STOBAEUS

Anthology

Volume One

Greek and English on facing pages

INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY FOOTNOTES

Greek and English edition
Dedication testimony, On Arithmetic,
Book I, and the ancient tables of contents

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About this edition

This Greek and English edition of Stobaeus's Anthology, Volume One, follows Curt Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, volumen I (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), containing Book I and its preliminary material. The Greek text and translation have undergone a full source, editorial, and layout review.

The edition contains the new introduction, dedication testimony, On Arithmetic, Book I through chapter 60, and the ancient contents as a bilingual appendix (source pp. 3–10). Chapters 2, 33-35, 37, 44, and 46 are lost; their restored headings are included. Chapter 2 also has a labeled proposed reconstruction. Chapter 42 is partly lost; its topic headings and missing-text notices are retained. The appendix outlines all four books; the full texts of Books II-IV are outside this volume.

Greek appears on the left and English on the facing right page. The translations are independently worded from the Greek. Explanatory notes appear as numbered footnotes beneath the English passage to which they belong. Shared passage identifiers allow the two sides to be compared even when their paragraphs occupy different amounts of space.

Wachsmuth's Latin introduction and full textual apparatus are outside the chosen translation scope. His apparatus is nevertheless consulted where a reading, supplement, attribution, or gap affects the English. The notes distinguish such textual evidence from explanation supplied for this edition.

The Greek in this edition has been transcribed and checked against the scanned pages. Modern spacing, apostrophes, and typographical presentation replace the original setting; dialectal forms and consequential editorial signs are retained. Latin descriptive author-headings are translated into Greek and English where noted. Difficult readings and interpretations remain explicitly qualified.

A library arranged for a reader

Stobaeus offers the reader an encounter with Greek thought through other people's words. A few lines of tragedy may stand beside a philosophical definition; a hymn beside a report of competing explanations of the world. The connective tissue is often no more than a heading and a name. Reading the collection therefore asks for two kinds of attention at once: to the particular voice of each extract and to the question under which it has been placed.

John Stobaeus, commonly called John of Stobi, is usually placed in the fifth century CE. The most useful starting point for his purpose is the later account of Photius. In his Bibliotheca, Photius describes four books of extracts, sayings, and precepts and reports that Stobaeus prepared them for his son Septimius, whose memory for what he read needed training. The dedication itself is lost; Photius's report supplies evidence for it.[1]

That purpose helps explain the collection's form. A passage lifted from a long work becomes something a reader can return to, remember, and set beside another passage. The arrangement gives ancient writing a second setting. A poet's words may now serve as testimony about providence; a statement about arithmetic may become part of an education in philosophy. The new setting is valuable, but it cannot recover everything that surrounded the quotation in its original work.

For that reason, an author's name above an excerpt is a beginning, not the end, of interpretation. A tragic character need not speak for the playwright. A doctrine reported under a philosopher's name need not reproduce that philosopher's exact wording. The notes in this edition identify such distinctions when they bear on how a passage should be read.

1. For the conventional dating, see Tiziano Dorandi, Stobaeana (2023), publisher's description, DOI 10.5771/9783985720965. For the dedication, see Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 167, quoted in Wachsmuth I, p. 3. The facing translation of that testimony follows the Greek as Wachsmuth prints it.

The shape of the first volume

This edition follows the first physical volume of Wachsmuth's 1884 publication. Its central text is Book I, which ranges across the divine, providence, fate, the constitution of the world, celestial and earthly phenomena, living beings, and the soul. Its understanding of nature is much wider than the modern subject called physics.[2]

The opening preserves traces of an earlier beginning. Wachsmuth explains that introductory material once praised philosophy and discussed philosophical schools, followed by views on geometry, music, and arithmetic. Its surviving conclusion is the section On Arithmetic. Beginning directly with the chapter on God would pass over a significant part of the volume's surviving Greek.[3]

Arithmetic here concerns more than practical calculation. Prometheus describes number among the gifts that make human life possible. Other extracts discuss unity, plurality, limit, harmony, knowledge, and the relation between numbers and the things we count. The material ranges from verse to compressed philosophical prose. Some sentences are damaged; their difficulty is part of the evidence the translator must preserve.

Book I then begins with a heading about God as maker and governor of the whole. Its first excerpts offer no continuous demonstration. Theodectes commends beginning with the gods; Euripides points to the encompassing sky; Aratus invokes Zeus through the signs that guide human work. Homeric lines follow in which the gods raise or lower human fortunes. These voices answer to a shared heading while retaining different emphases. The translation lets that variety remain audible.

2. For the volume's identity, see its title pages. For the ancient outline of Book I, see the table of chapter subjects reproduced from Photius in Wachsmuth I, pp. 3-6; for the opening chapter itself, pp. 23-24.

3. Wachsmuth I, pp. 13-14, explains the lost introductory material; the surviving On Arithmetic occupies pp. 15-22. His Latin explanation is summarized here as editorial context, not presented as a surviving introduction written by Stobaeus.

Translating a collection of voices

The aim of the English is clarity with room for the texture of the original. Long sentences may be divided where the argument permits it. Conditions, qualifications, comparisons, and changes of speaker must remain. A difficult philosophical sentence should not acquire an invented argument merely to make it smoother.

Verse remains visibly verse, without an imposed English meter. Its movement and images matter, as do its precise claims. In prose, the preference is for composed, readable sentences. Changes of register between poetry, technical explanation, and reported doctrine are retained. The collection's authors should not all sound like the same speaker.

Terms are translated consistently where the context supports consistency. The One and the monad must not be conflated when an excerpt distinguishes them. Conversely, one fixed English word cannot represent every occurrence of a Greek term across authors and centuries. Aretē may mean martial prowess in Homer and excellence more generally in a maxim about a city and its people. A note explains a consequential choice.[4]

The supplied edition is the textual point of reference. When its Greek differs from the wording familiar in another edition of a quoted author, the translation follows the facing page. Supplements and gaps remain visible. An editorially inferred attribution is not converted into a certainty. The reader can see both what the English says and what kind of evidence supports it.

The footnotes serve that comparison. They explain names and references, numerical examples, technical vocabulary, and textual difficulties where useful. They do not reproduce every manuscript variant. The object is a readable bilingual book whose decisions remain open to inspection.

4. Compare the distinction between monad and numbered bodily unit in On Arithmetic 9 (Wachsmuth I, p. 21), and aretē in Book I, chapter 1, excerpts 4 and 10 (pp. 23-24). These are local translation decisions, not a claim that a term has only these possible senses.

How to use the edition

Facing pages

Greek is on the even-numbered left page; the corresponding English is on the odd-numbered right page. Both pages of a spread contain the same sequence of passage identifiers. Notes are attached to the English reading page.

Passage numbers

I.3.1 means Book I, chapter 3, excerpt 1. Arith.3 identifies excerpt 3 of On Arithmetic. Letters follow subdivisions in the source; further suffixes divide long excerpts for comparison. The combined I.3.26–27 follows Wachsmuth. Testimony.1 labels Photius's report; I.2.reconstruction labels proposed material for the lost chapter.

Source pages

Footers cite the original printed pages in Wachsmuth. In the supplied PDF, printed page 3 is PDF page 43, page 15 is PDF page 55, and page 23 is PDF page 63.

Editorial signs

Angle brackets <like these> mark supplements in the base edition. Square brackets usually retain rejected wording; English-only notices of gaps or unresolved words are labeled and explained in notes. A dagger (†) flags corruption. Ellipses normally follow source gaps; notes identify any used only to show broken sense in English.

Notes and uncertainties

Footnote numbers run continuously through the edition. Where the source is damaged or unusually compressed, a note distinguishes the printed reading from the interpretation used in English. The notes are part of the translation, not a replacement for the facing Greek.

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* Text lost; restored headings included. See page 2.

Appendix: ancient tables of contents 1714

Base text: Wachsmuth, volume I (1884). Included: dedication and ancient contents, pp. 3-10; arithmetic, pp. 15-22; Book I, pp. 23-502.

The chosen Greek text is fully translated. Whole-volume source, editorial, and layout review is complete.

THE DEDICATION

Φωτίου μαρτυρία

Testimony.1

Προσφωνεῖ δὲ ταῦτα (ἐκλογῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων ὑποθηκῶν βιβλία τέσσαρα) δι' ὃν καὶ τὴν συνάθροισιν φιλοπονήσαι λέγει (Ἰωάννης Στοβαῖος), Σεπτιμίῳ ἰδίῳ υἱῷ. ἡ δὲ συναγωγὴ αὐτῷ ἔκ τε <φιλοσόφων καὶ> ποιητῶν καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας λαμπρῶς βεβιωκότων ἐγένετο ὧν, ὡς καὶ αὐτός φησι, τῶν μὲν τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν δὲ τὰ ἀποφθέγματα καί τινων ὑποθήκας συναλεξάμενος ἐπὶ τῷ ῥυθμίσαι καὶ βελτιῶσαι τῷ παιδὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀμαυρότερον ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀναγνωσμάτων μνήμην στείλειεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 3

THE DEDICATION

Photius on the dedication

Testimony.1

He dedicates these works (the four books of Extracts, Sayings, and Precepts) to the person for whose sake he says he undertook the labor of collecting them: his own son Septimius.[5] His collection was drawn from <philosophers and> poets, orators, and men who had distinguished themselves in public life. As he himself says, he gathered extracts from some, sayings from others, and precepts from others again, and sent them to his son to train and improve a natural capacity that was somewhat weak in remembering what he read.[6]

5. This is Photius's report of the dedication, quoted by Wachsmuth from the Bibliotheca (112a16 onward), not the lost dedicatory letter itself. The parenthetical title and name in the facing Greek belong to the form of the quotation printed by Wachsmuth; the name is absorbed into the surrounding identification here.

6. Wachsmuth prints "philosophers and" as an editorial supplement, crediting Elter. Angle brackets mark supplied words. The passage describes difficulty remembering reading; it does not establish any more specific diagnosis.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 3

ON ARITHMETIC

1 Αἰσχύλου ἐκ Προμηθέως

Arith.1

Ἦν δ’ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς οὔτε χείματος τέκμαρ
οὔτ’ ἀνθεμώδους ἦρος, οὔτε καρπίμου
θέρους βέβαιον· ἀλλ’ ἄτερ γνώμης τὸ πᾶν
ἔπραττον, ἕς τε δή σφιν ἀντολὰς ἐγὼ
ἄστρων ἔδειξα τάς τε δυσκρίτους ὁδούς,
ἀριθμὸν εὑρών, ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων.

1a [Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Παλαμήδους]

Arith.1a

ἔπειτα πάσης Ἑλλάδος καὶ ξυμμάχων
βίον διῴκησ’ ὄντα πρὶν πεφυρμένον
θηρσίν θ’ ὅμοιον· πρῶτα μὲν τὸν πάνσοφον
ἀριθμὸν εὕρηκ’ ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων.
…

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 15

ON ARITHMETIC

1 Aeschylus, from Prometheus

Arith.1

They had no certain sign of winter,
of blossoming spring, or fruit-bearing summer;
they did everything without understanding,
until I showed them the rising of the stars
and their courses, so difficult to discern,
discovering number, foremost of inventions.[7]

1a [The same author, from Palamedes]

Arith.1a

Then I set in order the life of all Greece
and her allies, which before was confused
and like the life of beasts. First I discovered
all-wise number, foremost of inventions.
…[8]

7. Prometheus speaks of the arts he gave to human beings. Wachsmuth identifies the passage with Prometheus Bound 454-459, but the excerpt's wording differs from the play's usual text. In particular, this Greek has "courses" (hodous), not "settings," and joins the discovery of number to the preceding sentence. The translation follows the supplied edition.

8. The bracketed attribution is editorial, not a secure transmitted author-and-title heading. Wachsmuth's note records competing assignments and identifies Nauck's placement among anonymous tragic fragments. The fragment should therefore not be treated as certainly from Aeschylus's Palamedes. The trailing dots are printed in the source.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 15

ON ARITHMETIC

2 <Πλουτάρχου> Arith.2a

Ὅτι καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς θεωρίαν Ὅμηρος ἠπίστατο, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους ἀναρσίους προσαγορεύων,

ἠδ’ ὅσ’ ἀνάρσιοι ἄνδρες ἐδηλήσαντ’ ἐπὶ χέρσου

τὸν δὲ ἵλεω καὶ φιλικὸν ἄρθμιον·

ἤκαχε Θεσπρωτούς, οἳ δ’ ἡμῖν ἄρθμιοι ἦσαν

καὶ πάλιν·

ἦ μὲν ἐμαρνάσθην ἔριδος πέρι θυμοβόροιο·

ἠδ’ αὖτ’ ἐν φιλότητι διέτμαγεν ἀρθμήσαντε

ἀναρμοστίαν μὲν τὴν ἔχθραν ἡγούμενος, ἁρμονίαν δὲ τὴν φιλίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄρθμιον ἐναρμόνιόν ἐστιν, ἅτε δὴ πάσης ἁρμονίας ἐν λόγοις ἀριθμῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἐχούσης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 16

ON ARITHMETIC

2 <Plutarch> Arith.2a

Homer also understood the study of numbers. He calls enemies and men at war “discordant”:

“and all the harm hostile men had done upon the land”;

but a kindly and friendly man he calls “in accord”:

“he afflicted the Thesprotians, who were at peace with us”;

and again:

“They fought indeed in strife that devours the heart,

but parted again in friendship, reconciled.”

He regards enmity as a lack of harmony and friendship as harmony; for “in accord” means “harmonious,” since every harmony has its origin in numerical ratios.[9]

9. The author heading is supplied by the editor. Wachsmuth associates this piece with a work circulating under Plutarch’s name rather than treating the attribution as secure. The argument turns on the Greek words anarsios, arthmios, and arthmeō, linking hostility and concord with numerical harmony. The quotations are Odyssey 10.459, Odyssey 16.427, and Iliad 7.301-302. Their wording here follows Stobaeus’s excerpt.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 16

ON ARITHMETIC

2 συνέχεια

Arith.2b

Ἡ μονὰς γονὴ ὑπὸ Τιμαίου τοῦ Λοκροῦ προσαγορεύεται, ὡς ἄρχουσα τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν γενέσεως.

Τοῦ περισσοῦ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου λόγου Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτον καὶ ἀμέριστον εἶδος τὸ ἕν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου ποίησιν ἰδιοποιουμένη μονὰς ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

3 Φιλολάου

Arith.3a

Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐσσίαν τῶ ἀριθμῶ καττὰν δύναμιν ἅ τις ἐντὶ ἐν τᾷ δεκάδι. Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θείω καὶ ὠρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμὼν κοινωνοῦσα … δύναμις ἀ τᾶς δεκάδος. Ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντ’ ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 16-17

ON ARITHMETIC

2 continued

Arith.2b

Timaeus of Locri calls the monad a generative principle, because it governs the generation of numbers.[10]

Aristotle declared the One to be the primary and indivisible form of the odd and indivisible principle. The monad, acquiring its distinctive character through the activity of this One, is the beginning and element of numbers.[11]

3 Philolaus

Arith.3a

We must consider the workings and essence of number in the light of the power contained in the decad. For great, all-completing, and all-accomplishing is the power of the decad: it participates in divine, heavenly, and human life as a beginning and guide … . Without it, all things are unlimited, unclear, and unseen.[12]

10. “Monad” renders monas, a unit considered as a principle of number. “The One” renders to hen. The text places these expressions close together, but later excerpts distinguish them explicitly; they are not automatically interchangeable.

11. This compressed sentence reports a doctrine attributed to Aristotle; it is not presented as a direct quotation from an identified Aristotelian work. Logos here is rendered “principle.” The phrase “through the activity of this One” translates kata de tēn toutou poiēsin; the causal relation is terse in the Greek.

12. The decad is ten understood as a complete numerical order. The Greek is in Doric forms, which are retained opposite. The gap after “guide” corresponds to a lacuna recorded by Wachsmuth after koinōnousa. The syntax surrounding that gap cannot be recovered with confidence; the English preserves the break rather than supplying a missing doctrine.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 16-17

ON ARITHMETIC

3 συνέχεια

Arith.3b

Κανονικὰ γὰρ ἁ φύσις ἁ τῶ ἀριθμῶ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῶ ἀπορουμένω παντὸς καὶ ἀγνοουμένω παντί. Οὐ γὰρ ἦς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ’ αὐτά, οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ’ ἄλλο, αἰ μὴ ἦς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἁ τούτω ἐσσία. Νῦν δὲ οὗτος καττὰν ψυχὰν ἁρμόσδων αἰσθήσι πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλάλοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, σωματῶν καὶ σχίζων τὼς λόγους χωρὶς ἑκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν περαινόντων.

