated of every good, and what is choiceworthy for its own sake.[608] Of these, the first is the divine, <the second> the genus of goods, and <the third the> end to which we refer everything, which is happiness.[609]

608. The rejected summary heading reads "In how many senses good is spoken of." It remains bracketed in Greek and is translated here. The opening concerns senses of a word, rather than three interchangeable objects. Σωτηρία is preservation or continued safety here; the first sense assigns a preserving cause to all existing things. The second is the predicate good applied to every particular good, and the third concerns choice for something's own sake.

609. The supplied τὸ δεύτερον and τρίτον τὸ remain bracketed in both languages. Θεῖον is the divine, γένος genus, and τέλος end. The concluding identification with happiness belongs to the third sense. The following classifications explore goods under different distinctions; their successive divisions should be read as the account presents them.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αἱρετὰ τελικὰ καὶ ποιητικά

II.7.19.2

Καὶ τὸ δι’ αὐθ’ αἱρετὸν δὲ τριχῶς λέγεσθαι· ἢ οὗ χάριν τινὰ πράττομεν ὡς ἐσχάτου· ἢ οὗ χάριν πάντα· ἢ τρίτον ὃ μέρος γίνεται τούτων. Τῶν δὲ δι’ αὑτ’ αἱρετῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά. Τελικὰ μὲν τὰς κατ’ ἀρετὴν προηγουμένας πράξεις· ποιητικὰ δὲ τὰ ὑλικὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Choiceworthy Things as Ends and Means

II.7.19.2

What is choiceworthy for its own sake is also spoken of in three senses: that for whose sake we do certain things, as an ultimate end; that for whose sake we do everything; and, third, what becomes a part of these.[610] Of things choiceworthy for their own sake, some serve as ends and others are productive means. Those serving as ends are preferred actions in accordance with virtue; productive means are the material things used by the virtues.[611]

610. The first two senses differ in scope: τινά, certain things, and πάντα, everything. The third retains the source's plural τούτων, these, without replacing it with a newly specified single end. Being a part belongs to this third formulation; the preceding distinctions between constituent parts and necessary conditions remain relevant.

611. Τελικά concerns ends, and ποιητικά what produces or contributes to them. Προηγουμένας is preferred, as in II.7.17.1; the printed word is retained. Wachsmuth prints τῶν ἀρετῶν, of the virtues, where his apparatus records transmitted τῶν αἱρετῶν, of choiceworthy things. The English follows the printed virtues. Ὑλικά is material things or means. The account expressly includes both classes among what is choiceworthy for its own sake.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 134

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τίμια ἐπαινετὰ δυνάμεις καὶ ὠφέλιμα

II.7.19.3

Τῶν δ’ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τίμια, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα. Τίμια μὲν οἷον θεόν, ἄρχοντα, πατέρα· ἐπαινετὰ δὲ οἷον δικαιοσύνην, φρόνησιν· δυνάμεις δὲ οἷον πλοῦτον, ἀρχήν, ἐξουσίαν· ὠφέλιμα δὲ τὰ ποιητικὰ τούτων καὶ φυλακτικά, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Honor Praise Powers and Usefulness

II.7.19.3

Of goods, some are worthy of honor, some praiseworthy, some powers, and some useful. Worthy of honor are, for example, a god, a ruler, and a father; praiseworthy are justice and practical wisdom; powers are wealth, office, and authority.[612] Useful things are those that produce and preserve these goods—for example, things that produce or preserve health and good condition.[613]

612. All four classes and all three examples of powers are retained. Τίμια concerns honor, while ἐπαινετά concerns praise. Here δυνάμεις names resources or powers such as wealth, office, and authority, rather than only bodily or mental faculties. Ἀρχή is office or rule, and ἐξουσία authority or power to act; they remain separate examples.

613. The final Greek examples are genitives, ὑγιείας and εὐεξίας: the useful things produce or preserve health and good condition. The English repeats the preceding verbs to express this construction. Wachsmuth conjectures in his apparatus that examples such as exercise and medicines might have fallen out, but does not print them in the text. None is inserted into either language.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα

II.7.19.4

Ἔτι τῶν [αἱρετῶν καὶ] ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ εἶναι αἱρετά, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τίμια καὶ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ’ αὑτά· (καὶ γὰρ τὰς δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν τῶν καθ’ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρχάς, οἷς <εὖ> ἂν χρήσαιτο καὶ ἂν ζητήσειεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ· καὶ οἷς δύναται εὖ χρῆσθαι ἀγαθὸς [καὶ] καθ’ αὑτὰ ἀγαθὰ πεφυκέναι, ὥσπερ ὑγιεινά, ἃ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ δύναιτο χρῆσθαι·) τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα δι’ ἕτερα· τῷ γὰρ ποιεῖν ἕτερα καὶ σῴζειν τῶν αἱρετῶν ὑπάρχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

For Themselves and for Other Things

II.7.19.4

Again, some goods are choiceworthy for themselves, and others for the sake of other things. Things worthy of honor, praiseworthy things, and powers are choiceworthy for themselves.[614] (For powers too belong among goods in themselves—for example, wealth and offices, which a good man might use <well> and seek. Things that a good man can use well are naturally goods in themselves, like healthful things, which a doctor might seek and be able to use.) Useful things are choiceworthy for other things: they belong among choiceworthy things because they produce and preserve other things.[615]

614. The rejected αἱρετῶν καὶ means "choiceworthy and"; the English follows the deletion. This classification assigns powers, including wealth and offices, intrinsic choiceworthiness. A later division in this same section lists wealth among productive goods only. Both statements are translated as transmitted, so that the reader can assess their relation rather than receive a harmonized replacement.

615. The supplied εὖ is bracketed as "well." The rejected καὶ before καθ' αὑτά means "and" or "also" and is omitted in English. The parenthesis is retained. Ὑγιεινά means healthful things, distinguished from ὑγίεια, health itself. The doctor supplies an analogy for competent use. In the final sentence τῶν αἱρετῶν follows Wachsmuth's printed correction of τῶν ἀρετῶν; here the English accordingly reads choiceworthy things.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Τέλη καὶ οὐ τέλη

II.7.19.5

Ἄλλη διαίρεσις· τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τέλη, τὰ δὲ οὐ τέλη· οἷον δικαιοσύνην μὲν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ ὑγίειαν τέλη καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα γενομένων κεκεφαλαιωμένα ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ τὴν ὑγίειαν, οὐ μὴν τό γε ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὴν θεραπείαν τοῦ κάμνοντος. Εὐφυΐαν δὲ καὶ ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μαθήσεις οὐ τέλη.

Ἀγαθὰ παντὶ καὶ κατὰ χρῆσιν

II.7.19.6

Ἄλλη διαίρεσις· τῶν τελῶν τὰ μὲν παντὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ οὐ παντί. Τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ φρόνησιν παντὶ ἀγαθά, ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν παραγένηται ὠφελεῖν· πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυνάμεις οὐ παντὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἀγαθά, καθ’ ὅσον ἀφώρισται τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς χρήσει. Φαίνεσθαι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ χρωμένους ὠφελεῖν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 135-136

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ends and Things That Are Not Ends

II.7.19.5

Another division: of goods in themselves, some are ends and others are not ends. Justice, virtue, and health are ends, as are, generally, all things constituted as a sum of particular results, as health is.[616] But what is conducive to health is not an end, nor is treatment of the sick person. Natural aptitude, recollections, and acts of learning are not ends.[617]

Goods for Everyone and Goods Depending on Use

II.7.19.6

Another division: among ends, some are good for everyone, and others are not good for everyone. Virtue and practical wisdom are good for everyone, since they benefit anyone in whom they occur. But wealth, offices, and powers are not good for just anyone, since their being good is determined by the good man's use of them.[618] Apparently these are also to be sought and benefit their users.[619]

616. Κεκεφαλαιωμένα suggests things summed up or brought together as a whole from particular results. Health illustrates such an outcome. The comparison distinguishes an end from what contributes toward it; the Greek remains compressed, and the English does not supply an additional example or a new definition of virtue.

617. The contrast retains τὸ ὑγιεινόν, what is healthful or conducive to health, and θεραπεία, treatment. The final list preserves all three items: εὐφυΐα, natural aptitude; ἀναμνήσεις, recollections; and μαθήσεις, acts of learning. Their exclusion from ends does not exclude them from the wider class of goods in themselves introduced at the start of the paragraph.

618. Wachsmuth prints τῶν τελῶν, among ends; his apparatus records alternatives including τελικῶν and ἀγαθῶν, but they are not adopted here. The qualification ὁπωσοῦν rules out indiscriminate benefit from wealth, offices, and powers. Their goodness is related to the good person's use. The clause about virtue and practical wisdom expressly says that they benefit whoever possesses them.

619. The final clause is irregular. Wachsmuth prints active ζητεῖν, "to seek," and his apparatus records several repairs, including a passive and formulations meaning that these things ought to be sought. The English gives that likely sense while retaining the printed Greek; "are to be sought" is an interpretation of the construction, not a passive printed by Wachsmuth. The second claim, benefit to users, leads into the following distinction between good and bad use.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι II.7.19.7

Οἷς δὲ τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὖ χρῆσθαι, τούτοις τὸν κακὸν κακῶς· ὥσπερ οἷς ἂν εὖ τὸν μουσικόν, τούτοις τὸν ἄμουσον κακῶς. Ἅμα δὲ κακῶς χρώμενον βλάπτεσθαι, καθάπερ ἵππον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν μὲν ἱππικὸν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὸν ἄφιππον οὐ μετρίως.

Ψυχικὰ σωματικὰ καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά II.7.19.8

Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός. Περὶ ψυχὴν μέν, οἷον εὐφυΐαν τε καὶ τέχνην καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἡδονήν· περὶ σῶμα δὲ ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐαισθησίαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀρτιότητα καὶ πάντα τὰ μόρια σὺν ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ἐνεργείαις· ἐκτὸς δὲ πλοῦτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ εὐγένειαν καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρίδα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 136

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Using Things Well and Badly

II.7.19.7

What the good person uses well, the bad person uses badly, just as what a trained musician uses well, someone untrained in music uses badly. At the same time, someone who uses things badly is harmed, just as a good horse benefits a skilled rider but harms an unskilled rider considerably.[620]

Goods of Soul Body and External Life

II.7.19.8

Again, some goods concern the soul, some the body, and some are external. Goods concerning the soul include natural aptitude, art, virtue, wisdom, practical wisdom, and pleasure.[621] Those concerning the body include health, keenness of sensation, beauty, strength, integrity, and all its parts together with their faculties and activities. External goods include wealth, reputation, noble birth, political power, friends, relatives, and one's homeland.[622]

620. The musical comparison concerns trained and untrained use; no particular instrument is named. The horse remains good in the example, yet benefits or harms according to the rider's competence. Οὐ μετρίως, literally not moderately, intensifies the harm. The examples explain why calling a resource good does not by itself guarantee benefit to every user.

621. All six goods of the soul are retained, including pleasure. Τέχνη is art or an organized skill; σοφία and φρόνησις remain wisdom and practical wisdom respectively. This is the Peripatetic classification. The earlier Stoic account grouped several similar items among preferred indifferents, illustrating the anthology's preservation of different schools' accounts.

622. Εὐαισθησία is keenness of sensation, as in II.7.13.19, and ἀρτιότης bodily integrity or completeness. The body's parts, their faculties, and their activities remain distinct. Here δυνάμεις concerns faculties, while the preceding divisions used the same word for resources or powers. All seven external goods are retained. Δόξα is reputation, εὐγένεια noble birth, and δυναστεία political power or influence.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Φύσις ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τελειότης

II.7.19.9

Τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ φύσει παρεῖναι, καθάπερ [γὰρ] ὀξύτητα καὶ μνήμην, τό τε ὅλον εὐφυΐαν· τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίνεσθαι, ὡς τάς τε προπαιδεύσεις καὶ διαίτας ἐλευθερίους· τὰ δ’ ἐκ τελειότητος ὑπάρχειν, οἷον φρόνησιν, δικαιοσύνην, τελευταῖον δὲ σοφίαν.

Κτῆσις καὶ ἀποβολή

II.7.19.10

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι καὶ κτήσασθαι καὶ ἀποβαλεῖν, ὡς πλοῦτον· τὰ δὲ κτήσασθαι μὲν ἀποβαλεῖν δ’ οὔ, ὡς εὐψυχίαν, ἀθαυμαστίαν· τὰ δὲ ἀποβαλεῖν μὲν κτήσασθαι δ’ οὔ, ὡς αἴσθησιν καὶ τὸ ζῆν· τὰ δ’ οὔτε κτήσασθαι οὔτ’ ἀποβαλεῖν, ὡς εὐγένειαν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Nature Cultivation and Full Development II.7.19.9

Of goods concerning the soul, some are always present by nature, such as sharpness, memory, and natural aptitude as a whole. Others arise from cultivation, such as preliminary studies and liberal ways of life.[623] Others result from full development, such as practical wisdom, justice, and, last, wisdom.[624]

Acquisition and Loss II.7.19.10

Again, some goods can both be acquired and lost, such as wealth. Some can be acquired but not lost, such as stoutheartedness and freedom from astonishment.[625] Some can be lost but not acquired, such as sensation and living; some can neither be acquired nor lost, such as noble birth.[626]

623. The printed αἰεί, always, is retained. Ὀξύτης is sharpness or quickness of mind in this context. The rejected γάρ means “for” and is omitted in English. Προπαιδεύσεις are preliminary studies or preparatory education. Διαῖται ἐλευθέριοι concerns liberal ways of life, with liberal conveying the ancient association with a free person’s cultivation.

624. Τελειότης is completeness or full development; the English keeps this distinct from natural endowment and the process of cultivation. The order of the final list is preserved, including τελευταῖον, last, before wisdom. The source classifies these goods by how they are present or arise; it does not assign a numerical age or timetable for their acquisition.

625. Εὐψυχία is stoutheartedness, the rendering also used in the earlier Stoic list, though the present classification is Peripatetic. Wachsmuth follows a correction of transmitted εὐτυχία, good fortune. Ἀθαυμαστία is freedom from astonishment or wonder; his printed correction replaces transmitted ἀθανασία, immortality. Both examples are translated from the printed text, and the assertion that they cannot be lost remains the source’s claim.

626. All four combinations of acquisition and loss are retained. Sensation and living illustrate goods already given with life that can be lost; the source does not explain the sense of acquisition further here. Noble birth concerns ancestry in this classification. These distinctions concern the specified goods rather than a universal assertion that every virtue is incapable of loss; compare the qualified discussion of virtue’s vulnerability at II.7.18.9.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 136-137

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Δι᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀγαθά

II.7.19.11

Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι δι᾽ αὐθ᾽ αἱρετὰ μόνον, ὡς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀοχλησίαν· τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ μόνον, ὡς πλοῦτον· τὰ δὲ <καὶ> ποιητικὰ καὶ δι᾽ αὐθ᾽ αἱρετά, ὡς ἀρετήν, φίλους, ὑγίειαν.

Ὁμωνυμία καὶ κατηγορίαι

II.7.19.12

Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ πολλαχῶς διαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθά, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἓν εἶναι γένος αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς δέκα λέγεσθαι κατηγορίας· ἐν ὁμωνυμίᾳ γὰρ ἐκφέρεσθαι τἀγαθόν, τά τε τοιαῦτα πάντα ὄνομα κοινὸν ἔχειν μόνον, τὸν δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγον ἕτερον.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Intrinsic and Productive Goods

II.7.19.11

Again, some goods are choiceworthy only for their own sake, such as pleasure and freedom from disturbance; some are only productive, such as wealth; and some are <both> productive and choiceworthy for their own sake, such as virtue, friends, and health.[627]

Homonymy and the Categories

II.7.19.12

Goods are also divided in many other ways, because they do not constitute one genus but are spoken of according to the ten categories. For “good” is expressed homonymously: all such things have only a name in common, while the account corresponding to that name differs.[628]

627. The supplied καί before ποιητικά is represented by bracketed “both.” Ἀοχλησία is freedom from disturbance or trouble, following Wachsmuth’s printed correction of ὀχλησία, disturbance. The three classes differ by their relation to choice for their own sake and to production of further goods. Wealth is productive only in this division; its earlier inclusion among goods choiceworthy for themselves remains visible at II.7.19.4.

628. Ὁμωνυμία is homonymy: sharing a name while the corresponding account, λόγος, differs. The passage explicitly invokes ten categories without listing them. It also denies that all goods constitute one genus, whereas the initial threefold classification used the expression genus of goods. These formulations are preserved without importing a solution to their relation. This completes source section II.7.19. Section 20 begins on printed p. 137, line 13 for its bracketed heading, and line 14 for the main discussion of ethical virtue.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 137

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς II.7.20.1

[Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅτι μεσότητες.]

Τούτων δὲ δὴ διωρισμένων, ἐπελθεῖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς λεγόμενα. Ταύτην γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειδὴ διμερῆ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν ὑπέθεντο τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λόγον ἔχουσαν, τὸ δ’ ἄλογον.

Ἀρεταὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου II.7.20.2

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ λογικὸν τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ εὐμάθειαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας· περὶ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἠθικὰς καλουμένας ἀρετάς.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ethical Virtue and the Parts of the Soul

II.7.20.1

With these distinctions now made, we must examine more precisely what is said about ethical virtue.[629] For they suppose that it arises in the nonrational part of the soul, since, for the present inquiry, they have assumed that the soul has two parts, one possessing reason and the other nonrational.[630]

Virtues of the Rational and Nonrational Parts

II.7.20.2

In the rational part arise nobility and goodness, practical wisdom, quickness of wit, wisdom, ease of learning, memory, and similar qualities.[631] In the nonrational part arise self-control, justice, courage, and the other virtues called ethical.[632]

629. The bracketed summary heading reads “On ethical virtue: that the virtues are means.” The Greek moves from singular ethical virtue to plural μεσότητες, means; its wording is retained rather than silently corrected. As with the preceding summary headings, it is translated here. The numbered subdivisions and their short descriptive labels are added for bilingual layout; source section 20 is continuous.

630. Πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν expressly limits the twofold division to the present inquiry. Ἄλογον means nonrational here, without itself implying viciousness. The grammatical construction shifts between the soul and its parts; the English expresses the division naturally while preserving its qualification.

631. Καλοκἀγαθία, nobility and goodness, remains in this list. Wachsmuth observes that its placement among intellectual qualities is inexact, but declines to alter the text. All six named qualities are retained. Φρόνησις and σοφία remain practical wisdom and wisdom respectively; εὐμάθεια concerns facility in learning.

632. Σωφροσύνη is rendered self-control, consistently with the preceding Peripatetic account. It concerns well-ordered desires, as the examples below explain. It should be distinguished from ἐγκράτεια, the ability to restrain desires despite their opposition, discussed in II.7.15. The classification concerns the part of the soul in which ethical virtue operates.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἔνδεια ὑπερβολὴ καὶ συμμετρία II.7.20.3

Ταύτας δή φασιν ὑπ’ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρῶνται, βουλόμενοι <ὑπὲρ> τῶν ἀφανῶν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν παρέχεσθαι πίστιν. Αὐτίκα γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων πλειόνων τε γινομένων καὶ ἐλαττόνων φθείρεσθαι τὴν ἰσχύν· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποτῶν καὶ σιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλειόνων γὰρ προσφερομένων ἢ ἐλαττόνων φθείρεσθαι τὴν ὑγίειαν, συμμέτρων δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ὄντων σῴζεσθαι τήν τε ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· παραπλησίως οὖν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.

Ἀνδρεία καὶ φόβος II.7.20.4

Τὸν μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὄντα τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε μηδὲ τὸν κεραυνὸν φοβεῖσθαι, μαινόμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι· τὸν δ’ ἔμπαλιν πάντα φοβούμενον, ὥστε καὶ τὴν σκιάν, ἀγεννῆ καὶ δειλόν· ἀνδρεῖον δ’ ὁμολογουμένως τὸν μήτε πάντα μήτε μηδὲν φοβούμενον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 137-138

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Deficiency Excess and Due Measure II.7.20.3

These virtues, they say, are destroyed by deficiency and excess. To demonstrate this they use the evidence of the senses, wishing to provide assurance drawn from visible things <concerning> things that are not visible.[633] For example, strength is destroyed both by too much exercise and by too little. The same holds for drink and food: too much or too little destroys health, whereas due measure in these things preserves both strength and health. So it is similarly with self-control, courage, and the other virtues.[634]

Courage and Fear II.7.20.4

For someone whose nature is such that he does not fear even a thunderbolt is mad rather than courageous. Conversely, someone who fears everything, even a shadow, is ignoble and cowardly. The person who fears neither everything nor nothing is, by common agreement, courageous.[635]

633. The supplied ὑπέρ remains bracketed as concerning. Φανερά and ἀφανῆ contrast what is manifest with what is not manifest: the sensible examples are offered as evidence for the ethical claim. The argument proceeds by analogy rather than identifying virtue with a bodily condition.

634. The exercise clause expressly includes both excess and deficiency, and the diet clause repeats the alternatives. Σύμμετρα means things in due measure or proportion. The comparison is with the preservation of strength and health, before the account turns to the development and destruction of virtue itself.

635. The two extremes concern what a person fears. The Greek says a shadow, without adding his own. Neither everything nor nothing preserves the double contrast: courage is not the complete absence of fear. The thunderbolt example and the appeal to common agreement remain distinct parts of the argument.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Αὔξησις καὶ φθορὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς II.7.20.5

Ταῦτ’ ἄρα καὶ αὔξειν καὶ φθείρειν τὴν ἀρετήν, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν μετρίους φόβους αὔξειν τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τοὺς δὲ μείζονας ἢ ἐλάττονας φθείρειν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν οὔσας κατὰ ταύτας ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις φθείρειν αὐτάς, τὰς δὲ μετριότητας αὔξειν.

Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη II.7.20.6

Οὐ μόνον δὲ τούτοις ἀφορίζεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. Διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν ἡμᾶς, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν καλῶν· οὐκ εἶναι δὲ λαβεῖν οὔτ’ ἀρετὴν οὔτε κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς. Τὴν οὖν ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ὑπάρχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Growth and Destruction of Virtue

II.7.20.5

These things, then, both increase and destroy virtue: measured fears increase courage, while greater or lesser fears destroy it. Similarly with the other virtues: the excesses and deficiencies associated with them destroy them, while due measures increase them.[636]

Pleasure and Pain

II.7.20.6

Virtue is marked out not only by these things but also by pleasure and pain. For pleasure leads us to do base things, and pain to refrain from noble things. Neither virtue nor vice can be acquired without pain and pleasure. Virtue, therefore, concerns pleasures and pains.[637]

636. The same field of experience can develop or undermine a virtue according to its measure. The source retains both greater and lesser fears. Μετριότητες, due measures, corresponds to the preceding measured fears and anticipates the fuller account of means; it does not recommend an identical amount of every feeling for everyone.

637. Λαβεῖν is rendered acquired; it can also mean grasped or apprehended. The compressed sentence associates both virtue and vice with pleasure and pain. The concluding claim concerns virtue's field, not an assertion that every pleasure is base or every pain noble. Wachsmuth compares Magna Moralia I.6, 1185b33–38, and Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1104b8–11.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πάθη δυνάμεις καὶ ἕξεις

II.7.20.7

Πρὸς δὲ τὸ σαφῶς δηλῶσαι τὰ περὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦντο τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν γινόμενα προσλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. ταῦτα δή φασιν ὑπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἕξεις. Πάθη δ’ εἶναι ὀργήν, φόβον, μῖσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, ἔλεον, τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις, οἷς καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· δυνάμεις <δέ>, καθ’ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων εἶναι λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ’ ἃς ὀργιζόμεθα, φοβούμεθα, ζηλοῦμεν, τῶν τοιούτων ὁτιοῦν πεπόνθαμεν· ἕξεις δέ, καθ’ ἃς πρὸς ταῦτά πως ἔχομεν καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ τούτων ἐνέργεια εὖ ἢ κακῶς ἀποτελεῖται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 139

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Passions Capacities and States

II.7.20.7

To explain these matters clearly, they thought it necessary to include in the account what occurs in the soul. They say that these things are present in human souls: passions, capacities, and states. Passions are anger, fear, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and similar things, which pleasure and pain accompany.[638] <And> capacities are those by which we are said to be susceptible to these things—for example, those by which we become angry, afraid, or emulous, or experience any such passion. States are those by which we stand in a certain way toward these things, and from which their activity comes about well or badly.[639]

638. Πάθη names feelings or passions without here defining them as irrational excesses, as the earlier Stoic account did. All six examples are retained. Ζῆλος is emulation or rivalry in this list; its mention does not by itself classify it as virtuous or vicious. Pleasure and pain accompany the passions.

639. The supplied δέ is bracketed as And. Δυνάμεις here are capacities for experiencing passions, distinct from the resources called powers in II.7.19. Ἕξεις are relatively settled states or dispositions. The threefold division distinguishes a feeling, the capacity to feel it, and the state governing how it is expressed.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὀργιλότης ῥᾳθυμία καὶ πρᾳότης

II.7.20.8

Δι’ ὃ εἰ μὲν οὕτως τις ὀργίζοιτο ῥᾳδίως, ὥστε ἐπὶ παντὶ καὶ πάντως, τὴν ἕξιν ἂν ἔχων φανείη τὴν τῆς ὀργιλότητος· εἰ δὲ οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲν μηδὲ ἐφ’ ὁτιοῦν, τὴν τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας· ἀμφοτέρας δ’ εἶναι ψεκτάς, ἐπαινουμένην δὲ ἕξιν ὑπάρχειν τὴν πρᾳότητα, καθ’ ἣν ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ᾧ δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα. Διόπερ ἕξεις εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, ἀφ’ ὧν τὰς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐνεργείας ἐπαινεῖσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

Τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς

II.7.20.9

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ τῶν πρακτῶν, πᾶσαν δὲ πρᾶξιν ἐν συνεχείᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι συμβέβηκε, παντὸς δὲ συνεχοῦς ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσιν εἶναί τινα ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν καὶ μεσότητα καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὑπάρχειν ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Irascibility Slackness and Gentleness II.7.20.8

Hence, if someone became angry so readily as to do so at everything and in every way, he would appear to possess the state of irascibility. If, on the other hand, he became angry not at all and at nothing whatsoever, he would possess the state of slackness. Both are blameworthy; the praiseworthy state is gentleness, by which we become angry when, how, and with whom we should.[640] Virtues, therefore, are states on the basis of which activities involving the passions come to be praised.[641]

The Mean Relative to Us II.7.20.9

Since virtue belongs to the sphere of action, and every action admits of consideration along a continuum, every continuum, as with magnitudes, has some excess, deficiency, and mean. These exist either in relation to one another or in relation to us.[642] In all these matters, then, the mean relative to us is best, for this accords with what knowledge and reason prescribe.[643]

640. Ῥᾳθυμία is slackness or lack of due responsiveness in this contrast, rather than the calmness elsewhere praised. Πρᾳότης, gentleness, allows appropriate anger. The source specifies three conditions: when, how, and with whom. They are preserved without importing a longer list from a parallel text.

641. The final sentence makes states the basis of praiseworthy activity involving passions. Wachsmuth records a suggested rewriting to say that the activities are completed in a praiseworthy way, but does not adopt it. The English follows the printed claim that they are praised.

642. Συνέχεια concerns continuity, here allowing degrees and intermediate positions, rather than merely the duration of an action. The comparison is with magnitudes. The wording πρὸς ἄλληλα, in relation to one another, is retained; it is not replaced with a different formulation from Aristotle.

643. The mean relative to us is constrained by ἐπιστήμη and λόγος, knowledge and reason. It is not simply whatever an individual happens to prefer. The next parenthesis distinguishes qualitative correctness from a numerical midpoint.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ποιὸν ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ἴσον

II.7.20.10

(τὸ γὰρ μέσον οὐ τὸν τοῦ ποσοῦ τόπον ὁρίζειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν <τοῦ> ποιοῦ, δι' ὃ καὶ τέλειον εἶναι τῷ οὕτω καὶ ἄκρως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐναντία πως καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀντικεῖσθαι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· ἐναντία δ' εἶναι τήν τ' ἔλλειψιν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν, τὸ δὲ μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ὅπερ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς τὸ ἄνισον πέπονθε, τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος πλέον ὄν, τοῦ δὲ πλείονος ἔλαττον.)

Θεόφραστος περὶ τοῦ καιροῦ

II.7.20.11

Τὸ οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέσον ἄριστον, οἷον, φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος, ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις ὁδὶ μὲν πολλὰ διελθὼν καὶ μακρῶς ἀδολεσχήσας, ὁδὶ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα, οὗτος δὲ αὐτὰ ἃ ἔδει μόνα τὸν καιρὸν ἔλαβεν. Αὕτη <ἡ> μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς <ἀρίστη>, αὕτη γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὥρισται τῷ λόγῳ.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Quality Quantity and Equality

II.7.20.10

(For the mean determines a position of quality, not of quantity; hence it is also complete, by being of this character and being so to the highest degree.[644] The contraries are in a way opposed both to one another and to the mean. Deficiency and excess are contraries; the mean stands toward each as the equal stands toward the unequal, being greater than the lesser and less than the greater.)[645]

Theophrastus on the Right Occasion

II.7.20.11

The mean relative to us, then, is best. For example, Theophrastus says, in conversations one person has gone through many things and chattered at length; another has dealt with few things and not even the necessary ones; but this person has dealt only with precisely what was needed and seized the right moment.[646] This mean relative to us is <best>, for it is determined in our case by reason.[647]

644. Ποσόν and ποιόν are quantity and quality. The supplied article τοῦ before ποιοῦ is retained in Greek and conveyed by the English construction, without a separate bracketed English word. Τέλειον is complete or perfect. The compressed explanation allows the mean to represent excellence at its highest degree; it does not call excellence mediocre.

645. Πως, in a way, qualifies the opposition. The equality comparison expressly preserves both relations: the mean exceeds the lesser and falls short of the greater. This mathematical analogy illustrates its position between extremes; the preceding sentence has already distinguished the ethical standard from quantity alone.

646. The source reads ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις, in conversations or encounters. It does not print εὐτυχίαις, good fortunes. Wachsmuth records Heeren's proposed alteration to a reference to a work On Good Fortune but retains the transmitted phrase. The English follows that decision. The third speaker's construction is compressed: dealt with is understood from the preceding comparison, while ἔλαβεν governs τὸν καιρόν, seized the right moment.

647. The supplied ἡ is conveyed by the English construction; supplied ἀρίστη remains bracketed as best. Καιρός concerns the right moment or occasion, not a fixed amount of speech. The example illustrates a mean determined by what is required in the circumstances.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὁρισμὸς τῆς ἀρετῆς

II.7.20.12

Διὸ ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν· εἶτα παραθέμενος τινὰς συζυγίας, ἀκολούθως τῷ ὑφηγητῇ σκοπῶν ἔπειτα καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπάγειν ἐπειράθη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

Ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἐναντίαι ἕξεις

II.7.20.13

ἐλήφθησαν δὲ παραδειγμάτων χάριν αἵδε· σωφροσύνη, ἀκολασία, ἀναισθησία· πρᾳότης, ὀργιλότης, ἀναλγησία· ἀνδρεία, θρασύτης, δειλία· δικαιοσύνη * * * * * ἐλευθεριότης, ἀσωτία, ἀνελευθερία· μεγαλοψυχία, μικροψυχία, χαυνότης· μεγαλοπρέπεια, μικροπρέπεια, σαλακωνία.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Definition of Virtue

II.7.20.12

Hence virtue is a state involving choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason and as the practically wise person would determine it.[648] Then, having set out certain groupings, he followed his teacher in examining the particulars and attempted to present them in the following way.[649]

Virtues and Opposing States

II.7.20.13

The following were selected as examples: self-control, licentiousness, insensibility; gentleness, irascibility, callousness; courage, rashness, cowardice; justice [text missing];[650] generosity, prodigality, illiberality; greatness of soul, smallness of soul, vanity;[651] magnificence, pettiness, ostentation.[652]

648. Ἕξις προαιρετική is a state involving choice; προαίρεσις concerns deliberate choice in this account. The definition links the mean both to reason and to the practically wise person's judgment. Wachsmuth inserts a Latin locator to Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106b36–1107a2, in the printed main text. That modern locator is given here rather than treated as ancient Greek prose.

649. The report continues from the named Theophrastus, and ὑφηγητής means his teacher or guide. Wachsmuth's second inserted locator identifies the parallel as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7, 1107a28 onward; it too is relocated to this note. Συζυγίαι are groupings or linked sets, illustrated by the virtue and its opposing extremes below. This local reference does not establish Theophrastus as the author of the whole epitome.

650. The five asterisks after justice mark a gap in Wachsmuth's text; they do not specify five missing words. No opposing states are invented to complete the group. The first three complete groups place the virtue first. Ἀναισθησία is insensibility in desire, while ἀναλγησία is callousness or lack of feeling in the anger group.

651. Ἐλευθεριότης is generosity or liberality, ἀσωτία prodigality, and ἀνελευθερία illiberality or lack of generosity. The order of the greatness-of-soul group is preserved: μεγαλοψυχία, μικροψυχία, χαυνότης. Χαυνότης suggests puffed-up vanity. The text is not reordered to put excess before deficiency in every group.

652. Μεγαλοπρέπεια is magnificence, μικροπρέπεια pettiness, and σαλακωνία ostentation or swagger. The last group's printed order is also retained. Wachsmuth compares Aristotle's different word for extravagant expenditure but prints σαλακωνία here. All seven named virtues remain in the list, including justice with its following gap.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁ κανὼν τοῦ λόγου

II.7.20.14

Τούτων δή τῶν ἕξεων αἱ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν ἢ ἐλλείπειν περὶ πάθη φαῦλαί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ σπουδαῖαι, τῷ μεσότητες εἶναι δηλονότι. Σώφρονά τε γὰρ εἶναι οὔτε τὸν καθάπαξ ἀνεπιθύμητον οὔτε τὸν ἐπιθυμητικόν· (τὸν μὲν γὰρ λίθου δίκην μηδὲ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρέγεσθαι, τὸν δὲ τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκόλαστον εἶναι)· τὸν δὲ μέσον τούτων, ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον ὁρίζοντα καθάπερ κανόνι σώφρονα λέγεσθαί τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι.

Ἡ μέση ἕξις τῆς πρᾳότητος

II.7.20.15

πρᾶόν τε <οὔτε τὸν ἀνάλγητον καὶ μηδενὶ μηδέποτε ὀργιζόμενον> οὔτε τὸν ἐπὶ παντὶ ὀργιζόμενον, κἂν μικρότατον ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὴν μέσην ἔχοντα ἕξιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Self-Control and Reason as a Rule

II.7.20.14

Of these states, some are base because they exceed or fall short in relation to passions, while others are excellent, evidently because they are means. For neither the person entirely without desire nor the person full of desire is self-controlled. (The former, like a stone, desires not even what accords with nature; the latter is licentious through excess in his desires.)[653] But the person between them, who desires what he should, when he should, and as much as he should, and determines the appropriate limit by reason as by a measuring rule, is both called self-controlled and is so in accordance with nature.[654]

Gentleness as an Intermediate State

II.7.20.15

Gentle is <neither the callous person who never becomes angry with anyone> nor the person who becomes angry at everything, however trivial, but the person who possesses the intermediate state.[655]

653. The comparison is λίθου δίκην, like a stone. The absence of all desire is a deficiency, including the absence of desire for things according to nature. The parenthesis contrasts this with licentiousness through excessive desire. The English keeps the general opening description full of desire and lets the parenthesis specify its excess.

654. The source specifies the object, occasion, and amount of desire. Κανών is a rule or measuring rod: reason sets the fitting limit. The concluding κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, to be so in accordance with nature, is retained alongside the naming of the person as self-controlled; it is not silently replaced with an assertion about habit or education.

655. The entire first extreme is supplied in Wachsmuth's text and remains bracketed in both languages. It means neither the person without feeling and never angry with anyone. The supplied description restores the contrast with anger at everything; it is distinguished from the surviving wording, including the smallest or most trivial provocation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀνδρεία καὶ ἀναλογία τῆς δικαιοσύνης II.7.20.16

ἀνδρεῖόν τε οὔτε τὸν μηδὲν φοβούμενον, κἂν ᾖ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιών, οὔτε τὸν πάντα καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον τὴν σκιὰν . . ., δίκαιόν τε οὔτε τὸν τὸ πλέον ἑαυτῷ νέμοντα οὔτε τὸν τὸ ἔλαττον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ δ’ ἴσον τὸ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὐ κατ’ ἀριθμόν·

Ἐλευθεριότης καὶ τὰ ἄκρα II.7.20.17

<ἐλευθέριόν> τε οὔτε τὸν προετικὸν ὅπως ἔτυχεν οὔτε τὸν ἀπρόετον . .,

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Courage and Proportionate Justice

II.7.20.16

Courageous is neither the person who fears nothing, even if a god is advancing against him, nor the person who fears everything and, as the saying goes, a shadow [text missing].[656] Just is neither the person who allots himself more nor the person who allots himself less, but the person who allots himself an equal share. Equal here means proportionately equal, not numerically equal.[657]

Generosity and Its Extremes

II.7.20.17

<Generous> is neither the person who gives things away haphazardly nor the person who gives nothing away [text missing].[658]

656. The source now gives a god advancing against someone, rather than the earlier thunderbolt. Both comparisons are retained. Wachsmuth marks a gap after the shadow; the English signals it without supplying the missing description of the courageous mean.

657. Justice concerns allocation in this example. The explanation expressly distinguishes equality κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, according to proportion, from equality κατ' ἀριθμόν, by number. Thus equal share here cannot simply mean the same numerical quantity for every recipient. The criterion of proportion is not further specified in this sentence.

658. The supplied ἐλευθέριον remains bracketed as Generous. Προετικός concerns readiness to give away, qualified by ὅπως ἔτυχεν, haphazardly. Wachsmuth prints the corrected ἀπρόετον, someone unwilling to give away, rather than transmitted ἀπροαίρετον, without deliberate choice. The following gap is retained; no description of the mean is supplied.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Μεγαλοψυχία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια

II.7.20.18

μεγαλόψυχόν τε οὔτε τὸν μεγάλων πάντων ἀξιοῦντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὸν μηδενὸς ὅλως, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὸ δέον ἐφ' ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα καὶ εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. μεγαλοπρεπῆ τε οὔτε τὸν πάντοτε καὶ ἔνθα μὴ δεῖ λαμπρὸν οὔτε τὸν μηδαμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸν κατὰ καιρὸν ἁρμόττοντα εἰς ἕκαστον.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Greatness of Soul and Magnificence

II.7.20.18

Great of soul is neither the person who thinks himself worthy of every great thing nor the person who thinks himself worthy of nothing at all, but the person who takes what is due in each case, according to worth.[659] Magnificent is neither the person who displays splendor always, even where he should not, nor the person who never does so anywhere, but the person who fits each occasion as the right moment requires.[660]

659. Μεγαλόψυχος is great of soul or magnanimous. The two extremes concern a person's estimate of his worth. The final construction, καὶ εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, is compressed; according to worth expresses its direction without adding a new object, such as offices or honors, that the Greek does not name.

660. Λαμπρός is splendid or brilliant in display. The source contrasts indiscriminate splendor with its complete absence, and again makes καιρός, the right occasion, decisive. Magnificence remains distinct from generosity and greatness of soul; the text does not merge their examples.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ φρόνησις

II.7.20.19

Τοιοῦτο μὲν τὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν εἶδος παθητικὸν καὶ κατὰ μεσότητα θεωρούμενον, ὃ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἀντακολουθίαν ἔχει <τῇ φρονήσει>, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ταῖς ἠθικαῖς κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον, αὗται δ᾽ ἐκείνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ φρόνιμος, ὁ γὰρ τοιόσδε αὐτὸν λόγος εἰδοποιεῖ· οὐ μὴν ὁ φρόνιμος καὶ δίκαιος κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν κοινῶς πρακτικός, φαύλου δ᾽ οὐδενός.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ethical Virtues and Practical Wisdom

II.7.20.19

Such is the form of the ethical virtues: concerned with passions and considered in terms of a mean. It also has a relation of reciprocal accompaniment <with practical wisdom>, though not in the same way: practical wisdom accompanies the ethical virtues in its own distinctive character, while they accompany it incidentally.[661] For the just person is also practically wise, since reason of this kind gives him his form. Yet the practically wise person is not also just by virtue of practical wisdom's own distinctive character, but because he is, in general, disposed to do what is noble and good and nothing base.[662]

661. The supplied τῇ φρονήσει remains bracketed in both languages. Παθητικόν means concerned with passions here; it does not make virtue itself a passion. Ἀντακολουθία is reciprocal accompaniment or implication. The following contrast distinguishes κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον, in respect of a thing's distinctive character, from κατὰ συμβεβηκός, incidentally. The asymmetry in how the qualities accompany one another is preserved.

662. Εἰδοποιεῖ means gives form or determines the kind of thing someone is; reason of this kind makes the just person what he is. The second sentence does not simply deny that the practically wise person is just. It distinguishes the basis on which justice belongs to him: his general disposition to do noble and good things rather than the distinctive account of practical wisdom alone. The final exclusion of every base thing remains explicit.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀστεῖα φαῦλα καὶ μέσα πάθη II.7.21.1

[Περὶ παθῶν ψυχῆς].

Τῶν δὲ παθῶν καὶ ὁρμῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀστεῖα, τὰ δὲ φαῦλα, τὰ δὲ μέσα. Ἀστεῖα μὲν φιλίαν, χάριν, νέμεσιν, αἰδῶ, θάρσος, ἔλεον· φαῦλα δὲ φθόνον, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὕβριν· μέσα δὲ λύπην, φόβον, ὀργήν, ἡδονήν, ἐπιθυμίαν.

Αἵρεσις ὅρος καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη II.7.21.2

Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν αἱρετέον καθάπαξ, τὰ δὲ ὁριστέον. Πᾶν δὲ πάθος περὶ ἡδονὴν συνίστασθαι καὶ λύπην, δι’ ὃ καὶ περὶ ταύτας τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Admirable Base and Intermediate Passions

II.7.21.1

Of passions and impulses, some are admirable, some base, and some intermediate.[663] Admirable are friendship, gratitude, indignation, modesty, confidence, and pity.[664] Base are envy, malicious joy, and insolence; intermediate are pain, fear, anger, pleasure, and desire.[665]

Choice Limits Pleasure and Pain

II.7.21.2

Of these, some are to be chosen without qualification, while others are to be limited.[666] Every passion takes shape in relation to pleasure and pain; hence the ethical virtues also concern these.[667]

663. The bracketed summary heading reads “On the passions of the soul.” It is retained in Greek and translated here. Πάθη and ὁρμαί are passions and impulses. Μέσα, intermediate things, names a class here; it is distinct from the virtuous means, μεσότητες, discussed in section 20. The final numbered subdivisions and their descriptive labels serve layout only.

664. All six admirable examples are retained. Χάρις is gratitude here; section 23 distinguishes its several senses. Νέμεσις is indignation rather than envy: compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7, 1108b1–5, where indignation concerns undeserved good fortune. Αἰδώς is modesty or a sense of shame, and θάρσος confidence, distinct from ἀνδρεία, courage. The printed θάρσος is retained; the apparatus records Meineke’s preference for θάρρος, another form of the word for confidence.

665. All three base and five intermediate examples remain. Ἐπιχαιρεκακία is malicious joy at another’s misfortune, the term used in the earlier Stoic account; ὕβρις is insolence or outrage, rather than merely high self-esteem. The classifications differ from the Stoic treatment: pity is now admirable, while pain, fear, anger, pleasure, and desire are intermediate. The next sentence concerns their choice or limitation. Wachsmuth also notes that this threefold classification differs from Aristotle’s.

666. Καθάπαξ is without qualification, and ὁριστέον means that limits must be set. The sentence does not repeat the three classes or explicitly assign each of them to one of its two clauses. Its wording is preserved without inventing a third instruction. In context, the intermediate feelings require determination rather than being automatically good or bad.

667. Pleasure and pain are the objects of περὶ ταύτας, concerning these. The account thus returns to the field of ethical virtue already described in II.7.20.6. Συνίστασθαι is takes shape or is constituted; the sentence relates every passion to pleasure and pain without reducing every named feeling to an identical experience.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 142

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἕξεις κακίας καὶ εἴδη ἔρωτος II.7.21.3

Φιλαργυρίαν δὲ καὶ φιληδονίαν καὶ ἐρωτομανίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἕξεις εἶναι ἀλλοίας περὶ τὰς κακίας. Ἔρωτα δ’ εἶναι τὸν μὲν φιλίας, τὸν δὲ συνουσίας, τὸν δὲ ἀμφοῖν· δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον, τὸν δὲ μέσον.

Διαφοραὶ φιλίας II.7.22.1

[Περὶ φιλίας].

Τῆς φιλίας δ’ εἶναι διαφορὰς τέσσαρας, ἑταιρικήν, συγγενικήν, ξενικήν, ἐρωτικήν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐεργετικὴν καὶ θαυμαστικὴν συγκαταριθμητέον, λόγου δεῖν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Vicious States and Kinds of Love

II.7.21.3

Avarice, love of pleasure, erotic frenzy, and similar things are states of a different kind, concerned with vices.[668] One kind of love seeks friendship, another sexual intercourse, and a third both; hence one is excellent, another base, and the third intermediate.[669]

Varieties of Friendship

II.7.22.1

Friendship has four varieties: friendship between companions, between relatives, between guest-friends, and between lovers.[670] Whether friendship based on benefaction and friendship based on admiration should also be counted requires discussion.[671]

668. The source calls these ἕξεις, states, distinguishing them from the preceding passions. All three examples remain: φιλαργυρία, avarice or love of money; φιληδονία, love of pleasure; and ἐρωτομανία, erotic frenzy. The compressed ἀλλοίας περὶ τὰς κακίας is rendered of a different kind, concerned with vices, without replacing it with a new definition of passion.

669. The genitives φιλίας and συνουσίας indicate what love seeks; συνουσία is sexual intercourse in this contrast. The third kind seeks both. The three ensuing judgments follow the same order, including the intermediate classification of the mixed kind. This is a classification of kinds of ἔρως, not an independently stated rule about every instance of sexual conduct.

670. The bracketed summary heading reads “On friendship.” All four varieties are retained. Ἑταιρική concerns companions, συγγενική relatives, ξενική the relationship of guest-friends, and ἐρωτική lovers. Guest-friendship is the bond associated with hospitality; it is not simply any friendship with a foreign person.

671. The additional two varieties are raised conditionally, not asserted as an unquestioned expansion from four to six. Εὐεργετική concerns benefaction and θαυμαστική admiration. The next sentence nevertheless gives a beginning for each, allowing discussion of their grounds without removing the preceding qualification.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 142-143

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρχαὶ καὶ τέλη φιλίας

II.7.22.2

Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς μὲν ἑταιρικῆς εἶναι τὴν συνήθειαν, τῆς δὲ συγγενικῆς τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ ξενικῆς τὴν χρείαν, τῆς δὲ ἐρωτικῆς τὸ πάθος, τῆς δ’ εὐεργετικῆς τὴν χάριν, τῆς δὲ θαυμαστικῆς τὴν δύναμιν. Πασῶν δὲ συλλήβδην εἶναι τέλη τρία, τὸ καλόν, τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ ἡδύ. Πάντα γὰρ τὸν ὁπωσοῦν πρὸς φιλίαν ἰόντα δι’ ἕν τι τούτων ἢ διὰ πάντα τὴν φιλίαν αἱρεῖσθαι.

Φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

II.7.22.3

Πρώτην μὲν οὖν, ὡς προέφην, εἶναι τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλίαν, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γενναμένους· ἐξῆς δὲ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ ὀθνείους· διὸ καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖν τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τὴν ἔλλειψιν· Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλαυτίας, τὸ δὲ φειδωλίας ἔχει διαβολήν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Beginnings and Ends of Friendship

II.7.22.2

The beginning of friendship between companions is familiarity; of friendship between relatives, nature; of guest-friendship, need; of erotic friendship, passion; of friendship based on benefaction, gratitude; and of friendship based on admiration, power.[672] Taken together, they have three ends: the noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant. For anyone who enters into friendship in any way chooses it for one of these or for them all.[673]

Friendship toward Oneself and Others

II.7.22.3

First, then, as I said before, comes friendship toward oneself; second, toward one's children; next, toward others close to us and toward strangers.[674] Hence, in friendship toward oneself we must guard against excess, and in friendships toward others against deficiency. For the former incurs the charge of selfishness, the latter of stinginess.[675]

672. All six beginnings remain in their printed order. Ἀρχή is a beginning or source, distinguished from the ends named next. Χρεία is need, συνήθεια familiarity, and χάρις gratitude in the relation involving benefaction. Δύναμις is power or capacity; the source does not restrict admiration to political authority.

673. Συλλήβδην considers the friendships collectively. The three ends are τὸ καλόν, the noble; τὸ συμφέρον, the advantageous; and τὸ ἡδύ, the pleasant. The final alternatives, one of these or all, qualify the collective formulation: the text does not say that every particular friendship must simultaneously pursue all three.

674. The first-person reference, as I said before, belongs to the epitomist's account and is retained. Wachsmuth inserts a modern locator, p. 118, line 11 onward, in the printed prose; it is relocated here rather than treated as ancient text. Compare the account of natural affinity with oneself at II.7.13.6. Τοὺς γενναμένους, those born, is understood as one's children. Οἰκεῖοι are those close or belonging to one's own circle, contrasted with ὀθνεῖοι, strangers.

675. The cautions differ in direction: excess toward oneself and deficiency toward others. Φιλαυτία is love of self, here pejoratively selfishness because it is a charge against excess; the preceding recognition of friendship toward oneself remains. Φειδωλία is stinginess or niggardliness, here in what one extends to others, without an express restriction to money.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χάρις εὐεργεσία ἀμοιβὴ καὶ μνήμη

II.7.23.1

[Περὶ χάριτος].

Χάριν δὲ λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τὴν μὲν ὑπουργίαν ὠφελίμου αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, τὴν δ’ ἄμειψιν ὑπουργίας ὠφελίμου, τὴν δὲ μνήμην ὑπουργίας τοιαύτης. Διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὰς δαίμονας τρεῖς ὁ βίος κατεφήμισε.

Χάρις ἐν ὄψει καὶ ἐν λόγοις

II.7.23.2

Λέγεσθαι δὲ χάριν καὶ τὴν ἐν ὄψει ἢ ἐν λόγοις, καθ’ ἣν τὸν μὲν εὔχαριν ὀνομάζεσθαι, τὸν δ’ ἐπίχαριν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Favor Requital and Remembrance

II.7.23.1

Charis is spoken of in three senses: the rendering of something useful for the recipient's own sake; requital for a beneficial service; and remembrance of such a service.[676] Ordinary custom has therefore also declared the goddesses three in number.[677]

Grace in Appearance and Speech

II.7.23.2

Charis also means grace in appearance or in speech, in virtue of which one person is called graceful, another charming.[678]

676. The bracketed summary heading reads "On charis," meaning favor, gratitude, or grace according to context. One English word cannot convey every sense. The first concerns giving a benefit for its recipient's own sake, the second returning a benefit, and the third remembering it. The first clause retains genitive ὠφελίμου in Greek; rendering something useful expresses that construction rather than changing it to the accusative adjective recorded in the apparatus.

677. The feminine τὰς δαίμονας refers to the Graces, the Charites, whose name shares the same stem as χάρις. The three goddesses illustrate the three senses just distinguished. Ὁ βίος is ordinary life, rendered ordinary custom in this religious explanation. It is not the personal name Bias, a proposed reading recorded by Wachsmuth but not printed here. No individual names for the goddesses are supplied.

678. This further sense concerns pleasing appearance or speech, rather than the giving, returning, and remembering of a benefit. The two adjectives are εὔχαρις, graceful or gracious, and ἐπίχαρις, charming or pleasing. Their pairing follows the Greek sequence; the sentence does not provide a further formal definition for each. The shared element char- connects them with χάρις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Βίος μετ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις II.7.24.1

Βίον δ’ αἱρήσεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον τὸν μετ’ ἀρετῆς, εἴτ’ ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας ποτὲ γένοιτο, τῶν καιρῶν αὐτὸν προαγαγόντων, εἴτε τινὶ βασιλεῖ δέοι συμβιοῦν εἴτε καὶ νομοθετεῖν ἢ ἄλλως πολιτεύεσθαι.

Δημοτικὴ θεωρητικὴ καὶ παιδευτικὴ διαγωγή II.7.24.2

Τούτων δὲ μὴ τυγχάνοντα πρὸς τὸ δημοτικὸν τραπήσεσθαι σχῆμα διαγωγῆς ἢ τὸ θεωρητικὸν ἢ μέσον <τὸ> παιδευτικόν. Προαιρήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν καὶ θεωρεῖν τὰ καλά.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

A Life with Virtue and Public Activity II.7.24.1

The virtuous person will choose a life with virtue,[679] whether he ever comes into a position of leadership because circumstances have brought him forward, whether he must live with a king, or whether he must legislate or take part in public life in some other way.[680]

Civic Contemplative and Educational Ways of Life II.7.24.2

If none of these opportunities falls to him, he will turn to an ordinary citizen's way of life, or the contemplative one, or the intermediate educational one.[681] For he will choose both to do and to contemplate noble things.[682]

679. Σπουδαῖος is the virtuous or excellent person. The governing choice is a life with virtue, not the unconditional pursuit of a particular office. Section 24 has no separate summary heading in the source. Its final numerical subdivisions and their descriptive labels are added for layout only.

680. The alternatives remain conditional. Ἡγεμονία is leadership or command, with circumstances bringing the person forward. Συμβιοῦν is to live with someone: the text does not expressly name an office as royal adviser. Legislating and other participation in public life complete the list.

681. Δημοτικὸν σχῆμα διαγωγῆς is understood here as an ordinary citizen's way of life, following the preceding roles in leadership, royal company, and legislation. It need not designate life under a democratic constitution. Wachsmuth's supplied article <τὸ> before παιδευτικόν is retained in Greek and absorbed into the English construction. The educational way is called intermediate without a further definition here.

682. Both doing and contemplating noble things are chosen. This first list is civic, contemplative, and intermediate educational; the later list in II.7.24.6 is practical, contemplative, and combined. Their different wording is retained rather than making them identical.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Θεωρία καὶ τὸ κοινωνικόν II.7.24.3

Κωλυόμενον δὲ περὶ ἄμφω γίνεσθαι διὰ καιρούς, θατέρῳ χρήσεσθαι, προτιμῶντα μὲν τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινωνικὸν ἐπὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὁρμῶντα πράξεις.

Γάμος ἔρως καὶ συμπεριφορά II.7.24.4

Δι’ ὃ καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σώφρονα ἔρωτα καὶ μεθυσθήσεσθαι κατὰ συμπεριφοράς, κἂν εἰ μὴ προηγουμένως.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Contemplation and Sociability II.7.24.3

If circumstances prevent him from engaging in both, he will follow one or the other, preferring the contemplative life but turning toward political actions because of his sociability.[683]

Marriage Love and Accommodation to Others II.7.24.4

Thus he will also marry, have children, take part in public life, fall in love temperately,[684] and become drunk as an accommodation to others, even if not as a primary aim.[685]

683. Θατέρῳ permits either one of the two activities. The preference for contemplation remains alongside the impulse toward political action, which is grounded in τὸ κοινωνικόν, sociability or one's social nature. The clause does not say that contemplation is the only virtuous activity. The later statement about public life as a primary choice is also retained; see II.7.24.7.

684. All five activities remain in the translation. The love is expressly qualified: τὸν σώφρονα ἔρωτα, literally the self-controlled or temperate love. The text does not give an unqualified endorsement of every kind of erotic attachment; compare its distinctions among kinds of love in II.7.21.3.

685. Μεθυσθήσεσθαι is to become drunk, not simply to drink wine. Κατὰ συμπεριφοράς is understood in the sense of accommodation or compliance with others; it explains the social occasion without specifying particular companions or amounts. The printed plural is retained; Wachsmuth queries a singular form in his apparatus. Κἂν εἰ μὴ προηγουμένως preserves the qualification even if not as a primary aim, rather than making drunkenness an end pursued for its own sake.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Παραμονὴ ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὰ νόμιμα

II.7.24.5

καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ μενεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ πάλιν, εἰ δέοι ποτὲ δι’ ἀνάγκας, ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ταφῆς προνοήσαντα κατὰ νόμον καὶ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ἐπιτελεῖν ὅσιον.

Τρεῖς ἰδέαι βίων

II.7.24.6

Βίων δὲ τριττὰς ἰδέας εἶναι, πρακτικόν, θεωρητικόν, σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολαυστικὸν ἥττονα ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, προκρίνεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν θεωρητικόν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Remaining in Life and the Customary Rites

II.7.24.5

And in general, practicing virtue, he will remain in life; yet, if it should ever be necessary because of constraints, he will depart from it,[686] having made provision for burial in accordance with law and ancestral custom and for the other things that it is pious to perform for the departed.[687]

Three Forms of Life

II.7.24.6

There are three forms of life: the practical, the contemplative, and the life composed of both.[688] For the life of enjoyment falls below what befits a human being, while of the other lives the contemplative is preferred.[689]

686. The conditional εἰ δέοι ποτὲ δι' ἀνάγκας is retained: if it should ever be necessary because of constraints. In this contrast, ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι means to depart from life. The printed μενεῖν is a future infinitive, giving he will remain, alongside the future of departing; Wachsmuth's apparatus records the transmitted present μένειν. No particular necessity or manner of departure is specified.

687. The provision concerns both burial and the other observances owed to the dead. Κατὰ νόμον καὶ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος specifies law and ancestral custom, while ὅσιον means pious or religiously proper. Τοῖς κατοιχομένοις means the departed or the dead. The sentence presents the arrangements as having been made before departure.

688. All three forms remain, including the composite life. Πρακτικός concerns activity or action, and θεωρητικός contemplation. The source's ἰδέαι are forms or kinds in this classification, without an express reference to separately existing Platonic Forms.

689. The life of enjoyment, ἀπολαυστικός, is placed below the human standard rather than counted among the three forms just named. The comparative preference for contemplation is retained. This judgment concerns a way of life organized around enjoyment; it does not itself state that every pleasure is vicious.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πολιτικὸς βίος προηγουμένως II.7.24.7

Πολιτεύεσθαί τε τὸν σπουδαῖον προηγουμένως, μὴ κατὰ περίστασιν· τὸν γὰρ πρακτικὸν βίον τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πολιτικῷ.

Κράτιστος καὶ δεύτερος βίος II.7.24.8

Βίον δὲ κράτιστον μὲν τὸν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸν κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα· τούτους μὲν οὖν αἱρετούς, φευκτὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ κακίαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 144-145

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Public Life as a Primary Choice II.7.24.7

The virtuous person will participate in public life as a primary choice, not merely as circumstances dictate; for the practical life is the same as the political life.[690]

The Best and the Second Life II.7.24.8

The best life is that in accordance with virtue amid things in accordance with nature; second is the life in accordance with the intermediate state, possessing most and the most important of the things in accordance with nature.[691] These lives, then, are choiceworthy; the life in accordance with vice is to be avoided.[692]

690. Προηγουμένως contrasts a primary choice with what is done κατὰ περίστασιν, in response to circumstances. Wachsmuth notes the Stoic terminology in this Peripatetic account. The assertion remains alongside the preference for contemplation in II.7.24.3 and 24.6; the text does not resolve that tension by retracting either statement. It also expressly identifies practical and political life.

691. The best life combines virtue with things in accordance with nature. The second combines an intermediate state, μέση ἕξις, with most and the most important of those natural things; both qualifications remain. This intermediate state is distinct from ethical virtue itself as a mean. The passage does not call the second life fully virtuous.

692. The plural τούτους makes both of the preceding lives choiceworthy, despite their different rank. The life according to vice is separately rejected. The following account distinguishes happiness from nobility, clarifying why the presence or absence of natural conditions matters.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐδαίμων καὶ καλὸς βίος

II.7.24.9

Διαφέρειν δὲ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον τοῦ καλοῦ, καθ’ ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι βούλεται διὰ παντός, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν· καὶ πρὸς ὃν μὲν οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετή, πρὸς ὃν δὲ αὐτάρκης.

Μέσος βίος καὶ καθήκοντα

II.7.24.10

Μέσον δέ τινα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ καθήκοντα ἀποδίδοσθαι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατορθώματα ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν εἶναι βίῳ, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῷ κατὰ κακίαν, τὰ δὲ καθήκοντα ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καλουμένῳ βίῳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Happy and the Noble Life

II.7.24.9

The happy life differs from the noble life in that the former requires conditions in accordance with nature throughout, while the latter can exist even amid conditions contrary to nature.[693] Virtue is not sufficient for the former, but is sufficient for the latter.[694]

The Intermediate Life and Appropriate Actions

II.7.24.10

There is an intermediate life, that in accordance with the intermediate state, in which appropriate actions are also performed.[695] For correct actions belong to the life in accordance with virtue, errors to the life in accordance with vice, and appropriate actions to the life called intermediate.[696]

693. Βούλεται, literally wishes or wants, is understood as requires in this characterization of the happy life. Διὰ παντός, throughout, remains a condition of that life. The noble life can exist even amid things contrary to nature; their presence does not by itself make virtuous conduct impossible.

694. The first relative clause refers to the happy life and the second to the noble life. Virtue alone is insufficient for happiness here but sufficient for nobility. This distinction belongs to the Peripatetic account and is not replaced with the earlier Stoic claim that virtue suffices for happiness.

695. The life is classified by an intermediate state, μέση ἕξις, between virtue and vice. It is distinct from the life combining practical and contemplative activity above. Καθήκοντα are appropriate actions, and ἀποδίδοσθαι presents them as performed or discharged.

696. All three correspondences remain: κατορθώματα, correct actions, with virtue; ἁμαρτήματα, errors, with vice; and καθήκοντα, appropriate actions, with the intermediate life. Wachsmuth notes the Stoic vocabulary and refers back to printed p. 119, lines 15–19, translated at II.7.13.9. Its occurrence here is preserved within the Peripatetic exposition. Section 24 ends with this sentence.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ καλόν II.7.25.1

Τεθεωρημένων δὲ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα διαλάβωμεν· εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν κοινῶς ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν τῶν μέσων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν, στοχαστικὴν τοῦ καλοῦ ᾗ καλόν, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ὑπεναντίαν εἶναι ταύτῃ·

Ἕξεις θεωρητικαὶ καὶ πρακτικαί II.7.25.2

κοινὴν δὲ δοξαστικῆς καὶ ἠθικῆς ἕξιν θεωρητικὴν καὶ προαιρετικὴν καὶ πρακτικὴν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καλῶν· τὴν δὲ διανοητικὴν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ * * κοινὴν ἀκρότητα λογικῆς κατασκευῆς εἶναι θεωρητικὴν καὶ πρακτικήν·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ethical Virtue and the Noble

II.7.25.1

Having considered these matters, let us also distinguish the following. Ethical virtue, in general, is a state involving the choice of intermediate pleasures and pains,[697] aiming at the noble as noble; vice is contrary to it.[698]

Contemplative and Practical States

II.7.25.2

Common to the opinion-forming and the ethical is a state that contemplates, chooses, and performs the noble things found in actions.[699] Intellectual virtue, and of the scientific [text missing], is a common excellence of rational constitution, contemplative and practical.[700]

697. The first-person invitation belongs to the exposition. Ἕξις προαιρετική is a state involving choice, as in II.7.20.12. The Greek specifies τῶν μέσων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν, intermediate pleasures and pains: the pleasures and pains are at the mean, rather than being classified here as morally indifferent. Section 25 has no separate summary heading. The final numbered subdivisions and their descriptive labels serve layout only.

698. Στοχαστική means aiming at a target. The qualification ᾗ καλόν, as noble, makes the noble itself the ground of the aim. The printed feminine ὑπεναντίαν refers to vice as contrary to ethical virtue; the Greek is not replaced with the wording of a parallel Aristotelian definition.

699. The construction is compressed: the feminine genitives δοξαστικῆς and ἠθικῆς, opinion-forming and ethical, have no expressed noun. The translation leaves that relation open rather than deciding silently between virtues and faculties. Wachsmuth queries the corresponding neuter forms, with a comparison to Nicomachean Ethics VI.13, 1144b14–15; those proposed forms are not substituted for the printed Greek. All three activities, contemplation, choice, and performance, remain.

700. This clause is damaged. Τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ means of the scientific or knowing part, but its grammatical connection is incomplete. The English deliberately retains a broken phrase at that point. The two asterisks mark a textual gap, not necessarily two missing words. Wachsmuth suggests adding and of the deliberative part, but does not print that reconstruction. Ἀκρότης is excellence or a highest development, and λογικὴ κατασκευή a rational constitution; both contemplative and practical remain in the surviving conclusion.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σοφία καὶ φρόνησις

II.7.25.3

σοφίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων· φρόνησιν δὲ ἕξιν βουλευτικὴν καὶ πρακτικὴν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ᾗ <ἀγαθὰ καὶ> καλά·

Ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη

II.7.25.4

ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἕξιν ἐν θάρσεσι καὶ φόβοις τοῖς μέσοις ἄμεμπτον· σωφροσύνην δὲ ἕξιν ἐν αἱρέσει καὶ φυγῇ ἀμέμπτους ποιοῦσαν δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Wisdom and Practical Wisdom

II.7.25.3

Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.[701] Practical wisdom is a state that deliberates about and performs good and noble things as <good and> noble.[702]

Courage and Self Control

II.7.25.4

Courage is a blameless state concerning confidence and fears at the mean.[703] Self-control is a state that renders people blameless in choice and avoidance for the sake of the noble itself.[704]

701. Σοφία is wisdom and ἐπιστήμη knowledge. The first causes, τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια, are the stated objects of this knowledge; the definition does not name particular causes or replace first with a different classification. Wachsmuth compares Metaphysics I.1, 981b28 and 982b9.

702. Φρόνησις remains practical wisdom, distinct from σοφία. Both deliberating and acting are included, and the good and noble are considered precisely as such. The supplied words <ἀγαθὰ καὶ> remain bracketed as good and, retaining the editor's visible supplement.

703. The printed plural θάρσεσι concerns instances or manifestations of confidence, paired with φόβοις, fears. Τοῖς μέσοις locates both at the mean. Courage is not defined here as the absence of every fear; compare the examples in II.7.20.4 and 20.16.

704. The plural ἀμέμπτους, blameless, supplies the implicit people made so by this state. Both choice and avoidance remain, with δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν identifying the noble itself as their motive. Σωφροσύνη is self-control in this Peripatetic account, distinct from the resistance to contrary desires called ἐγκράτεια.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Πραότης ἐλευθεριότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία II.7.25.5

πραότητα δὲ ἕξιν μέσην ὀργιλότητος καὶ ἀναλγησίας· ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ μεσότητα ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας·

Μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ νέμεσις II.7.25.6

μεγαλοπρέπειαν δὲ <μεσότητα σαλακωνείας καὶ μικροπρεπείας· νέμεσιν δὲ> μεσότητα φθονερίας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Gentleness Generosity and Greatness of Soul II.7.25.5

Gentleness is a state intermediate between irascibility and callousness; generosity, a mean between prodigality and illiberality;[705] greatness of soul, a mean between vanity and smallness of soul.[706]

Magnificence and Indignation II.7.25.6

Magnificence is <a mean between ostentation and pettiness;[707] indignation is> a mean between enviousness and malicious joy.[708]

705. The extremes remain in their printed order. Gentleness occupies the middle between readiness to anger and lack of feeling; generosity between wasteful giving and lack of generosity. The source prints πραότητα here, while the earlier discussion also uses forms with iota subscript. No change of the named virtue is intended.

706. Χαυνότης is puffed-up vanity, and μικροψυχία smallness of soul. The order here is vanity followed by smallness of soul, whereas the list in II.7.20.13 placed smallness of soul before vanity. Both source orders are retained.

707. The continuous angle-bracketed supplement begins with the mean defining magnificence and ends with the introduction of indignation. Its entire extent remains bracketed in Greek and English. Σαλακωνεία is ostentation or affected grandeur, a variant of the σαλακωνία printed in II.7.20.13; μικροπρέπεια is pettiness. The two printed forms are not silently made identical.

708. Φθονερία is enviousness and ἐπιχαιρεκακία malicious joy at another's misfortune. Νέμεσις is indignation, distinct from both. Its fuller association with undeserved good fortune was explained at II.7.21.1. The mean classification remains the one asserted by this account.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Σεμνότης αἰδὼς καὶ εὐτραπελία II.7.25.7

σεμνότητα δὲ μεσότητα αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· αἰδὼ δὲ μεσότητα ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· εὐτραπελίαν δὲ <μεσότητα> βωμολοχίας καὶ ἀγροικίας·

Φιλία ἀλήθεια καὶ δικαιοσύνη II.7.25.8

φιλίαν δὲ μεσότητα κολακείας καὶ ἔχθρας· ἀλήθειαν δὲ μεσότητα εἰρωνείας καὶ ἀλαζονείας· δικαιοσύνην δὲ μεσότητα ὑπεροχῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ πολλοῦ καὶ ὀλίγου.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Dignity Modesty and Wit

II.7.25.7

Dignity is a mean between self-will and obsequiousness;[709] modesty, a mean between shamelessness and being overawed;[710] wit, <a mean> between buffoonery and boorishness.[711]

Friendship Truthfulness and Justice

II.7.25.8

Friendship is a mean between flattery and enmity; truthfulness, a mean between self-depreciation and boastfulness;[712] justice, a mean between excess and deficiency, and much and little.[713]

709. Σεμνότης is dignity in social conduct. Αὐθάδεια is stubborn self-will or self-assertion, while ἀρέσκεια is an excessive eagerness to please, rendered obsequiousness. These are opposing ways of dealing with others, not two synonyms for the same pride.

710. Αἰδώς is modesty or a sense of shame. Κατάπληξις is being overawed, an inhibiting extreme opposite shamelessness in this classification. The source does not replace it with the ordinary fear that courage regulates.

711. The word <μεσότητα> is supplied and remains bracketed as a mean. Εὐτραπελία concerns wit or ready humor; βωμολοχία buffoonery, and ἀγροικία boorishness. The opposition concerns manner in social amusement rather than identifying every joke with a vice.

712. Φιλία retains friendship, the word used in section 22; in this classification it also concerns friendliness in association. Κολακεία is flattery and ἔχθρα enmity. Εἰρωνεία is self-depreciation or the understating of one's qualities, opposed to boastfulness, ἀλαζονεία. Truthfulness concerns an accurate presentation rather than a mean between truth and falsehood.

713. The Greek retains both pairs, ὑπεροχή and ἔλλειψις, excess and deficiency, followed by πολύ and ὀλίγον, much and little. No pair is omitted as redundant. Compare the earlier explanation of proportionate equality in II.7.20.16. The source's classification of justice as a mean is preserved.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ εἴδη

II.7.25.9

Πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἄλλων οὐσῶν ἀρετῶν, τῶν μὲν καθ’ αὐτάς, τῶν δ’ ἐν εἴδεσι τῶν εἰρημένων (οἷον ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὐσεβείας, ὁσιότητος, χρηστότητος, εὐκοινωνησίας, εὐσυναλλαξίας· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν σωφροσύνην εὐκοσμίας, εὐταξίας, αὐταρκείας· <ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εὐψυχίας, φιλοπονίας>), ἐπιδραμεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον καὶ τοὺς τούτων ὅρους.

Εὐσέβεια καὶ ὁσιότης

II.7.25.10

Εὐσέβειαν μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἕξιν θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων θεραπευτικήν, μεταξὺ οὖσαν ἀθεότητος καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας· ὁσιότητα δὲ ἕξιν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ κατοιχομένους τηρητικήν, μεταξὺ ἀνοσιότητος οὖσαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου τινός·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Other Virtues and Their Kinds

II.7.25.9

There are many other virtues, some in their own right and others among the kinds of those already mentioned. For example, under justice fall piety, holiness, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing; under self-control, propriety, orderliness, and self-sufficiency;[714] <under courage, stoutheartedness and love of effort>. It is not out of place to run through their definitions as well.[715]

Piety and Holiness

II.7.25.10

Piety is a state of attending to gods and divine spirits, lying between godlessness and superstition.[716] Holiness is a state of observing what is just toward the gods and the departed, lying between unholiness and a certain unnamed state.[717]

714. The distinction between virtues in their own right and kinds subordinate to the virtues named above remains. All five under justice and all three under self-control are retained. These relationships resemble the earlier Stoic classification at II.7.5b2.2, but the local Peripatetic list is followed, including its separate holiness and self-sufficiency.

715. The entire phrase assigning stoutheartedness and love of effort to courage is supplied in Wachsmuth's text and remains bracketed in both languages. Ἐπιδραμεῖν means to run over briefly; ὅροι are definitions. The next clauses define all ten of the named subordinate virtues, including the two introduced by this supplement.

716. Εὐσέβεια is piety, and θεραπευτική concerns attendance, service, or worship. Δαίμονες are divine spirits, without the necessarily evil sense of modern demons. The two named extremes are ἀθεότης, godlessness, and δεισιδαιμονία, superstition or excessive fear of divine powers.

717. Ὁσιότης, holiness, is distinguished from piety by its definition through obligations of justice toward both gods and the dead. Κατοιχόμενοι are the departed. The opposite ἀνοσιότης is named, but the other extreme remains unnamed; no name or additional practice is supplied to fill it.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Χρηστότης καὶ εὐκοινωνησία

II.7.25.11

χρηστότητα δὲ ἔξιν ἐκουσίως εὖ ποιητικὴν ἀνθρώπων, αὐτῶν ἐκείνων χάριν, μεταξὺ πονηρίας οὖσαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου· εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἔξιν ἀμέμπτους ἐν κοινωνίᾳ παρεχομένην, μεταξὺ ἀκοινωνησίας οὖσαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου·

Εὐσυναλλαξία

II.7.25.12

εὐσυναλλαξίαν δὲ ἕξιν εὐλαβητικὴν τῆς ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις ἀδικίας, μεταξὺ ἀσυναλλαξίας οὖσαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου, (τὴν δὲ ἀνώνυμον κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβοδίκαιον εἶναί πως)·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Kindness and Good Fellowship

II.7.25.11

Kindness is a state of voluntarily benefiting people for those people's own sake, lying between wickedness and an unnamed state.[718] Good fellowship is a state that renders people blameless in association, lying between unsociability and an unnamed state.[719]

Fair Dealing

II.7.25.12

Fair dealing is a state that guards against injustice in contracts, lying between bad dealing and an unnamed state.[720] (The unnamed state is, in a way, strict justice.)[721]

718. The definition of χρηστότης includes both willingness, ἑκουσίως, and the beneficiaries' own sake, αὐτῶν ἐκείνων χάριν. These motives are not replaced with an unstated aim of reputation or repayment. One extreme, πονηρία, wickedness, is named; the other is not.

719. Εὐκοινωνησία concerns good fellowship or participation in common life. The plural ἀμέμπτους supplies people as the implicit object, while ἐν κοινωνίᾳ specifies the sphere of association. The Greek retains ἀκοινωνησία, unsociability, and leaves the opposite extreme unnamed. The compressed printed construction is followed without replacing it with an apparatus conjecture.

720. Εὐσυναλλαξία concerns fair conduct in dealings, with συμβόλαια specifying contracts or agreements. Εὐλαβητική means careful to avoid or guard against something, here injustice. Ἀσυναλλαξία is rendered bad dealing; it can suggest an inability or unwillingness to deal properly.

