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Book I Chapter 49 · I.49.24.5–I.49.24.6
Ancient Greek
p. 109424.5
Τοιαύτης δὲ οὔσης τῆς διαφορᾶς ὑφ᾽ ἓν τίθεσθαι τὰς ⟨δύο⟩ δυνάμεις μήποτε ἄτοπον ἦν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μιᾶς ἥ τε νόησις οὐσίας ὁρμᾶται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀντίληψιν εἴ τις λέγει τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν, ὁμωνύμως ἐρεῖ), καὶ ἔδει ἄλλην μὲν θέσθαι τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δύναμιν καὶ ἑτερογενῆ, μεθ᾽ ἣν τὴν τῆς διανοίας, πάντας τοὺς ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀθρόαν ἐνέργειαν τὴν δὲ ἐν διεξόδῳ·
24.6
ἄλλην δὲ πάντῃ τὴν αἰσθητικήν, ἧς τὸ μέν τι μετὰ προσχρήσεως ὀργάνων, τὸ δὲ ⟨τι⟩ ἄνευ προσχρήσεως, τοῦ μὲν μετ᾽ ὀργάνων αἰσθητικοῦ καλουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἄνευ τούτων φανταστικοῦ, τὸ δέ τι οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, ὑπερβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ διεξοδεύον, τὸ ἀθρόον τούτων, δοξαστικὸν καλούμενον, ἐπιστάσεως οὔσης, πότερον τῆς διανοίας εἶδος τὸ τοιοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἄλλο, τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς μὲν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ φανταστικόν, ὑποβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ νοητικόν.
Stobaeus, Volume I: Book I Chapter 49
p. 109524.5 · Different kinds of apprehension
With a difference of this kind, perhaps it was inappropriate to place the ⟨two⟩ powers under one heading. For intellection and perception do not start from a single substance; and if someone calls the activity of intellect “apprehension,” the same name will have a different meaning. Everyone on either side should have posited the power of intellect as distinct and of another kind, with the power of discursive thought following it, but with the former an activity all at once and the latter an activity proceeding step by step;1364
24.6 · Perception, imagination, and opinion
and the perceptive power as altogether different. One part of it makes use of organs, while ⟨another⟩ does not: the part with organs is called perceptive, the part without them imaginative. Yet another belongs no less to the same genus but goes beyond what proceeds step by step; this apprehends these things all at once and is called the power of opinion. A question remains whether this kind is a species of discursive thought or whether the other is, the one that stands above the perceptive and imaginative but below the intellective.1365
Socrates
Reading Stobaeus, Volume I · Book I Chapter 49 · I.49.24.5–I.49.24.6
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Stobaeus gathered Greek philosophy and poetry for his son Septimius. Volume I presents the dedication testimony, On Arithmetic, Book I through chapter 60, and the ancient contents of all four books. This complete bilingual edition includes an introduction and 2,117 explanatory notes.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows Curt Wachsmuth’s 1884 Volume I, checked against the supplied scan. Gaps, lost-chapter headings, and uncertain attributions remain visible. Chapter 2 includes a labeled proposed reconstruction. The appendix outlines Books I–IV; the full texts of Books II–IV are outside this volume. Reader pages preserve the companion PDF’s numbering.
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Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation directly from the Greek. Prose and verse retain their distinct forms, with mixed passages preserving their quoted verse. Every passage is paired with its Greek and identified by the edition’s reference number. All 2,117 notes remain linked to their passages, with continuous numbering across the introduction and text.
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