3 συνέχεια

Arith.3c

Ἴδοις δέ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῶ ἀριθμῶ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντᾷ καὶ καττὰς δαμιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας καὶ καττὰν μουσικάν.

Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἁ τῶ ἀριθμῶ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἁρμονία, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐντι.

Τᾶς τῶ ἀπείρω καὶ ἀνοάτω καὶ ἀλόγω φύσιος τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐντί. Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐμπιτνεῖ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἐχθρὸν τᾷ φύσι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἁ δ’ ἀλάθεια οἰκεῖον καὶ σύμφυτον τᾷ τῶ ἀριθμῶ γενεᾷ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 17-18

ON ARITHMETIC

3 continued

Arith.3b

For the nature of number gives a rule, a guide, and instruction to everyone about everything that is puzzling or unknown. Without number and its essence, nothing whatsoever would be clear to anyone, whether things in themselves or one thing in relation to another. As it is, number, bringing all things into harmony with perception within the soul, makes them knowable and mutually commensurable, in the manner of a gnomon: it gives body to the ratios of things and separates them individually, both those of the unlimited things and those of the things that impose limit.[13]

3 continued

Arith.3c

You may see the nature and power of number at work not only in supernatural and divine things, but everywhere in all human deeds and words, in every skilled craft, and in music.

The nature of number admits no falsehood, nor does harmony; falsehood is foreign to both.

Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the unlimited, the unintelligent, and the irrational. Falsehood never enters number, for it is hostile and inimical to number's nature; truth, however, is native to and inseparable from the race of number.[14]

13. A gnōmōn can be a means of judging or measuring; in arithmetic it also names a figure added around another figure to produce a larger one. The passage combines a claim about knowledge with the language of numerical construction. "Mutually commensurable" interprets potagora allalois as things brought into a relation that number makes intelligible. "Things that impose limit" preserves the active participle perainontōn.

14. "Envy" translates phthonos, the reading retained in Wachsmuth's text. His apparatus records proposed alternatives; the unusual moral term has not been silently replaced. "Race of number" retains the figurative force of genea.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 17-18

ON ARITHMETIC

3 συνέχεια

Arith.3d

Καὶ τὰ ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ σώματα πέντε ἐντί· τὰ ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ, πῦρ, ὕδωρ καὶ γᾶ καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ ὁ τᾶς σφαίρας ὁλκὰς πέμπτον.

4 Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρχύτου διατριβῶν

Arith.4

Καὶ δοκεῖ ἁ λογιστικὰ ποτὶ τὰν ἄλλαν σοφίαν τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν κατὰ πολὺ διαφέρειν, ἀτὰρ καὶ τᾶς γαμετρικᾶς ἐναργεστέρως πραγματεύεσθαι ἃ θέλει. καὶ ἃς ἐκλείπει αὖ ἁ γαμετρικὰ ἀποδείξιας, ἁ λογιστικὰ ἐπιτελεῖ· καὶ ὁμῶς, αἰ μὴν εἰδέων ἐντὶ ἁ πραγματεία, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν.

5 Βουθήρου περὶ ἀριθμῶν

Arith.5a

Ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων σύγκειται … ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ <νοητῶν> μέτρον καὶ ἀσύνθετον καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ μόνον καὶ εἰλικρινές.

Τὸ <ἓν> χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πρώτη φύσις καὶ μαθεῖν <ἔστιν> αὐτὸ μηδ’ ἄλλο <τι> διορισαμένους.

… μόνον ἐστὶν εἰλικρινὲς αὐτὸ <τε ἑαυτὸ> δηλοῦν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 18-19

ON ARITHMETIC

3 continued

Arith.3d

And the bodies within the sphere are five: those within the sphere, fire, water, earth, and air; and fifth, the vessel of the sphere.[15]

4 From the discourses of Archytas

Arith.4

In relation to the other branches of knowledge, the art of calculation seems greatly to surpass the other arts, and to handle its chosen subjects more clearly even than geometry. The proofs that geometry in turn leaves incomplete, calculation completes. And likewise, if indeed the inquiry concerns forms, it also concerns the things that fall under those forms.[16]

5 Boutheros, On Numbers

Arith.5a

Number is composed of monads … which is the beginning of existing things and the measure of <intelligible things>, uncompounded, ungenerated, eternal, alone, and unmixed.

The <One> is apart from the other things, itself by itself, a beginning and primary nature; and <it is possible> to know it without defining <anything> else.

… it alone is unmixed, itself disclosing <itself too>.[17]

15. The wording is difficult, including the repetition of “within the sphere.” “Vessel” follows the printed holkas, a word for a ship or carrier. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records several proposed replacements and interpretations. The translation retains this reading without identifying the fifth body more precisely than the excerpt warrants.

16. Logistikē is the art of calculation. The final clause is compressed and its construction uncertain; “concerns the things that fall under those forms” supplies a parallel verb in English. This preserves the printed wording rather than silently rewriting the sentence. The attribution is the heading of the excerpt, not an independent judgment of authorship.

17. Boutheros is the name printed in the source heading. These statements are fragmentary. The gap after “monads” leaves the antecedent of “which” uncertain; the English does not invent a bridge. Wachsmuth supplies several words, shown in angle brackets. “Ungenerated” follows the printed agenēton; the apparatus records a different manuscript reading.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 18-19

ON ARITHMETIC

5 συνέχεια

Arith.5b

Ὁ περισσὸς τοῦ ἀρτίου τελεώτερός ἐστιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον ἔχει, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μέσου στερεῖται. Καὶ ὁ μέν, ὁπόταν γεννῶνται ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ πρὸς μονάδας, ταῖς αὐτοῦ χώραις καταλαμβάνει τὰς ταῖς γραμμαῖς περιεχομένας· ὁ δ’ ἐν οἰκείᾳ μὲν γινόμενος οὐδέποτε περαίνεται, ὅταν δ’ ἐν περισσῇ γένηται, αὐτός τε πέρατος τυγχάνει καὶ τὴν πλευρὰν λόγον ἔχουσαν ἴσχει.

5 συνέχεια

Arith.5c

Τὸ ἓν οὐσία καὶ φύσις καὶ νοῦς καὶ μήνυμα· ἀρχὴν γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ πέρας ἔχον ἐστί· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τούτου μετείληφεν ἃ ἔστι καὶ νοεῖται τῇ τούτου φύσει ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εἰλικρινούμενον καὶ εἰκὼν τε καὶ εἴδωλα τοῦ ἑνὸς γιγνόμενα.

ON ARITHMETIC

5 continued

Arith.5b

Odd number is more complete than even number. The former has a beginning, an end, and a middle; the latter lacks the middle. And when they are generated proportionally and in relation to units, the former fills with its own areas the areas enclosed by the lines. The latter, when it comes to be in its own area, is never bounded; but when it comes to be in an odd one, it is itself bounded and has a side possessing a ratio.[18]

5 continued

Arith.5c

The One is being, nature, mind, and disclosure: for it has a beginning, a middle, and an end. The other things that exist and are thought have also partaken of it; through its nature each is distinguished from the others, becoming an image and likenesses of the One.[19]

18. This geometrical comparison is obscure in the transmitted wording. “Areas” renders chōrai; “in its own area” and “in an odd one” make the elliptical contrast readable without claiming to reconstruct its diagram. Wachsmuth records uncertainty even over logos (“ratio”) in the last phrase. Compare the more explicit construction with successive odd and even gnomons in excerpt 10 below.

19. “Disclosure” renders mēnyma, the reading adopted by Wachsmuth for the manuscript’s mēnyōma. The final Greek moves from the singular “each” and “image” to a plural participle and “likenesses”; the slightly uneven English retains the movement of the printed text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 19

ON ARITHMETIC

6 Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου περὶ ἀριθμητικῆς

Arith.6

Τὴν δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πραγματείαν μάλιστα πάντων τιμῆσαι δοκεῖ Πυθαγόρας καὶ προαγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἀπαγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐμπόρων χρείας, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἀπεικάζων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς. Τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα ἀριθμὸς ἔχει καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ Ἑρμοῦ φασὶν εὕρημα, ὃν καλοῦσι Θώθ· οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν θείων περιφορῶν ἐπινοηθῆναι. Μονὰς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀριθμὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μονάδων πλῆθος συγκείμενον. Τῶν δὲ ἀριθμῶν ἄρτιοι μέν εἰσιν οἱ εἰς ἴσα διαιρούμενοι, περισσοὶ δὲ οἱ εἰς ἄνισα καὶ μέσον ἔχοντες. Οὕτως ἐν περισσαῖς ἡμέραις αἱ κρίσεις τῶν νοσημάτων γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσι καὶ αἱ μεταβολαί, ὅτι ὁ περισσὸς καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχει ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀκμῆς καὶ παρακμῆς ἐχομέναι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 20

ON ARITHMETIC

6 From Aristoxenus, On Arithmetic

Arith.6

Pythagoras seems to have honored the study of numbers more than anyone else and to have advanced it, taking it beyond the needs of merchants and likening all things to numbers. For number embraces the other things, and all numbers stand in a ratio to one another. The Egyptians say that it was an invention of Hermes, whom they call Thoth; others say that it was conceived from the divine revolutions.[20]

The monad, then, is the beginning of number, and number is a multitude composed of monads. Of numbers, the even are those divided into equal parts, the odd those divided into unequal parts and possessing a middle. Thus the crises and changes of illnesses are thought to occur on odd days, because odd number has a beginning, an end, and a middle, corresponding to onset, culmination, and decline.[21]

20. The “divine revolutions” are the celestial cycles from which counting is said to have been learned. The excerpt offers alternative accounts of arithmetic’s discovery, rather than endorsing only the Pythagorean account.

21. This is an ancient explanation of critical days in disease, reported as part of the numerical doctrine. The order “beginning, end, middle” and then “onset, culmination, decline” is the source’s own order.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 20

ON ARITHMETIC

7 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ ε′ τῶν Νόμων

Arith.7

Καὶ κοινῷ λόγῳ νομίσαντα πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησίμους τὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν δυνάμεις καὶ ποικίλσεις, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ποικίλλονται καὶ ὅσα ἐν μήκεσι παρέχονται καὶ ἐν βάθεσι ποικίλματα καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν φθόγγοις <καὶ κινήσεσι>, ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν εὐθυπορίαν τῆς ἄνω καὶ κάτω φορᾶς <καὶ τῆς κύκλῳ περιφορᾶς>. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ βλέψαντα τόν γε νομοθέτην προστάττειν πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις εἰς δύναμιν τούτων μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς συντάξεως. πρός τε γὰρ οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας πάσας, ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν παρέχει παιδείας μάθημα μεγάλην, ὡς ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς διατριβή. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυστάζοντα καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μνήμονα καὶ ἀγχίνουν ἀπεργάζεται παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδόντα θείᾳ τέχνῃ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 20-21

ON ARITHMETIC

7 Plato, from Book V of the Laws

Arith.7

And, speaking generally, one should recognize that the powers and varied combinations of numbers are useful for everything: both the variations numbers display in themselves and the patterns they produce in lengths and depths, and also in sounds <and motions>, whether in the straight course of upward and downward movement <or in circular revolution>. With all this in view, the lawgiver must direct every citizen, as far as each is able, to keep pace with this ordered study.

For household management, government, and all the arts, no single subject has such great educational power as the study of numbers. Most of all, it awakens the person who is naturally sleepy and slow to learn, making him quick to learn, retentive, and perceptive: through a divine art he advances beyond his own nature.[22]

22. Laws 747a-b. The excerpt begins in the middle of a construction; the English gives it an independent grammatical opening. The angle-bracketed phrases are supplied in Wachsmuth from the direct tradition of Plato and are absent from the Stobaeus manuscripts cited in his apparatus. “Powers” and “combinations” retain the broad numerical language without restricting it to modern algebraic exponentiation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 20-21

ON ARITHMETIC

8 Ἐκ τῶν Μοδεράτου Πυθαγορείου

Arith.8

Ἔστι δὲ ἀριθμός, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, σύστημα μονάδων, ἢ προποδισμὸς πλήθους ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχόμενος καὶ ἀναποδισμὸς εἰς μονάδα καταλήγων. Μονάδες δὲ περαίνουσι ποσότηθ’, ἥ τις μειουμένου τοῦ πλήθους κατὰ τὴν ὑφαίρεσιν παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ στερηθεῖσα μονήν τε καὶ στάσιν λαμβάνει· περαιτέρω γὰρ ἡ μονὰς τῆς ποσότητος οὐκ ἰσχύει ἀναποδίζειν· ὥστε μονὰς ἤτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑστάναι καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἄτρεπτος μένειν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ διακεχωρίσθαι καὶ παντελῶς μεμονοῦσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐλόγως ἐκλήθη.

9 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ>

Arith.9

Τινὲς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀρχὴν ἀπεφήναντο τὴν μονάδα, τῶν δὲ ἀριθμητῶν ἀρχὴν τὸ ἕν. Τοῦτο δὲ σῶμα τεμνόμενον εἰς ἄπειρον· ὥστε τὰ ἀριθμητὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ταύτῃ διαλλάττειν, ᾗ διαφέρει τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀσωμάτων. Εἰδέναι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο χρή, ὅτι τῶν ἀριθμῶν εἰσηγήσαντο τὰς ἀρχὰς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι τήν τε μονάδα καὶ τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ πάσας παρὰ τὸ ἑξῆς τὰς τῶν ὅρων ἐκθέσεις, δι’ ὧν ἄρτιοί τε καὶ περιττοὶ νοοῦνται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 21

ON ARITHMETIC

8 From Moderatus the Pythagorean

Arith.8

Number, to give a general description, is a system of monads, or the forward progression of a multitude beginning from a monad and a backward progression ending in a monad. Monads set a limit to quantity: as the multitude is diminished by subtraction, this quantity, stripped of every number, reaches a state of rest and stands still. For the monad cannot move backward any farther along the scale of quantity. It was therefore reasonably called a "monad," either because it stands still and remains unchanged, always in the same condition, or because it has been separated from the multitude and left altogether alone.[23]

9 <The same author>

Arith.9

Some declared the monad to be the beginning of numbers, but the One the beginning of things that are numbered. The latter is a body divisible without limit; thus things that are numbered differ from numbers in the same way that bodies differ from incorporeal things. We should also know that, as principles of numbers, later thinkers introduced the monad and the dyad, whereas the Pythagoreans introduced the successive setting out of all the terms through which even and odd are understood.[24]

23. The opening of the definition reads "monads set a limit to quantity," the plural construction printed by Wachsmuth on Usener's correction. The following relative clause refers to quantity; the passage then returns to the singular monad. Number is treated as a plurality of units, with the monad as the boundary beyond which subtraction of whole units cannot proceed. The explanation of monas plays on remaining and being alone.

24. "Things that are numbered" translates arithmēta and keeps them distinct from arithmoi, numbers. The "One" in this particular report is a bodily unit; the passage does not license importing that meaning into every occurrence of the One elsewhere. Wachsmuth prints the editorial author-heading in Latin as "Eiusdem"; it is rendered in Greek opposite for consistency.

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ON ARITHMETIC

10 <Πλουτάρχου>

Arith.10a

Πυθαγόρας πλείστῃ σπουδῇ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἐχρήσατο, τάς τε τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις ἀνῆγεν εἰς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων τὰς περιόδους. Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπεικάζων ἐπωνόμαζεν, ὡς Ἀπόλλωνα μὲν τὴν μονάδα οὖσαν, Ἄρτεμιν δὲ τὴν δυάδα … τὴν δὲ ἑξάδα Γάμον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην, τὴν δὲ ἑβδομάδα Καιρὸν καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν, Ἀσφάλειον δὲ Ποσειδῶνα τὴν ὀγδοάδα καὶ τὴν δεκάδα Παντέλειαν.