721. The parenthesis identifies the otherwise unnamed extreme only approximately: πως, in a way. Τὸ ἀκριβοδίκαιον is strict or exact justice; in this contrast it suggests an excessively rigorous insistence on what is just. Both the unusual description and its qualification remain, rather than assigning the extreme a new formal name.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐκοσμία καὶ εὐταξία

II.7.25.13

εὐκοσμίαν δὲ ἕξιν περί τε κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις τηρητικὴν τοῦ πρέποντος, μεταξὺ οὖσαν ἀκοσμίας καὶ ἀνωνύμου· εὐταξίαν δὲ ἕξιν στοχαστικὴν τοῦ περὶ τάξιν καλοῦ, μεταξὺ ἀταξίας οὖσαν καὶ ἀνωνύμου·

Αὐτάρκεια

II.7.25.14

αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἕξιν ἀρκουμένην τοῖς τυχοῦσι μετὰ ἐλευθεριότητος, μεταξὺ πτωχείας οὖσαν καὶ πολυτελείας·

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Propriety and Orderliness

II.7.25.13

Propriety is a state of observing what is fitting in movements and postures, lying between impropriety and an unnamed state.[722] Orderliness is a state that aims at what is noble in order, lying between disorder and an unnamed state.[723]

Self Sufficiency

II.7.25.14

Self-sufficiency is a state content with what comes one's way, together with generosity, lying between poverty and extravagance.[724]

722. Both κινήσεις, movements, and σχέσεις, postures or positions, remain in the definition of εὐκοσμία. Τὸ πρέπον is what is fitting. The named opposite, ἀκοσμία, is impropriety or lack of decorum in this context; the other extreme is left unnamed.

723. Εὐταξία is orderliness, with στοχαστική again expressing an aim at a target. Its object is the noble in matters of τάξις, order or arrangement. The named extreme is ἀταξία, disorder. This definition is distinguished from the preceding one concerning movements and postures.

724. The definition joins contentment with available circumstances to ἐλευθεριότης, generosity; neither element is omitted. Αὐτάρκεια is self-sufficiency here, defined as a particular ethical state. The source names πτωχεία, poverty or beggary, rather than ἀνελευθερία, illiberality, as one extreme; πολυτέλεια is costly extravagance. The unusual pairing is retained rather than rewritten as the earlier definition of generosity.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Εὐψυχία καὶ φιλοπονία

II.7.25.15

εὐψυχίαν δὲ ἔξιν ἀήττητον ἐν δεινῶν ὑπομοναῖς, μεταξὺ ἀψυχίας καὶ ἀρειμανιότητος· φιλοπονίαν δὲ ἔξιν ἀνένδοτον πόνοις ἐξεργαστικὴν τοῦ καλοῦ, μεταξὺ μαλακίας τε καὶ ματαιοπονίας.

Καλοκἀγαθία καὶ τελεία ἀρετή

II.7.25.16

Τὴν δὲ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετὴν συνεστηκυῖαν λέγεσθαι μὲν καλοκἀγαθίαν, τελείαν δ’ ἀρετὴν εἶναι, τά τε ἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα καὶ καλὰ ποιοῦσαν τά τε καλὰ δι’ αὐτὰ αἱρουμένην.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Stoutheartedness and Love of Effort

II.7.25.15

Stoutheartedness is a state unconquerable in enduring terrible things, between faintheartedness and warlike frenzy.[725] Love of effort is a state that does not yield to toil and works to accomplish the noble, between softness and futile toil.[726]

Nobility and Goodness and Complete Virtue

II.7.25.16

Virtue constituted from all the ethical virtues is called nobility and goodness, and is complete virtue,[727] making good things beneficial and noble, and choosing noble things for their own sake.[728]

725. Εὐψυχία is stoutheartedness, as in II.7.19.10. Its definition preserves endurance of terrible things and the two extremes: ἀψυχία, faintheartedness, and ἀρειμανιότης, warlike frenzy. The latter word evokes Ares, the god of war, and is not replaced with the earlier rashness or with absence of all fear.

726. Φιλοπονία is love of effort. Both not yielding to toils and accomplishing the noble remain. Μαλακία is softness or inability to bear hardship, while ματαιοπονία is futile toil. The mean therefore concerns the end and character of effort, not an unqualified preference for the greatest amount of labor.

727. Καλοκἀγαθία remains nobility and goodness, the compound used at II.7.18.4 and 20.2. Here it is constituted from all the ethical virtues and called complete. Its earlier inclusion among qualities of the rational part is not silently removed or made identical to this formulation.

728. The two activities remain distinct: making good things beneficial and noble, and choosing noble things for their own sake. The printed order ὠφέλιμα καὶ καλά, beneficial and noble, is retained; Wachsmuth records a proposed different order in the apparatus. The conclusion does not reduce nobility to usefulness. Section 25 ends here, before the transition to household management and politics in section 26.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν

II.7.26.1

Διωρισμένων δ’ ἱκανῶς τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ἀνειλημμένων κεφαλαίων τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου, ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς καὶ περὶ τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ τε καὶ πολιτικοῦ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον ἄνθρωπος.

Πρώτη κοινωνία

II.7.26.2

Πολιτεία δὲ πρώτη σύνοδος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τέκνων γεννήσει καὶ βίου κοινωνίᾳ. Τοῦτο δὲ προσονομάζεται μὲν οἶκος, ἀρχὴ δὲ πόλεώς ἐστι· περὶ οὗ δὴ καὶ λεκτέον.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Household Management and Politics

II.7.26.1

The matters concerning the virtues have been adequately distinguished, and almost all the main topics of ethics have been taken up. It is necessary next to discuss household management and politics as well,[729] since a human being is by nature a political animal.[730]

The First Community

II.7.26.2

The first political community is the union of a man and a woman according to law, for the begetting of children and the sharing of life.[731] This is called a household, and is the beginning of a city; we must therefore speak of it.[732]

729. Οἰκονομικόν concerns the management of an οἶκος, a household, rather than a modern national economy. Πολιτικόν concerns the πόλις, the city as a political community. Section 26 has no separate summary heading. Its final numerical subdivisions and descriptive labels serve layout only; the exposition is continuous.

730. Πολιτικὸν ζῷον is a political animal, an animal naturally belonging to a city or political community. Wachsmuth compares Aristotle, Politics I.2, 1253a2–3. The statement links the preceding ethical exposition to common life; it does not reduce political activity to the pursuit of office.

731. Πολιτεία here denotes a political community or association; later in this section it denotes a constitution or form of government. The source prints κατὰ νόμον, according to law, not according to nature. Both stated purposes, children and a shared life, remain.

732. Οἶκος means the household constituted by its members and common life, not merely its building. Calling it the beginning of a city prepares the account of the growth from households to villages and cities.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐξ οἴκων πόλις

II.7.26.3

Μικρὰ γάρ τις ἔοικεν εἶναι πόλις ὁ οἶκος, εἴ γε κατ᾽ εὐχὴν αὐξομένου τοῦ γάμου καὶ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδιδόντων καὶ συνδυαζομένων ἀλλήλοις ἕτερος οἶκος ἱφίσταται καὶ τρίτος οὕτω καὶ τέταρτος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων κώμη καὶ πόλις. Πλειόνων γὰρ γενομένων κωμῶν πόλις ἀπετελέσθη.

Πολιτεῖαι ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ

II.7.26.4

Διὸ καὶ τὰ σπέρματα καθάπερ τῆς γενέσεως τῇ πόλει παρέσχεν ὁ οἶκος, οὕτω καὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Καὶ γὰρ βασιλείας ὑπογραφὴν εἶναι περὶ τὸν οἶκον καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Γονέων μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τέκνα κοινωνίας τὸ σχῆμα βασιλικόν· ἀνδρῶν δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκας, ἀριστοκρατικόν· παίδων δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους δημοκρατικόν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

From Households to a City

II.7.26.3

The household seems to be a small city of a sort, if indeed, as the marriage prospers as one would wish and the children grow and pair with one another, another household is established, and so a third and a fourth, and from these a village and a city.[733] For when several villages came into being, a city was formed.[734]

Forms of Government in the Household

II.7.26.4

Thus, just as the household provided the city with the seeds of its coming into being, so too it provided the seeds of its constitution. For there is an outline of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy in the household.[735] The form of association between parents and children is royal; between husbands and wives, aristocratic; between children and one another, democratic.[736]

733. The conditional εἴ γε, if indeed, qualifies the comparison. Παίδων is children, and συνδυαζομένων ἀλλήλοις means pairing with one another; the translation does not add a further account of the marriages. The printed ἱφίσταται is an anomalous form. Established gives its contextual sense, without silently replacing the Greek with Meineke's proposed συνίσταται.

734. The sequence retains household, village, and city, with the final aorist ἀπετελέσθη, was formed. Wachsmuth compares Politics I.2, 1252b15–16 and 28. The passage gives a schematic account of political origins, not a dated history of a particular city.

735. Σπέρματα, seeds, continues the image of political growth; ὑπογραφή is an outline or sketch. The printed phrase εἶναι περὶ τὸν οἶκον is compressed and queried in the apparatus. In the household gives its contextual sense, while the Greek remains as printed.

736. Ἀνδρῶν and γυναῖκας are men and women, here husbands and wives in the household relationship. All three analogies remain in their stated order. Wachsmuth compares Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10–12, 1160b23–25, 32–33 and 1161a3–4. These are the account's ancient analogies of authority, not a classification of modern family arrangements.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Γένεσις τοῦ οἴκου

II.7.26.5

Συνέρχεσθαι γὰρ τῷ θήλει τὸ ἄρρεν κατὰ πόθον τεκνώσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ γένους διαμονῆς· ἐφίεσθαι γὰρ ἑκάτερον γεννήσεως. Συνελθόντων δὲ καὶ συνεργὸν τῆς κοινωνίας προσλαβομένων, εἴτε φύσει δοῦλον, (ἰσχυρὸν μὲν τῷ σώματι πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν, νωθῆ δὲ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀδύνατον διαζῆν, ᾧ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν,) εἴτε καὶ νόμῳ δοῦλον, ἐκ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνόδου καὶ τῆς πάντων πρὸς ἓν συμφέρον προμηθείας, οἶκον συνίστασθαι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Formation of the Household

II.7.26.5

For the male joins with the female out of a desire for procreation and the continuance of the kind; each desires generation.[737] When they have come together and taken an assistant into their association, whether a slave by nature—strong in body for service, but dull and unable to live on his own, for whom being ruled is advantageous—or a slave by law,[738] a household is constituted from their coming together and from everyone's taking thought for a single common advantage.[739]

737. Τέκνωσις is procreation, and γένους διαμονή the continuance of the kind or lineage through generation. The text speaks in terms of male and female and ascribes the desire to each. No modern racial category is implied by γένος here.

738. The distinction between a slave by nature and a slave by law belongs to the account's ancient justification of slavery. Its description of bodily strength, dullness, and supposed inability to live independently is retained as the author's claim, not an established description of enslaved people. The legal category is distinguished from that alleged natural condition; the passage does not specify a legal route into enslavement.

739. Συνεργός is an assistant or fellow worker, here explicitly an enslaved person, not freely hired staff. Προμήθεια is forethought or provision. The final clause states the common advantage claimed for the resulting household, without changing the unequal status of its members.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 148-149

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἀρχὴ καὶ μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς

II.7.26.6

Τούτου δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνδρα. Τὸ γὰρ βουλευτικὸν ἐν γυναικὶ μὲν χεῖρον, ἐν παιδὶ δ’ οὐδέπω, περὶ δούλους <δ’> οὐδ’ ὅλως· τὴν δ’ οἰκονομικὴν φρόνησιν, διοικητικὴν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ τε <οἴκου> καὶ τῶν κατ’ οἶκον, οἰκείαν ἀνδρὸς ὑπάρχειν. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι πατρικόν, τὸ δὲ γαμικόν, τὸ δὲ δεσποτικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικόν.

Τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ αἱ πρόσοδοι

II.7.26.7

Δεῖν γάρ, ὥσπερ στρατιᾷ μὲν παρασκευῆς, πόλει δὲ προσόδων, τέχνῃ δ’ ὀργάνων, οὕτω καὶ οἴκῳ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Διττὰ δὲ ταῦτα, πρός τε τὸ κοινότερον ζῆν καὶ πρὸς τὸ εὖ. Τούτων γὰρ πρῶτον ἔχειν δεῖν πρόνοιαν τὸν οἰκονομικόν, ἢ τὰς προσόδους αὔξοντα διὰ πορισμῶν ἐλευθερίων ἢ τὰ δαπανήματα συστέλλοντα· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς οἰκονομικῆς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 149

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Authority and the Parts of Household Management II.7.26.6

By nature the man has authority over this household. For the deliberative capacity is inferior in a woman, not yet present in a child, <and> not present at all in slaves.[740] Practical wisdom in household management, which administers the <household> itself and what belongs to it, is proper to a man.[741] One part is paternal, another marital, another concerned with mastery, and another with acquiring wealth.[742]

Necessities and Income II.7.26.7

For just as an army needs provisions, a city revenues, and a craft tools, so a household needs necessities. These are of two kinds, for living in the more general sense and for living well.[743] The household manager must first take thought for these, either increasing income through honorable means of acquisition or reducing expenses; for this is indeed the greatest principle of household management.[744]

740. These assertions of natural hierarchy belong to the ancient account. The local word χεῖρον means inferior or worse. Aristotle's related statement in Politics I.13, 1260a12–14 instead describes the woman's deliberative capacity as ἄκυρον, without authority; that wording is not substituted here. The supplied particle <δ'> is represented by and.

741. The supplied <οἴκου> remains bracketed as household. Φρόνησις is practical wisdom, now specified by its household function. The Greek explicitly assigns it to an ἀνήρ, a man; replacing that word with a neutral household manager would conceal the account's claim.

742. All four parts remain. Δεσποτικόν concerns a master's authority over enslaved people, distinct here from both paternal and marital authority. Χρηματιστικόν concerns the acquisition of wealth or resources, discussed below; it does not mean every aspect of household management.

743. Κοινότερον ζῆν is living in the more general sense, contrasted with living well. The distinction is between what sustains life as such and what supports a good life, not two unrelated inventories. The analogies preserve the separate needs of army, city, craft, and household.

744. Πορισμοὶ ἐλευθέριοι are means of acquisition befitting a free person, rendered honorable; the adjective does not mean free of charge. The source gives alternatives, increasing receipts or contracting expenditures. Κεφάλαιον here is a leading principle or main point, not financial capital.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐμπειρία καὶ χρηματιστική

II.7.26.8

Διὸ καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρον <δεῖν> εἶναι τὸν οἰκονομικόν, γεωργίας, προβατείας, μεταλλείας, ἵνα τοὺς λυσιτελεστάτους καρποὺς ἅμα καὶ δικαιοτάτους διαγνώσῃ. Τῆς δὲ χρηματιστικῆς τὴν μὲν εἶναι κρείττω, τὴν δὲ χείρω· κρείττω μὲν τὴν φύσει γιγνομένην, χείρω δὲ τὴν διὰ καπηλικῆς. <Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ οἰκονομικῆς> ἀπόχρη.

Πόλις καὶ πολίτης

II.7.26.9

Περὶ δὲ πολιτικῆς ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη κεφάλαια· πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι συνέστησαν αἱ πόλεις τῇ μὲν διὰ τὸ φύσει κοινωνικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῇ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον. Εἶτα ὅτι ἡ τελειοτάτη κοινωνία πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ μέτεστι πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς. Πόλις δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Experience and the Acquisition of Wealth

II.7.26.8

Therefore the household manager <must> also have experience of many things—farming, sheep rearing, and mining—so that he may discern the most profitable and at the same time most just returns.[745] Of the acquisition of wealth, one kind is better and another worse: that which occurs naturally is better, and that which occurs through retail trade is worse. <And these remarks, then, on household management> suffice.[746]

City and Citizen

II.7.26.9

The main points concerning politics would be these. First, cities were constituted partly because a human being is naturally social, and partly for advantage.[747] Next, the city is the most complete association, and a citizen is someone who shares in political authority. A city is a multitude of such people sufficient for a self-sufficient life.[748]

745. The supplied <δεῖν> remains bracketed as must. All three activities are retained, including mining. Both superlatives qualify καρποί, returns or yields: the most profitable and the most just. The stated economic criterion is therefore not profitability alone.

746. Καπηλική is retail trade or dealing for resale; the word is not silently broadened to all commerce. The account ranks natural acquisition above it. The entire closing phrase supplied by the editor remains bracketed in both languages, while ἀπόχρη, suffice, is transmitted outside the supplement.

747. Κοινωνικός means social or disposed to association. The two explanations remain joined: natural sociability and advantage. Calling the city the most complete association identifies its scope and sufficiency, rather than denying that a household is also an association.

748. Πολιτικὴ ἀρχή is political authority or office. Citizenship is defined through participation in it, not simply residence within the territory. Αὐτάρκεια here concerns the sufficiency of a political community for life; compare the different definition of an individual ethical state in II.7.25.14.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὅρος τοῦ πλήθους

II.7.26.10

Τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ὅρον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὥστε μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἀσυμπαθῆ μήτ' εὐκαταφρόνητον ὑπάρχειν, παρεσκευάσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἀνενδεῶς καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἐπιόντας ἱκανῶς.

Μέρη τῆς φρονήσεως

II.7.26.11

Εἶναι γὰρ τῆς φρονήσεως τὸ μὲν οἰκονομικόν, τὸ δὲ νομοθετικόν, τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν, τὸ δὲ στρατηγικόν. Οἰκονομικὸν μέν, ὡς εἶπον, τὸ διοικητικὸν αὐτοῦ τε <οἴκου> καὶ τῶν περὶ οἶκον, νομοθετικὸν δὲ . . . <πολιτικὸν δὲ . . ., στρατηγικὸν δὲ> τὸ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν καὶ διοίκησιν τῶν στρατοπέδῳ συμφερόντων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 150

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Limit of the Population

II.7.26.10

The population must have a limit such that the city is neither without fellow-feeling nor easily despised,[749] and that it is provided without deficiency with what is needed for life, and adequately with what is needed against invaders from outside.[750]

The Parts of Practical Wisdom

II.7.26.11

For one part of practical wisdom concerns household management, another legislation, another politics, and another military command.[751] The household part, as I said, administers the <household> itself and what belongs to it; the legislative part [text missing]; <the political part [text missing]; the military part>[752] concerns the study and administration of what is advantageous to an army camp.[753]

749. The unusual ἀσυμπαθής literally means without sympathy or shared feeling; without fellow-feeling follows that sense in the context of a political community. Wachsmuth queries the word and records proposed alternatives. The printed Greek is retained rather than replaced with a conjecture about size or disorder.

750. No numerical population is specified. The conditions concern internal cohesion, resistance to contempt, sufficient livelihood, and defense. The invaders are those coming against the city from outside, ἔξωθεν ἐπιόντας; the translation does not turn every outsider into an invader.

751. The four branches of φρόνησις remain distinct. Politics appears both as the wider subject under discussion and as a particular administrative branch beside legislation. The first-person as I said belongs to the exposition; Wachsmuth's modern locator p. 149, 8–10 is moved out of the Greek body into this note. It refers to the definition translated at II.7.26.6.

752. The source leaves a gap after legislative. Its supplement introduces political with another gap and then military. Both omissions remain explicitly missing, and the entire supplied transition stays within angle brackets in English. The supplied household is likewise bracketed. Definitions are not reconstructed from a parallel Aristotelian text.

753. Στρατοπέδῳ is a singular dative, to an army camp, here the army considered in its organized military setting. The surviving definition includes both θεωρία, study or consideration, and διοίκησις, administration. These explanatory qualifications belong to the note; the missing definitions remain missing.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις II.7.26.12

Ἄρχειν δ’ ἀναγκαῖον τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ πάντας. Τούτων δ’ ἕκαστον ὀρθῶς ἢ φαύλως ἔχειν· Ὀρθῶς μέν, ὅταν οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος στοχάζωνται· φαύλως δέ, ὅταν τοῦ ἰδίου. Τὸ δὲ φαῦλον παρέκβασιν εἶναι τοῦ ὀρθοῦ. Βασιλείαν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἐφίεσθαι τοῦ ὀρθοῦ· τυραννίδα δὲ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ὀχλοκρατίαν τοῦ φαύλου.

Μικτὴ πολιτεία καὶ μεταβολή II.7.26.13

Γίνεσθαι δέ τινα καὶ μικτὴν ἐκ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστην. Μεταβάλλειν δὲ τὰς πολιτείας πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Καθόλου δ’ ἀρίστην εἶναι πολιτείαν τὴν κατ’ ἀρετὴν διακεκοσμημένην, χειρίστην δὲ τὴν κατὰ κακίαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 150-151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Correct Constitutions and Their Deviations II.7.26.12

Cities must be ruled by either one person, a few, or all. Each arrangement is either correct or bad: correct when the rulers aim at the common advantage, bad when they aim at their own. The bad is a deviation from the correct.[754] Kingship, aristocracy, and democracy accordingly aim at what is correct; tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule at what is bad.[755]

Mixed Government and Constitutional Change II.7.26.13

There also comes to be a certain best constitution mixed from the correct forms of government.[756] Constitutions often change for the better and for the worse. In general, the best constitution is that ordered according to virtue, and the worst that ordered according to vice.[757]

754. The numerical distinction, one, few, or all, is separate from the criterion of common or private advantage. Παρέκβασις is a deviation from the correct form. The account's classification cannot therefore be inferred from the number of rulers alone.

755. The local epitome places δημοκρατία, democracy, among correct forms and ὀχλοκρατία, mob rule, among bad forms. In Politics III.7, Aristotle instead names πολιτεία as the correct rule of many and δημοκρατία as its deviation. Wachsmuth notes that difference. This translation preserves the epitome's own six names and their classification.

756. The feminine μικτήν and ἀρίστην imply πολιτείαν, constitution. The mixed form is constituted from the correct forms already named. The passage gives no particular institutional mixture or historical example, and none is added.

757. Both directions of change remain, improvement and deterioration. The general criterion is an ordering according to virtue or vice, linking the political discussion with the preceding ethical exposition. No necessary progression toward a better constitution is asserted.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 150-151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἐπιλογὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων II.7.26.14

Ἄρχειν δὲ καὶ βουλεύειν καὶ δικάζειν ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ πάντων, ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων.

Αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεων II.7.26.15

Στάσεις δ’ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι τὰς μὲν κατὰ λόγον, τὰς δὲ κατὰ πάθος. Κατὰ λόγον μέν, ὅταν οἱ ἴσοι ὄντες <ἄνισα, οἱ δὲ ἄνισοι ὄντες> ἴσα ἔχειν ἀναγκάζωνται· κατὰ πάθος δὲ διὰ τιμὴν ἢ φιλαρχίαν ἢ κέρδος ἢ εὐπορίαν.

Κατάλυσις καὶ μονιμότης II.7.26.16

Καταλύεσθαι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας διὰ δύο αἰτίας, ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ἀπάτῃ. Μονιμωτέρας δὲ γίνεσθαι τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος ἐπιμελουμένας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

The Selection of Officeholders II.7.26.14

Those who rule, deliberate, and judge are drawn, in democracies, from all, either by election or by lot;[758] in oligarchies, from the wealthy; and in aristocracies, from the best.[759]

The Causes of Civil Strife II.7.26.15

Civil strife in cities arises in some cases from reason, and in others from passion. From reason, when those who are equal are compelled to have <unequal shares, and those who are unequal> equal shares;[760] from passion, on account of honor, love of rule, gain, or wealth.[761]

Overthrow and Stability II.7.26.16

Constitutions are overthrown through two causes, either force or deception. They become more stable by attending to the common advantage.[762]

758. The compressed Greek supplies the people performing all three functions. Αἵρεσις is election or selection, and κλῆρος selection by lot. The alternatives concern appointment to political functions; lot does not mean fate here.

759. From all must be read within the account's category of eligible citizens, not as a statement of modern universal suffrage. Εὔποροι are those with abundant means, while ἄριστοι are the best as judged by the aristocratic criterion. All three forms retain their different stated bases of selection.

760. Στάσις is faction or civil strife. The distinction κατὰ λόγον and κατὰ πάθος identifies the grounds assigned to it: a claim about equality, or an affective motive. The full supplied contrast between unequal shares and unequal people remains bracketed. Shares expresses the objects of ἔχειν, to have, in the equality argument.

761. All four motives remain: τιμή, honor; φιλαρχία, love of rule or office; κέρδος, gain; and εὐπορία, wealth or affluence. The printed φιλαρχία is not replaced with an apparatus proposal referring to love of money. Passion here names the motivating attachment, not a separate fifth motive.

762. Πολιτεῖαι remain constitutions or forms of government. Μονιμωτέρας is comparative, more stable, rather than a promise that any constitution will become permanent. Attention to common advantage repeats the criterion used to distinguish correct government from deviation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Δικαστήρια καὶ ἀρχαί

II.7.26.17

Δικαστήρια δὲ καὶ βουλευτήρια καὶ ἐκκλησίας καὶ ἀρχὰς διωρίσθαι ταῖς πολιτείαις οἰκείως. Κοινοτάτας δ’ ἀρχὰς εἶναι ἱερωσύνην θεῶν, στρατηγίαν, ναυαρχίαν, ἀγορανομίαν, γυμνασιαρχίαν, γυναικονομίαν, παιδονομίαν, ἀστυνομίαν, ταμιείαν, νομοφυλακίαν, πρακτορείαν. Τούτων δ’ εἶναι τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεις, τὰς δὲ κατὰ πόλεμον, τὰς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Courts and Public Offices

II.7.26.17

Courts, council chambers, assemblies, and offices are determined in a manner appropriate to the constitutions.[763] The most common offices are priesthood of the gods, military command, naval command, supervision of markets, administration of gymnasia, oversight of women, oversight of children, city administration, treasury administration, guardianship of the laws, and collection of revenues.[764] Some of these concern cities, some war, and others ports and trade.[765]

763. Βουλευτήρια are council chambers or the institutions meeting in them; ἐκκλησίαι are civic assemblies. The arrangement of these institutions is said to fit the particular constitution, rather than to be identical in every city.

764. All eleven offices are retained in their printed order. A gymnasium was an institution of physical training and education. Γυναικονομία and παιδονομία designate official oversight of women and children; ἀστυνομία concerns administration of the city, not a modern police force. Ταμιεία concerns the treasury, and νομοφυλακία guardianship of laws.

765. Πρακτορεία is a rare term, rendered collection of revenues in this list of offices; LSJ gives collectorship and cites this passage. Its connection is with a πράκτωρ, a collector or official who exacts dues. The final three spheres are civic, military, and commercial; the text does not assign every listed office individually to one of them.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Διόρθωσις καὶ διανομὴ τῶν ἔργων II.7.26.18

Πολιτικοῦ δ’ ἀνδρὸς ἔργον εἶναι καὶ τὸ διορθῶσαι πολιτείαν, ὃ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον φαίνεσθαι τοῦ κτίσαι· καὶ τὸ διανεῖμαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰ σπουδαῖα. Δημιουργοὺς μὲν γὰρ καὶ θῆτας καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ ἐμπόρους πρὸς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὑπηρέτας γὰρ εἶναι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τούτους· τὸ δὲ μάχιμον πᾶν καὶ βουλευτικὸν κυριώτερον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ καλὰ σπουδάζειν.

Ἡλικίαι καὶ πολιτικὰ ἔργα II.7.26.19

Τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρεσβύτερον προβουλεύειν, τὸ δὲ γεραρώτερον θεραπεύειν τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δὲ νέον ἁπάντων προπολεμεῖν. Ταύτην δ’ ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάνυ τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151-152

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Reform and the Division of Work

II.7.26.18

The work of a statesman also includes correcting a constitution, which seems much harder than founding one, and dividing the multitude of people, some for necessary tasks and others for excellent ones.[766] Craftsmen, hired laborers, farmers, and merchants serve what is necessary, for these are assistants to those engaged in civic life.[767] The whole fighting and deliberating element has greater authority, because it attends to virtue and devotes itself to noble things.[768]

Age Groups and Civic Functions

II.7.26.19

Of these, the older element deliberates in advance, the more elderly serves the divine, and the young fights in the forefront for all.[769] This arrangement is very ancient, the Egyptians having first established it.[770]

766. Διορθῶσαι is to correct or set right, contrasted with κτίσαι, to found. The comparative much harder and the qualification seems both remain. The division that follows distinguishes necessities from σπουδαῖα, excellent or serious pursuits, within the account's hierarchy of civic work.

767. Δημιουργοί are craftsmen or artisans here; the same word's cosmological use for a divine maker, demiourgos, is not relevant to this occupational list. Θῆτες are hired laborers, distinct from the δοῦλοι, slaves, named earlier. Farmers and merchants complete the four groups. Τοῖς πολιτικοῖς is dative: these groups serve those engaged in civic life.

768. Κυριώτερον means more authoritative or possessing greater control. The account privileges the fighting and deliberating element on the stated ground of its concern for virtue and noble pursuits. This is its claim about a political hierarchy; the translation does not treat the other occupations as outside the city's population. The printed πᾶν, whole, remains.

769. The three age descriptions remain distinct: πρεσβύτερον, older; γεραρώτερον, more elderly or venerable; and νέον, young. Προβουλεύειν is to deliberate beforehand, and προπολεμεῖν to fight in front or in defense of others. Θεραπεύειν τὸ θεῖον concerns religious service or worship.

770. The assertion that Egyptians first established this arrangement belongs to the ancient exposition. Wachsmuth compares Politics VII.10, 1329b1–4. It is not presented as an independently demonstrated chronology of the origins of civic institutions.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 151-152

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Ἱερὰ καὶ κλῆροι

II.7.26.20

Πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἧττον καὶ τὸ τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις ἱδρύσθαι τόποις· καὶ τὸ τῆς τῶν ἰδιωτῶν χώρας τὸ μὲν ἕτερον πρὸς ταῖς ἐσχατιαῖς διατετάχθαι, τὸ δ’ ἕτερον πρὸς τῇ πόλει, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ νεμηθέντων, ἀμφότερα τὰ μέρη τῆς χώρας εὐσύνοπτα ὑπάρχῃ.

Συσσίτια καὶ κοινὴ παιδεία

II.7.26.21

Χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν συσσίτια ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας τῶν τέκνων σπουδάζειν·

Γάμοι καὶ ἡλικίαι

II.7.26.22

καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ῥώμην τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τελειότητα δεῖν μήτε νεωτέρων ἄγαν μήτε πρεσβυτέρων τοὺς γάμους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀτελῆ γὰρ γίνεσθαι κατ’ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τελείως ἀσθενῆ τὰ ἔκγονα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 152

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Sanctuaries and Allotments II.7.26.20

No less than the other matters, it is also a political concern that sanctuaries of the gods be established in the most conspicuous places,[771] and that one part of the land belonging to private citizens be assigned near the outer districts and the other near the city, so that, with two allotments distributed to each person, both parts of the territory may be easily surveyed.[772]

Common Meals and Common Education II.7.26.21

It is also useful to legislate the holding of common meals and to devote care to the common education of children;[773]

Marriage and Age II.7.26.22

and that, for the strength and full development of bodies, marriages must be contracted neither when people are too young nor when they are too old;[774] for at both ages the offspring are incompletely developed and wholly weak.[775]

771. Ἱερά are sanctuaries or sacred places. Ἐπιφανέστατοι means most conspicuous or prominent; the text does not specify a particular height, architectural plan, or dedication. The phrase no less than the other matters retains the comparative emphasis of οὐχ ἧττον.

772. Ἐσχατιαί are the outer or border districts of the territory. Each person receives two κλῆροι, allotments, one in each part. The stated purpose is εὐσύνοπτα, easily surveyed or overseen. That local wording remains, rather than being replaced with a different political motive from Aristotle's parallel account. Ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, to each person, is the reading printed in the text.

773. Συσσίτια are common or communal meals, an organized institution of shared dining. Κοινὴ παιδεία is common education; the source gives no curriculum or detailed educational organization here. The semicolon continues the sequence of political provisions into the following marriage rule.

774. This clause continues the preceding list of useful political provisions. The two comparative age terms are governed by the sense of excess expressed by ἄγαν, too much. The epitome gives no numerical ages, and none are supplied from Aristotle's fuller discussion.

775. Ἀτελῆ is incompletely developed and τελείως ἀσθενῆ wholly weak. Both descriptions remain as the ancient account's physiological claim. The play between τελειότητα, full development, and τελείως, wholly, is grammatical rather than an additional medical explanation.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Νόμοι περὶ γεννήσεως

II.7.26.23

Καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν δὲ μηθὲν ἐκτρέφειν πεπηρωμένον μηδ’ ἐκτιθέναι τέλειον μηδ’ ἐξαμβλοῦν συμφορώτατον δήπου. Καὶ τῶν μὲν πολιτικῶν τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα.

BOOK II CHAPTER 7

Laws Concerning Birth

II.7.26.23

And surely it is most advantageous to legislate that no impaired child be reared, that no fully formed child be exposed, and that no abortion be induced.[776] These, then, are the main points concerning politics.[777]

776. Πεπηρωμένον denotes a child with bodily impairment, while τέλειον here denotes one fully formed or whole. Ἐκτρέφειν is to rear, ἐκτιθέναι to expose or abandon an infant, and ἐξαμβλοῦν to cause an abortion. All three injunctions, including the account's discriminatory rule against rearing impaired children, remain as historical text. The final prohibition differs from the qualified provision concerning abortion in Aristotle, Politics VII.16, 1335b19–26; it is not replaced with that parallel wording.

777. Συμφορώτατον is most advantageous, and δήπου adds the force surely or presumably. The close ends both section 26 and the Peripatetic exposition in Chapter 7. The source begins Chapter 8 on printed p. 153; there is no omitted section 27.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 152

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Κεφάλαιον Η′ II.8.heading

Περὶ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

Φιλήμονος II.8.1

Ὅσα διὰ τοὺς πράττοντας αὐτοὺς γίγνεται,
οὐδενὶ πρόσεστιν οὐδὲ κοινωνεῖ τύχη.

Εὐριπίδου Πελιάσιν II.8.2

Οὐκ ἔστι τὰ θεῶν ἄδικ’· ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δὲ
κακῶς νοσοῦντα σύγχυσιν πολλὴν ἔχει.

Μενάνδρου II.8.3

Εἰ πάντες ἐβοηθοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις ἀεί,
οὐδεὶς ἂν ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐδεήθη τύχης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 153

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Chapter 8

II.8.heading

On What Is Up to Us.[778]

Philemon

II.8.1

In whatever comes about through the agents themselves,
fortune has no place and takes no share.[779]

Euripides in Daughters of Pelias

II.8.2

The gods' affairs are not unjust; but among human beings,
things grievously diseased involve great confusion.[780]

Menander

II.8.3

If we all always helped one another,
no human being would need fortune.[781]

778. Τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν are things that depend on us or are up to us. The heading frames a collection about agency, choice, and fortune; it does not make the excerpts agree on a single theory. This is Chapter 8 in Wachsmuth, numbered 7 in the Gaisford and Meineke editions cited in his chapter heading.

779. The opening ὅσα, whatever things, limits the assertion to events caused by the agents themselves. Οὐδενί refers back to those events. Τύχη is fortune or chance; both verbs exclude its participation in this specified class, rather than in every event without qualification.

780. The neuter plural τὰ θεῶν is the gods' affairs. The second clause is compressed: νοσοῦντα, being diseased, carries an image of sickness into human affairs. Κακῶς modifies the sickness, rendered grievously diseased. The English preserves that image and the unusual construction, without substituting the alternative readings proposed in the apparatus. The title Πελιάσιν identifies the lost play Daughters of Pelias; the fragment alone does not identify its speaker.

781. The counterfactual condition includes both everyone and always. It makes mutual assistance a proposed alternative to reliance on fortune; it does not assert that such universal assistance already occurs. Ἐδεήθη is a form of δέομαι, to need.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 153

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Εὐριπίδου Πειρίθῳ II.8.4

Ὁ πρῶτος εἰπὼν οὐκ ἀγυμνάστῳ φρενὶ
ἔρριψεν ὅστις τόνδ’ ἐκαίνισεν λόγον,
ὡς τοῖσιν εὖ φρονοῦσι συμμαχεῖ τύχη.

Μενάνδρου II.8.5

Ἀδύνατον ὡς ἔστιν τι σῶμα τῆς τύχης·
ὁ μὴ φέρων δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ πράγματα
τύχην προσηγόρευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον.

Φιλήμονος Παγκρατιαστῇ II.8.6

Καὐτόν τι πράττειν· οὐ μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐλπίδας
ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ <χρὴ>, παιδίον, πάντως ἔχειν,
ὧν βούλεταί τις, ἀλλὰ καὐτὸν τῇ τύχῃ
συλλαμβάνεσθαι· ῥᾷον ἡ τύχη πονεῖ,
ἐὰν μεθ’ ἑτέρου τοῦτο, μὴ μόνη, ποιῇ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 153-154

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Euripides in Pirithous

II.8.4

Whoever first introduced this new saying
did not speak with an untrained mind:
fortune fights alongside those who think well.[782]

Menander

II.8.5

How feeble a thing is fortune's body!
Whoever does not bear events in accordance with nature
has called his own character fortune.[783]

Philemon in The Pancratiast

II.8.6

Do something yourself as well. For you <must> not rest
all your hopes on fortune, my child,
for what you want, but yourself lend fortune a hand.
Fortune labors more easily
if she does this with another, not alone.[784]

782. The first two lines describe the unnamed originator of the maxim in the third. Συμμαχεῖ is a military image, fights as an ally. The attribution follows Wachsmuth's heading, Euripides in Pirithous; the isolated verses do not establish who speaks them within the play.

783. The printed σῶμα means body. Its personification of fortune is retained instead of the different wording proposed by earlier editors. Τρόπος is a person's character or disposition, not the external event itself. The final contrast challenges the habit of naming one's own response fortune; κατὰ φύσιν, in accordance with nature, remains explicit.

784. The fragment opens with the infinitive πράττειν used as an injunction. Wachsmuth supplies <χρὴ>, represented by bracketed must. The generic τις, someone, is made natural in English through you, continuing the direct address παιδίον, my child. Συλλαμβάνεσθαι is to assist or lend a hand: the speaker urges cooperation with fortune, rather than denying it every role. A pancratiast is an athlete in the pancration, a contest combining wrestling and striking.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 153-154

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Μενάνδρου II.8.7

Ἀτύχημα κἀδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει·
τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ’ αἱρέσει.

Εὐριπίδου Ὀρέστῃ II.8.8

Σὺ νῦν διάφερε τῶν κακῶν, ἔξεστι γὰρ
καὶ μὴ μόνον λέγ’, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρόνει τάδε.

Μενάνδρου Ῥαπιζομένῃ II.8.9

Ὁ μὴ δεχόμενος τῶν θεῶν τὸ σύμφορον
αὐτῶν διδόντων ἕνεκα τοῦ ζῆν οὐ βούλεται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Menander

II.8.7

Misfortune and wrongdoing differ:
the one comes about through fortune, the other through choice.[785]

Euripides in Orestes

II.8.8

Now distinguish yourself from the bad, for you can;
and do not merely say this, but think it too.[786]

Menander in The Woman Being Slapped

II.8.9

The man who refuses what is beneficial, when the gods themselves
give it for living, does not wish to live.[787]

785. Ἀτύχημα is an unlucky occurrence, ἀδίκημα a wrongful act. Αἵρεσις is choice; the distinction concerns how the two occur, not simply whether their outcomes are painful. The manuscripts attribute this item only to Menander. Wachsmuth's parenthetical comparison with The Woman Being Slapped does not supply an ancient play title to the heading.

786. Orestes 251–252. In the dialogue Orestes addresses Electra after her criticism of Helen's family. Τῶν κακῶν accordingly means the bad or wicked people; διάφερε urges her to be different from them. The source excerpt retains the positive command φρόνει, think, following λέγ', say. It is not rewritten into a different injunction drawn from a dramatic paraphrase.

787. The wording is difficult. Τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν διδόντων means when the gods themselves give, with τὸ σύμφορον, what is beneficial, understood as their gift. The final οὐ βούλεται, does not wish, has no expressed infinitive; the English supplies to live from the nearby τοῦ ζῆν. Wachsmuth retains the negative and states that the passage is not resolved. The translation gives this contextual construction without silently adopting a conjecture that removes the negative or changes the statement into a question.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 154

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<Anonymi> II.8.9a

τὸ δ’ ἀτυχεῖν ἢ τὸ μὴ
θεὸς δίδωσιν, οὐ τρόπου ’σθ’ ἁμαρτία.

Αἰσχύλου II.8.10

Κοινὸν τύχη, γνώμη δὲ τῶν κεκτημένων.

<Euripidis> II.8.11

Τὰ πλεῖστα θνητοῖς τῶν κακῶν αὐθαίρετα.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<Anonymous> II.8.9a

But being unfortunate, or not,
is given by a god; it is no fault of character.[788]

Aeschylus II.8.10

Fortune is common to all; judgment belongs to those who possess it.[789]

<Euripides> II.8.11

Most evils that mortals suffer are of their own choosing.[790]

788. Wachsmuth separates these two verses from the preceding Menander fragment and supplies the Latin heading Anonymi, of an anonymous author. The heading remains bracketed in both languages; the added letter a preserves his separate locator. Τὸ μή abbreviates not being unfortunate, and τρόπου here concerns character. The clause contrasts what a god gives with a fault of character. Wachsmuth considers the wording unresolved and discusses either a gap after gives or deletion of or not. Its compressed form is retained rather than replaced with an apparatus reconstruction.

789. Κοινόν means something shared in common, contrasted with the restricted possessors of γνώμη, judgment or understanding. The neuter κοινόν is retained as printed rather than changed to agree in gender with τύχη. The verse does not say that everyone has equally good judgment.

790. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution in Latin, Euripidis, on the evidence of the following heading, the same author. The supplement remains bracketed. Αὐθαίρετα means self-chosen; τὰ πλεῖστα, most, is essential and is not expanded to all. Suffer makes explicit the relation of the dative θνητοῖς, for mortals, to the evils.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 154-155

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.8.12

Ἔρωτες ἡμῖν εἰσι παντοῖοι βίου·
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐγένειαν ἱμείρει λαβεῖν,
τῷ δ' οὐχὶ τούτου φροντίς, ἀλλὰ χρημάτων
πολλῶν κεκλῆσθαι βούλεται πάτωρ δόμοις·
ἄλλῳ δ' ἀρέσκει μηδὲν ὑγιὲς ἐκ φρενῶν
λέγοντι πείθειν τοὺς πέλας τόλμῃ κακῇ·
οἳ δ' αἰσχρὰ κέρδη πρόσθε τοῦ καλοῦ βροτῶν
ζητοῦσιν· οὕτω βίοτος ἀνθρώπων πλάνη.
Ἐγὼ <δὲ> τούτων οὐδενὸς χρῄζω τυχεῖν,
δόξαν δὲ βουλοίμην ἂν εὐκλείας ἔχειν.

Ὁμήρου Ὀδυσσείας II.8.13

Εἰ μέν κε ἀσινέας ἐάας, νόστου τε μέδηαι,
καί κεν ἔτ' εἰς Ἰθάκην κακά περ πάσχοντες ἵκοισθε·
εἰ δέ κε σίνηαι, τότε τοι τεκμαίρομ' ὄλεθρον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

The same author

II.8.12

We have desires of every kind in life:
one longs to gain noble birth,
while another has no concern for that, but wants
to be called the father of great wealth in his house.[791]
Another likes to persuade his neighbors with wicked daring,
though nothing sound comes from his mind in speech;
and some mortals seek shameful gains before the noble.
Thus human life is a wandering astray.
I <however> have no wish to obtain any of these;
I would wish to have a reputation for honorable renown.[792]

Homer from the Odyssey

II.8.13

If you leave them unharmed and keep your return in mind,
you may yet reach Ithaca, though suffering hardships;
but if you harm them, then I foretell destruction for you.[793]

791. The same author refers to Euripides. Wachsmuth identifies the first eight verses with Rhadamanthys and notes their recurrence elsewhere in Stobaeus under that title. Εὐγένεια is noble birth, here an object of social aspiration. The unusual image father of wealth follows πάτωρ with κεκλῆσθαι, to be called; it is not silently changed into possessing wealth.

792. The contrast is between shameful gain and τὸ καλόν, the noble. Πλάνη is wandering or going astray. Supplied <δὲ> remains bracketed as however. The closing δόξαν εὐκλείας combines reputation with honorable renown; no particular deeds or prize are named. The first-person preference belongs to the fragment's speaker.

793. Odyssey XI.110–112: Tiresias warns Odysseus about the cattle of the Sun. Them refers to the cattle, whose identity is outside the quoted lines. Both conditions and the qualification though suffering hardships remain. The promise of return is conditional, not a guarantee independent of conduct.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδος II.8.14

Μήτηρ γάρ τέ μέ φησι, θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα,
διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλοςδε.
Εἰ μέν κ’ αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,
ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται.
Εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ’ ἵκομαι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ’ ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

Δημοσθένους ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου II.8.15

Ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργον ἅπασι πέπρακται· τῇ τύχῃ δ’, ἣν ὁ δαίμων ἔνειμεν ἑκάστῳ, ταύτῃ κέχρηνται.

Δημοκρίτου II.8.16

Ἄνθρωποι Τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο, πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίης. Βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκίη κατιθύνει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 155-156

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Homer from the Iliad

II.8.14

For my mother, the silver-footed goddess Thetis, tells me
that I carry two different fates toward my end in death.
If I stay here and fight around the Trojans' city,
my homecoming is lost, but my fame will never perish.
If I go home to my dear native land,
my noble fame is lost, but my life will endure
for a long time; the end that is death will not soon overtake me.[794]

Demosthenes in On the Crown

II.8.15

For what was the task of good men has been done by all; and the fortune that the divine power allotted to each is the fortune they have had.[795]

Democritus

II.8.16

People fashioned an image of Fortune as an excuse for their own lack of judgment. For fortune opposes practical wisdom in few things, while intelligent clear sight directs most things in life.[796]

794. Iliad IX.410–416. Achilles describes the alternatives reported by his mother: death at Troy with lasting fame, or return with a long life. Κῆρες are the two fates concerning his death; the alternatives are conditional. The accusative μέ is the subject of φερέμεν: Achilles carries the two fates. The English follows the seven lines as Wachsmuth prints them, including ἵκομαι in the homecoming condition, rather than substituting the wording of another Homeric edition.

795. On the Crown XVIII.208. The contrast separates the honorable task performed by the agents from the fortune allotted to each. Δαίμων here is a divine power, not a demon in the later sense. The perfects πέπρακται and κέχρηνται look back on what has been done and the fortune experienced; they do not promise control of the outcome.

796. Εἴδωλον is an image or likeness, here something people fashion to excuse ἀβουλίη, failure to deliberate well. The Ionic forms ἰδίης, ἀβουλίης, and ὀξυδερκίη remain in the Greek. The qualification few things, followed by most things, leaves a role for fortune; it is not a claim that judgment controls every event. Wachsmuth discusses a different wording of the first part transmitted through Eusebius, but the translation follows the text printed here.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἀναξιμένους II.8.17

Τὸ γὰρ δυσλόγιστον τοῦ βίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τύχην προσαγορεύειν εἰώθαμεν. Εἰ γὰρ ταῖς γνώμαις πάντα κατωρθοῦμεν, ὄνομα τῆς τύχης οὐκ ἂν ἦν.

Ἐπανδρίδου II.8.18

Φρόνιμος ὁ δι' ἑαυτὸν εὖ πρήσσων, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην μακάριος.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.8.19

Φρόνησις εὐτυχίην ὡς τὰ πολλὰ χαρίζεται, τύχη δὲ φρόνησιν οὐ ποιέει.

Θουκυδίδου δημηγορίας Ἀθηναίων II.8.20

Πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Anaximenes II.8.17

For we are accustomed to call the part of human life that is hard to calculate fortune. For if we got everything right through our judgments, there would be no name for fortune.[797]

Epandrides II.8.18

The man who prospers through himself is wise; the man who does so through fortune is blessed.[798]

The same author II.8.19

Practical wisdom generally brings good fortune, but fortune does not produce practical wisdom.[799]

Thucydides from the Athenians' Speech II.8.20

Everyone may, without reproach, make good provision for their interests in the face of the greatest dangers.[800]

797. Δυσλόγιστον is what is difficult to reckon or calculate, rather than necessarily irrational. The counterfactual condition follows the printed κατωρθοῦμεν, if we got things right; the consequence is that the name fortune would have no place. The heading gives Anaximenes without further identification.

798. Εὖ πρήσσων means doing well or prospering. The contrast assigns wisdom to success achieved through oneself and blessedness to success through fortune. The attribution Epandrides remains as printed. Wachsmuth calls the name unknown among philosophers and records proposed identifications; the fragment does not securely identify a particular author or school.

799. The same author refers to Epandrides in the preceding heading. Ὡς τὰ πολλά means for the most part or generally, an essential limit on the first claim. Εὐτυχίη is good fortune, whereas the second clause has the broader τύχη, fortune. The Ionic forms εὐτυχίην and ποιέει remain as printed.

800. Thucydides I.75.4, in the Athenian envoys' speech at Sparta. Ἀνεπίφθονον describes what is not subject to resentment or reproach; the infinitive explains what may be done without that reproach. The assertion belongs to the speakers' defense of their conduct, rather than being detached from the speech as Thucydides' own unqualified judgment.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 156-157

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Διογένους II.8.21

Διογένης ἔφη νομίζειν ὁρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορούουσαν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν

Τοῦτον δ’ οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητῆρα.

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου Ἐγχειριδίου II.8.22

Νόσος σώματός ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρέσεως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴ θελήσῃ. Χώλωσις σκέλους ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον, <προαιρέσεως δὲ οὔ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ἐπίλεγε· εὑρήσεις γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐμπόδιον,> σὸν δ’ οὔ.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.8.23

Μὴ ζήτει τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι ὡς θέλεις, ἀλλὰ θέλε ὡς τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεται καὶ εὑροήσεις.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Diogenes

II.8.21

Diogenes said he thought he saw Fortune leaping at him and saying:

But this raging dog I cannot strike.[801]

From Epictetus's Handbook

II.8.22

Disease is a hindrance to the body, but not to choice, unless choice itself wishes it. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, <but not to choice. Say this to yourself about each thing that befalls you; for you will find it a hindrance to something else,> but not to you.[802]

<The same author>

II.8.23

Do not seek for events to happen as you wish, but wish for events as they happen, and you will proceed smoothly.[803]

801. The quoted verse is Iliad VIII.299. The anecdote puts a Homeric line into Fortune's mouth: Diogenes imagines himself as the dog she cannot hit. The movement expressed by ἐνορούουσαν is difficult and has been variously emended; leaping at him follows Wachsmuth's printed form. The account reports what Diogenes thought he saw, without converting the imagined encounter into a literal event.

802. Handbook 9. Προαίρεσις, choice, is the capacity for deliberate moral choice central to Epictetus's account. The distinction acknowledges bodily hindrances while locating the final you in that capacity. Wachsmuth prints a long supplement drawn from the Handbook, beginning but not to choice after leg and ending hindrance to something else. It remains bracketed throughout in both languages; the final but not to you is outside it. The Greek retains θελήσῃ and σὸν as printed here.

803. Handbook 8. Wachsmuth supplies the heading the same author to separate this excerpt from the preceding one; the attribution remains bracketed. Εὐροήσεις means you will flow well or have a smooth course, the image retained in proceed smoothly. The translation follows the printed order of the second clause and does not insert the extra infinitive found in a different wording of the Handbook.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Κρίτωνος Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ φρονήσιος II.8.24.1

Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὕτως ἐτεχνάσατο τὸν ἄνθρωπον, δηλόμενος αὐτὸν μήτ' ἀδυνάτως ἔχεν ποττὰν τῶν καλῶν ὁρμάν, μήτε μὰν πάλιν ἀπροαιρέτως. Ἀρχὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐνεφύτευσε τοιαύταν, ἅ τις καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἅμα περιέχει καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν, ἵνα τᾶς μὲν δυνάμιος καὶ κατοχᾶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἦῃ, τᾶς δ' ἐπὶ ταῦτα παρορμάσιος καὶ κατ' ὀρθὸν λόγον ὀπαδήσιος ὁ θεός.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Crito the Pythagorean from On Practical Wisdom

II.8.24.1

For God fashioned the human being in this way, wishing him neither to lack the power to strive toward noble things nor, on the other hand, to do so without choice.[804] For he implanted in him a principle of such a kind that it includes both the power to act and the ability to choose, so that the human being himself might be responsible for the capacity for good things and their possession, while God is responsible for the encouragement toward them and the guidance that accords with right reason.[805]

804. The heading attributes the excerpt to Crito the Pythagorean and names a work on practical wisdom; it does not cite Plato's dialogue Crito. The Doric title φρονήσιος corresponds to φρονήσεως, practical wisdom. Other dialect forms include δηλόμενος, wishing, and ἔχεν, to have or be in a condition. The two negatives distinguish inability to strive for noble things from striving without choice; the passage rejects both conditions.

805. Ἀρχά is a principle or source of action. Τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ προαιρετόν distinguish ability from choice. The paired clauses assign responsibility to the human agent and to God: αὐτός refers to the human being, while ὁ θεός is the explicit subject of the second clause. Κατοχά is possession or holding fast, and ὀπαδήσις is guidance or leading along. The passage coordinates human responsibility with divine encouragement.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 157-158

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Κρίτωνος Πυθαγορείου — συνέχεια II.8.24.2

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναθρῴσκοντα αὐτὸν ἐποίησε εἰς [τὸν] ὠρανὸν καὶ αὐτὸ νοατὸν καὶ ὄψιν αὐτῷ ἐνέφυσε τοιαύταν, τὸν προσαγορευόμενον νόον, ᾧ τὸν θεὸν ὀψεῖται. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ θεῶ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον ἦν εὑρὲν οὔτ' ἄνευ νόω ἰδὲν τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ θνατὸν φύσιν ἔχει μετὰ ἀφροσύνας συγγενέος ῥιζοῦσθαι· καὶ ταύταν οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἐστιν ὁ δωρούμενος, ἀλλ' ἃ τᾶς γενέσιος οὐσία καὶ τᾶς αὐτῶν ψυχᾶς ἃ προαίρεσις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Crito the Pythagorean continued

II.8.24.2

And for this reason he made him rise toward heaven and the intelligible itself, and implanted in him a kind of sight, what is called intellect, by which he will see God.[806] For without God it was not possible to find what is best and most beautiful, nor without intellect to see God himself, since everything mortal naturally takes root with an inborn lack of understanding. It is not God who bestows this lack of understanding, but the substance of coming to be and the choice of their own soul.[807]

806. The printed ἀναθρῴσκοντα conveys rising or springing upward. Wachsmuth retains this unusual expression rather than replacing it with the proposed verb for looking upward. The Greek retains rejected [τὸν] before heaven; the English follows its deletion. Αὐτὸ νοατόν means the intelligible itself, not that the human being is himself intelligible. The following explanation identifies the sight in question with νόος, intellect, rather than with bodily eyesight.

807. The Doric forms θεῶ and νόω correspond to the genitives θεοῦ and νοῦ. The final ταύταν refers to ἀφροσύνα, lack of understanding; it does not refer to intellect. The text locates this deficiency in the nature of coming to be and the soul's own choice, expressly denying that God gives it. The plural αὐτῶν, their own, follows the general reference to mortal beings; the accompanying ψυχᾶς, soul, is singular in the Greek. This is the continuation and end of excerpt 24; the added subdivision serves layout only.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐκ τοῦ Πλουτάρχου εἰ ἡ τῶν μελλόντων πρόγνωσις ὠφέλιμος · 1

II.8.25.1

Ὁ δὲ Νέστωρ οὐκ ἀβέλτερος; ὕπνου φθονῶν τοῖς τὰς ναῦς φυλάσσουσι καὶ διακελευόμενος,

οὕτω νῦν φίλα τέκνα φυλάσσετε, μηδέ τιν’ ὕπνος
αἱρείτω, μὴ χάρμα γενώμεθα δυσμενέεσσιν·
Οὐ γενησόμεθα, φησί τις, οὐδ’ ἂν καθεύδωμεν, εἰ πεπρωμένον ἐστὶ μὴ ἁλῶναι τὸν ναύσταθμον.

Πλουτάρχου · συνέχεια

II.8.25.2

Τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα ληροῦντας, ὅτι καθείμαρται μὲν ἴσως ἅπαντα ταῦτα, συγκαθείμαρται δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ διὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτοις καὶ <τὸ> οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄλλως συντελεῖσθαι δίχα τούτων; Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι φυλακὴ καθευδόντων οὐδὲ νίκη φευγόντων οὐδὲ θερίσαι μὴ σπειράντων τὴν ἀγαθὴν γῆν καὶ καθαρὰν οὐδὲ γεννῆσαι μὴ συγγενόμενον γυναικὶ ἡλικίαν ἐχούσῃ καὶ σώματος φύσιν γόνιμον οὐδὲ ἄγρας τυχεῖν ἐν ἀθήροις χωρίοις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From Plutarch, Whether Foreknowledge of Future Events Is Useful · 1

II.8.25.1

And was Nestor not foolish, begrudging sleep to the men guarding the ships and urging them:

So keep watch now, dear children, and let sleep take no one,
lest we become a joy to our enemies?
We shall not become one, someone says, even if we sleep, if it is fated that the naval station will not be captured.[808]

Plutarch · Continuation

II.8.25.2

Who would not say to those who babble such things that perhaps all this has been fated, but co-fated with each thing is its being accomplished through these conditions, within them, in this way, and not otherwise, apart from them?[809] For there is no watch kept by sleepers, nor victory for men who flee; nor can there be harvesting without sowing good, clean soil, or begetting without intercourse with a woman who is of age and has a fertile bodily constitution, or catching game in places where there is no game.[810]

808. Iliad X.192–193. Nestor exhorts the guards at the Greek ships. The objection treats the camp's safety as fated independently of their keeping watch; the reply in the continuation challenges that independence. The opening question and the imaginary speaker's response are stages of the argument. Wachsmuth cites this Plutarch fragment as XV.3. The numbered layout divisions here do not introduce new ancient excerpts.

809. Συγκαθείμαρται means has been co-fated: the means and conditions are included with the outcome. The reply thus rejects the inference that a fated outcome makes the corresponding action unnecessary. The repeated through these, within these, in this way, and not otherwise deliberately emphasizes those connections. Supplied <τὸ> is the article that makes in this way parallel to the other nominal clauses; English absorbs it into the shared construction its being accomplished.

810. The examples specify different necessary conditions: wakefulness for guarding, standing rather than fleeing for victory, sowing for harvest, intercourse and fertility for begetting, and the presence of game for hunting. The agricultural wording retains both good and clean, corresponding to ἀγαθήν and καθαράν. No claim that effort guarantees every desired outcome is added to these examples.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Αἰσχίνου II.8.26

Ἀνθρώπῳ δέ τοι οὐκ ἄπορον καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἶναι.

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου Ἐγχειριδίου II.8.27

Μέμνησο ὅτι ὑποκριτὴς εἶ δράματος, οἷον ἂν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος· ἂν βραχύ, βραχέος· ἂν μακρόν, μακροῦ· ἂν πτωχὸν ὑποκρίνασθαί <σε> θέλῃ, τοῦτον ἵνα καλῶς ὑποκρίνῃ· ἂν χωλόν, ἂν ἄρχοντα, ἂν ἰδιώτην. Σὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ δοθὲν πρόσωπον ὑποκρίνασθαι καλῶς, ἐκλέξασθαι δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ἄλλου.

Ἐπικούρου II.8.28

Βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα λογισμὸς διῴκηκε κατὰ τὸν βίον συνεχῆ χρόνον.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Aeschines

II.8.26

Surely it is not beyond a human being to be noble and good.[811]

From Epictetus's Handbook

II.8.27

Remember that you are an actor in a play of whatever kind the director wishes: if short, in a short one; if long, in a long one. If he wishes <you> to play a beggar, see that you play that part well; likewise if your part is a lame man, a ruler, or a private citizen.[812] For your task is to play the assigned role well; choosing the role belongs to someone else.[813]

Epicurus

II.8.28

Fortune makes only a small intrusion upon the wise person; reason has managed the greatest and most decisive matters throughout life's continuous course.[814]

811. Καλὸν κἀγαθόν combines noble and good; the contraction κἀγαθόν joins καί and ἀγαθόν. Οὐκ ἄπορον means not impossible or not beyond one's resources. Wachsmuth's reference is to Hermann's collection of the Socratic Aeschines, rather than to a named speech by the Athenian orator.

812. Handbook 17. Διδάσκαλος, literally teacher, is the person who trains and directs the actors. Ὑποκριτής here means actor. The roles include poverty, bodily impairment, public authority, and private station. Supplied <σε> is shown as <you>. The local wording οἷον, τοῦτον ἵνα καλῶς, and the final repeated πρόσωπον remain as Wachsmuth prints them.

813. Πρόσωπον can denote a theatrical mask, character, or role. The metaphor places the quality of the performance with the actor while assigning selection of the role to another. The final ἄλλου, of someone else, does not itself name that director as god.

814. Principal Doctrine XVI, also preserved at Diogenes Laertius X.144. The claim limits fortune's interference while assigning the greatest and most decisive matters to λογισμός, reason or rational calculation. Wachsmuth's local text has the single perfect διῴκηκε, has managed, followed by its unusual phrase about continuous time through life. The longer sequence has managed, manages, and will manage in the Diogenes Laertius parallel is not inserted here.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Σωκράτους II.8.29

Σωκράτης ἔφη μεγίστην μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν βασιλείαν, ἀρίστην δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν.

Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας · 1 II.8.30.1

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔθετο ὁ θεός, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ σπουδαιότατον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. Τοῦτο γὰρ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον ἐλευθερία ἐστίν, εὔροια, εὐθυμία, εὐστάθεια, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δίκη ἐστὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ξύμπασα ἀρετή.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Socrates

II.8.29

Socrates said that kingship is the greatest rule, but ruling oneself is the best.[815]

Rufus from Epictetus's On Friendship · 1

II.8.30.1

Of existing things, god made some up to us and others not up to us. What he made up to us was the finest and most excellent thing, that through which he himself is happy: the use of impressions.[816] For when this is done correctly, it is freedom, a smooth course, cheerfulness, and steadiness; it is also justice and law and self-control and all virtue.[817]

815. The saying distinguishes μεγίστην, greatest in extent or power, from ἀρίστην, best in quality. The repetition of the root in ἀρχή, rule, and ἄρχειν, to rule, carries the contrast from kingship to self-government. The anthology reports the statement as a saying of Socrates without naming a source work.

816. The heading preserves both names: Rufus, from the writings of Epictetus On Friendship. It can be understood as words of Musonius Rufus quoted by Epictetus; the layered attribution is retained instead of assigning the passage exclusively to one author. Wachsmuth compares Epictetus fragment 169 in Schweighäuser; the passage is fragment 4 in Oldfather's collection.

817. Φαντασίαι are impressions, the appearances presented to the mind; their χρῆσις is the use made of them. The account identifies their correct use with freedom and virtue. Εὔροια, a smooth course or flow, continues the image seen in II.8.23. The striking claim that god himself is happy through this use belongs to the source and remains explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας · συνέχεια II.8.30.2

Τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐποιήσατο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς συμψήφους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι καὶ ταύτῃ διελόντας τὰ πράγματα, τῶν μὲν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πάντα τρόπον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ εἴτε τῶν παίδων δέοιτο, εἴτε τῆς πατρίδος, εἴτε τοῦ σώματος, εἴτε ὁτουοῦν, ἀσμένους παραχωρεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Rufus from Epictetus's On Friendship · Continuation

II.8.30.2

But all other things he made not up to us. Therefore we too must agree with god and, dividing things in this way, lay claim in every way to what is up to us, entrust what is not up to us to the cosmos, and gladly yield whatever it may need, whether our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.[818]

818. Συμψήφους, literally voting together or in agreement, describes assent to god's division of things. Ἀντιποιεῖσθαι is to claim or hold to something, contrasted with entrusting externals to the cosmos. The closing examples place children, homeland, and body among those externals in this account. Ἀσμένους, gladly, emphasizes the willing character of the assent; δέοιτο presents the cosmos as having need of what is yielded.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἑρμοῦ II.8.31.1

Ἔστι τοίνυν οὐσία καὶ λόγος καὶ νόημα καὶ διάνοια. Φέρεται δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις. Ἴεται δ’ ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ νόημα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἴεται. Ἐμπλέκεται δὲ τὸ νόημα τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἐλθόντα δὲ δι’ ἀλλήλων μία ἰδέα ἐγένοντο, αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς. Φέρεται δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς διάνοιαν δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις· ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ μένει, ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἐλλείπει καὶ ἑαυτῷ διαφέρεται· χεῖρον μὲν γίνεται, ὅταν ἀποσπασθῇ τῆς διανοίας· ὅταν δὲ ἀκολουθῇ καὶ πείθηται, κοινωνεῖ τῷ νοηματικῷ λόγῳ διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων.

Ἑρμοῦ — συνέχεια II.8.31.2

Τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖσθαι ἔχομεν, τὸ γὰρ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκουσίως· ἐχομένη γὰρ αἵρεσις τῶν κακῶν πλησιάζει τῇ σωματικῇ φύσει, διὰ <τε> τοῦτο τῷ ἑλομένῳ εἱμαρμένη δυναστεύει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Hermes

II.8.31.1

There are, then, substance, reason, conception, and understanding.[819] Opinion and perception are also borne toward understanding. Reason moves toward substance, and conception moves through reason. Conception is intertwined with understanding; passing through one another, they became a single form, and this is the form of the soul. Opinion and perception are borne toward its understanding; these do not remain in the same condition. As a result, it overshoots, falls short, and disagrees with itself. It becomes worse when it is separated from understanding; but when it follows and obeys, it shares in conceptual reason through learning.[820]

Hermes continued

II.8.31.2

But we have the power to choose; for choosing the better is up to us, and likewise choosing the worse, unwillingly.[821] For a choice that clings to evils draws near to bodily nature, <and> for this reason fate has dominion over the person who made the choice.[822]

819. The four opening terms are kept distinct: οὐσία, substance; λόγος, reason; νόημα, conception or a thought; and διάνοια, understanding or the activity of thinking. Their distinction matters to the account of how the soul's form arises. Νοηματικός is rendered conceptual, retaining its relation to νόημα. The heading attributes the excerpt to Hermes without naming a work.

820. The Greek shifts from plural ταῦτα, these, referring to opinion and perception, to singular verbs and ἑαυτῷ, with itself. The English preserves the shift rather than inserting soul as a definite new subject. The pair is treated collectively as unstable when separated from understanding. Μαθήματα are things learned or branches of learning; the text connects them with participation in reason.

821. The printed ἀκουσίως means unwillingly or involuntarily. Its relation to the assertion that choosing is up to us is difficult. Wachsmuth rejects changing it to ἑκουσίως, willingly, while considering whether an additional adversative might be needed. The English retains unwillingly and does not resolve the tension by reversing the word's meaning.

822. Αἵρεσις is choice; ἐχομένη describes its clinging to evils, and ἑλομένῳ is the person who has chosen. Εἱμαρμένη is fate, while δυναστεύει expresses its rule or dominion. Supplied <τε> is represented by <and>. The account ties subjection to fate to the choice's approach to bodily nature.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἑρμοῦ — συνέχεια

II.8.31.3

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσώματος οὐσία αὐτεξούσιός ἐστιν ὥσπερ ὁ νοηματικὸς λόγος, αὕτη δ’ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, διὰ τοῦτο εἱμαρμένη ταύτης οὐχ ἅπτεται, παραθεῖσα δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ διανοητικὸν λόγον, προΐησι καὶ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὃν συνέταξε φύσις τοῖς γιγνομένοις· τούτοις ψυχὴ κοινωνήσασα κοινωνεῖται ταῖς τούτων εἱμαρμέναις, ἀμέτοχος οὖσα τῆς τῶν γινομένων φύσεως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Hermes continued

II.8.31.3

Since, then, the incorporeal substance in us is self-governing, like conceptual reason, and always remains in the same and unchanging condition, fate does not touch it.[823] But, having set before itself the primary discursive reason from the first God, it also lets go of the entire reason that nature assigned to things that come to be. A soul that has shared in these things shares in their fates, although it has no share in the nature of things that come to be.[824]

823. Αὐτεξούσιος is self-governing or possessed of authority over itself. Wachsmuth prints ἀσώματος, incorporeal, against a transmitted bodily reading. The distinction between the unchanging incorporeal substance and its involvement with generated things governs the contrast between freedom and fate. Διανοητικός, discursive, belongs to the vocabulary of διάνοια and is distinguished here from νοηματικός, conceptual.

824. The construction is difficult. The English takes παραθεῖσα as having set before itself and προΐησι as lets go; these verbs can carry other senses. Their objects and the clause division follow Wachsmuth's punctuation. The final concession is explicit: the soul shares the fates of generated things despite not sharing their nature. This is the end of excerpt 31; the numbered subdivisions serve layout only.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐκ τοῦ Πλουτάρχου Περὶ φιλίας · 1 II.8.32.1

Ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ παντάπασι ταπεινοῦν τὴν φύσιν ὡς μηδὲν ἰσχυρὸν μηδὲ μόνιμον μηδὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν τύχην ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον εἰδότας ὅτι μικρόν ἐστι μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σαθρόν τε καὶ ἐπίκηρον ὃ δέχεται τὴν τύχην, τῆς δὲ βελτίονος μερίδος αὐτοὶ κρατοῦμεν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱδρυνθέντα, δόξαι τε χρησταὶ καὶ μαθήματα καὶ λόγοι τελευτῶντες εἰς ἀρετὴν ἀναφαίρετον ἔχουσι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον,

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From Plutarch's On Friendship · 1

II.8.32.1

Therefore we should not altogether belittle our nature as though it had nothing strong, stable, or above fortune.[825] On the contrary, we should recognize that it is a small part of the human being, frail and perishable, that is open to fortune, while we ourselves control the better part. There the greatest goods are established—sound opinions, learning, and reasonings leading to virtue—and their substance can neither be taken away nor destroyed.[826]

825. The heading On Friendship is retained as printed in Wachsmuth. The passage also survives in Plutarch's On Tranquillity of Mind 17, Moralia 475D–E; the difference in the transmitted title is not resolved by changing this anthology's heading. The numbered divisions are for bilingual layout and remain parts of a single excerpt.

826. Σαθρόν means unsound or frail, and ἐπίκηρον liable to perish. Οὐσία, rendered substance, can also denote property or possessions; here it belongs to the inner goods that cannot be confiscated or destroyed. Χρηστaί describes the opinions as sound or good, rather than explicitly calling them knowledge. The Greek retains the unusual printed ἱδρυνθέντα, established.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πλουτάρχου · συνέχεια

II.8.32.2

ἀνεκπλήκτους πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ θαρραλέους καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην λέγοντας, <ἃ> Σωκράτης, δοκῶν πρὸς τοὺς κατηγόρους λέγειν, πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος δύνανται, βλάψαι δὲ οὐ δύνανται. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ τύχη δύναται νόσῳ περιβαλεῖν, ἀφελέσθαι χρήματα, διαβαλεῖν πρὸς δῆμον ἢ τύραννον· κακὸν δὲ καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ταπεινόφρονα καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ φθονερὸν οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ μεγαλόψυχον <καὶ γενναῖον καὶ ἐλευθέριον>, οὐδὲ παρελέσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν καλῶν.

Πλάτωνος

II.8.33

Τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται, ᾧ δ’ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα ἡγεῖται, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Plutarch · Continuation

II.8.32.2

We should be undaunted and confident about the future and say to fortune <what> Socrates, while seeming to address his accusers, said to the judges: Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot harm me.[827] For fortune can indeed inflict disease, take away possessions, and slander a man before the people or a tyrant. But it cannot make the good and manly and magnanimous <and noble and generous> man bad, cowardly, low-minded, ignoble, or envious; nor can it take away his disposition toward noble things.[828]

Plato

II.8.33

Things that happen through fortune do not come about through human guidance. Where a human being is a guide toward what is right, these two are the guides: true opinion and knowledge.[829]

827. The opening continues the exhortation begun in II.8.32.1. Supplied <ἃ> appears as <what>. Anytus and Meletus were Socrates's accusers; the distinction between killing and harming recalls Plato, Apology 30C–D. This excerpt gives the saying in its own indirect form and directs its force toward the judges as well as the accusers.

828. Wachsmuth supplies the whole phrase <καὶ γενναῖον καὶ ἐλευθέριον>, represented by the bracketed continuation noble and generous. All the adjectives describe the same man. Ἀνδρώδη, manly, commends courage in the account's idiom. The final disposition toward noble things follows τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν καλῶν; the local wording is retained rather than replaced by the longer continuation in On Tranquillity of Mind.

829. Meno 99A. The excerpt distinguishes what happens by fortune from action guided by a person, and identifies true opinion and knowledge as the two guides to correctness. Δόξα ἀληθής is true opinion, contrasted with ἐπιστήμη, knowledge; the contrast does not make every opinion false. The compressed final wording follows this anthology's local text.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.8.34

Αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστὶ καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.8.35

Τί δέ; οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας ὡς ἅπασαι αἰσχραί, ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί; Ἢ δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<The same author> II.8.34

True opinions, for as long as they remain, are a fine thing and produce every good thing. But they are unwilling to remain for long and run away from the human soul. So they are not worth much until someone binds them by reasoning about the cause.[830] Once bound, they first become knowledge, and then stable. This is why knowledge is more valuable than right opinion and differs from it by the bond.[831]

The same author II.8.35

What then? Have you not noticed how opinions without knowledge are all ugly, with the best of them blind? Or do those who believe something true without understanding seem to differ at all from blind men traveling correctly along a road?[832]

830. Meno 97E–98A. Wachsmuth supplies the heading the same author, separating this passage from the preceding excerpt; it remains bracketed. In the dialogue the comparison has just been made with Daedalus's statues, which are said to run away unless tied down. The anthology begins with the true opinions rather than including that illustration.

831. Αἰτίας λογισμῷ is reasoning about the cause or reason why. The bond makes the opinions stable and thus accounts for the superior value assigned to knowledge. Plato's intervening remark identifying this binding with recollection is absent from the anthology and is not supplied in the translation. The plural ἐπιστῆμαι is rendered by the English mass noun knowledge.

832. Republic VI.506C. Socrates compares true opinion unsupported by understanding with a blind person who nevertheless travels the correct road. The comparison grants the correctness of the result while questioning its basis. The best opinions are called blind, not false. Αἰσχραί, ugly or shameful, retains the negative assessment of opinions held without knowledge.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.8.36

Ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἁπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσει εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πῃ αὐτοῦ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδε ἐξέγρεσθαι, εἰς ᾅδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.8.37

Τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι <καὶ> ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 162-163

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<The same author> II.8.36

If someone cannot distinguish the form of the good by an account, setting it apart from everything else, and make his way through all tests as in battle, eager to test according to essence rather than opinion, passing through all this without his account stumbling, one will not say that such a person knows the good itself or any other good whatsoever.[833] Rather, if in some way he touches an image of it, he does so by opinion, not knowledge; and, dreaming and sleeping through his present life, he will reach Hades before awakening here and fall completely asleep.[834]

The same author II.8.37

The opinion about noble and just <and> good things and their opposites that is genuinely true and firmly confirmed—whenever it arises in souls, I declare it divine and say that it comes into being in a godlike kind.[835]

833. Republic VII.534B–D. The supplied heading the same author remains bracketed. The passage describes the demands of dialectical examination: distinguishing the form of the good and sustaining an account through objections. Οὐσία here means essence or what a thing is, contrasted with opinion. Wachsmuth prints the third-person φήσει, will say; one will not say preserves that local shift instead of importing the dialogue's second-person you will say.