10 συνέχεια

Arith.10b

Αὐτοῦ δὲ πάλιν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τὸν μὲν ἄρτιον ἀτελῆ, πλήρη δὲ καὶ τέλειον ἀπέφηνε τὸν περιττόν, ὅτι μιγνύμενός τε πρὸς τὸν ἄρτιον ἀεὶ ποιεῖται ἐπικρατεῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν περισσόν, αὐτῷ τε πάλιν συντιθέμενος γεννᾷ τὸν ἄρτιον, ὁ δ’ ἄρτιος οὐδέποτε τὸν περιττόν, ὡς οὐ γόνιμος ὢν οὐδὲ ἔχων δύναμιν ἀρχῆς· ὥστε ἐν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι δίχα πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρτίων εἰς περισσοὺς τὴν ἀνάλυσιν λαμβάνουσιν, ὡς ὁ ἓξ καὶ ὁ δέκα, τῶν δὲ περιττῶν εἰς ἀρτίους οὐδείς· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον εἰς ἕτερα· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ πᾶσιν αἱ διαλύσεις.

ON ARITHMETIC

10 <Plutarch>

Arith.10a

Pythagoras devoted the greatest care to numbers, referring both the generation of living beings and the revolutions of the stars to them. He also named numbers by likening them to the gods: the monad was Apollo, the dyad Artemis … the number six Marriage and Aphrodite, seven the Opportune Moment and Athena, eight Poseidon the Steadfast, and ten All-Completeness.[25]

10 continued

Arith.10b

As for number itself, he declared the even incomplete, but the odd full and complete. For when odd is combined with even, it always makes the odd result prevail; and when added to itself, it generates even, whereas even never generates odd, since it is neither fertile nor endowed with the power of a beginning. Thus, when divided in two, many even numbers resolve into odd numbers, such as six and ten; but no odd number resolves into even numbers. For the beginning and element cannot be divided into other things; all the other things, however, resolve into the same constituents.[26]

25. The attribution to Plutarch is supplied by Wachsmuth, as in excerpt 2. The printed gap follows Artemis; no missing assignments have been invented. Kairos is the fitting or opportune moment. Asphaleios is an epithet of Poseidon associated with stability; Panteleia means complete fulfillment.

26. The arithmetic behind the first claim is odd + even = odd, odd + odd = even, and even + even = even. Halving six or ten gives three or five. These relations are used to support evaluative language about completeness and fertility; they do not themselves prove that evaluation. The final sentence about beginning and element is terse and has been left at the same level of generality as the Greek.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 21-22

ON ARITHMETIC

10 συνέχεια

Arith.10c

Ἔτι δὲ τῇ μονάδι τῶν ἐφεξῆς περισσῶν γνωμόνων περιτιθεμένων ὁ γινόμενος ἀεὶ τετράγωνός ἐστι· τῶν δὲ ἀρτίων ὁμοίως περιτιθεμένων ἑτερομήκεις καὶ ἄνισοι πάντες ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἴσος δὲ ἰσάκις οὐδείς. Καὶ μὴν εἰς δύο διαιρουμένων ἴσα τοῦ μὲν περισσοῦ μονὰς ἐν μέσῳ περίεστι, τοῦ δὲ ἀρτίου κενὴ λείπεται χώρα καὶ ἀδέσποτος καὶ ἀνάριθμος, ὡς ἂν ἐνδεοῦς καὶ ἀτελοῦς ὄντος. Περὶ δὴ τοῦ κοινοῦ λόγου τῶν ἀριθμῶν τοῦτον διέξεισι τὸν τρόπον.

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ON ARITHMETIC

10 continued

Arith.10c

Moreover, when successive odd gnomons are placed around the monad, the number produced is always square. When even gnomons are placed around it in the same way, all the resulting figures are oblong and unequal-sided; none is an equal number taken an equal number of times. And when the numbers are divided into two equal groups, an odd number has a monad left over in the middle; in an even number the middle is left empty, unoccupied, and unnumbered, as though the number were deficient and incomplete. This is how he sets out the general account of numbers.[27]

27. The odd construction gives 1, 1 + 3 = 4, 1 + 3 + 5 = 9, and so on. The standard even construction gives oblongs such as 2, 2 + 4 = 6, and 2 + 4 + 6 = 12. The phrase “in the same way” leaves its starting figure implicit; the text has not been silently changed to specify one. For the last comparison, picture an odd row as two equal groups with one central counter, an even row as two equal groups separated by a gap.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

Κεφάλαιον Α΄ I.1.heading

Ὅτι θεὸς δημιουργὸς τῶν ὄντων καὶ διέπει τὸ ὅλον τῷ τῆς προνοίας λόγῳ καὶ ποίας οὐσίας ὑπάρχει.

1 Θεοδέκτου I.1.1

Ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχὴν δὲ ποιεῖσθαι πρέπον.

2 Εὐριπίδου I.1.2

Ὁρᾷς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ’ ἄπειρον αἰθέρα,
καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ’ ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις;
τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ’ ἡγοῦ θεόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

Chapter 1

I.1.heading

That God is the maker of existing things and governs the whole through the rational order of providence, and what his essence is.[28]

1 Theodectes

I.1.1

It is fitting to make our beginning with the gods.

2 Euripides

I.1.2

Do you see this boundless aether high above,
holding the earth about in its moist embrace?
Regard it as Zeus; take this to be God.[29]

28. The chapter heading frames the excerpts that follow. Dēmiourgos means a maker or craftsman; it does not by itself specify creation from nothing. “Rational order” renders logos in the phrase concerning providence. The singular “God” in the heading coexists with poems speaking of Zeus and the gods. The anthology preserves these different voices.

29. Aether is the high, bright region of the sky. The verse identifies the enclosing heaven with Zeus. Wachsmuth cites it as a fragment of Euripides from an unidentified play (Nauck 935); the anthology’s context should not be mistaken for the missing dramatic context.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

3 Ἀράτου I.1.3

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
ἄρρητον, μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα
καὶ λιμένες, πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες.
τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι
δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει
μιμνήσκων βιότοιο, λέγει δ’ ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη
βουσί τε καὶ μακέλῃσι, λέγει δ’ ὅτε δεξιαὶ ὧραι
καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι.

4 <Ὁμήρου> I.1.4

Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρετὴν ἄνδρεσσιν ὀφέλλει τε μινύθει τε
ὅππως κεν ἐθέλῃσιν, ὁ γὰρ κάρτιστος ἁπάντων.

5 <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.5

Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς μέγιστος ἀνθρώποις νόμος.

6 <Ἀδεσπότου ἐλεγειακοῦ> I.1.6

Ζεὺς πάντων αὐτὸς φάρμακα μοῦνος ἔχει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

3 Aratus

I.1.3

Let us begin with Zeus, whom we men never leave
unspoken. Every street is full of Zeus,
and every gathering place of men; the sea
and harbors are full of him. Everywhere we all need Zeus.
For we too are his offspring. Kindly toward mankind,
he gives favorable signs and rouses the people to work,
reminding them of their livelihood. He tells when the soil is best
for oxen and mattocks, and when the seasons favor
digging around the plants and sowing every seed.[30]

4 <Homer>

I.1.4

Zeus increases or diminishes men's prowess
as he wills, for he is mightiest of all.[31]

5 <An unidentified tragic poet>

I.1.5

For God is the highest law for human beings.

6 <An unidentified elegiac poet>

I.1.6

Zeus himself alone holds remedies for all things.[32]

30. Aratus, Phaenomena 1-9. The poem introduces its account of the sky and its signs through Zeus's provision for human labor. Gyroō means to dig around or make a circular trench around a plant; "planting trees" alone would lose the particular action named here.

31. Iliad 20.242-243. Aretē here is prowess or excellence, in the poem's martial setting; rendering it automatically as moral "virtue" would obscure that context. The author heading is supplied in Wachsmuth's text.

32. Wachsmuth leaves this verse anonymous and discusses an attribution to Simonides that he regards as conjectural. The generic Greek headings for anonymous excerpts 5, 6, and 9 are editorial translations of the Latin labels in his edition. Pharmaka here is rendered "remedies."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

7 <Ὁμήρου> I.1.7

Ζεὺς δ’ αὐτὸς νέμει ὄλβον Ὀλύμπιος ἀνθρώποισιν,
ἐσθλοῖς ἠδὲ κακοῖσιν, ὅπως ἐθέλῃσιν ἑκάστῳ.

8 <Ὁμήρου> I.1.8

Ῥηΐδιον δὲ θεοῖσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,
ἠμὲν κυδῆναι θνητὸν βροτὸν ἠδὲ κακῶσαι.

9 <Ἀδεσπότου ποιητοῦ> I.1.9

Ζεὺς ὁ καὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου πείρατα νωμῶν.

10 Σιμωνίδου I.1.10

Οὔτις ἄνευ θεῶν
ἀρετὰν λάβεν, οὐ πόλις, οὐ <βροτός>.

11 Μενάνδρου I.1.11

Ἅπαντα σιγῶν ὁ θεὸς ἐξεργάζεται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 24-25

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

7 <Homer>

I.1.7

Olympian Zeus himself allots prosperity to human beings,
to good and bad alike, as he wills for each.

8 <Homer>

I.1.8

It is easy for the gods who hold broad heaven
either to exalt a mortal man or bring him low.[33]

9 <An unidentified poet>

I.1.9

Zeus, who governs the bounds of life and death.

10 Simonides

I.1.10

Without the gods no one has gained
excellence: no city, no <mortal>.[34]

11 Menander

I.1.11

In silence God brings everything to completion.

33. Excerpts 7 and 8 are Odyssey 6.188-189 and 16.211-212. The anthology brings them together under its theological heading, although they belong to different scenes in Homer.

34. The last word is supplied in Wachsmuth from the parallel quotation in Theophilus, To Autolycus II.8. “Excellence” retains the broader sense of aretē here; the city-and-individual pairing makes “martial prowess” too narrow as a default.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Κλεάνθους (α′)

I.1.12a

Κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεί,
Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
χαῖρε· σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν.
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, † ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείδω.
σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος, ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν,
πείθεται, ᾗ κεν ἄγῃς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται·
τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ἐνὶ χερσὶν
ἀμφήκη, πυρόεντ’, αἰειζώοντα κεραυνόν·
τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς φύσεως πάντ’ ἐρρίγα<σιν>·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Cleanthes (1)

I.1.12a

Most glorious of immortals, many-named, almighty ever,
Zeus, author of nature, steering all things by law,
hail! It is right for every mortal to address you.
For we are your offspring, alone of all mortal things
that live and move upon the earth having received
an "image of sound."†[35] So I shall hymn you
and sing forever of your might.
This whole cosmos, wheeling around the earth, obeys you
wherever you lead, and willingly submits to your rule.
Such is the servant you hold in your unconquerable hands:
the two-edged, fiery, ever-living thunderbolt;
beneath its stroke all nature trembles.[36]

35. Wachsmuth marks ēchou mimēma, literally "an image or imitation of sound," as corrupt. His apparatus records alternatives involving reason, mind, or a share, and connects the passage with human speech. The English retains a literal rendering of the doubtful words rather than silently adopting a conjecture. The dagger marks this unresolved difficulty.

36. This is the opening of Cleanthes's hymn to Zeus. The thunderbolt becomes the instrument directing the reason common to the world in the next lines. In erriga<sin> the edition supplies the verb's ending; English cannot display that supplement at an equivalent word boundary.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Κλεάνθους (β′)

I.1.12b

ᾧ σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
φοιτᾷ, μιγνύμενος μεγάλοις μικροῖς τε φάεσσι
…
ὡς τόσσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός,
οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,
οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις·
ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ <τ’> ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι.
καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα,
ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσι,
δύσμοροι, οἵ τ’ ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες
οὔτ’ ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον οὔτε κλύουσιν,
ᾧ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Cleanthes (2)

I.1.12b

With it you direct the common reason, which runs through all,
mingling with the lights both great and small—
…[37]
so great are you, supreme king through all time.
No deed is done upon the earth apart from you, divine one,
nor in the divine vault of heaven, nor in the sea,
except what bad men do in their own folly.
Yet you know how to make what is uneven even,
to bring order to disorder; what is hostile is friendly to you.[38]
For you have fitted all things into one, good with bad,
so that there is one reason for all, existing forever.
The wicked among mortals flee from it and let it go—
unhappy men who always long to possess good things,
yet neither see nor hear the common law of God.
If they obeyed it with understanding, their life would be good.

37. The dots reproduce a gap marked in the Greek edition. “Common reason” translates koinos logos: the rational order described here as passing through and unifying everything. “Lights” renders the printed phaessi.

38. The paired terms perissa/artia can mean irregular/regular or odd/even; akosma/kosmein, disorder/to order. “Uneven/even” preserves something of the first pairing. The claim about wrongdoing is retained without supplying a reconciliation between human folly and divine government. The supplied connective te is absorbed into the English coordination.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Κλεάνθους (γ′) I.1.12c

αὐτοὶ δ’ αὖθ’ ὁρμῶσιν ἄνοι κακὸν ἄλλος ἐπ’ ἄλλο,
οἳ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδὴν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
οἳ δ’ ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
ἄλλοι δ’ εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα
… ἐπ’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα φέρονται,
σπεύδοντες μάλα πάμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι.
ἀλλὰ Ζεῦ πάνδωρε, κελαινεφές, ἀρχικέραυνε,
ἀνθρώπους <μὲν> ῥύου ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
ἣν σύ, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
γνώμης, ᾗ πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷς,
ὄφρ’ ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε
θνητὸν ἐόντ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον,
οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

13a <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.13a

Θεοῦ θέλοντος εὖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεται.

13b <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.13b

Τί δ’ οὐ γένοιτ’ ἂν θεοῦ <γ’> ἐφιέντος τύχῃ;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

12 Cleanthes (3)

I.1.12c

Instead, senseless, they rush, each toward a different evil:
some driven by a bitter rivalry for reputation,
some turning to profit with no sense of order,
others to ease and the body's pleasant pursuits;
… they are carried this way and that toward different ends,
eager that the very opposite of these things should come to pass.[39]
But Zeus, giver of all, dark-clouded lord of thunder,
rescue human beings from their wretched ignorance.
Dispel it from the soul, Father, and grant us a share
in the judgment on which you rely to govern all with justice,
so that, honored by you, we may repay you with honor,
continually singing of your works, as befits
a mortal; for neither mortals nor gods have any greater prize
than always, in justice, to hymn the common law.

13a <An unidentified tragic poet>

I.1.13a

When God wills it, everything turns out well.[40]

13b <An unidentified tragic poet>

I.1.13b

What could not happen if God <indeed> gave Fortune leave?

39. The source marks missing text at the beginning of the line about being carried toward different ends. The next line is also difficult: the printed genesthai says "should come to pass," while Wachsmuth asks whether penesthai, "to lack," should be read. "These things" has an uncertain reference in the damaged sequence. The translation follows the printed text. The supplied particle men is also absorbed into the English coordination.

40. The subdivisions 13a–h belong to Wachsmuth's edition. Generic Greek headings for unidentified authors translate his Latin labels throughout this sequence. Angle brackets retain their supplied status.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

13c <Σοφοκλέους> I.1.13c

Ξὺν τῷ θεῷ πᾶς καὶ γελᾷ κωδύρεται.

13d <Ἀδεσπότου ποιητοῦ> I.1.13d

Γεννᾷ τὸ θεῖον εὐτυχῆ δωρήματα.

13e <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.13e

Ζεύς ἐσθ’ ὁ πέμπων τὴν ἐφήμερον τροφήν.

13f <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.13f

Ἄνευ θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ εἷς ἀνὴρ σθένει.

13g <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.13g

Θείᾳ προνοίᾳ πάντ’ ἐγέννησεν φύσις.

13h <Ἀδεσπότου ποιητοῦ> I.1.13h

Θεὸς μόνος πέφυκεν ἐν βροτοῖς μέγας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

13c <Sophocles> I.1.13c

With the god's leave, each of us both laughs and laments.[41]

13d <An unidentified poet> I.1.13d

The divine brings forth gifts of good fortune.

13e <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.13e

It is Zeus who sends our daily sustenance.

13f <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.13f

For without God not a single man has strength.

13g <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.13g

Through divine providence nature brought forth everything.

13h <An unidentified poet> I.1.13h

God alone is truly great among mortals.

41. Sophocles, Ajax 383. "With the god's leave" expresses syn tō theō, literally "with the god." The line places both contrary fortunes under divine power; it does not promise uninterrupted happiness.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

14 <Ὁμήρου> I.1.14

Καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι
παντοῖοί τ’ ἐλθόντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας,
ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

15 <Ὁμήρου> I.1.15

Τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

16 <Ἀδεσπότου ποιητοῦ> I.1.16

Πάντῃ πάρεστι καὶ βλέπει πάντῃ θεός.

17 <Εὐριπίδου> I.1.17

Θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδεὶς χωρὶς εὐτυχεῖ βροτῶν,
οὐδ’ εἰς τὸ μεῖζον ἦλθε, τὰς θνητῶν δ’ ἐγὼ
χαίρειν κελεύω θεῶν ἄτερ προμηθίας.

18 <Ἀρχιλόχου> I.1.18

Τοῖος ἀνθρώποισι θυμός, Γλαῦκε, Λεπτίνεω πάι,
γίνεται θνητοῖς, ὁκοίην Ζεὺς ἐφ’ ἡμέρην ἄγῃ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

14 <Homer> I.1.14

The gods too, looking like strangers from abroad,
come in all manner of forms and go about the cities,
watching human arrogance and respect for law.[42]

15 <Homer> I.1.15

The mind of men upon the earth is shaped
by the day the father of men and gods brings upon them.[43]

16 <An unidentified poet> I.1.16

God is present everywhere and sees everywhere.

17 <Euripides> I.1.17

For no mortal prospers apart from God
or rises to greater things. As for mortal foresight
without the gods, I bid it farewell.[44]

18 <Archilochus> I.1.18

Glaucus, son of Leptines, the temper of mortal men
changes with whatever day Zeus brings upon them.

42. Odyssey 17.485–487. The contrast is between hybris, overbearing or abusive conduct, and eunomiē, good order or observance of law.

43. Odyssey 18.135–136. “Day” includes the circumstances or fortune the day brings. Compare the saying attributed to Archilochus in excerpt 18.

44. The edition supplies the attribution to Euripides and cites an unidentified fragment (Nauck 1014). Its apparatus notes that a parallel source attributes the first line to him. The assembled fragment does not establish a lost dramatic context.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

19 <Εὐριπίδου Θυέστῃ> I.1.19

Θεοῦ θέλοντος κἂν ἐπὶ ῥιπὸς πλέοις.

20 <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.20

Θνητοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι καταφυγὴ θεοί.

21 <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.21

Καὶ τἀμπλακήματ’ ἔρχεται θεὸς μέτα,
ὅθεν λαβόντες οἱ κακῶς πεπραγότες
ἱκετηρίαν ἀπῆλθον ἐκ δυσπραξίας.

22 <Ἀδεσπότου τραγικοῦ> I.1.22

Νῦν οὐκέτι μοι δίχα θυμός,
ἀλλὰ σαφὴς <φάτις ἔσθ’>, ὅτι πάντα βροτοῖς
Ζεὺς ἐπικάρσια τέμνει,
καθελὼν μὲν δοκέοντ’,
ἀδόκητον δ’ ἐξαίρων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

19 <Euripides, Thyestes> I.1.19

If God wills it, you could sail even on a wicker mat.[45]

20 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.20

For mortal human beings, the gods are a refuge.

21 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.21

God comes in pursuit of transgressions too;
from him those who have fared badly take
a suppliant's branch, and escape their distress.[46]

22 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.1.22

Now my heart is divided no longer;
<the saying is> clear: for mortals
Zeus cuts across every expectation,
bringing down what seems likely,
and raising up what no one expects.[47]

45. Rhips is a woven or plaited object: the saying imagines an utterly inadequate craft succeeding through divine favor. The assignment to Euripides's Thyestes is supplied by the editor from parallel testimony, as the brackets indicate.

46. The construction of the first line and its relation to the following two are uncertain. The translation takes erchetai … meta as pursuit of offenses and hothen as referring back to God. Wachsmuth changes the transmitted "safety" to hiketērian, a suppliant's branch, and discusses disagreement over whether these lines belong together. The resulting image is difficult; the English preserves it.

47. The Greek says literally that Zeus "cuts everything crosswise" for mortals. The next pair, "what seems likely" and "the unexpected," supplies the sense of overturned expectations. The words "the saying is" are an editorial supplement.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

23 <Ὀρφέως> (α′) I.1.23a

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ’ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη,
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος·
Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
ἓν κράτος, εἷς δαίμων γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων·
ἓν <δὲ> δέμας βασίλειον, ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ αἰθήρ, νύξ τε καὶ ἦμαρ·
καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής·
πάντα γὰρ ἐν Ζηνὸς μεγάλῳ τάδε σώματι κεῖται·

23 <Ὀρφέως> (β′) I.1.23b

τοῦ δή τοι κεφαλὴ μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα
οὐρανὸς αἰγλήεις, ὃν χρύσεαι ἀμφὶς ἔθειραι
ἄστρων μαρμαρέων περικαλλέες ἠερέθονται·
ταύρεα δ’ ἀμφοτέρωθε δύο χρύσεια κέρατα
ἀντολή τε δύσις τε, θεῶν ὁδοὶ οὐρανίων.
ὄμματα δ’ ἠέλιος τε καὶ ἀντιόωσα σελήνη·
οἷς δέ οἱ ἀψευδὲς βασιλήιον ἄφθιτος αἰθήρ,
ᾧ δὴ πάντα κλύει καὶ φράζεται· οὐδέ τίς ἐστιν
αὐδὴ οὐδ’ ἐνοπὴ οὐδὲ κτύπος οὐδὲ μὲν ὄσσα,
ἢ λήθει Διὸς οὖας ὑπερμενέος Κρονίωνος.
ὧδε μὲν ἀθανάτην κεφαλὴν ἔχει ἠδὲ νόημα·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

23 <Orpheus> (1)

I.1.23a

Zeus came first; Zeus is last, the lord of thunder.
Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle; from Zeus all is fashioned.
Zeus became male; Zeus was an immortal bride.
Zeus is the foundation of earth and starry heaven.
Zeus is king; Zeus himself is the first begetter of all.
One power, one divinity arose, the great ruler of all:
<and> one royal body in which all these things revolve,
fire and water and earth and aether, night and day,
and Metis, first progenitor, and Eros of many delights;
for all these lie within the mighty body of Zeus.[48]

23 <Orpheus> (2)

I.1.23b

His head and his fair countenance, to behold,
are the radiant sky, around which golden locks
of glittering stars float in surpassing beauty.
His two golden bull's horns on either side
are sunrise and sunset, the paths of the heavenly gods.
His eyes are the sun and the moon that faces it;
his unerring royal ear is the imperishable aether,
through which he hears and perceives everything.[49]
No voice, no shout, no crash, no utterance
escapes the ears of mighty Zeus, the son of Cronus.
Such are his immortal head and his intelligence.

48. The supplied attribution "Orpheus" identifies an Orphic poem; it does not establish a historical author. Wachsmuth compares quotations in On the Cosmos, Eusebius, and Proclus. Metis means intelligence or resourceful counsel; Eros is love or desire. Here they appear within a divine body embracing the cosmos and combining male and female powers.

49. The unusual ois is a form of ous, "ear," not the relative pronoun "to whom." The cosmic anatomy continues: stars are hair, the sun and moon eyes, and the aether an organ of hearing and awareness. The translation retains the poem's concrete imagery.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

23 <Ὀρφέως> (γ′) I.1.23c

σῶμα δὲ οἱ περιφεγγές, ἀπείριτον, ἀστυφέλικτον,
ἄτρομον, ὀβριμόγυιον, ὑπερμενὲς ὧδε τέτυκται·
ὦμοι μὲν καὶ στέρνα καὶ εὐρέα νῶτα θεοῖο
ἀὴρ εὐρυβίης, πτέρυγες δέ οἱ ἐξεφύοντο,
τῇς ἐπὶ πάντα ποτᾶθ’, ἱερὴ δέ οἱ ἔπλετο νηδὺς
γαῖά τε παμμήτωρ ὀρέων τ’ αἰπεινὰ κάρηνα,
μέσση δὲ ζώνη βαρυηχέος οἶδμα θαλάσσης
καὶ πόντου· πυμάτη δὲ βάσις χθονὸς ἔνδοθι ῥίζαι,
τάρταρά τ’ εὐρώεντα καὶ ἔσχατα πείρατα γαίης.
πάντα δ’ ἀποκρύψας αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς
μέλλεν ἀπὸ κραδίης προφέρειν πάλι θέσκελα ῥέζων.
…

24 <Ἀδήλου φιλοσόφου> I.1.24

Τί πότ’ ἐστὶ θεός; νοῦς. τί δὲ νοῦς ἐστι; φρόνησις.
Ζῆνα δὲ σὺ νόμιζε τοῦτον, ὅθεν ἔχομεν ἀεὶ <τὸ> ζῆν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

23 <Orpheus> (3)

I.1.23c

His body, shining all around, boundless, unshakable,
unquivering, strong-limbed, surpassing in might, is formed thus:
the god's shoulders and chest and broad back
are the wide-powered air; wings have grown upon him,
on which he flies over all. His sacred belly
is earth, the mother of all, and the steep peaks of mountains.
His belt about the middle is the surge of the deep-roaring sea
and ocean; his lowest foundation is the roots within the ground,
moldy Tartarus, and the earth's furthest limits.
Having hidden everything away, he was to bring it forth
again from his heart into joyful light, working wonders anew.
…[50]

24 <An unidentified philosopher>

I.1.24

What, then, is God? Mind. And what is mind? Understanding.
Take Zeus to be that from which we always have our life.[51]

50. The closing image moves from the world contained within Zeus to its renewed emergence from him. The dots reproduce the discontinuity printed after the excerpt; no further conclusion has been supplied. "Moldy" renders eurōenta, an epithet evoking the dank darkness of Tartarus.

51. The Greek makes a verbal association between Zēna, an inflected form of Zeus, and zēn, "to live." The attribution is uncertain: Wachsmuth's apparatus notes that the excerpt lacks a heading and that earlier editors differed over whether the speaker was a philosopher or a tragic poet. His printed question-and-answer punctuation is retained. The supplied article to turns "to live" into a noun phrase, rendered "our life."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

25 Πορφυρίου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων I.1.25

Ζεὺς οὖν ὁ πᾶς κόσμος, ζῷον ἐκ ζῴων καὶ θεὸς ἐκ θεῶν. Ζεὺς δὲ καὶ <ὁ θεός>, καθὸ νοῦς ἀφ' οὗ προφέρεται πάντα, ὅτι δημιουργεῖ τοῖς νοήμασι.

26 Χρυσίππου I.1.26

Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν φαίνεται ὠνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πᾶσι δεδωκέναι τὸ ζῆν. Δία δὲ αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν αἴτιος καὶ δι' αὐτὸν πάντα.

27 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κρατύλου I.1.27

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσι· συντιθέμενα δὲ εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οἵῳ τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

25 Porphyry, from On Images

I.1.25

Zeus, then, is the whole cosmos, a living being made up of living beings and a god made up of gods. <The god> too is Zeus insofar as he is mind, from which everything is brought forth, because he creates by his thoughts.[52]

26 Chrysippus

I.1.26

Zeus, then, appears to have received his name from giving life to all. They call him Dia because he is the cause of everything and all things are through him.[53]

27 Plato, from Cratylus

I.1.27

Some call him Zēna, others Dia. Put together as one, the names reveal the nature of the god—precisely what we say a name ought to be capable of doing. For to us and to everything else there is no greater cause of life than the ruler and king of all.[54]

52. Agalmata are sacred images or representations. The excerpt distinguishes the cosmos as a comprehensive living god from the productive divine mind. The next two excerpts pursue verbal associations within the Greek names of Zeus; these should not be confused with a modern historical derivation of the name.

53. The wordplay joins Zeus with zēn, “to live,” and Dia with dia, “through.” Dia and Zēna in the following excerpt are alternative accusative forms of the same god’s name; English has no corresponding pair.

54. Cratylus 396a. Joined together, the name forms suggest “through whom there is life.” The translation follows the excerpt’s wording and preserves its account of what a name is supposed to reveal.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <Ἀδήλου Πλατωνικοῦ> (α′) I.1.28a

Φημὶ κατ’ ἀμφοτέρων λέγεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ τε δημιουργοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Καὶ μοι δοκῶ πρῶτα κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ Πλάτωνι χρήσεσθαι μάρτυρι τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης. Πλάτων γάρ τοι καὶ αὐτὸς Δία μὲν καλεῖ τὸν δημιουργὸν τῶν ἁπάντων, θεὸν δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. Τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε· ἐπειδὰν ἐν Φαίδρῳ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φορᾶς διαλέγηται, τάδε φησὶ περὶ τοῦ μεγάλου Διός· “Ὁ δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος· <τῷ δ’ ἕπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων>.”

28 <Ἀδήλου Πλατωνικοῦ> (β′) I.1.28b

Οἶμαι σαφὴς ἐν τούτοις ὑπάρχει μνημονεύσας τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ἁπάντων· καὶ γὰρ ἀνέθηκεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον θεῶν· ἔφη γοῦν ἕπεσθαι τῇ ἐκείνου πορείᾳ τοὺς στρατιώτας θεούς· στρατιώτας δὲ ἐκάλεσε τοὺς τῇδε θεούς, οἳ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου τῆς γενέσεως στρατηγοῦσιν.

Ὁμοίως Ὀνάτας ὁ Πυθαγόρειος ἐπεμνήσθη τοῦ τε δημιουργοῦ καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων τούτῳ θεῶν, λέγων οὕτως· “τοὶ δ’ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρᾶτον θεὸν καὶ νοατὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι, ὥσπερ χορευταὶ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον καὶ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στραταγόν.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <An unidentified Platonist> (1)

I.1.28a

I maintain that the name “god” is applied to both the maker and the cosmos. I think I should first, in keeping with my own principles, call Plato as a witness to this view.[55] For Plato himself calls the maker of all things Zeus, and also calls this cosmos a god.

He speaks of the maker in this way. When discussing the movement of the universe in the Phaedrus, he says this of great Zeus: “Zeus, the great leader in heaven, drives a winged chariot and goes first, ordering and caring for everything; <an army of gods and divine spirits follows him>.”[56]

28 <An unidentified Platonist> (2)

I.1.28b

I think it is clear that in these words he has spoken of the maker of everything. For he assigned to him a following of gods concerned with the cosmos: he said that the gods who serve as soldiers follow on his journey. He called the gods of this realm soldiers because they command the warfare of coming-to-be here.[57]

Similarly, Onatas the Pythagorean mentioned both the maker and the gods who follow him, saying: “The other gods stand in relation to the first and intelligible god as members of a chorus to their leader, or soldiers to their general.”[58]

55. The author is unidentified. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records an attribution to Porphyry and a suggestion of Iamblichus, but his heading leaves the matter open. “Maker” translates dēmiourgos, also conventionally transliterated “demiurge.” The argument distinguishes the maker from the cosmos without denying the name “god” to either.

56. Phaedrus 246e. The final clause is supplied in Wachsmuth from Plato. “Divine spirits” renders daimones; it does not imply the evil spirits suggested by modern English “demons.”

57. “Coming-to-be” translates genesis, the realm or process of generation. The martial interpretation belongs to this commentator’s explanation of the Platonic quotation.

58. The quotation attributed to Onatas is in Doric Greek, whose forms are retained on the facing page. “Intelligible” means apprehensible by intellect. The comparison establishes an ordered relation between a first god and other gods.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 32

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <Ἀδήλου Πλατωνικοῦ> (γ′) I.1.28c

Κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ Πλάτων ἀμφοτέρων ἐπεμνήσθη ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ· τὸν γὰρ δημιουργὸν ἡγεμόνα πάντων τῶν θεῶν εἶπε, τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων. Μέλλοντας δὲ ἴσμεν θεοὺς τοὺς ἀεὶ γενητούς, τουτέστι συναπτομένους ποτὲ σώμασι.

Ἐν δὲ τῷ Τιμαίῳ χωρίσας τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνικῶς διὰ τοῦ οἰκητηρίου τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς πάντας ὠνόμασεν· “οὗτος” γὰρ ἔφη, “ὄντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεόν”· δῆλος γὰρ ὁ μὲν λογιζόμενος θεὸς ὁ δημιουργὸς ὤν, ὁ δὲ ἐσόμενος καὶ γιγνόμενος ἀεὶ ὁ κόσμος λεγόμενος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <An unidentified Platonist> (3)

I.1.28c

In the same way Plato mentioned both in the letter to Hermias and Coriscus. He called the maker the leader of all the gods, both those who exist and those who are to come. By gods "to come" we understand those who are always subject to generation—that is, those who at some time are joined to bodies.[59]

In the Timaeus, separating the gods from multiplicity, he named them all in the singular through their dwelling-place, the cosmos. For he said: "This was the reasoning of the god who always exists concerning the god who was to exist at some time." It is clear that the god who reasons is the maker, while the one who is to exist and is always coming-to-be is what is called the cosmos.[60]

59. The reference is to the Sixth Letter transmitted under Plato's name, 323d. The explanation of gods "to come" is the commentator's interpretation of the cited distinction.