834. The contrast between touching an image through opinion and knowing the good leads into the images of dreaming, waking, and death. Hades is the realm of the dead. The last clause keeps the printed infinitive ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν, to fall asleep completely, rather than replacing it with a different form from the Republic's direct tradition.

835. Statesman 309C. The speaker is the Eleatic Stranger, who is explaining the divine bond by which the statesman joins different characters. Βεβαίωσις is confirmation or firm assurance, making this more than an unstable belief. Supplied <καὶ> is represented by <and>. Δαιμόνιος here means godlike, and γένος a kind or class; the language associates this confirmed true opinion with a divine kind of being.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 162-163

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.8.38

Ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ <οὐκ> ἔστι δημιουργός.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

<The same author>

II.8.38

For when knowledge fails, the person who errs errs in a respect in which he is <not> an expert practitioner.[836]

836. Republic I.340E. This is part of Thrasymachus's reply to Socrates: in the strict use of a professional title, error occurs when the relevant expertise has failed. Δημιουργός here is a practitioner of a craft or profession, such as a physician. Wachsmuth supplies both the heading the same author and the crucial negative <οὐκ>; both remain bracketed in English. The Greek retains the local aorist ἐπιλιπούσης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 163

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν

II.8.39.1

Ἐν ταῖς πρῴην ἡμῖν γεγονυίαις, Χρυσάοριε, πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλέξεσι τὸν περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν βίων ἀνακινήσαντες λόγον, ἣν ταῖς ἔξω ψυχαῖς ἀπονείμας ὁ Πλάτων κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ὅλως τὸ αὐτεξούσιον λεγόμενον ἀναιρεῖν, εἴγε ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων κατὰ τὴν προτέραν περίοδον καὶ ὧν ἠγάπησαν ἢ ἐμίσησαν ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς ἥσθησαν ἢ ἐλυπήθησαν ἠθοπεποιημέναι ἐπὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἔρχονται, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδόκει ἐᾶν, ὡς εἰς ἀπολογίαν δυνάμενα παρασχεῖν τινας πιθανότητας· ἃ δὲ μετὰ τὸ ἑλέσθαι καὶ μέλλειν τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν εἰς τὰ σώματα εἰσκρίσεως παθεῖν αὐτὰς ἔφη, χαλεπὰ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο,

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 163-164

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry, On What Is Up to Us

II.8.39.1

In our former discussions with one another, Chrysaorius, we raised the question of the choice of lives. By assigning this choice to souls outside bodies, Plato seems in danger of abolishing what is up to us and what is generally called self-government, if indeed the souls come to choose with their characters already formed by what they have lived through in the previous cycle and by what they loved or hated, or what pleased or pained them.[837] It seemed best to leave these matters aside, since they allowed some plausible lines of defense. But the things he said they undergo through their admission into bodies, once they have chosen and are about to produce particular human beings, seemed difficult to us.[838]

837. Porphyry addresses Chrysaorius and examines the choice of lives in Plato's Myth of Er, Republic X.617D–621B. The relative ἣν refers to the choice assigned to souls outside bodies. The objection is conditional: if earlier experience has already formed their characters, how free is their later choice? The argument does not begin by asserting that Plato has conclusively abolished freedom.

838. The discussion sets aside the objection from prior habituation because plausible defenses are available, then turns to the stronger difficulty about what follows the choice. Εἴσκρισις is admission or entry, here into bodies. The active ἀποφαίνειν describes souls bringing particular human beings into manifestation. This is the opening of one continuous excerpt; the added numerical subdivisions serve bilingual layout only.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 163-164

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.2

ποτὲ μὲν λέγοντος „ὁ πρῶτος αἱρείσθω βίον ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης“, ποτὲ δὲ, ὅτι ὃν εἰλήχαμεν δαίμονα ἀναπόδραστός τις ἡμῖν φρουρός. Τὴν γὰρ Λάχεσιν, ἥτις τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ θυγάτηρ, τῷ λαχόντι καὶ ἑλομένῳ τινὰ βίον συμπέμπειν φύλακά τε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἀποπληρωτὴν τοῦ αἱρεθέντος· ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Κλωθὼ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρα καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ ἀτράκτου ἀγαγὼν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν Ἄτροπον τὴν τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦσαν ἀμετάτροπα,

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.2

At one point he says, “Let the first choose a life with which he will be joined by necessity”; at another, he says that the daimon allotted to us is an inescapable guardian.[839] For Lachesis, who is a daughter of Necessity, sends along with the person who has drawn a lot and chosen a life a guardian of that life and a fulfiller, in every respect, of what has been chosen. This guardian takes the chooser and leads him to Clotho, beneath her hand and the turning of the spindle, and afterward to Atropos, who makes what has been spun irreversible.[840]

839. Republic X.617E and 620D–621A. Daimon here means the guardian spirit associated with the chosen life. The excerpt concentrates on its inescapable guardianship as part of the problem about necessity. The quoted wording is Porphyry’s form of the Platonic passage as printed by Wachsmuth; it is not replaced with the wording of another Republic edition.

840. Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos are the three Fates in the myth. Their relation to Necessity and the spindle gives the choice its binding force. The masculine guardian takes the person who chose the life; the subject is not Lachesis in this clause. The local ἀμετάτροπα means irreversible. The sentence continues into II.8.39.3.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.39.3

ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἄγει θρόνον καὶ δι’ ἐκείνου διεξελθεῖν ποιήσας ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀπάγει εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, ἀφ’ οὗ μέτρον μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πιόντας πάντων ἐκλανθάνεσθαι. Οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐπικεκλωσμένων καὶ κατηναγκασμένων καὶ ἐπικεκυρωμένων ὑπὸ Μοιρῶν τε καὶ Λήθης καὶ Ἀνάγκης, ἑπομένου καὶ παραφυλάττοντος τὴν εἱμαρμένην τοῦ δαίμονος, τίνος ἂν εἴημεν κύριοι ἢ πῶς ἔτι „ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀδέσποτος, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἕξει“;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.3

From there he leads him, with no turning back, beneath the throne of Necessity. After making him pass through it with the others, he takes him away to the plain of Forgetfulness, beside the river Ameles. From this river, he says, they must drink a measure of water, and those who drink forget everything.[841] With all this thus spun, constrained, and ratified by the Fates, Forgetfulness, and Necessity, and with the daimon following and keeping watch over fate, what could we be masters of? Or how could it still be true that "virtue has no master; each person will have more or less of it as he honors or dishonors it"?[842]

841. Republic X.621A. The plain is named Lethe, Forgetfulness; Ameles is the river beside it. The local text says that drinking causes complete forgetting. Its ἐκλανθάνεσθαι is retained rather than replaced by the different verb in the direct Platonic tradition. The movement beneath Necessity's throne and the drinking belong to the myth under discussion.

842. The concluding quotation returns to Republic X.617E. Ἀδέσποτος means without a master; it does not mean without moral responsibility. The question is how this claim can stand together with the myth's constraints. These are objections being recalled and developed, not yet Porphyry's final answer. His reply follows in II.8.39.4.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.39.4

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λαβὼν μικρὰν ἡμᾶς ἀπεσφάλθαι τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου γνώμης κατεῖδον, ἐθαυμάσαμεν τοὺς ἀπορήσαντας. Βίους γὰρ αὐτοὺς μόνον λέγειν ἡγησάμενοι καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τὰ περὶ βίον πραγματευσάμενοι μέμνηνται γεωργικοῦ τινος βίου καὶ πάλιν πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἄλλου στρατιωτικοῦ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ἐν ἀνθρώποις θεωρουμένων βίων καὶ τούτων τῆς αἱρέσεως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐν πολλοῖς οὔσης καὶ πάλιν τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταθέσεως, εἰκότως θαυμάζουσι πῶς ὁ τούτων ἑλόμενός τινα κατηνάγκασται ἐκ παντὸς τοῦτον ἀποπλῆσαι μόνον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.4

When, then, I took Plato's writings in hand and saw that we had strayed a little from the philosopher's meaning, we were surprised at those who had raised the difficulties.[843] They supposed that he meant simply lives, in the sense in which writers on life mention a farming life, another political, and another military; they took Plato likewise to mean the many different lives observed among human beings. Since the choice of these, and likewise a change away from them, is in many cases up to us, they naturally wonder how someone who has chosen one of them is compelled to fulfill that one alone in every respect.[844]

843. The reply begins by reconsidering what Plato means by βίος, life. The printed sentence shifts from the singular I took and I saw to the plural we were surprised; the English retains both. Μικράν is rendered a little, following the local wording.

844. The objectors take lives to mean human occupations or ways of living, such as farming, politics, and soldiering. Porphyry's reply will distinguish these from the primary kind of life constituted by being a human or a particular animal. The qualification ἐν πολλοῖς, in many cases, limits the claim that choosing and changing occupations is up to us.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.5

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς βίον λέγεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσι καθ’ ἕν τι σημαινόμενον λογικῆς ζωῆς, διέξοδον αὐτῷ ἀποδιδόντες ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν καὶ σχέσεων καὶ ποιήσεων καὶ παθημάτων συνεστῶσαν, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀλόγων ζωὰς λέγει βίους. Βίος γὰρ κατ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἡ τοῦ κύκνου ζωὴ καὶ πάλιν ἄλλος βίος ὁ λέοντος, καθ’ ὃ λέων, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀηδόνος· βίος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπειος καὶ τούτου ὁ μέν τις γυναικεῖος, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος· λέγει γὰρ εἶναι παντοδαπὰ τῶν βίων τὰ παραδείγματα.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.6

Ἓν μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον παρ’ αὐτῷ σημαινόμενον βίου, ἕτερον δὲ ὃ παρίστησι συμβεβηκός τι τούτων καὶ δεύτερόν τινα χαρακτῆρα ἐπὶ προηγουμένῳ τῷ ῥηθέντι βίῳ. Προηγούμενος μὲν γὰρ βίος κυνὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν κυνὸς ζωήν· ἐπισυμβαίνει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ βίῳ ἡ τῶν θηρευτικῶν κυνῶν ἢ τῶν ἰχνευτικῶν ἢ τῶν περὶ τράπεζαν ἢ τῶν οἰκοφυλάκων, καὶ δεύτερος ἂν εἴη οὗτος βίος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued II.8.39.5

For those of the Stoa understand life as having one particular meaning, that of rational existence. They describe it as a course composed of activities, relations, productive actions, and experiences undergone; Plato, however, also applies the word life to the existence of nonrational animals.[845] For according to him a swan's existence is also a life; the lion's, insofar as it is a lion, is another life, and the nightingale's another. Human life too is a life, and one kind of it is female, another male; for he says that the patterns of lives are of every kind.[846]

Porphyry continued II.8.39.6

One meaning of life in Plato is of this sort; another is what he presents as an incidental feature of these lives, a secondary character attached to life in the primary sense just described. For a dog's primary life is its existence as a dog. The life of hunting dogs, tracking dogs, dogs kept about the table, or house-guarding dogs is an incidental addition to this life; this would be a secondary life.[847]

845. The distinction is expressed through βίος, life or a course of life, and ζωή, existence or being alive. Porphyry reports a Stoic use confined to rational life and contrasts it with Plato's inclusion of animal lives. The four constituents of the Stoic course remain distinct: activities, relations, productive actions, and what is undergone. Παθήματα here includes experiences undergone, rather than only emotions.

846. Republic X.620A–B supplies the swan, lion, and nightingale examples in the Myth of Er; the patterns of lives are presented at 618A. These references appear as modern locators in Wachsmuth and are moved here. Ἀνδρεῖος in the contrast with γυναικεῖος means male, rather than courageous. The argument distinguishes kinds of embodied life before turning to occupations within them.

847. Προηγούμενος, primary, and δεύτερος, secondary, distinguish levels of description here, rather than successive incarnations. Being a dog is the primary life; hunting, tracking, accompanying people at table, or guarding a house characterizes it further. Συμβεβηκός is an incidental attribute. The comparison develops Porphyry's interpretation of the Republic X.618A passage cited in Wachsmuth.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.39.7

Ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις, ἀφῃρημένοις τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, ἢ διὰ φύσεως ὁ χαρακτὴρ οὗτος ἐπισυνίσταται ἢ διὰ κατατάξεως τοῦ κτησαμένου· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἢ ἐκ προγόνων γενέσθαι ἀγαθῶν ἢ κάλλους τυχεῖν σωματικοῦ διὰ φύσεως ἐπορίσθη ἢ τύχης, πλὴν ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἦν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δῆλον. Τὰς δέ γε τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλήψεις καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ <τὰς> τῶν πολιτικῶν βίων ἀρχῶν τε διώξεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἠρτῆσθαι συμβέβηκεν, εἰ καί τινα δυσεπίτευκτα, τῷ καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν προσδεῖσθαι συλλήψεως, δι’ οὗ εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν δύσκολα καὶ ἀποθέσθαι οὐ ῥᾴδια, ὥσπερ ἀρχὰς καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ δημαγωγίας.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.7

But in nonrational animals, which are deprived of self-government, this character is added either through nature or through the assignment made by the owner. In humans, being born of good ancestors or obtaining bodily beauty was provided through nature or fortune; at any rate, it is clear that none of these was up to us.[848] But taking up crafts, pursuits, and sciences, and <the> pursuit of political ways of life and offices, and such things, have come to depend on what is up to us. Some are indeed hard to achieve because they also require assistance from outside; through this dependence they are difficult to attain and not easy to lay aside, as with offices, tyrannies, and popular leadership.[849]

848. The account denies αὐτεξούσιον, self-government, to nonrational animals and attributes their secondary roles to nature or an owner's assignment. It then distinguishes human ancestry and bodily beauty, which are likewise presented as unchosen circumstances. Good ancestors follows the printed ἀγαθῶν without adding a particular lineage or social rank.

849. The contrast concerns taking up a pursuit, rather than guaranteeing success in it. Supplied <τὰς> makes the pursuit of political life and office parallel to the other items; English shows it as <the>. Δημαγωγίαι are forms of leadership of the people, here called popular leadership. The text acknowledges both external assistance and the difficulty of relinquishing certain positions once attained.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.8

Πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἠρτῆσθαι συμβέβηκεν <ἐκ> τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ τεῦξις αὐτῶν οὐ πάντως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀφ’ οὗ δ’ ἄν τινος τύχωμεν, τῇ τάξει αὐτοῦ ἕπεσθαι ἀνάγκη. Δέδοται μέντοι ἐπὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν ἐχόντων μεσότητα καὶ μὴ ἤδη εἰς κακίαν ἀνηγμένων τὸ χρήσθαι τοῖς βίοις οὗ τις μέτεισιν, ἢ κακῶς ἢ καλῶς. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τυραννίδας τινὲς προαχθέντες ἥπιοι καὶ πρᾶοι γεγόνασι καὶ βασιλείαις πονηρῶς ἐχρήσαντο.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.9

Τούτων <δὲ> οὕτως ἐχόντων ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις τῶν βίων ταῖς ἔξω ψυχαῖς προηγουμένως τῶν πρώτων ἐστί, κἄπειτα αἱρεθέντος ἥ τε Ἀνάγκη τὸ ἀπαραίτητον ἐκύρωσεν, ὅ τε δαίμων ἐπηκολούθησεν, ὡς ἂν δὴ τοῦ βίου προστάτης ὢν καὶ ἐπόπτης ἕκαστος ἑκάστου, συναναγκάζων ἐμμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς τῷ αἱρεθέντι καὶ μὴ προβλέπειν, αἵ τε Μοῖραι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐπένησαν ἑκάστῳ βίον, <οἷον> τὰ [τε] γιγνόμενα διὰ παντὸς μαρτυρεῖ τοῦ χρόνου.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.8

All such things, then, have come to depend <on> choice, but their attainment is not altogether up to us; once we obtain one of them, we must follow its order.[850] Yet in practically all lives occupying a middle position and not already classed as vicious, it is granted to use the lives one pursues either badly or well. For some advanced to tyrannies have proved gentle and mild, and kingships have been used badly.[851]

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.9

<Now>, this being so, the choice of the primary lives belongs in the first instance to souls outside bodies. Once one had been chosen, Necessity ratified its inescapable character and the daimon followed, each as protector and supervisor of the particular life, compelling the souls to remain in what has been chosen and not look beyond it.[852] The Fates spun such a life for each, <as> events bear witness throughout all time.[853]

850. Προαίρεσις is deliberate choice. Supplied <ἐκ> is represented by <on> with depend. The sentence distinguishes choosing a pursuit, attaining it, and the order or conditions that accompany it once attained. Οὐ πάντως means not altogether; it does not remove every role for the agent in attaining the object.

851. The middle position describes lives not already classified as vicious, so that good and bad uses remain distinguishable. The printed relative οὗ in the clause about the lives one pursues is compressed and has been questioned by editors; the English conveys the contextual sense without changing that Greek. The tyranny and kingship examples distinguish the name of a position from the use made of it. The subject of the kingship example is not expressed, and the English leaves it unspecified.

852. The primary lives are the kinds of existence distinguished in II.8.39.5–6, such as human or animal life. The souls outside are those choosing before embodiment in the myth. Porphyry applies Necessity and the daimon's guardianship to that primary choice. Wachsmuth retains προβλέπειν, to look ahead; look beyond it keeps the image in the context of remaining within the selected life, rather than adopting an editorial replacement meaning to abandon it.

853. Supplied <δὲ> is rendered <Now>, and <οἷον> as <as>. The rejected [τε], and, remains visible in Greek and is omitted from the English sentence. The Fates' spinning and the claim that events throughout time attest it belong to Porphyry's interpretation; the following example gives his proposed evidence.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.10

Οὔτε γὰρ ἀνήρ, κἂν σφόδρα δι᾽ ἀσέλγειαν μαλακίζηται καὶ πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ ἡ προαίρεσις μετασχηματίζῃ τὰ ἔξωθεν <εἰς> τὰ τῆς θηλείας συνήθη, γυνή ποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο, οὔτε γυνὴ τὰ ἀνδρῶν ἐγχειροῦσα δρᾶν, ἀνήρ ποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.39.11

Ζῶσι μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν βίον αἱ ψυχαὶ μετ᾽ ἀνάγκης, διὰ λήθης αὐτὸν διεξέρχονται καὶ ὅτι ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς ἡ αἵρεσις αὐτοῦ ποτὲ γέγονε, παντελῶς ἐπιλελησμέναι. Ἔρχεται δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπου μάλιστα ἀνειμένον [ἐλεύθερον] τὸ ἐθελούσιον πρὸς μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν καὶ μὴ ἐν σώματι [δεδεμένην] πεπεδημένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰ τοῦ ζῴου καὶ συναμφοτέρου <πρὸς> αὐτεξούσια ἔργα λελυμένου. Σὺν γὰρ τούτῳ διεξάγει τὸν ἀνθρώπειον βίον ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, σὺν τῷ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου αὐτεξούσια ἔργα τὴν ὁρμὴν προσήκουσαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 166-167

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.10

For a man would never become a woman, even if he becomes extremely effeminate through licentiousness and his choice reshapes all his outward traits <into> those customary for a woman; nor would a woman, attempting to do what men do, ever become a man.[854]

Porphyry continued

II.8.39.11

Souls therefore live this life under necessity and pass through it in forgetfulness, having completely forgotten that its choice was once up to them.[855] In the human case, voluntary action comes into play most freely with regard to matters of the soul, considering the soul on its own and not as fettered in a body; with regard to matters of the living creature and the composite, the human being is released <for> actions under his own control. For each of us passes through human life with this, together with the impulse appropriate to the composite's actions under its own control.[856]

854. Porphyry offers this claim about male and female nature as evidence that a primary kind of life remains fixed. The words ἀσέλγεια, licentiousness, and μαλακίζεσθαι, to become effeminate or soft, carry the ancient author's moral assessment of behavior; the passage is translated as his historical argument. Προαίρεσις is the subject of reshapes, so that deliberate choice is expressly acknowledged while its supposed limits are asserted. Supplied <εἰς> is shown as <into>.

855. The necessity concerns the selected primary life just discussed, whereas the forgotten choice belongs to the soul before embodiment. Forgetfulness here explains why the agent living that life no longer remembers having chosen it. The conclusion still distinguishes this necessity from the voluntary actions considered in the next sentences.

856. The composite, συναμφότερον, is the embodied living creature constituted from soul and body; Wachsmuth compares Alcibiades I.130A, where body, soul, and their combination are distinguished. The concluding construction is compressed: it considers the soul on its own and also actions belonging to the composite. Rejected [ἐλεύθερον], free, and [δεδεμένην], bound, are omitted from the English body; unrestrained and fettered senses remain in the surviving ἀνειμένον and πεπεδημένην. Supplied <πρὸς> is shown as <for>. Αὐτεξούσια describes actions under the agent's own control, and ὁρμή the corresponding impulse to act.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 166-167

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐν ταὐτῷ

II.8.40

Διοικεῖται γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν τῇδε προσήκουσαν αὐτῷ διάζησιν. Ἔχει δὲ ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ κατάλληλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ αὐτεξούσιον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. Διὸ κἂν ἄγηται ὑπὸ προθυμιῶν φυσικῶν πρός τινα τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐν αἱρέσει πιπτόντων βίων, ἀλλ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν, κἂν πάντως ἐμπέσῃ. Ὅσα γὰρ τῇ πιθανῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατατιθέμεθα διὰ τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι, ὅ τι μὴ ἡ φαντασία σύρει ἡμᾶς καὶ νευροσπαστεῖ πρὸς αὐτήν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 167

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From the same work

II.8.40

For each living creature is governed according to the mode of life appropriate to it here. Human life has within itself the self-government appropriate to a human being. Therefore, even if someone is led by natural inclinations toward one of the ways of life available for choice here, he still has it in his power not to enter it, even if in fact he does enter it.[857] For in all cases in which we assent to a persuasive impression because it is persuasive, withholding assent is nevertheless also up to us, since the impression does not drag us toward itself or pull us like a puppet.[858]

857. Here refers to embodied life. Αὐτεξούσιον continues the term self-government, while προθυμίαι are inclinations or eager impulses. Being led toward a way of life is distinguished from being unable to refrain from entering it. The concession κἂν πάντως ἐμπέσῃ, even if in fact he does enter it, is retained: the occurrence of a choice is not itself described as unavoidable necessity.

858. Συγκατατίθεσθαι means to assent to or accept an impression, rather than merely to receive one. Πιθανός means persuasive; the passage does not thereby declare the impression true. Νευροσπαστεῖ introduces the image of a puppet moved by strings. The claim is that an impression can be persuasive without mechanically compelling the assent of the person who receives it.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 167

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐν ταὐτῷ

II.8.41.1

Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῦτ᾽ ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ἔχειν μὲν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τὰς ψυχάς, πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαφόρους ἐμπεσεῖν, εἰς τὸ <τοῦτον> ἢ τοῦτον ἐλέσθαι τὸν βίον, ὃν μετὰ ποιᾶς ζωῆς καὶ σώματος οἰκείου τῇ ζωῇ ἐκτελεῖν μέλλει (καὶ γὰρ λέοντος βίον ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς εἶναι ἐλέσθαι καὶ ἀνδρός)· κἀκεῖνο μὲν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἅμα τῇ πρός τινα τῶν τοιούτων βίων πτώσει ἐμπεπόδισται.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.41.2

Κατελθοῦσαι δὲ εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν ἀπολύτων γεγονυῖαι ψυχαὶ ζῴων, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον φέρουσιν οἰκεῖον τῇ τοῦ ζῴου κατασκευῇ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν μὲν εἶναι πολύνουν καὶ πολυκίνητον ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπου, ἐφ᾽ ὧν δὲ ὀλιγοκίνητον καὶ μονότροπον ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν πάντων ζῴων. Ἐξηρτῆσθαι δὲ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦτο τῆς κατασκευῆς, κινούμενον μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, φερόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς κατασκευῆς γινομένας προθυμίας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 167-168

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From the same work

II.8.41.1

For Plato's overall meaning seems to be this: before entering bodies and different lives, souls have self-government in choosing <this> life or that, which each soul is to complete with a certain kind of existence and a body suited to that existence (for it is up to them to choose a lion's life as well as a man's).[859] That self-government has been constrained at the very moment of falling into one of these kinds of life.[860]

Porphyry continued

II.8.41.2

Once they have descended into bodies and have become souls of living creatures instead of unattached souls, they bring with them a self-government suited to the living creature's constitution. In some cases it is varied in thought and movement, as in a human being; in others it has few movements and only one way of acting, as in almost all other living creatures.[861] This self-government depends on the constitution: it moves from itself, but is carried along in accordance with the inclinations arising from the constitution.[862]

859. Porphyry summarizes what he takes Plato to mean. Choosing a lion's life or a man's concerns primary kinds of life, distinguished from occupations at II.8.39.5–7. Ζωή here denotes the kind of living existence to which the body is suited; the choice is not simply that of a profession.

860. Supplied <τοῦτον> is shown as <this> in this life or that. The printed ἐμπεπόδισται means has been hindered or constrained: the freedom to choose a primary life is checked upon entry into that life. The following sentences distinguish the self-government that embodied creatures then possess, rather than saying that all self-government disappears.

861. Unattached souls renders ψυχαὶ ἀπόλυτοι, souls not yet joined to bodies. Here αὐτεξούσιον, self-government, has a range suited to each creature's constitution: the contrast is between varied human activity and the restricted activity of almost all other animals, without making the latter claim universal. This is a more qualified use of self-government than the denial to nonrational animals at II.8.39.7.

862. Κινούμενον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ describes movement originating from itself, while φερόμενον κατὰ τὰς… προθυμίας describes its direction according to inclinations arising from the constitution. Προθυμίαι are inclinations or eager impulses here. Both claims stand together: self-government is presented as self-moving while remaining dependent on the creature's constitution.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.8.42.1

Πανταχοῦ δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς φεύγειν προσήκει, διώκειν δὲ τὸ μέσον, ἂν μὴ ἤδη τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πάθεσι κακίας ἀνηκέστοις δεδεμένον δουλεύῃ καὶ ὑποτεταγμένον ᾗ τούτοις.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.2

Ἀρέσκει καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀτάκτως κληροῦσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους καὶ λαμβάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὡς ἄγει αὐτὰς ἡ περίοδος. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη παυσαμένη ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ περιόδῳ πρώτη ἥξει, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα <δευτέρα> ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ κληρωσουμένη· στρεφομένας γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ καταληγούσας τῇ τούτου φορᾷ περιάγεσθαι ὡς εἰς τάξιν, κλήρων σημαινόντων τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον. Διὸ καὶ τῆς Λαχέσεως οἱ κλῆροι λαμβάνονται τῷ προφήτῃ, ἥτις ἀπὸ τοῦ λαγχάνειν καὶ κληροῦσθαι κέκληται. Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς περιστροφὴν πολλοὶ εἶναι εἰρήκασιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From the same work

II.8.42.1

Everywhere we should avoid extremes and pursue the mean, unless what is up to us, already bound by incurable passions of vice, is enslaved and subjected to them.[863]

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.2

It is also acceptable to hold that souls are not assigned lives by lot and receive them in a disorderly way, but in order, as the cycle leads them. For the soul that first came to rest in the first cycle will arrive first, and the second <second>, to draw its lot in the second cycle. For they are turned by the universe and, coming to the end of their course with its movement, are carried round into a kind of order, the lots signifying first and second place.[864] That is also why the prophet takes the lots of Lachesis, who is named from obtaining a lot and being allotted one. Many have said that Lachesis is the revolution of the universe.[865]

863. Wachsmuth compares Republic X.619A, where the choice of lives is associated with seeking the middle and avoiding extremes. The qualification about passions remains explicit: the exhortation is not presented as though an agent's capacity were wholly unaffected by vice. Incurable renders ἀνήκεστος within Porphyry's ethical argument.

864. The lots are interpreted as positions in an ordered cycle, rather than an absence of order. The repeated first and second and the successive cycles follow the printed wording. Wachsmuth supplies the second occurrence of <δευτέρα>; English retains <second>. The account is Porphyry's interpretation of the myth's cosmic order, not a statement that drawing lots makes every later action involuntary.

865. Republic X.617D is Wachsmuth's locator for the prophet and Lachesis's lots. Porphyry connects her name with λαγχάνειν, obtaining by lot, and κληροῦσθαι, being allotted or drawing a lot. He then reports an identification of Lachesis with cosmic revolution. These explanations belong to his reading of the myth; the translation does not turn the etymological explanation into an independently established historical derivation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.3

Ἀρέσκει καὶ τὸ χραίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτεξούσιον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγγινομένης ἐνταῦθα προβιοτῆς, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αὐτεξούσιον ἐκ τῆς πρός τινα τῶν τῇδε βίων τῆς <ψυχῆς> ἔξω ἔτι οὔσης ῥοπῆς, ἣν αἵρεσιν ὁ Πλάτων λέγει.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.3

It is also acceptable to hold that the self-government of souls is defiled by the prior life lived here, while the self-government of human beings is defiled by the inclination toward one of the lives here of the <soul> while it is still outside the body, which Plato calls choice.[866]

866. Χραίνεσθαι, to be stained or defiled, preserves the passage's image of an effect on self-government. The earlier life here affects the soul, while the inclination formed before embodiment affects the human being who subsequently lives the chosen life. Προβιοτή is rendered prior life; ῥοπή is inclination. Supplied <ψυχῆς> is shown as <soul>, and outside is understood from the contrast with embodied life.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.42.4

Ἀρέσκει καὶ τὸ τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἐοικυῖαν ταῖς τῶν νόμων διαγορεύσεσι, νόμον οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὴν καί,

θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
ἀΐδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις,

φησὶν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Οἵ τε γὰρ νόμοι, οὐκ ἀναγκάζοντες, διαγορεύουσιν, ὡς ἐὰν λῃστεύσῃς, τάδε πείσῃ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀριστεύσῃς, τῶνδε τεύξῃ· οἵ τε καθ' εἱμαρμένην θεσμοί, ἐὰν βίον ἕλῃ ἀνδρός, οὕτως ζήσῃ, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ ἑλοῦ ἐκ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσι· καὶ ἐὰν <ἐν> ἀνδράσι γενόμενος βίον ἕλῃ στρατιώτου, τάδε σε παθεῖν καὶ δρᾶσαι ἀνάγκη, οὐ μὴν ἔτι βίον σε ἀνάγκη ἑλέσθαι στρατιώτου καὶ τάδε παθεῖν <καὶ δρᾶσαι> ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.4

It is also acceptable to hold that fate is of this kind, resembling the pronouncements of laws, being itself a law and also,

an ancient decree of the gods,
everlasting, sealed with broad oaths,
as Empedocles says.[867] For laws pronounce, without compelling: if you commit robbery, you will suffer these things; if you excel, you will obtain these rewards. So too the ordinances of fate declare: if you choose a man's life, you will live in this way; they do not, however, compel you outright to choose it as well. And if, having come to be <among> human beings, you choose a soldier's life, you must undergo and do these things; yet you are not thereby compelled to choose a soldier's life and to undergo <and do> these things out of necessity.[868]

867. The two verse lines are attributed to Empedocles in the source, where Wachsmuth cites verses 369–370 in Stein's numbering. Broad oaths follows πλατέεσσι… ὅρκοις and retains the unusual image. The verse is embedded in Porphyry's description of fate as law; it is not a new excerpt or a separate claim by Stobaeus.

868. The printed ἑλοῦ, choose!, is the imperative in the command that the ordinances do not compel one to obey. The law analogy distinguishes a conditional consequence from compulsion to satisfy its condition: a law specifies what follows robbery without forcing someone to rob. Likewise the soldier's obligations follow the choice of that secondary life. The contrast retains both the primary human life and an occupation within it. Supplied <ἐν> is shown as <among> and <καὶ δρᾶσαι> as <and do>. The necessity in the final clause remains within the contrast rather than making the initial choice compulsory.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.5

Δι’ ὃ κεῖται μὲν τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων· ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστι, τούς τε πρώτους ἐλέσθαι βίους καὶ ζῆσαι, φέρε, βίον ἀνθρώπου, τῶν τε δευτέρων ἐλέσθαι βίον τινά· ἑλομένῳ δὲ καὶ ζῶντι κατὰ τοῦτον, ἀνάγκη τἀκόλουθα καὶ δρᾶσαι καὶ παθεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.5

That is why patterns of both primary and secondary lives are set out. It is up to souls to choose primary lives and live, for example, a human life, and to choose some life among the secondary ones. But once someone has chosen and is living accordingly, he must both do and undergo what follows from it.[869]

869. The primary and secondary lives are the distinction developed at II.8.39.5–9 and resumed in II.8.41: a kind of embodied existence, and a further way of life within it. Patterns are the available exemplars of both. The account places the choice with the soul and necessity in the consequences of living the selected life.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.42.6

Εἰ μέντοι ἐνδέχεται καταμαντευσάμενον τῆς Πλάτωνος γνώμης, ἐπιτυχῶς στοχάσασθαι, πόθεν ταῦτα λαβὼν Πλάτων περὶ αὐτῶν διελέχθη ὡς τοῖς γιγνομένοις ὄντων συμφώνων, φαίην ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅτι <παρὰ> τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις σοφῶν τοὺς βίους ἐκ τῶν ὡροσκόπων σημειουμένων καὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσι τῶν ἀστέρων πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῳδιακῷ ἄστρα διαθέσεως, <ὡς> ἀκολούθους τῇ τοῦ ὡροσκόπου ἀνατολῇ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 169-170

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.6

If, however, by divining Plato's meaning one can successfully conjecture where Plato obtained these things and discussed them as being in accord with what happens, I would say, I think, that he took them <from> the sages among the Egyptians.[870] They infer lives from ascendants and from the arrangement, at births, of the planets in relation to the stars in the zodiac, <as> lives that follow the rising of the ascendant.[871]

870. The Egyptian source is introduced as conjecture, qualified by if, successfully conjecture (ἐπιτυχῶς στοχάσασθαι), I would say, and I think. The account does not establish that Plato derived the Myth of Er from a particular Egyptian text. In ὄντων συμφώνων, being in accord, the matters discussed are the understood subject.

871. Ὡροσκόπος is rendered ascendant, the rising point or degree used to mark the celestial configuration at birth. Here ἀστέρες are the moving heavenly bodies contrasted with stars in the zodiac. Supplied <παρά> and <ὡς> appear as <from> and <as>. The printed plural ἀκολούθους refers to the lives inferred from these signs.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 169-170

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια

II.8.42.7

Ἀναγκάζειν μὲν τὴν ποιὰν διάθεσιν τῶν σχηματισμῶν ποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βίους ταῖς διὰ τῆς ὡροσκοπούσης μοίρας ἰούσαις ψυχαῖς εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, πῶς ἐχόντων τότε τῶν σχηματισμῶν, μὴ συντίθεσθαι αὐτὸν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις· τῶν δὲ ψυχῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐνούσας διαθέσεις ἐπὶ τοὺς ὡροσκόπους φερομένων καὶ βίους, <οὓς> σημαίνουσιν οἱ σχηματισμοί, βλεπουσῶν ὥσπερ ἐν πίνακι [γεγραμμένα] ἐν τῇ οὐρανίᾳ γῇ γεγραμμένους, τὰς ἑλομένας διὰ μὲν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον δύνασθαι καὶ μὴ βιῶναι οὕτως, ἑλομένας δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ στροφῇ κατὰ στιγμὴν τοῦ χρόνου τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τοῦ ὡροσκόπου ἐναλλαττόμενα ἀνάγκῃ ἐκτελεῖν τὰ γεγραμμένα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.7

He does not, however, agree with the Egyptians that a particular arrangement of configurations compels a particular kind of life for souls entering birth through the ascending degree, with the configurations disposed as they are at that time.[872] Rather, souls are carried toward ascendants according to the dispositions within them and see lives—<which> the configurations signify—inscribed as if on a tablet in the heavenly earth.[873] Through self-government the souls that choose can also refrain from living in this way; but, having chosen the things that change in the revolution at each moment of the ascendant's rising, they must necessarily carry out what is inscribed.[874]

872. He is Plato as interpreted by Porphyry. The contrast is between configurations compelling the initial kind of life and configurations indicating lives toward which souls move according to their own dispositions. The Greek construction is compressed, and the statement continues the conjecture begun in II.8.42.6.

873. Heavenly earth follows the printed οὐρανίᾳ γῇ; it is not silently replaced by heaven or sphere. The lives are pictured as writing displayed on a tablet. Supplied <οὓς> is <which>. Rejected [γεγραμμένα], written, remains visible in Greek but is omitted in English; the surviving γεγραμμένους already describes the inscribed lives.

874. The wording uses ἑλομένας, having chosen, twice, while distinguishing the ability not to live in a proposed way from the binding sequence once a life is selected. The English keeps this difficult contrast. The changing things are the patterns presented during the celestial revolution, not an added claim that the soul can change its primary kind of life after embodiment.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.8

Διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀναφορᾷ φέρε καὶ κύων γεννᾶται καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ καὶ πολλοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πάντων οὔτε ὁ πρῶτος βίος ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτε ὁ δεύτερος; Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴποιμ' ἂν οὐχ οὕτως ταχυτέραν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορείαν πάσαις, ὡς μὴ φθάσαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ ὡροσκόπου τὴν ἐκείνων εἴσοδον· προλαμβανούσης δὲ ἀεὶ τῆς φορᾶς καὶ ἑκάστης κατὰ κλῆρον διαφορᾶς ἄλλο παράδειγμα βίου φερούσης, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε συντρέχειν πάντῃ τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐν τῇ <αὐτῇ> ὥρᾳ εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐμβάλλειν.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.9

Ἔπειτα ὁ μὲν κλῆρος ἔξω * * πρὶν εἰς τὸν τῆς σελήνης ὑποκάτω τόπον πεσεῖν· τοῦ <δὲ> πρώτου βίου ἡ διέξοδος διὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ σφαιρῶν γιγνομένη, ἄλλως ἄλλης κατ' αὐτὰ κινουμένης κατὰ τὰς προθυμίας πρός τινας τῶν δευτέρων βίων, οὐχ ὁμοίως προσέχειν πάσας ποιεῖ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 170-171

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.8

Why, then, at the same rising are, say, a dog, a man, a woman, and many men born, when neither the primary life nor the secondary is the same for them all?[875] First, I would say that the passage is not so swift for all souls that the rising of the ascendant fails to get ahead of their entry. Since the motion is always getting ahead, and each difference according to the lot brings a different pattern of life, those who seem to enter the world in the <same> hour must never coincide in every respect.[876]

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.9

Next, the lot is outside [text missing], before entry into the region beneath the moon.[877] <But> the course of the primary life through the seven spheres, as different souls move differently in these matters according to their inclinations toward certain secondary lives, means that they do not all attend in the same way to what is inscribed.[878]

875. Primary lives distinguish such kinds as human and canine existence; secondary lives further characterize a life within its primary kind. The question challenges an apparently common birth configuration with differences of both kinds. Wachsmuth regards the repeated many men, πολλοὶ ἄνδρες, as corrupt but leaves it in the text; it is retained here.

876. The proposed answer depends on differences of entry while the ascendant continues to rise, so apparent sameness of hour does not mean complete sameness of circumstances. I would say marks the answer as Porphyry's proposal. Supplied <αὐτῇ> is shown as <same>. No precise physical speed or unit of temporal difference is supplied.

877. The two asterisks after ἔξω, outside, mark a gap in Wachsmuth's text, not necessarily two missing words. The English marks the same loss without inventing a verb or completing the account of the lot. The surviving contrast places the lot outside, before entry into the region below the moon.

878. The seven spheres belong to the celestial journey described in the argument. The primary life has been selected, but inclinations toward secondary lives differentiate how souls attend to the displayed patterns. Supplied <δέ> is <But>. The awkward κατ' αὐτά is kept and rendered broadly as in these matters, without adopting an editorial alteration of its wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.10

Ἤδη οὖν ἡ μὲν ἑλομένη κυνὸς βίον ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν ὡροσκόπον· ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τὴν παράκλισιν τῆς στιγμῆς ἐπὶ τόνδε· φέρει δ’ αὐτὴν ἡ Δίκη κατὰ τῆς ἠθοποιίας ἰδιότητα ἐπί τινα μοῖραν τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἣ βίον ἔχει γεγραμμένον πρόσφορον ταῖς αὐτῆς προθυμίαις.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.11

Ἡ δὲ Δίκη Τύχη λέγεται, αἰτία οὖσα ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπείῳ λογισμῷ. Ζῳδίων δὲ ὄντων δώδεκα, δι’ ὧν ἡ ὁδὸς ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεπίστευται τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις γίγνεσθαι τῇδε πανταχοῦ σχεδόν, αἱ μὲν πρῶται τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ μοῖραι, ὡς ἂν ἀγαθῷ νενεμημέναι τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦ ζῳδίου, παρεδόθησαν εἶναι ἀμφιλαφεῖς· αἱ δὲ τελευταῖαι ἐπὶ πάντων τοῖς κακοποιοῖς λεγομένοις ἀστράσιν ἀπενεμήθησαν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued II.8.42.10

By now, then, the soul that has chosen a dog's life comes to this ascendant, while the one that has chosen a human life comes to that ascendant as the instant shifts. Justice carries the soul, according to the distinctive way its character has been formed, to a certain degree of the revolution that has a life inscribed suited to the soul's own inclinations.[879]

Porphyry continued II.8.42.11

Justice is called Fortune, since she is a cause hidden from human reasoning.[880] There are twelve zodiacal signs, and the Egyptians believe that souls make their journey here through them almost everywhere. The first degrees of the zodiac, having been assigned to the sign's lord as a beneficent one, have been handed down as ample; the last degrees in every case have been assigned to the so-called malefic stars.[881]

879. Παράκλισις τῆς στιγμῆς is a shifting or deviation of the instant, distinguishing arrivals at apparently the same time. Ἠθοποιία concerns the formation of character; the character and inclinations of the soul direct its relation to the displayed life. Δίκη, Justice, is personified as carrying the soul; the next sentence explains why this cause is also called Fortune.

880. Fortune, Τύχη, names a cause whose operation is hidden from human reasoning, rather than an absence of causation. Justice and Fortune are two descriptions of the same directing cause. The compressed placement of πανταχοῦ σχεδόν, almost everywhere, leaves its exact scope uncertain; the English keeps it with the journey rather than treating it as a claim about the distribution of Egyptian belief.

881. Ἀμφιλαφεῖς is ample or spacious; the contrast with cramped later lots suggests wider opportunity. Compare Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos I.5, on beneficent and maleficent planets, and On the Disposition of Terms, on planetary rulership of divisions of the signs (I.21 in Hübner's edition; I.20 in Robbins's). Porphyry is not assumed to reproduce Ptolemy's table.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.12

Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἡ τῶν πρώτων κλήρων εὐμοιρία ἀποδοχῆς ἠξίωται καὶ ἡ τῶν ὑστέρων ἐστενοχωρεῖσθαι λέγεται. Σημαίνειν μὲν οὖν τὰ ποιὰ σχήματα τοὺς βίους τίθεται Πλάτων· ἀναγκάζειν δὲ οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἑλομένας ζῆν καὶ καθὰ σημαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχειν τὸν εἱρμὸν τῶν γεγραμμένων.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.13

Αἰτία τοίνυν ἑλομένων ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ ἀνδρὸς βίον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ζῴου τῆς εἰς τὸν ὡροσκόπον φορᾶς· αἰτία δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐνεχθείσης εἰς τόνδε τὸν ὡροσκόπον τὸ ἑλέσθαι τὸν δεύτερον βίον, ὃν γεγραμμένον δεικνύει ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὡροσκόπον τεταγμένη διακόσμησις τῶν ἀστέρων.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued II.8.42.12

Thus the good fortune of the earlier lots has won acceptance, while that of the later ones is said to be cramped.[882] Plato, then, posits that the particular configurations signify lives, but not that they compel them. Rather, the souls that have made their choice live their lives and necessarily experience the connected sequence of what is inscribed, in accordance with what the configurations signify.[883]

Porphyry continued II.8.42.13

Responsibility for being carried to the ascendant, then, rests with those who have chosen a woman's or a man's life or that of another living creature. Choosing the secondary life is likewise the responsibility of the soul carried to this particular ascendant—the life that the arrangement of the stars, ordered in relation to the ascendant, displays as inscribed.[884]

882. In Republic X, earlier numbers give priority in choosing, while the last chooser is still told not to despair. Porphyry supplies an astrological explanation for differences in room for choice. A favorable lot is not made sufficient for good judgment: Plato's first chooser selects a disastrous tyranny.

883. The distinction is between σημαίνειν, to signify, and ἀναγκάζειν, to compel. Necessity belongs to the εἱρμός, the connected sequence of the selected life, while the initial selection remains attributed to the soul. The feminine ἑλομένας refers to souls; the Greek is not replaced by a formulation making the stars themselves choose.

884. The two clauses with αἰτία, cause or responsibility, are elliptical, and their genitives have prompted proposed grammatical repairs. The English reads responsibility as belonging to the choosers in the first clause and to the soul carried to the particular ascendant in the second, without changing those genitives. The contrast still distinguishes choosing a primary kind of life from choosing its further secondary character.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.14

Εἰ μή τις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὴν σποράν ὡροσκοπίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ κυνὸς ἐλέσθαι ἐμφαίνειν τὸν κλῆρον εἴποι, τὴν δὲ τῆς ἐκ γαστρὸς ἐκτροπῆς ὡροσκοπίαν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ προαιρεθέντι ἐνδεικνύναι τὴν αἵρεσιν.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.15

Ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τῶν παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις παραδεδομένων ἡ τοῦ μύθου πλάσις ἐσκευώρηται, συγχωρήσειεν ἄν τις· εἰ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ νοήματα κατὰ μέρος τῷ Πλάτωνι διεσκευάσθη, χαλεπὸν τὸ ἀποφήνασθαι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.14

Or someone might say that horoscopic observation at conception reveals the lot for choosing a human life or a dog's,[885] while horoscopic observation at emergence from the womb indicates the choice of the secondary life in addition to the one already chosen.[886]

Porphyry continued

II.8.42.15

But one might concede that the shaping of the myth drew upon traditions handed down among the Egyptians. Whether Plato elaborated it in detail according to these very conceptions, however, is difficult to pronounce upon.[887]

885. Εἰ μή τις, unless someone should say, introduces an alternative to the preceding account. The English Or someone might say conveys that qualification without turning it into an unqualified doctrine. Σπορά is conception, literally sowing; emergence from the womb follows ἐκ γαστρὸς ἐκτροπή.

886. Ὡροσκοπία concerns determining or observing the ascendant. The alternative assigns different roles to the observations at conception and birth: the primary kind of life and the secondary life added to it. Compare Ptolemy's On Conception and Birth (Tetrabiblos III.2 in Hübner's edition; included in III.1 in Robbins's). That discussion also distinguishes the two occasions for astrological judgment, but does not establish an identical doctrine or direct dependence.

887. This explicit reservation limits the whole proposed parallel. Porphyry distinguishes a possible Egyptian background for the shaping of the myth from the harder claim that Plato followed the particular astrological conceptions just set out. Neither the concession nor the final uncertainty warrants presenting that detailed derivation as established history.

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.16

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρου τυγχάνεις ὢν ἐραστής τε καὶ ἐπαινέτης, ὅρα μοι μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὸ διττὸν οἶδε τῶν βίων, τὸν μέν τινα ἀκίνητον, ὃν ἐλέσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μὴ ἐλέσθαι δύναται, ὅταν δὲ ἕληται ἀφύκτως ἔχουσα * * μεταβάλλειν, ἢ δι' ἀρετῆς αὐτὸν διοικεῖ ἢ κακίας· τούτου γὰρ μεμνημένος φησί·

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.17

Μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται.
Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἀπαραβάτου εἴη ἂν λέγων βίου· περὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τί οὖν φησὶν Ὅμηρος;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued II.8.42.16

Since you are also a lover and admirer of Homer, consider whether he too, before Plato, knew the twofold character of lives: one kind is fixed, which the soul can choose or decline to choose; but once it has chosen, being in an inescapable condition * * to change it, it directs that life through virtue or vice.[888] For it is with this life in mind that he says:

Porphyry continued II.8.42.17

But I say no man has escaped his fate,
neither coward nor brave, once he has been born.[889]
He would thus be saying this about the primary and inviolable life. But concerning the secondary life, that it is up to us, what, then, does Homer say?[890]

888. The two asterisks after ἔχουσα mark a gap, not necessarily two missing words. The missing text may have governed μεταβάλλειν, to change; the English deliberately leaves this broken connection visible. No wording meaning unable is supplied from an editorial reconstruction. The question proposes that Homer already knew the distinction of lives; it does not establish that Homer explicitly taught Porphyry's account of the soul's prior choice.

889. Iliad VI.488–489, spoken by Hector to Andromache as he prepares to return to battle. Coward and brave give κακός and ἐσθλός their force in that setting. Μοῖρα is an allotted fate or portion. The English is newly translated from the quotation as printed by Wachsmuth.

890. The identification of this fate with a primary, inviolable life is Porphyry's interpretation. The potential expression εἴη ἄν λέγων is retained as would be saying; the passage does not turn the Homeric lines into an explicit declaration of the distinction between primary and secondary lives.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.18

οἷον δὴ νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.
ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κακ᾽ ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε᾽ ἔχουσι.

Πορφυρίου — συνέχεια II.8.42.19

Διὰ τί οὖν „οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί“; Δηλοῖ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἀπὸ θεῶν τι ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τὸ πλέον δι᾽ αὐτούς· ἢ ὅτι τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων παρὰ θεῶν, οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς ἔξω τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἰς κακὰ ἐμπίπτειν; ἀλλ᾽ ἀπολύεται αὐτούς, τῷ αὐτεξουσίους ποιῆσαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ αὐταῖς ἐπιτρέψαι ἐλέσθαι βίους, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς καὶ ἀμαθίας „σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε᾽ ἔχουσιν“.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Porphyry continued II.8.42.18

Ah, how mortals blame the gods!
For they say that evils come from us; but they themselves too,
through their own recklessness, bear pains beyond their allotted fate.[891]

Porphyry continued II.8.42.19

Why, then, "but they themselves too"? For this indicates that something also comes to them from the gods, even if the greater part is due to themselves. Or, because the patterns of lives come from the gods, does this mean that even the gods themselves are not free from responsibility for people's falling into evils?[892] But he acquits them on the ground that they made the souls self-governing and allowed them to choose lives; whereas people, through haste and ignorance, "through their own recklessness, bear pains beyond their allotted fate."[893]

891. Odyssey I.32–34, Zeus addressing the gods with Aegisthus's actions in mind. Themselves too retains καὶ αὐτοί, because Porphyry's next question depends on those words. Ὑπὲρ μόρον means beyond the allotted portion or fate. Only these three lines are quoted here; the wider story supplies context, rather than additional anthology text.

892. The question raises the difficulty that the gods supply the patterns from which lives are chosen. Αἰτία can mean cause or responsibility; free from responsibility makes the force of outside the cause clear in this argument. Porphyry does not simply omit the possible objection to divine responsibility: he states it before giving his answer.

893. The acquittal rests on the souls' self-government and permission to choose. The subsequent masculine plural refers to the people whose haste and ignorance lead to the quoted sufferings. The repeated final verse has ἔχουσιν here, while the preceding quotation has ἔχουσι; both local forms are retained. This closes excerpt 42; the following excerpt has a new attribution to Iamblichus.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνιον περὶ εἱμαρμένης

II.8.43.1

Οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄϋλος ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ἑαυτήν, ἀσώματος, ἀγένητος πάντῃ καὶ ἀνώλεθρος, παρ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτοκίνητος παντελῶς καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὅλων κινήσεων. Αὕτη δὴ οὖν καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ τὴν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὴν ἀπόλυτον περιείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ ζωήν.

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια

II.8.43.2

<Καὶ> καθ’ ὅσον μὲν δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν ἑαυτὴν ὑποτάττει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἄγεται καὶ δουλεύει ταῖς τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκαις· καθ’ ὅσον δὲ αὖ τὴν νοερὰν ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἄφετον ἀπὸ πάντων καὶ αὐθαίρετον ἐνέργειαν ἐνεργεῖ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἑκουσίως πράττει καὶ τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ μετ’ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From Iamblichus's letter to Macedonius on fate

II.8.43.1

The soul's substance, considered in itself, is immaterial, incorporeal, wholly ungenerated and indestructible, possessing being and life from itself, entirely self-moving, and a principle of nature and of all movements. Insofar as it is such, therefore, it contains within itself a life that is both self-governing and independent.[894]

Iamblichus continued

II.8.43.2

<And> insofar as it gives itself to things that come to be and subjects itself to the movement of the universe, to that extent it is also led under fate and serves the necessities of nature.[895] But insofar as it exercises its own intellectual activity, which is in truth free from all things and self-chosen, to that extent it acts voluntarily in what belongs to it and truly lays hold of the divine, the good, and the intelligible.[896]

894. The attribution introduces Iamblichus's letter to Macedonius on fate. Οὐσία denotes the soul's own being or nature; immaterial and incorporeal retain the distinct descriptions ἄϋλος and ἀσώματος. Ἀρχή is a principle or source, not necessarily a beginning in time. The qualification considered in itself and the subsequent insofar as are essential to the distinction developed in the following sentences.

895. Supplied <Καί> is shown as <And>. The repeated insofar as and to that extent relate the soul's subjection to fate to its engagement with things that come to be. The passage does not erase that qualification by declaring every activity of an embodied soul either wholly compelled or wholly independent.

896. Νοερά is intellectual, describing an activity of intellect; νοητόν is intelligible, what intellect apprehends. Ἄφετος means free or released, while αὐθαίρετος means chosen by oneself. The contrast concerns the soul's modes of activity and retains both its relation to nature and its voluntary apprehension of what is divine.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐν ταὐτῷ

II.8.44

Τὸν κατὰ νοῦν ἄρα βίον καὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον τῶν θεῶν διαζῆν μελετητέον· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν μόνος ἀποδίδωσι τὴν ἀδέσποτον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξουσίαν, ἀπολύει τε ἡμᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεσμῶν καὶ ποιεῖ ζῆν οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τινα βίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεῖον καὶ τῇ βουλήσει τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀποπληρούμενον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From the same work

II.8.44

We should therefore train ourselves to live the life that accords with intellect and holds fast to the gods.[897] For this life alone restores to us the soul's masterless authority, frees us from the bonds of necessity, and makes us live not some human life, but the divine life filled with good things by the will of the gods.[898]

897. Μελετητέον calls for practice or training, not merely considering a theory. Νοῦς is intellect, corresponding to the intellectual activity in the preceding excerpt. Ἀδέσποτος means without a master, while ἐξουσία is authority or power; the expression characterizes the soul's independence in this form of life.

898. Wachsmuth prints θεῶν, of the gods, in place of the transmitted θείων, divine. The English follows his printed text: the gods' will is distinguished from the good things with which the life is filled, expressed by ἀγαθῶν. Βούλησις means will.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ

II.8.45.1

Καὶ γὰρ ἤδη τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, αἱ μὲν κινήσεις αἱ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῆς πεπρωμένης πρὸς τὰς ἀΰλους καὶ νοερὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ περιφορὰς ἀφομοιοῦνται, ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν νοητὴν καὶ ἄχραντον εὐταξίαν ἀπείκασται· τὰ δ' αἴτια τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς προηγουμένοις αἰτίοις συνήρτηται καὶ τὸ ἐν γενέσει πλῆθος πρὸς τὴν ἀμέριστον οὐσίαν καὶ πάντα οὕτω τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης συνῆπται πρὸς τὴν προηγουμένην πρόνοιαν. Κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἐπιπλέκεται ἡ εἱμαρμένη τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τῷ εἶναι τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐστιν ἡ εἱμαρμένη καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ὑφέστηκε.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

The same author

II.8.45.1

For now, to state the matter as a whole: fate's movements throughout the cosmos are assimilated to immaterial and intellectual activities and revolutions, and its order is modeled on intelligible and undefiled good order.[899] Secondary causes depend on prior causes, and the multiplicity within becoming on indivisible substance; thus everything belonging to fate is connected with providence, which takes precedence. Fate, then, is interwoven with providence in its very being; fate exists by virtue of providence's existence and has its being from it and around it.[900]

899. The attribution continues Iamblichus, whose letter to Macedonius on fate is named at II.8.43. Πεπρωμένη and εἱμαρμένη both designate fate here. Νοερός, intellectual, describes activities of intellect; νοητός, intelligible, describes what is apprehended by intellect. The distinction is retained in English.

900. The dependence of secondary causes on prior causes leads to the dependence of fate on providence, πρόνοια. Prior and taking precedence express causal rank here. Γένεσις denotes coming into being, the realm of becoming contrasted with indivisible substance. The images of interweaving and existence from and around providence preserve the text's claim that fate is subordinate to and inseparable from providence.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια II.8.45.2

Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀρχὴ τοῦ πράττειν ἔχει μὲν συμφωνίαν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχάς· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀφειμένη ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπόλυτος ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν πράξεων ἀρχή. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός. Διότι μὲν γὰρ <οὐκ> ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως παράγεται οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως, πρεσβυτέρα καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἐνδιδομένη, προτέτακται· διότι γε μὴν ἀφ’ ὅλων τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερίδων καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων στοιχείων μοίρας τινὰς κατενείματο καὶ ταύταις πάσαις χρῆται, περιέχεται αὐτὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς εἱμαρμένης διατάξει, συντελεῖ τε εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ συμπληροῖ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ κατασκευὴν καὶ χρῆται αὐτῇ δεόντως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Iamblichus continued

II.8.45.2

Given this, the human principle of acting is in harmony with both these principles of the whole; but there is also in us a principle of actions released from nature and free from the motion of the whole. It is therefore not contained in the principle of the whole.[901] Because it is <not> produced from nature or from the motion of the whole, it stands prior, being older and not imparted by the whole. Yet because it has allotted itself certain shares from all the regions of the cosmos and from all the elements, and uses all these shares, it is also contained in fate's ordering, contributes to it, completes the constitution within it, and uses it as it should.[902]

901. Both these principles refers to providence and fate. Wachsmuth then prints a fresh clause, there is also ... a principle within us, rather than repeating it has; the English retains that construction. In the next sentence, the principle supplies what is understood in the Greek phrase in that of the whole.

902. Supplied <οὐκ> is retained as <not>: the principle is not derived from nature or cosmic motion. The printed ἐνδιδομένη, imparted, is questioned in the apparatus but not replaced here. The passage describes both priority to the cosmic principle and participation in fate through shares taken from the cosmos. Κατασκευή is an organized constitution; the English keeps its connection with the ordering just described.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 174

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια II.8.45.3

Καὶ καθ’ ὅσον μὲν λόγον καθαρὸν αὐθυπόστατον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τε ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τέλειον ἡ ψυχὴ συνείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἀπόλυτός ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἔξωθεν· καθ’ ὅσον γε μὴν καὶ ζωὰς ἄλλας προβάλλει ῥεπούσας εἰς τὴν γένεσιν καὶ ἐπικοινωνεῖ τῷ σώματι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἔχει συμπλοκὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου διάταξιν.

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.8.46.1

Εἰ δέ τις ταὐτόματον καὶ τὴν τύχην ἐπεισάγων ἀναιρεῖν οἴεται τὴν τάξιν, μαθέτω ὡς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἄτακτον οὐδ’ ἐπεισοδιῶδες οὐδὲ ἄνευ αἰτίας οὐδὲ ἀόριστον οὐδὲ εἰκῇ οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπεισιὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Οὔκουν ἀναιρεῖται ἡ τάξις καὶ συνέχεια τῶν αἰτιῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἕνωσις καὶ ἡ δι’ ὅλων διατείνουσα τῶν πρώτων ἐπικράτεια.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 174-175

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Iamblichus continued

II.8.45.3

To the extent that the soul has taken into itself a pure rational principle that subsists of itself, moves itself, acts from itself, and is perfect, it is free from everything external.[903] But to the extent that it also puts forth other modes of life inclining toward coming into being and shares in the body, it is enmeshed in the ordering of the cosmos as well.[904]

From the same work

II.8.46.1

If anyone thinks that by introducing spontaneity and fortune he abolishes order, let him learn that nothing in the universe is disorderly, an isolated episode, without a cause, indeterminate, random, intruding out of nothing, or accidental. Accordingly, the order and continuity of causes are not abolished, nor the unity of principles, nor the dominance of the first principles that extends through everything.[905]

903. Λόγος is a rational principle here, described as καθαρός, pure; αὐθυπόστατος, subsisting of itself; and αὐτοκίνητος, moving itself. Its activity from itself is separately stated. These are the grounds of the freedom from external things claimed in this clause.

904. The repeated to the extent ... to that extent preserves the qualifications καθ' ὅσον ... κατὰ τοσοῦτον. The same soul is considered in its relation to the pure rational principle and in the other modes of life it puts forth in contact with becoming and the body. Συμπλοκή is an interweaving or entanglement, here enmeshed in the cosmic ordering.

905. Τὸ αὐτόματον, here in the contracted form ταὐτόματον, is spontaneity or chance occurrence; τύχη is fortune. The successive negatives retain the full scope of the claim. An isolated episode renders ἐπεισοδιῶδες, suggesting something disconnected from an ordered sequence. The argument does not introduce fortune as an exception to causation, but places it within an account of causal order.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 174-175

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια II.8.46.2

Βέλτιον οὖν ἀφορίζεσθαι· ἡ τύχη τῶν πλειόνων τάξεων ἢ καὶ ἄλλων δή τινων [ἤ] ἐστιν ἔφορος καὶ συναγωγὸς αἰτία, πρεσβυτέρα τῶν συνιόντων, ἣν τότε μὲν θεὸν ἐπικαλοῦμεν, <τότε δὲ δαίμονα> παρειλήφαμεν. Ἡνίκα μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὰ κρείττονα αἴτια τῶν συνι<όντων> ᾖ, θεός ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἔφορος, ὅταν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει, δαίμων. Ἀεὶ οὖν μετ᾽ αἰτίας πάντα ἐπιτελεῖται καὶ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἄτακτον ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἐπεισέρχεται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 175

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Iamblichus continued

II.8.46.2

It is better, then, to define it thus: fortune is an overseeing and unifying cause of the more numerous orders, or indeed of certain other things, prior to the things that come together. We have come to recognize it as a cause that we call at one time a god, <at another a daimon>.[906] For when the causes of the things that come together are higher, a god is their overseer; when they are causes within nature, a daimon. Everything, then, is always accomplished with a cause, and nothing whatsoever disorderly intrudes among things that come to be.[907]

906. The opening definition is textually uncertain. Wachsmuth leaves the more numerous orders, τῶν πλειόνων τάξεων, and or indeed of certain other things unresolved rather than printing a proposed replacement such as higher orders. Rejected [ἤ], or, remains in Greek and is omitted from English. Supplied <τότε δὲ δαίμονα> is shown as <at another a daimon>. Fortune is presented as prior to the things brought together, rather than as their accidental product.

907. The contrast distinguishes higher causes from causes operating within nature, with a god or a daimon as overseer respectively. Daimon retains the Greek category of divine being. The supplied completion <όντων> is within συνιόντων, of the things that come together; the English translates the completed word as a whole. The Greek construction is compressed, and the concluding claim expressly keeps all occurrences within causal order.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 175

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.8.47.1

Διὰ τί οὖν παρ’ ἀξίαν αἱ διανομαὶ ἀποδίδονται; ἢ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν ὅσιον; οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κεῖται, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱρέσει τἀγαθά, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει μόνον κυριώτατα δὴ ἀφώρισται, τὰ δ’ ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἀμφισβητεῖται. Οὐκ ἄλλη οὖν ἐπικαρπία τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἢ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς.

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια II.8.47.2

Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐλαττοῦται ὅστις σπουδαῖος ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης, κρείττονα γὰρ αὐτὸν πάσης συντυχίας ἡ μεγαλοψυχία ἀπεργάζεται. Οὐδὲ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεται· ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρότης καὶ τελειότης τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν συμπληρῶσαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ μὴν τά γε ἐναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα γυμνάζει καὶ συνέχει καὶ συναύξει τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν ἐστι χωρὶς αὐτῶν καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γίγνεσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 175-176

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

From the same work

II.8.47.1

Why, then, are distributions made contrary to merit? Or is it not even proper to raise this question in the first place?[908] For good things depend on nothing else, but on the human being himself and his choice; it is in deliberate choice alone that these are most strictly defined. The matters that trouble most people are disputed through ignorance. Virtue, therefore, has no fruit other than itself.[909]

Iamblichus continued

II.8.47.2

Nor is any good person diminished by Fortune, for greatness of soul makes him superior to every circumstance.[910] Nor does this occur contrary to nature: the soul's highest excellence and perfection suffice to complete the best nature of the human being. Indeed, the very things that seem contrary train and sustain virtue and will increase it; it is impossible to become noble and good without them.[911]

908. The question concerns διανομαί, distributions or allotments, and ἀξία, merit or worth. Ὅσιον carries the sense of religious propriety: the reply questions whether it is permissible even to begin from the assumption that the distribution of genuine goods is unjust. The argument will locate those goods in the agent's choice.

909. Αἵρεσις is choice; προαίρεσις is deliberate choice. The good is located in this activity rather than in the external allotments that prompted the question. Ἐπικαρπία is fruit, yield, or profit: virtue itself is the return it produces, without requiring a further prize from Fortune.

910. Μεγαλοψυχία is greatness of soul, the disposition that makes the good person superior to συντυχίαι, circumstances or encounters of fortune. The claim concerns his standing in virtue; the text's answer is that Fortune does not diminish that good.

911. Ἀκρότης is the soul's highest excellence, joined here to τελειότης, perfection. Apparent adversities become occasions for exercising virtue. The English retains the sequence of present γυμνάζει and συνέχει, trains and sustains, followed by future συναύξει, will increase. Καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, noble and good, describes the resulting moral character.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 175-176

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Ἰαμβλίχου — συνέχεια II.8.47.3

Καὶ αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ διάθεσις τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ καλὸν προτιμᾷ τε διαφερόντως καὶ τὴν τοῦ λόγου τελειότητα μόνην ἐν μακαρίᾳ ζωῇ τίθεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐν οὐδενὸς μέρει περιορᾷ καὶ ἀτιμάζει.

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.8.48

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐν ψυχῇ μέν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ νοερά τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθάνατος, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἄρα αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐνυπάρχει τῇ θείᾳ ζωῇ, τῶν δὲ θνητοειδῶν οὐδὲν κύριον ἢ συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἐστιν, ἢ παραιρεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Ὅλως γὰρ ἐν νοερᾷ μὲν ζωῇ τὸ μακάριον ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει· ταύτην δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν μέσων οὔτε ἐπιδιδόναι ποιεῖ οὔτ’ ἐστὶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. Μάτην ἄρα αἱ τύχαι καὶ τὰ ἄνισα δῶρα τῆς τύχης διατεθρύληται παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 176

BOOK II CHAPTER 8

Iamblichus continued

II.8.47.3

This disposition of the good person, therefore, gives special honor to the noble and counts only the perfection of reason as belonging to a blessed life; everything else it disregards and disdains as of no account.[912]

<From the same work>

II.8.48

Since, then, the human being is in the soul, and the soul is intellectual and immortal, the soul's nobility, good, and end are therefore inherent in divine life. Nothing of a mortal kind has power either to contribute anything to perfect life or to deprive it of happiness.[913] In general, our blessedness lies in intellectual life; none of the intermediate things makes this life advance or can take it away.[914] It is in vain, then, that people have gone on talking about turns of fortune and Fortune's unequal gifts.

912. Τὸ καλόν is the noble, the object of moral esteem here. Λόγος is reason, whose perfection is placed at the center of the blessed life, μακαρία ζωή. The contrasting judgment on everything else continues the refusal to make virtue's value depend on Fortune's gifts.

913. Wachsmuth separates this paragraph as a new excerpt and supplies From the same work; the heading stays bracketed in both languages. The printed ἐν ψυχῇ, in the soul, is retained rather than adopting a proposed alteration of the opening. It locates the human being in the soul for the argument that follows. Θεία ζωή is divine life, as printed; the apparatus proposes perfect instead of divine, but that is not substituted here.

914. The intermediate things, τὰ μέσα, are the indifferents considered apart from moral good and evil. The feminine ταύτην most directly resumes intellectual life, νοερὰ ζωή, rather than the neuter blessedness, τὸ μακάριον; this life makes that reference explicit. Τέλος is the end or final aim, while εὐδαιμονία, happiness, and τὸ μακάριον, blessedness, describe the fulfillment located in that life.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 176

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Κεφάλαιον Θ′ II.9.heading

Ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός.

Δημοκρίτου II.9.1

Ἀπ’ ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ’ ἄν· τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν. Αὐτίκα ὕδωρ βαθὺ ἐς πολλὰ χρήσιμον καὶ δῆυτε κακόν, κίνδυνος γὰρ ἀποπνιγῆναι· μηχανὴ ὧν εὑρέθη, νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Chapter 9

II.9.heading

That no one is bad willingly.[915]

Democritus

II.9.1

From the very same things from which good things come to us, we might also reap bad things; yet we might keep clear of the bad things.[916] For example, deep water is useful for many purposes and, again, harmful, since there is a danger of drowning. A means was therefore found: teaching people to swim.[917]

915. Ἑκών means willing or acting voluntarily; πονηρός here is bad or morally base. The heading frames the collection that follows, whose excerpts approach harmful conduct, judgment, and responsibility in different ways. This is Chapter 9 in Wachsmuth, numbered 8 in the Gaisford and Meineke editions named at its opening.

916. The words τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν, yet we might keep clear of the bad things, are uncertain. The apparatus questions εἴημεν, we might be, and reports that other editors supposed a gap after it. Wachsmuth prints neither a gap nor a repair in the main text; the English preserves the tentative wording without adding a condition about knowing how to use things.

917. The example distinguishes a thing's usefulness from the danger it can also present. Μηχανή is a means or contrivance, and Ionic ὦν means therefore. The printed active διδάσκειν is teaching, retained here; the apparatus records a proposed change to learning. Teaching swimming addresses the danger of deep water while leaving its useful properties intact.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 176-177

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.9.2

Ἀνθρώποισι κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται, ἐπὴν τις τἀγαθὰ μὴ πιστῆται ποδηγετέειν μηδὲ ὀχέειν εὐπόρως. Οὐ δίκαιον <ὦν> ἐν κακοῖσι τὰ τοιάδε κρίνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀγαθοῖσι· τοῖσι δὲ ἀγαθοῖσι οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ κακά, ᾧ τινι βουλομένῳ ἂν εἴη.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.9.3

Ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος ἐς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ νηκηδής ἐστιν· ὃς δ’ ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογέῃ καὶ τὰ χρεόντα μὴ ἔρδῃ, τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιάδε ἀτερπέα· ὅταν τ’ εὖ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κακίζει.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

The same author

II.9.2

Bad things grow for human beings out of good things whenever someone does not know how to guide and handle the good things skillfully.[918] It is <therefore> not right to reckon such things among the bad, but among the good. Yet good things can also be used for bad ends, if anyone should wish to.[919]

<The same author>

II.9.3

The person of cheerful mind who turns to just and lawful deeds rejoices both waking and dreaming, is in good condition, and is free from care.[920] But for anyone who disregards justice and fails to do what he ought, all such things are joyless; whenever he recollects clearly, he is afraid and reproaches himself.[921]

918. The attribution continues Democritus. The Greek retains Ionic forms including πιστῆται, knows, and the extended infinitives ποδηγετέειν and ὀχέειν. Guiding and handling render the images of leading and carrying or driving; εὐπόρως adds facility or resourcefulness. The harm is connected with failure in the use of good things.

919. Supplied <ὦν>, therefore, remains visible in both languages. The conclusion distinguishes classifying something as good from using it for an evil purpose. The final words retain the possibility of a user wishing to make that harmful use; the chapter heading does not remove this qualification from the excerpt.

920. The supplied heading continues the attribution to Democritus. Εὔθυμος describes a cheerful or settled state of mind; its related noun is εὐθυμία. This excerpt connects that condition with just and lawful conduct. It does not use εὐδαιμονία, happiness, or establish that the two terms are interchangeable.

921. Ἔρρωται is in good condition or vigorous, and νηκηδής is free from care; these characterize the just agent's state in the fragment. In the final clause, the object of recollection is left unstated. The English preserves the remembering and self-reproach without adding a particular offense.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 177-178

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.9.4

Οἱ θεοὶ τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν, πλὴν ὁκόσα κακὰ καὶ βλαβερὰ καὶ ἀνωφελέα. Τάδε δ’ οὔτε πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωρέονται, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ τοῖσδεσι ἐμπελάζουσι διὰ νόου τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.9.5

Τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ’ ἀβέβαιος, φύσις δὲ αὐτάρκης· διόπερ νικᾷ τῷ ἥσσονι καὶ βεβαίῳ τὸ μέζον τῆς ἐλπίδος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 178

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

<The same author> II.9.4

The gods give human beings all good things, now as in the past, apart from whatever is bad, harmful, and useless.[922] Neither in the past nor now do the gods bestow these things on human beings; people themselves come upon them through blindness of mind and lack of judgment.[923]

<The same author> II.9.5

Fortune is lavish in gifts but unreliable; nature is self-sufficient.[924] Thus, with what is less but secure, nature prevails over the greater amount held out by hope.[925]

922. The attribution to the same author is supplied. The opening retains τἀγαθὰ πάντα, all good things, before the exception for evils. The apparatus records a proposed deletion of τἀγαθά, but the English does not simplify the printed sentence into all things.

923. Ἐμπελάζουσι expresses approaching or coming into contact with these evils, here come upon them. The stated cause is νόου τυφλότης, blindness of mind, and ἀγνωμοσύνη, lack of judgment. The contrast assigns the harmful encounter to human intellectual failure rather than to a harmful divine gift.

924. The attribution is supplied. Αὐτάρκης is self-sufficient, in contrast with Fortune's unreliable generosity. The apparatus proposes adding and stable after self-sufficient, but that addition is not printed here; the assurance is expressed by βεβαίῳ, secure, in the following clause.

925. The printed μέζον is an Ionic form of the comparative μεῖζον, greater. The opposition is between the smaller but secure and the greater that is hoped for. Held out by hope conveys the compressed τῆς ἐλπίδος, of hope, without inserting a proposed grammatical repair.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 178

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Εὐσεβίου

II.9.6.1

Θεοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φήναντος τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὰ φατιζόμενα ὄψει ἐοῦσαι διαφανέες ὁδοὶ διφάσιαι προκέαται βίου ψυχῇσι ἀνθρώπων, ἀδαμαντίνῃ αἱμασιῇ παχυτάτῃ καὶ ἐς πολλὸν ὕψος ἀνηκούσῃ [κατὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φήναντος] ἀπ' ἀλληλέων τὰ πρῶτα διεργόμεναι. Καὶ ἡ μὲν αὐτέων ἐστίν, ὁκοία δὴ τὴν τιμιωτέρην τάξιν λαχοῦσα, ἐκ δεξιῆς χεροὸς ἐσιόντων· αὕτη ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῇσι ἡγέεται· ἡτέρη δὲ λαιὴ ἐοῦσα ἐπὶ τὴν κακίην ἐστὶ παραπέμπουσα. Φατίζονται δὲ εἶναι τοιαίδε.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Eusebius

II.9.6.1

According to what is told, two roads of life, which God revealed to humankind from the beginning, lie before human souls, plain to sight. At first they are separated from one another by an adamantine wall, very thick and rising to a great height.[926] One, having received the more honored position, lies on the right of those entering: this leads them to virtue. The other lies on the left and sends them toward vice. They are said to be as follows.[927]

926. The attribution names Eusebius without identifying a work. The opening presents a reported account, κατὰ τὰ φατιζόμενα. Rejected [κατὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φήναντος] remains in the Greek but is omitted from the English; the apparatus treats it as a repeated or explanatory addition. The roads are separated at first, τὰ πρῶτα, a qualification retained here.