60. Timaeus 34a. The preceding sentence is compressed and textually difficult; Wachsmuth prints oikētēriou, "dwelling-place," as a correction. The English takes the cosmos as the collective designation for the gods dwelling in it. The ensuing quotation makes the main distinction explicit: the maker always exists, whereas the cosmos comes to be.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 32-33

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <Ἀδήλου Πλατωνικοῦ> (δ′) I.1.28d

Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος·

Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐπ’ ὠκεανὸν μετ’ ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας
χθιζὸς ἔβη μετὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ’ ἅμα πάντες ἕποντο.
δωδεκάτῃ δέ τοι αὖθις ἐλεύσεται οὐλυμπόνδε.
Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον Διὸς ταυτὶ λέγεται· οἵ τε γὰρ θεοὶ ἅμα πάντες εἵποντο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον. Ὁπόταν δὲ εἰς τὸν Ὄλυμπον ἀφίκωνται, δηλοῦσι καὶ τὴν διαφοράν, ἑτέρου λεγομένου Διὸς τοῦ κεχωρισμένου τῶν θεῶν.

28 <Ἀδήλου Πλατωνικοῦ> (ε′) I.1.28e

Ἡ γοῦν Θέτις εἰς μὲν τὸν Ὄλυμπον ἦκεν (χρῆν γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν ἐκτελεῖν τὸ μύθευμα)·

εὖρε δὲ εὐρύοπα Κρονίδην ἄτερ ἥμενον ἄλλων
ἀκροτάτῃ κορυφῇ πολυδειράδος Οὐλύμποιο.
Τὴν μέντοι δωδεκάτην ἀκουστέον τῆς ἐπανόδου τῶν θεῶν, ὁπόταν ὑπερβάντες τὰ δώδεκα ζῴδια ἐπὶ τῷ νώτῳ γένωνται τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, στάντας δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖσε περιάγῃ ἡ περιφορά· λόγος γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ψυχῶν καὶ θεῶν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 33

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

28 <An unidentified Platonist> (4)

I.1.28d

Homer speaks similarly:

"Zeus went to Ocean, to the blameless Ethiopians,
yesterday for a feast; all the gods followed with him.
On the twelfth day he will return to Olympus."[61]
These words concern Zeus within the cosmos, for all the gods followed together. The multitude of gods is a work of the maker, brought into being together with the cosmos. But when they reach Olympus, they also show the distinction: another Zeus is spoken of, the one who is separate from the gods.[62]

28 <An unidentified Platonist> (5)

I.1.28e

Thetis accordingly came to Olympus—for the poem had to carry the story through—

"and found the far-seeing son of Cronus seated apart from the others
on the highest summit of many-ridged Olympus."[63]
The "twelfth day," however, must be understood of the gods' return, when they have passed beyond the twelve signs of the zodiac and come to be on the outer surface of heaven; standing there, they are carried around by its revolution. For the same account applies to souls and to gods.[64]

61. Iliad 1.423–425. In the ancient poem "Ethiopians" designates the distant people visited by the gods; it should not be mapped without qualification onto the boundaries of a modern country.

62. The two Zeuses belong to the commentator's philosophical reading of the Homeric narrative. The quotation itself says that Zeus travels with the gods; the distinction between a cosmic Zeus and a separate Zeus is argued from this and the following passage.

63. Iliad 1.498–499. Thetis, the mother of Achilles, finds Zeus apart from the other gods. The parenthetical remark about completing the story belongs to the commentator.

64. The explanation combines Homer's "twelfth day" with the zodiac and the heavenly journey described in Phaedrus 247c, a parallel noted by Wachsmuth. "Outer surface" translates nōton, literally "back." This allegorical explanation is part of the excerpt, not an interpretation supplied by this translation.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 33

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29a I.1.29a

Θαλῆς ἐρωτηθείς, Τί πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων; ἀπεκρίνατο· Θεός, ἀγέννητον γάρ.

Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθείς, Τί θεός; εἶπε· Τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον.

Ἑρμῆς ἐρωτηθείς, Τί θεός; εἶπεν· Ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός, σοφώτατος νοῦς καὶ ἀΐδιος.

29b <Ἀετίου> (α′) I.1.29b.1

Θαλῆς νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες· διήκειν δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὑγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ.

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἀπεφήνατο τοὺς ἀπείρους οὐρανοὺς θεούς.

Ἀναξιμένης τὸν ἀέρα. δεῖ δ’ ὑπακούειν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτως λεγομένων τὰς ἐνδηκούσας τοῖς στοιχείοις ἢ τοῖς σώμασι δυνάμεις.

Ἀρχέλαος ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεόν, οὐ μέντοι κοσμοποιὸν τὸν νοῦν.

Ἀναξαγόρας νοῦν κοσμοποιὸν τὸν θεόν.

Δημόκριτος νοῦν τὸν θεὸν ἐν πυρὶ σφαιροειδεῖ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29a

I.1.29a

Asked, “What is the oldest of all things?” Thales replied, “God, for he is unbegotten.”

Asked, “What is God?” Socrates said, “That which is immortal and eternal.”

Asked, “What is God?” Hermes said, “The maker of the universe, supremely wise and eternal mind.”[65]

29b <Aëtius> (1)

I.1.29b.1

Thales identifies God as the mind of the cosmos, and the universe as both ensouled and full of divine spirits. A divine power that sets the elemental moisture in motion also pervades it.[66]

Anaximander declared the boundless heavens to be gods.

Anaximenes identified God with air. In statements of this kind, one must understand the powers residing in the elements or bodies.

Archelaus identified God with air and mind, though not a mind that makes the cosmos.

Anaxagoras identified God with a mind that makes the cosmos.

Democritus identified God with mind in spherical fire.

65. These are sayings attributed to Thales, Socrates, and Hermes in the collection. Their compact question-and-answer form does not establish that they record historical conversations. “Unbegotten” means that God has no origin through generation.

66. Wachsmuth’s supplied heading assigns this survey to Aëtius, Opinions I.7.11–34. These are compressed doctrinal reports, not necessarily the philosophers’ own words. The explanatory sentence following Anaximenes belongs to the transmitted survey. “Divine spirits” translates daimones.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 34

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Ἀετίου> (β′)

I.1.29b.2

Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν.

Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, τὴν <δ’> ἀόριστον δυάδα <δαίμονα> καὶ τὸ κακόν, περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος.

Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

Σπεύσιππος τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ.

Κριτόλαος καὶ Διόδωρος ὁ Τύριος νοῦν ἀπ’ αἰθέρος ἀπαθοῦς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 34-35

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Aëtius> (2)

I.1.29b.2

Diogenes, Cleanthes, and Oenopides identify God with the soul of the cosmos.

Of the first principles, Pythagoras identifies the monad with God and the good: it is the nature of the One and mind itself. <But> the indefinite dyad he identifies with <a divine spirit> and evil; material plurality belongs to it.[67]

Posidonius identifies God with an intelligent, fiery breath, having no form but changing into whatever it wishes and assimilating itself to all things.

Speusippus holds that mind is identical neither with the One nor with the good, but has a nature of its own.

Critolaus and Diodorus of Tyre identify God with mind derived from aether that is unaffected by change.[68]

67. “Monad” and “dyad” designate unity and the twofold principle, here opposed as definite unity and indefinite plurality. This is the survey’s attribution to Pythagoras. It should not erase the differences between the several accounts of number already encountered in On Arithmetic.

68. Pneuma, rendered “breath” in the preceding report, can designate an active, pervasive physical principle. Aether is the celestial element. “Unaffected by change” renders apathēs, literally not subject to being acted upon.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 34-35

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Ἀετίου> (γ′) I.1.29b.3

Ἡράκλειτος τὸ περιοδικὸν πῦρ ἀΐδιον, εἱμαρμένην δὲ λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἐναντιοδρομίας δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄντων.

Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς νοῦν κόσμου πύρινον.

Μνησαγόρας τὸν κόσμον, τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἀπὸ πνεύματος.

Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.

Παρμενίδης τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ πεπερασμένον σφαιροειδές.

Μέλισσος καὶ Ζήνων τὸ ἓν καὶ πᾶν καὶ μόνον ἀΐδιον καὶ ἄπειρον.

29b <Ἀετίου> (δ′) I.1.29b.4

<Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν σφαῖρον καὶ> τὸ ἕν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἓν τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὕλην δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, εἴδη δὲ τὸ νεῖκος καὶ τὴν φιλίαν. Λέγει δὲ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα θεοὺς καὶ τὸ μῖγμα τούτων τὸν κόσμον καὶ προσαναλυθήσεται τὸ μονοειδές· καὶ θείας μὲν οἴεται τὰς ψυχάς, θείους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν καθαροὺς καθαρῶς.

Πολέμων τὸν κόσμον θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 35-36

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Aëtius> (3)

I.1.29b.3

Heraclitus identifies God with eternal fire moving in cycles, and fate with reason that produces existing things through the movement of opposites.

Zeno the Stoic identifies God with the fiery mind of the cosmos.

Mnesagoras identifies God with the cosmos, whose primary substance comes from breath.

Boethus declared aether to be God.

Parmenides identifies God with what is motionless, bounded, and spherical.

Melissus and Zeno identify God with the One that is all, alone eternal and unlimited.[69]

29b <Aëtius> (4)

I.1.29b.4

<Empedocles identifies God with the Sphere and> the One; the One he identifies with necessity, its matter with the four elements, and its forms with strife and friendship. He also calls the elements gods and their mixture the cosmos, and says that the uniform whole will be further dissolved. He considers souls divine, and also regards as divine those who, themselves pure, partake of them purely.[70]

Polemo declared the cosmos to be God.

69. The first Zeno is explicitly “the Stoic.” The Zeno paired here with Melissus belongs to the distinct Eleatic sequence. The survey places bounded and unlimited conceptions side by side; the translation retains the difference.

70. Wachsmuth supplies the opening identification with Empedocles and the Sphere. The clause about the uniform whole’s dissolution is damaged; his apparatus records several attempts to repair it. The English follows the printed wording tentatively. “Forms” translates eidē here, without replacing the report’s terminology with a reconstructed account of Empedocles.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 35-36

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Ἀετίου> (ε′)

I.1.29b.5

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Καλχηδόνιος τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. Θεὸν δ’ εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις Ὀλυμπίους θεούς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποσελήνους δαίμονας ἀοράτους.

Ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ … καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. Τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν <διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος προσγείου> Ἅιδην προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπόρον Δήμητραν. Ταῦτα δὲ χορηγήσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 36-37

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Aëtius> (5)

I.1.29b.5

Xenocrates of Chalcedon, son of Agathenor, identifies the monad and the dyad as gods. The monad is male, occupies the rank of father, and reigns in heaven; he also calls it Zeus, the odd, and mind, which for him is the first god. The dyad is female, like a mother of gods, and presides over the region beneath heaven; for him it is the soul of the universe. Heaven too is a god, the stars are fiery Olympian gods, and there are other invisible divine spirits beneath the moon.

He also holds that … and that they pervade the material elements. Of these powers, he calls the one <through the air near the earth> Hades; the one through moisture, Poseidon; and the seed-bearing one through earth, Demeter. Having furnished these notions to the Stoics, he has restated the earlier ones from Plato.[71]

71. The dots mark a gap in the report. “Powers” supplies the sense needed after it, while the missing subject remains visible. The words connecting Hades with the air near earth are also editorially supplied in an awkwardly transmitted sentence; the facing text follows Wachsmuth. The final judgment about Plato and the Stoics belongs to the survey.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 36-37

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Ἀετίου> (ς′)

I.1.29b.6

Πλάτων δὲ τὸ ἕν, τὸ μονοφυές, τὸ μοναδικόν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τἀγαθόν. Πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸν νοῦν σπεύδει. Νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός, χωριστὸν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ χωριστὸν ἀκουέσθω τὸ ἀμιγὲς πάσης ὕλης καὶ μηδενὶ τῶν σωματικῶν συμπεπλεγμένον, μηδὲ τῷ παθητῷ τῆς φύσεως συμπαθές. Τούτου δὲ πατρὸς καὶ ποιητοῦ τὰ ἄλλα θεῖα ἔκγονα νοητὰ μέν, ὅ τε νοητὸς λεγόμενος κόσμος <καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι>, παραδείγματα δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐναιθέριοί τινες δυνάμεις, (λόγοι δ’ εἰσὶν ἀσώματοι,) καὶ <ἔμπυροι καὶ> ἐναέριοι καὶ ἔνυδροι, αἰσθητὸς δὲ [τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ ἔκγονα] ἥλιος, σελήνη, ἀστέρες, γῆ καὶ ὁ περιέχων πάντα κόσμος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 37

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Aëtius> (6)

I.1.29b.6

Plato identifies God with the One, the single-natured, the unitary, what truly is, and the good. All such names point toward mind. God, then, is mind, a separate form; “separate” is to be understood as unmixed with any matter, entangled with nothing bodily, and sharing none of the affections of mutable nature.

The other divine offspring of this father and maker are intelligible: the so-called intelligible cosmos <and the Forms>, which are patterns of the visible cosmos. Besides these there are certain powers in the aether (they are incorporeal rational principles), and powers <in fire and> in air and water. Perceptible, however, are [offspring of the first god] the sun, moon, stars, earth, and the cosmos that encompasses all.[72]

72. This is a report about Plato, using technical distinctions between intelligible and perceptible realities. Wachsmuth brackets “offspring of the first god” as intrusive here; the English preserves those brackets. His apparatus also questions the parenthetical explanation of the powers as incorporeal logoi. These textual features should not be read as an unproblematic statement directly quoted from Plato.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 37

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Ἀετίου> (ζ′) I.1.29b.7

Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος <χωριστόν>, ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι, ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καλούμενον.

Οἱ Στωικοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ᾽ οὓς ἅπαντα καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται. Καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν ἐνδιῆκον δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον δι᾽ ὅλης τῆς ὕλης, δι᾽ ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξαν, θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἀνωτάτω δὲ πάντων νοῦν ἐναιθέριον εἶναι θεόν.

29b <Ἀετίου> (η′) I.1.29b.8

Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεούς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως. Ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄλλας τέσσαρας φύσεις κατὰ γένος ἀφθάρτους τάδε· τὰ ἄτομα, τὸ κενόν, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰς ὁμοιότητας· αὗται δὲ λέγονται ὁμοιομέρειαι καὶ στοιχεῖα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 37-38

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

29b <Aëtius> (7)

I.1.29b.7

Aristotle holds that the highest god is a <separate> form, as in Plato, set over the sphere of the universe, which is an aetherial body, what he calls the fifth body.

The Stoics declare God to be intelligent: a craftsmanlike fire proceeding methodically toward the generation of the cosmos, containing all the seminal rational principles in accordance with which everything comes to be according to fate.[73] He is a breath pervading the whole cosmos, taking different names as it varies throughout all the matter it has penetrated. They also hold that the cosmos, the stars, and the earth are gods, and that the highest god of all is mind in the aether.[74]

29b <Aëtius> (8)

I.1.29b.8

Epicurus holds that the gods have human form, but all are apprehensible by reason because of the extreme fineness of the images' nature. He also recognizes these four other natures as imperishable in kind: atoms, void, the unlimited, and likenesses. These last are called "like-parted constituents" and elements.[75]

73. "Seminal rational principles" translates spermatikoi logoi, the formative principles here described as contained in divine fire. "Craftsmanlike" renders technikon: fire is credited with ordered productive activity.

74. The sentence explaining the changing divine names is textually awkward. Wachsmuth retains the transmitted wording and notes a correction concerning the variations of matter. The English follows its general construction without silently substituting that correction into the Greek.

75. "Images" renders eidōla; "like-parted constituents" renders homoiomereiai. The final list is translated as the survey prints it. Its unusual combination of terms should not be normalized into a more familiar reconstruction of Epicurean doctrine.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 37-38

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

30 <Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Κρατῆρος> I.1.30

Τοιοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ σῶμα ἐκείνου, οὐχ ἁπτὸν οὐδὲ ὁρατὸν οὐδὲ μετρητὸν οὐδὲ διαστατὸν οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ τινὶ σώματι ὅμοιον. Οὔτε γὰρ πῦρ ἐστιν οὔτε ὕδωρ οὔτε ἀὴρ οὔτε πνεῦμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ. Ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὤν, μόνῳ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ἀναθεῖναι ἠθέλησε, καὶ τὴν γῆν κοσμῆσαι.

31a <Ἀδεσπότου ποιητοῦ> I.1.31a

Ἡρακλέους κρατεροῦ ὃς γᾶν ἐκάθαρεν ἅπασαν,
πετροβάτα τε θεοῦ, Πανὸς νομίοιο βριάκτα,
θείου ἰατῆρος τ’ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ὀλβιοδώτα,
πρεσβίστας τε θεᾶς Ὑγιείας μειλιχοδώρου,
ναυσί τ’ ἐπ’ ὠκυπόροισι Διοσκούρων ἐπιφαντᾶν,
Κουρήτων θ’, οἳ ματρὶ Διὸς Ῥέᾳ ἐντὶ πάρεδροι,
καὶ Χαρίτων μεμνᾶσθαι ἐν ἔργῳ παντὶ μέγιστον,
ἠδὲ Χρόνου παίδων Ὡρᾶν, αἳ πάντα φύοντι,
Νυμφᾶν τ’ οὐρειᾶν, αἳ νάματα κάλ’ ἐφέποντι.

31b <Ἀδήλου λυρικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.1.31b

Ὑμνέωμες μάκαρας, Μοῦσαι Διὸς ἔκγονοι ἀρτίποις αὐδαῖς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

30 <Hermes, from The Mixing Bowl>

I.1.30

For such is his body: neither tangible nor visible, neither measurable nor extended, nor like any other body. It is neither fire nor water nor air nor breath; rather, all things come from him. For, being good, he wished to reserve this for himself alone, and to order the earth.[76]

31a <An unidentified poet>

I.1.31a

To remember mighty Heracles, who cleansed the whole earth,
and the rock-walking god, powerful Pan of the pastures,
and the divine healer Asclepius, giver of prosperity,
and most august Hygieia, the goddess of gentle gifts,
and the Dioscuri, appearing over swift-sailing ships,
and the Curetes, attendants of Rhea, the mother of Zeus,
and the Graces, is of highest importance in every undertaking,
and the Seasons, children of Time, who bring forth all things,
and the mountain Nymphs, who tend the lovely streams.[77]

31b <An unidentified lyric poet>

I.1.31b

Let us hymn the blessed gods, Muses born of Zeus,
with voices perfectly attuned.[78]

76. Wachsmuth supplies the heading from the Hermetic treatise called The Mixing Bowl or The Monad. The description deliberately denies ordinary bodily attributes to what it calls God's "body." The final clause follows the wording printed here, including "earth"; its relation to the preceding statement is compressed.

77. The opening names depend on "to remember," which occurs later in the Greek. The English brings that verb forward. Hygieia personifies health; the Dioscuri are the divine brothers associated here with aid at sea. The poem calls the Seasons children of Chronos, "Time"; this is not the name Kronos, Zeus's father. Its Doric forms are retained in Greek.

78. The printed artipois, literally "sound-footed," is unusual with "voices"; "perfectly attuned" is an interpretive rendering of its metrical image. The first-person form hymneōmes means "let us hymn," not "hymn" as a command to the Muses alone.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 38-39

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

32 <Φιλήμονος> I.1.32

Ὃν οὐδὲ εἷς λέληθεν οὐδὲ ἓν ποιῶν,
οὐδ’ αὖ ποιήσων οὐδὲ πεποιηκὼς πάλαι,
οὔτε θεὸς οὔτ’ ἄνθρωπος, οὗτός εἰμὶ ἐγὼ
Ἀήρ, ὃν ἄν τις ὀνομάσειε καὶ Δία.
ἐγὼ δ’ ὃ <θεοῦ ’στιν> ἔργον, εἰμὶ πανταχοῦ,
<ἐνταῦθ’ ἐν Ἀθήναις, ἐν Πάτραις, ἐν Σικελίᾳ,>
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πάσαισιν, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις
πάσαις, ἐν ὑμῖν πᾶσιν· οὐκ ἔστιν τόπος
οὗ μὴ ’στιν ἀήρ· ὁ δὲ παρὼν ἀπανταχοῦ
πάντ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδε [πανταχοῦ παρών].

33 Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου· περὶ προνοίας (α′) I.1.33a

Ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γιγνομένων ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἐὰν δύο ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον. Εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, οὐδ’ ἂν ἴδῃ.

Χρώματα ὁ θεὸς εἰ πεποιήκει καὶ καθόλου πάντα <τὰ> ὁρατά, δύναμιν δὲ θεατικὴν αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί ἂν ἦν ὄφελος; — Οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν. — Ἀλλ’ ἀνάπαλιν, εἰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, οἷα ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως τί ὄφελος; — Οὐδέν. — Τί δ’, εἰ καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, <φῶς δὲ μὴ πεποιήκει>; — Οὐδ’ οὕτως τι ὄφελος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 39-40

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

32 <Philemon> I.1.32

No one has escaped me in a single deed,
nor in what he will do, nor in what he did long ago,
neither god nor man. I am that watcher,
Air, whom one might also call Zeus.
I do what <belongs to a god>: I am everywhere,
<here in Athens, in Patrae, in Sicily,>
in every city, in every house,
in every one of you. There is no place
where air is absent; whoever is present everywhere
must necessarily know everything [being present everywhere].[79]

33 Arrian's Epictetus: On Providence (1) I.1.33a

It is easy to praise providence on the evidence of anything that happens in the cosmos, provided one has these two things within oneself: the ability to see each event in its connections, and a grateful disposition. Otherwise one person will fail to see the usefulness of what has happened, while another will fail to be grateful for it even if he does see.[80]

If God had made colors and, generally, everything visible, but had not made a capacity to see them, what use would there have been? "None at all." Conversely, if he had made the capacity but had not made existing things such as could fall within its scope, what use would that have been? "None." And if he had made both of these, <but had not made light>? "Even then there would have been no use."

79. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution from the excerpt's recurrence in chapter 10; that parallel also supplies the bracketed line naming places and the words about a god's work. The final square-bracketed repetition is treated as an intrusive marginal explanation. Air speaks as a personified, all-pervading witness.

80. Epictetus, Discourses I.6.1–11, recorded by Arrian. The argument concerns the mutual suitability of things and the capacities using them; it requires gratitude as well as understanding. The supplied article ta is absorbed into "everything visible."

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

33 Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου (β′)

I.1.33b

Τίς οὖν ὁ ἁρμόσας τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς δ’ ὁ ἁρμόσας τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸν κολεὸν καὶ τὸν κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν; Οὐδείς; Καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον, οὐχὶ δὲ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον. Ἆρ’ οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην, τὰ δὲ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρασις καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει; Τὸ δ’ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προθυμία ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ <ἡ> δύναμις ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην;

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω· ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθ’ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν <καὶ συντίθεμεν> τάδε τινὰ δι’ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπ’ ἄλλων ἐπ’ ἄλλα τούτοις πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην; ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν, τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον, ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτως θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίγνεσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 40-41

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

33 Arrian's Epictetus (2)

I.1.33b

Who, then, fitted this to that and that to this? Who fitted the sword to the sheath and the sheath to the sword? No one? Yet from the very construction of finished objects we are accustomed to declare that they must be the work of some craftsman, not things constructed at random. Does each of these reveal its craftsman, while visible things, sight, and light do not? And male and female, the desire of each for union, and <the> capacity to use the organs provided for it—do these too fail to reveal the craftsman?

Let those things stand. What of the mind's particular construction? Through it we do not merely receive impressions from sensible objects when we encounter them: we also apprehend something, subtract, add, <and combine> particular things through them; and, by Zeus, we pass from some things to others related to them. Are even these insufficient to move people and turn them toward acknowledging the craftsman? Then let them explain to us what produces each of these things, or how things so wonderful and skillfully formed can arise at random and spontaneously.[81]

81. The sequence moves from fitted artifacts to bodily functions and then to the mind's active operations. "Acknowledging" renders the negative expression mē apolipein, "not leaving out" the craftsman. The argument and its challenge to an opponent are presented in Epictetus's own rhetorical form.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

34 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ>· ὅτι πάντα ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον (α′) I.1.34a

Πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἄν τις πεισθείη, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πραττομένων ἐφορᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ; Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; — Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. — Τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; — Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. — Πόθεν γὰρ οὕτως τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλαστάνει, ὅταν ἐκφέρειν τὸν καρπόν, ἐκφέρει, ὅταν πεπαίνειν, πεπαίνει, ὅταν ἀποβάλλειν, <ἀποβάλλει>, καὶ φυλλορροεῖν, <φυλλορροεῖ>, καὶ αὐτὰ εἰς αὐτὰ συνειλούμενα ἐφ’ ἡσυχίας μένειν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι, μένει καὶ ἀναπαύεται;

34 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> (β′) I.1.34b

Πόθεν δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν τῆς σελήνης καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσοδον καὶ ἄφοδον τοσαύτη παραλλαγὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεωρεῖται; Ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ ψυχαὶ δὲ αἱ ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον; Ἀλλ’ αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα, οὐ παντὸς δὲ αὐτῶν κινήματος, ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς, ὁ θεὸς αἰσθάνεται;

Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν περὶ τῆς θείας διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θείων, ὁμοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δύνασαι καὶ ἅμα μὲν αἰσθητικῶς ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων κινεῖσθαι, ἅμα δὲ διανοητικῶς, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς μὲν συγκαταθετικῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνανευστικῶς ἢ ἐφεκτικῶς·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 41-42

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

34 <The same author>: Divine oversight (1) I.1.34a

Someone asked how a person could be persuaded that God observes every action he performs. “Do you not think,” he replied, “that all things form a unity?” “I do,” the man said. “And do you not think that earthly things respond in sympathy to heavenly things?” “I do.”

“How else do these things happen in such order, as though by God’s command? When he tells plants to flower, they flower; to sprout, they sprout; to bear fruit, they bear it; to ripen it, they ripen it; to shed it, <they shed it>; to lose their leaves, <they lose them>; to draw into themselves and remain quietly at rest, they remain and rest.[82]

34 <The same author> (2) I.1.34b

“How else do we see such variation and changes to opposite conditions in earthly things corresponding to the moon’s waxing and waning and the sun’s approach and withdrawal? If plants and our bodies are bound so closely to the whole and affected along with it, are not our souls much more so? If our souls are thus bound and joined to God, being parts and portions of him, does God fail to perceive every movement of theirs, as something belonging to him and sharing his nature?[83]

“You yourself can reflect on divine government and on each divine thing, and also on human affairs. You can at the same time be moved by countless things in perception and in thought, assenting to some, rejecting others, or withholding judgment.

82. Epictetus, Discourses I.14.1–10. The heading means “That the divine observes everything.” “Sympathy” here means a correspondence or mutual responsiveness within the ordered whole, not simply fellow-feeling. The quotation continues on the next facing pages.

83. “Parts and portions” renders moria and apospasmata, the latter literally pieces separated off. The argument relies on the soul’s intimate relation to the divine and moves from human cognitive capacity to divine awareness. It is not a claim introduced by the translator.

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

34 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> (γ′) I.1.34c

τύπους τε τοσούτους ἀφ’ οὗτω πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ σαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φυλάττεις καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν κινούμενος εἰς ἐπινοίας ὁμοειδεῖς ἐμπίπτεις τοῖς πρώτοις τετυπωκόσι, τέχνας τε ἄλλας ἐπ’ ἄλλαις καὶ μνήμας ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων διασῴζεις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οἷός τέ ἐστι πάντα ἐφορᾶν καὶ πᾶσι συμπαρεῖναι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τινὰ ἴσχειν διάδοσιν; Ἀλλὰ φωτίζειν μὲν οἷός τέ ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος τηλικοῦτον μέρος τοῦ παντός, ὀλίγον δὲ τὸ ἀφώτιστον ἀπολείπεται, ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐπέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς σκιᾶς, ἣν ἡ γῆ ποιεῖ· ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν πεποιηκὼς καὶ περιάγων, μέρος ὄντ’ αὐτοῦ μικρὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος δὲ οὐ δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι;

35 Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Ποιμένιον I.1.35

Οἱ θεοὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην συνέχοντες διὰ παντὸς ἐπανορθοῦνται· ἡ δ’ ἐπανόρθωσις αὐτῶν ποτὲ μὲν ἐλάττωσιν κακῶν, ποτὲ δὲ παραμυθίαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἀναίρεσιν ἀπεργάζεται· ἀφ’ οὗ δὴ διακοσμεῖται ἡ εἱμαρμένη τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, διακοσμουμένη δὲ οὐχ ὑποφαίνεται πᾶσα πρὸς τὴν ἄτακτον φύσιν τῆς γενέσεως. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον σῴζεται ἡ πεπρωμένη διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπανορθώσεως καὶ τὸ παρατρέπον αὐτῆς μένει κατὰ τὴν ἄτρεπτον τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθότητα συνεχόμενον, διότι οὐκ ἐᾷ ὑπορρεῖν εἰς τὴν ἄτακτον πλημμέλειαν. Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων τό τε ἀγαθοειδὲς τῆς προνοίας τό τε αὐτεξούσιον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πάντα τὰ κάλλιστα διασῴζεται, τῇ βουλήσει τῶν θεῶν συνυπάρχοντα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

34 <The same author> (3) I.1.34c

"You preserve in your soul so many impressions from so many varied things; moved by them, you arrive at conceptions resembling the things that first made those impressions. You retain one skill after another and memories of countless things. Yet God cannot observe everything, be present with everything, and receive some communication from everything?

"The sun can illuminate so great a portion of the universe, leaving only a little unlit—what is covered by the shadow the earth casts. But the one who made and guides the sun itself, a small part of him in comparison with the whole: is he unable to perceive everything?"

35 Iamblichus, from the letter to Poemenius I.1.35

The gods, holding fate together, continually set it right. Their correction sometimes lessens evils, sometimes brings relief, and at times even removes them. Fate is thereby adorned with good things; thus ordered, it does not reveal itself in its entirety to the disorderly nature of coming-to-be.

Destiny, then, is preserved all the more through this correction. Its tendency to deviate remains held in check by the gods' undeviating goodness, which does not allow it to slip into disorderly disharmony. This being so, the good character of providence, the soul's self-determination, and all the finest things are preserved, existing together with the will of the gods.[84]

84. The argument presents divine correction as preserving fate rather than abolishing it. Autexousion, "self-determination," is the soul's power of acting on its own authority. The clause about fate not revealing itself in its entirety follows the printed hypophainetai; it is compressed and should not be silently turned into a different claim about fate's operation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (α′) I.1.36a

Καθόλου δὲ ὅπερ ἐν νηΐ μὲν κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ δὲ κορυφαῖος, [ἐν πόλει δὲ νόμος,] ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἡγεμών, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ, πλὴν καθόσον τοῖς μὲν καματηρὸν τὸ ἄρχειν πολυκίνητόν τε καὶ πολυμέριμνον, τῷ δὲ ἄλυπον ἄπονόν τε πάσης κεχωρισμένῳ σωματικῆς ἀσθενείας· ἐν ἀκινήτῳ <γὰρ> ἱδρυμένος δυνάμει πάντα κινεῖ καὶ περιάγει, ὅπου βούλεται καὶ ὅπως, ἐν διαφόροις ἰδέαις καὶ φύσεσιν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ἀκίνητος ὢν ἐν ταῖς τῶν χρωμένων ψυχαῖς πάντα οἰκονομεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν.