927. Ἀδαμάντινος describes the wall as made of adamant, an image of extreme hardness; αἰμασιή is a wall or enclosure. The right-hand road receives the more honored position and leads to ἀρετή, virtue; the left-hand road leads to κακίη, vice. The repeated language of what is said frames the ensuing description as an account within the excerpt.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 178-179

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.2

Ἡ μὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς τὰ πρῶτα οὐκ εὐήλατά κως παρέχειν δοκέει οἵα τε μέντοι εὐτυχέϊ πόνῳ ἀνυσθῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κατηγεομένους ἔχει καὶ παραπέμψαντας <ἂν> ἀκινδύνους· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁδὸς ἰθέη τε καὶ εὐρέη μέχρι τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ· ἐπ᾽ ἣν ἀνελθὼν ἐν τοῖσι καλλίστοισι ἕσεαι καὶ <ἐν> θέῃ ἄλλων τε μυρίων ἀγαθῶν [καὶ] τῶν εὐδαιμονεστάτων, ἀτὰρ δὴ καὶ φωτός, παντὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ κάλλεϊ μυρίῳ προήκοντος καὶ αὐγοειδεστάτου.

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.3

Πέριξ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν γῆν ἀναπεπταμένην αἱ πόλιες ἔασι καὶ οἱ τὴν γῆν κατοικέοντες καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι, περὶ τῶν, ὡς ἕκαστα ἔχει, ὁ ἐπὶ συμβολῇ τῶν ψυχέων προπεμφθεὶς ἐρέει λόγος. Καὶ ἥδε μὲν ὧδέ κως ἔχει·

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Eusebius continued II.9.6.2

The road of virtue seems at first to offer no easy passage, yet it can be traversed by successful toil; it also has guides who <would> conduct travelers safely.[928] After that it is a straight and broad road, as far as the one leading to the citadel of the noble itself. Having ascended to it, you will be among the most beautiful things and <in> contemplation of countless other goods of the greatest blessedness, and also of light, surpassing all other light by an immeasurable beauty and supremely radiant.[929]

Eusebius continued II.9.6.3

Around it, across all the land spread out, are the cities and those who inhabit and work the land. Reason, sent ahead to meet the souls, will tell how matters stand with each of them. Such, then, is this road.[930]

928. The printed εὐτυχέϊ πόνῳ is successful or fortunate toil; the apparatus records proposals to replace the adjective, but the English retains it. The supplied potential particle <ἄν> is represented by <would>. Compare Hesiod, Works and Days 287–292, where the road to virtue is initially difficult and becomes easier after the ascent. This is a comparison of the image, not a claim that the present excerpt quotes Hesiod.

929. The phrase μέχρι τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν is compressed: as far as the road leading to the citadel. Αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is the noble or beautiful itself, here the noble itself. Supplied <ἐν> remains <in>, and rejected [καί], and, is omitted from English while remaining in Greek. The final genitive describes light as surpassing all other light in beauty.

930. Λόγος, Reason, is personified within the account. Sent ahead to meet the souls, ἐπὶ συμβολῇ τῶν ψυχέων, he will later address them as a divine messenger, herald, and counselor. The cities and their inhabitants belong to the surrounding landscape; their detailed treatment is deferred to this figure. The next clause turns to the road of vice.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.4

ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν κακίην ἄγουσα ἔστιν οἵη τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ὀλίγου πάγχυ καὶ τούτου οὐ γνησίου, ἀπατηλοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ παραγωγῇ τῶν προσιόντων γεῦσαί τευ ἥδεος· ὥστε δὲ μηδενὸς μετὰ ταῦτα ἡγεμόνος εὑρισκομένου, εὐθὺς ἄγει ἐς ὁδὸν σκολίην, σκόλοπάς τε ἔχουσαν, οἵτινες δὴ ὀξέες, μεγάλοι καὶ πυκνοὶ καταπεπήγασι, καὶ χαράδρας καὶ κρημνοὺς κατὰ κεφαλῆς ὠθέοντας τοὺς ἐπαυρισκομένους κατὰ τοῦ συμψήσοντος καὶ παρασυρέοντος τοὺς κατενεχθέντας ἐς αὐτὸν ποταμοῦ κάτω βορβόρῳ καὶ λίθοις ῥέοντος, ὥστε πολλοὺς εὐθὺς οὕτω διαφθείρεσθαι.

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.5

Οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τύχῃ, οὔταρ᾽ οἰκείῃ προμηθείῃ, ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτόθι ἐούσας πόλιας διασκεδαννύαται ἄλλοι ἄλλοσε καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν, πολλὴν ἐοῦσαν, τὴν χώρην, περὶ τῶν δὴ καὶ αὐτῶν ὁ προειρημένος ἄγγελος ἀπηγήσεται. Τουτέων ἐουσέων τῶν ὁδῶν τοιουτέων, ἄγει ὁ προειρημένος καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ θεοῦ μεγάλου κῆρυξ <καὶ> σύμβουλος λόγος, <ὃς> ψυχῇσι τῇσι μελλούσῃσι κατιέναι τοιάδε προφωνέει·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Eusebius continued II.9.6.4

But the road leading to vice offers at its beginning a taste of something pleasant, very little of it, and even this is not genuine but deceptive, meant to lead those approaching astray.[931] After this, with no guide to be found, it leads straight onto a crooked road with sharp, large stakes driven closely together, and gullies and precipices that hurl those who encounter them headlong down toward the river below. This runs with mud and stones and will engulf and sweep away those cast down into it, so that many are immediately destroyed in this way.[932]

Eusebius continued II.9.6.5

The rest, by chance rather than their own forethought, are scattered in different directions toward the cities there and throughout the whole extensive country. The messenger already mentioned will report on these too.[933] Such being the roads, the previously mentioned Reason leads the way and stands in the middle—the great god's herald <and> counselor, <who> makes the following proclamation to the souls about to descend:[934]

931. The beginning of the road to vice is contrasted with the road to virtue in the preceding units. Its limited pleasure is called οὐ γνήσιον, not genuine, and ἀπατηλόν, deceptive; παραγωγή expresses the misleading of those who approach.

932. The transition ὥστε δέ is awkward, and the apparatus considers repairs or a gap; the English follows the surviving sequence without inserting lost material. The hazards extend the allegorical landscape. Συμψήσοντος describes the river's engulfing or sweeping away those thrown into it; παρασυρέοντος adds its carrying them along.

933. The surviving travelers are dispersed by τύχη, chance, rather than their own προμηθείη, forethought. The narrative again postpones details about the places and their inhabitants to the messenger's report; it does not name the cities here.

934. Λόγος is personified as Reason, the messenger already introduced in this continuous excerpt. The Greek places that name after its titles, herald and counselor; English moves it earlier to clarify the subject. Supplied <καί> and <ὅς> are retained as <and> and <who>. The direct speech begins in the next unit and continues through II.9.6.8.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.6

„ψυχαὶ ἀνθρώπων, φύσιν ἔχουσαι θνηταί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καὶ ζωῇ μὲν τῇ ἐπὶ γῆς νομιζομένῃ θανάτῳ ἐγκυρέουσαι, θανάτῳ δὲ τῷ δοκέοντι αὐτόθι ζωὴν ἀπολαμβάνουσαι, ἐπεὰν χρόνου τοῦ τεταγμένου ὑμῖν ἀνυσθέντος αὖτις ἀπολυθῆτε σώματος, τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτόθι θανάτῳ ὑποδεξαμένου ὑμέας, διαδέξονται αὖτις ὑμέας τρόπον τῆς ἐπὶ γῆς ζωῆς βίοι οἱ ὀφειλόμενοι·

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια II.9.6.7

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παραινέω, θεοῦ μεγάλου Ἑρμέω καὶ θεῶν τῶν λοιπῶν προφήτης τε καὶ σύμβουλος λόγος, καὶ ἀπειθεούσῃσι μὲν προλέγω θνητὰ κακά, πειθομένῃσι δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἔσεσθαι τοῖσι τῶν θεῶν ὁμοιεύμενα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Eusebius continued

II.9.6.6

"Souls of human beings, whose nature is to be mortal as well as immortal, who encounter death in what is called life on earth and receive life again in what seems death there:[935] when the time appointed for you has run its course and you are again released from the body that received you in death there, the lives due to you, corresponding to your earthly life, will receive you again.[936]

Eusebius continued

II.9.6.7

And that is why I counsel you—I, Reason, prophet and counselor of the great god Hermes and of the other gods.[937] For those who disobey I foretell mortal evils, while for those who obey there will be good things like those of the gods.[938]

935. The address belongs to Reason's speech. Its contrast reverses ordinary descriptions of life and death: earthly life is called an encounter with death, while what seems death there returns life to the soul. The body's receiving the souls in death belongs to that same contrast.

936. Βίοι οἱ ὀφειλόμενοι are the lives due or owed to the souls. Their correspondence with the earthly life is expressed by τρόπον τῆς ἐπὶ γῆς ζωῆς. The address does not promise an identical fate to every soul; the next unit distinguishes the consequences of obedience and disobedience.

937. The first-person speaker now names himself as λόγος, Reason, resuming the figure introduced by the narrator. Hermes is explicitly named as the great god, alongside the other gods. Προφήτης can mean a prophet or spokesman; these are Reason's roles within the imagined proclamation.

938. The printed θνητά, mortal, is retained despite the following warning about enduring harms. The apparatus proposes replacements meaning unending or immortal; those are not used in the translation. The Ionic ὁμοιεύμενα describes the promised goods as like those of the gods.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Εὐσεβίου — συνέχεια

II.9.6.8

Οὐ χρὴ ὦν βραχυτάτης κιβδήλου τε καὶ εὐδιασκεδάστου τευ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα κακὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ παραμενέοντα τὸν πάντα χρόνον αἱρέεσθαι καὶ βίῳ τῷ βραχυτάτῳ βίον βλάψαι τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα μακρότατον, οὐδ’ αὖ πόνον ὀλίγον καταδεισάσας ἀγαθὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ παραμενέοντα τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ εὐδαιμονίην βιοτῆς μηκίστης τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα προΐεσθαι.“

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Eusebius continued

II.9.6.8

You must therefore not choose great evils that endure for all time for the sake of some pleasure that is extremely brief, counterfeit, and easily dissipated, nor damage the longest life that follows by means of the shortest life.[939] Nor, from fear of a little toil, must you throw away great goods that endure for all time and the happiness of the longest life that follows."[940]

939. Κίβδηλος is counterfeit or spurious, and εὐδιασκέδαστος easily dissipated. The speech contrasts the shortest earthly life and its passing pleasures with the longest life afterward. Both evils and goods are described as remaining for all time, τὸν πάντα χρόνον; the English preserves that full duration.

940. The Ionic εὐδαιμονίη is happiness, here the promised good condition of the ensuing life. The conclusion urges the souls to endure limited toil rather than relinquish those lasting goods. This closes Reason's continuous speech and the Eusebius excerpt; the following Hierocles attribution begins a new excerpt.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Ἱεροκλέους ἐκ τοῦ Τίνα τρόπον θεοῖς χρηστέον II.9.7.1

Πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χρῆσθαι θεοῖς καὶ τὸ διειληφέναι, ὡς οὐδενός ποτε κακοῦ γίγνεται θεὸς αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τῆς κακίας ἁπαντᾷ μόνης, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν τέ εἰσιν αἴτιοι καὶ τῶν εὐχρήστων, ἡμεῖς δέ ἐσμεν οἱ τὰς εὐεργεσίας αὐτῶν οὐ προσιέμενοι, περιβάλλοντες δ’ ἑαυτοὺς κακοῖς αὐθαιρέτοις.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Hierocles, from How One Should Deal with the Gods

II.9.7.1

Understanding the following also seems to me to contribute greatly to dealing well with the gods: a god never becomes the cause of any evil; these evils arise from vice alone.[941] The gods, so far as depends on them, cause good and useful things, while we are the ones who refuse their benefactions and surround ourselves with evils of our own choosing.[942]

941. The attribution supplies both Hierocles's name and the title of his work. Χρῆσθαι θεοῖς concerns how one deals with the gods. The opening distinguishes κακία, moral vice, from the evils it causes; the excerpt later considers the different status of illness, poverty, and other external hardships.

942. Τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς qualifies the gods' agency: so far as depends on them, or for their part. Αὐθαίρετος means chosen by oneself. The clause emphasizes human refusal of divine benefactions rather than attributing moral evil to the gods.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Ἰεροκλέους — συνέχεια II.9.7.2

Ἤδη καιρὸν ἔχειν μοι τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐκεῖνο δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, ὡς δὴ οἱ ‘βροτοὶ’ τοὺς ‘θεοὺς’ αἰτιῶνται ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιπεμπομένων τῶν κακῶν,

οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσιν.

ἐπείτοιγε ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς κακῶν αἴτιός ἐστιν, ἐκ πολλῶν <ἂν> νοήσειέ τις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἀποχρήσειεν ἂν ἴσως ὁ Πλάτωνος ἐκεῖνος λόγος. Οὐ γὰρ θερμοῦ φησι τὸ ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον, οὐδὲ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· οὕτως οὖν οὐδὲ ἀγαθοποιοῦ τὸ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Hierocles continued

II.9.7.2

That poetic saying seems timely to me at this point: “mortals” blame the “gods,” as though their evils were sent by them,

but they themselves too
through their own recklessness have pains beyond their allotted fate.[943]

For one <might> understand from many considerations that the god is in no way whatsoever the cause of evils; for the present, however, that argument of Plato’s might perhaps suffice. “For cooling,” he says, “does not belong to what is hot, but the opposite; nor does warming belong to what is cold, but the opposite. Accordingly, doing harm does not belong to a doer of good either, but the opposite.”[944]

943. Homer, Odyssey 1.32–34: Zeus complains that mortals blame the gods while bringing additional suffering upon themselves through recklessness. Hierocles paraphrases the opening and quotes the end of line 33 and line 34. Ὑπὲρ μόρον is beyond one’s allotted fate; the context is Aegisthus’s disregard of a divine warning.

944. Compare Plato, Republic 335D, where Socrates argues that the good cannot harm. Hierocles adapts the comparison: Plato pairs heat and cooling with dryness and moistening, whereas this excerpt pairs heat and cooling with cold and warming. The local wording is retained. Supplied <ἄν> in the preceding sentence is represented by <might>.

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Ἱεροκλέους — συνέχεια II.9.7.3

Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεός, πεπληρωμένος εὐθὺς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ταῖς ἁπάσαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἂν κακοποιητικὸς ὁ θεὸς εἴη, οὐδέ τινων κακῶν αἴτιος, πάντα δὲ τοὐναντίον παρέχων ἀγαθὰ τοῖς λαβεῖν βουλομένοις ἅπασι, χαριζόμενος δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τῶν μέσων, ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι [τὰ] ποιητικά τε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Ἓν δὲ καὶ μόνον αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν <ἡ κακία>.

Ἱεροκλέους — συνέχεια II.9.7.4

Ταῦτα χρὴ διειληφέναι, ὡς τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν θεῶν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν τῆς κακίας. Τίνα οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦ κακῶς πάσχειν αἴτια; Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν μέσων ἐστί τινα παρὰ φύσιν καὶ δύσχρηστα ἢ νὴ Δία ποιητικὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ἄξιον καὶ περὶ τούτων τὴν νυνὶ διάληψιν ἔχειν, οἷον νόσου λέγω, πηρώσεως, θανάτου, πενίας, δόξης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων. Πολλὰ τοίνυν πέφυκεν αὐτῶν περαίνειν καὶ ἡ κακία, καὶ <δὴ> δι’ ἀκρασίαν καὶ λαγνείαν πολλαὶ μὲν γίνονται νόσοι, πολλαὶ δὲ πηρώσεις· διά τε ἀδικίαν πολλοὶ μὲν ἐχειροκοπήθησαν καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἀνεδέξαντο λώβας, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ὅλως ἀπέθανον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Hierocles continued

II.9.7.3

Moreover, the god is good, filled from the very beginning with all the virtues. Accordingly, the god could not produce evil or be the cause of any evils; on the contrary, he offers every good thing to all who are willing to receive it. Along with good things, he also grants some of the intermediate things: those that accord with nature for us and produce what accords with nature.[945] There is one sole cause of evils: <vice>.[946]

Hierocles continued

II.9.7.4

These distinctions must be understood: the gods are the causes of good things, and vice of bad things. What, then, causes us to fare badly? Since some intermediate things are contrary to nature and difficult to use—or, by Zeus, produce things of that kind—it is worth applying the present distinction to them too: I mean illness, physical impairment, death, poverty, reputation, and the like.[947] Vice too, then, is naturally capable of producing many of these, and <indeed> many illnesses and many impairments result from lack of self-control and lust. Because of injustice many have had their hands cut off and suffered other such mutilations, while many have even died outright.[948]

945. Τὰ μέσα, intermediate things, are the things classed as morally indifferent, distinct from virtue and vice. Here the partitive τῶν μέσων refers to those that accord with nature and produce what accords with nature, rather than to all indifferents. Rejected [τὰ], the article before ποιητικά, remains in Greek but is omitted from English.

946. The subject <ἡ κακία> is supplied in the source edition and remains marked as <vice>. The claim concerns moral evils; the next part asks separately about external hardships, distinguishing their causes from the gods' goodness.

947. Τὰ μέσα, intermediate things, are neither virtue nor vice in themselves, even when contrary to nature. The printed δόξης means reputation; it is retained despite sitting awkwardly among these examples. The later ἀδόξους explicitly describes people without a good reputation.

948. Supplied <δή> is rendered <indeed>. The excerpt attributes many such outcomes to vice, without saying that every illness or death has that cause. Its examples connect mutilation and death with injustice; matter is subsequently introduced as another cause.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Ἰεροκλέους — συνέχεια II.9.7.5

Ἐμποδίζεται δὲ πυκνὰ καὶ ἡ φιλάνθρωπος ἰατρικὴ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς πρόθεσιν ὑπὸ τῆς κακίας. Ἄπρακτα γὰρ γίνεται τὰ βοηθήματα τῆς τέχνης δι᾽ ἀπείθειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν καὶ φυγοπονίαν τῶν νοσούντων· καὶ μὴν πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπειργάσατο πτωχοὺς καὶ ἀπόρους ἀσωτία καὶ πολυτέλεια, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδόξους αἰσχροκέρδεια καὶ μικροπρέπεια. Μετά γε μὴν τὴν κακίαν δευτέρα τῶν τοιούτων πρόφασις ἡ ὕλη.

Ἰεροκλέους — συνέχεια II.9.7.6

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ μετέωρα καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῆς εἰλικρινεστάτης οὐσίας γεγονότα, δι᾽ ὁμαλοῦ πορεύεται, πάντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κατὰ τοὺς τῆς φύσεως λόγους περαιουμένων· τὰ δ᾽ ἐπίγεια καθάπερ ὑποστάθμην καὶ ἰλὺν ἔχοντα τῶν ὅλων τὴν οὐσίαν * * *

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Hierocles continued

II.9.7.5

Vice also frequently frustrates the humane art of medicine, contrary to its own purpose. For the aids provided by the art become ineffectual through patients' disobedience, lack of self-control, and avoidance of exertion.[949] Moreover, wastefulness and extravagance have made many people poor and destitute; shameful profit-seeking and meanness have made many disreputable. After vice, however, matter is a second cause of such things.[950]

Hierocles continued

II.9.7.6

For things aloft and above us proceed evenly, as things that have come to be from the purest substance, with everything in them being accomplished according to nature's rational principles.[951] But earthly things, having as their substance, as it were, the sediment and mud of the whole… [text missing][952]

949. Φιλάνθρωπος, humane or benevolent toward human beings, characterizes the purpose of medicine. In this ancient ethical account, the patients' conduct can frustrate the art's attempted remedies; the examples continue the argument about vice as a cause of external misfortune.

950. Πρόφασις introduces a further cause or occasion of external hardship. The following lines explain ὕλη, matter, through a contrast between the heavenly and earthly realms. This material cause is distinguished from κακία, moral vice.

951. Μετέωρα refers to things aloft, here contrasted with earthly things, and λόγοι to nature's rational principles. The description belongs to the excerpt's account of heavenly regularity and earthly material limitations.

952. Ὑποστάθμη is sediment or dregs, and ἰλύς mud or silt. The metaphor makes the earthly realm the material residue of the whole. The printed gap follows οὐσίαν, substance, leaving this final contrast grammatically unfinished.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Μουσωνίου II.9.8.1

Πάντες, ἔφη, φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως, ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ δ’ οὔ· καὶ τούτου μέγα τεκμήριον ὅτι πᾶσιν ὁμοίως οἱ νομοθέται καὶ προστάττουσιν ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀπαγορεύουσιν ἃ μὴ χρή, οὐχ ὑπεξαιρούμενοι οὐδένα τῶν ἀπειθούντων ἢ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥστε ἀτιμώρητον εἶναι οὐ νέον, οὐ πρεσβύτην, οὐκ ἰσχυρόν, οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, οὐχ ὁντιναοῦν.

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.9.8.2

Καίτοι ἐχρῆν, εἰ ὅλον ἐπείσακτον τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἦν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ φύσει ἡμῖν μετῆν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὖσιν ἔργοις οὐδεὶς ἀπαιτεῖται εἶναι ἀναμάρτητος, μὴ μεμαθηκὼς τὴν τέχνην, οὕτως μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον μηδένα ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον, ὅστις ἀρετὴν μὴ ἐξέμαθεν, ἐπείπερ ἀρετὴ μόνη ποιεῖ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐν βίῳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Musonius

II.9.8.1

All of us, he said, have a natural constitution that enables us to live without wrongdoing and nobly; it is not that one of us can and another cannot.[953] Strong evidence for this is that lawmakers prescribe what everyone must do and prohibit what they must not do, equally for all. They exempt none of those who disobey or do wrong from punishment: neither young nor old, strong nor weak, nor anyone whatsoever.[954]

Musonius continued

II.9.8.2

Yet if virtue were something brought in wholly from outside, with no share in it belonging to us by nature, the following ought to hold: just as no one is expected to be free from error in the work of the other arts without having learned the art, so no one who had not learned virtue ought to be expected to be free from wrongdoing in the conduct of life.[955] For virtue alone makes one avoid wrongdoing in life.[956]

953. The heading names Musonius; Hense's 1905 collection numbers this discourse 2, whereas the anthology locator here remains II.9.8. The reporting verb ἔφη, he said, preserves the form of a recorded teaching. The opening asserts a shared natural capacity to live well; it does not say that everyone already possesses fully developed virtue.

954. Ἀναμαρτήτως means without error or wrongdoing. The reference to laws emphasizes wrongdoing here; the following comparisons extend the language of error to practical skills. The lawmakers' universal demands are offered as evidence for the capacity asserted in the opening.

955. Ἐπείσακτος means introduced or brought in from outside. This is a conditional argument: if virtue were entirely acquired without any natural basis, an untrained person should be excused as in other arts. It is not a denial that virtue requires learning and practice.

956. Τέχνη denotes an art or trained skill. The passage moves between errors in skilled work and wrongdoing in life, using the same family of words, ἁμαρτάνω and ἀναμάρτητος. Virtue is presented as what enables right conduct, while the question concerns its natural basis.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.9.8.3

Νῦν δὲ ἐν μὲν θεραπείᾳ καμνόντων οὐδεὶς ἀναμάρτητον ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἄλλον ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ ἐν χρήσει λύρας οὐδένα ἄλλον ἢ τὸν μουσικόν, <καὶ> ἐν χρήσει πηδαλίων οὐδένα ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κυβερνήτην· ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ οὐκέτι μόνον ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἀξιοῦσιν, ὃς δοκεῖ μόνος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτης πεποιημένους. Δῆλον οὖν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἕτερον τούτου αἴτιον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.9.8.4

Καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο μέγα τεκμήριον τοῦ μετεῖναι ἀρετῆς φύσει ἡμῖν, τὸ πάντας οὕτως διαλέγεσθαι περὶ ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἀρετὴν καὶ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν. Οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν πολλῶν, ὃς ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄφρων ἢ φρόνιμος τυγχάνει ὤν, ἄφρων ὁμολογήσει εἶναι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄδικος ἢ δίκαιος τυγχάνει ὤν, φήσει ὅτι ἄδικος. Ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ἐρωτᾷ τις πότερα σώφρων ἢ ἀκόλαστος, εἶθ' ἅπας ἀποκρίνεται ἐρωτηθείς, ὅτι σώφρων. Καὶ ἁπλῶς ἂν ἐρωτᾶται τις πότερον ἀγαθὸς εἴη ἢ φαῦλος, φαίη ἂν ἀγαθός, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχων εἰπεῖν οὔτε διδάσκαλον αὐτοῦ καλοκἀγαθίας, οὔτε μάθησιν ἀρετῆς ἢ ἄσκησιν τίνα τυγχάνει πεποιημένος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Musonius continued

II.9.8.3

As things stand, however, no one expects anyone but a physician to be free from error in treating the sick, or anyone but a musician in playing the lyre, <and> anyone but a helmsman in handling the steering oars.[957] In life, by contrast, people expect freedom from wrongdoing not only of the philosopher, who alone seems to attend to virtue, but equally of everyone, including those who have given it no attention. Clearly, then, the only reason for this is that human beings are born for virtue.[958]

Musonius continued

II.9.8.4

Moreover, another strong proof that we have a share in virtue by nature is that all speak about themselves as possessing virtue and being good. For no ordinary person, when asked whether he is foolish or sensible, will admit to being foolish; nor again, when asked whether he is unjust or just, will he say that he is unjust.[959] Likewise, if someone asks whether a person is self-controlled or undisciplined, then everyone who is asked replies that he is self-controlled. And if someone is asked simply whether he is good or bad, he would say he is good, even though he could not name a teacher of moral goodness of his own or say what study of virtue or practice he has undertaken.[960]

957. Πηδάλια are a ship's steering oars; κυβερνήτης is the helmsman who handles them. The supplied conjunction <καί> remains marked as <and>. The examples concern trained expertise in medicine, music, and navigation.

958. Πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι describes human nature as directed or fitted toward virtue. The philosopher is said to seem alone in attending to it, ὃς δοκεῖ μόνος; the qualification remains. The conclusion explains the shared expectation of right conduct, not universal actual goodness.

959. The argument appeals to people's ordinary claims about themselves as evidence of a natural share in virtue. Those claims do not establish that the speakers have already achieved virtue: the next unit distinguishes an innate starting point from mistaken self-assurance.

960. At 184:1 the printed εἶθ' ἅπας is an editorial reconstruction, here read as then everyone. The final clause retains printed ἢ, or, between study and practice; the apparatus considers alternatives. Καλοκἀγαθία denotes moral goodness or excellence.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.9.8.5

Τοῦτ’ οὖν τίνος ἄλλου τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ἢ τοῦ φυσικὴν εἶναι ὑποβολὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ πρὸς καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐνεῖναι. Διὰ δὲ τὸ πάντως ἀγαθοὺς ὑπάρχειν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, οἱ μὲν ἀπατώμεθα ὡς καὶ δὴ ὄντες ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ αἰσχυνόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν <ὡς> οὐκ ἐσμέν.

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.9.8.6

Ἐπεὶ διὰ τί, πρὸς θεῶν, γράμματα μὲν ἢ μουσικὴν ἢ παλαιστικὴν οὐδεὶς μὴ μαθὼν εἰδέναι φησίν, οὐδὲ ἔχειν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας προσποιεῖται, μὴ καὶ διδάσκαλον παρ’ ὃν ἐφοίτα ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἀρετὴν δὲ ἔχειν πᾶς ὑπισχνεῖται; ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδενὸς φύσει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ ἥκει <τις> εἰς τὸν βίον ἔχων ὑποβολὰς * * *

BOOK II CHAPTER 9

Musonius continued

II.9.8.5

Of what else, then, is this proof but that there is a natural predisposition in the human soul toward moral goodness, and a seed of virtue in each one of us?[961] But because we are in any case bound to be good, some of us are mistaken in thinking that we actually are good, while others are ashamed to acknowledge <that> we are not.[962]

Musonius continued

II.9.8.6

For why, by the gods, does no one claim to know reading and writing, music, or wrestling without having learned them, or pretend to possess these skills without also being able to name the teacher with whom he studied, whereas everyone claims to possess virtue?[963] Because human beings have no natural share in any of those arts, nor does <anyone> enter life with predispositions… [text missing][964]

961. Ὑποβολή is an initial impulse or predisposition toward goodness, and σπέρμα a seed. The argument concerns a natural starting point for virtue; it does not equate that endowment with the completed virtue claimed by the speakers.

962. The main text reads πάντως, in any case or by all means, rather than the proposed πάντας, all people. The English therefore qualifies the obligation to be good. Supplied <ὡς> provides the that-clause after acknowledge.

963. Γράμματα here denotes learning letters, or literacy; παλαιστική is the trained art of wrestling. The contrast concerns skills ordinarily acquired through instruction and attendance on a teacher, rather than the natural beginning of moral development.

964. Supplied <τις> is rendered <anyone>. The Greek breaks off after ὑποβολάς, predispositions, before stating what they concern. The apparatus suggests a completion contrasting these arts with virtue, but the missing wording is not inserted.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 10–14

Κεφάλαιον Ι′ II.10.heading

Ὁποῖον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν φιλόσοφον.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΑ′ II.11.heading

Ὅτι χρὴ σέβειν τὸ θεῖον.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΒ′ II.12.heading

Ὅτι τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ δικαίοις βοηθεῖ τὸ κρεῖττον.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΓ′ II.13.heading

Περὶ μαντικῆς καὶ ὡς εἴη ἀναγκαία τῷ βίῳ [καὶ] ἡ τῶν μελλόντων πρόγνωσις.

deest.

BOOK II CHAPTERS 10–14

Chapter 10

II.10.heading

What the philosopher should be like.

[Text missing][965]

Chapter 11

II.11.heading

That one should revere the divine.

[Text missing][966]

Chapter 12

II.12.heading

That the higher power helps the pious and just.

[Text missing][967]

Chapter 13

II.13.heading

On divination, and how foreknowledge of future events is necessary for life.

[Text missing][968]

965. Wachsmuth prints the Latin notice deest, is missing, beneath this Greek heading. The heading survives; the excerpts that once belonged to the chapter are not supplied here.

966. Τὸ θεῖον is the divine. This is a preserved chapter heading followed by the editor's missing-text notice, not an excerpt or an additional saying attributed to an author.

967. Τὸ κρεῖττον, literally what is superior, is rendered the higher power. The heading names the topic of the missing chapter; no surviving excerpts follow it here to show how that topic was developed.

968. Μαντική is divination; πρόγνωσις is foreknowledge. The rejected second [καί], and, remains in Greek and is omitted from English. With that deletion, foreknowledge is the subject of is necessary, rather than a disconnected additional topic. Only the heading survives here.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 10–14

Κεφάλαιον ΙΔ′ II.14.heading

Ὅτι χρὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίας, ἐκκλίνειν δὲ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους.

deest.

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Chapter 14

II.14.heading

That one should greatly value the company of the wise, and avoid the base and uneducated.

[Text missing][969]

969. Συνουσία here is association or company; περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι means to value highly. The heading contrasts the company of the wise with that of the base and uneducated. The editor again marks the chapter's text as missing.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Κεφάλαιον ΙΕ′ II.15.heading

Περὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτι οὐ τῷ λόγῳ χρὴ κρίνειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τρόπῳ· ἐκτὸς γὰρ ἔργου πᾶς λόγος περιττός.

Ἀστυδάμαντος Ἀλκμαίωνος II.15.1

<Οὐ> τοῦ δοκεῖν μοι, τῆς δ’ ἀληθείας μέλει.

Εὐριπίδου Ἱκέτισιν II.15.2

Τυδέως δ’ ἔπαινον ἐν βραχεῖ θήσω μέγαν·
φιλότιμον ἦθος, πλούσιον, φρόνημα δὲ
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις, οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἔχων.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Chapter 15

II.15.heading

On seeming and being, and that a person should be judged by character rather than speech; for all speech apart from action is superfluous.[970]

Astydamas, from Alcmaeon

II.15.1

Seeming is <not> my concern; truth is.[971]

Euripides, from Suppliants

II.15.2

I shall give Tydeus great praise in brief:[972]
a character rich in love of honor, with his pride
in deeds, not in words.[973]

970. Τρόπος is manner or character, contrasted with λόγος, speech. The final sentence is printed as part of the heading here. The apparatus notes its absence from Photius's corresponding list and compares a possible verse formulation; the wording printed in this heading is retained.

971. The supplied negative <Οὐ> is decisive and remains visible as <not>. The attribution identifies Astydamas and the play Alcmaeon; this isolated tragic verse does not identify its speaker or establish the circumstances in which it was spoken.

972. The source cites Suppliants 901 and 907–908, bringing together the announcement of Tydeus's praise and two later verses. The intervening lines are not printed in this anthology excerpt. Adrastus praises Tydeus in the play's memorial account of the fallen warriors.

973. Φιλότιμος means eager for honor; πλούσιος literally means rich. The compressed description is rendered here as a character rich in love of honor. The local passage ends with ἔχων, having or possessing, which governs the descriptions, rather than the parallel play's final ἴσον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Αἰσχύλου Ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας II.15.3

<Οὐ> γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλω
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

<Εὐ>ήνου II.15.4

Ἡγοῦμαι σοφίης εἶναι μέρος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον
ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν, οἷος ἕκαστος ἀνήρ.

Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδος II.15.5

Οὐ γὰρ λόγοισι τὸν βίον σπουδάζομεν
λαμπρὸν ποιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς δρωμένοις.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Aeschylus, from Seven against Thebes

II.15.3

For I wish <not> to seem the best, but to be so,[974]
reaping a harvest from a deep furrow in my mind,
from which sound counsels sprout.[975]

<Eu>enus

II.15.4

I consider it no small part of wisdom[976]
to know correctly what each man is like.[977]

Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus

II.15.5

For we do not strive to make our life illustrious
by words more than by the deeds we do.[978]

974. The supplied negative <Οὐ> remains visible. In the play a messenger describes Amphiaraus, with third-person θέλει, he wishes. The anthology prints first-person θέλω, I wish, which is retained without turning the verse into a personal profession by Aeschylus. Wachsmuth cites 598–600; the consulted parallel edition numbers the corresponding lines 592–594.

975. The agricultural image joins a deep furrow in the mind with the good counsels that grow from it. Ἄλοξ is a furrow, καρπόομαι to reap or obtain a crop, and κεδνός good or sound. The image gives inward judgment a productive depth beyond outward reputation.

976. The beginning of the author's name is supplied: <Εὐ>ήνου, here <Eu>enus. The source's attribution is retained as reconstructed, without an added biographical identification.

977. Σοφίη is wisdom; γιγνώσκειν is to recognize or know. The point is accurate judgment of each person's character. The phrase no small part preserves the Greek understatement, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον.

978. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 1143–1144. Theseus speaks after restoring Oedipus's daughters to him; his fulfilled promise supplies the context for the contrast between words and deeds.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Poetae incerti II.15.6

Ὁ βίος ἔστ’ ἀλαζονείας δεόμενος.

Ἐπιχάρμου II.15.7

Πρὸς <δὲ> τοὺς πέλας πορεύου λαμπρὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχων,
καὶ φρονεῖν πολλοῖσι δόξεις τυχὸν ἴσως <οὐδὲν φρονῶν>.

Φωκυλίδου II.15.8

Πολλοί τοι δοκέουσι σαόφρονες ἔμμεναι ἄνδρες,
σὺν κόσμῳ στείχοντες, ἐλαφρόνοοί περ ἐόντες.

Εὐριπίδου II.15.9

Πᾶς ὁ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν τεχνολογῶν θαυμάζεται,
διακρινόμενος δὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἐλέγχεται,
ὑποβολιμαίαν σύνεσιν ἠμφιεσμένος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Unknown poet II.15.6

Life is in need of boastfulness.[979]

Epicharmus II.15.7

<But> go to your neighbors wearing a splendid cloak,
and many may perhaps think you sensible <though you have no sense>.[980]

Phocylides II.15.8

Many men, indeed, seem to have sound judgment,
walking with decorum, though they are frivolous.[981]

Euripides II.15.9

Everyone who expounds an art on his own is admired;[982]
but when tested against others he is exposed,
clothed in counterfeit understanding.[983]

979. The poet is unidentified; Wachsmuth's apparatus suggests a comic source. The printed line says that life needs ἀλαζονεία, boastfulness or pretension, without a negative. Its transmission is disputed, and the apparatus considers a negative reading; that conjecture is not substituted for the printed text.

980. Both <δέ>, but, and the final <οὐδὲν φρονῶν>, though you have no sense, are editorial supplements. Τυχὸν ἴσως doubles the expression of uncertainty, reflected by may perhaps. The cloak creates an impression of sound judgment. The attribution names Epicharmus without identifying a play.

981. The couplet is assigned to Phocylides without a work title. The epic forms σαόφρονες and ἔμμεναι mean sound in mind and to be. Κόσμος here concerns order or decorum in one's bearing, contrasted with ἐλαφρόνοοι, light or frivolous in mind.

982. The attribution to Euripides is retained from the printed heading. The apparatus questions it and suggests Philippides, or possibly Hermippus; the source is therefore uncertain.

983. Τεχνολογῶν describes discourse on an art or technical subject. Comparison with others tests the apparent expertise. Ὑποβολιμαῖος evokes something substituted or passed off as genuine; together with the clothing image, it characterizes sham understanding.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Φιλήμονος Ἀδελφοῖς II.15.10

Οὐκ ἂν λαλῇ τις μικρόν, ἐστὶ κόσμιος,
οὐδ’ ἂν πορεύηταί τις εἰς τὴν γῆν βλέπων·
ὁ δ’ ἡλίκον μὲν ἡ φύσις φέρει λαλῶν,
μηθὲν ποιῶν δ’ ἄσχημον, οὗτος κόσμιος.

Εὐριπίδου Φοίνικι II.15.11

<Οἱ> πεῖραν οὐ δεδωκότες
μᾶλλον δοκοῦντες ἢ πεφυκότες σοφοί.

Εὐριπίδου Ἀντιόπῃ II.15.12

Ὃς δ’ εὐγλωσσίᾳ
νικᾷ, σοφὸς μέν, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τὰ πράγματα
κρείττω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἀεί ποτε.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Philemon, from Brothers

II.15.10

A man is not well behaved simply because he speaks little,
nor because he goes about looking at the ground;
but one who speaks as much as his nature permits
and does nothing unseemly—that man is well behaved.[984]

Euripides, from Phoenix

II.15.11

<Those> who have given no proof of themselves,
seeming wise rather than being so by nature.[985]

Euripides, from Antiope

II.15.12

Whoever wins by eloquence
is clever, certainly; but I always hold deeds
better than words.[986]

984. Κόσμιος means orderly or decorous in conduct. Speaking little or looking down does not by itself establish good character; the final line tests the person by what he does. The fragment is assigned to Philemon's Brothers.

985. The supplied <Οἱ> means those who; the negative οὐ is already present in the transmitted verse. Πεῖραν διδόναι means to submit to a test or give proof of oneself. The surviving fragment contrasts a reputation for wisdom with wisdom established in fact. Phoenix is the lost play named in the heading.

986. Εὐγλωσσία is fluency or eloquence; σοφός here concedes the successful speaker's cleverness. The speaker then ranks πράγματα, actual deeds or matters accomplished, above λόγοι, words. The fragment comes from Euripides's lost Antiope; its speaker is not named in this excerpt.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Εὐριπίδου

II.15.13

<Οὐ> μὴ φρονήσεθ’, οἳ κενῶν δοξασμάτων
πλήρεις πλανᾶσθε, τῇ δ’ ὁμιλίᾳ βροτοὺς
κρινεῖτε καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν τοὺς εὐγενεῖς;
οἱ γὰρ τοιοίδε τὰς πόλεις οἰκοῦσιν εὖ
καὶ δώμαθ’, αἱ δὲ σάρκες αἱ κεναὶ φρενῶν
ἀγάλματ’ ἀγορᾶς εἰσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δόρυ
μᾶλλον βραχίων σθεναρὸς ἀσθενοῦς μένει·
ἐν τῇ φύσει δὲ τοῦτο κἀν εὐψυχίᾳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Euripides, from Electra

II.15.13

Will you <not> think sensibly, you who wander[987]
full of empty notions, and judge which mortals are noble
by dealings with them and by their character?[988]
For people of this sort manage cities well
and households; flesh empty of sense
is an ornament of the marketplace. For a strong arm
withstands a spear no better than a weak one;
this lies in natural character and courage.[989]

987. The opening is rendered tentatively. Wachsmuth prints supplied <Οὐ> followed by μή and the positive φρονήσεθ', think sensibly; the two negatives do not fit the expected exhortation cleanly. Murray's separate edition of Electra prints ἀφρονήσεθ', act foolishly, yielding an appeal to stop being foolish. That reading is not substituted for the local Greek; the English gives the apparent direction of the appeal while acknowledging its difficult wording.

988. Euripides, Electra 383–390. Orestes speaks after the poor farmer's welcome has shown him the man's worth. He urges judgment through personal dealings, ὁμιλία, and character, ἤθη, rather than the conventional signs of noble birth or status. The local anthology wording is retained where the play's separate text differs.

989. The contrast is between bodily strength and the character or courage needed to stand firm. Μένει takes δόρυ as its object: the arm withstands a spear, rather than holds one. Κἀν contracts καὶ ἐν, and in; it is not a conditional expression.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Ἴωνος II.15.14

Ἐκ τῶν λόγων μὴ κρίνε, Κλεινοφῶν, σοφὸν
ἢ χρηστὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν βίον ἐξέταζ' ἀεί·
πολλοὶ γὰρ <εὖ> λέγουσιν ἀδικίας χάριν,
τὰ δ' ἔργ' ἔχουσι φαῦλα, κοὐ φρονοῦσιν εὖ.

Εὐριπίδου Παλαμήδῃ II.15.15

Ὅστις λέγει μὲν εὖ, τὰ δ' ἔργ' ἐφ' οἷς λέγει
αἰσχρ' ἐστί, τούτου τὸ σοφὸν οὐκ αἰνῶ ποτέ.

Σοφοκλέους II.15.16

Σύ τοι λέγεις νιν, οὐκ ἐγώ· σὺ γὰρ ποιεῖς
τοὔργον, τὰ δ' ἔργα τοὺς λόγους εὑρίσκεται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Ion

II.15.14

Do not judge a man wise or good from his words, Kleinophon;[990]
always examine his life.
For many speak <well> for the sake of injustice,
while their deeds are base, and they do not think well.[991]

Euripides, Palamedes

II.15.15

When a man speaks well but the deeds he speaks about
are shameful, I never praise his cleverness.[992]

Sophocles, Electra

II.15.16

You are the one saying it, not I: for you do
the deed, and deeds find their own words.[993]

990. The printed heading gives Ion, but the attribution is uncertain. Wachsmuth cross-references the fragment under Philemon; his apparatus discusses Philistion and a possible Moschion. The bare heading is retained without identifying a particular Ion or assigning the verses securely to another poet.

991. The adverb <εὖ>, well, is an editorial supplement. The printed address is Κλεινοφῶν, Kleinophon; the apparatus records the more usual Κλειτοφῶν, Kleitophon. Βίος, life, directs attention to sustained conduct, with the final verse contrasting polished speech and actual deeds.

992. The heading assigns the fragment to Euripides' Palamedes without identifying its speaker. Τὸ σοφόν is cleverness or intellectual skill here: the speaker refuses to praise eloquence associated with shameful conduct.

993. Sophocles, Electra 624–625. Electra answers her mother Clytemnestra, who has complained that her own words and deeds provoke Electra's accusations. Electra makes conduct responsible for the language used about it; deeds are imagined finding their own verbal expression.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Εὐριπίδου Θυέστῃ II.15.17

<Οὐ> πώποτ’ ἔργου μᾶλλον εἰλόμην λόγους.

<Poetae incerti> II.15.18

Τῷ λόγῳ μὲν εὖ διέρχῃ πάντα, τῷ δ’ ἔργῳ κακῶς.

Μενάνδρου II.15.19

Οὐχ ὁ λόγος αὔξει τὴν τέχνην περισσὸς ὤν,
ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ κοσμεῖ τὴν τέχνην τὰ πράγματα.

Εὐριπίδου Πελιάσιν II.15.20

Φθείρου· τὸ γὰρ δρᾶν οὐκ ἔχων, λόγους ἔχεις.

Μενάνδρου II.15.21

Τί δ’ ὄφελος <εὖ> λαλοῦντος, ἂν κακῶς φρονῇ.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Euripides, Thyestes II.15.17

<Never> have I preferred words to action.[994]

<Unknown poet> II.15.18

In speech you handle everything well, but in action badly.[995]

Menander II.15.19

An abundance of words does not enhance an art;
but the deeds themselves adorn the art.[996]

Euripides, Peliades II.15.20

Be off! For you have words, though you lack the power to act.[997]

Menander II.15.21

But what use is speaking <well> if one's judgment is bad?[998]

994. Initial <οὐ>, not, is supplied; together with πώποτε, ever, it is rendered <Never>. The heading assigns this statement to Euripides' Thyestes, but the isolated line does not identify its speaker or the situation in which the preference is declared.

995. The second-person διέρχῃ addresses an unnamed person: the same matters are handled well in speech and badly in action. The author is unidentified; the attribution <Unknown poet> is supplied editorially.

996. The heading assigns the couplet to Menander; the apparatus reports an attribution to Hermodotus elsewhere in Stobaeus. Τὰ πράγματα, the actual facts or deeds, adorn τέχνη, art or skill. The contrast is between the work itself and the mere abundance of words about it.

997. Printed λόγους ἔχεις means you have words. The compressed τὸ δρᾶν οὐκ ἔχων contrasts this with lacking the capacity to act. The apparatus records a proposed λόγους λέγεις, you speak words; the translation retains ἔχεις, have.

998. Supplied <εὖ>, well, makes the explicit contrast with κακῶς, badly. The line asks whether skill in speech is any use when the thought or judgment behind it is poor.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Εὐριπίδου Μηδείας

II.15.22

Ἦ πολλὰ πολλοῖς εἰμι διάφορος βροτῶν·
ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὅστις ἄδικος ὢν σοφὸς λέγειν
πέφυκε, πλείστην ζημίαν ὀφλισκάνει·
γλώσσῃ γὰρ αὐχῶν τἄδικ᾽ εὖ περιστελεῖν,
τολμᾷ πανουργεῖν, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐκ ἄγαν σοφός.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Euripides, Medea

II.15.22

Indeed, I differ in much from many mortals.[999]
For in my eyes an unjust man gifted in speech
incurs the heaviest penalty:
boasting he can neatly cloak injustice with his tongue,
he dares act the villain, but is not so very wise.[1000]

999. Euripides, Medea 579–583. Medea speaks to Jason after his defense of his new marriage. The following lines in the play explicitly turn her general condemnation against him. The judgment belongs to the dramatic speaker.

1000. Περιστελεῖν means wrap up or cover: the tongue is imagined dressing injustice attractively. The recurrence of σοφός turns on a distinction between verbal cleverness and genuine wisdom. The penalty is stated as Medea's judgment of such a person.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Μενάνδρου II.15.23

Ὁ μὲν λόγος <σου> συνέσεως πολλῆς γέμει·
τὰ δ’ ἔργα σύνεσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα φαίνεται.

Ποσειδίππου II.15.24

Οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ εὖ φρονεῖν·
πολλοὶ γὰρ εὖ λέγοντες οὐκ ἔχουσι νοῦν.

Εὐριπίδου II.15.25

Ἤδη δὲ πολλῶν ἠρέθην κριτὴς λόγων,
καὶ πόλλ’ ἀμιλληθέντα μαρτύρων ὕπο
τἀναντί’ ἔγνων συμφορᾶς μιᾶς πέρι.
κἀγὼ μὲν οὕτω χὥστις ἔστ’ ἀνὴρ σοφὸς
λογίζομαι τἀληθές, εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν
βλέπων δίαιτάν θ’ ἥντιν’ ἡμερεύεται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Menander

II.15.23

<Your> speech is full of great understanding;
but your deeds appear to lack understanding.[1001]

Poseidippus

II.15.24

Speaking well is no achievement; thinking well is;
for many who speak well have no sense.[1002]

Euripides, from Phoenix

II.15.25

Before now I have been chosen to judge many accounts,[1003]
and when many claims were contested by witnesses,
I learned contradictory things about a single event.
This is how I, and any man who is wise,
reckon the truth: by looking at a man's character
and the manner of life in which he spends his days.[1004]

1001. The supplied <σου> means your. The same noun, σύνεσις, understanding, is first credited to the speech and then found absent from the deeds. The heading names Menander without identifying a play or speaker.

1002. Ἔργον here presents the worthwhile or demanding task: sound thought rather than fluent speech. Φρονεῖν, think or exercise judgment, is Wachsmuth's printed reading; his apparatus records a correction from ποιεῖν, do. The translation follows the printed distinction between speaking and thinking.

1003. Aeschines, Against Timarchus 152, quotes these verses as Euripides's Phoenix and uses them to urge judgment from a person's life rather than suspicion or accusation. The local heading names Euripides only. Aeschines's parallel has different word order in the first line and σκοπῶν, looking at, where the anthology prints βλέπων; the local text is retained.

1004. Contradictory accounts concern one and the same event, συμφορᾶς μιᾶς. The speaker therefore looks to the person's φύσις, character or nature, and δίαιτα, habitual manner of living. The final middle form ἡμερεύεται is difficult; the rendering gives its apparent reference to daily life, supported by Aeschines's explanation in section 153. It is retained rather than silently replaced by another reading.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

<Incerti tragici> II.15.25a

Καὶ τῷδε δηλώσαιμ’ ἄν, εἰ βούλοιο σύ,
τἀληθές, ὡς ἔγωγε καὐτὸς ἄχθομαι,
ὅστις λέγειν μὲν εὐπρεπῶς ἐπίσταται,
τὰ δ’ ἔργα χείρω τῶν λόγων παρέσχετο.

Μενάνδρου II.15.26

Ὁ μὲν λόγος σου, παῖ, κατ’ ὀρθὸν εὐδρομεῖ,
τὸ δ’ ἔργον ἄλλην οἶμον ἐκπορεύεται.

Σοφοκλέους Ἐριφύλῃ II.15.27

Γλῶσσ’ ἐν κενοῖσιν ἀνδράσιν τιμὴν ἔχει,
ὅπου λόγοι σθένουσι τῶν ἔργων πλέον.

Μενάνδρου II.15.28

<Ὁ> μὴ φρονῶν μέν, πολλὰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου λαλῶν,
δείκνυσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν τρόπον τοῖς ῥήμασι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

<Unknown tragedian>

II.15.25a

And by this I could show you, if you wished,
the truth: that I too resent anyone
who knows how to speak with elegance,
but has produced deeds worse than his words.[1005]

Menander

II.15.26

Your speech, boy, runs a straight course;
but your conduct goes along another path.[1006]

Sophocles, from Eriphyle

II.15.27

Among empty men the tongue is held in honor,
where words have greater force than deeds.[1007]

Menander

II.15.28

<He> who has no sense, yet talks at length on each matter,
shows his character in the very words he uses.[1008]

1005. Wachsmuth separates these four verses as excerpt 25a and supplies the attribution <Unknown tragedian>; they are not treated as a continuation securely belonging to Euripides. The opening by this refers to a demonstration whose wider context is absent. Εὐπρεπῶς suggests attractive or respectable presentation, tested here against conduct.

1006. The contrast extends a road image: speech runs straight, while the deed, τὸ ἔργον, takes a different path. The address παῖ means boy or child; the fragment does not identify the speaker or the person addressed.

1007. The tongue stands for verbal ability. Κενοῖσιν, empty, characterizes men lacking substance; it does not refer here to poverty. The lost Eriphyle is named, but the excerpt supplies no dramatic setting or speaker.

1008. The supplied article <ὁ> is represented by <He>. Τρόπος is character or disposition: the thoughtless speaker's own words expose it. The line thus treats speech itself as evidence of the person speaking.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Θεμιστίου ἐκ τοῦ Μετριοπαθοῦς ἢ Φιλοτέκνου II.15.29

Ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐὰν μὴ τῷ τρόπῳ σύμφωνος ᾖ, ἀλλότριος γίνεται καὶ οὐ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ὃν Θερσίτης ἔλεγε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς,

ὃν κεν ἐγὼ δήσας ἀγάγω·
οὗτος γὰρ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Αἴαντος ἦν· ὁ κυφὸς δὲ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν προσήκοντα ὑπεβάλετο.

Μύσωνος II.15.30

Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς ἔφη δεῖν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν λόγων τὰ<ς πράξεις> κρίνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων τοὺς λόγους.

Θεοφράστου II.15.31

<Οὐ> τὸν βίον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λόγου δεινότητος πιστοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐταξίας.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Themistius, from On Moderation of Emotion, or On Love of One's Children

II.15.29

That if speech is not in accord with character, it becomes alien and does not belong to its speaker, like the words Thersites addressed to the Achaeans:

whom I might bring in bonds.[1009]
For this belonged to Achilles and Ajax; the hunchback appropriated it, though it did not belong to him at all.[1010]

Myson

II.15.30

Myson of Chen said that one should judge <deeds> not by words, but words by deeds.[1011]

Theophrastus

II.15.31

We establish the credibility of a life <not> from skill in speech, but that of speech from good order in life.[1012]

1009. The verse is the opening part of Iliad II.231. Thersites is addressing Agamemnon about a Trojan captive for whom ransom might be brought. The local quotation stops before the rest of the Homeric line, which adds or another of the Achaeans.

1010. Themistius means that such a boast would fit Achilles or Ajax; he is not saying that Homer assigns this utterance to them. The hunchback refers to Thersites. Ὑπεβάλετο evokes passing something off as one's own, reinforcing the claim that speech must fit the speaker's character.

1011. The name is Myson, not Musonius. The completion τὰ<ς πράξεις> supplies the noun deeds and the end of its article; English marks the supplied noun. Diogenes Laertius I.108 independently assigns Myson a related maxim about testing arguments by facts. The wording here remains Wachsmuth's quotation, with deeds and words.

1012. Supplied <οὐ> is retained as <not>. Printed πιστοῦμεν means make credible or establish credibility, rather than the transmitted πιστεύομεν, believe. Εὐταξία, good order, concerns the ordering of conduct here; the person's way of life gives authority to the speech.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Δημοσθένους II.15.32

Ὡς ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὸ ἔργον, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν.

Δημοκρίτου II.15.33

Πολλοὶ δρῶντες τὰ αἴσχιστα λόγους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν.

<Ἀ>πολλώνιος Γλαύκ<ῳ> II.15.34

<Κ>αλὸν μᾶζα καὶ τρίβων, μὴ κατ' ἐπιτήδευμα δοξοκοπικὸν καλούμενα, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὰ πράγματα ἄγῃ πρὸς αὐτά, σεμνῶς φορούμενα.

Πυθαγόρου II.15.35

Ἐπιδείκνυσο μὴ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἃ φρονεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἃ ποιεῖς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Demosthenes

II.15.32

For all speech, if action is absent, seems a futile and empty thing.[1013]

Democritus

II.15.33

Many people who do the most shameful things cultivate the finest words.[1014]

<A>pollonius to Glauc<us>

II.15.34

Barley-cake and a threadbare cloak are <f>ine things,[1015] when not called for as a practice to win reputation, but borne with dignity when circumstances lead one to them.[1016]

Pythagoras

II.15.35

Do not display in words what you think, but in deeds what you do.[1017]

1013. Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac 12. In its original setting, Athenian envoys must be able to point to action supporting their message. The local quotation has τὸ ἔργον, singular, where the parallel text has τὰ πράγματα; that local wording is retained.

1014. The superlatives αἴσχιστα, most shameful, and ἀρίστους, best or finest, sharpen the disparity. The Ionic ἀσκέουσιν means practice or cultivate: polished speech is being distinguished from the conduct of those who practice it.

1015. The heading supplies the initial <Ἀ> of Apollonius and the ending of Glaucus's name; the English marks the corresponding reconstructed portions. Only the initial <K> of καλόν, fine, is supplied in the body, reflected in <f>ine.

1016. Barley-cake and the worn cloak represent austere living. The main text has καλούμενα, called or summoned, and φορούμενα, borne or worn; these are retained despite the awkward combination. The passage contrasts choosing austerity for reputation with bearing it with dignity when circumstances lead to it.

1017. The printed wording is difficult: ἃ φρονεῖς means what you think, and ἃ ποιεῖς what you do. The apparatus proposes replacements meaning think well and do well, and also considers exchanging the clauses. Those changes are not used here; the uneasy parallel is preserved.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Δημοκρίτου II.15.36

Ἔργα καὶ πρήξιας ἀρετῆς, οὐ λόγους ζηλοῦν χρεών.

Σωκράτους II.15.37

Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθείς, τίνων μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἰσχύει, „ὧν ἡ πρᾶξις“, εἶπε, „συνακολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.“

<Εὐ>ξιθέου II.15.38

<Εὐ>ξίθεος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τοὺς χρηστοὺς μὲν ἐν τοῖς <λόγοις>, ἀχρήστους δὲ κατὰ τὸν βίον ὁμοίους ἔφη εἶναι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐνυπνίοις.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Democritus

II.15.36

It is virtue's deeds and actions that one should emulate, not words.[1018]

Socrates

II.15.37

When Socrates was asked whose speech has the greatest force, he said, "That of those whose action accompanies their speech."[1019]

<Eu>xitheus

II.15.38

<Eu>xitheus of Athens said that those who are good in <words>[1020] but worthless in their lives are like pleasant dreams.[1021]

1018. The unusual printed πρήξιας is retained; the apparatus flags the manuscript form with sic. It functions as actions alongside ἔργα, deeds. Ζηλοῦν urges emulation or striving after these practical expressions of virtue.

1019. Συνακολουθεῖ means follows along with or accompanies. Action supplies the force of persuasive speech by keeping pace with it. This is a reported saying assigned to Socrates; the excerpt does not name the questioner.

1020. Both the heading and the narrative name begin with supplied <Εὐ>, rendered <Eu>. Supplied <λόγοις>, words, completes the contrast with the way of life described in the following clause.

1021. Ἀγαθοῖς ἐνυπνίοις means good or pleasant dreams. The comparison sets an appealing appearance against the lack of corresponding value in conduct. The verbal opposition χρηστούς and ἀχρήστους contrasts being good or useful with being worthless.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου Ἐγχειριδίου II.15.39

Τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέροντα τοῖς ποιμέσιν ἐπιδείκνυσι πόσον ἔφαγεν, ἀλλὰ πέψαντα τὴν νομὴν <ἔσω>, ἔρια ἔξω φέρει καὶ τυρόν· καὶ σὺ μὴ τὰ θεωρήματα τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἐπιδείκνυε, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν πραχθέντα ἔργα.

Δημοκρίτου II.15.40

Οὔτε λόγος ἐσθλὸς φαύλην πρῆξιν ἀμαυρίσκει, οὔτε πρῆξις ἀγαθὴ λόγου βλασφημίῃ λυμαίνεται.

Δημοσθένους Ὀλυνθιακῶν II.15.41

Τὸ γὰρ πράττειν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὕστερον ὂν τῇ τάξει, πρότερον τῇ δυνάμει καὶ κρεῖττόν ἐστι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

From Epictetus's Handbook

II.15.39

Sheep do not show their shepherds how much they have eaten by bringing them grass. Instead, after digesting their forage <within>, they bring forth wool and cheese outside.[1022] You too should not display your principles to laypeople, but the deeds accomplished from them.[1023]

Democritus

II.15.40

Fine speech does not conceal a base deed, nor is a good deed spoiled by slanderous speech.[1024]

Demosthenes, from the Olynthiacs

II.15.41

For action, though it comes after speaking and voting in sequence, comes first in effectiveness and is superior.[1025]

1022. Epictetus, Handbook 46.2. The supplied <ἔσω> means within. The anthology prints τυρόν, cheese, where the separate Handbook text has γάλα, milk. Local φέροντα means bringing; the apparatus considers a different reading involving bringing up or vomiting. The printed wording is retained.

1023. Θεωρήματα are philosophical principles or propositions, not necessarily mathematical theorems. The comparison turns inward assimilation into outward conduct. The local ending has πραχθέντα ἔργα, deeds accomplished; the separate Handbook text instead speaks of deeds coming from principles that have been digested. That wording is not imported into the anthology.

1024. Πρῆξις is the Ionic form of the word for action. The two halves deny that words can cancel the moral quality of a deed: fine speech cannot obscure a base action, and verbal slander cannot spoil a good one. Ἀμαυρίσκει literally suggests dimming or obscuring.

1025. Demosthenes, Third Olynthiac 15. Χειροτονεῖν refers to voting by a show of hands. The distinction is between sequence, τάξις, and effective power, δύναμις: speeches and votes precede implementation, but their practical force depends on action. The surrounding speech contrasts decrees with actually doing what they prescribe.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Φαλάριδος II.15.42

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο συνιείς, ὅτι λόγος ἔργου σκιὰ παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς πεπίστευται.

Διογένους II.15.43

Διογένης λόγον τινὰ διεξῄει περὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ὡς ἐπῄνουν αὐτὸν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ δὲ „κάκιστα ἀπόλοισθε“ εἶπε, „τοῖς ἔργοις μοι ἀντιλέγοντες.“

Πολυαίνου II.15.44

Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τῇ σεμνότητι τῶν λόγων καὶ ἡ πεῖρα τῶν ἔργων ἕπηται, τοῦτό τοι χρὴ καλεῖν δόγμα φιλοσόφου· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπαγγέλληται μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ βίος πράττῃ μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἆρα οὐ κόμπος ταῦτα καὶ τερατεία σοφιστοῦ καὶ μειρακίων ἀκοὰς ἐκπλήττειν ἐσπουδακότος;

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Phalaris

II.15.42

Without even understanding this: that among the wise speech is held to be the shadow of action.[1026]

Diogenes

II.15.43

Diogenes was delivering a discourse on temperance and self-control. When the Athenians praised him, he said, “May you perish miserably—you contradict me by your deeds.”[1027]

Polyaenus

II.15.44

For when the test of deeds also keeps pace with the dignity of the words, this indeed should be called a philosopher’s teaching. But when speech promises great things and life accomplishes not even the least, is this not the boasting and bombast of a sophist intent on astonishing young men’s ears?[1028]

1026. The source cites Letter 35 in the correspondence transmitted under the name of Phalaris. The excerpt opens with the participle συνιείς, understanding, rather than a complete independent sentence. The shadow image makes speech dependent on the deed it represents.

1027. Σωφροσύνη, temperance, and ἐγκράτεια, self-control, concern the audience’s conduct, not its willingness to applaud a discourse. The wish κάκιστα ἀπόλοισθε is a curse, not a request that the crowd go away; the following participle explains it through their contradictory deeds.

1028. Πεῖρα τῶν ἔργων puts the dignity of the discourse to the test of actual conduct. Δόγμα is teaching or doctrine here. Κόμπος and τερατεία characterize boastful, sensational display; the final phrase points to its intended effect on young listeners. The heading supplies the name Polyaenus without further identification.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Ἐν ταὐτῷ περὶ Δημοσθένους II.15.45

. . τοῖς λόγοις καλλωπιζόμενος, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔργοις ὑπερβάλλων τοὺς λόγους, εἴγε δὴ βάσανον τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι χρὴ νομίζειν ὅταν τῷ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἕπηται.

Λυκίου ἐκ τῶν Μουσωνίου, Πότερον ἰσχυρότερον ἔθος ἢ λόγος II.15.46.1

Αὖθις ἐνέπεσεν ἡμῖν ζήτησις, πότερον ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἔθος ἢ λόγος <εἴη>, εἰ ὁ μὲν λόγος διδάσκοι ὀρθῶς τί εἴη ποιητέον, τὸ δὲ ἔθος γίνοιτο κατὰ τοιοῦτον λόγον πράττειν ἐθιζομένων. Τῷ δὲ Μουσωνίῳ τὸ ἔθος ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνυσιμώτερον, καὶ συνηγορῶν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἤρετο τῶν παρόντων τινὰ οὕτως· Δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἰατροῖν, τοῦ μὲν ἱκανοῦ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν ὡς ὅτι ἐμπειρότατα, περὶ δὲ θεραπείαν τῶν καμνόντων μηδὲν τετριμμένου, τοῦ δ’ εἰπεῖν μὲν ἀδυνάτου, θεραπεύειν δ’ εἰθισμένου κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἰατρικόν, πότερον, ἔφη, μᾶλλον ἕλοιο ἂν παρεῖναί σοι νοσοῦντι; Ὁ δ’ ἀπεκρίνατο, τὸν θεραπεύειν εἰθισμένον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

In the same work, on Demosthenes

II.15.45

. . adorning himself with words,[1029] but surpassing his words by his deeds—if indeed one must regard it as a test of truth when action also follows speech.[1030]

Lucius, from the accounts of Musonius: Whether Habit or Reason Is Stronger

II.15.46.1

Again the question arose among us whether habit or reasoned teaching <would be> more effective for acquiring virtue, if teaching correctly showed what ought to be done, while habit arose in those becoming accustomed to act according to such teaching.[1031] Musonius thought habit more effective, and in support of his view asked one of those present: “Of two physicians, one can speak most knowledgeably about medicine but has no practice in treating the sick; the other cannot expound it but is accustomed to treating according to medical teaching. Which would you prefer to have with you when ill?” He answered, “The one accustomed to treating.”[1032]

1029. Two printed dots mark missing text at the beginning. The surviving opening contains no negative; none has been supplied before adorning himself with words. The missing clause may have qualified the contrast, but it is not reconstructed here.

1030. The heading says in the same work, on Demosthenes. Wachsmuth questions the same-work reference and discusses a possible confusion between persons named Polyaenus; the attribution is therefore not made more definite. The two excerpts remain separate as printed. Βάσανος evokes a touchstone or test: conduct accompanying speech supplies the proposed criterion of truth.

1031. The heading names Lucius as the recorder of Musonius’s discussion. Λόγος here is reasoned teaching or an explanatory account directing practice; ἔθος is habit formed by repeated action. Supplied <εἴη> is marked as <would be>.

1032. The phrase περὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν ὡς ὅτι ἐμπειρότατα is awkward, and the apparatus records several proposed repairs. The English keeps the adverb’s reference to speaking knowledgeably about medicine. The contrast is with practical experience treating patients; the printed Greek is retained.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Λυκίου — συνέχεια

II.15.46.2

Καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος· Τί δέ; δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν τοῦ μὲν πεπλευκότος πολλάκις καὶ κυβερνήσαντος ἤδη πλοῖα ἱκανά, τοῦ δὲ ὀλιγάκις μὲν πεπλευκότος, κυβερνήσαντος δὲ μηδέποτε· ἐὰν οὗτος ὁ μὴ κυβερνήσας ἱκανώτατα λέγῃ ὃν τρόπον χρὴ κυβερνᾶν, ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ἐνδεῶς καὶ παντάπασιν ἀσθενῶς, ποτέρῳ ἂν πλέων χρήσαιο κυβερνήτῃ; Καὶ ὃς εἶπεν, ὅτι τῷ κυβερνήσαντι πολλάκις.

Λυκίου — συνέχεια

II.15.46.3

Πάλιν ὁ Μουσώνιος· Μουσικοῖν δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ἐπισταμένου τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ λέγοντος αὐτοὺς πιθανώτατα, ᾄδειν δὲ ἢ κιθαρίζειν ἢ λυρίζειν ἀδυνατοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ περὶ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ὄντος ἥττονος, κιθαρίζοντος δὲ καλῶς καὶ λυρίζοντος, ἔτι δὲ ᾄδοντος· ποτέρῳ ἂν ἐπιτρέψαις ἔργον μουσικόν, ἢ πότερον ἂν ἐθέλοις γενέσθαι διδάσκαλον τῶν μουσικῶν παιδὸς οὐκ εἰδότος; Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι τὸν ἐν τοῖς <ἔργοις> ἱκανόν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Lucius on Musonius continued

II.15.46.2

And Musonius said: “What, then, of two men, one who has often sailed and already steered a fair number of ships, and another who has sailed only a few times and never steered? If the man who has never steered explains very ably how one should steer, while the other does so inadequately and quite feebly, which would you employ as helmsman when sailing?” He replied that he would employ the one who had often steered.[1033]

Lucius on Musonius continued

II.15.46.3

Again Musonius said: “And what of two musicians, one who knows musical theory and expounds it most persuasively but cannot sing or play the kithara or the lyre, and another who is weaker in theory but plays the kithara and lyre well and also sings? To which would you entrust a musical task, or which would you wish to become the music teacher of a child who knows no music?”[1034] He answered that he would choose the one competent in <practice>.[1035]

1033. Having sailed is distinguished from having steered: the second man has some sailing experience but has never taken the helm. The comparison gives greater weight to repeated practical responsibility than to the ability to describe how steering should be done.

1034. Κιθαρίζειν and λυρίζειν distinguish playing the kithara and the lyre. The comparison also includes singing and tests competence both in a musical task and in teaching an untaught child. Λόγοι μουσικοί are accounts or principles of music, rendered musical theory.

1035. Supplied <ἔργοις> is rendered <practice>. It states the sphere in which the chosen musician is capable: actually performing the tasks under discussion. The supplied word is not expanded into a claim that theoretical instruction has no value.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Λυκίου — συνέχεια

II.15.46.4

Τί οὖν, εἶπεν ὁ Μουσώνιος, ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης ἢ ἐγκρατείας τοῦ ἃ χρὴ δύνασθαι λέγειν οὐ πολὺ κρεῖττον τὸ ἐγκρατῆ γενέσθαι καὶ σώφρονα περὶ τὰ πραττόμενα πάντα; Συνεχώρει κἀνταῦθα ὁ νεανίσκος, ἧττον καὶ φαυλότερον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἔργῳ τὸ λέγειν περὶ σωφροσύνης ἱκανῶς.

Λυκίου — συνέχεια

II.15.46.5

Ὅθεν ὁ Μουσώνιος συνάπτων τοῖς προειρημένοις, πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔφη, τὸ τὸν ἑκάστου λόγον ἐπίστασθαι πράγματος κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐθίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τὴν τοῦ λόγου; ἐπείπερ τὸ μὲν ἔθος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πράττειν ἄγει, τὸ δ’ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι λέγειν. Συνεργεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῇ πράξει ὁ λόγος διδάσκων ὅπως πρακτέον καὶ ἔστι τῇ τάξει πρότερος τοῦ ἔθους· οὐ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναί τι καλὸν οἷόν τε μὴ κατὰ λόγον ἐθιζόμενον· δυνάμει μέντοι τὸ ἔθος προτερεῖ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἐστὶ κυριώτερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἄγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἥπερ ὁ λόγος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Lucius on Musonius continued

II.15.46.4

"What, then?" said Musonius. "That is how matters stand in those cases. But in matters of temperance or self-control, is becoming self-controlled and temperate in everything one does not far better than being able to say the proper things about them?" The young man conceded this as well: speaking competently about temperance is weaker and of less value than being temperate in action.[1036]

Lucius on Musonius continued

II.15.46.5

Musonius then connected this with what had been said: "Given this, how could knowing the reasoned account of each matter be better than becoming accustomed to act and acting in accordance with that account's guidance? Habit leads to the ability to act, whereas knowing the account of a matter leads to the ability to speak.[1037] The account does, indeed, also assist action by teaching how one should act, and comes before habit in order: one cannot become accustomed to anything noble unless one is habituated in accordance with an account. Yet in effectiveness habit comes before the account, because it has greater power to lead a person to action than the account does."[1038]

1036. The passage pairs σωφροσύνη, temperance or sound self-restraint, with ἐγκράτεια, self-control. Musonius now transfers the comparisons with skilled crafts to moral conduct. The young man prefers the actual exercise of the virtue to the ability to speak competently about it.

1037. Λόγος remains an account or reasoned teaching, and ὑφήγησις its direction or guidance. The practice favored by Musonius is itself practice according to such guidance. The distinction concerns what chiefly develops the ability to act and what chiefly develops the ability to speak.

1038. Priority is explicitly qualified: teaching comes first τῇ τάξει, in order, because good habituation requires rational direction; habit takes precedence δυνάμει, in effectiveness or power, because it more effectively leads a person to act. The conclusion preserves both the practical superiority of habit and the necessary contribution of reasoned teaching.

BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Ἐκ τοῦ Θεοδώρου τῶν Τέλητος ἐπιτομῆς, Περὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι

II.15.47.1

Κρεῖττόν φασι τὸ δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι· μὴ καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι κρεῖττόν ἐστιν; — Ἀμέλει. — Πότερον οὖν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθοὶ ὑποκριταὶ εἶναι <εὖ> ὑποκρίνονται ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι; — <Διὰ τὸ εἶναι. —> Κιθαρίζουσι δὲ <εὖ> πότερον διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθοὶ κιθαρισταὶ <εἶναι> ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι; — Διὰ τὸ εἶναι. — Τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα ἁπλῶς διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθοὶ <εἶναι> εὖ πράττουσιν ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι; — Διὰ τὸ εἶναι. — Δι’ ὃ δ’ εὖ βιοῦσι κρεῖττον ἢ δι’ ὃ μή· ὥστε κρεῖττον φαίνοιτ’ ἂν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῦ δοκεῖν· ὁ γὰρ δίκαιος ἀγαθός, οὐχ ὁ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

From Theodorus's epitome of Teles: On Seeming and Being

II.15.47.1

They say that seeming just is better than being just. Is seeming good perhaps also better than being good? — Certainly. — Then is it because they seem to be good actors that people act <well>, or because they are? — <Because they are. —> And do they play the kithara <well> because they seem <to be> good kithara players or because they are? — Because they are.[1039] — And in all other matters, generally, is it because they seem <to be> good that they do well, or because they are? — Because they are. — What enables them to live well is better than what does not. Thus being good would appear better than seeming so; for it is the just person who is good, not the person who seems to be just.[1040]

1039. The heading identifies an abridgment by Theodorus of Teles's writings. The dialogue tests the preference for a good reputation against examples of actual competence: ὑποκριταί are actors, and κιθαρισταί players of the kithara. Being good at a craft supplies the comparison for being morally good.

1040. The printed supplements are retained: two instances of <well>, two of <to be>, and the entire first answer, <Because they are. —>. The argument moves from doing well to living well; the initial claim favoring appearance is the position being challenged.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Τέλητος — συνέχεια

II.15.47.2

Καὶ τί ποτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὅσα δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι; μᾶλλον ἂν βούλοιο εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς <ἢ δοκεῖν εἶναι> καὶ ἔχειν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν ἔχειν; εὐθέως, ὁρᾶν ἂν βούλοιο, ἢ δοκεῖν ὁρᾶν; ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; εὔπορος εἶναι, φίλους ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν πάλιν, φρονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; ἄλυπος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; θαρσαλέος εἶναι, ἄφοβος εἶναι, ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; ἐπὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης δὲ οὐκέτι δίκαιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν; — Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἂν μᾶλλον βουλοίμην δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι. — Ἢ οὐχ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ἄφοβος καὶ ἄλυπος, οὐχ ὁ δοκῶν; διὰ τί δὲ βούλει ἀνδρεῖος δοκεῖν εἶναι; — Τιμήσουσί με. —

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Teles continued

II.15.47.2

And what about the other goods—all that people regard as good? Would you rather really be in that condition <than seem to be>, and have those goods rather than seem to have them? To take an immediate example, would you wish to see or to seem to see? To be healthy rather than seem so? To be strong rather than seem so? To be well provided for, to have friends, rather than seem so?[1041] Again, with the goods of the soul: to have understanding rather than seem to? To be free from distress rather than seem so? To be confident, fearless, courageous rather than seem so? But when it comes to justice, would you no longer prefer to be just rather than seem so? — Yet I would also prefer to seem courageous rather than be so. — Or is it not the courageous person who is both fearless and free from distress, rather than the person who seems so? Why do you wish to seem courageous? — They will honor me. —[1042]

1041. The list begins with what people commonly regard as goods, including health, resources, and friends; it does not restrict the term to moral virtue. The supplied comparison <ἢ δοκεῖν εἶναι> is marked in English as <than seem to be>.

1042. The goods of the soul include understanding and freedom from distress (ἄλυπος). The interlocutor's answer about courage introduces a new objection: an apparent virtue may bring public honor. The reply that follows tests the costs of that reputation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Τέλητος — συνέχεια

II.15.47.3

Καὶ γὰρ πρωτοστάτην σε καταστήσουσι καὶ μονομαχεῖν κελεύσουσι καὶ ἵνα λάχῃς μηχανήσονται καὶ λαχόντος ἐπιχαρήσονται καθάπερ τῷ Αἴαντι· εἶτα τί οἴει πείσεσθαι, δειλὸς μὲν ὤν, κινδυνεύων δέ; καὶ ἐὰν αἰχμάλωτος γένῃ δοκῶν ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι πέδας ἕξεις μεγάλας καὶ χειροπέδας, καὶ οὐθεὶς σοι μὴ πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατακεκλεισμένος ἔσῃ, κἂν βασανίζωσί σε πολλὰς λήψῃ, καὶ λέγων τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐ μὴ πιστευθήσῃ, ἀλλὰ δόξεις μωκᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν καρτερικὸς εἶναι· καὶ κελεύσουσί σε δέρειν καὶ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ παροπτᾶν. ὅρα πόσα λήψῃ δοκῶν ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι καὶ καρτερικός· σὺ δὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν προσφέρῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀποκρύπτεις, ὥσπερ οἱ ῥήτορες.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Teles continued

II.15.47.3

Yes—and they will put you in the front rank, order you to fight in single combat, contrive to have you draw the lot, and rejoice when you do, just as with Ajax. What do you think will happen then, when you are a coward but face danger?[1043] And if you are taken captive while reputed courageous, you will have heavy fetters and handcuffs. No one will trust you; instead you will also be kept locked up. If they torture you, you will receive many blows; even when you tell the truth you will not be believed, but will be thought to be mocking them because you seem able to endure. They will order you to be beaten, stretched on the rack, and roasted. See how much you will receive from seeming courageous and able to endure! Yet you put forward that advantage and conceal these consequences, like the orators.[1044]

1043. Ajax is chosen by lot to face Hector in single combat in Iliad VII.171–192; his comrades rejoice at his appearance in VII.214. Teles uses the heroic comparison to expose the danger of a reputation that assigns a coward duties requiring real courage. Πρωτοστάτης is a man stationed in the front rank.

1044. The first refusal to trust concerns a captive's custody; the later refusal to believe concerns truthful speech under torture. The active infinitives after κελεύσουσί σε describe orders for the captive to be beaten, stretched, and roasted, expressed causatively in English. The final contrast recalls the promised honor while exposing its concealed costs.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀριστόδωρον ἐπιστολῆς

II.15.48

Ἀκούω Δίωνος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἑταῖρον εἶναί τέ σε νῦν καὶ γεγονέναι διὰ παντός, τὸ σοφώτατον ἦθος τῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρεχόμενον· τὸ γὰρ βέβαιον καὶ πιστὸν καὶ ὑγιές, τοῦτο ἐγώ φημι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλα τεινούσας σοφίας τε καὶ δεινότητας κομψότητας οἶμαι προσαγορεύων ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Plato, from the Letter to Aristodorus

II.15.48

I hear that you are now, and have always been, one of Dion's closest companions, displaying the wisest of the dispositions that make for philosophy.[1045] For steadfastness, trustworthiness, and soundness—this, I say, is true philosophy. The other kinds of wisdom and cleverness, directed toward other ends, I believe I name rightly when I call them refinements.[1046]

1045. Letter 10, 358C, in the letters transmitted under Plato's name. Stobaeus's attribution is preserved without treating the heading as proof of authorship. The excerpt selects the body of the short letter to Aristodorus, omitting its greeting and closing exhortation. Aristodorus is praised for his enduring friendship with Dion.

1046. Βέβαιον, πιστόν, and ὑγιές describe stability, reliability, and soundness of character. Κομψότητες, refinements or niceties, contrasts other intellectual accomplishments with this practical character. The sentence redirects the measure of philosophy toward how someone lives; it does not supply a catalogue of the other accomplishments.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Αἰσχίνου περὶ Δημοσθένους

II.15.49

Πλεῖστον δὲ ἐκ πολιτείας εἰληφὼς ἀργύριον ἐλάχιστα περιεποιήσατο. Νῦν μέντοι τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον ἐπικέκλυκε τὴν δαπάνην αὐτοῦ. Ἔσται δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦθ' ἱκανόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ πώποτε πλοῦτος τρόπου περιεγένετο· καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον, τὸν βίον οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων προσόδων πορίζεται, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων κινδύνων. Πρὸς δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνην καὶ λόγων δύναμιν πῶς πέφυκε; δεινὸς λέγειν, κακὸς βιῶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ κέχρηται καὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ σώματι καὶ παιδοποιίᾳ, ὥστ' <ἐμὲ> μὴ βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἃ τούτῳ πέπρακται. Ἤδη γάρ ποτε εἶδον μισηθέντας τοὺς τὰ τῶν πλησίον αἰσχρὰ λίαν σαφῶς λέγοντας. Ἔπειτα τί συμβαίνει τῇ πόλει; οἱ μὲν λόγοι καλοί, τὰ δὲ ἔργα φαῦλα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 15

Aeschines on Demosthenes

II.15.49

Though he has taken a very great deal of money from public life, he has saved very little. For now, however, the king's gold has flooded in to cover his expenses. Yet even this will not be enough: no amount of wealth has ever overcome a person's character. And the chief point is that he makes his living from our dangers, rather than from his own revenues.[1047] As for sound judgment and power of speech, how is he constituted? A formidable speaker, a bad man in his way of life.[1048] For he has so conducted himself, both in the use of his body and in fathering children, that <I> am unwilling to say what he has done. I have before now seen people hated for describing their neighbors' shameful deeds too plainly. What, then, is the result for the city? Fine words, but base deeds.[1049]

1047. Against Ctesiphon 173–174. These are Aeschines's hostile allegations about Demosthenes, rather than established biographical facts. The image of the king's gold inundating his expenditure suggests money flowing in to meet his spending. Wachsmuth's local text has unqualified τρόπου, character, and ἡμετέρων, our; the separate speech has an added πονηροῦ, bad, and ὑμετέρων, your. The English follows the anthology.

1048. Εὐγνωμοσύνη is sound or fair-minded judgment, with a moral force sharpened by the contrast with verbal skill. Δεινὸς λέγειν, κακὸς βιῶναι opposes being formidable in speaking to being bad in living. The contrast prepares the concluding opposition between fine words and base deeds.

1049. The source supplies only <ἐμὲ>, <I>; μή, the negative, is already in the printed text. Παιδοποιία concerns fathering or procreation. Aeschines insinuates misconduct while declining to describe it, and the translation leaves that allegation unspecified. This excerpt closes Chapter 15.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Κεφάλαιον ΙϚ′ II.16.heading

Ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοις ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἑαυτοὺς λανθάνουσι καταβλάπτοντες.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΖ′ II.17.heading

Περὶ εὐδοξίας.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΗ′ II.18.heading

Περὶ φήμης.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΙΘ′ II.19.heading

Ὅτι μέτρον ἄριστον.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Chapter 16

II.16.heading

That those who plot against others harm themselves without realizing it.

[Text missing][1050]

Chapter 17

II.17.heading

On good reputation.

[Text missing][1051]

Chapter 18

II.18.heading

On public report.

[Text missing][1052]

Chapter 19

II.19.heading

That due measure is best.

[Text missing][1053]

1050. Wachsmuth prints deest, is missing, beneath each of the following fifteen headings. The notices mark missing chapter texts, not surviving excerpts left untranslated. Here λανθάνουσι with the participle indicates that the plotters harm themselves without being aware of doing so.

1051. Εὐδοξία is favorable reputation or esteem. This heading concerns being well regarded; the next heading names φήμη, report or public talk, more generally. Neither chapter's excerpts are present here.

1052. Φήμη can denote report, rumor, or what people say about someone. The surviving heading does not establish which examples or particular applications the missing chapter contained.

1053. Μέτρον is measure or a fitting limit. Due measure expresses the maxim's preference for a proper measure over excess. The heading gives no author's name, and the chapter text is missing.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Κεφάλαιον Κ′ II.20.heading

Ὅτι δυσκατόρθωτον ἡ ἀρετή, εὐμεταχείριστον δὲ ἡ κακία.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΑ′ II.21.heading

Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀσυνέτων δοκιμασίας.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΒ′ II.22.heading

Ὅτι τὴν ὑπόκρισιν τοῖς κεχρημένοις ἐπιβλαβῆ οὖσαν καὶ πρὸς οὓς γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβλητέον.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΓ′ II.23.heading

Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, φθόνου γὰρ καὶ διαβολῆς αἴτιον γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Chapter 20

II.20.heading

That virtue is difficult to achieve, while vice is easy to practice.

[Text missing][1054]

Chapter 21

II.21.heading

That one should take no account of the judgment of those without understanding.

[Text missing][1055]

Chapter 22

II.22.heading

That hypocrisy should be cast out of the soul, since it harms both those who practice it and those toward whom it is directed.

[Text missing][1056]

Chapter 23

II.23.heading

That one should not meddle, since such conduct gives rise to envy and slander.

[Text missing][1057]

1054. Δυσκατόρθωτον indicates something difficult to accomplish successfully; εὐμεταχείριστον contrasts what is readily taken up or practiced. The Greek prints these predicates in the neuter although ἀρετή and κακία are feminine.

1055. Δοκιμασία is assessment or approval; τῶν ἀσυνέτων identifies those making that assessment. Λόγον ποιεῖσθαι means to take account of something. The heading concerns the judgment made by the unwise, rather than an examination of them.

1056. Ὑπόκρισις here is pretense or dissimulation, rather than stage performance as such. The heading identifies harm to those who employ it as well as to its targets. Its chapter text is missing.

1057. Πολυπραγμονεῖν is intrusive meddling or busybodiness. The heading connects this behavior with envy and slander without specifying who feels the envy or directs the slander.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Κεφάλαιον ΚΔ′ II.24.heading

Ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλημμελεῖ τις τὸ μεταμελεῖσθαι κάλλιστον.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΕ′ II.25.heading

Περὶ λοιδορίας ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚϚ′ II.26.heading

Ὅτι ἐν τῷ λοιδορεῖσθαι χρὴ σκοπεῖν μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιπεπτώκαμεν ἐλαττώμασι.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΖ′ II.27.heading

Περὶ ἀνάγκης τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Chapter 24

II.24.heading

That when one has done wrong, regretting it is best.

[Text missing][1058]

Chapter 25

II.25.heading

On verbal abuse, which is not good.

[Text missing][1059]

Chapter 26

II.26.heading

That in exchanges of abuse we should consider whether we have fallen into the same faults.

[Text missing][1060]

Chapter 27

II.27.heading

On necessity in life.

[Text missing][1061]

1058. Πλημμελεῖν is to err or act wrongly; μεταμελεῖσθαι is to regret what one has done. Κάλλιστον, literally finest or noblest, qualifies the act of regretting one's own error. Only the heading is present.

1059. Λοιδορία is insulting or abusive speech. The heading evaluates it as οὐκ ἀγαθόν, not good. The missing chapter's excerpts are not available here to develop that judgment.

1060. Λοιδορεῖσθαι can be middle, exchanging abuse, or passive, being reviled. The English leaves the speaker's precise role in the quarrel open. The surviving heading calls for self-examination, but its missing chapter cannot clarify that role.

1061. Ἀνάγκη is necessity or constraint; κατὰ τὸν βίον places the topic in the sphere of life. The heading alone does not specify a doctrine of fate or explain what necessities the missing chapter discussed.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 16–30

Κεφάλαιον ΚΗ′ II.28.heading

Ὅτι εὐκαίρως δεῖ πράττειν.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΚΘ′ II.29.heading

Περὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναβάλλεσθαι.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον Λ′ II.30.heading

Ὅτι καὶ τὸ δυστυχῆσαι πολλάκις ἐπωφελὲς γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἄφροσι.

deest.

Chapter 28

II.28.heading

That one should act at the right time.

[Text missing][1062]

Chapter 29

II.29.heading

On intention: that one should not put things off haphazardly.

[Text missing][1063]

Chapter 30

II.30.heading

That even suffering misfortune often proves beneficial, and especially to the foolish.

[Text missing][1064]

1062. Εὐκαίρως means at a fitting or opportune moment. The heading concerns the timing of action; its missing excerpts would have supplied the examples or arguments.

1063. The main text prints βούλεσθαι, to wish or will. The heading links intention with avoiding haphazard delay. The apparatus distinguishes another index heading about deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι), which is not substituted here. The relation between the two parts of the preserved title is compressed.

1064. Πολλάκις, often, qualifies the claim of benefit. The chapter's explanation of how misfortune might help the foolish, those lacking good judgment, is missing along with its excerpts.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Κεφάλαιον ΛΑ′ II.31.heading

Περὶ ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας.

Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβῃ II.31.1

Ἔχει γέ <τοι> τι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς
δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τοῦτο δ’ ἤν τις εὖ μάθῃ,
οἶδεν τό γ’ αἰσχρόν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.2

Παῖς ὢν φυλάττου πραγμάτων αἰσχρῶν ἄπο·
ὡς ἢν τραφῇ τις μὴ κακῶς, αἰσχύνεται
ἀνὴρ γενόμενος αἰσχρὰ δρᾶν· νέος δ’ ὅταν
πόλλ’ ἐξαμάρτῃ, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἔχει
εἰς γῆρας αὐτοῖς τοῖς τρόποισιν ἔμφυτον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 199-200

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Chapter 31

II.31.heading

On Upbringing and Education.[1065]

Euripides, from Hecuba

II.31.1

A good upbringing also, <you know>, teaches something of goodness;[1066]
and whoever learns this well recognizes what is shameful,
having learned by the standard of what is noble.[1067]

From the same author

II.31.2

While still a boy, keep clear of shameful deeds;
for one who is not badly brought up is ashamed,
once a man, to do shameful things.[1068] But when someone
commits many wrongs in youth, he carries that fault
into old age, rooted in his very character.[1069]

1065. Ἀγωγή is upbringing or the guidance through which character is formed; παιδεία is education or training in a broader sense than formal schooling. Surviving excerpts resume here after the preserved headings and missing-text notices of Chapters 16–30.

1066. Hecuba 600–602. The supplied particle <τοι>, which addresses or assures the listener, is marked as <you know>. In the play Hecuba reflects on character and upbringing after hearing of Polyxena's courageous death. The anthology selects these three verses from her speech.

1067. Κανών is a rule or measuring standard. What is noble, τὸ καλόν, supplies the standard by which the shameful, τὸ αἰσχρόν, is recognized. The educational comparison concerns moral discrimination; it does not turn the isolated verses into an exhaustive statement of Euripides's own views.

1068. The same author refers to Euripides. Wachsmuth cites fragment 926 in Nauck's numbering without naming a play. The Greek has μὴ κακῶς, not badly: good upbringing fosters reluctance to do shameful things in adulthood. Neither a particular speaker nor a lost dramatic setting is supplied.

1069. The closing phrase αὐτοῖς τοῖς τρόποισιν means in the very dispositions or traits of character. Repeated wrongdoing in youth is described as taking root and persisting into old age. The noun ἁμαρτία here is fault or wrongdoing; a later technical or theological meaning is not imposed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 199-200

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἱκετίδων II.31.3

Τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει·
αἰσχύνεται γὰρ τἀγάθ' ἀσκήσας ἀνὴρ
κακὸς κεκλῆσθαι πᾶς τις· ἡ δ' εὐανδρία
διδακτόν, εἴπερ καὶ βρέφη διδάσκεται
λέγειν τ' ἀκούειν θ' ὧν μάθησις ἐν λόγῳ.
ἃ δ' ἂν μάθῃ τις ταῦτα σῴζεσθαι φιλεῖ
εἰς γῆρας· οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύετε.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Πελιάσιν II.31.4

Ὁ γὰρ ξυνών, κακὸς μὲν ἦν τύχῃ γεγώς,
τοιούσδε τοὺς ξυνόντας ἐκπαιδεύεται,
χρηστοὺς δ' ὁ χρηστός· ἀλλὰ τὰς ὁμιλίας
ἐσθλὰς διώκειν, ὦ νέοι, σπουδάζετε.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 200

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Euripides, from Suppliants

II.31.3

For an upbringing that is not bad brings a sense of shame;
every man who has practiced goodness is ashamed
to be called bad. Manly courage is teachable,[1070]
if even little children are taught
to speak and listen, things whose learning is a matter of speech.
What someone learns tends to be preserved
into old age. So educate your children well.[1071]

Euripides, from Daughters of Pelias

II.31.4

For the man you associate with, if he happens to be bad,
trains his companions to be like himself;
while a good man trains them to be good. So, young men,
make it your concern to seek out noble company.[1072]

1070. Suppliants 911–917. Αἰδώς is a sense of shame or moral regard; εὐανδρία is manly excellence or courage. The passage follows Adrastus's praise of Tydeus, already excerpted at II.15.2. The argument connects practiced goodness, concern about a bad name, and the possibility of teaching courage.

1071. The local phrase ὧν μάθησις ἐν λόγῳ, whose learning is a matter of speech, is difficult. It is retained with its reference to learning to speak and listen, rather than replaced by the different wording of the separate play. Βρέφη means infants or very young children. The conclusion stresses the persistence of what is learned into old age.

1072. The same-author heading continues the attribution to Euripides and names his lost Daughters of Pelias, Πελιάδες; Wachsmuth cites fragment 612 in Nauck's numbering. Association is itself treated as education: a companion forms those around him after his own character. The excerpt supplies no identifiable dramatic speaker.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σοφοκλέους II.31.5

Ἐπεὶ πέπρακται πᾶν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καλῶς,
χωρῶμεν ἤδη, παῖδες, ἐς τὰ τῶν σοφῶν
διδασκαλεῖα μουσικῆς. παιδεύματα
προσλαμβάνειν γὰρ δεῖ καθ' ἡμέραν αἰεί,
ἕως <τ'> ἂν ἐξῇ μανθάνειν βελτίονα.
παῖς δ' οὖν κακὸν μὲν δρᾶν τι προῖκ' ἐπίσταται,
αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ μανθάνων ἄνευ πόνου·
τὰ χρηστὰ δ', οὐδ' ἢν τὸν διδάσκαλον λάβῃ,
ἐμνημόνευσεν, ἀλλὰ κέκτηται μόλις.
ταῦτ' οὖν φυλαξώμεσθα καὶ μοχθητέον,
ὦ παῖδες, ὡς ἂν μήτ' ἀπαιδεύτων βροτῶν
δοκῶμεν εἶναι, κατοδημοῦντος πατρός
* * *

Ἐμπεδοκλέους II.31.6

Ἀλλ' ἄγε, μύθων κλῦθι, μάθησις γὰρ φρένας αὔξει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Sophocles

II.31.5

Since all that concerns the god has been well done,[1073]
let us go now, children, to the wise men's
schools of music. For one must always
gain instruction day by day,
<and> as long as one can, learn better things.[1074]
A child, after all, knows how to do something bad at no cost,
learning it from himself without toil;
but good things, even if he gets a teacher,
he has not kept in mind; he barely makes them his own.
Let us therefore guard against this and labor,
children, so that we may neither seem to be among
uneducated mortals, with a father at home
* * *[1075]

Empedocles

II.31.6

But come, listen to my words: learning makes the mind grow.[1076]

1073. The heading attributes these verses to Sophocles; Wachsmuth cites fragment 736 in Nauck's numbering. His apparatus records Nauck's doubts about the attribution and Meineke's response. No play or particular dramatic speaker is named here.

1074. Μουσική can include poetic and musical education; παιδεύματα are lessons or training. Supplied <τ'> is marked as <and>. The following contrast pictures bad conduct as freely acquired through self-teaching without toil, but good conduct as difficult to remember and make one's own.

1075. The final μήτ', neither, anticipates an unfinished paired construction. The printed κατοδημοῦντος πατρός means a father being at home or in residence. Wachsmuth marks a gap immediately afterward; its extent and the missing continuation are not supplied.

1076. Wachsmuth cites verse 74 in Stein's numbering. Μῦθοι here are spoken words or an account; φρένες denotes the mental faculties. The verse connects listening and learning with the growth of understanding.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σοφοκλέους Αἴαντος II.31.7

Οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ γνώμαισι τἀγαθὸν χεροῖν
ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασι πρίν τις ἐκβάλῃ.

Εὐριπίδου Ἱππολύτου II.31.8

Ὦ πόλλ’ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κἀξευρίσκετε,
ἓν δ’ οὐκ ἐπίστασθ’, οὐδ’ ἐθηράσασθέ πω,
φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Sophocles, from Ajax

II.31.7

For those poor in judgment, though they hold a good thing in their hands,
do not recognize it until someone casts it away.[1077]

Euripides, from Hippolytus

II.31.8

O humans, who make so many errors in vain,[1078]
why do you teach countless arts
and devise and discover everything,
yet not know one thing, nor have yet hunted it down:
to teach good judgment to those who have no sense?[1079]

1077. Ajax 964–965. Tecmessa speaks after Ajax's death. In the preceding verses she says that those rejoicing over him may mourn his loss when they need his spear. The good held but unrecognized is illustrated by Ajax's military service; the anthology gives only the general maxim.

1078. Hippolytus 916–920. Theseus speaks to Hippolytus after Phaedra's death and her accusation against him. He wrongly thinks his innocent son guilty; the angry complaint therefore belongs to a dramatic misjudgment. The anthology selects these five verses from their exchange.

1079. Τέχναι are teachable skills or arts. Φρονεῖν is to exercise understanding or sound judgment, and νοῦς is understanding. The one thing missing is the ability to teach good judgment to those who lack it; the question contrasts this failure with the many arts people already teach.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀντιφάνους II.31.9

Τὸ γὰρ πεπαιδεῦσθαι, μόνον ἄν τις τοῦτ’ ἔχῃ,
ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τὸ <τῶν> ἀδικημάτων
μὴ λαμβάνειν τὰς ἀξίας τιμωρίας,
ἐλεεῖν δὲ πάντως.

Παροιμία II.31.10

Μελέτη χρονισθεῖσ’ εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται.

Ἀλέξιδος II.31.11

Ὦ παῖ, μέγιστος ἔρανός ἐστί μοι τὸ σὲ
θρέψαι κατὰ τρόπον· ὃν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀπέλαβον
παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, δεῖ τοῦτον ἀποδοῦναί με σοί.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Antiphanes

II.31.9

For being truly educated, if one has only this,[1080]
also means not to exact the deserved penalties
for <the> wrongs,
but to show mercy in every case.[1081]

Proverb

II.31.10

Practice, with time, becomes nature.[1082]

Alexis

II.31.11

Child, bringing you up properly is my greatest contribution;[1083]
for what I myself received from my father
I must repay to you.[1084]

1080. The heading names Antiphanes without identifying a play or speaker. The opening is compressed, especially the parenthesis if one has only this. Wachsmuth retains ἀληθές, true, while recording its disputed status. The English preserves the claim about true education without replacing the adjective by a proposed alternative or supplying a lost comic context.

1081. Supplied <τῶν> is marked as <the>. Here taking the penalties is understood as exacting punishment, in contrast with showing mercy. The excerpt does not restrict its wrongs to a particular kind or reduce πάντως, in every case, to an occasional recommendation. Its isolated comic voice should not simply be treated as Antiphanes's personal doctrine.

1082. Μελέτη is practice or repeated exercise, and χρονισθεῖσα indicates its continuation over time. Nature renders φύσις: the line describes an acquired practice becoming settled in someone. The source labels it a proverb, rather than attributing it here to a named tragedian. The same verse occurs at II.7.11m.1, supporting the reported view that training can contribute to aptitude for virtue.

1083. Alexis is named without a play or dramatic speaker. Ἔρανος can mean a contribution, a loan, or a favor to be returned; here it supplies a financial image for upbringing. Κατὰ τρόπον means properly or in the fitting manner. The metaphor does not establish the details of a legal loan.

1084. The recipient of the repayment is the child addressed, σοί, not the speaker's own father. What the speaker received from that father is returned through care for the next generation. The shift of recipient is part of the verse's image, rather than a debt the child is being asked to repay.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους Νεφελῶν II.31.12.1

Λέξω τοίνυν τὴν ἀρχαίαν παιδείαν, ὡς διέκειτο,
ὅτ’ ἐγὼ τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη ’νενόμιστο.
πρῶτον μὲν ἔδει παιδὸς φωνὴν γρύξαντος μηδέν’ ἀκοῦσαι
εἶτα βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς εὐτάκτως εἰς κιθαριστοῦ
τοὺς κωμήτας γυμνοὺς ἀθρόους, κεἰ κριμνώδη κατανίφοι.
εἶτ’ αὖ προμαθεῖν ᾄσμ’ ἐδίδασκεν τὼ μηρὼ <μὴ> ξυνέχοντας,
ἢ Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινάν, ἢ Τηλέπορόν τι βόημα
ἐντειναμένους τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἣν οἱ πατέρες παρέδωκαν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Aristophanes, from Clouds

II.31.12.1

[Stronger Argument] I will explain how education was arranged in the old days,
when I flourished by speaking what was just, and temperance was the rule.[1085]
First, no one was to hear a boy's voice—not even a grunt;
then the boys of each district had to walk in orderly groups along the streets to the kithara teacher's, lightly clad, even if snow fell thick as meal.[1086]
Next he taught them to learn a song, <not> pressing their thighs together:
either "Dread Pallas, sacker of cities," or "Some far-traveling cry,"
putting their voices to the mode their fathers had handed down.[1087]

1085. Clouds 961–1008. The personified Stronger, or Just, Argument defends older education against the Weaker, or Unjust, Argument in a contest over Pheidippides's training. Speaker labels and continuation headings are editorial. These are rival comic voices, not an unqualified statement of Aristophanes's own educational program.

1086. Γυμνούς can mean naked or lightly clad, including wearing only a tunic without a mantle. Here the walk through winter weather stresses hardiness; complete street nudity is not required by the word. The later scene at the physical trainer's has a different setting.

1087. The quoted phrases are openings of songs. Ἁρμονία is the musical mode or melodic arrangement handed down from the fathers. Supplied <μή> is rendered <not>; the instruction explicitly keeps the thighs apart. The verse joins traditional music to disciplined bodily posture.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους — συνέχεια

II.31.12.2

εἰ δέ τις αὐτῶν βωμολοχεύσαιτ’ ἢ κάμψειέν τινα καμπήν,
οἵας οἱ νῦν τὰς κατὰ Φρῦνιν ταύτας τὰς δυσκολοκάμπτους,
ἐπετρίβετο τυπτόμενος πολλάς, ὡς τὰς Μούσας βασανίζων.
ἐν παιδοτρίβου δὲ καθίζοντας τὸν μηρὸν ἔδει προβαλέσθαι
τοὺς παῖδας, ὅπως τοῖς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν δείξειαν ἀπηνές·
εἶτ’ αὖ πάλιν αὖθις ἀνισταμένους συμψῆσαι καὶ προνοῆσαι
εἴδωλον τοῖσιν ἐρασταῖσιν τῆς ἥβης μὴ καταλείπειν.
ἠλείψατο δ’ ἂν τοὐμφαλοῦ οὐδεὶς παῖς ὑπένερθεν τότ’ ἄν, ὥστε
τοῖς αἰδοίοισι δρόσος καὶ χνοῦς ὥσπερ μήλοισιν ἐπήνθει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

The Stronger Argument continued

II.31.12.2

If any of them played the buffoon or twisted one of those twists
the moderns use in Phrynis's style, those hard-to-twist twists,
he was thrashed with many blows for torturing the Muses.[1088]
When sitting at the physical trainer's, the boys had to extend a thigh
so that they showed onlookers nothing indecent;
then, getting up again, they had to smooth the surface and take care
not to leave their lovers an impression of their pubic parts.[1089]
No boy then would anoint himself below the navel, so that
dew and down bloomed on his genitals as on fruit.[1090]

1088. The repeated καμπ- words parody elaborate melodic turns associated here with Phrynis. The local reading βασανίζων, torturing the Muses, is retained. The joke treats musical novelty as an injury to the Muses and answers it with physical punishment.

1089. Training in the gymnasium involved male nudity. The bodily imprint is to be smoothed away from the surface on which the boys sat; ἥβη, youth or puberty, here indicates the pubic region. The ἐρασταί are adult male lovers in the pederastic setting. The speaker's ideal of modesty includes managing what those lovers can see.

1090. The imagery of dew and down compares the natural covering of the pubic region to the bloom on fruit. Μῆλα can denote apples or other tree-fruit. The speech's praise of sexual restraint itself employs erotic imagery, a tension that belongs to the comedy.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους — συνέχεια

II.31.12.3

οὐδ’ ἂν μαλακὴν φυρασάμενος <τὴν> φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν ἐραστὴν
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν προαγωγεύων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐβάδιζεν·
οὐδ’ ἀνελέσθαι δειπνοῦντ’ ἐξῆν κεφάλαιον τῆς ῥαφανῖδος,
οὐδ’ ἄννηθον τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἁρπάζειν οὐδὲ σέλινον,
οὐδ’ ὀψοφαγεῖν, οὐδὲ κιχλίζειν, οὐδ’ ἴσχειν τὼ πόδ’ ἐναλλάξ. —

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

The Stronger Argument continued

II.31.12.3

Nor would he go about softening <his> voice toward his lover,
acting as his own pimp with his eyes.[1091]
At dinner he was not allowed to take the head of the radish,
or snatch his elders' dill or celery,
or gobble delicacies, or giggle, or keep his feet crossed. —[1092]

1091. Προαγωγεύων means acting as a procurer or pimp: the boy is imagined offering himself through glances and an affected voice. Supplied <τὴν>, the Greek article before voice, is represented by <his>. The sexual language continues the same pederastic setting as the preceding verses.

1092. The speaker now extends discipline from posture and courtship to table manners and deference to elders. Ὀψοφαγεῖν is to eat relishes or delicacies greedily; it is not simply the ordinary act of eating a meal. The closing dash marks the rival Argument's interruption.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους — συνέχεια

II.31.12.4

Ἀρχαῖά γε καὶ Διπολιώδη καὶ τεττίγων ἀνάμεστα,
καὶ Κηκείδου καὶ Βουφονίων. —
Ἀλλ’ οὖν ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα
ἐξ ὧν ἄνδρας Μαραθωνομάχους ἡμὴ παίδευσις ἔθρεψε.
σὺ δὲ τοὺς νῦν εὐθὺς ἐν ἱματίοισι διδάσκεις ἐντετυλίχθαι·
ὥστε μ’ ἀπάγχεσθ’, ὅταν, ὀρχεῖσθαι Παναθηναίους δέον αὐτούς,
τὴν ἀσπίδα τῆς αἰδοῦς προέχων ἀμελῇ τῆς Τριτογενείης.
πρὸς ταῦτ’, ὦ μειράκιον, θαρρῶν ἐμὲ τὸν κρείττω λόγον αἱροῦ·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

The rival Arguments continued

II.31.12.4

[Weaker Argument] Ancient stuff indeed, Dipolieia stuff, brimming with cicadas,
and Kekeides and the Bouphonia! —[1093]
[Stronger Argument] Yet these are the very things
by which my schooling reared the men who fought at Marathon.
You teach the moderns to wrap themselves in cloaks right from the start:
enough to make me hang myself when they ought to dance the Panathenaic dances,
but a lad holds out the shield of modesty and neglects Tritogeneia.[1094]
So, young fellow, take heart and choose me, the Stronger Argument.

1093. The Weaker Argument mocks the old-fashioned catalogue. The Dipolieia and Bouphonia evoke archaic rites for Zeus; the cicadas recall golden hair ornaments associated with older Athenians. Kekeides is explained by the ancient scholia as an earlier dithyrambic poet. The Stronger Argument answers by claiming that his schooling produced the Marathon generation.

1094. The Panathenaic dance evokes armed dancing in Athena's festival, and Tritogeneia is Athena. Wachsmuth prints τῆς αἰδοῦς, of modesty, where separate play editions commonly have τῆς κωλῆς, an anatomical word used here for the genitals according to the ancient scholia. The English preserves the unusual shield of modesty. The complaint concerns covering oneself instead of serving the goddess.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους — συνέχεια

II.31.12.5

κἀπιστήσῃ μισεῖν ἀγορὰν καὶ βαλανείων ἀπέχεσθαι,
καὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, κἂν σκώπτῃ τίς σε φλέγεσθαι·
καὶ τῶν θάκων τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ὑπανίστασθαι προσιοῦσιν,
καὶ <μὴ> περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας σκαιουργεῖν, ἄλλο τε μηδὲν
αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ὅτι τῆς Αἰδοῦς μέλλεις τἄγαλμ' ἀναπλάττειν·
μηδ' εἰς ὀρχηστρίδος εἰσᾴττειν, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κεχηνὼς
μήλῳ βληθῇς ὑπὸ πορνιδίου τῆς εὐκλείας ἀποθραυσθείς·
μηδ' ἀντειπεῖν τῷ πατρὶ μηδέν, μηδ' Ἰαπετὸν καλέσαντα
μνησικακῆσαι τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐξ ἧς ἐνεοττοτροφήθης. —

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

The Stronger Argument continued

II.31.12.5

And you will know to hate the marketplace and keep away from bathhouses,
to be ashamed of shameful things and blush if someone mocks you,
to rise from your seat when your elders approach,
and <not> behave rudely toward your own parents, nor do anything else shameful, since you are going to shape an image of Modesty.[1095]
Nor rush into a dancing girl's house, lest, gaping at the spectacle,
you be hit by an apple from a prostitute and chipped away from your good name.[1096]
Nor contradict your father in anything, nor call him Iapetus
and bear a grudge against the age that reared you in the nest. —[1097]

1095. Αἰδώς is personified Modesty or moral regard, an ideal to be embodied. Φλέγεσθαι, to burn, here describes blushing under mockery. Supplied <μή> is marked as <not>. Σκαιουργεῖν is to behave rudely or abusively toward the parents; the printed wording is retained.

1096. An ὀρχηστρίς is a female dancer or entertainer; the following πορνίδιον is a disparaging diminutive for a prostitute. The apple has an erotic role as an invitation or token of desire. The speaker warns that accepting such attention damages respectable reputation; the comic image chips that reputation away like a piece broken off.

1097. Iapetus, a figure of the ancient mythical generation, serves as a contemptuous label for an old man. The nest image in ἐνεοττοτροφήθης refers to being reared: the son is told to respect the older generation that brought him up. The closing dash introduces another interruption by the Weaker Argument.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοφάνους — συνέχεια

II.31.12.6

Εἰ ταῦτ’, ὦ μειράκιον, πείσῃ τούτῳ, νὴ τὸν Διόνυσον
τοῖς Ἱπποκράτους υἱέσιν εἴξεις καί σε καλοῦσιν βλιτομάμμαν. —
Ἀλλ’ οὖν λιπαρός γε καὶ εὐανθὴς ἐν γυμνασίοις διατρίψεις,
οὐ στωμύλλων κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν τριβολεκτράπελ’, οἷά περ οἱ νῦν,
οὐδ’ ἑλκόμενος περὶ πραγματίου γλισχαντιλογεξεπιτρίπτου·
ἀλλ’ εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν κατιὼν ὑπὸ ταῖς μορίαις ἀποθρέξει
στεφανωσάμενος καλάμῳ λευκῷ μετὰ σώφρονος ἡλικιώτου
σμίλακος ὄζων καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνης καὶ λεύκης φυλλοβολούσης
ἦρος ἐν ὥρᾳ χαίρων, ὁπόταν πλάτανος πτελέᾳ ψιθυρίζῃ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

The rival Arguments continued

II.31.12.6

[Weaker Argument] If you obey him in this, young fellow, by Dionysus,
you will turn out like Hippocrates's sons, and they will call you a vegetable-pap fool. —[1098]
[Stronger Argument] Yet you will be sleek and blooming, spending your time in the gymnasia,
not jabbering thorny quips in the marketplace like the moderns,
nor dragged about over some sticky, quibbling, pettifogging little case.[1099]
Instead, going down to the Academe, you will run beneath the sacred olive trees,
wreathed in white reed, with a temperate companion of your own age,
smelling of smilax, an untroubled life, and poplar shedding its leaves,
rejoicing in the season of spring, when plane-tree whispers to elm.[1100]

1098. The ancient scholia explain εἴξεις as becoming like, not yielding to, and identify this Hippocrates as an Athenian, not the physician. Βλιτομάμμαν is a comic insult glossed as fool: its food imagery combines leafy greens and pap. Vegetable-pap fool is a deliberately approximate rendering of the wordplay.

1099. The extended compounds mock the verbal cleverness and petty litigation of the rival education. Wachsmuth's γλισχαντιλογεξεπιτρίπτου is retained without inserting the rho found in γλισχραντι- in other texts. Ἀπραγμοσύνη below, an untroubled life or freedom from meddling, answers this picture of contentious business.

1100. Here the Academe is a gymnasium ground with sacred olive trees. Καλάμῳ λευκῷ is white reed; λεύκη later is poplar, and smilax a climbing plant. Φυλλοβολούσης is rendered shedding leaves; putting out leaves is also proposed for this disputed phrase. The spring setting and whispering plane-tree and elm are retained.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μενάνδρου II.31.13

[Μανθάνειν]
ὅτου δ’ ἂν ἔργου τυγχάνῃς ἄπειρος ὤν,
τὸ πυνθάνεσθαι τῶν κατειδότων καλόν.

Εὐριπίδου Ῥήσῳ II.31.14

Σοφοῦ παρ’ ἀνδρὸς χρὴ σοφόν τι μανθάνειν.

Μενάνδρου II.31.15

Πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἓν καλῶς μεμαθηκέναι,
ἢ πολλὰ φαύλως περιβεβλῆσθαι πράγματα.

Σοφοκλέους Φθιωτίδων II.31.16

Νέος πέφυκας· πολλὰ καὶ μαθεῖν σε δεῖ,
καὶ πόλλ’ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ διδάσκεσθαι μακρά.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Menander

II.31.13

Whatever task you happen to be inexperienced in,
it is a good thing to ask those who know it.[1101]

Euripides, from Rhesus

II.31.14

One should learn something wise from a wise man.[1102]

Menander

II.31.15

Far better to have learned one thing well
than to have draped oneself poorly in many subjects.[1103]

Sophocles, from Women of Phthiotis

II.31.16

You are young: you must learn many things,
hear many things, and be taught at length.[1104]

1101. Wachsmuth prints [Μανθάνειν], to learn, as rejected wording before the couplet. His apparatus records Meineke's removal of it as a repetition from the following Euripidean verse, II.31.14. It is omitted from the English. The heading gives Menander's name but no play or speaker; the advice concerns seeking knowledge when one lacks experience.

1102. Rhesus 206. The Chorus speaks to Dolon while asking about the disguise he proposes for spying on the Greeks; he goes on to describe a wolfskin. Σοφός can therefore imply cleverness or skill in this setting as well as wisdom. The anthology preserves the line as a general maxim and attributes the play to Euripides in its heading.

1103. Περιβεβλῆσθαι suggests covering or clothing oneself with many things. The contrast concerns how well something is learned and how poorly a larger range may be acquired. Πράγματα is broad, matters or subjects; the excerpt names no particular field of study or Menandrian play.

1104. Φθιωτίδες is a feminine plural title, rendered Women of Phthiotis; Wachsmuth cites fragment 627 in Nauck's numbering. No particular speaker is identified here. Μακρά is the printed neuter plural, rendered at length: the advice joins learning and listening with extended instruction.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Tragici incerti> II.31.16a

Ἀεί τι βούλου χρήσιμον προσμανθάνειν.

Φιλήμονος II.31.17

Ἤκουσα τούτων αὐτός· οὐδὲ φύεται
αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, νοῦς,
ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμ'· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τι καὶ
ἑτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαί <τί που>
κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεί, φασί, φύονται φρένες.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Unidentified tragedian> II.31.16a

Always desire to learn something useful in addition.[1105]

Philemon II.31.17

I heard them myself.[1106] Understanding does not grow
of its own accord in human beings, my good fellow,
like thyme in a field;[1107] but by saying something,
listening to others, and observing <something here or there>,
minds keep growing little by little, they say.[1108]

1105. The supplied attribution is printed in Latin: Tragici incerti, of an unidentified tragedian. Wachsmuth's apparatus records Nauck's separation of this saying from the preceding Sophoclean excerpt and cites anonymous tragic fragment 228 in his numbering. Προσμανθάνειν means to learn further or add to one's learning; βούλου urges the desire to do so.

1106. The heading names Philemon without identifying a play or speaker. The opening retains I heard them myself; the isolated excerpt does not identify the people or subject matter to which τούτων refers. The printed text is not replaced by Meineke's proposed singular wording.

1107. Νοῦς is understanding or intelligence. The contrast is with thyme growing in a field without cultivation: human understanding requires the activities named next. Wachsmuth retains the unusual neuter αὐτόματον beside the masculine νοῦς, rather than silently adopting the proposed masculine form. The image concerns the growth of understanding, not a denial that human beings have natural intellectual capacities.

1108. The main text has λέγειν τι, saying something, which the English retains. Wachsmuth questions that wording and records alternatives including experiencing or looking; those conjectures are not substituted for speaking. The supplied <τί που> is represented by <something here or there>, leaving its object indefinite. Φρένες here names the mental faculties, rendered minds. Both gradual growth and the qualification they say remain explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μενάνδρου II.31.18

Ὅταν λέγῃς μὲν πολλά, μανθάνῃς δὲ μή,
τὸ σὸν διδάξας τοὐμὸν οὐ μαθὼν ἔσῃ.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίῳ II.31.19

Ἔργον ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου
ἄνοιαν ἡμέρᾳ μεταστῆσαι μιᾷ.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Φιλαδέλφοις II.31.20

Οὐ ῥᾴδιον
ἄνοιαν ἐν μικρῷ μεταστῆσαι χρόνῳ.

Εὐριπίδου Μελεάγρῳ II.31.21

Ἐκ γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ὅστις ἐκπονεῖ
σκληρὰς διαίτας, οἱ γόνοι βελτίονες.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Menander

II.31.18

When you speak a great deal but do not learn,
you will have taught your own lesson without learning mine.[1109]

Menander, from The Carthaginian

II.31.19

To dislodge long-established folly
in a single day is hard work.[1110]

Menander, from The Affectionate Brothers

II.31.20

It is not easy
to dislodge folly in a short time.[1111]

Euripides, from Meleager

II.31.21

For from father and mother, when one endures
harsh regimens, the offspring are better.[1112]

1109. Τὸ σόν and τοὐμόν mean what is yours and what is mine, here rendered as the respective lessons or contributions to an exchange. The printed ending οὐ μαθὼν ἔσῃ is retained: the talker ends without learning the other person's contribution. The excerpt identifies no play or particular speaker.

1110. The same author is Menander, and the heading names The Carthaginian. The wording contrasts ἄνοια, folly or lack of understanding, established over a long time with the hope of changing it in one day. The fragment supplies no speaker or dramatic circumstances.

1111. The same-author heading continues the attribution to Menander. Φιλάδελφοι expresses brotherly affection, rendered The Affectionate Brothers, brothers who love one another; this does not reconstruct the lost play's plot. Both ἄνοια and μεταστῆσαι recur from the preceding excerpt: folly is something to be moved from its established position.

1112. Wachsmuth cites fragment 529 in Nauck's numbering. The construction is compressed: singular ὅστις ἐκπονεῖ, whoever labors through, does not agree regularly with the preceding father and mother. "When one" cautiously renders the indefinite relative; Clement's alternative plural participle, ἐκπονουμένων, is not substituted. Δίαιτα is a regimen or way of life. The printed γόνοι means offspring, rather than πόνοι, toils, found in another transmission.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοκράτης

II.31.22

Ξενοκράτης νέον φιλοσοφεῖν βουλόμενον ἤρετο, εἰ γεγεωμέτρηκε· τοῦ δὲ ἀποφήσαντος, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἠστρονόμηκε· καὶ τοῦτο ἀπειπόντος, ἀλλ’ εἰ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀνέγνωκεν· ὁ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἔξαρνος ἦν· ἄλλως δὲ εἰ γράμματα οἶδεν· <οὐδὲ> ταῦτα ἔφη ἐκεῖνος εἰδέναι. «Πόκος τοίνυν», εἶπεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης, «ὑπὸ γναφέως οὐ πλύνεται».

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenocrates

II.31.22

Xenocrates asked a young man who wished to study philosophy whether he had studied geometry. When he said no, Xenocrates asked whether he had studied astronomy; when he denied that too, whether he had read the poets. He denied this as well.[1113] Failing that, Xenocrates asked whether he knew his letters. He said that he did <not even> know those.[1114] "Fleece, then," said Xenocrates, "is not washed by a fuller."[1115]

1113. The anecdote presents geometry, astronomy, reading the poets, and finally basic literacy as preparation for philosophy. Xenocrates is the subject of the story; the excerpt supplies no separate author heading. A related anecdote in Diogenes Laertius 4.10 has a different sequence and wording. Its additional material is not imported into Stobaeus's text.

1114. The Greek compresses the later questions by omitting the repeated verb asked. Failing that renders the transition ἄλλως δέ without replacing Wachsmuth's printed ἄλλως with a conjecture. Knowing one's letters means basic literacy here. The supplied <οὐδὲ> is represented by <not even>; the negative is an editorial supplement, not an unmarked word of the transmitted text.

1115. Πόκος means fleece or wool in its raw state; γναφεύς is a fuller, a worker who cleans and finishes cloth. The joke treats the unprepared student as raw material that has not reached the stage appropriate to the specialist's work. This is the image's implication, not a general claim that raw wool cannot be washed. The translation retains Wachsmuth's πλύνεται, is washed, and his corrected ὑπὸ γναφέως, by a fuller. Compare the differently worded fleece saying in Diogenes Laertius 4.10.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Αἰσχίνου Σωκρατικοῦ

II.31.23.1

Οὗτός ἐστι Μιλτιάδης ὁ Στησαγόρου, ὃς παῖς μὲν ὢν ἤσκει Ὀλύμπια καὶ κρείττων ἦν τοὺς πόνους πονῶν ἢ παιδοτρίβης ἐπιτάττων· ἐκεῖ δὲ μείζους παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ πρεσβυτέρους κατεμαχέσατο καὶ ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου ἄκων ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδοτρίβου ἐξήχθη·

Αἰσχίνου — συνέχεια

II.31.23.2

ἔτι δὲ ἐπίτροποι αὐτοῦ ἐγένοντο οὔτε τὰς αὐτὰς ἡλικίας ἔχοντες οὔτε τοὺς αὐτοὺς τρόπους· καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ἦν κατήκοος. Παιδαγωγὸς αὐτῷ ἠκολούθει οὐ πάνυ σπουδαῖος καὶ τούτῳ οὐδὲν πώποτε ἠναντιώθη. Ταῦτα μὲν παιδὶ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐπιτετήδευται· ἐπεὶ δὲ μειράκιον ἤρχετο γίγνεσθαι, σιωπᾶν καλὸν ἡγήσατο εἶναι· σεσιώπηται αὐτῷ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς χαλκοῖς ἀνδριᾶσι. Τοῦ σώματος αὐτῷ καλὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐπιμεμέληται τούτου, ὥστ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἄριστα ἔχει τὸ σῶμα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Aeschines the Socratic

II.31.23.1

This is Miltiades, the son of Stesagoras.[1116] As a boy he trained for the Olympic contests, and his capacity for performing the hard work surpassed his trainer's capacity for prescribing it. There he defeated boys bigger and older than himself, and while competing for the crown he was withdrawn by his trainer against his will.[1117]

Aeschines continued

II.31.23.2

Moreover, he had guardians who differed in age and character, and he was obedient to them all. An attendant of no great merit used to accompany him, and he never opposed him in anything.[1118] Such was his conduct as a boy. When he began to become a young man, he considered it a fine thing to keep silent; he has kept quieter than bronze statues. He thought it a fine thing to care for his body; he has taken such care of it that even now he is in better physical condition than anyone else his age.[1119]

1116. Aeschines the Socratic is the associate of Socrates, distinct from the orator who opposed Demosthenes; compare Diogenes Laertius 2.60 and 2.64. Diogenes 2.61 lists a dialogue entitled Miltiades among his works. Stobaeus's heading supplies neither a dialogue title nor the speaker's name, and the young man is identified here only as Miltiades, son of Stesagoras.

1117. Ἥσκει describes training, not winning an Olympic victory. The comparison presents the boy as able to endure more exertion than the παιδοτρίβης, or athletic trainer, could prescribe. The excerpt does not specify the athletic event or explain why the trainer withdrew him from competition.

1118. The ἐπίτροποι are guardians or persons entrusted with his supervision. The παιδαγωγός is the attendant who accompanied and supervised a boy, distinct from the athletic trainer of the preceding sentences. The account stresses obedience despite the supervisors' differences and the attendant's lack of merit; it does not explain those arrangements further.

1119. The comparison with bronze statues exaggerates the young man's restraint in speech. The perfect forms σεσιώπηται and ἐπιμεμέληται connect his earlier choices with their continuing results: reticence and excellent bodily condition. The continuation heading and the division into two layout units are editorial; this is one uninterrupted ancient excerpt.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Εὐριπίδου κωμ¯ II.31.24

Ὅστις νέος ὢν Μουσῶν ἀμελεῖ,
τόν τε παρελθόντ’ ἀπόλωλε χρόνον,
καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα τέθνηκε.

<Comici incerti.> II.31.25

Φύσιν ἔχειν ἄριστόν ἐστι· δεύτερον δὲ <μανθάνειν.>

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Euripides (attribution uncertain)

II.31.24

Whoever neglects the Muses while young[1120]
has wasted the time already past
and is dead to the time ahead.[1121]

<Unidentified comic poet.>

II.31.25

To have natural ability is best; next comes <learning.>[1122]

1120. The printed heading names Euripides, followed by an unresolved abbreviation, here transcribed κωμ̄ with an overline marking abbreviation. Wachsmuth cites fragment 927 in Nauck's numbering but questions the heading: his apparatus suggests that a play title is concealed and considers a different author. No complete title or secure dramatic attribution can be recovered from this heading alone.

1121. The Muses evoke the cultivation supplied by poetry, music, and education. The final verse describes the neglectful person as dead with respect to the future, keeping the metaphor rather than making future time itself die. No speaker or dramatic setting is identified.

1122. Both the Latin attribution and the concluding μανθάνειν, learning, are editorial supplements and remain visibly supplied in English. Wachsmuth records Meineke's addition of the infinitive. Φύσις here is natural capacity or aptitude. The fragment ranks that capacity first and learning second; it does not identify a particular skill, poet, or play.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος Νόμων ζ′ II.31.26

Ἀγνοεῖται παρὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀλίγου. — Τὸ ποῖον; — Ὡς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ διαφέροντά ἐστιν ἡμῶν φύσει πρὸς τὰς χρείας εἰς ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων τὰ περὶ τὰς χεῖρας· ἐπεὶ τὰ γε περὶ πόδας τε καὶ <τὰ> κάτω τῶν μελῶν, οὐδὲν διαφέροντα εἰς τοὺς πόνους φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ κατὰ χεῖρας ἀνοίᾳ τροφῶν καὶ μητέρων οἷον χωλοὶ γεγόναμεν ἕκαστοι. τῆς φύσεως γὰρ ἑκατέρων τῶν μελῶν σχεδὸν ἰσορροπούσης, αὐτοὶ διὰ τὰ ἔθη διάφορα αὐτὰ πεποιήκαμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενοι.

Κράντωρ II.31.27

Κράντωρ ἔλεγε μήτε δύνασθαί τινα τὰ μεγάλα πρὸ τῶν μικρῶν μυηθῆναι, μήτ’ ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐλθεῖν πρὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις διαπονηθῆναι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, from Laws, Book 7

II.31.26

Almost everyone is mistaken about something. — What is that? — The belief that our right and left sides, in the use of our hands for each task, differ by nature.[1123] For the feet and <the> lower limbs show no difference in their capacity for exertion; but as for our hands, through the folly of nurses and mothers we have each become, as it were, lame.[1124] For although nature leaves the limbs on either side almost evenly balanced, we ourselves, through habits and improper use, have made them different.[1125]

Crantor

II.31.27

Crantor used to say that no one could be initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser, nor could one come to philosophy before working through the general course of studies.[1126]

1123. Laws 7, 794D–E. The dialogue's question interrupts the Athenian Stranger's argument about bodily training. The Greek opening means that almost everyone is in error; the following that-clause states the mistaken assumption, not the speaker's conclusion. The English makes this connection explicit with the belief. Χρείας means uses or practical needs, while χεῖρας means hands.

1124. The supplied article <τὰ> before lower is represented by <the>. The comparison with feet leads to the image of being lame in one's use of the hands: the criticism concerns training one side at the expense of the other. The qualification as it were preserves οἷον.

1125. The final explanation opposes nature's nearly even balance to differences produced by habitual, improper use. Σχεδόν means almost or nearly; the sentence does not assert absolute identity. Its subject is the formation of bodily capacities through upbringing and practice.

1126. Crantor compares advancement in education with progression through lesser and greater initiations. Τὰ ἐγκύκλια are the general or preparatory studies that precede philosophy here; the excerpt supplies no fixed list of subjects. Διαπονηθῆναι conveys sustained work, rather than mere exposure to those studies. The analogy gives an order of preparation, not a description of a particular initiation ceremony.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρκεσίλαος II.31.28

Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁρῶν τινα νεανίσκον φιλοσόφων λόγων κατακούοντα πρὶν παιδευθῆναι, οὐδὲ τοὺς τῆς Δήμητρος, ἔφη, καρποὺς καλλίστους καὶ τροφιμωτάτους ὄντας εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς τοῖς παισὶν ἁρμόζειν, τὸ δὲ γάλα τῶν τιτθῶν.

Δημοσθένης II.31.29

Δημοσθένης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔφη τὴν μὲν ῥίζαν τῆς παιδείας εἶναι πικράν, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς γλυκεῖς.

Ἀριστοτέλης II.31.30

Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί μάλιστα δεῖ ἀσκεῖν τοὺς νέους, εἶπε· «παιδείαν».

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Arcesilaus

II.31.28

Arcesilaus, seeing a certain young man listening to philosophical discussions before receiving an education, said that not even Demeter's crops, though finest and most nourishing, suit children straight from birth;[1127] their nurses' milk does.[1128]

Demosthenes

II.31.29

Demosthenes the orator said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet.[1129]

Aristotle

II.31.30

When someone asked Aristotle the Peripatetic what young men should practice most of all, he said, "Education."[1130]

1127. Demeter's crops are the grain that provides mature nourishment, contrasted with a newborn's milk. The analogy concerns the learner's readiness: the value of philosophical discussion does not make it suitable before preparation. The anecdote names no particular preliminary curriculum.

1128. The printed οὐδὲ, not even, is retained. Halm proposed οὐ δεῖ, one should not, which would change the construction; that conjecture is not substituted here. Τιτθαί are nursing women or wet nurses. Arcesilaus's name occurs within the anecdote; the separate label above is editorial.

1129. Stobaeus explicitly names Demosthenes the orator. Diogenes Laertius 5.18 attributes a similar saying to Aristotle, with plural roots and singular fruit. The translation keeps this excerpt's attribution, singular root, and plural fruits; the botanical image contrasts education's initial difficulty with its benefits.

1130. Ἀσκεῖν means to practice or train: the answer presents education as an activity to be cultivated. Παιδεία includes intellectual and character formation, without specifying a subject here. The identification the Peripatetic belongs to the anecdote itself; Aristotle's separate label above is editorial, as is Demosthenes's label in the preceding unit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Θεοφράστου II.31.31

Ἀναγκαιοτάτη δ’ ἐπὶ γυναικῶν ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων δοκεῖ παίδευσις εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ μέχρι χρησίμου πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· τὸ δ’ ἐξακριβούμενον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀργοτέρας τε ποιεῖ πρὸς τἆλλα καὶ λάλους καὶ περιέργους.

Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς II.31.32

Ἡ γὰρ συνακολουθοῦσα παντὶ τῷ βουλήματι τοῦ διδάσκοντος τῶν μανθανόντων, αὕτη πασῶν ἐστι μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη ἀκρόασις.

Ἀντισθένης II.31.33

Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, ποῖος στέφανος κάλλιστός ἐστιν, εἶπεν, «ὁ ἀπὸ παιδείας».

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Theophrastus II.31.31

For women, instruction in letters seems most necessary—and even that only as far as is useful for managing a household.[1131] But further refinement makes them more idle in other matters, talkative, and meddlesome.[1132]

Iamblichus, from On the Soul II.31.32

For the learners' listening that follows the teacher's every intention is the most harmonious and the best of all.[1133]

Antisthenes II.31.33

When someone asked Antisthenes, the Socratic philosopher, what sort of crown was finest, he said, "The one that comes from education."[1134]

1131. Wachsmuth prints γραμμάτων, letters or written learning, Meineke's correction of the transmitted πραγμάτων, affairs. Οἰκονομία is management of the household; the excerpt gives no list of the reading or writing skills it allows. Αὐτή refers to the instruction itself: even that is restricted to the stated usefulness.

1132. This fragment voices a restrictive view of women's education, tying it to household usefulness and disparaging study carried further. The qualification seems (δοκεῖ) and the limiting phrase only as far as are retained. Stobaeus supplies no larger argumentative setting for these claims or title of the work excerpted.

1133. The heading names On the Soul; the selection contains only this sentence, whose introductory for points to an argument outside the excerpt. Μουσικωτάτη can suggest cultivated responsiveness as well as harmonious agreement. The word is not limited here to hearing performed music. The emphasis is on the learner's attention following the teacher's entire intention, not simply hearing the sound of the words.

1134. Στέφανος is a wreath or crown of honor. The answer treats education as the source of the finest distinction, without naming a particular contest or material wreath. Antisthenes is the subject of the anecdote, rather than an author named by a separate source heading. Παιδεία includes the cultivation and formation gained through education.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ὁ αὐτός II.31.34

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἀναγκαιότατον εἴη μάθημα, «τὸ ἀπομαθεῖν», εἶπε, «τὰ κακά».

Ἀριστοτέλης II.31.35

Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη τὴν παιδείαν εὐτυχοῦσι μὲν κόσμον εἶναι, πταίουσι δὲ καταφυγὴν ἐλευθέριον.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Antisthenes again

II.31.34

Asked what lesson was most necessary, the same man said, “To unlearn what is bad.”[1135]

Aristotle

II.31.35

Aristotle said that education is an adornment for those who prosper, and for those who stumble a refuge worthy of a free person.[1136]

1135. The same man refers back to Antisthenes. The printed question asks for the most necessary lesson, retaining ἀναγκαιότατον rather than the alternative best recorded in the apparatus. Ἀπομαθεῖν reverses learning: acquired bad habits or lessons must be unlearned. Τὰ κακά remains general; the excerpt supplies no list of particular vices. Compare the related saying in Diogenes Laertius 6.7.

1136. The adjective ἐλευθέριον carries the sense of what befits a free person and the dignity associated with such an education. Πταίουσι, those who stumble, can describe people encountering reverses; the contrast is with those faring well. The local attribution is Aristotle; compare the related saying in Diogenes Laertius 5.19.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος II.31.36

Ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπῳ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν εὐφυέστερον εἰς τὸ φυγεῖν μὲν τὸ κακόν, ἰχνεῦσαι δὲ καὶ ἑλεῖν τὰ πάντων ἄριστα καὶ ἑλόντα αὖ κοινῇ ξυνοικεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.37

Πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς πανουργία, ἀλλ’ οὐ σοφία φαίνεται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, from Laws, Book 5

II.31.36

For a human being, no possession is better fitted than the soul[1137] for escaping what is bad, tracking down and capturing the best things of all, and, after capturing them, living in their company for the rest of life.[1138]

Plato, from Menexenus

II.31.37

All knowledge, when separated from justice and the rest of virtue, appears as cunning, not wisdom.[1139]

1137. Laws 5, 728C–D. Εὐφυέστερον describes what is better suited by nature to the activities named. The verbs for tracking and capturing make the pursuit of good things a kind of hunt; living together then turns what has been captured into enduring company.

1138. Wachsmuth prints τὰ πάντων ἄριστα, the best things of all, in the plural. His apparatus records the separate Platonic reading τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, a singular object. The English follows the anthology's plural and its image of sharing the rest of life with what one has obtained. No particular list of goods is supplied by the excerpt.

1139. Menexenus 246E–247A. Ἐπιστήμη is knowledge or skilled understanding, rather than a restriction to modern natural science. Πανουργία here is the cunning that can put such competence to unscrupulous use. The separation from justice and the other virtues determines the judgment; the sentence does not condemn knowledge without that qualification. The local ἀλλ', but, makes the contrast with wisdom explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Αἰλιανοῦ II.31.38

Σωκράτης ὁ γενναῖος ᾐτιᾶτο τῶν πατέρων ἐκείνους, ὅσοι <μὴ> παιδεύσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς υἱεῖς, εἶτα ἀπορούμενοι ἦγον ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς νεανίσκους καὶ ἔκρινον αὐτοῖς ἀχαριστίας, ὅτι οὐ τρέφονται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν· εἶπε γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀξιοῦν τοὺς πατέρας, μὴ γὰρ οἵους τε εἶναι τοὺς μὴ μαθόντας τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν αὐτά.

Ἀντιφῶντος II.31.39

Πρῶτον, οἶμαι, τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ παίδευσις· ὅταν γάρ τις πράγματος κἂν ὁτουοῦν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ποιήσηται, εἰκὸς καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ὀρθῶς γίγνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τῇ γῇ οἷον ἄν τις τὸ σπέρμα ἐναρόσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἔκφορα δεῖ προσδοκᾶν· καὶ ἐν νέῳ σώματι ὅταν τις τὴν παίδευσιν γενναίαν ἐναρόσῃ, ζῇ τοῦτο καὶ θάλλει διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, καὶ αὐτὸ οὔτε ὄμβρος οὔτε ἀνομβρία ἀφαιρεῖται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Aelian

II.31.38

The noble Socrates used to reproach those fathers who, <not> having educated their own sons, later, when in need, brought the young men before the magistrates and prosecuted them for ingratitude because they were not being supported by them.[1140] For he said that the fathers were demanding the impossible: people who had not learned what is just could not do it.[1141]

Antiphon

II.31.39

Education, I think, comes first in human affairs. For whenever one makes a correct beginning in any undertaking whatsoever, the ending too is likely to turn out correctly.[1142] For whatever kind of seed one sows in the earth, one must expect a corresponding kind of produce. And whenever one sows a noble education in a young body, it lives and flourishes throughout life, and neither rain nor drought takes it away.[1143]

1140. Wachsmuth identifies this as fragment 4 of Aelian's Various History in the Teubner edition he cites. The main text calls Socrates γενναῖος, noble or high-minded; the proposed replacement Athenian is not adopted. The supplied negative <μή> is represented by <not>. Its presence is essential: the complaint concerns fathers who failed to educate their sons.

1141. The fathers bring the charge, and they are the people seeking support from the sons. Τρέφεσθαι here is to be maintained or supported; the young men are accused of ingratitude. The concluding reason treats learning what is just as preparation for doing it. The story does not identify a particular prosecution or provide the text of a law.

1142. The heading gives Antiphon's name without a work title or details sufficient to identify which writer of that name is intended. The phrases I think and likely qualify the priority given to education and the expectation that a good beginning brings a good end.

1143. In the second sowing image the young body receives education as soil receives seed. The neuter pronouns τοῦτο and αὐτό are rendered it, maintaining the image of what is sown. Rain and drought threaten ordinary crops; here the image makes sound education a lasting possession.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ

II.31.40

Ἀναρχίας δ’ οὐδὲν κάκιον ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γινώσκοντες οἱ πρόσθεν ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴθιζον τοὺς παῖδας ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐξανδρούμενοι εἰς μεγάλην μεταβολὴν ἰόντες ἐκπλήσσοιντο.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Antiphon: From the same author

II.31.40

Nothing is worse for human beings than anarchy. Knowing this, people of earlier times accustomed children from the beginning to being governed and doing what they were told, so that, as they grew into men and underwent a great change, they might not be overwhelmed.[1144]

1144. Ἀναρχία is an absence of rule or governing authority. Its opposite here is learning ἄρχεσθαι, to be governed, and to do what is ordered. The explanation attributes this early habituation to people of former times, presenting continuity of obedience as preparation for the transition to adulthood.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.41

Οἵῳ τις ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς ἡμέρας συνῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς τρόπους.

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ζ' II.31.42

Κόποι καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμιοι.

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.31.43

Τά τε χύδην μαθήματα ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητός τε ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.41

One is bound to become, in character, like the person with whom one spends most of the day.[1145]

Plato, Republic VII II.31.42

Fatigue and sleep are enemies of learning.[1146]

Plato: From the same work II.31.43

And the subjects encountered piecemeal in their education must be brought together for them into an overview of the kinship of the subjects with one another and with the nature of being.[1147]

1145. This saying has no author heading. Wachsmuth's apparatus records Spengel's reconstruction of two verses, which Spengel attributed to Menander, and also suggests that Antiphon might have said it. The translation follows the printed prose without adopting either attribution. Τρόποι means character or manner of conduct.

1146. Republic VII.537B. Socrates is explaining why further study is postponed during two or three years of compulsory physical training. Κόποι encompasses exertion and its weariness, rendered fatigue here. The sentence belongs to the discussion of successive stages in the students' training.

1147. Republic VII.537C. The passage concerns selected twenty-year-olds continuing their training. Χύδην means piecemeal; σύνοψις is an integrated view. The English takes the subjects' kinship to extend both to one another and to the nature of being. The separate Platonic text includes παισίν, as children, which is absent from Wachsmuth's main text and is not inserted here.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σωκράτους II.31.44

Πανήγυρίς ἐστι ψυχῆς ἡ παιδεία· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ [ψυχῆς] θεάματα καὶ ἀκούσματα.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.45

Τοῖς μὲν σταδιοδρομοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ τέρματι τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς νίκης, τοῖς δὲ φιλοπονήσασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ γήρως τὸ πρωτεῖον τῆς φρονήσεως ἀπόκειται.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.46

Οὗτος ἰδὼν πλούσιον ἀπαίδευτον, ἔφη· «ἰδοὺ καὶ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἀνδράποδον».

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Socrates

II.31.44

Education is a festival for the soul:[1148] for in it are many things to see and hear.[1149]

Socrates: From the same author

II.31.45

For runners, the prize of victory awaits at the finish; for those who have worked hard, the first prize of wisdom awaits in old age.[1150]

Socrates: From the same author

II.31.46

He saw a rich man without education[1151] and said, “Look, a golden slave too.”[1152]

1148. The printed heading is Socrates. Wachsmuth records Spengel’s proposal to read Isocrates, comparing Panegyricus 43, which praises the founders of Greek festivals. The comparison supplies a related festival theme, without establishing a verbatim source for this saying. The heading is retained as printed.

1149. Wachsmuth marks the second ψυχῆς, of the soul, for deletion following Meineke; it remains bracketed in the Greek and is omitted from the English. The first ψυχῆς is retained. Things seen and heard sustain the image of a festive gathering offering varied experiences.

1150. The comparison gives different finishing points to a footrace and a life of effort. Βραβεῖον is the victor’s prize; πρωτεῖον is a first prize or distinction. Φρόνησις here is wisdom or sound understanding, the reward of sustained effort. The same-author heading continues the attribution to Socrates from excerpt 44.

1151. The heading and the opening he continue the local attribution to Socrates. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records parallel collections assigning the saying to Socrates or Isocrates. These varying attributions do not establish who originally said it.

1152. Ἀνδράποδον is a slave regarded as property. The image makes wealth a golden covering for someone who lacks education; it does not state that the rich man was legally enslaved. The printed καί is retained as too.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀριστοτέλους II.31.47

Οὗτος ἐρωτηθείς, τί τῶν ζῴων κάλλιστον, ἔφη· «ἄνθρωπος τὴν ψυχὴν παιδείᾳ κεκοσμημένος».

Ἀριστοτέλης II.31.48

Ὁ αὐτὸς ὀνειδιζόμενος ὑπό τινος, ὅτι βαρβαρίζει, ἔφη· «ἐγὼ μὲν τῷ λόγῳ, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ».

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Aristotle

II.31.47

When he was asked which living creature is most beautiful, he said, “A human being whose soul has been adorned by education.”[1153]

Aristotle

II.31.48

When someone reproached the same man for speaking like a barbarian,[1154] he said, “I do so in speech; you do so in conduct.”[1155]

1153. The answer makes education the adornment of the soul. The main heading attributes the saying to Aristotle; Wachsmuth’s apparatus also records witnesses that assign it to Socrates. The local attribution is preserved without treating it as proof of historical authorship.

1154. Βαρβαρίζειν here carries the linguistic reproach of speaking in a non-Greek or faulty manner. The reply turns that charge against the critics’ conduct. Λόγος and τρόπος distinguish speech from character or behavior. The Greek you, ὑμεῖς, is plural, although the narrator introduces a single critic.

1155. There is no separate author heading before excerpt 48: the source begins the same man, continuing the preceding attribution to Aristotle. His name is repeated above for orientation. The apparatus asks whether the anecdote belongs to Anacharsis; this possibility is not substituted for the local attribution.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Demosthenis> II.31.49

Οὐ μικρὸν ὠφελεῖ τὸ τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς συνεθίζειν.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.50

Ἅπασα φύσις βελτίων γίγνεται παιδείαν προσλαβοῦσα τὴν προσήκουσαν, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ὅσοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐφυέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν ὑπῆρξε· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν μόνον βελτίοσι γίγνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει διενεγκεῖν.

Θουκυδίδου II.31.51

Κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις παιδεύεσθαι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Demosthenes> II.31.49

Accustoming you to hear what is best is of no small benefit.[1156]

Demosthenes: From the same author II.31.50

Every natural disposition becomes better on receiving the education suited to it,[1157] and by far most of all in those who were better endowed than others from the outset. For some become better only than their former selves, while others also come to surpass other people.[1158]

Thucydides II.31.51

But it is best to be trained in what is necessary.[1159]

1156. Demosthenis, of Demosthenes, is a supplied Latin attribution. Wachsmuth's reference is Oration XIII.14; the corresponding passage is section 13 in Butcher's Greek edition of that speech. There the speaker urges his Athenian audience to listen to sound civic advice. The anthology has an abridged form, with συνεθίζειν, to accustom, retained here without importing the parallel's first-person verb.

1157. From the same author follows the supplied Demosthenes heading. Wachsmuth identifies the parallel as [Ps.] Demosthenes LXI; the passage is 61.42 in Rennie's Greek edition. The designation [Ps.] marks a piece transmitted under Demosthenes's name but treated as pseudonymous. The anthology's heading is preserved.

1158. Φύσις concerns an individual's natural disposition or endowment here. The argument distinguishes improvement over one's own earlier condition from surpassing other people; αὑτῶν is reflexive, themselves. The local γίγνεται, ὅσοις, τοῖς and βελτίοσι are retained rather than replaced by forms from another text.

1159. Thucydides I.84.4, in Archidamus's speech defending Spartan preparedness. The surrounding argument urges practical preparation for a capable enemy. The anthology retains the infinitives εἶναι and παιδεύεσθαι, rendered impersonally here. The separate Thucydidean text describes the best person with ὅστις and the finite παιδεύεται, and has the superlative ἀναγκαιοτάτοις, most necessary; those forms are not substituted for the local wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Εὐκλείδου II.31.52

Οὗτοι γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστα μανθάνουσιν, οἵ τινες καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα μιμοῦνται.

Δημώνακτος Ὑψαίου καὶ Σωκράτους II.31.53

Τὰς μὲν πόλεις ἀναθήμασι, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς μαθήμασι κοσμεῖν δεῖ.

Σωκράτης II.31.54

Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθείς, πῶς ἄν τις ἄγοι καλῶς τοὺς ἰδίους παῖδας, εἶπε· «νέους μὲν ὄντας παιδεύσας, ἄνδρας δὲ γενομένους διδάξας συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν διανείμας αὐτοῖς, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχθροὶ γένωνται».

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Euclid

II.31.52

For those people learn best who also imitate what is finest.[1160]

Demonax, Hypsaeus, and Socrates

II.31.53

Cities should be adorned with votive offerings,[1161] souls with learning.[1162]

Socrates

II.31.54

When Socrates was asked how one might guide one's own children well,[1163] he said, "By educating them while they are young, teaching them once they have become men to adapt to what happens, and distributing one's property among them, so that they do not become enemies over it."[1164]

1160. The heading supplies only Euclid's name, without identifying a work or settling which Euclid is meant. The first κάλλιστα is adverbial, best; the second, τὰ κάλλιστα, is the object of imitation, what is finest. The saying does not specify particular models or confine imitation to an artistic practice.

1161. Ἀναθήματα are dedicated offerings, objects set up in honor of a deity. The image compares the visible adornment of cities with the cultivation of souls through μαθήματα, things learned or studies. Κοσμεῖν, to adorn or put in order, applies to both.

1162. The printed heading combines the names Demonax, Hypsaeus, and Socrates; all three are retained without deciding how this composite attribution arose. Wachsmuth's apparatus also records a related witness naming Democritus. The heading is not treated as evidence that the three named figures jointly composed the saying.

1163. Socrates's name belongs to the narrative itself; the separate label is repeated for orientation. Ἄγοι, might guide, introduces a question about the direction of one's children through successive stages of life, not solely their early instruction.

1164. Συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσι means accommodating oneself to events or outcomes. Οὐσία here is property or an estate. The text does not prescribe equal shares, an age for distribution, or a legal arrangement; nor does it expressly identify with whom the children might become enemies.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἰσοκράτους πρὸς Δημόνικον II.31.55

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Isocrates, To Demonicus

II.31.55

For bodies naturally grow through measured exertion, while the soul grows through worthy discourse.[1165]

1165. Wachsmuth cites To Demonicus 12. Σύμμετροι πόνοι are proportionate or measured exertions; the phrase does not commend the greatest possible strain. Σπουδαῖοι λόγοι are worthy or serious discourses. The parallel makes such discourse the soul's means of growth, as bodily effort is the body's.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Δημοκρίτου II.31.56

Πάντων κάκιστον ἡ εὐπετείη παιδεῦσαι τὴν νεότητα, αὕτη γάρ ἐστι ἣ τίκτει τὰς ἡδονὰς ταύτας, ἐκ τῶν ἡ κακότης γίνεται.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.57

Ζηλωτικῶς ὁμῆ πονέειν παῖδες ἀνιέντες, οὔτε γράμματ’ ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην, οὐδ’, ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν ξυνέχει, τὸ αἰδέεσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου φιλέει γίνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Democritus

II.31.56

Ease is the worst thing of all for educating the young.[1166] For it is this that begets these pleasures, from which badness arises.[1167]

Democritus: From the same author

II.31.57

Children who relax their shared effort to excel[1168] would learn neither letters nor music nor competitive practice,[1169] nor what most holds virtue together—the feeling of shame. For a sense of shame is very apt to arise from this.[1170]

1166. The main heading Democritus reflects Burchard's correction of the manuscript attribution to Democrates, reported in Wachsmuth's apparatus. The printed εὐπετείη, ease, is nominative, followed by the compressed infinitive παιδεῦσαι, to educate. The English keeps ease as the subject, understood here as an unexacting approach to upbringing; it does not adopt Meineke's proposed changes of case.