36 Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (β′) I.1.36b

Ἐφεπόμενοι γὰρ αὐτῷ δηλονότι ἐξίασιν ἄρχοντες μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα, θεσμοθέται δὲ εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα δικαστήρια, βουλευταὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησιασταὶ εἰς συνέδρια τὰ προσήκοντα· καὶ ὁ μὲν εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον βαδίζει διαιτησόμενος, <ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογησόμενος, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀποθανούμενος>. Γίνονται δὲ καὶ δημοθοινίαι νόμιμοι καὶ πανηγύρεις ἐνιαύσιαι, θεῶν τε θυσίαι καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι καὶ χοαὶ κεκμηκότων. Ἄλλα δ’ ἄλλως ἐνεργούμενα κατὰ μίαν πρόσταξιν ἢ νόμιμον ἐξουσίαν σῴζει τὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ὅτι

πόλις <δ’> ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει,
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Aristotle, from the letter to Alexander (1) I.1.36a

In general, what a helmsman is in a ship, a charioteer in a chariot, a leader in a chorus, [law in a city,] and a commander in an army, God is in the cosmos—with this difference: for them, ruling is wearisome, full of movement and anxiety; for him it is painless and effortless, since he is free from every bodily weakness. <For> established in unmoving power, he moves and guides everything wherever and however he wishes, in diverse forms and natures.[85]

So too the law of a city, itself unmoving in the souls of those who live by it, orders all the affairs of the constitution.

36 Aristotle, from the letter to Alexander (2) I.1.36b

In obedience to it, magistrates go to their offices, judicial magistrates to their proper courts, and councilors and members of the assembly to the appropriate meetings. One man goes to the prytaneum to dine; <another goes before the judges to defend himself, another to prison to die>. There are also lawful public banquets and annual festivals, sacrifices to gods, rites for heroes, and libations for the dead.

These varied activities, carried out under one ordinance or lawful authority, bear out the poet's saying:

"<And> the city is filled at once with incense,
and at once with paeans and lamentations."[86]

85. The heading attributes the work to Aristotle as a letter to Alexander; Wachsmuth identifies it as On the Cosmos, chapter 6, 400b5 onward. The attribution is retained as it stands in Stobaeus. Wachsmuth brackets "law in a city" as an intrusive anticipation of the analogy developed next.

86. Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 4–5. The thesmothetae are judicial magistrates. "To dine" interprets diaitēsomenos, "to live or be maintained," in the setting of the prytaneum, a civic building associated with public meals; Wachsmuth records sitēsomenos, "to be fed," in the parallel text. A paean is a ritual song; its pairing with lamentation illustrates different activities within one community.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (γ′) I.1.36c

Οὕτως ὑποληπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος πόλεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου. Νόμος μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινὴς ὁ θεός, οὐδεμίαν ἐπιδεχόμενος διόρθωσιν ἢ μετάθεσιν, κρείττων δ’, οἶμαι, καὶ βεβαιότερος τῶν ἐν τοῖς κύρβεσιν ἀναγεγραμμένων. Ἡγουμένου δὲ ἀκινήτως αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμμελῶς ὁ σύμπας οἰκονομεῖται δι’ αὐτοῦ διάκοσμος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, μεμερισμένος κατὰ τὰς φύσεις πάσας ὁμοίως διὰ τῶν οἰκείων σπερμάτων εἰς τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα κατὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη.

Καὶ γὰρ ἄμπελοι καὶ φοίνικες καὶ περσέαι

συκαῖ τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ ἐλαῖαι,
ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητής, τά τε ἄκαρπα μέν, ἄλλας δὲ παρεχόμενα χρείας,
πλάτανοι καὶ πεῦκαι καὶ πύξοι, [κλῶνές τε]

κλήθρη τ’ αἴγειρός τε καὶ εὐώδης κυπάρισσος,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Aristotle, from the letter to Alexander (3)

I.1.36c

We must think in the same way of the greater city, by which I mean the cosmos. For us God is an evenly balanced law, admitting neither correction nor alteration, superior and more secure, I think, than the laws inscribed on tablets. Under his unmoving and harmonious rule, the entire order of heaven and earth is governed through him, distributed throughout all natures by their proper seeds into plants and animals according to their kinds and species.

For vines, palms, and persea trees,

“sweet fig trees and olives,”
as the poet says, and trees that bear no fruit but serve other uses—planes, pines, and box trees, [and branches]

“alder, poplar, and fragrant cypress”—[87]

87. The verse quotations are Odyssey 7.116 and 5.64. “Persea trees” retains the ancient plant name without assigning it a modern species here. Wachsmuth brackets “and branches” as an intrusive alternative reading associated with the following word for alder. The sentence continues on the next spread.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (δ′) I.1.36d

αἵ τε καρπὸν ὀπώρας ἡδύν, ἄλλως δὲ δυσθησαύριστον φέρουσαι,

ὄχναι καὶ ῥοιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποι,
τῶν τε ζῴων τά τε ἄγρια καὶ ἥμερα, τά τ’ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ <ἐν> ὕδατι βοσκόμενα γίνεται τε καὶ ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμῷ. Πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος.

Εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν, ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμοῖ. Καλοῦμεν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ Δία, παραλλήλως χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοιμεν, δι’ ὃν ζῶμεν. Κρόνου δὲ παῖς καὶ Χρόνου λέγεται, διήκων ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, ἀστραπαῖός τε καὶ βρονταῖος <καὶ αἴθριος> καὶ αἰθέριος, κεραύνιός τε καὶ ὑέτιος ἀπὸ τῶν ὑετῶν τε καὶ κεραυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλεῖται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Aristotle, from the letter to Alexander (4)

I.1.36d

and those that bear sweet seasonal fruit which is otherwise hard to store,

“pear trees, pomegranates, and apple trees with splendid fruit,”
and animals, wild and tame, those that feed in air, on earth, and <in> water—all come into being, flourish, and perish in obedience to God’s ordinance. For, as Heraclitus says, “Every creeping thing is driven by a blow.”[88]

Though one, he has many names, receiving them from all the changes he himself brings about. We call him both Zēna and Dia, using the names together as though saying “through whom we live.” He is called the child of Kronos and of Chronos, passing from one boundless age into another. He is called god of lightning and thunder, <and of clear skies> and of aether, of the thunderbolt and of rain, from rains, thunderbolts, and the other phenomena.[89]

88. The verse is Odyssey 7.115. The saying attributed to Heraclitus has pan herpeton, “every creeping thing,” and plēgēi nemetai, “is driven by a blow.” The analogy presents living things as subject to an ordering force; the translation follows the wording of this excerpt.

89. The wordplay on Dia and zēn, “through” and “to live,” returns from excerpts 26–27. Here Kronos, the divine father, is explicitly paired with Chronos, Time; the two spellings are kept distinct in English.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (ε′) I.1.36e

Καὶ μὴν ἐπικάρπιος μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν, πολιεὺς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὀνομάζεται, γενέθλιός τε καὶ ὁμόγνιος καὶ ἐρκεῖός τε καὶ πατρῷος ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς ταῦτα κοινωνίας, ἑταιρεῖός τε καὶ φίλιος καὶ ξένιος, ἔτι δὲ στρατιός τε καὶ τροπαιοῦχος, καθάρσιός τε καὶ παλαμναῖος καὶ ἱκέσιος καὶ μειλίχιος, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι· σωτήρ τε καὶ ἐλευθέριος ἐτύμως [οὕτως εἰπεῖν]· ὡς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, οὐράνιός τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως ὢν καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν.

37 Ξενοφῶντος· Ἀπομνημονευμάτων δ′ (α′) I.1.37a

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη ποτέ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοί, ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται, κατεσκευάκασι; — Καὶ ὅς· Μὰ τὸν Δί’, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. — Ἀλλ’ οἶσθά γ’, ἔφη, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν φωτὸς δεόμεθα, ὃ ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσι; — Νὴ Δί’, ἔφη, ὅ γ’ εἰ μὴ εἴχομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἂν ἦμεν, ἕνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀναπαύσεώς γε δεομένοις ἡμῖν νύκτα παρέχουσι, κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον. — Πάνυ γε, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο χάριτος ἄξιον.

— Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἥλιος, φωτεινὸς ὤν, τάς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα σαφηνίζει, ἡ δὲ νὺξ διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὴ εἶναι ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστίν, ἄστρα ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἀνέφηναν, ἃ ἡμῖν τῆς νυκτὸς τὰς ὥρας ἐμφανίζει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ ὧν δεόμεθα πράττομεν; — Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε σελήνη οὐ μόνον τῆς νυκτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ μέρη φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιεῖ. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

36 Aristotle, from the letter to Alexander (5) I.1.36e

He is also named Fruit-bringer from fruits and Protector of the City from the city; Patron of Birth, of Kindred, of the Household Enclosure, and of Ancestral Life, from his relation to these things. He is Patron of Companionship, Friendship, and Guests; also God of Armies and Bearer of Trophies, Purifier and Avenger of Blood, Protector of Suppliants and Gracious One, as the poets say. He is truly Savior and Liberator [so to speak]. To say it all, he is Heavenly and Earthly, bearing names from every nature and fortune, since he himself is the cause of all.[90]

37 Xenophon, Memorabilia IV (1) I.1.37a

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided what human beings need?" "No, by Zeus, it has not occurred to me." "But you know, surely, that first of all we need light, which the gods provide us?" "Indeed: without it we should be like blind people, for all the good our eyes would do us." "And since we also need rest, they provide night, the finest opportunity for rest." "Certainly; that too deserves gratitude."[91]

"Then again, the bright sun makes clear to us the times of day and everything else, whereas night, being dark, is less clear. So they have made stars appear at night, which show us its divisions and enable us to do many things we need to do." "That is so." "Moreover, the moon makes clear to us not only the divisions of the night but also those of the month." "Most certainly."

90. The catalogue renders divine epithets by their functions rather than leaving an unexplained list of Greek names. Katharsios means "Purifier." Palamnaios is interpreted here as avenging bloodshed; herkeios refers to the household enclosure. The source brackets "so to speak" as intrusive.

91. Memorabilia IV.3.3–6. Socrates speaks with Euthydemus. The passage treats light, rest, and the visible marking of time as evidence of divine care for human needs. "Divisions" avoids treating the ancient hōrai as necessarily identical to fixed modern clock hours.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

37 Ξενοφῶντος· Ἀπομνημονευμάτων δ′ (β′) I.1.37b

— Τὸ δ’ ἐπεὶ τροφῆς δεόμεθα, ταύτην ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδόναι καὶ ὥρας ἁρμοττούσας πρὸς τοῦτο παρέχειν, <αἳ> ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον ὧν δεόμεθα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς εὐφραινόμεθα; — Πάνυ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα φιλάνθρωπα.

— Τὸ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἡμῖν παρέχειν οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξιον, ὥστε συμφύειν τε καὶ συναύξειν τῇ γῇ καὶ ταῖς ὥραις πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα ἡμῖν, συντρέφειν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς καὶ μιγνύμενον τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς εὐκατεργαστότερά τε καὶ ὠφελιμώτερα καὶ ἡδίω ποιεῖν αὐτά, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλείστου δεόμεθα τούτου, ἀφθονέστατον αὐτὸ παρέχειν ἡμῖν; — Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, προνοητικόν.

38 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ (α′) I.1.38a

Ποιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον ἔστω δύο μέρη. — Ποίω; — Τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δ’ ἀνθρώπινον. — Οὕτω μεμάθηκα. — Ποιητικήν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ’ ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι. — Μεμάθηκα.

— Ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτά, ὅσα τ’ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐκ γῆς ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ <τῷ> τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι χρώμενοι. — Ποίῳ τῳ; — Τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

37 Xenophon, Memorabilia IV (2) I.1.37b

"And what of this: since we need food, they bring it forth for us from the earth and provide seasons suited to it, <which> supply us in abundance and variety not only with necessities but also with things that delight us?" "These too are very kindly provisions for humanity."

"And they provide water, so valuable that, together with earth and the seasons, it helps everything useful to us grow and flourish. It helps nourish us ourselves, and, mixed with our food, makes it easier to prepare, more beneficial, and more pleasant. Since we need it in the greatest quantity, they provide it most abundantly." "That too," he said, "shows forethought."

38 Plato, from Sophist (1) I.1.38a

"First, let there be two divisions of productive art." "Which?" "The divine and the human." "I understand." "If we remember what was said at the beginning, we called every power productive that causes things not previously existing to come into being afterward." "I understand."

"Then all mortal animals and plants, whatever grows on earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless bodies formed from earth within earth, whether fusible or not—shall we say that anything other than a god's craftsmanship causes them to come into being when they did not exist before? Or shall we adopt <the> common opinion?" "What opinion?" "That nature produces them from some spontaneous cause arising without intelligence; or that the cause comes from a god, with reason and divine knowledge?"[92]

92. Sophist 265b–e. "Productive art" translates poiētikē; the definition concerns bringing into being, not poetry specifically. The contrasting alternatives are preserved without importing a later doctrine of creation from nothing.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

38 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ (β′) I.1.38b

— <Ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως> διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὲν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων <οἴεσθαί σε> κατὰ θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

— Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ εἰ μέν σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξασόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφ’ ἃ νῦν ἔλκεσθαι φῄς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ’ ἄν· ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τούτων ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων ξυνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον. — Ὀρθῶς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

38 Plato, from Sophist (2)

I.1.38b

"<I myself, perhaps> because of my age, often change my mind between the two. But now, looking to you and supposing <that you think> they come into being through a god, I too have come to hold that view."

"Good, Theaetetus. If we thought you likely to adopt another opinion later, we would now try to bring you to agreement by an argument carrying compelling persuasion. But since I see that your nature will itself advance, even without our arguments, toward the position to which you now say you are drawn, I shall leave it: otherwise we should spend time unnecessarily. I shall posit that what is said to exist by nature is made by divine art, and what human beings construct from it by human art. On this account there are two kinds of production, human and divine." "Correct."[93]

93. The conversation here establishes a working division without supplying the fuller argument the speaker says he could offer. The supplements in the first reply restore words from Plato that are missing in the excerpt's transmission.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Ὀνάτου· περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου (α′) I.1.39a

Ὁ μὲν θεὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐπαΐει, οὔτε νοητῶς οὔτε ἐπαϊστῶς, εἰ μή τισι πάγχυ ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ δυνάμιες δ’ αὐτῶ ἀλήθεια· ὧν οἶμαι νομεῖς εἰ ἐναργέα τε καὶ ἐπαϊστά. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν νόος καὶ ψυχὰ καὶ τὸ ἀγεμονικὸν τῶ σύμπαντος κόσμω· τὰ δὲ δυνάμιες αὐτῶ τἀλήθεια, ὧν οἶμαι νομεῖς, τά τ’ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πράξεες καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον ἐπιστρωφῶσες. Ὁ μὲν ὧν θεὸς αὐτὸς οὔτε ὁρατὸς οὔτε αἰσθητός, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ μόνον καὶ νόῳ θεωρατός· τὰ δ’ ἔργα αὐτῶ καὶ τὰ πράξεες ἐναργέες τε καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἐντὶ πάντεσσιν ἀνθρώποις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (1) I.1.39a

God perceives the affairs of other living beings, yet is himself apprehensible neither to thought nor to perception, except to a very few human beings. His powers, however, are true realities—†hōn oimai nomeis ei†—manifest and perceptible.[94]

For God himself is mind, soul, and the governing principle of the entire cosmos. His powers in truth—†hōn oimai nomeis†—are his works and actions, those extending throughout the whole cosmos. God himself is neither visible nor perceptible, but can be contemplated only by reason and mind; his works and actions are manifest and perceptible to all human beings.

94. The opening is badly corrupted. Wachsmuth retains the manuscript wording and leaves his extensive reconstruction in the apparatus. Two broken sequences containing nomeis are given in transliteration between daggers: their syntax and meaning are not securely recoverable. Hōn oimai means “of which, I think.” The surrounding English is tentative, supplying a transition to God’s being apprehended and taking alētheia as “true realities.” The clearer conclusion must not disguise the damaged opening.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Ὀνάτου· περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου (β′) I.1.39b

Δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ μὴ εἷς εἶμεν ὁ θεός, ἀλλ’ εἷς μὲν ὁ μέγιστος καὶ καθυπέρτερος καὶ ὁ κρατέων τῶ παντός, τοὶ δ’ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν· βασιλεύεν δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετᾷ μέζων. Οὗτος δέ κ’ εἴη θεὸς ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, τοὶ δ’ ἄλλοι θεοὶ οἱ θέοντες ἐντὶ κατ’ οὐρανὸν σὺν τᾷ τῶ παντὸς περιαγήσι, κατὰ λόγον ὀπαδέοντες τῷ πράτῳ καὶ νοατῷ.

Τοὶ δὲ λέγοντες ἕνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλὼς ἁμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τᾶς θείας ὑπεροχᾶς οὐ συνθεωρεῦντι. Λέγω δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ καθαγεῖσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων.