1167. Ταύτας means these or those. Wachsmuth questions the demonstrative, whose reference is not explained within the excerpt; Hense proposed φαύλας, base, but the translation retains these pleasures. The local ἐκ τῶν is rendered from which, linking the pleasures with the ensuing badness; the manuscript's ἐξ ὧν is not substituted.

1168. Wachsmuth prints Ζηλωτικῶς ὁμῆ πονέειν as his reconstruction of a textually uncertain opening. The English connects these words with ἀνιέντες, relaxing or giving up, as shared effort directed toward excelling. The apparatus's alternatives include Mullach's willingly; none is substituted here. The potential force of ἂν μάθοιεν is preserved by would learn.

1169. Γράμματα means letters or basic literacy; μουσική includes music and poetic cultivation. The printed Ionic ἀγωνίην is rendered broadly as competitive practice, without specifying an athletic event. Meineke proposed ἀγωνιστικήν; the local word is retained.

1170. Τὸ αἰδέεσθαι is feeling shame or respect, and αἰδώς the related sense of shame or reverence. The relation of from this to the preceding clauses is compressed and is left open in English. Φιλέει means tends or is apt to here; very apt preserves both that qualification and μάλα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.58

Ἡ παιδεία εὐτυχοῦσι μὲν ἐστι κόσμος, ἀτυχοῦσι δὲ καταφύγιον.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.59

Κρέσσων ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν φανέεται προτροπῇ χρεώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ ἤπερ νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ. Λάθρῃ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές· διόπερ ξυνέσι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ὀρθοπρηγέων τις ἀνδρήιος ἅμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος γίνεται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Democritus: From the same author II.31.58

For the fortunate, education is an adornment; for the unfortunate, a refuge.[1171]

Democritus: From the same author II.31.59

One will appear more effective in promoting virtue by using exhortation and persuasive speech than by using law and compulsion.[1172] For someone kept from injustice by law is likely to do wrong in secret; but someone led by persuasion to what is right is unlikely to do anything amiss either secretly or openly.[1173] Hence, by acting rightly with understanding and knowledge, one becomes at once courageous and upright in judgment.[1174]

1171. Κόσμος here is adornment or distinction; καταφύγιον is a place of refuge. The saying gives education a different benefit in each condition of fortune: it adds to prosperity and offers shelter in adversity. The same-author heading continues the attribution to Democritus.

1172. The opening compares exhortation and persuasion with law and compulsion as means toward virtue. In promoting virtue makes explicit the direction expressed by ἐπ᾽ ἀρετήν. Προτροπή is exhortation or encouragement; λόγου πειθοῖ is persuasion through speech. Φανέεται is rendered will appear, retaining the form of the claim.

1173. Both εἰκός, likely, and οὐκ εἰκός, unlikely, are retained. The argument contrasts restraint imposed by law with being led through persuasion to what one ought to do. Its claim concerns conduct in private as well as in public; the translation does not turn likelihood into a categorical impossibility.

1174. The conclusion connects right action with ξυνέσι and ἐπιστήμῃ, understanding and knowledge. Ἀνδρήιος expresses courage; εὐθύγνωμος joins uprightness with judgment or disposition. The Ionic forms, including ξυνέσι, ὀρθοπρηγέων and ἀνδρήιος, are retained rather than regularized into Attic spelling.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Θεάγους

II.31.60

Πάντα τὰ φυτὰ κινδυνεύει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα καὶ τὰ ζῷα, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ῥᾷστον ἡμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεται, ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν, τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ φυτεύειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φυτεῦσαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιῷ, μετὰ τοῦτο θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος καὶ πολλὴ καὶ χαλεπὴ καὶ δύσκολος γίγνεται. οὕτως δὲ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἡ τοῦ υἱέος τούτου, εἴτε φυτείαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν δεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν, πάντων ῥᾴστη γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολός τε καὶ ἐν φόβῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεδιότι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, from Theages

II.31.60

All growing things seem likely to follow the same pattern: both things that spring from the earth and animals, the others as well as human beings.[1175] For with plants, too, the easiest part for those of us who cultivate the earth is this—to make all the preparations before planting and to do the planting itself. But once what has been planted takes life, tending the growth becomes an extensive, hard, and troublesome task. Human affairs seem to follow the same course; I infer what holds in other cases from my own experience. For in my case the planting of this son—whether one should call it planting or begetting a child—has been the easiest thing of all.[1176] But rearing him is difficult and fraught with anxiety for me, afraid for him as I am.[1177]

1175. Theages 121B–C. Demodocus is addressing Socrates about his son's upbringing. Φυτά first covers growing living things, including animals and human beings; in the subsequent agricultural comparison it refers specifically to plants.

1176. Φυτεία, planting, and παιδοποιία, begetting children, carry the agricultural comparison into fatherhood. The wordplay contrasts initial generation with the continuing care that follows.

1177. The closing δεδιότι, afraid, is a dative participle referring back to ἐμοί, for me. It describes the father's fearful state. The English makes the elliptical closing clause explicit; the separate Platonic text's additional ἀεί, always, is not inserted.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Διογένους II.31.61

Ὅταν ἄλλου τινὸς φροντίζῃς, τότε ἀμελεῖς σαυτοῦ.

Πλάτων II.31.62

Πλάτων παρεκελεύετο τοῖς μαθηταῖς τρία ταῦτα ἔχειν· ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς γνώμης σωφροσύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γλώττης σιγήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἰδῶ.

Κλεάνθης II.31.63

Κλεάνθης ἑταίρου ἀπιέναι μέλλοντος καὶ ἐρωτῶντος πῶς ἂν ἥκιστα ἁμαρτάνοι, εἶπεν· «εἰ παρ' ἕκαστα ὧν πράττοις δοκοίης με παρεῖναι».

Ὁ αὐτός II.31.64

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους μόνῃ τῇ μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Diogenes

II.31.61

Whenever you concern yourself with someone else, you neglect yourself.[1178]

Plato

II.31.62

Plato urged his pupils to have these three things: self-control in their judgment, silence on their tongue, and modesty in their eyes.[1179]

Cleanthes

II.31.63

When a companion was about to leave and asked how he might go wrong as little as possible,[1180] Cleanthes said, “If you imagined me present at everything you did.”[1181]

Cleanthes: The same man

II.31.64

The same man said that the uneducated differ from wild beasts only in their bodily form.[1182]

1178. The saying contrasts attention to another with neglect of oneself. The indefinite ἄλλου τινός could also mean something else; the Greek does not specify the object of concern more closely. The heading attributes the saying to Diogenes.

1179. Γνώμη here concerns judgment or thought; σωφροσύνη is self-control or soundness of mind. Αἰδώς expresses modesty or a sense of shame that restrains one’s gaze. The name Plato occurs in the opening sentence, without a separate source heading; it is repeated above for orientation.

1180. The companion asks how he might err least, not how he could make error impossible. Cleanthes is named in the opening sentence, without a separate source heading. The Greek does not identify the companion or say where he is going.

1181. The conditional reply supplies a way to answer the preceding question: imagine Cleanthes present at each action. Wachsmuth prints πράττοις, a correction of the manuscript’s πράττεις, and notes a parallel anecdote attributed to Zeno. The local attribution to Cleanthes is retained.

1182. The same man refers to Cleanthes in excerpt 63; the source has no separate author heading here. Ἀπαίδευτοι means people without education or cultivation. The harsh comparison expresses the value the saying places on education; μορφή concerns outward form.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Δημοκρίτου II.31.65

Ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ <καὶ> φύσις ποιέει.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.66

Τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἔργματα τοῖσι πόνοισι ἡ μάθησις ἐξεργάζεται, τὰ δ’ αἰσχρὰ ἄνευ πόνων αὐτόματα <ἡ ἀμαθίη> καρποῦται· καὶ γὰρ ὧν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα πολλάκις ἐξέργει τοιοῦτον εἶναι· οὕτω μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς ἐστι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Democritus

II.31.65

Nature and teaching are similar. For teaching reshapes a human being, and nature <too> produces by reshaping.[1183]

Democritus: From the same author

II.31.66

Learning produces noble deeds through toil, but <ignorance> reaps shameful ones of themselves, without toil.[1184] For indeed it often forces a person to be like this even against his will. So … [the concluding clause is uncertain].[1185]

1183. Μεταρυσμοῖ and μεταρυσμοῦσα express reshaping. Wachsmuth prints nominative φύσις, nature; the English takes it as the subject of ποιέει, makes or produces, with an implicit object in this compressed clause. This differs from accusative φύσιν, which would give makes a nature. The supplied καί, too, is retained.

1184. The editor supplies ἡ ἀμαθίη, ignorance, as the contrasting subject. Noble deeds renders καλὰ ἔργματα; the printed ἔργματα is an editorial correction of the transmitted χρήματα. The following ἐξέργει is taken in its constraining sense, forces. Ignorance is understood here as continuing subject; the compressed reference remains uncertain.

1185. Wachsmuth prints the continuous clause οὕτω μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς ἐστι, containing “so,” “of great,” “and,” “of the vegetative,” and “is,” but its syntax and sense are unresolved. Φυτικῆς normally concerns plants or vegetative life. The English notice and dots are editorial, not a gap in the Greek. The apparatus proposes φοιτήσιος, instruction, with a recast clause about power; that conjecture is not adopted.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μητροδώρου II.31.67

Νέος ἐν πολυτελέσι βρώμασι καὶ ποτοῖς ἔτι δὲ ἀφροδισίοις ἀναστρεφόμενος λέληθεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ θέρει τὴν χλαῖναν κατατρίβων.

Ἀντισθένους II.31.68

Δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίοις ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν παιδεύσει.

Δημοσθένης Φιλιππικῶν II.31.69

Ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτ', οἶμαι, δυνατὸν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λαμπρὰ καὶ καλὰ πράττοντας μικρὸν καὶ ταπεινὸν φρονεῖν. Ὁποῖα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ἔχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Metrodorus

II.31.67

A young man who lives amid lavish food and drink, and sexual pleasures besides, does not realize that he is wearing out his cloak in summer.[1186]

Antisthenes

II.31.68

Those who are to become good men must train their bodies through exercise and their souls through education.[1187]

Demosthenes, from the Philippics

II.31.69

Yet I think it is never possible to acquire a great and vigorous spirit while doing petty and base things, just as one cannot think in a petty and servile way while doing splendid and noble things.[1188] For whatever people's pursuits may be, their spirit must correspond.[1189]

1186. Χλαῖνα is a substantial cloak. Wearing it out in summer suggests using up a resource before the season when it will be needed. Applied to the young man's pleasures, the image may suggest squandering his strength or means; the saying does not explicitly identify what the cloak represents.

1187. The dative παιδεύσει, through education, balances γυμνασίοις, through exercise. Both body and soul fall under ἀσκεῖν, to train or cultivate. The saying gives bodily exercise and education parallel roles in preparing a person to become good.

1188. The heading places the passage under Philippics. It also survives at Demosthenes 13.25, in the speech Περὶ συντάξεως, On Organization, where the speaker contrasts the Athenians' present conduct with that of their ancestors. The local anthology wording governs the translation.

1189. Φρόνημα is one's spirit, outlook or cast of mind; νεανικόν adds youthful vigor or boldness. The conclusion links this outlook to ἐπιτηδεύματα, pursuits or habitual practices. The English retains both the speaker's I think and the necessary correspondence expressed by ἀνάγκη.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος II.31.70

Κράτιστον μέν ἐστι παρὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν διδάσκεσθαι· δεύτερον δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν.

Δημοκρίτου II.31.71

Οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε σοφίη ἐφικτόν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ τις.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.72

Ἔστι κου νέων ξύνεσις καὶ γερόντων ἀξυνεσίη· χρόνος γὰρ οὐ διδάσκει φρονέειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡραίῃ τροφῇ καὶ φύσις.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.31.73

Ὁ ἀντιλογεόμενος καὶ πολλὰ λεσχηνευόμενος ἀφυὴς ἐς μάθησιν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon II.31.70

It is best to learn what is good from one's own nature, and second best from those who are truly good.[1190]

Democritus II.31.71

Neither skill nor wisdom is attainable unless one learns.[1191]

Democritus: From the same author II.31.72

Understanding is, I suppose, found among the young, and lack of it among the old. For time does not teach sound judgment, but upbringing at the proper time and nature do.[1192]

Democritus: From the same author II.31.73

Someone who contradicts and indulges in much idle talk is naturally ill suited to learning.[1193]

1190. On Hunting 13.4. The local wording is retained: the second source of learning is the truly good. The separate Xenophon text refers instead to those who truly know something good; its longer expression is not inserted here.

1191. Τέχνη is art, craft, or skilled practice; σοφίη is the Ionic form of wisdom. The English follows the printed Democritus heading. Wachsmuth's apparatus records the alternative name Democrates; it is not substituted for the local attribution.

1192. I suppose renders Ionic κου. The closing ὡραίῃ τροφῇ, upbringing at the proper time, is dative, whereas φύσις, nature, is nominative. The English gives the apparent contrast, treating them as coordinated sources of judgment, while the local grammar is imperfect. Neither its order nor its wording is replaced by the parallel's nature and right way of life.

1193. Λεσχηνευόμενος denotes talk or chatter, here paired with contradicting. Ἀφυής concerns a lack of natural aptitude; the saying does not express an absolute impossibility of learning. No particular teacher, opponent, or occasion is identified.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Διογένης

II.31.74

Διογένης ἄτοπον ἔφησεν εἶναι ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν λύχνον ἐπιχεῖν ἔλαιον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης ὁρῶμεν, ὅπως δὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ φρονιμώτεροι γενόμενοι κατανοήσομεν τὰ τῷ βίῳ βέλτιστα, μηδὲν ἐθέλειν ἀναλίσκειν.

Ὁ αὐτός

II.31.75

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἡ γῆ βαστάζει βαρύτατον, ἔφη· «ἄνθρωπον ἀπαίδευτον».

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Diogenes

II.31.74

Diogenes said it was absurd to pour oil into a lamp so that we can see at the table,[1194] yet be unwilling to spend anything so that, becoming wiser in mind, we can discern what is best for life.[1195]

Diogenes: The same man

II.31.75

When the same man was asked what was the heaviest thing borne by the earth, he said, “An uneducated person.”[1196]

1194. Diogenes is named in the opening narrative, without a separate author heading in the source. His name is repeated above for orientation. The lamp is fed with oil to provide light at the table.

1195. The sentence contrasts spending resources to see at a meal with unwillingness to spend on wiser judgment. Κατανοεῖν is to perceive or understand; the two forms of seeing connect physical light with understanding what benefits life.

1196. The same man continues Diogenes from excerpt 74; the source gives no separate heading here. The answer turns a question about physical weight into a judgment about lack of education or cultivation. Wachsmuth records a parallel attribution to Demonax; it does not replace the local attribution to Diogenes.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀντισθένης II.31.76

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, «εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα».

Σόλων II.31.77

Σόλων ἐπετίμα τινὶ κυβεύοντι· τοῦ δὲ λέγοντος περὶ μικροῦ παίζειν, «ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος οὐ μικρόν», ἔφη.

Ὑπερίδης II.31.78

Ὑπερίδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μὴ μαθόντα <τὰ> καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Antisthenes

II.31.76

When Antisthenes was asked by someone what he would teach his son, he said, “If he intends to live with gods, a philosopher; but if with human beings, an orator.”[1197]

Solon

II.31.77

Solon was rebuking someone who was playing dice. When the man said he was playing for small stakes, Solon replied, “But the habit is no small thing.”[1198]

Hyperides

II.31.78

Hyperides the orator used to say that one cannot live well without having learned <the> noble things in life.[1199]

1197. In these four anecdotes, the names belong to the narrative; their repeated display labels are editorial. The future διδάξει is retained as would teach. The answer leaves its verb implicit: philosopher and orator indicate the intended outcome of the son’s education, rather than a stated curriculum.

1198. Ἔθος is habit or customary practice. The reply shifts the measure from the size of the stake to the habit of playing.

1199. The repetition of καλῶς, well, and καλά, noble or fine things, links the quality of life with what one learns. The supplied article τὰ, the, is retained; it makes explicit the substantive expression the noble things.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σωκράτης

II.31.79

Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἐπιστήμη, ἔφη· «ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς»· πόθεν δὲ μάλιστα κακοὶ γίνονται, «ἐξ ἀγωγῆς κακῆς καὶ ὁμιλίας πονηρᾶς» ἔφη.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Socrates

II.31.79

When asked what knowledge is, Socrates replied, “Care of the soul.” Asked further what chiefly makes people bad, he said, “Bad upbringing and wicked company.”[1200]

1200. The first answer joins ἐπιστήμη, knowledge, with ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς, care of the soul. The second question asks πόθεν, from what source, people become bad. Ἀγωγή is upbringing or training, and ὁμιλία association or company. The unnamed questioner and the occasion remain unspecified.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτων

II.31.80

Πλάτων εἶπε τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δεύτερον ἥλιον εἶναι.

Ζήνων

II.31.81

Ζήνων ἐρωτηθείς, πῶς ἄν τις νέος ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνοι, «εἰ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχει», ἔφη, «οὓς μάλιστα τιμᾷ καὶ αἰσχύνεται».

Ἐκ τῆς Περὶ φιλίας ἐπιστολῆς

II.31.82

Ἡ παιδεία κἂν μηδὲν ἕτερον ἀγαθὸν ἔχῃ, τό γε συμφοιτᾶν αὐτὴν νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἐκσῴζει κακίας, οἷς ἂν ᾖ τις αἰδώς· καὶ πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄλλους * *

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato

II.31.80

Plato said that education is a second sun for human beings.[1201]

Zeno

II.31.81

Zeno was asked how a young person might go wrong as little as possible. “If he keeps before his eyes,” he said, “those whom he most honors and before whom he feels shame.”[1202]

From the letter On Friendship

II.31.82

Education, even if it has no other good quality, at least by keeping one company night and day preserves from vice those who have some sense of shame.[1203] And many, themselves and others… [text missing][1204]

1201. Education is likened to a source of light. No work title is given, so this brief saying does not identify a particular Platonic dialogue. Plato and Zeno are named in the opening narratives of excerpts 80 and 81; their separate labels above are editorial.

1202. Αἰσχύνεται with a person as object concerns the shame or restraint one feels before that person. The image is of keeping respected people in view; no particular mentor is named. The Greek retains the printed present ἔχει, keeps, rather than the alternative optative ἔχοι recorded in the apparatus.

1203. The heading names a letter On Friendship; Wachsmuth identifies Plutarch in his parenthetical fragment reference, Plut. fr. 18,15. Συμφοιτᾶν is to accompany or keep company, with αὐτήν read as education, the subject of the infinitive. The English construes the compressed opening accordingly. The printed ἐκσῴζει, preserves from, is an adopted correction; the apparatus records transmitted ἔξω, outside.

1204. The final clause is unfinished. Πολλοί is nominative, many; σφᾶς αὐτούς and ἄλλους are accusative, themselves and others. The surviving words do not supply a predicate that securely connects them. The two printed asterisks mark the gap after others; no missing verb or conclusion is supplied.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρίστωνος Ὁμοιωμάτων II.31.83

Τὸ κύμινον, φασί, δεῖ σπείρειν βλασφημοῦντας, οὕτω γὰρ καλὸν φύεσθαι· καὶ τοὺς νέους χρὴ παιδεύειν ἐπισκώπτοντας, οὕτω γὰρ χρήσιμοι ἔσονται.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From Ariston's Comparisons

II.31.83

They say one should sow cumin while uttering curses, for in that way it grows well;[1205] young people too should be educated with mockery, for in that way they will be useful.[1206]

1205. The heading names Ariston's Comparisons without identifying which Ariston. Φασί, they say, presents the claim about sowing cumin as something reported within the analogy. Βλασφημεῖν here is to utter abusive or ill-omened words.

1206. Ἐπισκώπτειν is to mock, tease or make jokes at someone's expense. The passage applies its account of cultivating cumin to the training of young people. The excerpt gives no wider context to establish how seriously the analogy is intended.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος II.31.84

Πᾶσα ψυχὴ δείμασι συνοῦσα ἐκ νέων μᾶλλον ἂν διὰ φόβων ἐθίζοιτο γίγνεσθαι· τοῦτο δέ που πᾶς ἂν φαίη δειλίας ἄσκησιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνδρίας εἶναι. Τὸ δ’ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀνδρίας ἂν φαῖμεν ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, τὸ νικᾶν τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἡμῖν δείματά τε καὶ φόβους.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato

II.31.84

Every soul that lives amid terrors from youth would become more accustomed to living in fear. Everyone would presumably call this training in cowardice, rather than courage.[1207] But the opposite, we would say, is a practice of courage right from youth: overcoming the terrors and fears that confront us.[1208]

1207. Laws VII, 791B–C. Ἄσκησις, training, and ἐπιτήδευμα, practice or pursuit, connect repeated experience with the formation of character. The English retains the potential would and the qualifying που, rendered presumably.

1208. Wachsmuth's apparatus reports Plato's ἅπασα for the local πᾶσα, and γίγνεσθαι, to become, for εἶναι, to be, in the preceding sentence. It also notes Clinias's brief question before the final sentence, absent here. The Greek and English follow the anthology's continuous passage.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστωνύμου τομαρίων καὶ Σωκράτους II.31.85

Ταῖς μὲν πόλεσι τὰ τείχη, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς ὁ ἐκ παιδείας νοῦς κόσμον καὶ ἀσφάλειαν παρέχει.

Φιλόξενος ὁ μουσικός II.31.86

Φιλόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς ἐρωτηθείς, τί μάλιστα συνεργεῖ παιδείᾳ, εἶπε, «χρόνος».

Διογένης II.31.87

Διογένης ἔλεγε τὴν τῶν παίδων ἀγωγὴν ἐοικέναι τοῖς τῶν κεραμέων πλάσμασιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπαλὸν μὲν τὸν πηλὸν ὄντα ὅπως θέλουσι σχηματίζουσι καὶ ῥυθμίζουσιν, ὀπτηθέντα δὲ οὐκέτι δύνανται πλάσσειν, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἐν νεότητι μὴ διὰ πόνων παιδαγωγηθέντας, τελείους γενομένους ἀμεταπλάστους γίνεσθαι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From the booklets of Aristonymus and Socrates II.31.85

Walls provide cities with order and security; for souls, understanding gained through education does the same.[1209]

Philoxenus the musician II.31.86

Philoxenus the musician was asked what contributes most to education. He replied, “Time.”[1210]

Diogenes II.31.87

Diogenes used to say that bringing up children resembles the shaping done by potters. Just as potters give clay whatever shape and form they wish while it is soft, but can no longer mold it once it has been fired, so too those who have not been trained through toil in their youth become impossible to reshape once they are grown.[1211]

1209. The compound heading is retained as printed. Τομάρια means small rolls or books; the heading joins the names Aristonymus and Socrates without explaining their relation. Κόσμος can mean order or adornment; the comparison joins it with ἀσφάλεια, security, and makes educated understanding the soul’s counterpart to a city’s walls.

1210. Συνεργεῖ means helps or contributes to. The answer names the time education requires, without specifying a particular course of study. Philoxenus, Diogenes and Monimus are named within the narratives of excerpts 86–88; their separate display labels are editorial.

1211. Ἀγωγή is upbringing or training; διὰ πόνων specifies training through toil or exertion. The contrast is between soft and fired clay. Ἀμεταπλάστους, impossible to reshape, carries that image into the claim about adults; the English preserves the comparison’s categorical wording.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μόνιμος ὁ Κυνικὸς φιλόσοφος II.31.88

Μόνιμος ὁ Κυνικὸς φιλόσοφος ἔφη, κρεῖττον εἶναι τυφλὸν <εἶναι> ἢ ἀπαίδευτον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸν βόθρον, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμπίπτειν.

Ἐκ τῶν Δίωνος Χρειῶν II.31.89

Ἀθηναίοις ἐρομένοις, ὅπως λῷον <ἂν> αὐτοῖς γίγνοιτο, ἔχρησεν ἡ Πυθία· εἰ τὸ κάλλιστον εἰς τὸ δεξιὸν οὖς τῶν παίδων ἐντιθέναι βούλοιντο· οἱ δὲ τρήσαντες αὐτὸ χρυσίον ἐνέβαλον, ἀγνοήσαντες, ὅτι τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον ἐμήνυσε.

Δημοκρίτου II.31.90

Φαύλων ὁμιλίη ξυνεχὴς ἕξιν κακίης συναέξει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Monimus the Cynic philosopher

II.31.88

Monimus the Cynic philosopher said that it is better to <be> blind than uneducated: the former falls into a pit, the latter into an abyss.[1212]

From Dio's Anecdotes

II.31.89

When the Athenians asked how things <might> go better for them, the Pythia replied that they would if the Athenians were willing to put the finest thing into their children's right ear.[1213] They pierced the ear and put in gold, not realizing that she meant philosophical discourse.[1214]

Democritus

II.31.90

Continual association with bad people will increase a disposition toward vice.[1215]

1212. The supplied εἶναι, be, is marked in both languages. The first εἶναι in Greek belongs to the indirect statement that it is better; the supplied second infinitive belongs to being blind. Βόθρος, pit, and βάραθρον, abyss or chasm, are deliberately different words, making the second fall the more severe image.

1213. Χρεῖαι are brief instructive anecdotes or sayings. The heading names Dio without further identification. The supplied ἄν marks the potential question and is represented by the marked might. The English makes explicit the reply's implied reference to things going better, while retaining its condition, if they were willing.

1214. The anecdote turns on taking the finest thing as a material object rather than something heard and learned. Λόγος here is discourse or speech, qualified as philosophical. The text names the Pythia but gives no further setting for the oracle.

1215. The Ionic forms ὁμιλίη and κακίης, and the printed ξυνεχὴς and συναέξει, are retained. Ἕξις is a disposition or settled habit; the future συναέξει describes its increase through continued association.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος Νόμων α′

II.31.91

Ἢ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐρωτηθέντες εἴποιμεν <ἂν>, ὡς ἑνὸς μὲν βραχὺ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὄφελος, εἰ δ᾽ ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνίνησιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίγνοιντ᾽ ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι τὰ τε ἄλλα ἂν πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἂν νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι. παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δὲ ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑβριστότεροι διὰ πολέμων νίκας γενόμενοι, μυρίων ἄλλων κακῶν δι᾽ ὕβριν ἐνεπλήσθησαν, καὶ παιδεία μὲν οὐδεπώποτε γέγονε Καδμεία, νῖκαι δὲ ἀνθρώποις πολλαὶ δὴ τοιαῦται γεγόνασί τε καὶ ἔσονται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, Laws I

II.31.91

Or, when asked this question in this way, we <would> reply that one person would bring little benefit to the city.[1216] But if you are asking generally about the education of those educated—what great benefit it brings the city—it is not hard to say that those educated well would become good men. Once they were such, they would act well in other matters and would even defeat their enemies in battle. Education, then, brings victory too; victory, however, sometimes brings lack of education.[1217] For many, made more insolent by victories in war, were filled with countless other evils through their insolence. Education has never been Cadmeian, but many human victories have indeed been so, and will be.[1218]

1216. Laws I, 641B–C. The supplied ἄν is shown in <would>. The opening contrasts one person's benefit with that of education generally. The repeated potential forms are retained rather than made into unqualified predictions.

1217. Ἀπαιδευσία is deficient education or cultivation, the opposite of παιδεία. The passage concerns character as well as effectiveness in battle: victory can encourage ὕβρις, insolent excess.

1218. A Cadmeian victory is proverbially a success ruinous to its victor. Here the expression is transferred to education: education has never produced that kind of outcome, whereas many victories have. Compare Herodotus, Histories 1.166.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Διογένους II.31.92

Ἡ παιδεία ὁμοία ἐστὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ· καὶ γὰρ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ πολυτέλειαν.

Ἰσοκράτους πρὸς Δημόνικον II.31.93a

Πάντων μὲν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον, μάλιστα δὲ τὴν σαυτοῦ φρόνησιν ἄσκει· μέγιστον γὰρ ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ νοῦς ἀγαθὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπου σώματι.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.93b

Ἠγοῦ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων πολλὰ πολλῶν εἶναι χρημάτων κρείττω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταχέως ἀπολείπεται, τὰ δὲ πάντα τὸν χρόνον παραμένει· σοφία γὰρ μόνη τῶν κτημάτων ἀθάνατος.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Diogenes

II.31.92

Education is like a golden crown, for it carries both honor and great expense.[1219]

Isocrates, To Demonicus

II.31.93a

Take care of everything that concerns your life, but above all exercise your own judgment; for a good mind in a human body is the greatest thing within the smallest compass.[1220]

<From the same author>

II.31.93b

Regard many things learned as better than much money:[1221] money soon runs out, but learning remains for all time; for wisdom alone among possessions is immortal.[1222]

1219. Τιμή can mean honor or value, while πολυτέλεια is great expense or costliness. The comparison sets education's distinction beside its cost; the saying does not describe the crown's material value alone.

1220. To Demonicus 40, as identified by the printed reference. Φρόνησις is practical understanding or judgment, and ἄσκει calls for its exercise or training. The final image sets the greatness of a good mind within the small compass of the human body.

1221. Ἀκούσματα are things heard, including lessons or instruction. The Greek contrasts money that gives out with learning that remains. Its final feminine μόνη and ἀθάνατος agree with σοφία, wisdom; the English follows this local construction rather than changing it to the neuter forms recorded for Isocrates in the apparatus.

1222. To Demonicus 19. The supplied heading continues the Isocrates attribution of 93a; it is preserved in angle brackets in both languages. The same applies to the supplied heading of 93c.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.93c

Ὥσπερ τὴν μέλιτταν ὁρῶμεν ἐφ’ ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ βλαστήματα καθιζάνουσαν, ἀφ’ ἑκάστου δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα λαμβάνουσαν, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τοὺς παιδείας ὀρεγομένους μηδενὸς μὲν ἀπείρως ἔχειν, πανταχόθεν δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα συλλέγειν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<From the same author>

II.31.93c

Just as we see the bee settling on every plant but taking what is useful from each, so those who desire education must likewise be acquainted with everything and gather what is useful from every source.[1223]

1223. To Demonicus 52. The bee's broad visiting is joined to selective gathering: the repeated χρήσιμα means what is useful. The phrase μηδενὸς ἀπείρως ἔχειν calls for being unacquainted with nothing, expressed positively in the English. The comparison does not say to accept everything encountered.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.93d

Μᾶλλον τήρει τὰς τῶν λόγων ἢ τὰς τῶν χρημάτων παρακαταθήκας.

Δημοκρίτου II.31.94

Κρέσσονές εἰσι αἱ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐλπίδες ἢ ὁ τῶν ἀμαθέων πλοῦτος.

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρίστωνος Ὁμοιωμάτων II.31.95

Κυβερνήτης μὲν οὔτε ἐν μεγάλῳ πλοίῳ οὔτε ἐν μικρῷ ναυτιάσει, οἱ δὲ ἄπειροι ἐν ἀμφοῖν· οὕτως ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἐν πλούτῳ καὶ ἐν πενίᾳ οὐ ταράττεται, ὁ δ’ ἀπαίδευτος ἐν ἀμφοῖν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<From the same author>

II.31.93d

Guard words held in trust more carefully than money held in trust.[1224]

Democritus

II.31.94

The hopes of the educated are better than the wealth of the unlearned.[1225]

From Ariston's Comparisons

II.31.95

A helmsman will be seasick neither on a large ship nor on a small one, but the inexperienced will be seasick on either. In the same way, an educated person remains untroubled in both wealth and poverty, while an uneducated person is troubled in both.[1226]

1224. To Demonicus 22. The editorially supplied heading continues the Isocrates attribution of 93a–c and is marked in both languages. Παρακαταθήκη is something deposited in another's keeping; the saying applies the same image of a trust to words and to money.

1225. Ἐλπίδες means hopes or expectations: the comparison sets the educated person's prospects above the unlearned person's possessions. The printed Ionic forms κρέσσονες and ἀμαθέων are retained.

1226. The heading names Ariston's Comparisons without identifying which Ariston. The helmsman represents practiced skill, while the inexperienced at sea supply the comparison for the uneducated. The first clause uses the future ναυτιάσει, will be seasick; the application uses the present ταράττεται, is troubled or disturbed.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πυθαγόρου II.31.96

Ἀπαιδευσία πάντων τῶν παθῶν μήτηρ· τὸ δὲ πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἐν πολυμαθείας λόγων ἀναλήψει, ἐν ἀπαλλάξει δὲ τῶν φύσει παθῶν θεωρεῖται.

Βίων II.31.97

Βίων ἔλεγε κατὰ Ἡσίοδον τρία γένη εἶναι μαθητῶν, χρυσοῦν, ἀργυροῦν, χαλκοῦν· χρυσοῦν μὲν τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ [μὴ] μανθανόντων· ἀργυροῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν διδόντων καὶ <μὴ> μανθανόντων· χαλκοῦν δὲ τὸ τῶν μανθανόντων μέν, οὐ διδόντων δέ.

Σωκράτης II.31.98

Σωκράτης παρῄνει τοῖς νέοις πολλάκις ἐσοπτρίζεσθαι καὶ τοὺς μὲν εὐπρεπεῖς ὅμοιον ποιεῖν τῷ εἴδει καὶ <τὸν> τρόπον, τοὺς δὲ ἀμόρφους περιστέλλειν τὸ δυσειδὲς τῇ εὐτροπίᾳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Pythagoras

II.31.96

Lack of education is the mother of all passions. Being educated is seen not in amassing learned discourses, but in release from natural passions.[1227]

Bion

II.31.97

Bion used to say, following Hesiod, that there are three kinds of learners: gold, silver, and bronze.[1228] The gold class consists of those who give and learn; the silver, of those who give and do <not> learn; the bronze, of those who learn but do not give.[1229]

Socrates

II.31.98

Socrates used to advise young people to look at themselves often in a mirror: the handsome were to make <their> character, too, match their appearance, and the ugly to cover their ugliness with goodness of character.[1230]

1227. Πολυμαθεία is wide learning. The compressed τῶν φύσει παθῶν, with φύσει meaning by nature, is rendered natural passions. Wachsmuth compares Porphyry, To Marcella 9, whose wording has ψυχικῶν, of the soul. The local wording, present θεωρεῖται and Pythagoras heading are retained.

1228. Bion's and Socrates's names are narrative attributions, repeated as display labels for orientation. Give probably refers to payments or contributions for instruction, but the Greek leaves its object unstated.

1229. In the gold class, [μὴ] retains a negative rejected by the editor; it is omitted from the English, so these learners both give and learn. In the silver class, the supplied <μὴ> gives the opposite result. Bronze retains the printed negative οὐ.

1230. Εἶδος here is visible appearance; τρόπος is character or manner. The supplied τὸν is represented by <their>. Περιστέλλειν suggests wrapping or cloaking, with good character as the covering.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σωκράτης II.31.99

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἥδιστον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἔφη· «παιδεία καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἱστορία τῶν ἀγνοουμένων».

Πιττακός II.31.100

Πιττακὸς συνεβούλευε πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐφόδιον παρατίθεσθαι παιδείαν· γηροκομικωτάτη γὰρ αὕτη καὶ εὐκόλως ποιοῦσα ὑποφέρειν τὰς τοῦ γήρως δυσκολίας.

Σωκράτης II.31.101

Σωκράτης Ξενοφῶντα νέον <ὄντα> ὁρῶν εὐφυῆ ἠρώτησεν, εἰ οἶδεν ὅπου τῆς ἀγορᾶς οἱ ἰχθύες εἶεν. τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος, «ναί», ἐξῆς ἤρετο, «τί δὲ τὰ λάχανα;» ὡς δ’ εἶπε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἤρετο, εἰ οἶδεν ὅπου οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ διατρίβουσι· σιωπῶντος δὲ ἐπιπλήξας αὐτὸν κατέλιπεν· ὁ δὲ διατραπεὶς ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ἤρξατο φιλοσοφεῖν.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Socrates

II.31.99

Asked what is most pleasant in life, the same man replied, “Education, virtue, and inquiry into things unknown.”[1231]

Pittacus

II.31.100

Pittacus advised storing up education as provision for old age: it is the best nurse in old age and makes its difficulties easy to bear.[1232]

Socrates

II.31.101

Socrates saw that Xenophon <was> young and naturally gifted, and asked whether he knew where the fish were in the marketplace.[1233] When Xenophon said yes, he next asked, “What about the vegetables?” After Xenophon had answered this and the other questions, Socrates finally asked whether he knew where honorable and good men spent their time. Xenophon fell silent; Socrates rebuked him and left him. Disconcerted, Xenophon began to pursue philosophy from that point.[1234]

1231. The inline same man refers back to Socrates in 98; the repeated Socrates display label is editorial. Ἱστορία here is inquiry or investigation, with τῶν ἀγνοουμένων specifying things not known, rather than a narrative of past events.

1232. Ἐφόδιον is provision for a journey, here applied to preparing for old age. Γηροκομικωτάτη is a superlative describing care for the old. Pittacus and the Socrates of 101 are named within their narratives; their separate display labels are editorial.

1233. The supplied ὄντα, being, is represented by the marked was. Εὐφυής describes natural ability or aptitude. The English follows the local sequence of questions and replies.

1234. Καλοὶ κἀγαθοί is the expression noble or honorable and good. Διατραπείς conveys being disconcerted or abashed; from that point renders ἀπ’ ἐκείνου. The excerpt ends with Xenophon beginning philosophy after the rebuke; no invitation or additional dialogue is supplied.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Σωκράτης

II.31.102

Σωκράτης πρὸς τινα πάντα εἰδέναι φάσκοντα καὶ πολυμάθειαν ὑπισχνούμενον (ἐτύγχανε δὲ εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν συγκατιὼν αὐτῷ) ἐπιστὰς χωρίῳ πεφυτευμένῳ, ἤρετο αὐτὸν «οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ γεωργὸς ἀμελῆσαι μὴ καταφυτεύσας πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν, ἀλλὰ διαλείμματα μεταξὺ τῶν δένδρων καταλιπών;»· τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος «καὶ μὴν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων ἔτι ἐβίω, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀπώλετο», «εἶτα», ἔφη, «σὺ ἐν τῇ σαυτοῦ ψυχῇ οὐδὲ μικρὸν τόπον παραλιπών, ἄλλα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις μαθήματα σωρεύων, οἴει τινὰ καρπὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν δρέψασθαι;»

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Socrates

II.31.102

Socrates put a question to someone who claimed to know everything and professed wide learning. He happened to be going down to the Academy with him, and stopped beside a planted plot.[1235]

“Does the farmer not seem to you to have been negligent, not planting the whole ground, but leaving gaps between the trees?”

The man replied, “Yet if he had not done this, none of these would have lived any longer; they would have destroyed one another.”[1236]

“Then,” he said, “do you expect to reap any fruit from those studies, when you have not left even a little space in your own soul, but heap one study upon another?”[1237]

1235. Socrates is named within the narrative, without a separate source heading; his name is repeated above for orientation. Wachsmuth questions πρὸς and tentatively suggests πυνθανόμενος, asking. The English connects the opening with the subsequent question while retaining the local Greek.

1236. The printed οὐ δοκεῖ gives a negative leading question. In the counterfactual reply, ἔτι ἐβίω is rendered would have lived any longer.

1237. The final question carries the field’s spacing into the soul. Μαθήματα are subjects or studies; their accumulation is compared with planting trees without space between them.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ

II.31.103

Ἡ παιδεία καθάπερ εὐδαίμων χώρα πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ φέρει.

II.31.104

Τῷ μὲν Ὀρέστῃ μαινομένῳ τὴν Ἠλέκτραν ὁ μῦθος, τῇ δὲ τῶν νέων ὁρμῇ τὴν εὐβουλίαν ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος παρίστησιν εἰς ἀντίληψιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From the same author

II.31.103

Education, like a prosperous land, bears every good thing.[1238]

II.31.104

Myth places Electra beside Orestes in his madness as a helper; philosophical discourse places good counsel beside youthful impulse as a helper.[1239]

1238. The printed same-author heading continues the Socrates attribution of 102; it has no supplement brackets. Εὐδαίμων means fortunate or prosperous, here applied to a land that yields good things.

1239. No separate attribution is printed for this excerpt. The shared παρίστησιν εἰς ἀντίληψιν describes providing someone or something alongside as support. Εὐβουλία is good counsel or sound deliberation. The comparison names Electra's support for Orestes but identifies no particular drama.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.105

Ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ ἐν ὁδῷ μακρᾷ, δεῖ που καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν εὐσχήμονα εἶναι.

<Πλάτωνος> II.31.106

Πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ ῥᾷον καὶ κάλλιον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων πράττῃ.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.107a

Δύο ἐπιτηδεύματα ἢ δύο τέχνας ἀκριβῶς διαπονεῖσθαι σχεδὸν οὐδεμία φύσις ἱκανὴ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων· οὐδ’ αὖ τὴν μὲν αὐτὸς ἱκανὸς ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλον ἀσκοῦντα ἐπιτροπεύειν.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.107b

Τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἄλληλα ταράττοντα δυσμάθειαν παρέχει.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.105

In life, as on a long journey, there must, I suppose, also be seemly rest.[1240]

<Plato> II.31.106

And each thing is produced in greater quantity, more easily and better, when one person does one task according to his nature and at the right time, free from other tasks.[1241]

<From the same author> II.31.107a

Almost no human nature is capable of working thoroughly at two occupations or two crafts; nor, again, is one capable of practicing one himself while supervising someone else practicing the other.[1242]

<From the same author> II.31.107b

For contrary things, by disturbing one another, make learning difficult.[1243]

1240. This saying has no separate author heading. Εὐσχήμονα qualifies the rest as proper or seemly; the comparison makes room for rest within the course of life. The particle που gives the assertion its qualifying tone, rendered I suppose.

1241. The supplied heading identifies Plato, Republic II.370C; its reference is recorded here. Εἷς ἕν means one person doing one thing. Σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων is freedom from other tasks, allowing attention to the work at hand, rather than a claim that the worker is idle.

1242. The supplied same-author heading refers to Plato, with the reference Laws VIII.846D–E. Almost retains σχεδόν. The local αὐτός means himself: practicing one craft personally is distinguished from supervising another person's practice.

1243. The supplied heading refers to Plato, Laws VII.812E. Δυσμάθειαν means difficulty in learning; the local form is retained rather than the δυσμαθίαν recorded from the separate Platonic text. The short extract does not itself identify the contrary things.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.108

Πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι <εὖ> ὥσπερ ἓν οὐ δυνατός.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.109a

Ὅσα δ’ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.109b

Ῥᾴων δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσι μελέτη παντὸς πέρι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.109c

Κρεῖττον γάρ που σμικρὸν εὖ, ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<From the same author> II.31.108

The same person cannot imitate many things <well> as he can one.[1244]

<From the same author> II.31.109a

Again, for whatever great matters must be worked through well, everyone has long agreed that one must practice them first in small and easier cases, before tackling the greatest matters themselves.[1245]

<From the same author> II.31.109b

And practice in any subject is easier on lesser than on greater matters.[1246]

<From the same author> II.31.109c

For it is better, I suppose, to finish a little well than much inadequately.[1247]

1244. The supplied heading refers to Plato, Republic III.394E. Wachsmuth supplies εὖ, well, from Plato in place of the manuscript's ἐν; the English visibly mirrors the supplement. The contrast concerns doing many kinds of imitation well, rather than simply attempting them.

1245. Sophist 218C. The supplied same-author heading continues the Plato attribution. Διαπονεῖσθαι suggests working through something with effort; μελετᾶν is to practice or exercise oneself. Cases renders the smaller and easier things used for practice. The local περὶ τούτων, "concerning these," differs from Plato's wording recorded in the apparatus.

1246. Statesman 286A. Παντὸς πέρι gives the broad scope, "concerning anything"; the comparison concerns the scale of the matters used for practice. The supplied heading again continues Plato. The local μελέτη is practice, and the comparative ῥᾴων means easier.

1247. Theaetetus 187E. Που lightly qualifies the assertion, expressed as "I suppose." The contrast is between doing a little well and much without sufficient success; περᾶναι means to bring through or finish. The supplied same-author heading continues Plato.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος Νόμων ζ′

II.31.110a

Ἡ μὲν τρυφὴ δύσκολα καὶ ἀκράχολα καὶ σφόδρα ἀπὸ σμικρῶν κινούμενα τὰ τῶν νέων ἤθη ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δὲ τούτου ἐναντίον ἥ τε σφοδρὰ καὶ ἀγρία δούλωσις ταπεινούς τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρους καὶ μισανθρώπους ποιοῦσα ἀνεπιτηδείους ξυνοίκους ἀποτελεῖ . . . . τοῖς δὲ παιδίοις τὸ δήλωμα ὧν ἐρᾷ καὶ μισεῖ κλαυθμοὶ καὶ βοαί, σημεῖα οὐδαμῶς εὐτυχῆ· ἔστι δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὗτος τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν, μόριον οὐ σμικρὸν τοῦ βίου διαγαγεῖν χεῖρον ἢ μὴ χεῖρον. — Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. — Ὁ δὴ δύσκολος οὐδαμῶς τε ἵλεως ἆρ’ οὐ δοκεῖ σφῷν θρηνώδης τε εἶναι καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πλήρης μᾶλλον ἢ χρεών ἐστι τὸν ἀγαθόν; . . . ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὸς λόγος οὔθ’ ἡδονὰς φησι δεῖν διώκειν τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον οὔτ’ αὖ τὸ παράπαν φεύγειν τὰς λύπας, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ μέσον, ὃ νῦν δὴ προσεῖπον ὡς ἵλεων ὀνομάσας.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, Laws VII

II.31.110a

Indulgence makes the young ill-tempered, irritable and violently upset by trifles. Its opposite, harsh and savage subjection, makes them abject, servile and hostile to others, producing unsuitable companions . . . .[1248]

Little children express what they love and hate by crying and shouting, signs that are by no means auspicious. This period lasts no less than three years—no small part of life to pass in a worse state or otherwise.

— You are right. —

Does not the ill-tempered man, who is not at all cheerful, seem to you two prone to lamenting and generally fuller of wailing than a good man should be? . . .[1249]

For my argument is that the right life must neither pursue pleasures nor altogether avoid pains, but embrace the mean itself, which I have just described by calling it cheerful.[1250]

1248. Laws VII.791D–792D. Τρυφή is indulgence or pampering; δούλωσις is subjection, compared here with the opposite extreme of upbringing. The opening concerns character, and ξυνοίκους describes people with whom one shares a life or household.

1249. Both runs of dots retain the anthology's omissions. The brief reply and the resumed question remain in their printed sequence; the omitted dialogue is not filled from another text of Plato.

1250. Ἵλεως, cheerful, describes an even, contented disposition, opposed here to chronic discontent and lamentation. The mean concerns one's relation to pleasure and pain; the passage does not equate it with pursuing pleasure or eliminating all pain.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.110b

Οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ πολυπειρία καὶ πολυμαθεία μετὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς γίγνεται πολὺ τούτων μείζων ζημία.

II.31.110c

Πλάτων λέγοντός ποτε Ἰσοκράτους, ὡς δίκαια ποιεῖ πολὺν μισθὸν τοῖς μαθηταῖς εἰσπραττόμενος, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εὐφυεῖς ὠφελῶν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀφυεῖς πονεῖν, «τοὐναντίον» ἔφη, «ποιεῖς, Ἰσόκρατες· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς εὐφυεῖς οὐ πονεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ἀφυεῖς οὐκ ὠφελεῖς».

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος II.31.110d

Ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<From the same author>

II.31.110b

For inexperience in everything is nowhere a terrible thing or the greatest of evils; but wide experience and much learning, with bad upbringing, do far greater harm than these.[1251]

II.31.110c

When Isocrates once said that he was justified in charging his pupils a large fee—since he benefited the gifted and labored over the ungifted—Plato said, "You do the opposite, Isocrates: you do not labor over the gifted, and you do not benefit the ungifted."[1252]

From the same author's Euthyphro

II.31.110d

For it is right to care first for the young, so that they may be as good as possible, just as a good farmer can be expected to care first for young plants, and then for the others too.[1253]

1251. Laws VII, 819A. The supplied heading continues Plato. Ἀπειρία is inexperience; πολυπειρία and πολυμαθεία express breadth of experience and learning. The harmful combination includes κακὴ ἀγωγή, bad upbringing or guidance, rather than breadth of learning alone. The local plural τούτων, "than these," is retained in the comparison. The excerpt does not make clear what the plural refers to.

1252. There is no separate heading: Plato is named within the anecdote as the speaker who answers Isocrates. Εὐφυεῖς and ἀφυεῖς contrast natural aptitude and its absence. The reply reverses the teacher's two grounds for his fee, distinguishing the benefit given from the effort spent.

1253. Euthyphro 2D. This same-author heading is printed without supplement brackets and continues Plato from the preceding anecdote. The comparison repeats the priority, πρῶτον, for young people and young plants. Care for the other plants follows afterward; the final clause does not say to neglect them.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.110e

Οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ.

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.31.110f

Τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<From the same author> II.31.110e

One must work no less at learning than at physical training.[1254]

<From the same author> II.31.110f

We must say that the pleasures of learning are unmixed with pains and belong by no means to many people, but to very few.[1255]

1254. Republic VI, 504D. The supplied heading continues Plato. Πονητέον expresses an obligation to work or exert oneself; learning is compared with gymnastic training. The comparative οὐχ ἧττον requires no less effort, rather than merely recommending some effort.

1255. Philebus 52B. The supplied heading continues Plato. Μαθήματα are studies or things learned; the claim concerns the pleasures attached to learning. Both the exclusion of pains and the restriction to very few people are explicit. Ῥητέον means that this is what one must say.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας ς′

II.31.110g

Παντὸς σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φυτοῦ εἴτ’ ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζῴων ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει μηδὲ ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ᾖ, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. — Πῶς δ’ οὔ; — Ἔχει δή, οἶμαι, λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κακίον’ ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. — Ἔχει. — Οὐκοῦν, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς φῶμεν οὕτω τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν ποτε αἰτίαν ἔσεσθαι;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic VI

II.31.110g

We know of every seed or growing thing, whether of the earth or of animals, that if it receives neither its proper nourishment, season nor place, the stronger it is, the greater its need of what suits it. For what is bad is, I suppose, more opposed to what is good than to what is not good.[1256]

— How could it not be? —

It makes sense, then, I think, for the best nature, under less suitable nurture, to fare worse than an inferior one.[1257]

— It does. —

Then shall we also say of souls that the most gifted, when given bad upbringing, become exceptionally bad? Or do you think that great injustices and unalloyed wickedness arise from an inferior nature, rather than a vigorous nature ruined by nurture, while a weak nature will never cause great good or evil?[1258]

1256. Republic VI.491D–E. The work-only heading continues Plato. Φυτοῦ has the broad sense of a growing thing in an analogy covering plants and animals. The stronger endowment is said to have greater need of the nourishment and conditions suited to it.

1257. The printed κακίον' is an elided form of κακίονα, worse, referring to the nature that fares badly. The apparatus distinguishes it from the manuscript's κακίων and the separate Platonic text's adverb κάκιον. The printed comparative is retained.

1258. Νεανική here means vigorous, in contrast to the inferior or weak nature. The argument connects exceptional wickedness with strong natural gifts corrupted by upbringing, rather than making such gifts sufficient for goodness.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐν ταὐτῷ II.31.110h

Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή.

Νόμων ς′ II.31.110i

Παντὸς φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὁρμηθεῖσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον τῶν τε ἄλλων φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἡμέρων καὶ ἀγρίων <καὶ ἀνθρώπων>· ἄνθρωπος δέ, ὥς φαμεν, ἥμερον, ὅμως μὴν παιδείας μὲν ὀρθῆς τυχὸν καὶ φύσεως εὐτυχοῦς θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῷον γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφὲν ἀγριώτατον ὁπόσα φύει γῆ.

Ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου II.31.110k

Ὡς δή τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημεῖον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

In the same work

II.31.110h

You see, then, that we were not right in saying that even the very elements of a philosophical nature, when badly nurtured, are in a way causes of falling away from the pursuit, as are the so-called goods—wealth and all such resources.[1259]

Laws VI

II.31.110i

Every growing thing's first growth, if well directed toward the excellence of its own nature, is most decisive in bringing it to its proper completion—other plants, domestic and wild animals, <and human beings> alike.[1260] The human being, as we say, is tame; yet, with right education and a fortunate natural endowment, it tends to become the most divine and tamest of creatures, but if inadequately or badly reared, the wildest of all that the earth produces.[1261]

From the Timaeus

II.31.110k

Indeed, as the saying goes, what we learn in childhood leaves a remarkable trace in memory.[1262]

1259. Republic VI.495A. The same-work heading is not supplied. Wachsmuth prints οὐ καλῶς, not rightly; this negative reading is retained, despite its tension with the preceding argument. Τροφή is nurture, continuing the earlier comparison with growing things. The pursuit is philosophy. The excerpt does not enumerate the elements of the philosophical nature.

1260. Laws VI.765E–766A. The work-only heading continues Plato. Ἀρετή is the excellence proper to the living thing's nature; τέλος is its fitting completion. Wachsmuth supplies καὶ ἀνθρώπων, and human beings, from Plato; the English mirrors the supplement.

1261. The contrast between tame and wild develops the comparison with other living things. Right education and a fortunate nature are joined, and φιλεῖ means tends to or is apt to, rather than guaranteeing the outcome. The alternative is inadequate or bad rearing.

1262. Timaeus 26B. The work-only heading continues Plato. Μνημεῖον is a reminder or memorial; trace in memory conveys the image of learning that leaves a lasting mark. The source lettering passes directly from 110i to 110k: no excerpt 110j has been omitted from this translation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Νόμων α′> II.31.110l

Λέγω δὴ καὶ φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν δεῖν παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσι.

Πολιτείας ζ′ II.31.110m

Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μανθάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἧττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110n

Ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν· μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Laws I> II.31.110l

I say and maintain that anyone who is going to be good at anything must practice that very thing right from childhood, both in play and in earnest, in the particulars appropriate to the task.[1263]

Republic VII II.31.110m

For we must not believe Solon that one can learn many things as one grows old; one is less able to do so than to run. Great and numerous labors are all for the young.[1264]

<In the same work> II.31.110n

The beginning is the greatest part of any work, especially with anything young and tender. For then, above all, molding takes place and a pattern is impressed—whatever one wishes to stamp on each individual.[1265]

1263. Laws I.643B. The supplied work-and-book heading continues Plato. With ὁτιοῦν, anything, ἀγαθός concerns being good at a pursuit; it is not restricted here to moral virtue. Παίζοντα and σπουδάζοντα join play with serious application. The excerpt does not specify particular crafts or exercises.

1264. Republic VII.536D. The work-and-book heading continues Plato. The view attributed to Solon is reported indirectly, rather than as a separate verse quotation. The comparative with running is retained; πολλοί describes numerous labors. This is the excerpt's claim about age and effort, not a general editorial judgment about older learners.

1265. Republic II.377A–B. The same-work heading is supplied; it does not repeat the preceding excerpt's book number. Πλάττεται and ἐνσημήνασθαι evoke molding and stamping soft material. Τύπος is the pattern or impression imparted to each individual. The image emphasizes the formative importance of beginnings.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110o

Κινδυνεύει γοῦν ἐκ τῆς παιδείας, ὅποι ἄν τις ὁρμήσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τὸ ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ;

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<In the same work>

II.31.110o

It seems likely, then, that whatever direction one takes in education, what follows will be of the same kind. Or does not like always call forth like?[1266]

1266. Republic IV.425B–C. The same-work heading is supplied. Κινδυνεύει qualifies the claim as seeming likely; ὅποι gives the direction taken. The printed text repeats τὸ ὅμοιον, like, without the additional word found in the separate Platonic text. No extra wording has been inserted here.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας ζ′ II.31.110p

Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, ὦ ἄριστε, εἶπον τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ’ ᾖς καθορᾶν, ἐφ’ ᾧ ἕκαστος πέφυκε.

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110q

Πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ ὁ πόνος αὐταῖς, ἴδιος ἀλλ’ οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος.

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110r

Εἷς ἕκαστος ἓν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δὲ οὔ· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν, ὥστ’ εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic VII

II.31.110p

"Then, my good friend," I said, "bring children up in their studies through play, instead of by force, so that you may better see what each is naturally suited for."[1267]

<In the same work>

II.31.110q

For souls lose heart far more in demanding studies than in physical training: the effort is more their own, being theirs alone, rather than shared with the body.[1268]

<In the same work>

II.31.110r

Each person could practice one pursuit well, but not many; if he tried to take up many, he would fail to attain distinction in any of them.[1269]

1267. Republic VII.536E. The work-and-book heading continues Plato. The narrator's I said is part of the excerpt. Play is connected with discerning each child's natural aptitude: πέφυκε concerns what the individual is naturally fitted to do.

1268. Republic VII.535B. The supplied same-work heading continues the Republic. Ἰσχυροῖς describes strong or demanding studies. The distinction concerns labor proper to the soul, as against labor it shares with the body; the whole explanation is retained.

1269. Republic III.394E. The supplied heading refers to the same work, with the reference now in Book III. The potential forms are rendered could and would. The final phrase concerns becoming ἐλλόγιμος, distinguished or held in regard in a pursuit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Νόμων ζ′

II.31.110s

Ἄνευ ποιμένος δὲ οὔτε πρόβατα οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν πω βιωτέον, οὐδὲ δὴ παῖδας ἄνευ τινῶν παιδαγωγῶν οὐδὲ δούλους ἄνευ δεσποτῶν. ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμὺ καὶ ὑβριστότατον θηρίον γίγνεται· διὸ πολλοῖς αὐτὸ οἷον χαλινοῖς τισι δεῖ δεσμεύειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Laws VII

II.31.110s

Without a shepherd, neither sheep nor any other creature at all should live; nor children without some attendants, nor slaves without masters.[1270] The child is the hardest of all beasts to manage. Since it possesses in the highest degree a source of understanding that is not yet ordered, it becomes a scheming, shrewd and exceedingly insolent beast. That is why it must be bound, as it were, with many bridles.[1271]

1270. Laws VII.808D. The work-and-book heading is not supplied. Παιδαγωγοί are guides or attendants responsible for children. The comparison uses ancient relations of household authority as a model for supervision, explicitly including enslaved people and masters.

1271. The capacity for understanding is pictured as a spring or source not yet put in order. The bridles are an explicit simile, marked by οἷον, as it were; the image calls for multiple restraints.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110t

Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς τήν γε ὀρθὴν πάντως δεῖ τροφὴν φαίνεσθαι δυναμένην ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἐργάζεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηταί που. — Τί μήν; — Σώματα δὲ κάλλιστα, οἶμαι, τό γε ἁπλούστατον, ὡς ὀρθότατα δεῖ νέων ὄντων εὐθὺς φύεσθαι τῶν παίδων. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ἐννοοῦμεν, ὡς ἡ πρώτη βλάστη παντὸς ζῴου πολὺ μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη φύεται, ὥστε καὶ ἔριν πολλοῖς παρέσχηκε μὴ γίγνεσθαι τά γ' ἀνθρώπινα μήκη διπλάσια ἀπὸ πέντε ἐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν αὐξανόμενα; — Ἀληθῆ. — Τί οὖν; πολλὴ αὔξη ὅταν ἐπιρρέῃ πόνων χωρὶς πολλῶν καὶ συμμέτρων, οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι μυρία κακὰ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀποτελεῖ; — Καὶ πάνυ γε. — Οὐκοῦν τότε δεῖται πλείστων πόνων, ὅταν ἡ πλείστη τροφὴ προσγίγνηται τοῖς σώμασιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<In the same work> II.31.110t

Then I suppose it has been rightly said that proper nurture must in every case be seen to be capable of making bodies and souls as beautiful and good as possible. — Of course. — As for making bodies most beautiful, the simplest point, I think, is that children must grow as straight as possible from their earliest years. — Yes, indeed.[1272]

And what of this? Do we not realize that every living thing's first growth is by far its greatest and most abundant—so much so that it has even given many cause for dispute that human stature does not double as it increases during the twenty remaining years after age five? — True.[1273]

What, then? When great growth comes without numerous and proportionate exertions, do we not know that it produces countless evils in the body? — Most certainly. — Then bodies need the most exertion when they receive the most nourishment.[1274]

1272. Laws VII.788C–789A. The same-work heading is supplied and continues Plato. Τροφή is nurture, including nourishment. The elliptical σώματα δὲ κάλλιστα, bodies most beautiful, is connected in English with the preceding making. The following ὡς ὀρθότατα concerns children growing as straight as possible.

1273. The printed ἔριν means dispute. The negative μὴ γίγνεσθαι is retained: human stature does not become double during the twenty years following age five. This is the growth comparison stated in the dialogue, contrasting that later increase with the initial growth of living things.

1274. Πόνοι are exertions or labors; the earlier phrase requires them to be both numerous and proportionate, σύμμετροι. The conclusion connects the greatest nourishment with the greatest exertion. The replies and the comparative claims remain part of the excerpt's dialogue.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110u

Ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐστι τρία μαθήματα, λογισμοὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἓν μάθημα, μετρητικὴ δὲ μήκους καὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ βάθους ὡς ἓν αὖ δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων περιόδου πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς πέφυκε πορεύεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα, οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχόμενα δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλά τινας ὀλίγους· οὓς δὲ, προϊόντες ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει φράσομεν. οὕτω γὰρ πρέπον ἂν εἴη· τῷ δὲ πλήθει ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα . . . ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτος παροιμιασάμενος εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀνάγκῃ μή ποτε φανῇ μαχόμενος, ὅσαι θεῖαί γε, οἶμαι, τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰσιν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ βλέποντες λέγουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὗτος πάντων <τῶν> λόγων εὐηθέστατός ἐστι μακρῷ. — Τίνες οὖν, ὦ ξένε, αἱ μὴ τοιαῦται ἀνάγκαι τῶν μαθημάτων, θεῖαι δέ; — Δοκῶ μέν, ἃς μή τις πράξας μηδὲ αὖ μαθὼν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἐν ἀνθρώποις θεὸς οὐδὲ δαίμων οὐδὲ ἥρως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<In the same work> II.31.110u

Three further subjects, then, belong to free people. Calculation and the study of numbers form one; measuring length, surface and depth, a second; and third, the circuit of the stars—how they naturally travel in relation to one another. The majority must not labor at all these in their precise form, but a certain few; which people, we shall specify when we reach the end. That would be fitting. For the majority, as much of them as is necessary . . .[1275]

But it seems that whoever first framed the proverb about god had these matters in view when he said that not even a god would ever be seen fighting necessity—at least, I think, those necessities that are divine. For as regards human necessities, which most people have in view when they say such a thing, this is by far the most foolish of all sayings.[1276]

— What, then, stranger, are the necessities of these studies that are not of that sort, but divine? —

I think that no one, without having practiced and learned these things, could ever become a god, a divine spirit or a hero among human beings.[1277]

1275. Laws VII.817E–818C. The supplied same-work heading continues Plato. Free people marks ancient social status. The distinction concerns exact study by a few and what is necessary for the majority. The future cross-reference belongs to the quoted discussion. The dots mark an omission in the source excerpt; nothing has been inserted.

1276. Wachsmuth supplies τῶν, an article before λόγων; English needs no separate word for it. Printed πάντων already means all. The proverb is restricted here to divine necessities; its application to human necessities is rejected as foolish. The person who first framed it is not named in the excerpt.

1277. The answer retains Δοκῶ, I think, and both practice and learning. Δαίμων is rendered divine spirit, distinct from god and hero. Denying such an outcome without these studies does not assert that studying them is sufficient to attain it.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας β′

II.31.110v.1

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὑρημένης; ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μουσική. — Ἔστι γάρ. — Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρχόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ; — Πῶς δ’ οὔ; — Μουσικῆς δ’, εἶπον, τίθης λόγους ἢ οὔ; — Ἔγωγε. — Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δὲ θάτερον; — Ναί. — Παιδευτέον δ’ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; — Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. — Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθές. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα. — Ἔστι ταῦτα. — Τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἁπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς. — Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic II

II.31.110v.1

What, then, is the education to be? Or is it hard to find a better one than that discovered over so long a time? I suppose it consists of physical training for the body and music for the soul. — Indeed. — Then do we not begin educating with music before physical training? — How could we not? — Do you include accounts in music, I said, or not? — I do. — And do accounts have two forms, one true, the other false? — Yes. — Must we educate in both kinds, but in false ones first? — I do not understand, he said, what you mean.

— Do you not understand, I said, that we first tell children stories? This is, I suppose, generally speaking false, but there is truth in it too. We use stories with children before physical training. — That is so. — This is what I meant: we must take up music before physical training. — Right, he said.[1278]

1278. Republic II.376E–377D. Μουσική covers music and poetic or literary cultivation, here including stories. The claim of falsehood is qualified as generally speaking, with truth also present. The numerical subdivisions and continued label serve layout only.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας β′ — συνέχεια

II.31.110v.2

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν· μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ. — Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. —Ἆρ’ οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἃς ἐπειδὰν τελειωθῶσιν ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; — Οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν. — Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ’ ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον· τοὺς δ’ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν· ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic II continued

II.31.110v.2

Then you know that the beginning is the greatest part of any work, especially with anything young and tender. For then, above all, molding takes place and a pattern is impressed—whatever one wishes to stamp on each individual. — Most certainly.[1279]

Then shall we so readily let children hear whatever stories anyone happens to invent and take into their souls beliefs mostly contrary to those we shall think they ought to hold once they are grown? — We certainly shall not allow it. — First, then, we must, it seems, supervise the makers of stories, approving any good story they make and rejecting any that is not good. We shall persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved stories to children and to shape their souls with stories far more than their bodies with their hands. Most of the stories they now tell must be thrown out.[1280]

1279. The beginnings-and-stamping passage repeats II.31.110n in the printed anthology. Τύπος is a pattern or impression, and the verbs evoke shaping and stamping soft material. The repetition is retained within this longer dialogue.

1280. Μυθοποιοί are makers of stories. Approval and rejection concern the tales, which nurses and mothers are then to use in shaping souls. Τοὺς πολλούς calls for rejecting most of the tales currently told.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ> II.31.110w

Ἀλλ’ εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, <ὡς> οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ’ ἔστι τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον λεκτέα πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς ἃ καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρὸς μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμύνειν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτε ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ μή, ἀλλ’ <ἃ> ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτον ἀκούουσιν, ὅ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν. — Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

<In the same work>

II.31.110w

But if we are somehow to persuade them <that> no citizen has ever been at enmity with another and that this is not holy, then these, rather, are the kinds of things children should be told from the outset by old men and old women; and as they grow older, the poets must be compelled to compose stories close to these.[1281]

Hera's being bound by her son, Hephaestus's being hurled down by his father when he was about to defend his mother as she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has composed must not be admitted into the city, whether composed with underlying meanings or without them.[1282]

For the young person cannot judge what is an underlying meaning and what is not. But <whatever> beliefs he takes in at that age tend to become hard to wash away and unalterable. For these reasons, perhaps, we should make it our chief concern that the first stories they hear are told as beautifully as possible with a view to virtue. — That does make sense, he said.[1283]

1281. Republic II.378C–E. The supplied same-work heading continues Plato's Republic II. Wachsmuth also supplies ὡς (that) in the opening sentence and ἃ (whatever) later; both supplements are marked in Greek and English. The opening's compressed dative sequence is interpreted as old men and old women telling the tales, with the children growing older as their later audience. The dialogue concerns the city's future guardians.

1282. The examples concern violence within the divine family and warfare among gods. Hephaestus is Hera's son; Zeus is the father who hurls him down. Ὑπόνοια is an underlying or hidden meaning, here the kind of interpretation often called allegorical. The objection is that young hearers cannot reliably distinguish this meaning from the story's surface.

1283. The image δυσέκνιπτα means difficult to wash out. Φιλεῖ expresses a tendency, while ἴσως qualifies the educational conclusion as perhaps; neither qualification is dropped. The passage continues the preceding excerpt's concern with stories that shape early beliefs.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας γ′

II.31.110x

Μετὰ μουσικὴν γυμναστικῇ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι. — Τί μήν; — Δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀκριβῶς τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παίδων διὰ βίου· ἔχει δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὧδε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστὸν ᾖ σῶμα, τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐμποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὑτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον· σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται; — Καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτως, ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι . . . .

Ἐν ταὐτῷ

II.31.110y

Οὐδὲν δὲ δέοι ἂν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἦθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; — Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ’ ὅς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic III

II.31.110x

After music, young men must be nurtured through physical training. — Of course. — They must indeed be carefully nurtured in this way too, from childhood throughout life. But it is somewhat like this, I think; consider it yourself as well. For it does not seem to me that a body in good condition instills goodness in the soul by its own excellence; rather, the reverse: a good soul by its own excellence provides a body as good as possible.[1284] How does it seem to you? — The same to me, he said. — Then if, after adequately caring for the mind, we were to entrust it with settling the details concerning the body . . . .[1285]

In the same work

II.31.110y

They would need to do or imitate nothing else but what befits them, right from childhood: brave, temperate, pious, free people, and everything of that kind.[1286] They should neither do what is servile nor become skilled in imitating it, nor anything else shameful, lest imitation lead them to become what they imitate. Or have you not noticed that imitations, if kept up for a long time from youth, settle into character and nature, in body, voice and thought? — Very much so, he said.[1287]

1284. Republic III.403C. The work-and-book heading continues Plato. Ἀρετή is excellence, applied here to body and soul. The local ἐμποιεῖν is rendered instilling goodness in the soul; the comparison reverses the proposed direction of influence.

1285. The four dots mark an omission in the printed anthology, leaving the conditional unfinished. The mind is to settle the details concerning the body; no missing conclusion is supplied.

1286. Republic III.395C–D. The same-work heading is not supplied. The opening moves from things befitting them to adjectives describing people as models for imitation; its compressed construction is retained. Free and servile join the language of social status with that of conduct.

1287. Τοῦ εἶναι, of being, contrasts actual character with performed imitation. The local ἀπολαύωσιν is retained. The next question describes sustained imitation becoming ἤθη, character or dispositions, and φύσις, nature, extending to body, voice and thought.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πολιτείας ζ′

II.31.110z

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους. — Τί δή; — Ὅτι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα. — Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. — Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ’ ᾖς καθορᾶν, ἐφ’ ᾧ ἕκαστος πέφυκε.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Republic VII

II.31.110z

Then calculation, geometry and all the education preparatory to dialectic must be set before them while they are children, without making the teaching take the form of compulsory learning. — Why? — Because, I said, a free person should learn no subject under slavish constraint. For bodily exertions, even when performed by force, do not make the body any worse; but no lesson forced upon the soul remains in it. — True, he said.[1288]

"Then," I said, "my good friend, bring children up in their studies through play, instead of by force, so that you may better see what each is naturally suited for."[1289]

1288. Republic VII.536D–E. Προπαιδεία is preparatory education, here preceding dialectic. Δουλεία literally means slavery, supplying the social image behind slavish constraint and its contrast with the free learner. The bodily and mental effects of forced exertion are distinguished.

1289. The closing play passage repeats II.31.110p in the source. Here εἶπον precedes ὦ ἄριστε; I said is placed accordingly in English. The repetition is retained, linking the teaching method with discerning each child's natural aptitude.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.111

Ξενοκράτης, ὁπότε τις αὐτῷ σχολάζειν ἤθελεν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων μετειληφώς, «ἄπιθι», εἶπε, «λαβὰς οὐκ ἔχεις πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν· δεῖ γὰρ προμεμαλάχθαι διὰ τούτων τὴν ψυχήν».

II.31.112

Ἰσοκράτης τοῖς μαθηταῖς παρεκελεύετο μὴ πραγματολογεῖν ἀλλὰ <τὰ> πράγματα παρέχειν τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.

II.31.113

Ἀγησίλαος ἐρωτηθείς, τίνα χρὴ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους παῖδας ἐκμανθάνειν, «ἃ αἰσχρόν», ἔφη, «γέροντας μὴ εἰδέναι».

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

II.31.111

Whenever someone who had received none of the general studies wished to study with Xenocrates, he said, “Go away: you have no handles for philosophy. The soul must first have been softened through these studies.”[1290]

II.31.112

Isocrates urged his pupils not to talk about matters, but to put <the> matters themselves before their hearers.[1291]

II.31.113

Asked what free boys ought to learn thoroughly, Agesilaus said, “Things it is shameful not to know in old age.”[1292]

1290. Ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα are general studies, here preparatory to philosophy; no fixed list is given. Λαβαί evokes grips in wrestling, picturing preparatory studies as grips or means of access to philosophy. Προμεμαλάχθαι adds prior softening or working of the soul. Xenocrates is named within the narrative, without a separate heading.

1291. The English follows the literal play between talking about matters and providing them; the precise point is compressed. Πράγματα παρέχειν can also mean causing trouble. Usener supplies τὰ, the, which is visibly marked in English. Isocrates is named within the text.

1292. Ἐλευθέρους means free in social status. The answer measures childhood education by knowledge that would still be expected in old age. No particular curriculum or occasion is specified in this unheaded anecdote.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου II.31.114

Παρ’ Εὐκλείδῃ τις ἀρξάμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον θεώρημα ἔμαθεν, ἤρετο τὸν Εὐκλείδην· «τί δέ μοι πλέον ἔσται ταῦτα μαθόντι;», καὶ ὁ Εὐκλείδης τὸν παῖδα καλέσας «δός», ἔφη, «αὐτῷ τριώβολον, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐξ ὧν μανθάνει κερδαίνειν».

II.31.115

Μέναιχμον τὸν γεωμέτρην Ἀλέξανδρος ἠξίου συντόμως αὐτῷ παραδοῦναι τὴν γεωμετρίαν· ὁ δὲ «ὦ βασιλεῦ», εἶπε, «κατὰ μὲν τὴν χώραν ὁδοί εἰσιν ἰδιωτικαὶ καὶ βασιλικαί, ἐν δὲ τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ πᾶσίν ἐστιν ὁδὸς μία».

Ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου II.31.116

Ἡράκλειτος μὲν ἔλεγε πολυμάθειαν νοῦν μὴ ἐμποιεῖν· Ἀνάξαρχος δὲ πολυμάθειαν κάρτα μὲν ὠφελεῖν, κάρτα δὲ βλάπτειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From Serenus

II.31.114

Someone who had begun studying geometry with Euclid, after learning the first theorem, asked him, “What more will I gain from learning these things?” Euclid called the boy and said,[1293] “Give him three obols, since he must make a profit from what he learns.”[1294]

II.31.115

Alexander asked the geometer Menaechmus to teach him geometry concisely. “O king,” he said, “across the country there are ordinary and royal roads, but in geometry there is one road for everyone.”[1295]

From Serenus

II.31.116

Heraclitus used to say that much learning does not instill understanding.[1296] Anaxarchus, however, said that much learning greatly benefits, but also greatly harms.[1297]

1293. The heading cites material under Serenus’s name without specifying a work or further identifying the author. The boy called to make the payment is apparently an attendant; the text gives no name or explicit status.

1294. Τριώβολον is a payment of three obols, a denomination of Greek currency. The reply turns the pupil’s demand for advantage into a literal cash profit.

1295. This anecdote has no separate author heading. It names Menaechmus and Alexander; the apparatus compares a similar Euclid story without replacing those names. Roads for ordinary people and for royalty provide the contrast with geometry’s single shared route.

1296. The heading prints Σερήνου, Serenus; the apparatus credits Meineke with correcting the manuscript’s Σερίνου. The parenthetical Bywater fragment reference printed beside Heraclitus’s name is a modern editorial reference and is not part of the quoted saying.

1297. Πολυμάθεια is extensive learning, while νοῦς is understanding or intelligence. The two sayings are juxtaposed: Anaxarchus gives learning both beneficial and harmful effects, without specifying the conditions for either.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἰαμβλίχου Εὐσταθίῳ περὶ μουσικῆς

II.31.117

. . . . <ἓ>ν ἐκεῖνο εἰδότας, ὡς αἵ τε μεγάλαι φύσεις τὰ μεγάλα κακὰ γεννῶσι διαφθαρεῖσαι καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντως ἐστὶ βλαβερώτατα ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν ῥέψαντα.

II.31.118

Γεωμέτρης τις τὸν Διογένην ἀπαίδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ ἐκάλει· ὁ δὲ «συγγίνωσκέ μοι», ἔφη, «μὴ μαθόντι ἃ μηδὲ Χείρων τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐδίδαξε [τουτέστι γεωμετρεῖν]».

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου Πυθαγορικῶν ἀποφάσεων

II.31.119

Ἔφασκον δὲ καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις πάσας τῶν τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἑκουσίους ὀρθάς τε εἶναι καὶ εἰς τέλος ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ ἀκουσίους φαύλους τε καὶ ἀτελεῖς γίνεσθαι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Iamblichus, to Eustathius, On Music

II.31.117

. . . . knowing this <one> thing: that great natures produce great evils when corrupted,[1298] and even the best pursuits are certainly most harmful when they turn toward evil.[1299]

II.31.118

A certain geometer called Diogenes uneducated and ignorant. “Forgive me,” he said, “for not having learned what not even Chiron taught Achilles.”[1300]

From Aristoxenus’s Pythagorean Sayings

II.31.119

They also used to say that, in all study of the sciences and the arts, voluntary learning is sound and reaches its goal, while involuntary learning proves poor and incomplete.[1301]

1298. The four opening dots mark omitted material. Only ἔ is supplied in <ἔ>ν, one; the English marks the complete word. The participle εἰδότας, knowing, remains dependent on the omitted context.

1299. Φύσεις refers to natural constitutions or endowments. Ἐπιτηδεύματα are pursuits or practices; their excellence does not prevent harm when they turn toward evil. The text connects corruption with the great natures, and the turn toward evil with the pursuits.

1300. The narrative has no separate author heading. The bracketed τουτέστι γεωμετρεῖν, that is, to do geometry, is rejected by Meineke and omitted from the English. The reply invokes Chiron as Achilles’ teacher while challenging the geometer’s measure of education.

1301. The heading presents these as Pythagorean sayings; the plural they belongs to the excerpted account. Ἑκούσιος and ἀκούσιος contrast willing and unwilling learning. Τέλος, goal or completion, and ἀτελής, incomplete, link the contrast to whether the study reaches its end.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ παιδεύσεως ἠθικῆς

II.31.120.1

Φιλοσοφίαν φαντὶ ὄρεξιν εἶμεν τῶ ἀναλαμβάνεν ἢ συνέχεν αὔταυτον ἐν ἀρετᾷ πρακτικᾷ καττὰν ἔφεσιν τᾶς σοφίας δι’ αὐταύταν· ταύτας δ’ ἀρχὰν μὲν τὰν φύσιν προειδέμεν, μέσα δὲ τὰν ἄσκησιν, τέρμα δὲ τὰν εἴδησιν φέρεν. Εὐτυχὲς μὲν ὦν εἶμεν φῦναι εὖ, τραφῆμέν τε καὶ ἀχθῆμεν καττὸν ὀρθὸν νόμον καθομόλογά τε τᾷ φύσι ἔθεα· δεῖ δ’ ἀσκηθῆμεν ὑπό τε γενέτορας ἢ ἐπιτρόπως, παιδευτάς τε σώφρονας γενέσθαι· καλὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ποτιτάσσεν τὰ ἄριστα, μηδὲ ποτιδέεσθαι ἀνάγκας, εὐπειθέα δ’ εἶμεν τοῖς ὑφαγεομένοις τὰ ἄριστα ποτὶ πρᾶξιν καὶ εἴδησιν· ταὶ γὰρ εὐφυΐαι καὶ ταὶ καλαὶ τροφαὶ πολλάκις φθάνοντι τὰς διδασκαλίας ἐς ὀρθότατα ἄγοισαι, ἀποδέοντι δὲ μόνον λόγω ἀγεμόνος, τὸν ἐντίθητι ἐπιστάμα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 229-230

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas the Pythagorean, On Moral Education

II.31.120.1

They say philosophy is a desire to establish or maintain oneself in practical virtue, in pursuit of wisdom for its own sake.[1302] Nature is its beginning, practice its middle, and knowledge its end.[1303] It is fortunate, then, to be naturally well endowed, and to be reared and guided by right law and habits in accord with nature. One must be trained under parents or guardians, and the teachers must be temperate. But it is good to prescribe the best things for oneself without needing compulsion, and to obey those who guide one toward the best things in action and knowledge. For natural gifts and good upbringing often anticipate instruction, leading toward what is most correct; they lack only reason as a guide, which knowledge instills.[1304]

1302. The attribution and title follow the heading. Wachsmuth's apparatus describes this as a Neopythagorean work; the Doric wording does not by itself establish authorship by the historical Archytas. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1303. Nature, practice and knowledge form the stated beginning, middle and end. The verb printed προειδέμεν is difficult; the apparatus offers several repairs. The English gives the sequence without silently adopting one.

1304. The final clause makes knowledge, ἐπιστάμα, the source of reason's guidance. Natural gifts and upbringing can precede instruction, but they still need that guide. The relative τὸν refers to the guide being instilled.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 229-230

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα — συνέχεια

II.31.120.2

Δύο μὲν ὦν ἔντι βίοι ἀντίπαλοι, τοὶ τῶν πρατήων ἀντιποιεύμενοι, πρακτικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος· πολὺ δὲ κάρρων δοκέει εἶμεν ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων κεκραμένος ποτὶ καιρὼς τὼς ἁρμόδδοντας συντεταγμένος καθ' ἑκατέραν διέξοδον. Γεγόναμες γὰρ ποτ' ἐνέργειαν νοεράν, ἂν καλέομες πρᾶξιν· τᾶς δὲ διανοίας ἁ μὲν πρακτικὰ ἐπὶ τὰν πολιτικὰν φέρεται, ἁ δὲ ἐπισταμονικὰ ἐπὶ τὰν θέαν τῶν συμπάντων, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ καθόλω νόος ταύτας τὰς δύο δυνάμιας ἀμπέχων ἐπὶ τὰν εὐδαιμονίαν, τὰν φαμὲς ἐνέργειαν ἀρετᾶς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ εἶμεν, οὔτε πρακτικὰν ἔασαν μόνον ὥστε καὶ μὴ τὰν ἐπιστάμαν περιέχεν, οὔτε θεωρητικὰν ὡς ἄπρακτον εἶμεν· ἁ γὰρ τέλειος διάνοια ποτὶ δύο ἀρχὰς ἐπικρατέας ῥέπει, ποθ' ἃς καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πέφυκε, τάν τε κοινωνικὰν καὶ τὰν εἰδημονικάν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ κατὰ τοίας ἀντιλήψιας δοκέοντι ἀντιθλίβεν ἀλλάλας ταὶ ἀγωγαί (ταὶ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικαὶ ἀφέλκοισαι τᾶς θεωρίας, ταὶ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ ἀπὸ τᾶς πολιτείας μετάγοισαι ἐς ἀσυχίαν), ἀλλ' ὦν τὰ πέρατα συναψαμένα ἁ φύσις ἀπέδειξεν ἐν τωυτῷ ἀνωμένα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιπαθέες ἔντι ταὶ ἀρεταί, ἀλλ' ἁρμονίας ἁπάσας συμφωνότεραι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 230-231

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas continued

II.31.120.2

There are, then, two rival lives, competing for primacy: the practical and the philosophical. A life blended from both, arranged along each course for suitable occasions, seems much better.[1305] We were born for intellectual activity, which we call action. Of thought, the practical part turns toward civic life, the part concerned with knowledge toward contemplation of all things. Intellect as a whole, encompassing these two powers, aims at happiness—which we say is the activity of virtue amid good fortune—allowing it neither to be solely practical and so exclude knowledge, nor contemplative and so inactive.[1306] For complete thought inclines toward two governing principles for which the human being is naturally fitted: the social and the knowing. Even if the ways of life answering to such conceptions seem to crowd each other out (civic pursuits drawing one away from contemplation, contemplative pursuits leading from civic life into quiet), nature has brought their ends together and shown them realized together. For the virtues are not mutually opposed, but more concordant than any harmony.[1307]

1305. The practical and philosophical lives compete for precedence. The proposed blend gives each its fitting occasions; it does not simply identify them. Πρᾶξις is then used broadly enough to include intellectual activity.

1306. Εὐδαιμονία is happiness or flourishing, distinguished here from εὐτυχία, good fortune. The compressed passage joins action and knowledge within that happiness, rather than excluding either.

1307. The closing comparison makes the virtues mutually consonant. Even where civic and contemplative pursuits compete for time or attention, the argument presents their fulfillment as compatible.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 230-231

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα — συνέχεια II.31.120.3

Αἰ δὲ κά τις ἐκ νέου ὁρμαθεὶς αὐτὸς ἁρμόσδηται ἐς τὰς ἀρχὰς τᾶν ἀρετᾶν καὶ τὸν θεῖον νόμον τᾶς τῶ κόσμω ἁρμονίας, εὔροον βίον διεξαξεῖ· αἰ δὲ κα αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν πλαζόμενος τύχῃ ἀγεμόνων καρρόνων, ἀπευθύνεν τὸν δρόμον δυνασεῖται ποτὶ μακαριότατα, ὥσπερ τοὶ ἀτυχέοντες ἐν πλόῳ ἀνύοντι τὰν θάλασσαν διὰ τᾶς κυβερνατικᾶς <τᾶς> εὐπλοίας ἐφιέμενοι, ὅπερ ἐν βίῳ τᾶς εὐδαιμονίας. Αἰ δὲ μήτ᾽ αὐτὸς νοέοι τὰ ποτίφορα, μήτ᾽ ἐπιτρόπων τύχοι ἐμφρόνων, οὐδὲν ὄφελος χοραγίας ἀφθόνω· ἀφροσύνα γάρ, αἰ καὶ ἐς τἆλλα εὐτυχεῖ, κακοδαίμων ἐσαεὶ ἐστιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 231

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas continued

II.31.120.3

If someone sets out from youth and brings himself into harmony with the principles of the virtues and the divine law of the cosmos's harmony, he will lead a smooth-flowing life. If, while straying on his own, he happens upon better guides, he will be able to straighten his course toward the greatest happiness.[1308] So those who meet with misfortune on a voyage cross the sea through the navigator's art, seeking <the> successful passage, which in life corresponds to happiness.[1309] But if he neither understands for himself what is conducive to this nor finds wise guardians, abundant resources are of no use. For folly, even if fortunate in other respects, is always unhappy.[1310]

1308. The Doric ἁρμόσδηται means brings himself into harmony. The principles of the virtues are joined to the cosmic harmony's divine law; εὔροον, smooth-flowing, carries this order into the description of a life. Τύχῃ with the genitive means happens upon better guides.

1309. Wachsmuth supplies <τᾶς> before εὐπλοίας; the English marks the corresponding article. The navigator's skill directs an adverse voyage toward successful passage, the comparison's counterpart to happiness in life.

1310. Χορᾱγία is provision or material resources. The closing sentence makes folly itself the subject: even favorable circumstances cannot make it happy. The text distinguishes being fortunate, εὐτυχεῖ, from happiness, εὐδαιμονία.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα — συνέχεια

II.31.120.4

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν ἅπαντι πρᾶτον ἀνάγκα σκοπᾶν μὲν τὸ τέλος (τοῦτο γὰρ ποιέοντι κυβερνᾶται μὲν λιμένα [νεὼς] ἐς ὃν καταχθήσονται προτιθέμενοι, ἀνίοχοι δὲ τέρμα δρόμω, τοξόται δὲ καὶ σφενδονᾶται σκοπόν, ποθ’ ὃν παντᾷ ἁρμόσδονται), ἀνάγκα καὶ τᾷ ἀρετᾷ προκέσθαι τινα ὥσπερ τέχνᾳ τῶ βίω σκοπὸν ἢ πρόθεσιν, ταῦτα γὰρ ὀνυμαίνω καθ’ ἑκατέρων· τοῦτο δὲ φαμὶ εἶμεν τῶν μὲν πρακτικῶν τὸ κράτιστον, <τῶν δὲ ἐπισταμονικῶν τὸ σοφώτατον>, τῶ δὲ βίω τὸ τέληον ἀγαθόν, τὸ λέγοντι <τοὶ> τἀνθρώπεια σοφοὶ εὐδαιμονίαν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas continued

II.31.120.4

Since in everything one must first consider the goal, as navigators do by setting before themselves the harbor where they will put in, charioteers the finish of a race, and archers and slingers a target toward which they make every adjustment,[1311] virtue too, as an art of life, must have some target or objective set before it; I use these names in either case. I say that this is what is best in practical matters, <what is wisest in matters of knowledge>, and the complete good of life, which <the> wise in human affairs call happiness.[1312]

1311. The repeated images give τέλος the sense of an end or goal: harbor, finish and target. The Greek retains [νεὼς], a ship-word Wachsmuth rejects as a duplication; the English omits it. The following σκοπός and πρόθεσις name a target or purpose for the art of living.

1312. The entire clause <τῶν δὲ ἐπισταμονικῶν τὸ σοφώτατον> is Wachsmuth's supplement, balancing practical matters with matters of knowledge. He also supplies <τοὶ>, the, before the wise. Both supplements are marked. The complete good of life is identified with εὐδαιμονία, happiness.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα — συνέχεια

II.31.120.5

Ταύταν δὲ οὔτε καττὰν ἀλάθειαν κρίνεν δύνανται τοὶ κακῶς ἔχοντες, οὔτε ἐλέσθαι ἰσχύοντι τοὶ μὴ ἐκδαλότατα ὀρέοντες αὐτάν· τίνοντι δὲ δίκας ἀφροσύνας τοὶ ἀδονᾷ τὸ ἄριστον διδόντες, κολάσδονται τοὶ τὰν ἀναλγησίαν πάντων προτιμέοντες, καθόλω δ’ εἰπέν, ἄγχονται ἐν κακᾷ ζάλᾳ τοὶ ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ σωμάτων ἢ ἐν ψυχᾶς ἀλόγῳ κατασκευᾷ ἀπολιπόντες τὰν εὐδαίμονα ζωάν. Οὐδὲ πολλὸν ἀπὸ τούτων εὐτυχέστεροί ἐντι τοὶ ἐξαίροντες μὲν τὸ καλόν, ὡς καττούτω τί μὴ λέγεν, ὁμότιμον δὲ αὐτῷ τὰν ἀδονὰν καὶ τὰν ἀναλγησίαν καὶ τὰς εὐπαθείας τὰς πράτας καὶ φυσικὰς καὶ ἀλόγως ὁρμὰς ἢ σώματος ἢ ψυχᾶς ἀντέχοντες· ἑκάτερα γὰρ ἀδικέοντι, τὰν μὲν ψυχικὰν ἀκρότατα καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτᾶς κατάγοντες ἐς ἰσότατα ποττὰν τοῦ σώματος τεληότατα, τὰν δὲ σωματικὰν εὐεξίαν ἐς ὕψος ἀντικαθιστάντες τᾷ ψυχικᾷ ἀδονᾷ· ἐνεμεσήθη δὲ καὶ ἁ φύσις καὶ τὸ θεῖον τᾷ τούτων διακράσι· οὐ γὰρ φυλάσσοντι τὰν ἀξίαν τῶ κάρρονος ποττὸ χεῖρον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas continued

II.31.120.5

Those in a bad condition cannot judge this truly, nor can those who do not see it very clearly choose it. Those who give pleasure first place pay the penalty of folly; those who prefer freedom from pain to everything are punished. In general, those who abandon the happy life in bodily comfort or an irrational condition of soul are choked in a cruel storm.[1313]

Not much more fortunate than these are those who exalt the noble [wording uncertain],[1314] but hold pleasure, freedom from pain, primary and natural pleasant states, and irrational impulses of body or soul to be of equal worth with it. For they wrong both: they bring the soul's eminence and its activities down to equality with the body's perfection, while raising bodily well-being to the same height as the soul's pleasure. Nature and the divine have also taken offense at their blending, for they do not preserve the worth of the better relative to the worse.[1315]

1313. This refers to happiness at the end of the preceding unit. Ἀναλγησία is absence of pain or insensibility to it; εὐπάθεια here concerns comfortable or pleasant conditions. The passage rejects treating these states as the highest good and continues the voyage image with a destructive storm.

1314. The English comment wording uncertain flags ὡς καττούτω τί μὴ λέγεν, retained unchanged in Greek. Wachsmuth reports that τί μὴ λέγεν seemed corrupt to Meineke. No secure translation of these intervening words is asserted; the contrast between exalting the noble and giving other states equal worth remains clear.

1315. The list of pleasant states and natural impulses is compressed in Greek, and its precise coordination is uncertain. Διακράσι describes their blending of these goods. Doric ἀκρότατα, ἰσότατα and τελητότατα correspond to eminence, equality and perfection. The text says soul's pleasure at the end of the comparison; it does not replace that phrase with virtue. Both body and soul are wronged by the resulting hierarchy.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἀρχύτα — συνέχεια

II.31.120.6

Ἀλλ’ ἀμὲς γε λέγομες σῶμα μὲν εἶμεν ψυχᾶς ὄργανον, νόον δὲ ἀγεμόνα τᾶς τε ἄλλας ψυχᾶς καὶ τῶ σκάνεος αὐτᾶς, τὰν δ’ ἐς τᾶλλα εὐτυχίαν φυσικὰν ὀργανικὰν τᾷ νοερᾷ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶμεν, αἴ κα παντελὴς δυνάμι τε καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ χοραγίᾳ ᾖ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Archytas continued

II.31.120.6

But we, for our part, say that the body is an instrument of the soul, and intellect the leader of the rest of the soul and of its bodily frame.[1316] Good fortune in other matters is naturally instrumental to intellectual activity, provided it is complete in power, time and resources.[1317]

1316. The Doric ἀμὲς λέγομες means we say. Σκᾶνος is the bodily frame. The image makes the body an instrument and intellect its leader, while also distinguishing intellect from the rest of the soul.

1317. The final αἴ κα clause is conditional, with an unstated subject. The English takes it to concern favorable circumstances complete in capacity, time and provision. Χορᾱγία again means resources or support. External good fortune serves intellectual activity as an instrument; it is not identified with happiness itself. This ends excerpt 120; the numbered subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἰερωνύμου II.31.121

Δεῦρο δὴ καὶ σκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον διειλήφασιν οἱ πατέρες· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις εὑρήσομεν αὐτοὺς οὐ μικρὰ διαφωνοῦντας· οἵτινες πρῶτον μὲν βαρβάροις παραβαλόντες <τοὺς παῖδας> παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τούτων ἀκούειν κελεύσαντες, ἱκανῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τοῦ κατὰ πόδας ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλῶς ἡγησομένου δεομένων τῶν παιδίων καὶ τοῦ φυλάττοντος καθάπερ συβώτου μὴ πλανηθῇ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ . . . διὸ καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐργατῶν ἀποδοκιμασθέντα, τοῦτον ἐπὶ παιδαγωγίᾳ κατατάττουσι, τὰ φύσει τιμιώτατα τοῖς εὐτελεστάτοις διδόντες· ὅθεν καὶ Περικλῆς, οἰκέτου ποτὲ πεσόντος ἀπὸ ἐλαίας καὶ τὸ σκέλος συντρίψαντος· «νέος ἄρα», ἔφη, «παιδαγωγὸς πέφηνεν», οὐκ ἀπιθάνως τῆς ὑπουργίας τὴν ἀτιμίαν σκώψας.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Hieronymus

II.31.121

Come, let us also consider how fathers have understood children's upbringing. For here too, as in the preceding matters, we shall find them seriously inconsistent.[1318] They first hand <the children> over to barbarian pedagogues and tell them to obey these men, and consider this adequate care.[1319] It is as though children needed someone to follow on their heels rather than lead them well, and someone to guard them like a swineherd against straying, rather than . . .[1320] That is why they assign a man rejected as a laborer to serve as a pedagogue, giving what is naturally most precious to those valued least. So, when a household slave once fell from an olive tree and broke his leg, Pericles said, "A new pedagogue has appeared, then." His mockery of the low esteem of this service was not without point.[1321]

1318. The heading names Hieronymus without identifying a work or giving further biographical details. The opening refers to preceding matters in the discussion, not to past generations.

1319. Βάρβαροι marks the attendants as non-Greek. A παιδαγωγός here supervises a child's conduct, rather than teaching a classroom subject. Wachsmuth supplies <τοὺς παῖδας>, <the children>.

1320. The follower–leader contrast concerns direction rather than mere physical custody. Three printed dots mark a gap after ἀλλ' οὐχὶ, rather than; the missing positive contrast is not restored.

1321. Οἰκέτης is a household slave, not explicitly Pericles's own. The quip exposes the low value attached to the attendant's role. Νέος means new here, not necessarily young; no further occasion is specified.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου ἐπιστολῆς Σωπάτρῳ Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς

II.31.122.1

Παντὸς ζῴου καὶ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὁρμηθεῖσα πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ἀρετὴν κυριωτάτη πασῶν ἐστι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον, καὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων τοίνυν εὐεξίας ἡ πρώτη βελτίστη τῆς φύσεως πρόοδος ὁδῷ <τε> πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα τεταγμένως, ἐφ' ἥνπερ αὐτὴν προχωρεῖν ἄξιον· ταύτην τοίνυν ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία δεόντως προοδηγεῖ, σπέρματα τῶν ἀρετῶν ἤδη προκαταβαλλομένη καὶ ἐν ἀπαλαῖς ἔτι καὶ ἀβάτοις ψυχαῖς θαυμαστὴν οἰκείωσιν ἐμποιοῦσα πρὸς τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτήδευσιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Iamblichus, letter to Sopater, On the Upbringing of Children

II.31.122.1

In every animal and plant, the first growth, well directed toward each one's excellence, is the most decisive of all for bringing about the fitting end.[1322] So too, in children's sound development, nature's earliest and best advance proceeds methodically <and> in due order toward the perfection it deserves to reach.[1323] Proper education fittingly leads this advance, already sowing seeds of the virtues and creating in souls still tender and untrodden a remarkable affinity with the pursuit of noble things.[1324]

1322. The heading identifies a letter of Iamblichus to Sopater and gives its subject. The numerical divisions and continued labels serve layout only. In the opening plant-and-animal comparison, ἀρετή is excellence; the subsequent virtues concern human upbringing.

1323. Πασῶν, of all, is retained without supplying a noun. Wachsmuth supplies τε, mirrored by <and>. The sentence connects good initial development with an ordered movement toward its proper completion.

1324. Ἀβάτοις is the printed reading, untrodden; the apparatus records the proposed εὐβάτοις, easily traversed, without adopting it. The seeds and tender souls extend the growth image into early moral formation.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς — συνέχεια

II.31.122.2

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ προτείνει παράδειγμα τῶν καλῶν ἔργων, ἵνα οἱ θεώμενοι παῖδες αὐτὰ ζηλῶσι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀφομοίωσιν· ἔπειτα τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἄγει καλῶς καὶ ἐμποιεῖ τὰ σπουδαῖα ἤθη, μήπω δυναμένων αὐτῶν λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, διὰ [τε] τῆς συνηθείας τῶν καλῶν τρέπουσα αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἔτι δὲ τούτοις συμφωνίαν ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης πρὸς τὰ καλὰ <καὶ αἰσχρὰ> ἔργα παρασκευάζει, ὥστε μὴ μόνον πράττειν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρειν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς συμμέτρως, μηδὲ ἀποφεύγειν μόνον τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ δυσχεραίνειν αὐτὰ ἐγκαιρότατα·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

On the Upbringing of Children continued

II.31.122.2

First, through the senses, education presents in father, mother, pedagogue and teacher a model of noble deeds, so that children seeing these deeds may aspire to become like those people.[1325] Then it guides them well through habits and implants good character, while rational understanding is not yet within their power, turning their souls toward the better through familiarity with noble things.[1326] In addition, it brings their pleasure and pain into accord with noble <and shameful> deeds, so that they not only do noble deeds but also rejoice in them in due measure, and not merely avoid shameful things but also feel distaste for them at just the right time.[1327]

1325. The model is embodied in the adults' conduct. The English connects αὐτά, these things, with the children's seeing, and αὐτούς with the adult models they seek to resemble. Pedagogue and teacher are listed separately.

1326. Habituation precedes the child's ability to grasp through reason. The rejected [τε] remains visible in Greek but is omitted from the translated sense; no additional conjunction is inserted there.

1327. Wachsmuth supplies <καὶ αἰσχρὰ>, <and shameful>. The aim includes proportionate pleasure and timely aversion, alongside doing or avoiding the corresponding deeds.

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Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς — συνέχεια

II.31.122.3

προάγουσι δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐνταῦθα, ὃ χρὴ προηγεῖσθαι παντὸς [τοῦ] ὀρθοῦ βίου, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν ἐντίθησι, δι’ ὧν ἀπάγονται μὲν πάντων τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ εὐλάβειάν τινα πρὸς αὐτὰ κτῶνται, ἐφίενται δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ σύντονον ὁρμὴν προσλαμβάνουσι· μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα προστάγματα τινα νουθετητικά, μικρὰ μὲν ὄντα τοῖς ῥήμασι, μεγάλην δέ τινα δύναμιν τοῖς τηλικούτοις παρεχόμενα, οἷον τὸ «δεῖ» καὶ ποτε «οὐ δεῖ» καὶ τὸ «μέχρι πόσου;» καὶ «ποῖόν τι τὸ ἄριστόν ἐστι [μέτρον];» καὶ «τίς τὰ τοιαῦτα;» συμμετρίαν αὐτοῖς ἐναρμόζει τὴν πρὸς ἀλλότριον λόγον συνταττομένην, οἷον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ διδασκάλου· καὶ τό γε δὴ κράτιστόν ἐστι τὰ οἰκεῖα παραγγέλματα καὶ νουθετήματα <τὰ> φέροντα πρὸς ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν παραδιδόναι δεόντως, τὰ μὲν ἐν κοιναῖς γνώμαις, τὰ δ’ ἐν ἔργων ἀσκήσει, τὰ δ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων μελέτῃ, τὰ δ’ ἐν ταῖς ὑποθήκαις περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πρακτέων, τὰ δ’ ἐν ταῖς τῆς ζωῆς κατασκευαῖς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

On the Upbringing of Children continued

II.31.122.3

As they advance at this stage, education instills in them what must precede every right life: shame at shameful deeds and ambition for noble ones. Through these, they are drawn away from all shameful things and acquire a certain caution toward them, while they desire good things and gain a vigorous impulse toward them.[1328] Next, certain admonitory injunctions—short in words but powerful for children of that age, such as "One must," sometimes "One must not," "How far?", "What sort of thing is best?" and "Who does such things?"—establish in them a measure attuned to another's reason, such as a lawgiver's and a teacher's.[1329] Most important is to hand down properly the appropriate commands and admonitions <that> lead toward each virtue: some in general maxims, some in the practice of deeds, some in the study of discourses, some in advice on what to do or not do, and some in the arrangements of life.[1330]

1328. Φιλοτιμία is ambition or love of honor, here directed toward noble conduct. The rejected article [τοῦ] is retained in Greek but excluded from the translated sense.

1329. The short formulas are compressed. The English supplies does in τίς τὰ τοιαῦτα;, literally who, such things?; the missing verb is not settled by the text. The rejected [μέτρον], measure, is not translated.

1330. The learner is still guided by another person's reason. Wachsmuth's supplied <τὰ> is represented by <that>. The five settings for instruction, from maxims to the arrangements of life, are all retained.

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Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς — συνέχεια

II.31.122.4

Ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτων ἕνεκα ἱκανῶς ἔχωσι, τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοὺς παιδευτέον, ἀρχομένους ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, ἔπειτα προϊόντας ὀσημέραι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ πρὸς τοὺς τῆς αἰτίας ἀπολογισμούς· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν δι’ εὐκρινείας ἐπιστημονικῆς τελέως φυλακτέον ἔτι ἀτελέσι διανοίαις παρακατατίθεσθαι, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . . . καὶ διὰ πειθοῦς ἐμμελοῦς [καὶ] προσαγόμενον τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀκουόντων καταβλητέον εἰς αὐτοὺς ὡς οἷόν τ’ ἐστὶ μάλιστα· γεγυμνασμένων δ’ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τούτοις ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει τῆς εἰς ἀρετὴν ἀγωγῆς οἱ ὅροι τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀφοριζέσθωσαν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας ἡ ἀκροτάτη παραδιδόσθω θεωρία, τελειότης τε τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ ἀναμάρτητος καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἐπιστήμη <καὶ> βεβαιότης ἐντιθέσθω τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλήθεια· ἡ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτο ἀγωγὴ [τῆς παιδείας] τέλος ἔχει τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγωγῆς τὸ κράτιστον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

On the Upbringing of Children continued

II.31.122.4

Once they are sufficiently prepared for these purposes, they must be educated through reasoned accounts, beginning with simpler and more familiar ones, then progressing daily and little by little toward explanations of the cause.[1331] At this stage, one must completely avoid entrusting what has the clarity of exact knowledge to minds still immature. But the other—so to speak . . .—which also draws the hearers' understanding through fitting persuasion, must be planted in them as fully as possible.[1332] Once they have been adequately trained in these matters, at the end of their guidance toward virtue let the definitions of the virtues be laid down, and let the highest contemplation of the cause be imparted. Let completeness of reasoning, infallible and irrefutable knowledge <and> certainty of understanding be instilled—truth. For guidance to this point has as its goal what is best in children's upbringing.[1333]

1331. Λόγοι now become reasoned accounts taught to the learner, with gradual progress toward explanations of cause. The printed ἕνεκα is retained and rendered for these purposes; the apparatus records a proposal to delete it.

1332. The three-dot gap interrupts the contrast after so to speak; no missing description is reconstructed. Exact knowledge is distinguished from instruction through fitting persuasion. The rejected [καὶ] remains in Greek but contributes no additional and to the English.

1333. The culminating definitions, contemplation and knowledge follow adequate training. The supplied <καὶ> is mirrored by <and>; rejected [τῆς παιδείας], of education, is not translated. The English takes the bare nominative ἀλήθεια, truth, as a concluding apposition.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ παραπλησίως παιδευτέον τὰς θυγατέρας τοῖς υἱοῖς

II.31.123.1

Λόγου δέ ποτε τινὸς ἐμπεσόντος, εἰ τὴν αὐτὴν παιδείαν παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱέας καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας· Ἵππους μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ κύνας ὁμοῦ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως παιδεύουσιν οἵ τε ἱππικοὶ καὶ οἱ κυνηγετικοὶ τοὺς ἄρρενας τῶν θηλειῶν· ἀλλ' αἵ τε κύνες αἱ θήλειαι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄρρεσι διδάσκονται θηρᾶν· ἵππους τε θηλείας ἄν τις θέλῃ τὰ ἵππων ἔργα ἀποτελεῖν καλῶς, οὐ διάφορον τῶν ἀρρένων διδασκαλίαν διδασκομένας ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἐξαίρετόν τι ἄρα δεήσει ἔχειν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ παρὰ τὰς θηλείας, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ τὰς αὐτὰς παραγίνεσθαι δέον ἀρετὰς ἀμφοῖν ὁμοίως ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρετὰς μὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν παιδευμάτων ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρων οἷόν τε ὂν ἐλθεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius, Whether Daughters Should Be Educated Like Sons

II.31.123.1

Once, when discussion arose whether sons and daughters should receive the same education, he said:[1334] Trainers of horses and hunting dogs train males no differently from females. Female dogs are taught to hunt just like males; and if one wants mares to perform horses' tasks well, one sees them receiving no different instruction from male horses.[1335] Yet male human beings, then, will need something special in their education and upbringing in comparison with females—as though the same virtues did not need to come equally to both man and woman, or as though the same virtues could be reached through different forms of education rather than the same ones.[1336]

1334. The heading attributes the discussion to Musonius and states its question. The opening presents his response in reported speech. The numerical divisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1335. The comparison concerns the same task being taught to males and females within each kind of animal. It does not require horses and dogs to be trained together.

1336. The final as though clauses expose the assumption being challenged, rather than endorse a special educational privilege for males. Παιδεύματα are forms of education, here considered as means of acquiring virtues.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.2

Ὅτι δὲ οὐχ ἅλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἀνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥᾴδιον μαθεῖν. Αὐτίκα, φρονεῖν δεῖ μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα· ἢ τί ὄφελος εἴη ἂν ἄφρονος ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός; Εἶτα <δεῖ> δικαίως βιοῦν οὐδέτερον ἧττον θατέρου· ἀλλ’ ὅ τε ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἄδικος ὤν, ἥ τε γυνὴ οὐκ ἂν οἰκονομοίη χρηστῶς, ἢ μὴ δίκαιος ἀλλ’ ἄδικος οὖσα πρῶτον ἀδικήσει τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὴν Ἐριφύλην φασί. Σωφρονεῖν μὲν αὖ καλὸν τὴν γυναῖκα, καλὸν δ’ ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα· τὸ γοῦν μοιχεύειν τῷ μοιχεύεσθαι ἐπίσης κολάζουσιν οἱ νόμοι. Καὶ λιχνεῖαι καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαι καὶ ἄλλα παραπλήσια κακά, ἀκολαστήματα ὄντα καὶ καταισχύνοντα μεγάλως τοὺς ἐνεχομένους αὐτοῖς, ἀποφαίνει τὴν σωφροσύνην ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὖσαν ἀνθρώπῳ παντί, τῷ τε θήλει καὶ τῷ ἄρρενι· διὰ γὰρ σωφροσύνης μόνης ἐκφεύγομεν ἀκολασίαν, ἄλλως δ’ οὐδαμῶς.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.2

It is easy to learn that a man's virtues are not one set and a woman's another. First, a man must have understanding, and a woman must too; of what use would a foolish man or woman be? Next, both <must> live justly, neither less so than the other. A man could not be a good citizen while unjust, nor could a woman manage a household well: if she is unjust rather than just, she will wrong her husband first, as they say Eriphyle did.[1337] Again, it is good for a woman to be temperate, and equally good for a man. At any rate, the laws punish an adulterer and an adulteress equally.[1338] Greed for delicacies, drunkenness and other such evils, being acts of intemperance and greatly disgracing those caught up in them, show that temperance is absolutely necessary for every human being, female and male. For through temperance alone we escape intemperance, and in no other way.[1339]

1337. Wachsmuth supplies <δεῖ>, <must>. Different civic and household roles are assumed, but justice is required in both. Eriphyle is named as an example of a wife harming her husband; the text gives no details of the story.

1338. The Greek contrasts active μοιχεύειν with passive μοιχεύεσθαι; the English makes the surrounding male–female comparison explicit. Equal punishment is the speaker's assertion here, rather than a survey of different legal systems.

1339. Σωφροσύνη is rendered temperance consistently with earlier passages. Λιχνεῖαι refers to appetite for delicacies; it is paired with excessive drinking as evidence for the shared need to restrain appetites.

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Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.3

Τὴν ἀνδρείαν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως μόνοις προσήκειν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν· ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταύτῃ. Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα <καὶ> καθαρεύειν δειλίας τήν γε ἀρίστην, ὡς μήθ' ὑπὸ πόνου μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβου κάμπτεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς ἔτι σωφρονήσει, ἐάν τις ἢ φοβῶν ἢ προσάγων πόνους βιάσασθαι δύνηται αὐτὴν ὑπομεῖναί <τι> τῶν αἰσχρῶν. Δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀμυντικῶς ἔχειν τὰς γυναῖκας, εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία φαίνεσθαι μέλλουσι κακίους ἀλεκτορίδων καὶ ἄλλων ὀρνίθων θηλειῶν, αἳ πολὺ μείζοσι ζῴοις ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεοττῶν διαμάχονται. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀνδρείας αἱ γυναῖκες δέοιντο; Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀλκῆς τῆς δι' ὅπλων μέτεστιν αὐταῖς, ἐδήλωσε τὸ Ἀμαζόνων γένος, ἔθνη πολλὰ δι' ὅπλων καταστρεψάμενον· ὥστ' εἴ τι ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἀνασκησία μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι <πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αἰτία ἂν εἴη. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν> ἀρετὰς ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν προσήκειν ἀμφοῖν. Παντὶ γὰρ δὴ ζῴῳ καὶ φυτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τὴν προσαγομένην ὀρθῶς ἐμποιεῖν χρὴ τὴν ἐκείνῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.3

Someone might perhaps say courage belongs to men alone; that too is not so. A woman must also act courageously <and> be free from cowardice—at least the best woman—so as not to bend under pain or fear. Otherwise, how will she remain temperate if someone can, by threats or inflicting pain, force her to endure <something> shameful?[1340] Women must also be able to defend themselves, unless, by Zeus, they are to seem worse than hens and other female birds, which fight animals far larger than themselves for their young. How, then, would women not need courage? The Amazons, who subdued many peoples by arms, showed that women also share in armed prowess.[1341] Thus, if other women lack anything here, lack of training rather than lack of natural fitness <for courage would be the cause. If, then, there are by nature the same> virtues for man and woman, the same upbringing and education must of necessity suit both. For the care given to every animal and plant must properly instill the excellence appropriate to it.[1342]

1340. Ἀνδρεία and ἀνδρίζεσθαι use vocabulary associated with men, yet courage is required of women too. The best-woman qualification and coerced endurance are retained. Supplied καὶ and τι are visibly mirrored in English.

1341. Female birds and the Amazons provide examples of defense and armed capability. The Amazon conquest is presented as Musonius's illustration; no further historical account is supplied here.

1342. The long bracket is Wachsmuth's supplement, spanning a conjectural completion and the next conditional premise. The printed ἀνασκησία, lack of training, is nominative; the English contrasts this with lack of natural fitness.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.4

Ἦ εἰ μὲν ἔδει αὐλεῖν δύνασθαι παραπλησίως ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀμφοτέρους ἂν ἐπ’ ἴσον τὴν αὐλητικὴν τέχνην ἐξεδιδάσκομεν, καὶ εἰ κιθαρίζειν ἔδει ἑκάτερον, . . .· ἀμφοτέρους δὲ εἰ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀγαθοὺς τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν καὶ φρονεῖν ὁμοίως δύνασθαι καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀνδρείας μετέχειν καὶ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲν ἧττον θατέρου θάτερον, οὐκ ἄρ’ ὁμοίως ἑκάτερον παιδεύσομεν; οὐδὲ τὴν τέχνην, ἀφ’ ἧς γένοιτ’ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, ἐπ’ ἴσον ἀμφοτέρους διδάξομεν; Ἀλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρως.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.4

Or, if man and woman had to be able to play the aulos alike, and this were necessary for each in life, we would teach both the art of aulos-playing equally; and if each had to play the kithara, . . .[1343] But if both must become good in the virtue proper to a human being, equally able to exercise understanding and be temperate, and share in courage and justice, neither one less than the other, shall we not educate each alike? Shall we not also teach both equally the art by which a person might become good?[1344] Rather, we must do this, and not otherwise.[1345]

1343. The aulos and kithara are musical instruments used here as examples of learned arts. The printed three-dot gap follows the second conditional example; its missing conclusion is not reconstructed.

1344. The two negative questions expect agreement. Τέχνη, art or craft, is applied to the training through which a person might become good, not just to musical skill.

1345. The comparison returns to the shared human virtues named in the argument: understanding, temperance, courage and justice. This paragraph concludes before the next objection about wool-working, which follows in the same source excerpt.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.5

Τί οὖν καὶ ταλασίαν, φησί τις ἴσως, ἀξιοῖς σὺ παραπλησίως ἐκμανθάνειν ταῖς γυναιξὶν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ γυμναστικὴν μετέρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίως τὰς γυναῖκας; Τοῦτο μὲν οὐκέτι ἀξιώσω ἐγώ· φημὶ δὲ ὅτι οὔσης ἐν τῷ γένει <τῷ> ἀνθρωπίνῳ τῆς μὲν ἰσχυροτέρας φύσεως τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, τῆς δ' ἀσθενεστέρας τῆς τῶν θηλειῶν, ἑκατέρᾳ φύσει τῶν ἔργων ἀπονεμητέον τὰ προσφορώτατα καὶ τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις ἀποδοτέον, τὰ δὲ ἐλαφρότερα τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις· διὰ τοῦτο ταλασία μὲν ταῖς γυναιξὶ μᾶλλον πρέποι ἂν ἤπερ ἀνδράσιν, ὥσπερ <καὶ> οἰκουρία· γυμναστικὴ δὲ ἀνδράσι μᾶλλον ἢ γυναιξίν, ὥσπερ καὶ θυραυλία· ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ ἄνδρες τινὲς τῶν ἐλαφροτέρων ἔργων ἔνια καὶ δοκούντων γυναικείων μεταχειρίσαιντ' ἂν εἰκότως, καὶ γυναῖκες αὖ τῶν σκληροτέρων καὶ δοκούντων μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἀνδράσιν ἐργάσαιντ' ἄν, ὅταν ἢ τὰ τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ὑφηγήται ἢ τὰ τῆς χρείας ἢ τὰ τοῦ καιροῦ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.5

"Then do you also expect men to learn to spin wool in the same way as women, and women to pursue physical training in the same way as men?" someone may perhaps say.[1346] I shall not go that far. I say that, since within the human race the nature of males is stronger and that of females weaker, the most suitable tasks should be assigned to each nature: heavier tasks to the stronger and lighter ones to the weaker. That is why spinning would be more fitting for women than for men, as would <also> staying at home; physical training would be more fitting for men than for women, as would life out of doors.[1347] Sometimes, however, some men might reasonably undertake some lighter tasks considered women's work, and women in turn might perform some harder tasks considered more fitting for men, whenever bodily condition, need or circumstances so direct.[1348]

1346. Ταλασία is spinning wool; γυμναστική is physical training. The imagined objection asks whether the same education in virtue also requires identical practical occupations.

1347. Wachsmuth supplies the second article in τῷ γένει <τῷ> ἀνθρωπίνῳ; English expresses this as the human race. His supplied <καὶ> appears as <also>. Οἰκουρία, staying at home, is paired with θυραυλία, life out of doors.

1348. The comparatives more fitting and the expressions sometimes, some and might remain qualified. Bodily condition, need and circumstances can direct either sex toward tasks usually associated with the other.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.6

Πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἐν κοινῷ κεῖται τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἔργα [καὶ ἐστι κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν] καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποτακτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ἑτέρῳ· ἔνια δὲ δὴ ἐπιτηδειότερα τὰ μὲν τῇδε τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ τῇδε· δι' ὃ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ γυναικεῖα· ὅσα μέντοι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει εἰς ἀρετήν, ταῦτα φαίη τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἴσον ἑκατέρᾳ προσήκειν φύσει, εἴγε καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς προσήκειν φαμὲν οὐδὲν τοῖς ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις. Ὅθεν εἰκότως οἶμαι καὶ παιδευτέον ὅσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν παραπλησίως τό τε θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν· καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ νηπίων εὐθὺς διδακτέον, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δὲ κακὸν [κακὸν ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν], καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν πρακτέον, τόδε δὲ οὔ· ἐξ ὧν περιγίνεται φρόνησις τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ὁμοίως κόραις καὶ κόροις καὶ οὐδὲν διαφορώτερον τοῖς ἑτέροις· εἶτα δὲ ἐμποιητέον αἰδῶ πρὸς ἅπαν αἰσχρόν. ὧν ἐγγενομένων ἀνάγκη σώφρονας εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.6

For perhaps all human tasks lie open in common, and none need necessarily be ruled out for either sex.[1349] Some, however, are more suitable to one nature and some to the other, which is why some are called men's tasks and others women's. Yet whatever relates to virtue one could rightly say is equally fitting for each nature, if indeed we say that the virtues themselves belong no more to one than to the other. Therefore I think it reasonable that both female and male should be educated alike in whatever concerns virtue. Beginning from earliest childhood, they should immediately be taught that this is good and that bad, that this is beneficial and that harmful, and that this should be done and that should not.[1350] From these lessons practical wisdom comes to those who learn them, girls and boys alike, and no more to one than to the other. Then a sense of shame at everything disgraceful must be instilled in them. Once these qualities are present, both man and woman must be temperate.[1351]

1349. The qualifying ἴσως, perhaps, is retained. Wachsmuth rejects [καὶ ἐστι κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν], and they are common to men and women; the Greek retains it in brackets and the English omits it.

1350. The shared lessons concern good and bad, benefit and harm, and action and restraint. The rejected repetition [κακὸν ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν], bad, the same for both, is retained only in Greek.

1351. Φρόνησις is practical wisdom. The same lessons are said to produce it alike in girls and boys. Αἰδώς is the sense of shame before disgraceful conduct; σώφρονας describes the resulting temperance.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.7

Καὶ μὴν τὸν παιδευόμενον ὀρθῶς, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, εἴτε ἄρρην εἴτε θήλεια, ἐθιστέον μὲν ἀνέχεσθαι πόνου, ἐθιστέον δὲ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θάνατον, ἐθιστέον δὲ μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι πρὸς συμφορὰν μηδεμίαν· δι’ ὅσων ἂν τις εἴη ἀνδρεῖος. Ἀνδρείας δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείχθη δεῖν μετεῖναι καὶ γυναιξίν. Ἔτι τοίνυν πλεονεξίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἰσότητα δὲ τιμᾶν καὶ εὐποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἀνθρώπους, ἔστι μὲν δίδαγμα κάλλιστον καὶ δικαίους ἐπιτελεῖ τοὺς μανθάνοντας· τί δὲ μᾶλλον ἄνδρα μεμαθηκέναι χρὴ ταῦτα ἢ γυναῖκα; εἰ γὰρ νὴ Δία πρέπει δικαίας εἶναι γυναῖκας, καὶ ταὐτὰ δεῖ μεμαθηκέναι ἄμφω τά γε κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα. Εἰ γάρ τί που μικρὸν ὁ μὲν εἴσεται, ἡ δὲ οὔ, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ μὲν εἴσεται, ὁ δὲ οὔ, τεχνίτου τινὸς ἐχόμενον, οὔπω τοῦτο διάφορον ἀποφαίνει τὴν ἑκατέρου παιδείαν· μόνον περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἕτερος ἕτερα μεμαθηκέτω, ἀλλὰ ταὐτά.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.7

Anyone receiving a proper education, whoever it may be, male or female, must be trained to endure hardship, not fear death, and not be crushed by any misfortune: through all these things a person could be courageous. A little earlier it was shown that women too must share in courage.[1352] Further, to shun greed, honor equality, and, as a human being, wish to benefit other humans and not to harm them is a most noble lesson and makes learners just. Why should a man have learned these things any more than a woman? For, by Zeus, if women ought to be just, then both must have learned the same things, at least the most decisive and important matters.[1353] If, in some small matter within an artisan's province, he will know something and she will not, or conversely she will know and he will not, that does not yet show their education to be different. Only let neither have learned different things from the other about any of the most important matters, but the same.[1354]

1352. The repeated ἐθιστέον calls for habituation in endurance, fearlessness before death and resistance to misfortune. The reference to the earlier argument on women's courage stays within this excerpt.

1353. Πλεονεξία is the desire to take more, opposed here to equality. The phrase ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἀνθρώπους places both the acting person and those helped or harmed on the common footing of being human.

1354. The printed τεχνίτου means of an artisan. A minor difference in knowledge within that province does not yet establish a difference in education. The same learning is required of both sexes in the principal matters.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.123.8

Ἂν δέ τις ἐρωτᾷ με, τίς ἐπιστήμη τῆς παιδείας ταύτης ἐπιστατεῖ, λέξω πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι φιλοσοφίας ἄνευ ὥσπερ ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν οὐδείς, οὕτως οὐδ' ἂν γυνὴ παιδευθείη ὀρθῶς. Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο βούλομαι λέγειν, ὅτι τρανότητα περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότητά τινα περιττὴν χρὴ προσεῖναι ταῖς γυναιξίν, ᾗπερ φιλοσοφήσουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐγὼ πάνυ τι τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ), ἀλλ' ὅτι ἤθους χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν τρόπου κτητέον ταῖς γυναιξίν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκαγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.123.8

If someone asks me what branch of knowledge oversees this education, I will reply that without philosophy no woman could be properly educated, any more than any man could.[1355] By this I do not mean that women must possess clarity in argument and some extraordinary cleverness as their way of practicing philosophy—for I do not particularly commend this even in men.[1356] I mean that women must acquire goodness of character and moral excellence in conduct, since philosophy is itself the practice of moral excellence and nothing else.[1357]

1355. The question asks which ἐπιστήμη, branch of knowledge, directs the education just described. The reply makes philosophy necessary for both sexes, rather than naming a separate discipline for women.

1356. Τρανότης concerns clarity in discourse, while δεινότης περιττή adds exceptional cleverness. The printed ᾗπερ connects these capacities with the proposed way of philosophizing; the parenthesis expressly withholds special praise from such accomplishments in men too.

1357. Καλοκαγαθία combines being fine and good; here it describes conduct and the aim of philosophical practice. The closing sentence defines philosophy through this moral excellence.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Θεοφράστου II.31.124.1

Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ παιδεία, καὶ τοῦτο πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἡμεροῦν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀφαιροῦσα τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ ἄγνωμον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἤθη κοινότερα καὶ ὑγρότερα γίνεται. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὐκ ἄν τις ἴσως ἐπιτιμῴη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν . . .· ὅσοι δὲ τραφέντες ἐλευθερίως καὶ χορηγίαν ἔχοντες ἱκανὴν ὥστ’ εἰς ὁποιονοῦν βίον ἐλθεῖν, ἄσκεπτοι περὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου τυγχάνουσι, τούτοις ἤδη δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν.

Θεοφράστου — συνέχεια II.31.124.2

Ἄτοπον γὰρ ὥστ’ ἀληθῶς, εἰ αἱρέσεως αὐτοῖς διδομένης πόλιν μὲν ἂν ἕλοιντο τὴν ἐνδοξοτάτην καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους τοὺς ἀρίστους, βίον δὲ ἐξὸν ἐλέσθαι τὸν ἄριστον, κατολιγωρήσαντες τούτου, πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀποδιδοίησαν, μηδὲ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ κρίνειν καὶ σκοπεῖν ἐλθόντες. Ἀλλ’ ὁδὸν μὲν βαδίζειν εἰ δέοι, ἄλλων πύθοιντ’ ἂν πολλάκις καὶ ἀναζητήσαιεν ἡγεμόνα μεθ’ οὗ ποιήσαιντο τὴν κομιδὴν ἀσφαλῶς, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ βίου παντὸς, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, κυβεύοντες, οὐδενὶ κοινωσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν χείριστον, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, προσπίπτουσι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Theophrastus

II.31.124.1

For education seems—and everyone agrees on this—to tame souls, removing what is beastlike and unreasoning; hence characters become more sociable and pliant.[1358] As for the many, one might perhaps not blame them, because they lack the freedom . . .[1359] But those with a liberal upbringing and adequate resources to enter any way of life, who nonetheless give no thought to the best one, may then justly be called to account.[1360]

Theophrastus continued

II.31.124.2

For it is truly absurd if, given a choice, they would choose the most renowned city and the best friends and intimates, yet, when free to choose the best life, would disregard it and hand their affairs over to whatever happens, without even beginning to judge and examine.[1361] Yet if they had to travel a road, they would often ask others and seek a guide with whom they might make the journey safely.[1362] But when gambling—as the saying goes—with their whole life, they consult no one and fall into the worst life, if it happens so.[1363]

1358. The heading names Theophrastus without giving a work title. The opening for connects with an earlier argument. More sociable and pliant renders κοινότερα καὶ ὑγρότερα, qualities of character shaped by education. The three subdivisions serve layout only.

1359. Three printed dots mark a gap after ἐξουσίαν, freedom or opportunity. The missing words are not restored; the precise limit on the many's opportunity therefore remains unstated.

1360. Ἐλευθερίως describes a liberal upbringing, and χορηγία sufficient resources. The criticism distinguishes those lacking opportunity from those equipped to consider and choose a way of life.

1361. The contrast concerns care in choosing one's surroundings and associates versus neglect in choosing a life. Οἰκεῖοι are those close to someone, rendered intimates; no particular city or circle is named.

1362. The ordinary journey supplies an analogy for the more consequential direction of a whole life. The guide is not identified with a named person or philosophical school.

1363. Κυβεύοντες evokes throwing dice. The worst life supplies the noun understood with τὸν χείριστον; the qualifying ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, if it happens so, leaves the outcome to chance.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Θεοφράστου — συνέχεια II.31.124.3

Καὶ μὴν καὶ πολλῷ γ’ ἐπισφαλεστέρα τῆς διαιρέσεως ἡ ἐκτροπὴ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὀρθὴν βαδίζοντι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ βλάβαι μεγάλαι καὶ ἡ ἀναστροφὴ χαλεπή, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατος· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ χρόνος δίδωσιν ἐξουσίαν μεταθέσεως, οὔθ’ ἡ φύσις δύναται μεταμανθάνειν τὸ βέλτιον ὅταν ἐντραφῇ τοῖς χείροσιν, ἀλλὰ προαιρεῖται <μὲν> καὶ ἕτερά γε προκρίνει βελτίω, καταζῇ δ’ ὅμως ἐν τοῖς εἰωθόσιν· ἀλλ’ ὅπερ πολλάκις λέγεται, τοῦτο ἀληθὲς ἔοικεν εἶναι, διότι πάντες ἥκιστα περὶ ἑαυτῶν βουλεύονται.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Theophrastus continued

II.31.124.3

For someone not taking the right road, turning aside is also far more perilous than “the division.”[1364] For the harms are great and the return difficult—rather, almost impossible. Time does not allow a change, nor can nature learn the better anew once it has been reared in worse ways. It chooses <indeed> and judges other things better, yet still lives out its life in accustomed habits.[1365] But what is often said seems true: all people deliberate least about themselves.[1366]

1364. Wachsmuth prints τῆς διαιρέσεως, than the division or distinction. Its relation to the comparative and the road image is uncertain. A branching point or choice may be intended, but the English preserves the difficult comparison rather than silently replacing the Greek.

1365. Nature remains the subject through the contrast between choosing better things and living in established habits. The passage concerns relearning the better after formation in worse ways. Wachsmuth supplies <μὲν>, reflected by <indeed>; almost qualifies the preceding claim of impossibility.

1366. The main text has ἥκιστα, least. The apparatus proposes κάκιστα, worst, as a different reading; that conjecture is not adopted here. The conclusion thus concerns how little people deliberate about themselves.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου ἐκ τοῦ Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πολλαῖς ἀποδείξεσι πρὸς ἓν πρᾶγμα χρήσασθαι

II.31.125.1

Λόγου δέ ποτε γενομένου περὶ ἀποδείξεων, ἃς χρὴ ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων πρὸς κατάληψιν ὧν μανθάνουσιν, ἔφη ὁ Μουσώνιος, οὐχὶ πολλὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστου πράγματος ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις προσήκειν, ἀλλ' ἀνυσίμους καὶ ἐναργεῖς. Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἐκεῖνος, ἔφη, ἐπαινετὸς ὁ φάρμακα πολλὰ προσφέρων τοῖς νοσοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' ὀλίγων ὧν προσφέρει λόγου ἀξίως ὠφελῶν· οὔτε φιλόσοφος ὁ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδείξεων διδάσκων τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' ὀλίγων ἐπάγων αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ὃ μέντοι βούλεται· καὶ ὁ ἀκουστὴς ὅσῳπερ ἂν ᾖ συνετώτερος, τοσούτῳ μειόνων δεήσεται τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τοσούτῳ θᾶττον συναινέσει τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι γε ὑγιεῖ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius, That One Should Not Use Many Proofs for a Single Matter

II.31.125.1

Once, when discussion arose about the proofs young people must hear from philosophers in order to grasp what they learn, Musonius said that one should seek effective and clear proofs for each matter, rather than many.[1367] For the praiseworthy doctor, he said, is not the one who gives the sick many medicines, but the one who benefits them appreciably through the few he gives; nor is the praiseworthy philosopher the one who teaches his listeners through many proofs, but the one who brings them through a few to the very point he intends.[1368] And the more intelligent the listener, the fewer proofs he will need, and the sooner he will assent to the argument's main point, since it is sound, at any rate.[1369]

1367. The heading states the question, and the opening reports Musonius's response. Ἀπόδειξις means a proof or demonstration by argument; the emphasis is on effectiveness and clarity. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1368. The medical comparison distinguishes the benefit achieved from the number of remedies used. Likewise, the philosopher's success is measured by bringing the listener to the intended conclusion, not by accumulating arguments.

1369. Wachsmuth prints ὅτι γε ὑγιεῖ, since it is sound, at any rate. The English retains the causal wording; the claim concerns a sound argument's main point, not quick assent regardless of its truth.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.125.2

Ὅστις δὲ πανταχοῦ δεῖται ἀποδείξεως καὶ ὅπου σαφῆ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν, ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδείκνυσθαι βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰ δι’ ὀλίγων δυνάμενα, παντάπασιν ἄτοπος καὶ δυσμαθής. Θεοὺς μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀποδείξεως δεῖσθαι πρὸς οὐδέν, ὅτι μήτε ἀσαφὲς μήτε ἄδηλόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς μηδέν, πρὸς <οἷα> μόνα δεῖ τῶν ἀποδείξεων· τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἀνάγκη τὰ μὴ φανερὰ μηδ’ αὐτόθεν γνώριμα διὰ τῶν φανερῶν καὶ προδήλων ζητεῖν ἀνευρίσκειν, ὅπερ ἔργον ἀποδείξεώς ἐστιν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.2

Whoever needs proof at every point, even where the facts are clear, or wants many proofs for what can be demonstrated to him by a few, is altogether absurd and slow to learn.[1370] It is reasonable, then, that the gods need no proof for anything, since nothing is obscure or unclear to them, and proofs are needed only for <such things>.[1371] But human beings must seek to discover what is not evident or known of itself through what is evident and obvious; that is the work of proof.[1372]

1370. The criticism concerns demanding redundant demonstrations, including proofs where the facts are already clear. It does not reject the need to establish what is genuinely unknown.

1371. The gods' complete knowledge supplies the limiting contrast with human understanding. Wachsmuth prints Usener's supplied <οἷα>, referring back to obscure or unclear things; the English reflects the connection with <such things>.

1372. Αὐτόθεν γνώριμα are things known directly, without the argument now sought. Proof proceeds from what is evident to what is not evident; this distinction prepares the examples that follow.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.125.3

Οἷον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, αὐτόθεν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι γνώριμον, ἐπείπερ ἔργῳ προσκαλεῖται ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀγαθὸν οὖσα, ἡ ἡδονή· λαβόντος δέ τινος λῆμμα γνώριμον, τὸ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἶναι καὶ προσλαβόντος ἕτερον γνώριμον τούτῳ, τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς οὐχ αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἀποδείκνυομεν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὰ τῶν γνωρίμων τὸ μὴ γνώριμον. Πάλιν ὡς ὁ πόνος οὐκ ἔστι κακόν, αὐτόθεν μὲν οὐ φαίνεται πιθανόν· τοὐναντίον γὰρ τούτου δοκεῖ πιθανώτερον, τὸ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον· τεθέντος δὲ φανεροῦ λήμματος, τοῦ πᾶν τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν εἶναι καὶ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ φανερωτέρου, τοῦ πόνους πολλοὺς οὐκ εἶναι φευκτούς, περαίνεται τὸ μὴ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.3

For example, that pleasure is not a good does not seem known of itself, since in fact pleasure invites us as though it were a good.[1373] But if someone takes a known premise—that every good is to be chosen—and adds another known fact to it, that some pleasures are not to be chosen, we demonstrate that pleasure is not a good: the unknown through the known.[1374] Again, that hardship is not an evil does not appear convincing of itself. Its contrary seems more convincing: that hardship is an evil. But once an evident premise is laid down, that every evil is to be avoided, and a more evident one is added, that many hardships are not to be avoided, it follows that hardship is not an evil.[1375]

1373. Good is considered here as something to be chosen, rather than merely something attractive or pleasant. Pleasure's immediate appeal is what makes the conclusion require an argument.

1374. The proof combines a universal premise about good with counterexamples among pleasures. It denies pleasure an unqualified status as good; it does not conclude that every pleasure must be avoided.

1375. Πόνος is hardship, including painful effort. The main text calls the added premise φανερωτέρου, more evident; the apparatus questions this wording, but it is retained. The parallel argument concerns what is to be avoided.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.125.4

Τοιοῦτου δ’ ὄντος τοῦ γένους τοῦ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὀξύτεροι οἱ δ’ ἀμβλύτεροί εἰσι καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν ἕθεσι κρείττοσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐν χείροσι τεθραμμένοι, οἱ μὲν ἤθους ἢ φύσεως ὄντες χείρονος, πλειόνων δέοιντ’ ἂν ἀποδείξεων καὶ πραγματείας μείζονος, ὥστε δέξασθαι ταυτὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τυπωθῆναι κατὰ ταῦτα, καθάπερ οἶμαι καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ὁπόταν μέλλῃ καλῶς ἕξειν, πάνυ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ τῶν νέων εὐφυέστεροι καὶ ἀγωγῆς μετεσχηκότες κρείττονος, οὗτοι ῥᾷόν τε καὶ θᾶττον καὶ δι’ ὀλίγων ἀποδείξεων συναινοῖεν ἂν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀκολουθήσειεν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.4

Since proof is of this kind, and since some people are sharper and others duller, and some have been reared in better habits and others in worse, those of worse character or nature would need more proofs and greater effort to accept these teachings and be shaped in accordance with them.[1376] In the same way, I think, bodies in poor condition need a great deal of care if they are to be well.[1377] But young people who are more gifted and have received a better upbringing would assent more easily and quickly to what is rightly said, and follow it, through a few proofs.[1378]

1376. The comparison distinguishes natural ability from character and habits formed in upbringing. Πραγματεία is the work or treatment required for teaching, not necessarily a written treatise.

1377. Τυπωθῆναι, to be shaped or impressed, extends the aim beyond merely hearing an argument. The comparison with bodily care concerns formation; I think preserves the speaker's qualification.

1378. Better aptitude and upbringing reduce the amount of proof required; they do not eliminate it. The potential wording describes how such learners would assent and follow what is rightly said.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.125.5

Ὅτι δ’ οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα, γνοίημεν ἂν ῥᾳδίως, εἰ νοήσαιμεν μειράκιον ἢ νεανίαν, τὸν μὲν ἐν τρυφῇ πάσῃ τεθραμμένον καὶ τό τε σῶμα τεθηλυμμένον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκλελυμένον ὑπὸ ἐθῶν ἀγόντων εἰς μαλακίαν, ἔτι δὲ νωθῆ παρεχόμενον καὶ δυσμαθῆ τὴν φύσιν· τὸν δ’ αὖ Λακωνικῶς πως ἠγμένον καὶ τρυφᾶν οὐκ εἰθισμένον καὶ καρτερεῖν μεμελετηκότα καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ὀρθῶς εὐήκοον ὄντα· εἶτα τοὺς δύο τούτους νεανίας εἰ θείημεν ἀκούοντας φιλοσόφου λέγοντος περὶ θανάτου, περὶ πόνου, περὶ πενίας, περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὡς οὐ κακῶν ὄντων· πάλιν δ’ αὖ περὶ ζωῆς, περὶ ἡδονῆς, περὶ πλούτου, περὶ τῶν παραπλησίων τούτοις, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἆρά γε ὁμοίως ἄμφω προσήσονται τοὺς λόγους καὶ παραπλησίως ἑκάτερος <ἂν> πίθοιτο τοῖς λεγομένοις; Οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.5

We could readily recognize that this is so if we pictured two youths or young men: one reared in every luxury, softened in body and enfeebled in soul by habits tending toward softness, and also naturally dull and slow to learn; the other brought up in a somewhat Spartan manner, unused to luxury, practiced in endurance and receptive to what is rightly said.[1379] Then suppose we set these two young men to hear a philosopher speaking about death, hardship, poverty and the like as things that are not bad; and again about life, pleasure, wealth and similar things as not being goods.[1380] Will both accept the arguments equally, and <would> each be similarly persuaded by what is said? One cannot say so.[1381]

1379. The example contrasts upbringing and natural aptitude together. Somewhat retains πως: the second youth is brought up in a Spartan manner, rather than necessarily being a Spartan. Receptive renders εὐήκοον, ready to listen.

1380. Πόνος is hardship, including painful effort. The claims are that the first group of things are not bad and the second are not goods; the translation does not turn these into claims that the former are goods or the latter bad.

1381. Wachsmuth prints Meineke's supplied <ἄν> in the second question; English marks the corresponding <would>. The denial concerns equal receptiveness in these two differently formed hearers, not the possibility of teaching either one.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.125.6

Ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν μόγις καὶ βραδέως καὶ ὥσπερ μοχλευόμενος ὑπὸ μυρίων λόγων τάχ’ ἂν ἐπινεύσειεν, ὁ νωθέστερος· ὁ δ’ αὖ ταχέως καὶ ἑτοίμως δέξεται τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οἰκεῖα καὶ προσήκοντα αὐτῷ, μήτε ἀποδείξεων δεόμενος πολλῶν, μήτε πραγματείας μείζονος. Ἢ οὐ τοιοῦτος παῖς ἐκεῖνος ὁ Λάκων; ὃς Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἠρώτησεν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόνος ἐστίν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκεῖνος φαίνεται φύσει πεφυκὼς καλῶς καὶ τεθραμμένος εὖ πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὥστε ἔγγιον εἶναι νομίζειν τὸν πόνον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ· ὅς γε ὡς ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ μὴ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὤν, ἐπυνθάνετο. Ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἀγασθεὶς τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν ἄρα πρὸς αὐτόν·

Αἵματος εἷς ἀγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος, οἷ’ ἀγορεύεις.
Πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἐπείσθη ἂν μήτε πενίαν μήτε θάνατον δεδιέναι, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων φοβερῶν, μηδ’ αὖ διώκειν πλοῦτον ἢ ζωὴν ἢ ἡδονήν;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.6

Rather, the duller one might perhaps assent only with difficulty and slowly, as though pried into agreement by countless arguments. The other will accept what is said quickly and readily as congenial and fitting for himself, needing neither many proofs nor a lengthy treatment.[1382] Was not that Spartan boy of this kind, the one who asked the philosopher Cleanthes whether hardship is good? For he appears so well endowed by nature and so well brought up toward virtue that he thought hardship nearer to the nature of good than to that of bad. Taking it as agreed that hardship is not bad, he asked whether it actually is good. Hence Cleanthes, admiring the boy, said to him:

You are of noble blood, dear child, from what you say.[1383]

How then would someone of this kind not readily be persuaded to fear neither poverty nor death nor anything else considered fearful, and not, in turn, to pursue wealth or life or pleasure?[1384]

1382. The first hearer's assent remains qualified by τάχ' ἄν, might perhaps. Μοχλευόμενος pictures him being moved by a lever. The other needs neither numerous proofs nor a more extensive treatment; the contrast concerns the hearers' preparation.

1383. Wachsmuth identifies the verse as Odyssey 4.611. Cleanthes uses it to commend the boy's speech. The question goes beyond the conceded claim that hardship is not bad and asks whether it is good; these are distinct claims.

1384. The final rhetorical question concerns this kind of hearer. Things considered fearful renders τῶν δοκούντων φοβερῶν; the passage does not endorse their apparent fearfulness. The three objects of pursuit remain wealth, life and pleasure.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.125.7

Ἵνα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθω τοῦ λόγου, φημὶ δεῖν τὸν διδάσκαλον τὸν φιλόσοφον μὴ λόγων πλῆθος μηδ’ ἀποδείξεων ζητεῖν διεξιέναι πρὸς τοὺς μανθάνοντας, ἀλλὰ καιρίως περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν καὶ <ἃ> καθικνεῖται τῆς διανοίας τοῦ ἀκούοντος καὶ * * * στικὰ εἶναι λέγειν καὶ ἀνατραπῆναι μὴ ῥᾴδια· καὶ μάλιστά γε τῷ παρέχειν αὐτὸν περί τε τῶν χρησιμωτάτων λέγοντα καὶ ὁμολογούμενα οἷς λέγει πράττοντα, τούτῳ μεταχειριζόμενον τοὺς ἀκούοντας·

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.7

To return to the beginning of the argument, I say that the philosopher who teaches should not seek to run through a multitude of arguments or proofs for his students. He should speak to the point on each matter and say <what> reaches the hearer's mind[1385] and * * * -stika [word incomplete], and is not easy to overturn.[1386] Above all, he should influence his hearers by showing himself speaking about the most useful matters and acting in agreement with what he says.[1387]

1385. Wachsmuth supplies <ἃ>, <what>, before καθικνεῖται, reaches or touches. Καιρίως calls for speaking aptly or to the point, rather than accumulating arguments.

1386. Three printed asterisks mark a gap followed by the surviving fragment στικὰ. Its missing beginning is not supplied. The damaged sequence, including εἶναι λέγειν, prevents a secure continuous construction; the English marks the fragment rather than silently restoring an adjective such as persuasive.

1387. The teacher's conduct must agree with his speech. Μεταχειριζόμενον describes his dealing with or influencing the hearers by that example; the damaged preceding wording does not erase this practical emphasis.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.125.8

τὸν δὲ μαθητὴν ἐντετάσθαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σκοπεῖν μὲν ὅπως μὴ λάθῃ ψεῦδός τι παραδεξάμενος· τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν μὴ μὰ Δία πολλὰς ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις ἀκούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναργεῖς· καὶ ἅπερ ἂν πεισθῇ τῶν παραινουμένων ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ, τούτοις ἐπακολουθεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἔσται τις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὠφελημένος, ἂν οἷς παραδέχεται λόγοις οὖσιν ὑγιέσι τὰ ἔργα παρέχηται συνῳδά.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.125.8

The pupil, in turn, must apply himself intently to what is said and watch that he does not unwittingly accept anything false.[1388] As for truths, by Zeus, he should seek to hear clear proofs, rather than many. Whatever recommendations he is persuaded apply to himself and are true, he must follow in his life.[1389] For only in this way will anyone have benefited from philosophy: if his deeds harmonize with the sound arguments he accepts.[1390]

1388. Ἐντετάσθαι asks for concentrated attention. The pupil must guard against accepting a falsehood unawares; he is not being instructed to assent without scrutiny.

1389. Ἐναργεῖς means clear or evident. The contrast is with the number of proofs, not with having proof at all. Ἑαυτῷ εἶναι asks whether the advice applies to the hearer himself as well as whether it is true.

1390. Συνῳδά literally evokes sounding together: deeds must harmonize with accepted arguments. Ὑγιέσι, sound, describes those arguments. The final sentence makes philosophical benefit depend on this agreement in life.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου ἐκ τοῦ Ὅτι καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον

II.31.126.1

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπύθετό τις αὐτοῦ, εἰ καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον, οὕτω πως ἤρξατο διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφητέον αὐταῖς. Λόγον μέν, ἔφη, τὸν αὐτὸν εἰλήφασι παρὰ θεῶν αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ᾧ τε χρώμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ καθ' ὃν διανοούμεθα περὶ ἑκάστου πράγματος, <εἰ> ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστι καὶ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει τὸ θῆλυ τῷ ἄρρενι, ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μέρη σώματος τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει ἑκατέρῳ καὶ οὐδὲν θατέρῳ πλέον. Ἔτι δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ οἰκείωσις φύσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐ μόνον γίνεται τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναιξίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον αὗταί γε τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καὶ δικαίοις ἔργοις ἀρέσκεσθαι πεφύκασι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προβάλλεσθαι. Τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, διὰ τί [πρότερον] τοῖς μὲν ἀνδράσι προσήκοι ἂν ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὔ; πότερον, ὅτι ἄνδρας μὲν προσήκει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, γυναῖκας δὲ οὔ;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius, That Women Too Should Practice Philosophy

II.31.126.1

When someone asked him whether women too should practice philosophy, he began to show, in something like these terms, that they should. Women, he said, have received from the gods the same reason as men, which we use in our dealings with one another and by which we reflect on each matter, <whether> it is good or bad, noble or shameful.[1391] The female likewise has the same senses as the male: sight, hearing, smell and the rest. Both likewise have the same bodily parts, and neither has more than the other. Further, a natural desire for virtue and affinity with it belong not only to men but also to women.[1392] For women are by nature no less pleased than men with noble and just deeds, and no less disposed to reject their opposites. Since this is so, why would it be fitting for men to investigate and consider how to live well—which is what practicing philosophy is—but not for women? Is it because men ought to be good, but women not?[1393]

1391. Λόγος, reason, includes its use in human dealings and in judging good and bad. Wachsmuth prints Halm's supplied <εἰ>, <whether>. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1392. Οἰκείωσις describes an affinity or sense of belonging, here directed toward virtue and paired with desire. The argument joins shared capacities with a natural orientation toward virtue; this is not yet the possession of completed virtue.

1393. Wachsmuth brackets [πρότερον], earlier, following Cobet's deletion. It remains visible in Greek but is omitted from the running English. The questions challenge assigning the pursuit of a good life to men alone.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.126.2

Σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν προσηκόντων γυναικὶ τῇ ἐσομένῃ ἀγαθῇ· φανεῖται γὰρ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τούτων ἕκαστον μάλιστ’ ἂν αὐτῇ περιγινόμενον. Αὐτίκα δεῖ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἐκλογιστικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀρχικὴν τῶν οἰκετῶν. Ταῦτα δ’ ἐγώ φημι τῇ φιλοσοφούσῃ ὑπάρξαι ἂν μάλιστα· εἴγε ἕκαστον μὲν τούτων μέρος τοῦ βίου ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ περὶ βίον οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἢ φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὥσπερ ἔλεγε Σωκράτης, τοῦτο διατελεῖ σκοπῶν,

Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ’ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.2

Let us also examine one by one the qualities appropriate to a woman who is to be good; each will appear to come to her above all from philosophy.[1394] First, a woman must be skilled in household management, able to reckon what benefits the household, and capable of directing the household slaves.[1395] I say these qualities would belong above all to a woman who practices philosophy, since each is part of life, and knowledge about life is nothing other than philosophy. And the philosopher, as Socrates used to say, continually considers:

What bad and good have come to pass for you within your halls.[1396]

1394. Περιγινόμενον describes qualities accruing to her. The list applies the shared rational capacity to domestic responsibilities, which are treated as parts of life and therefore within philosophy's concern.

1395. Οἰκέται are household slaves. The three requirements concern managing the household, reckoning its interests, and directing those who serve within it.

1396. Wachsmuth identifies the verse as Odyssey 4.392. The printed parenthetical locator is bibliographical, not part of the ancient quotation. Musonius reports Socrates's use of the line to describe the philosopher's continuing inquiry.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.126.3

Ἀλλὰ δεῖ δὴ καὶ σώφρονα εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα· οἵαν καθαρεύειν μὲν ἀφροδισίων παρανόμων, καθαρεύειν δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀκρασίας, μὴ δουλεύειν ἐπιθυμίαις, μηδὲ φιλόνεικον εἶναι, μὴ πολυτελῆ, μὴ καλλωπίστριαν. Ταῦτα μὲν ἔργα τῆς σώφρονός ἐστι· καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἐκεῖνα· κρατεῖν μὲν ὀργῆς, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δ’ ὑπὸ λύπης, κρείττονα δὲ πάθους παντὸς εἶναι. Ταῦτα δ’ ὁ φιλόσοφος παρεγγυᾷ λόγος· ὁ δὲ μαθὼν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσας ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι ἂν κοσμιώτατος, εἴτ’ ἀνὴρ εἴη εἴτε γυνή.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.3

But a woman must also be temperate: able to keep free of unlawful sexual acts and of lack of self-control in other pleasures, not be enslaved to desires, and be neither quarrelsome, extravagant nor fond of self-adornment.[1397] These are the tasks of a temperate woman, along with these further ones: to master anger, not be mastered by grief, and be stronger than every passion.[1398] Philosophical teaching enjoins these things. In my view, one who has learned and practiced them would become most orderly, whether a man or a woman.[1399]

1397. Καλλωπίστρια describes one occupied with adorning herself; πολυτελής adds extravagance. The list concerns desire and display as well as sexual restraint.

1398. The mastery language contrasts ruling anger with being ruled by grief. Πάθος, passion, gathers such affections together; the prescribed temperance extends beyond bodily pleasures.

1399. Ὁ φιλόσοφος λόγος means philosophical discourse or teaching. The conclusion applies learned and practiced temperance to men and women alike; κοσμιώτατος describes exemplary orderliness of conduct.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.126.4

Τί οὖν; ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· δικαία δ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γυνὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα, οὐδ’ ἄμεμπτος βίου κοινωνός, οὐδ’ ὁμονοίας ἀγαθὴ συνεργός, οὐδὲ ἀνδρός γε καὶ τέκνων ἐπιμελὴς κηδεμών, οὐδὲ φιλοκερδείας ἢ πλεονεξίας πάντῃ καθαρά; Καὶ τίς ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου τοιαύτη γένοιτο, ἥν γε ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, εἴπερ εἴη τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφος, τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι χεῖρον νομίζειν, ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττοῦσθαι τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν κρεῖττον ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὸ δὲ καὶ τέκνα μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν ἢ τὸ ζῆν; Τῆς δὲ ἐχούσης οὕτω τίς ἂν εἴη γυνὴ δικαιοτέρα;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.4

Well then, that is how these matters stand. Would a woman who practices philosophy not be just, a blameless partner in life, a good helper in concord,[1400] a careful guardian of husband and children, and entirely free of love of gain or grasping?[1401] Who could become such a woman more readily than the philosopher? For if she were truly a philosopher, she would necessarily consider doing injustice worse than suffering it, inasmuch as it is more shameful; would judge having less better than taking more than her share; and would love her children more than life itself. What woman could be more just than one so disposed?[1402]

1400. The main text reads ὁμονοίας, concord. The apparatus proposes οἰκονομίας, household management, but the translation retains concord. Βίου κοινωνός is a partner in life, here within the family setting.

1401. Φιλοκέρδεια is love of gain, while πλεονεξία is grasping for more than one's share. The later contrast between having less and taking more develops this account of justice.

1402. The condition if she were truly a philosopher qualifies the ensuing judgments. Doing wrong is set below suffering it, and grasping below receiving less; justice is valued above personal advantage.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.126.5

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀνδρειοτέραν εἶναι προσήκει γυναῖκα τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου τὴν πεπαιδευμένην καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τῆς ἰδιώτιδος· ὡς μήτε θανάτου φόβῳ, μήτε ὄκνῳ τῷ πρὸς πόνον ὑπομεῖναί τι αἰσχρόν, μηδ' ὑποπτῆξαι μηδενὶ ὅτι εὐγενής, ἢ ὅτι δυνατός, ἢ ὅτι πλούσιος, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία ὅτι τύραννος. Ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτῇ μεμελετηκέναι μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι μὴ κακόν, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν μὴ ἀγαθόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν μὲν πόνον μὴ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπονίαν μὴ διώκειν ἐξ ἅπαντος. Ὅθεν εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην καὶ αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον, οἵαν ἃ μὲν ἂν τέκῃ τρέφειν μαστῷ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ ὑπηρετεῖν χερσὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῆς· ἃ δὲ δουλικὰ νομίζουσιν ἔνιοι, ταῦτα ἀόκνως ποιεῖν. Ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη γυνὴ μέγα μὲν ὄφελος εἴη τῷ γεγαμηκότι, κόσμος δὲ τοῖς προσήκουσι γένει, παράδειγμα δὲ χρηστὸν ταῖς ἐπισταμέναις αὐτήν;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.5

Further, the educated woman should be more courageous than the uneducated one, and the woman who practices philosophy than the woman without that training. Neither fear of death nor reluctance to face hardship should make her put up with anything disgraceful, nor should she cower before anyone because he is nobly born, powerful, wealthy or even, by Zeus, a tyrant.[1403] For she has practiced thinking nobly, regarding death as not bad and life as not a good; likewise, not turning away from hardship or invariably pursuing freedom from it.[1404] Hence it is reasonable that this woman should work with her own hands and bear hardship: nursing the children she bears at her own breast, serving her husband with her own hands, and unhesitatingly doing what some regard as servile tasks.[1405] Would not such a woman be a great benefit to her husband, an ornament to her kinspeople and a good example to the women who know her?[1406]

1403. Ἰδιῶτις contrasts here with the woman trained in philosophy. Courage includes refusing disgrace and not cowering before distinctions of birth, power or wealth, even the power of a tyrant.

1404. The negations remain distinct: death is not bad, while life is not a good. The passage does not say that death is good or life bad. Ἐξ ἅπαντος qualifies the pursuit of freedom from hardship, rather than forbidding all relief.

1405. Εἰκὸς makes the inference reasonable or likely. Αὐτουργική describes doing one's own work, and κακόπαθος bearing hardship. Nursing and service to the husband remain explicit; servile is what some people call these tasks, not an unqualified description by the translator.

1406. The final question names three relationships: husband, relatives connected by birth and women acquainted with her. Κόσμος, ornament, presents her as bringing credit to her family.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια

II.31.126.6

Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας, ὅταν ἀφέμεναι τοῦ οἰκουρεῖν ἐν μέσοις ἀναστρέφωνται τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ μελετῶσι λόγους καὶ σοφίζωνται καὶ ἀναλύωσι συλλογισμούς, δέον οἴκοι καθημένας ταλασιουργεῖν. Ἐγὼ δὲ οὐχ ὅπως τὰς γυναῖκας τὰς φιλοσοφούσας, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀξιώσαιμ’ ἄν, ἀφεμένους τῶν προσηκόντων ἔργων, εἶναι περὶ λόγους μόνον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσους μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἔργων φημὶ δεῖν ἕνεκα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικοῦ λόγου ὄφελος οὐδέν, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρῃ σώματος ἀνθρωπίνου, οὕτως οὐδ’ εἴ τινα φιλόσοφος ἔχει ἢ διδάσκει λόγον, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ φέρῃ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.6

"But, by Zeus," some say, "women who attend philosophers must generally be headstrong and brazen, when they abandon staying at home, mix with men, practice arguments, devise subtleties and analyze syllogisms, when they ought to sit at home working wool."[1407] For my part, I would not approve of women who practice philosophy—or even men—abandoning their proper tasks and concerning themselves only with arguments.[1408] Whatever arguments they use, I say they should use for the sake of action. For just as a medical argument is of no benefit unless it leads to the health of a human body, so any argument a philosopher possesses or teaches is of no benefit unless it leads to the virtue of a human soul.[1409]

1407. Some say introduces an objection, not the teacher's own verdict. The qualifying ὡς ἐπὶ πολύ, generally, is retained. Ταλασιουργεῖν is working wool; the requirement to sit at home belongs to these objectors' formulation.

1408. The reply applies the demand for proper work to men as well as women. It rejects abandoning those tasks for argument alone, rather than removing the household responsibilities described in the preceding passage.

1409. The medical comparison makes argument answerable to its practical result: bodily health in medicine and virtue of the soul in philosophy. The reference to action, ἔργα, continues the contrast between useful philosophical teaching and mere verbal activity.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Μουσωνίου — συνέχεια II.31.126.7

Πρὸ παντὸς δὲ σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον χρή, ᾧ ἕπεσθαι τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀξιοῦμεν, εἰ δύναται θρασείας ποιεῖν ὁ τὴν αἰδῶ μέγιστον ἀποφαίνων ἀγαθόν· εἰ ζῆν ἰταμώτερον ἐθίζει ὁ καταστολὴν πλείστην ὑφηγούμενος· εἰ μὴ διδάσκει σωφρονεῖν ὁ κακὸν ἀποδεικνὺς ἔσχατον τὴν ἀκολασίαν· εἰ μὴ προτρέπει οἰκονομεῖν ὁ παριστὰς ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν οἰκονομικήν. καὶ στέργειν δὲ . . . καὶ αὐτουργεῖν ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγος παρακαλεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Musonius continued

II.31.126.7

Above all, we must examine the teaching that we expect women who practice philosophy to follow. Can it make them brazen, when it declares a sense of shame the greatest good? Can the teaching that advocates the greatest restraint accustom them to live more shamelessly?[1410] Does it not teach temperance when it shows licentiousness to be the gravest evil? Does it not urge household management when it presents that skill as a virtue?[1411] And philosophers' teaching urges the woman to accept . . . and to work with her own hands.[1412]

1410. The questions answer the objection about brazen conduct. Αἰδώς is a sense of shame before disgrace; καταστολή denotes restraint or reserve. The argument distinguishes these from the courage praised above.

1411. Σωφρονεῖν is to practice temperance, opposed to ἀκολασία, licentiousness. Οἰκονομική is the skill of managing the household, not economics in its modern sense.

1412. Wachsmuth prints three dots after στέργειν δὲ, leaving the complement of accept missing. The English retains that gap. Proposed supplements in the apparatus are not adopted; the woman's own work, αὐτουργεῖν, remains explicit after it.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 246-247

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος ἐν δ′ Σωκρατικῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων II.31.127.1

Γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανός <τις> γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι. οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν, ὥστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τὴν τε γῆν ὁπόση ἐστὶν εἰδέναι καὶ ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι. τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσξυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν. ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοίη ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν· ἔφη δὲ ἱκανὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.

Ξενοφῶντος — συνέχεια II.31.127.2

ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν ἕνεκα πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἢ νυκτὸς ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἔχειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ῥᾴδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρά τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ταῦτα εἰδέναι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 247

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon, Memorabilia, Book IV

II.31.127.1

He said one should learn geometry until <one> could, if ever necessary, take over, hand over or divide land, or mark out work, correctly by measurement.[1413] This, he said, was so easy to learn that a person attending to the measurement would both know the extent of the land and leave understanding how it is measured.[1414] But he disapproved of learning geometry as far as diagrams difficult to understand. He said he could not see what benefit these brought, although he was certainly not inexperienced in them. He said they could consume a person's life and keep him from many other useful subjects.[1415]

Xenophon continued

II.31.127.2

He also urged them to gain experience in astronomy, though here too only far enough to recognize the time of night, month and year for journeys, seafaring and guard duty,[1416] and for other activities carried out by night, in a month or in a year, to be able to use signs, distinguishing the times just mentioned.[1417] These things too, he said, were easy to learn from night hunters, helmsmen and many others whose business it is to know them.[1418]

1413. The heading identifies Book IV of Xenophon's Memorabilia; the unnamed he is Socrates as represented by Xenophon. Supplied <τις> corresponds to <one>. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1414. The practical applications are receiving, transferring and dividing land, and marking out work. The lesson links knowing a plot's extent with understanding how its measurement is made.

1415. Διαγράμματα are geometric figures or diagrams. The criticism concerns the usefulness and time required for difficult studies; the narrator explicitly says Socrates was not inexperienced in them.

1416. Ἀστρολογία here concerns practical knowledge of the heavens for recognizing time and guiding the activities listed. The restriction concerns how far this study needs to be pursued.

1417. Τεκμήρια are indications or signs used to identify times. The source names their practical purposes without specifying particular stars, constellations or observational tables.

1418. Νυκτοθηρῶν refers to people who hunt by night, and κυβερνητῶν to helmsmen. These practitioners illustrate the accessible experience on which the recommended learning can draw.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος — συνέχεια II.31.127.3

τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ <μὴ> ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα καὶ τοὺς πλάνητάς τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γνῶναι, καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς περιόδους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἠβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 247-248

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon continued

II.31.127.3

But he strongly discouraged going so far in astronomy as to learn the objects <not> in the same circuit, and the wandering and unmeasurable stars, and to spend one's time investigating their distances from the earth, their periods and their causes.[1419] He said he saw no benefit in these matters either, although he was certainly not unacquainted with them. He said these too could consume a person's life and prevent many useful pursuits.[1420] In general he discouraged becoming an investigator of heavenly matters—how the god contrives each thing. For he thought neither that these things were discoverable by human beings nor that someone seeking what the gods had not wished to make clear would please them. He said that one occupied with these questions would also risk losing his mind, no less than Anaxagoras did, who took the greatest pride in explaining the gods' contrivances.[1421]

1419. Supplied <μὴ> is reflected by <not>. The difficult descriptor ἀσταθμήτους is retained literally as unmeasurable, alongside wandering; the translation does not replace it with a different astronomical category.

1420. The repeated contrast concerns practical benefit and the time absorbed by study. The word here is ἀστρονομία, astronomy, following ἀστρολογία above; the argument continues to discuss knowledge of heavenly bodies.

1421. Εὑρετά, discoverable, is governed by οὔτε, neither: this is Socrates's reported belief about divine workings. The charge of madness against Anaxagoras belongs to this portrayal, rather than to an independently established biographical diagnosis.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 247-248

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος — συνέχεια II.31.127.4

ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἠγνόει, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥᾳδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὔ· ἠγνόει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ἠγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὢν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος πάντα τὸν χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὢν διαμένει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 248

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon continued

II.31.127.4

For while saying that fire and the sun are the same thing, he did not recognize that people readily look at fire but cannot look directly at the sun, and that exposure to the sun darkens their complexions, whereas exposure to fire does not.[1422] Nor did he recognize that nothing growing from the earth can grow well without the sun's radiance, whereas all such things perish when heated by fire.[1423] And in saying that the sun is a red-hot stone, he also failed to recognize that a stone in fire neither shines nor endures for long, whereas the sun endures through all time as the brightest of all.[1424]

1422. He continues the reference to Anaxagoras in the preceding passage. The comparison contrasts fire and the sun, both in looking at them and in their reported effects on human complexions.

1423. The main text reads αὐγῆς, radiance; the apparatus contrasts this with αὐτῆς in the manuscript L. The growth comparison therefore concerns the sun's light, not merely the presence of the sun itself.

1424. Διάπυρος describes the stone as heated through, rendered red-hot. The Greek has no article before λίθος in the comparison. These claims form the criticism of Anaxagoras reported in Xenophon's account; the translation preserves that reasoning.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος — συνέχεια II.31.127.5

ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν· καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι. προύτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας παρά τε τῶν εἰδότων μανθάνοντας ὅσα ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα ἢ τί πῶμα ἢ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ, καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότατα <ἂν> διάγοι. τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἰατρὸν τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα ἑαυτοῦ.

Ξενοφῶντος — συνέχεια II.31.127.6

εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα, δι’ ὧν <οἱ> θεοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσιν, οὐδέποτε ἔρημον ἔφη γίγνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 248-249

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon continued

II.31.127.5

He also told them to learn calculation; here, as in the other subjects, he told them to guard against fruitless labor. He himself examined all these matters and went through them with his companions up to the point of usefulness.[1425] He also strongly urged his companions to care for their health, learning as much as possible from those who know, and each paying attention to himself throughout life: what food or drink or kind of exertion benefited him, and how, by using these, he <could> live in the best health.[1426] For he said it was hard for someone who attended to himself in this way to find a doctor who discerned what benefited his health better than he did himself.[1427]

Xenophon continued

II.31.127.6

If, however, someone wanted more help than human wisdom could provide, he advised giving attention to divination.[1428] For, he said, the person who knows the means by which <the> gods give people signs concerning their affairs[1429] is never deprived of the gods' counsel.[1430]

1425. Λογισμοί are calculations. The limit is usefulness, rather than a rejection of learning the subject. Συνεσκόπει and συνδιεξῆει describe Socrates examining and going through these matters with his companions.

1426. Πόνος here is physical exertion, considered alongside food and drink. Wachsmuth prints <ἂν> supplied from Xenophon's text; English marks the corresponding <could>. Learning from knowledgeable people accompanies attention to one's own experience.

1427. Ἑαυτοῦ is a genitive of comparison, than himself. The physician is compared with the person who consistently attends to his own condition; the wording keeps that qualification.

1428. The recommendation is conditional on seeking benefit beyond the measure of human wisdom. Divination supplements the human inquiry described above; the passage does not replace that inquiry with it.

1429. Wachsmuth prints the article <οἱ> supplied from Xenophon's text. English marks it as <the> before gods.

1430. Σημαίνουσιν means give signs or indications. The means of these signs are not enumerated here. The final phrase is counsel of the gods, keeping the divine source of the guidance explicit.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀγησίλαον ἐπιστολῆς

II.31.128.1

Ἀπέστειλάς μοι δεόμενος παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, φάσκων ἐθέλειν περὶ τοῦ υἱέος συμβουλεύεσθαι, ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως σῴζων τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἔθη καὶ ξενικῶν παιδευμάτων κοινωνήσει· κάμνω δὲ οὐ μετρίως κἀγώ· καὶ γὰρ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὥσπερ οἶσθα, πόρρω ἥκω καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ εὐθυμίας πέρι φροντίζουσιν, ὡς ἐμοῦ βουλευομένου ἄλλο τι ἢ ζωὴν δικαίαν αἱρουμένου θάνατόν τε μέχρι μὴ αἰσχρός ἐστι τιμῶντος· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν σωζοίμεθα, ἅπερ ἐπέστειλα [διὰ στόματος] καὶ συγγινομένων ἀκούσῃ ἡμῶν· εἰ δέ τι <τῶν> εἰωθότων γένοιτο κακόν, τότε σοι δίδαγμα ἔστω ἡ ἐπιστολὴ φράζουσα ὑπὲρ ὧν μαθεῖν ἐβουλήθης.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Attributed to Xenophon, From the Letter to Agesilaus

II.31.128.1

You sent to ask me to come to you, saying that you wished to consult about your son: by what means and in what way he might preserve Spartan customs while also sharing in foreign studies.[1431] But I too am seriously ill. For, as you know, I have reached an advanced age, and the doctors are concerned about cheerfulness, as though I were considering something other than choosing a just life and honoring death so long as it is not shameful [construction uncertain].[1432] But if we are spared, you will also hear from us, when we meet, what I have sent.[1433] If one <of the> usual misfortunes should occur, let the letter then be your instruction, setting out what you wished to learn.[1434]

1431. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, of the same author, carries forward Xenophon's name. This letter belongs to the pseudonymous or apocryphal Xenophon letter collection; the Agesilaus letter is fragment VII in Hercher's numbering. See Anna Marchewka, Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium 32(2) (2022), pp. 5–7, DOI 10.14746/sppgl.2022.XXXII.2.1. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels serve layout only.

1432. The text prints ζωὴν δικαίαν, a just life. The relation of βουλευομένου to the following genitive participles is not secure; the English gives a qualified construal. The qualification μέχρι μὴ αἰσχρός ἐστι, so long as it is not shameful, is retained.

1433. Wachsmuth rejects [διὰ στόματος], by word of mouth, following Usener. It remains visible in Greek but is omitted from the running English. Meeting and hearing from the writer are expressed by the remaining words.

1434. Wachsmuth prints Meineke's supplied <τῶν>, reflected by <of the>. The usual misfortunes contrasts with being spared, without naming a particular outcome; the letter would provide instruction if a meeting became impossible.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 249

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πρὸς Ἀγησίλαον — συνέχεια

II.31.128.2

Νόμος μὲν <ὁ> πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς ἄγων, ὦ Ἀγησίλαε, ἀνθρώπου δόγμα πάντως· παντὸς δὲ ἀμείνων ὃν Λυκοῦργος εὗρε· νόθα δὲ ἐπὶ νόθοις θηρεύειν κενὸς ὁ πόνος. Μηθὲν οὖν ἀνθρώπινον παίδευμα τῷ παιδὶ πρόσφερε, ἴθι δ’ ἐπὶ τὸν δεύτερον μὲν ἀναγεγραμμένον, πρῶτον δὲ καὶ μόνον ἐν θεοῖς κείμενον, ὅς ἐστι νοῦς ἐπιστήμων <ἀεὶ> κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχων.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Letter to Agesilaus continued

II.31.128.2

<The> law that leads toward the plausible, Agesilaus, is certainly a human judgment.[1435] Yet the one Lycurgus found is better than any; to hunt spurious things with spurious means is futile labor.[1436] So offer the boy no human learning. Turn to the one recorded as second, but first and alone established among the gods,[1437] which is knowing intellect, <always> remaining the same in the same way.[1438]

1435. Wachsmuth prints Usener's supplied article <ὁ>, reflected by <The>. Τὸ εἰκός can mean what is likely, plausible or appropriate; its precise force in the contrast with human judgment is uncertain here.

1436. Lycurgus is named as the finder of a superior law. Νόθα, spurious things, and νόθοις, with spurious things, leave the objects and means of the hunting metaphor unspecified; the English does not identify a particular foreign curriculum.

1437. No noun is repeated after the masculine article in the printed Greek. Usener's proposed <νόμων>, of laws, appears only in the apparatus and is not adopted. The relation of recorded as second to first among the gods remains uncertain.

1438. Νοῦς ἐπιστήμων is knowing intellect. Its sameness and constancy distinguish it from the human judgments described above. Wachsmuth prints Usener's supplied <ἀεὶ>, <always>.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀγησίλαον ἐπιστολῆς — συνέχεια II.31.128.3

Πόθεν δέ, ὦ γενναῖε, φήσεις, ἔστι τοῦτον λαβεῖν; Παρὰ φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν, οὓς θείους λέγων ὅσι᾽ ἂν εἴποιμι. Τούτων γὰρ νόμος οὐδεὶς ἄρχει γραφεὶς ὑπὸ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν δόξῃ ψευδεῖ ἐπικεχρωσμένος, τὸ δὲ ξυγγενὲς τῆς φύσεως ἄγει πρὸς τὰ κρείττω μαθήματα· <οὐδὲ> φεύξῃ φωραθεὶς παρανόμων δίκην· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνων νόμων ἐραστὴς ἁλώσῃ, οὐδὲ ξενικῶν ἔσῃ ἐπαινέτης, θείων δὲ καὶ αἰωνίων παντὸς πάντῃ ἀξιομαθητοτέρων εἶναι νομιζομένων. Ὁδὸς μὲν οὖν ὧδέ σοι δεδηλώσθω·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 249-250

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From the Letter to Agesilaus, continued

II.31.128.3

"But where, my noble friend," you will say, "can one acquire this?" From philosophical men, whom I could piously call divine. For no law written by base men and tainted with false opinion rules them; the kinship of their nature leads toward better studies.[1439] <Nor>, if you are found out, will you face a charge of unlawful conduct.[1440] For you will not be caught as a lover of human laws, nor will you be a praiser of foreign ones, but of divine and eternal laws, held in every respect to be more worthy of learning than anything else. Let the way, then, have been shown to you in this manner.[1441]

1439. This refers back to the divine mind described in the preceding unit. The contrast is between laws written by human beings and the affinity of nature that leads the philosophers toward better studies.

1440. Wachsmuth prints Hercher's supplied <οὐδὲ>, reflected by <Nor>. Δίκην φεύγειν is the legal idiom for facing prosecution, with the alleged offense in the genitive, here παρανόμων (LSJ, φεύγω IV). The sentence denies that the recipient will face such a charge; it does not describe fleeing punishment.

1441. The printed ἀξιομαθητοτέρων means more worthy of learning. The apparatus explains a shortened manuscript form with a compendium as this comparative, while also recording Dindorf's different conjecture. The Greek here follows the form in Wachsmuth's main text.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀγησίλαον ἐπιστολῆς — συνέχεια II.31.128.4

δύναμαι δέ σοι ἀφηγήσασθαι, ὅσα ἀρετῆς ἔρωτα ἐμβάλλει, τὰ δὲ μείζω καὶ πλείω κρειττόνων ἂν εἴη. Τροφὴ μὲν οὖν ἔστω σώματος ἥπερ ἐν Λάκωσι· ψυχῆς δὲ νέας καὶ ἀρτιφυοῦς λόγοι ὁδὰς ἔχοντες ἀνδρῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ τὸν βίον διενηνοχότων· παιδιαὶ δὲ ἄκοσμοι ἢ μῦθοι γραῶν ἐμβάλλοντες φρόνημα ταπεινὸν ἀπίτωσαν· τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔστω σὺν ἀνδράσι σώφροσιν, ἔνθα ὅμοια ὄψεται ἴσα τε ἀκούσεται. Πέφυκε δὲ πάντων μὲν ζῴων κρατεῖν τὸ ἔθος, παντὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπου. Κινδυνεύομεν δέ, ὦ Ἀγησίλαε, μιμηταὶ εἶναι τῶν λεγομένων τε καὶ δρωμένων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 250

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

From the Letter to Agesilaus, continued

II.31.128.4

I can, however, set out for you what instills a love of virtue; greater and more numerous matters would be the task of better men.[1442] Let the nourishment of the body be that customary among the Laconians. For a young and newly growing soul, let it be accounts containing hodas [uncertain word] of men whose lives have been distinguished by virtue.[1443] Let disorderly games or old women's stories that instill a lowly cast of mind be gone.[1444] Let the boy spend most of his time with temperate men, where he will see and hear like things. Habit naturally rules all living creatures, and the human being most of all. For we are liable, Agesilaus, to imitate what is said and done.[1445]

1442. The writer limits his own claim: he offers what can awaken love of virtue, while reserving greater and more extensive instruction for better men. The main text reads ὅσα and ἀρετῆς; the latter is Meineke's correction of the manuscript's ἀρχῆς.

1443. Λάκωσι is the main text's form for the Laconians. The following ὁδὰς is difficult and is retained as printed, without confidently translating it as paths. The apparatus records proposals including commands, songs and praises, as well as the possibility of a participle meaning guiding. English therefore marks the uncertain word rather than adopting one of these repairs.

1444. Παιδιαί means games or amusements. The letter dismisses both disorderly games and old women's stories in connection with the lowly cast of mind they instill; the account preserves its characterization.

1445. The boy is the subject understood in ἔστω, ὄψεται and ἀκούσεται. Temperate follows σώφροσιν; the final sentences connect habitual company and the imitation of words and deeds.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ

II.31.129.1

Δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον. — Ποῖα; — Τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. — Οὐκ ἔμαθον. — Νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας. — Οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι. — Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει ξυγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν; — Οὐδέν. — Ἀλλ' αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἓν ὂν γένος; — Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο. — Τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντ' ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; — Καὶ σφόδρα γε. — Ξυγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονε. — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — Στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν. — Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato, From the Sophist

II.31.129.1

We must distinguish two kinds of badness in the soul. — What kinds? — One like disease in the body, the other like ugliness arising in it. — I do not understand. — Perhaps you have not regarded disease and internal conflict as the same. — Nor do I know how I should answer that. — Do you understand internal conflict as anything other than the destruction, through some disagreement, of what is naturally akin? — Nothing else. — And ugliness: is it anything other than the single kind of disproportion that is ugly everywhere? — Nothing else at all.[1446] — Well then, in people in a bad condition, have we not noticed opinions conflicting with desires, anger with pleasures, reasoning with pains, and all these with one another in the soul? — Very much so. — Yet all these must necessarily be naturally akin. — Of course. — Then we shall speak correctly if we call vice internal conflict and disease of the soul. — Quite correctly indeed.[1447]

1446. Κακία begins broadly as badness or defect; πονηρία at the end names vice. The comparison distinguishes internal discord, likened to disease, from disproportion, likened to ugliness.

1447. Στάσις is conflict within what belongs together. Opinions, desires, anger, pleasure, reasoning and pain are treated as naturally related elements whose disagreement constitutes vice. The numerical subdivisions and continued labels divide one uninterrupted excerpt for layout only; the source identifies the passage as Sophist 227D-230E.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.2

Τί δ’; ὅσα κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενον πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνει, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν; — Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἴσμεν ἅπασαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν. — Σφόδρα γε. — Τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου ξυνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον. — Ἔοικεν. — Ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν. — Ναί. — Τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν. — Κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ δὴ νῦν λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ξύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.2

What of things that move, set themselves a target and try to reach it, yet at every impulse go astray and miss it? Shall we say that they suffer this through proportion in their relations to one another, or, on the contrary, through lack of proportion? — Clearly through lack of proportion.[1448] — Yet we know that every soul is unwillingly ignorant of whatever it does not know. — Certainly. — And ignorance, when the soul strives for truth but its understanding goes off course, is nothing other than a derangement of the mind. — Quite so. — Then an uncomprehending soul must be regarded as ugly and lacking proportion. — It seems so.[1449] — Thus there are, it appears, these two kinds of evil in it: one called vice by most people, most clearly a disease of the soul. — Yes. — The other they call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge it as badness when it alone occurs in the soul. — We must fully concede what I questioned when you said it just now: that there are two kinds of badness in the soul. Cowardice, intemperance and injustice must all be regarded as disease in us, while the condition of much and varied ignorance must be regarded as ugliness.[1450]

1448. The target image links failure to lack of proportion, ἀμετρία, rather than the internal conflict discussed before. The printed θέμενον is singular amid plural participles; the English follows the continuing plural subject without substituting a different Greek reading.

1449. The argument presents ignorance as an unwilling failure of understanding while the soul aims at truth. Παραφροσύνη, a derangement of the mind, continues the image of understanding going astray from its target, truth.

1450. The respondent now accepts both categories. The English takes μόνον as by itself; it can also be taken as only in the soul. The translation keeps broad badness distinct from the more specific vice.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.3

Οὐκοῦν ἔν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματε ταὐτὼ δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην; — Τίνε τούτω; — Περὶ μὲν αἶσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική. — Φαίνεται. — Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα δίκη; — Τό γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν. — Τί δέ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν; — Οὐδεμίαν. — Φέρε δή· διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω; σκόπει. — Σκοπῶ. — Καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν. — Πῇ; — Τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὐτὴ τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφ’ ἑνὶ τῶν αὐτῆς ἑκατέρῳ. — Τί οὖν; καταφανές πῃ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.3

Then have not two arts arisen to deal with these two bodily conditions? — Which two? — Gymnastics for ugliness, medicine for disease. — It appears so.[1451] — And for insolence, injustice and cowardice, is not the art of punishment naturally the most appropriate corrective of all the arts? — That is likely, at least, according to human opinion, so to speak.[1452] — What then? For ignorance as a whole, could anyone name another art more correctly than teaching? — None. — Come, should we say that teaching has only one kind, or more, with two chief kinds within it? Consider. — I am considering. — And I think we might find the answer most quickly in this way. — How? — By seeing whether ignorance itself has some division down the middle. For if it is twofold, it clearly compels teaching also to have two parts, one for each of its two kinds.[1453] — Well then, is what we are now seeking at all clear to you?

1451. Gymnastics and medicine supply the bodily counterparts in the analogy. The Greek repeatedly uses dual forms for the two conditions and the two arts; the English expresses their pairing without reproducing the grammatical dual.

1452. Κολαστική is the art of punishment or correction; δίκη here names its corrective function. The reply explicitly qualifies the proposed correspondence as likely according to human opinion.

1453. The inquiry divides teaching by first dividing the ignorance it addresses. No two forms of teaching have yet been named at this point; the following dialogue develops the distinction.

BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.4

Ἀγνοίας δ’ οὖν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφοριζόμενον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσι. — Ποῖον δή; — Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δι’ οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν. — Ἀληθῆ. — Καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι. — Πάνυ γε. — Τί δὲ δὴ <τῷ> τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον; — Οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι. — Καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄτομόν ἐστιν ἤδη πᾶν ἢ τινα ἔχει διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας. — Οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.4

Well, I think I see a large and troublesome kind of ignorance marked off, weighing against all its other parts. — What kind? — Thinking that one knows something when one has not understood it. It seems likely that all the errors we make in thought arise for everyone through this. — True. — And I think this alone among the forms of ignorance has been given the name lack of learning. — Certainly.[1454] — What, then, should we call the part of instruction that removes this?[1455] — I think, Stranger, that we call the other branch instruction in crafts, but this one, here at least, education. — Indeed, Theaetetus, that is so among almost all Greeks. But we must also examine whether this is now wholly indivisible, or has some division deserving a name. — Then we must examine it.[1456]

1454. Ἄγνοια is the general term ignorance; ἀμαθία, rendered lack of learning, is here assigned specifically to the presumption of knowing what one does not know. The passage thus distinguishes this state from the other kinds of ignorance.

1455. Wachsmuth supplies <τῷ> from Plato's text. English expresses the article through the construction the part of instruction; it adds no new kind of instruction.

1456. Δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας denotes instruction in crafts, contrasted here with παιδεία, education. Calling education indivisible or dividing it concerns the dialogue's classification of kinds; it does not yet settle what method education should use.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.5

Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι κατὰ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι. — Κατὰ τί; — Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μόριον αὐτῆς λειότερον. — Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγομεν; — <Τὸ μὲν> ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς μάλιστ' ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι· τὸ δ' οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικήν. — Ἔστιν οὕτω. — Τὸ δέ γε εἴξασί τινες ἂν λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν ἐθέλειν τὸν οἰόμενον <σοφὸν εἶναι> τούτων <ὧν> οἴοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν. — Ὀρθῶς γε νομίζοντες.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.5

It seems to me, then, that it still divides in some way along this line. — Along what line? — Of instruction through words, one way seems rather rough, while its other part is smoother. — What do we say each of these is? — <One is> a venerable ancestral practice, used especially toward sons, and still used by many today whenever their sons do something wrong: sometimes they scold, sometimes they encourage more gently. Taken as a whole, this would most correctly be called admonition. — That is so.[1457] — As for the other, some people would seem, after reasoning it out for themselves, to have concluded that all lack of learning is involuntary; that someone who thinks <he is wise> will never want to learn any of the matters about <which> he supposes himself skilled; and that the admonitory form of education achieves little despite much effort.[1458] — And they are right to think so.[1459]

1457. Supplied <Τὸ μὲν>, from Plato's text, marks the first branch and is expressed by <One is>. Νουθετητική, admonition, includes both angry correction and gentler encouragement; it is not limited to scolding.

1458. The claim that lack of learning is involuntary is made by those introducing the second method. Their reason concerns presumed knowledge: the person who thinks he already knows will not willingly learn those same matters.

1459. Wachsmuth supplies <σοφὸν εἶναι> and <ὤν> from Plato's text. English marks <he is wise> and <which>; the claim to skill remains the learner's own supposition. The reply endorses the reasoning just stated.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.6

Τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται. — Τίνι δή; — Διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἶθ' ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγουσι δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταὐτόν τε τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δ' ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας· οἱ δὲ ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.6

That is why they set about removing this opinion in another way. — What way? — They question a person about the things on which he thinks he is saying something when he is saying nothing. Then they readily examine the opinions of these people, who are wandering in them, and gather them in discussion and set them side by side in one place.[1460] By setting them together, they show that the opinions contradict one another at the same time, about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respects.[1461] Those who see this become angry with themselves but gentler toward others. In this way they are freed from their grand and rigid opinions about themselves—a release that is the most pleasant of all to hear about, and comes about most securely in the person experiencing it.[1462]

1460. The opinion being removed is the learner's belief that he knows. The questioning examines what the person himself says and brings those opinions together; it does not begin by supplying him with a new lesson.

1461. The Greek specifies the conditions of opposition: simultaneously, about the same things, in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The translation retains each qualification rather than treating any difference between statements as a contradiction.

1462. The release is from μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν, grand and rigid opinions, about oneself. The accompanying change of attitude is directed both inward, in anger at oneself, and outward, in greater gentleness toward others.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Πλάτωνος — συνέχεια

II.31.129.7

νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν <ἂν> τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή. — Βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἕξεων αὕτη. — Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Plato continued

II.31.129.7

For, my dear boy, those who purify them have formed the same judgment about the soul as physicians have about bodies. Physicians believe that a body cannot benefit from the food offered it until someone has expelled what obstructs it within.[1463] So these men think that the soul will gain no benefit from the studies offered it until someone examining the person has brought him to shame, removed the opinions obstructing his learning, and made him appear purified, believing that he knows only the things he actually knows, and no more.[1464] — Certainly this is the best and most temperate of dispositions.[1465] — For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must say that refutation is the greatest and most authoritative of purifications. And we must hold that someone who has not been refuted, even if he happens to be the Great King, is unclean in the most important respects and has become uneducated and ugly in precisely those respects in which someone who is truly to be happy ought to be most pure and most beautiful.[1466]

1463. The medical comparison concerns removing an obstruction before nourishment can help. Wachsmuth supplies <ἂν> from Plato's text after the first πρίν; English expresses its force in the construction until someone has expelled. The translation follows the printed ἐντός, within.

1464. Ἔλεγχος is refutation through examination of the person's claims. Here shame and the removal of obstructive opinions precede learning; the resulting purified state is a recognition of the limits of one's knowledge.

1465. Σωφρονεστάτη, most temperate, describes the disposition just defined: believing one knows what one actually knows, without claiming more. The praise concerns this intellectual restraint.

1466. The Great King is admitted as a possible case by even if; exalted status does not exempt anyone from examination. Unclean, uneducated and ugly concern the respects that matter for becoming truly happy, rather than a claim about bodily dirt or physical appearance.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Ξενοφῶντος II.31.130

Παίδευσις γὰρ καλὴ διδάσκει χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ λέγειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀκούειν. οἱ μὲν οὖν παρασχόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ μοχθεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκεσθαι αὐτοὶ μὲν μαθήσεις καὶ ἐπιπόνους μελέτας ἔχουσι, σωτηρίαν δὲ ταῖς αὐτῶν πόλεσιν· οἱ δὲ μὴ θέλοντες διὰ τὸ ἐπίπονον διδάσκεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἡδοναῖς ἀκαίροις διάγειν, φύσει οὗτοι κάκιστοι· οὔτε γὰρ νόμοις οὔτε λόγοις ἀγαθοῖς πείθονται· οὐ γὰρ εὑρίσκουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ πονεῖν οἷον χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὥστε οὔτε θεοσεβεῖς δύναιντ’ ἂν εἶναι οὔτε σοφοί. τῷ τε ἀπαιδεύτῳ χρώμενοι πολλὰ ἐπιτιμῶσι τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις. διὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι· διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀμεινόνων ἅπασαι <αἱ> ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὕρηνται· ἀμείνους δὲ οἱ θέλοντες πονεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 31

Xenophon, On Hunting

II.31.130

For good education teaches people to make use of laws and to speak and listen about what is just.[1467] Those who commit themselves to hard work and instruction gain learning and strenuous practice for themselves, and safety for their own cities.[1468] But those who, because it is hard, do not want to be taught, and instead want to pass their time in ill-timed pleasures, are the worst by nature. For they are persuaded neither by laws nor by good arguments. Since they do not work, they do not discover what a good person ought to be like; thus they could be neither reverent toward the gods nor wise.[1469] Acting in their uneducated way, they find much fault with the educated.[1470] Through such people, then, nothing would go well. But through better people all <the> benefits for humankind have been discovered; and the better people are those willing to work.[1471]

1467. The editorial reference identifies On Hunting 13.14-17; the Greek attribution itself names Xenophon. Education here joins the use of laws with speaking and listening about justice, rather than treating learning as the acquisition of information alone.

1468. The contrast gives learning and demanding practice to the learners themselves, and safety to their own cities. The printed αὐτοὶ, themselves, and the order ἐπιπόνους μελέτας, strenuous practice, are retained rather than replaced from a fuller Xenophon text.

1469. The description φύσει, by nature, stands beside the concluding emphasis on willingness to work; this excerpt does not develop their relation. Δύναιντ’ ἄν, could be, retains the potential form of the stated consequence.

1470. Τῷ τε ἀπαιδεύτῳ χρώμενοι literally speaks of making use of what is uneducated. The English understands the neuter adjective as their uneducated manner of acting; no particular opponent is named.

1471. Wachsmuth supplies <αἱ> from the Xenophon text, reflected by <the>. The final comparison identifies the better people by their willingness to undertake effort, returning to the contrast between training and avoidance of hardship.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 32

Κεφάλαιον ΛΒ′ II.32.heading

Ὅτι κάλλιστον ἡ φιλία τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

deest.

BOOK II CHAPTER 32

Chapter 32

II.32.heading

That friendship is the finest of good things.

[Text missing][1472]

1472. Wachsmuth prints deest, is missing, beneath this preserved heading. The chapter text is missing here; this is not a notice that surviving excerpts remain untranslated. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν is understood as of good things, the class within which friendship is ranked finest.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 255

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Κεφάλαιον ΛΓ′ II.33.heading

Ὅτι ἡ ὁμοιότης τῶν τρόπων φιλίαν ἀπεργάζεται.

Εὐριπίδου II.33.1

Ὅστις δ’ ὁμιλῶν ἥδεται κακοῖς ἀνήρ,
οὐ πώποτ’ ἠρώτησα, γιγνώσκων ὅτι
τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷσπερ ἥδεται ξυνών.

Εὐριπίδου Βελλεροφόντῃ II.33.2

Ἀνὴρ δὲ χρηστὸς χρηστὸν οὐ μισεῖ ποτε,
κακῷ κακὸς δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς·
φιλεῖ δὲ θοὐμόφυλον ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 255

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Chapter 33

II.33.heading

That similarity of character produces friendship.[1473]

Euripides

II.33.1

As for a man who enjoys keeping bad company,
I have never inquired, knowing
that he is like those whose company he enjoys.[1474]

Euripides, Bellerophon

II.33.2

Yet a good man never hates a good man;
pleasures fuse a bad man with the bad;
and what is of like kind tends to draw people.[1475]

1473. Τρόποι are dispositions or ways of behaving. The chapter develops similarity of character through excerpts about companionship, shared pleasures, kinship and concord. Its surviving text begins immediately below this heading.

1474. Wachsmuth cites Euripides, fragment 809 in Nauck's numbering, without naming a play in the heading. The precise question remains unexpressed; the following comparison indicates that the inquiry concerns the man's character. No dramatic speaker is identified.

1475. Bellerophon, fragment 298 in Nauck. Συντέτηκεν pictures the bad as melted or fused together through pleasures. Θοὐμόφυλον combines τὸ ὁμόφυλον, what is of like kind; φιλεῖ with the infinitive means tends or is accustomed to, rather than loves in this construction.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 255

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Εὐριπίδου Πελιάσιν II.33.3

<Ὁ> γὰρ ξυνὼν κακὸς <μὲν> ἦν τύχῃ γεγὼς
τοιούσδε τοὺς ξυνόντας ἐκπαιδεύεται,
χρηστοὺς δ’ ὁ χρηστός· ἀλλὰ τὰς ὁμιλίας
ἐσθλὰς διώκειν, ὦ νέοι, σπουδάζετε.

Μενάνδρου II.33.4

Ἡ τῶν ὁμοίων αἵρεσις μάλιστά πως
τὴν τοῦ βίου σύγκρασιν ὁμόνοιαν ποιεῖ.

Εὐριπίδου Ἀντιγόνῃ II.33.5

Νέοι νέοισι συννοσοῦσι τἄφρονα.

Μενάνδρου Περικειρομένῃ II.33.6

<Οὕ>τω ποθεινόν ἐστιν ὁμότροπος φίλος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 255-256

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Euripides, Daughters of Pelias II.33.3

For <the> man you associate with, if he happens <indeed> to be bad,[1476]
trains his companions to be like himself;
while a good man trains them to be good. So, young men,
make it your concern to seek out noble company.[1477]

Menander II.33.4

Choosing those who are alike, more than anything perhaps,
brings concord to life's mingling.[1478]

Euripides, Antigone II.33.5

The young share the follies of the young.[1479]

Menander, The Woman with Her Hair Shorn II.33.6

<So> desirable is a friend of like character.[1480]

1476. The printed supplements <Ὁ> and <μὲν> are reflected by <the> and <indeed>. The particle marks the first side of the contrast between a bad companion and a good one.

1477. Daughters of Pelias, fragment 612 in Nauck. These verses also occur at II.31.4 and are retained again in their second place in the anthology. Association there illustrates education; here it develops the chapter's concern with character and friendship.

1478. Wachsmuth cites Com. IV, p. 324, unassigned fragment 468, without naming a play. The English understands τῶν ὁμοίων as those alike whom one chooses. Σύγκρασις is a blending or mingling; the image presents shared life as a mixture brought into concord. Πως qualifies the assertion.

1479. Antigone, fragment 160 in Nauck. Συννοσοῦσι, from συννοσέω, pictures those involved as sharing another's sickness: here the shared condition is folly. Τἄφρονα combines τὰ ἄφρονα, foolish things. The isolated verse identifies no speaker or particular offense.

1480. Wachsmuth cites Com. IV, p. 185, fragment 1. Only the initial <Οὕ> of οὕτω, so, is supplied in Greek; the English marks the resulting whole word <So>. Ὁμότροπος describes someone whose character or disposition is like one's own.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Μενάνδρου II.33.7

Οὐδείς ἐστί μοι
ἀλλότριος, ἂν ᾖ χρηστός· ἡ φύσις μία
πάντων, τὸ δ’ οἰκεῖον συνίστησιν τρόπος.

Ὁμήρου II.33.8

Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον.

Δημοκρίτου II.33.9

Ὁμοφροσύνη φιλίην ποιέει.

II.33.10

Διογένης ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἐστι φίλος, “μία ψυχή, <ἔφη,> ἐν δυσὶ σώμασι κειμένη”.

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Menander

II.33.7

No one is a stranger to me,
if he is good; nature is one
for all, but character establishes kinship.[1481]

Homer

II.33.8

How a god always leads like to like![1482]

Democritus

II.33.9

Like-mindedness makes friendship.[1483]

II.33.10

When Diogenes was asked what a friend is, <he said,> “One soul residing in two bodies.”[1484]

1481. Wachsmuth cites fragment 2 at the same comic-fragment location as the preceding excerpt, while the heading again names Menander alone. Ἀλλότριος, a stranger or outsider, contrasts with τὸ οἰκεῖον, what is one’s own or akin. Kinship here renders the closeness established by character, rather than asserting a blood relationship.

1482. Odyssey 17.218. Melanthius speaks this line scornfully about the swineherd and Odysseus, who appears as a beggar; the anthology isolates it as a saying about likeness. The second ὡς is directional, to, and is retained in the Greek.

1483. Ὁμοφροσύνη is agreement of mind or outlook. The Ionic forms φιλίην and ποιέει correspond to Attic φιλίαν and ποιεῖ; they are retained in the Greek.

1484. The source attributes this answer to Diogenes. Usener’s supplied <ἔφη>, he said, restores the reporting verb and is marked in the English as well.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 33

<Θουκυδίδου> II.33.11

Εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βεβαίαν γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν, εἰ μὴ μετὰ ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιντο καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοιότροποι εἶεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσσοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων καθίστανται.

Ἀριστοτέλους II.33.12

Ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος κίρναται τοῖς τῶν πινόντων τρόποις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία τοῖς τῶν χρωμένων ἤθεσι.

II.33.13

Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἐστι φίλος, ἀπεκρίνατο· “Ἄλλος ἐγώ”.

II.33.14

Τὴν φιλίαν ἔφη ἰσότητα εἶναι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

<Thucydides>

II.33.11

Knowing that neither friendship between individuals nor partnership between cities becomes secure unless they should deal with one another with apparent virtue and be alike in other respects as well.[1485] For differences in action, too, arise where judgment differs.[1486]

Aristotle

II.33.12

As wine is blended to suit the drinkers' dispositions, so is friendship to suit the characters of those who engage in it.[1487]

II.33.13

When Pythagoras was asked what a friend is, he answered, "Another I."[1488]

II.33.14

He said that friendship is equality.[1489]

1485. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Thucydides, identifying III.10. The excerpt begins with a participle, knowing, whose governing construction lies outside this selection. The conditional wording retains the hypothetical force of γίγνοιντο and εἶεν.

1486. The printed δοκούσης means seeming or apparent: the passage requires virtue as it appears to the parties, without asserting that this appearance guarantees genuine virtue. Similarity in other respects is also an explicit condition.

1487. Κίρναται means is mixed or blended; the same verb is understood in the second half. The comparison makes the participants' character determine the form of friendship, as the drinkers' dispositions determine the blending of wine.

1488. Ἄλλος ἐγώ literally means another I: the friend is described as another self. The wording is kept distinct from the image of one soul in two bodies in II.33.10.

1489. He continues the attribution to Pythagoras in the preceding excerpt. The brief saying gives no further specification of what kind of equality is meant.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Ἰάμβλιχος Μακεδονίῳ περὶ Ὁμονοίας II.33.15

Ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα βούλεται ἐνδείκνυσθαι, συναγωγὴν ὁμοίου τοῦ νοῦ κοινωνίαν τε καὶ ἕνωσιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνείληφεν· ἀφορμηθεῖσα δὴ οὖν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πόλεις καὶ οἴκους, κοινούς τε συλλόγους πάντας καὶ ἰδίους [οἴκους], φύσεις τε καὶ συγγενείας πάσας ἐπιπορεύεται, κοινάς τε καὶ ἰδίας ὡσαύτως· ἔτι δὲ περιέχει καὶ τὴν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμογνωμοσύνην· ὑφ' ἑνὸς μὲν γάρ τις νοήματος καὶ μιᾶς γνώμης κυβερνώμενος ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, διχογνωμονῶν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀνόμοια λογιζόμενος διαστασιάζει· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ αὐτῆς ἐπιμένων διανοήσεως ὁμοφροσύνης ἐστὶ πλήρης· ὁ δὲ ἄστατος τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐπ' ἄλλην δόξην φερόμενος ἀστάθμητός ἐστι καὶ πολέμιος πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

<Πλάτωνος> II.33.15a

Φιλία ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ ἐναντίων δεινὴ καὶ ἀγρία καὶ τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολλάκις ἔχουσα ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἥμερος τε καὶ κοινὴ διὰ βίου.

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Iamblichus to Macedonius, On Concord

II.33.15

Concord, as its very name seeks to indicate, embraces within itself a bringing together of like mind, fellowship and union.[1490] Starting from this, it extends to cities and households, to all public and private gatherings, and ranges over all natures and relationships, public and private alike.[1491] It also includes each individual's agreement with himself. For someone governed by a single thought and a single judgment is at concord with himself; but someone divided in judgment within himself and reasoning inconsistently is at variance. The person who holds to the same understanding throughout is full of like-mindedness; but one whose reasoning is unstable, who is carried now to one opinion and now to another, is unsteady and at war with himself.[1492]

<Plato>

II.33.15a

Friendship arising from opposites is fierce and wild, and does not often afford us a shared bond; friendship arising from those who are alike is gentle and shared throughout life.[1493]

1490. The explanation connects ὁμόνοια, concord, with likeness or agreement of νοῦς, mind. The passage then extends this agreement from relationships among people to agreement within a single person.

1491. The second [οἴκους], households, is rejected in the printed Greek and omitted from the English. Wachsmuth records Meineke's deletion. Public and private are then applied to both gatherings and the following natures and relationships.

1492. The account of inward concord contrasts governance by one thought and judgment with divided judgment and shifting opinions. The translation retains the local ἐπ' ἄλλην δόξην, toward another opinion, rather than adopting an alternative from the apparatus.

1493. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Plato, Laws VIII, 837B, and separates this excerpt from the preceding Iamblichus passage. The contrast is between friendship from opposites and from those who are alike; τὸ κοινόν is what they hold in common.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου

II.33.16

<Οὐ> γὰρ δή ποτε εἵμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ’ ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι.

BOOK II CHAPTER 33

Plato, from the Phaedrus

II.33.16

For it is <not> ever ordained that a bad person be a friend to a bad person, or that a good person be no friend to a good person.[1494]

1494. Supplied <Οὐ>, not, governs both alternatives. The second alternative includes μὴ φίλον, no friend; the translation retains both negations rather than turning this into a claim that good people cannot be friends.

BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Κεφάλαιον ΛΔ′ II.34.heading

Ὅτι χρὴ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις καὶ τοῖς κινδύνοις μὴ περιορᾶν τοὺς φίλους.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛΕ′ II.35.heading

Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ συναδικεῖν τοῖς φίλοις.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛϚ′ II.36.heading

Περὶ γνησίων καὶ ἀβεβαίων φίλων.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛΖ′ II.37.heading

Ὅτι χρὴ ταχείας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους διαλλαγὰς τὰ ἁμαρτήματα αὐτῶν ῥᾷον φέροντας μετὰ τῆς ἀμνηστίας.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Chapter 34

II.34.heading

That one should not neglect friends in misfortune and danger.

[Text missing][1495]

Chapter 35

II.35.heading

That one should not join friends in wrongdoing.

[Text missing][1496]

Chapter 36

II.36.heading

On genuine and unreliable friends.

[Text missing][1497]

Chapter 37

II.37.heading

That one should reconcile quickly with friends, bearing their faults more lightly and putting them out of mind.

[Text missing][1498]

1495. Wachsmuth prints deest, is missing, beneath each of the following twelve preserved headings. Their chapter texts are missing, rather than surviving but untranslated. Περιορᾶν here is to overlook or neglect friends when they need help.

1496. Συναδικεῖν with τοῖς φίλοις means to share in wrongdoing with one's friends. The heading distinguishes friendship from complicity; its missing excerpts would have developed that distinction.

1497. Γνήσιοι are genuine friends, while ἀβέβαιοι are unstable or unreliable. The printed heading retains this contrast; no negative is inserted before genuine from the alternative mentioned in the apparatus.

1498. Διαλλαγαί are reconciliations. Ἀμνηστία here is not keeping the faults in memory, rendered putting them out of mind; the heading supplies no particular dispute or political setting. The comparative ῥᾷον, more lightly, is retained.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Κεφάλαιον ΛΗ′ II.38.heading

Ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις τοὺς γνησίους τῶν φίλων διαγινώσκομεν.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛΘ′ II.39.heading

Φιλικὰ παραγγέλματα.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον Μ′ II.40.heading

Περὶ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ ὁποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΜΑ′ II.41.heading

Περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔστιν ἀπ’ ἐχθρῶν ὠφεληθῆναι.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Chapter 38

II.38.heading

That in misfortune we recognize which friends are genuine.

[Text missing][1499]

Chapter 39

II.39.heading

Precepts on friendship.

[Text missing][1500]

Chapter 40

II.40.heading

On enmity and how one should be disposed toward enemies.

[Text missing][1501]

Chapter 41

II.41.heading

On how one can benefit from enemies.

[Text missing][1502]

1499. Τοὺς γνησίους τῶν φίλων means the genuine ones among one's friends. The title makes misfortune the occasion for recognizing them, but the missing text supplies no surviving examples here.

1500. Παραγγέλματα are instructions or precepts; φιλικά places them in the sphere of friendship. Only this general description survives here, not the individual instructions.

1501. Ὁποῖόν τινα asks what sort of person one should be in relation to enemies. The heading concerns one's disposition toward them; the missing text does not allow its particular advice to be recovered.

1502. Ὠφεληθῆναι is to receive benefit. The title asks how such benefit is possible, but its missing excerpts cannot establish which ways of benefiting were intended.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Κεφάλαιον ΜΒ′ II.42.heading

Περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΜΓ′ II.43.heading

Ὅτι μείζων ἡ χάρις ἐν καιρῷ δοθεῖσα.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΜΔ′ II.44.heading

Περὶ τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΜΕ′ II.45.heading

Ὅτι τοὺς πονηροὺς οὐ χρὴ εὖ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

deest.

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BOOK II CHAPTERS 34–45

Chapter 42

II.42.heading

On doing good to others.

[Text missing][1503]

Chapter 43

II.43.heading

That a favor is greater when given at the right time.

[Text missing][1504]

Chapter 44

II.44.heading

On doing good in return.

[Text missing][1505]

Chapter 45

II.45.heading

That one should neither benefit the wicked nor accept benefits from them.

[Text missing][1506]

1503. Εὐεργετεῖν is to benefit someone or do them good. The next two headings distinguish a favor's timing from doing good in return; the present chapter's own examples are missing.

1504. Χάρις here is a favor given, rather than gratitude received. Ἐν καιρῷ means at a fitting or opportune time; μείζων preserves the comparison, greater, without an expressed standard of comparison.

1505. The prefix ἀντι- marks a benefit returned for a benefit. The heading concerns reciprocal action, without specifying a financial repayment or a particular kind of favor.

1506. The title pairs doing good to the wicked with receiving good from them. Its arguments and examples are missing; the following surviving chapter takes up ingratitude.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Κεφάλαιον ΜΣ′ II.46.heading

Περὶ ἀχαριστίας.

Μενάνδρου II.46.1

Ἀχάριστος ἄνθρωπος μὴ νομιζέσθω φίλος·
μήθ’ ὃς πονηρός, κατεχέτω χρηστοῦ τόπον.

Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδος II.46.2

Φίλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν ἐκβαλεῖν ἴσον λέγω
καὶ τὸν παρ’ αὐτῷ βίοτον, ὃν πλεῖστον φιλεῖ.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Αἴαντος II.46.3

Χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ’ ἀεί.
Ὅτου δ’ ἀπορρεῖ μνῆστις εὖ πεπονθότος,
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτ’ ἔθ’ οὗτος εὐγενὴς ἀνήρ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Chapter 46

II.46.heading

On Ingratitude.[1507]

Menander

II.46.1

Let no ungrateful person be considered a friend;
nor let one who is wicked occupy a good man's place.[1508]

Sophocles, Oedipus the King

II.46.2

For I say that casting out a good friend is the same
as casting out the life one holds most dear.[1509]

Sophocles, Ajax

II.46.3

For kindness is what always gives birth to kindness.
But the man from whom memory of kindness received drains away
could no longer be a noble man.[1510]

1507. Ἀχαριστία is ingratitude. The excerpts draw on several senses of χάρις: a favor, gratitude and a favor returned. Parenthetical D. numbers printed beside the selections are companion cross-references, not a replacement for Wachsmuth's main numbering, which is retained here, including 9a.

1508. Wachsmuth cites Com. IV, p. 325, unassigned fragment 470. The two prohibitions concern who deserves the standing of a friend or a good person. The heading names Menander without identifying a play or speaker.

1509. Oedipus the King 611-612. The comparison makes rejecting a good friend equivalent to casting away one's own cherished life. The printed παρ' αὐτῷ refers to the life one has, rather than supplying a separate benefit or sum of money.

1510. Ajax 522-524. The repeated χάρις links a benefit with a responding benefit or gratitude. Memory of having been treated well is the test in the following lines. Εὐγενής can mean well-born; here the rebuke connects nobility with remembering kindness.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

<Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> II.46.4

Χάρις διαρρεῖ καὶ προδοῦσ’ ἁλίσκεται.

Ἀναξανδρίδου II.46.5

Οὐχὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἡ χάρις τίκτει χάριν.

Σοφοκλέους II.46.6

Ἀμνήμονος γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ὄλλυται χάρις.

Θεοκρίτου II.46.7

Θρέψαι <κα> λυκιδεῖς, θρέψαι κύνας ὥς ἐ φάγωντι.

Μενάνδρου II.46.8

Οὐχὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
διάνοιαν αἰτῶν εἷς ἕκαστος καὶ λαβών.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

<From the same author> II.46.4

Gratitude drains away and is caught in treachery.[1511]

Anaxandrides II.46.5

It is not with many that favor begets favor.[1512]

Sophocles II.46.6

For gratitude perishes in a forgetful man.[1513]

Theocritus II.46.7

One <might> rear wolf-cubs, rear dogs, for them to eat him.[1514]

Menander II.46.8

Each person does not have the same mind
when asking and after receiving.[1515]

1511. Wachsmuth supplies the same-author attribution and identifies Ajax 1267. Χάρις is personified: it drains or slips away, and the feminine προδοῦσα presents it as betraying, not as being betrayed.

1512. Wachsmuth cites Com. III, p. 200, unassigned fragment 15. The line echoes the reciprocity expressed in II.46.3 while limiting its realization: not many return one favor with another.

1513. Fragment 735 in Nauck's numbering; no play is named. Ἀμνήμων describes someone who does not remember, tying the loss of χάρις to the failure of memory already emphasized in II.46.3.

1514. Idyll 5.38. The English takes θρέψαι as a third-person aorist optative with the supplied Doric modal <κα>, reflected by <might>. The local third-person ἐ is him; φάγωντι retains the Doric form. The grim outcome pictures beneficiaries turning on the person who raised them.

1515. Wachsmuth cites Com. IV, p. 325, unassigned fragment 471. Διάνοια is the attitude or state of mind that changes between requesting something and having received it; the object requested is not specified.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.46.9

Ἀεὶ δ’ ὁ σωθεὶς ἐστιν ἀχάριστος φύσει.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ II.46.9a

Ἅμ’ ἠλέηται καὶ τέθνηκεν ἡ χάρις,
ἣν δεόμενος τότ’ ἀθάνατον σχήσειν ἔφη.

Εὐριπίδου Πελιάσιν II.46.10

Ἐν τοῖσι μὲν δεινοῖσιν ὡς φίλοι φίλων·
ὅταν δὲ πράξωσ’ εὖ, διωθοῦνται χάριν,
αὐτοὶ δι’ αὐτοὺς εὐτυχεῖν ἡγούμενοι.

Φιλήμονος II.46.11

Ὅταν τις ἡμῶν ἀμέριμνον ἔχῃ βίον,
οὐκ ἐπικαλεῖται τὴν τύχην εὐδαίμονα·
ἐπὴν δὲ λύπαις περιπέσῃ καὶ πράγμασιν,
εὐθὺς προσάπτει τῇ τύχῃ τὴν αἰτίαν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. II, printed pp. 261

BOOK II CHAPTER 46

From the same author

II.46.9

Yet the one who has been saved is always ungrateful by nature.[1516]

From the same author

II.46.9a

No sooner has he been pitied than gratitude is dead,
which, when in need, he said he would keep immortal.[1517]

Euripides, Daughters of Pelias

II.46.10

In danger, what friends they are to their friends!
But when they fare well, they thrust gratitude aside,
thinking their success is their own doing.[1518]

Philemon

II.46.11

When one of us has an untroubled life,
he does not call Fortune blessed;
but when he falls into grief and troubles,
he immediately lays the blame on Fortune.[1519]

1516. The same-author heading continues Menander; Wachsmuth cites unassigned fragment 472, verse 1. Ἀεί, always, and φύσει, by nature, preserve the saying's sweeping formulation. Being saved is the benefit whose recipient is accused of ingratitude.

1517. Wachsmuth separates 9a from 9 while citing these as verses 2-3 of the same unassigned fragment 472. The simultaneous receipt of pity and death of gratitude contradict the earlier promise to keep gratitude immortal. The local σχήσειν, would keep, is retained.

1518. Daughters of Pelias, fragment 611 in Nauck. The first line is an exclamation with no expressed verb. The contrast is between professed friendship in danger and the claim of self-sufficient success afterward; δι' αὑτούς attributes prosperity to themselves.

1519. The printed heading names Philemon, but Wachsmuth also cites an attribution to Menander, Com. IV, p. 239, unassigned fragment 20. The local εὐδαίμονα is an adjective agreeing with Fortune, retained as blessed, rather than the alternative participle describing the fortunate person. The contrast with assigning blame makes the withheld acknowledgment clear.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Θεόγνιδος II.46.12

Δείλους εὖ ἔρδοντι δύω κακά· τῶν τε γὰρ αὐτοῦ
χήρωσις κτεάνων καὶ χάρις οὐδεμία.

II.46.13

Διογένης ἐρωτηθείς, τί τάχιστα γηράσκει παρ’ ἀνθρώποις, εἶπε· “Χάρις”.

Αἰλιανοῦ II.46.14

Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέους ἑαυτὸν εἴκαζε ταῖς δρυσί, λέγων ὅτι καὶ ἐκείνας ὑπέρχονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ δέονται αὐτῶν, εἰ ὕει, στέγην τὴν ἐκ τῶν κλάδων ποθοῦντες· ὅταν δὲ οὔσης εὐδίας παρίωσι, τίλλουσιν αὐτὰς καὶ περικλῶσι. καὶ αὐτὸς οὖν ἔλεγεν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχειν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Theognis

II.46.12

Two evils attend one who benefits the base:
loss of his own possessions, and no gratitude.[1520]

II.46.13

When Diogenes was asked what grows old fastest among people, he said, “Gratitude.”[1521]

Aelian

II.46.14

Themistocles, son of Neocles, compared himself to oak trees. He said that people take shelter beneath them too and need them when it rains, seeking the shelter of their branches; but when they pass by in fair weather, they strip them and break off branches.[1522] He said that he himself suffered the same treatment from the people.[1523]

1520. Theognis 955-956. The printed δύω, two, is retained, as is χήρωσις, a noun meaning loss or deprivation, rather than a different verbal reading. The two costs are giving up one’s own possessions and receiving no gratitude.

1521. The author’s name is part of the anecdote, not a separate heading. Χάρις is rendered gratitude in this chapter’s context: the answer treats gratitude as something that quickly ages or loses its force.

1522. The trees are needed for shelter in bad weather but damaged when that need has passed. The comparison makes usefulness followed by mistreatment the point of the anecdote.

1523. Wachsmuth cites Aelian, Various History IX.18. The parenthetical D.24 printed beside this excerpt is a companion numbering cross-reference; the D. numbers do not add further source sections to this chapter.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Ἐκ τῆς περὶ φιλίας Ἐπιστολῆς

II.46.15

Ὡς μέντοι λαμπρόν ἐστιν εὖ ποιεῖν, οὕτως ἀμειπτέον· ... ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἀχαριστίας ὄφλῃ τις δίκην, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλάβης κοινοῦ τῶν εὖ πεισομένων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἑτέρων ἀνακοπῇ πρὸς εὐεργεσίαν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

From the Letter on Friendship

II.46.15

Indeed, just as doing good is noble, so one must repay it.[1524] ...[1525] lest one incur a charge not only of ingratitude but also of damaging the common interest of those who would receive benefits, by holding others back from benefiting them.[1526]

1524. The Greek heading names a Letter on Friendship. Wachsmuth's parenthetical reference cites Plutarch, fragment XVIII.16 in Dübner; this reference does not supply an additional author name in the Greek heading. The verb ἀμειπτέον calls for repayment without an expressed object.

1525. The printed dots mark a lacuna before ἵνα, lest. They are retained without inserting the connective wording proposed in the apparatus.

1526. The construction around κοινοῦ τῶν εὖ πεισομένων εἰς αὐτούς is compressed and difficult. The English takes it as the common interest of future beneficiaries, injured when others are held back from beneficence toward them; it does not silently substitute the apparatus's proposed repairs.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Ἰαμβλίχου Σωπάτρῳ

II.46.16

Φευκτὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀχαριστία δι' ἑαυτήν· ἀχθεσθείη δ' ἄν τις πρὸς αὐτὴν δικαιότερον, ἐπειδὴ κωλύει τἀγαθὸν προϊέναι καὶ ἐκφαίνεσθαι, τήν τε χώραν αὐτῶν παντελῶς ἀνατρέπει καὶ κατακλείει πως εἰς στενὸν τὰς ἔξω διαφαινομένας τῶν καλῶν ἐνεργείας, ἀποστερεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς θείας βοηθείας πάσης· διὰ τοῦτ' ἐστι πάνδεινον. παντὶ <δ'> ἀνδρὶ παρακελεύομαι πρῶτον, λόγον ὀρθὸν κατέχειν εὐεργεσιῶν μετὰ φιλίας· δεύτερον, εὐχαρίστους τὰς εὐεργεσίας παραλαμβάνειν καὶ προκαλεῖσθαι τὰς μείζονας εὐποιΐας διὰ τῆς εὐχαριστίας.

II.46.17

Θεμιστοκλῆς, διαβαλλόντων αὐτὸν ἐπ' ἐκκλησίας τινῶν ὡς εἶδεν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡδέως ἀκούοντας, "κοπιᾶν", ἔφη, "μοι δοκεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εὐεργετούμενοι"· κόπος γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐεργεσίας κόρος, δι' ὃν συμβαίνει καινότητος ἐπιθυμεῖν.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Iamblichus to Sopater

II.46.16

So ingratitude is to be avoided for what it is in itself. One might resent it with still greater justification because it prevents the good from advancing and coming to light, entirely overthrows their sphere,[1527] and in some way shuts within narrow limits the outwardly manifest activities of noble things. It also deprives the community of all divine assistance; that is why it is utterly dreadful.[1528] <And> I urge every man, first, to retain a right understanding of benefactions in a spirit of friendship;[1529] second, to receive benefits gratefully and to invite greater acts of goodness through gratitude.[1530]

II.46.17

When certain men were slandering Themistocles at an assembly, he saw the majority listening with pleasure and said, “Men of Athens, you seem to me to be weary of receiving benefits.” For weariness is, in truth, surfeit with benefits, through which people come to desire novelty.[1531]

1527. Χώρα is a sphere or field of operation. The plural αὐτῶν, their, follows the singular τἀγαθόν, the good; the English preserves this loose reference rather than replacing the printed wording with an apparatus proposal.

1528. Τὰς ἔξω διαφαινομένας τῶν καλῶν ἐνεργείας describes the activities of noble things as manifested outwardly. The claim then extends beyond human reciprocity to the community’s loss of divine assistance.

1529. Meineke’s supplied <δ’> is expressed as <And>. Λόγον ὀρθόν is a right understanding or account; μετὰ φιλίας adds friendship to the attitude with which benefactions are understood.

1530. The Greek qualifies the benefits as εὐχαρίστους; English expresses the required attitude by receive benefits gratefully. The conclusion connects receiving gratefully with encouraging further beneficence.

1531. The explanation follows the reported reply and links κόπος, weariness, with κόρος, surfeit. The printed καινότης means novelty; the desire is for something new after repeated benefits, rather than for a common interest.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Ἐκ τῶν Ὑψαίου ὑποθηκῶν περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν II.46.18

Οὐδένα μισήσεις ὡς ἀχάριστον, ἐὰν ὡς ἀληθῶς χαρίζῃ.

II.46.18a

Τοὺς μηδεμίαν ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσιν ὑπὸ σοῦ χάριν ἐκτίνοντας ἄλλοι λεγέτωσαν ἀχαρίστους, σὺ δ’ ἀνοήτους, ὅτι τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ συνιᾶσιν.

II.46.19

Εἰκότως οἱ νομοθέται μόνης ἀχαριστίας δίκας οὐχ ὁρίζουσιν, ὡς τοῦ μὲν εὖ ποιοῦντος τὴν μεγίστην ἀμοιβὴν ἐν οἷς ἔτυχεν εὖ ποιῶν ἀπειληφότος, τοῦ δὲ ἀχαρίστου τὴν ἀξίαν τίνοντος δίκην ἐν ᾧ λανθάνει τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ συνεχόμενος, ἀχαριστίᾳ.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

From Hypsaeus's Counsels on Doing Good

II.46.18

You will hate no one for being ungrateful if you truly do someone a kindness.[1532]

II.46.18a

Let others call ungrateful those who make no return for whatever benefits they receive from you; you call them foolish, because they do not understand the finest of good things.[1533]

II.46.19

Lawgivers reasonably prescribe no penalties for ingratitude alone, because the person who does good has received his greatest reward in the very good he happens to have done.[1534] The ungrateful person, meanwhile, pays the penalty he deserves in being held fast, without realizing it, by the greatest evil—ingratitude.[1535]

1532. The heading identifies counsels or instructions on doing good. The condition if you truly do someone a kindness is essential: the saying links genuine beneficence with freedom from hatred of the recipient.

1533. Wachsmuth marks this as a separate excerpt, 18a, without adding a new attribution. Its contrast is between calling someone ungrateful and regarding him as lacking understanding. The finest of good things is not further named in this sentence.

1534. The argument places the benefactor's reward in the good deed itself, rather than making it depend on repayment by the recipient.

1535. Λανθάνει retains the ungrateful person's lack of awareness of his own condition. The passage treats ingratitude itself as a penalty; II.46.22, by contrast, introduces judicial punishment. The anthology preserves both accounts.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Ἀπολλώνιος Ἠρωδιανῷ II.46.20

Μὴ φεῦγε διὰ τοὺς ἀσημάντους χρήσιμος εἶναι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων χάριτας ἀποδοῦναι.

Ἀπολλώνιος Νουμηνίῳ II.46.21

Οὐ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἡ χάρις τίκτει χάριν.

Ξενοφῶντος Κύρου παιδείᾳ II.46.22

... δικάζονται δὲ [οὐχ] ἥκιστα ἀχαριστίας· καὶ ὃν ἂν γνῶσι δυνάμενον μὲν χάριν ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ ἀποδιδόντα δέ, κολάζουσι τοῦτον ἰσχυρῶς· οἴονται γὰρ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους καὶ περὶ θεοὺς ἂν μάλιστα ἀμελῶς ἔχειν καὶ περὶ πατρίδα καὶ περὶ γονέας καὶ περὶ φίλους· ἕπεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ ἀχαριστίᾳ <ἡ> ἀναισχυντία, καὶ γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ εἶναι μεγίστη ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἡγεμών.

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BOOK II CHAPTER 46

Apollonius to Herodian

II.46.20

Do not avoid being useful to good people on account of insignificant people.[1536] For the good are able to repay favors even on the others' behalf.[1537]

Apollonius to Numenius

II.46.21

Not among many people does kindness beget gratitude.[1538]

Xenophon, Education of Cyrus

II.46.22

... They judge cases of ingratitude least of all.[1539] And whenever they find someone able to repay a favor but not repaying it, they punish him severely. For they believe that the ungrateful would be especially neglectful toward the gods as well, and toward their country, parents and friends.[1540] Shamelessness seems especially to follow ingratitude, for it too seems to be the greatest guide to all shameful acts.[1541]

1536. The printed ἀσημάντους means insignificant or unremarkable. The translation retains it rather than adopting the apparatus's proposed alternatives referring to ingratitude or forgetfulness.

1537. Οὗτοι refers to the good people, while ἐκείνων refers back to the insignificant people. The good can offer repayment even on behalf of those others; the saying therefore urges continued usefulness.

1538. The same noun χάρις serves first for kindness bestowed and then for the gratitude it produces in return. The printed attribution to Apollonius is retained.

1539. Wachsmuth cites Education of Cyrus I.2.7. The initial dots are retained. He rejects [οὐχ], not; the English therefore follows the remaining ἥκιστα, least of all, without silently restoring not least from a familiar wording.

1540. Severe punishment is conditional on finding someone able to repay who nevertheless does not do so. The broader claim about neglect is presented as their belief and retains the potential force of ἄν through would.

1541. Supplied <ἡ> marks shamelessness as the subject; English does not require a separate article here. Both occurrences of δοκεῖ, seems, are retained. The passage ends with shamelessness as a guide toward shameful acts.

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