39 Ὀνάτου· περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου (γ′) I.1.39c

Τοὶ δ’ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρᾶτον θεὸν καὶ νοατὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι, ὥσπερ χορευταὶ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον καὶ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στραταγὸν καὶ λοχῖται καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξίαρχαν καὶ λοχαγέαν, ἔχοντες φύσιν ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθαγεομένῳ. ξυνὸν μὲν ὦν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τῶ ἄρχοντος καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ’ οὐ κ’ ἔτι δύναιντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, ὥσπερ οὔτε χορευταὶ ποτὶ συνοιδίαν, οὔτε στρατιῶται ποτὶ στρατιάν, ἀπολειφθέντες τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαίω.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (2)

I.1.39b

It also seems to me that there is not just one god. One is greatest and highest, ruling the universe; the others are many, differing in power. The one greater in might, greatness, and excellence rules over them all. This would be the god who encompasses the entire cosmos; the other gods are those that run their courses in heaven with the revolution of the whole, following the first and intelligible god in accordance with reason.

Those who say there is one god rather than many are mistaken: they fail to consider the greatest dignity of divine superiority. I mean ruling and leading beings like oneself, and being strongest and highest among the rest.[95]

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (3)

I.1.39c

The other gods stand in relation to the first and intelligible god as members of a chorus to their leader, soldiers to their general, and men in companies and ranks to their regimental and company commanders. It is their nature to follow and attend upon one who leads well.

Their work is therefore shared by ruler and ruled. Yet the ruled could no longer be organized for that work if deprived of a leader, just as neither choristers could join in song nor soldiers form an army without, respectively, a chorus-leader and a general.[96]

95. The claim is explicitly for a plurality of gods under one supreme ruler. Its reasoning makes ruling over kindred beings a mark of divine superiority. This position is preserved as a distinct argument within Stobaeus's collection, not harmonized with every preceding account.

96. The opening comparison was quoted earlier in excerpt 28. English reverses the order of "general" and "chorus-leader" at the end to make their respective groups unambiguous; all parts of the comparison are retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Ὀνάτου· περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου (δ′) I.1.39d

Τοιαύτα δὲ φύσις οὐδενὸς ποτιδεῖται, οὔτε συγγενέος οὔτε ἔξωθεν· διόπερ οὔτε ἐκ δύο συνάρμοσται, ψυχᾶς καὶ σώματος (καὶ γὰρ διόλω ἐστὶ ψυχά), οὔτε ἐναντίων τινῶν (τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία καὶ κρατὲν καὶ κρατεῖσθαι πέφυκεν). Ἃ δέ γε τῶ σώματος κρᾶσις μιαίνει τὸ καθαρὸν τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ἁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκήρατος καὶ θεῖόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ θνατὸν καὶ θολομιγές· οὕτω δὲ μιαίνει καὶ μόλιβδος χρυσὸν καὶ τὰν τὸ τᾷ φύσι γνήσιον τὸ νόθον. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς θνατοῖς δέδωκεν ὁ θεὸς ζῴοις δι᾽ ἀΐδιον ἀνάγκαν καὶ ἄφυκτον. Φύσι γὰρ ἄπορον καὶ πτωχὸν πᾶν τὸ γενέσιος κεκοινωνηκός.

39 Ὀνάτου· περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου (ε′) I.1.39e

Θεὸς μὲν ὢν ἔστι, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τῶ λόγου εἶπον, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀρχὰ καὶ πρᾶτον· θεῖος δὲ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ δινεύμενα πανταχῶς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δαίμων ἐστὶν ἁ ψυχὰ (αὔτα γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ κινεῖ τὸ διόλω ζῷον)· δαιμόνιον δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτω γε πάντα. δεῖ ὢν οὕτω διαιρεῖν, θεὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ δαίμονα καὶ δαιμόνιον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 49-50

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (4)

I.1.39d

Such a nature needs nothing, whether kindred or external. It is therefore composed neither of the two, soul and body—for it is soul throughout—nor of any opposing things, since opposites are by nature capable of both mastering and being mastered.

Mixture with body stains the purity of soul: soul is undefiled and divine, whereas body is mortal and mingled with impurity. So too lead stains gold, and what is spurious stains what is genuine by nature. In general, God has given body to mortal living beings through eternal and inescapable necessity. For everything that shares in coming-to-be is by nature needy and poor.[97]

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (5)

I.1.39e

God, then, exists, as I said at the beginning of the discourse, for he himself is the beginning and the first. The cosmos and the things revolving within it in every direction are divine. Likewise the soul is a divine spirit, since it rules and moves the whole living being; the body and everything belonging to it are of a divine spirit. We must therefore distinguish in this way: God and the divine, a divine spirit and what belongs to a divine spirit.[98]

97. Wachsmuth regards the opening words as uncertain and notes further disturbance in the comparison with genuine and spurious things. The translation preserves its recoverable contrast. “Such a nature” connects this section to the preceding account; the manuscript division and that connection are not secure enough to support a more elaborate reconstruction.

98. The Greek contrasts the nouns theos and daimōn with their corresponding adjectives, theion and daimonion. The English makes the second relation explicit because “demonic” would introduce an alien suggestion of evil. Wachsmuth questions whether the final classification is a later explanatory addition but retains it in the text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 49-50

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

40 Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου· περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως (α′) I.1.40a

Περὶ θεῶν οἱ μέν τινές εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες, μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον· οἱ δὲ εἶναι μέν, ἀργὸν δὲ καὶ ἀμελὲς καὶ μὴ προνοεῖν μηδενός· τρίτοι δέ, οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων καὶ οὐρανίων, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς μηδενός· τέταρτοι <δὲ> οἱ καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς κοινὸν δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐχὶ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἑκάστου· πέμπτοι δέ, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ Σωκράτης, οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι

οὐδέ σε λήθω
κινύμενος.

40 Ἀρριανοῦ Ἐπικτητείου (β′) I.1.40b

Εἴπερ οὖν ὑγιῶς λέγεται τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεῷ, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων ἐπεσκέφθαι. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, πῶς ἐστι τέλος ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς; Εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ μέν, μηδενὸς δὲ ἐπιμελούμενοι, καὶ οὕτω πῶς ὑγιὲς ἔσται; Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὄντων καὶ ἐπιμελουμένων, εἰ μηδεμία διάδοσις εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία γε καὶ εἰς ἐμέ, πῶς ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ὑγιὲς ἔσται; Πάντα οὖν ταῦτα ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἐπεσκεμμένος τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχε τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ πάντα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 50-51

BOOK I CHAPTER 1

40 Arrian's Epictetus: On Contentment (1) I.1.40a

Concerning the gods, some say that the divine does not even exist. Others say it exists but is inactive and indifferent, taking forethought for nothing. A third group says it exists and exercises providence, but only over great and heavenly matters, not over anything on earth. <And> a fourth extends this care to earthly and human affairs, but only collectively, not to each individual. A fifth group, which included Odysseus and Socrates, says:

"Nor do I escape your notice
when I move."[99]

40 Arrian's Epictetus (2) I.1.40b

If, then, it is sound to say that our end is to follow God, we must have examined each of these positions. If there are no gods, how can following the gods be our end? If they exist but care for nothing, how can the statement be sound even then? And if they both exist and care, but nothing passes from them to human beings—and, by Zeus, to me as well—how can it still be sound?

The good and honorable person, having examined all these matters, has subordinated his own judgment to the one who governs everything, as good citizens subordinate theirs to the law of their city.[100]

99. Epictetus, Discourses I.12.1–7. The fragment of verse is from Iliad 10.279–280, Odysseus addressing Athena. The five positions classify the scope of divine concern; they are not all endorsed by the speaker.

100. Telos, "end," means the governing aim of life. The concluding comparison links personal judgment with the citizen's relation to law. This completes chapter 1 in Wachsmuth's volume.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 50-51

BOOK I CHAPTER 2

Κεφάλαιον Β′ I.2.heading

Περὶ τῶν νομιζόντων μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν καὶ ἐπομένας ταύτῃ θείας ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς διοικήσει δυνάμεις.

Σοφοκλῆς Οἰδίποδι I.2.reconstruction

Πρόνοια δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς <σαφής·>
εἰκῇ κράτιστον ζῆν, ὅπως δύναιτό τις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 51-52

BOOK I CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2: The denial of providence

I.2.heading

On those who think that there is no providence, nor divine powers attendant upon it in the government of the universe.[101]

Sophocles, Oedipus: proposed reconstruction

I.2.reconstruction

There is no <certain> foreknowledge of anything;
it is best to live at random, as one can.[102]

101. The entire chapter is lost in the manuscripts described by Wachsmuth. He restores its title from Photius and discusses evidence for its former contents on pp. 51–52. The quotation below is his proposed reconstruction of one possible excerpt; it is not a surviving passage of this chapter. The Latin discussion is outside this translation's scope.

102. Oedipus Tyrannus 978–979. Wachsmuth proposes that Stobaeus probably quoted these lines here, drawing on the parallel discussion in Theophilus, To Autolycus II.8; he supplies saphēs from Sophocles. Pronoia can mean foresight or providence. "Foreknowledge" suits the dramatic saying; its placement under a heading denying providence would give it a further argumentative use. The characters' words should not be treated as a declaration of Sophocles's own doctrine.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 51-52

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

Κεφάλαιον Γ′ I.3.heading

Περὶ Δίκης παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμένης ἐποπτεύειν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τιμωροῦ οὔσης τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων.

1 Ἡσιόδου Ἔργων I.3.1

Τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεεινοῖς
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς·
ἀνθρώποισι δ’ ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη.

2 Σοφοκλῆς I.3.2

Εἴ τοι νομίζεις <ἄνδρα> συγγενῆ κακῶς
δρῶν οὐχ ὑφέξειν τὴν δίκην, οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖς.

3 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.3

Ὁρῶ γὰρ χρόνῳ
δίκαν πάντ’ ἄγουσαν εἰς φῶς βροτοῖς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 52-53

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

Chapter 3: Justice and divine punishment I.3.heading

On Justice, appointed by God to watch over what human beings do on earth, and to punish those who do wrong.[103]

1 Hesiod, Works and Days I.3.1

For the son of Cronus laid down this law for human beings:
fish, wild beasts, and winged birds
may devour one another, since justice is not among them;
but to human beings he gave justice, by far the best gift.[104]

2 Sophocles I.3.2

If you think that, by wronging a <man> of your own kin,
you will escape the penalty, your thinking is unsound.[105]

3 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.3

For I see Justice, in time,
bringing everything to light for mortals.[106]

103. Dikē can mean justice, judgment, or punishment, and can also name the personified goddess Justice. The chapter repeatedly moves between these senses. Its excerpts differ about the timing and nature of punishment; they are not parts of a single continuous argument. Chapter numbers here follow Wachsmuth.

104. Works and Days 276–279. “The son of Cronus” is Zeus. The opposition distinguishes the mutual predation of animals from the justice given to human beings.

105. Oedipus Tyrannus 551–552. Wachsmuth restores andra, “man,” from Sophocles. Here dikē refers to the penalty or reckoning for a wrong.

106. Wachsmuth leaves the poet unidentified. His apparatus rejects the earlier transfer to this excerpt of the heading “Euripides, Oedipus,” which belongs to excerpt 6.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

4 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.4

Φθείρει γὰρ ἡ πρόνοια τὴν ἀβουλίαν.

5 <Εὐριπίδου> I.3.5

Ἀρετὰς δίωκε· καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ἂν βροτῶν
κακὸς πεφύκῃ, ζημιοῦσιν οἱ θεοί.

6 Εὐριπίδης Οἰδίποδος I.3.6

Οὐ δῆκταί πως κύνες οἱ θεοί,
ἀλλ’ ἡ Δίκη γὰρ καὶ κατὰ σκότου βλέπει.

7 <Σοφοκλέους> I.3.7

Θεοῦ δὲ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπεκπηδᾷ βροτός.

8 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.8

Εἱμαρμένον δὲ τῶν κακῶν βουλευμάτων
κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἐστι καρποῦσθαι βροτούς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

4 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.4

For foresight destroys thoughtlessness.[107]

5 <Euripides> I.3.5

Pursue virtues; for whoever among mortals
is wicked, the gods punish.[108]

6 Euripides, Oedipus I.3.6

The gods are not, surely, biting dogs;
but Justice sees even in the dark.[109]

7 <Sophocles> I.3.7

No mortal can leap clear of a god's blow.[110]

8 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.8

It is fated that, from evil designs,
mortals should reap evil returns.

107. Pronoia here naturally means foresight; aboulia is want of counsel or judgment. The apparatus questions whether the latter word is sound, but the facing Greek and English retain the printed text.

108. Ion 440–441, identified in the base edition. Aretas is plural, "virtues" or forms of excellence. The supplied author-heading is marked by angle brackets.

109. The first line is textually troubled: the apparatus records several proposed repairs to its wording and meter. The English keeps the contrast recoverable from the printed text rather than importing a conjectural line. The attribution is retained as the heading gives it.

110. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution from Theophilus, To Autolycus II.8; he also notes the line's transmission among sayings assigned to Menander. The heading therefore remains marked as supplied.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

9 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.9

Οὐχ εὕδει Διὸς
ὀφθαλμός, ἐγγὺς δ’ ἐστί, καίπερ ὢν πρόσω.

10 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.10

Οὐ γάρ τις, οὐδὲ χρημάτων ὑπεργέμων,
νόμον μιαίνων ἀσφαλῶς γηράσεται·
ἀλλ’ ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτὸς ἡ Δίκη ποτὲ
τῷ δυσσεβοῦντι σῖγ’ ἔχουσ’ ἐνήλατο.

11 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.11

Τὸ μὴ δίκαιον ἔργον οὐ λήθει θεούς.

12 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.12

Δαίμων βροτοῖσι πόλλ’ ἀνευρίσκει κακά.

13 <Ἡσιόδου Ἔργων> I.3.13

Εὖ δ’ ὅπιν ἀθανάτων μακάρων πεφυλαγμένος εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

9 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.9

The eye of Zeus does not sleep;
it is close at hand, though far away.

10 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.10

No one, though overflowing with wealth,
will grow old in safety while defiling the law;
some day or night, Justice,
keeping silent, springs upon the impious.[111]

11 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.11

An unjust deed does not escape the gods.

12 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.12

A divine power devises many evils for mortals.[112]

13 <Hesiod, Works and Days> I.3.13

Be very mindful of the watchful regard of the blessed immortals.[113]

111. The final verb is a past tense used as a general statement: Justice “has sprung” upon the offender. The English present preserves the maxim’s force.

112. Daimōn here means a divine power or agency. The brief line, detached from its dramatic context, does not specify which power or explain whether the evils are deserved.

113. Works and Days 706. Opis combines the gods’ regard with the reverence or reckoning it calls for; “watchful regard” keeps the connection with this chapter’s theme.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 53-54

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

14a Εὐριπίδης Μελανίππῃ I.3.14a

Δοκεῖτε πηδᾶν τἀδικήματ’ εἰς θεοὺς
πτεροῖσι, κἄπειτ’ ἐν Διὸς δέλτου πτυχαῖς
γράφειν τιν’ αὐτά, Ζῆνα δ’ εἰσορῶντά νιν
θνητοῖς δικάζειν; οὐδ’ ὁ πᾶς ἂν οὐρανὸς
Διὸς γράφοντος τὰς βροτῶν ἁμαρτίας
ἐξαρκέσειεν, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνος ἂν σκοπῶν
πέμπειν ἑκάστῳ ζημίαν· ἀλλ’ ἡ Δίκη
ἐνταῦθά πούστιν ἐγγύς, εἰ βούλεσθ’ ὁρᾶν.

14b <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.14b

Λύπας μὲν ἀνθρώποισιν, ὦ γύναι, θεοὶ
τοῖσιν διδοῦσιν, οὓς ἂν ἐχθαίρωσ’, ἐπεὶ
οὐ σφιν πονηρόν ἐστιν.

15a Εὐριπίδης Φρίξῳ I.3.15a

Ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν οἴεται τοὐφ’ ἡμέραν
κακόν τι πράσσων τοὺς θεοὺς λεληθέναι,
δοκεῖ πονηρὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἁλίσκεται,
ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγουσα τυγχάνῃ Δίκη.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 54-55

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

14a Euripides, Melanippe

I.3.14a

Do you think wrongdoings leap up to the gods
on wings, and someone then writes them down
in the folds of Zeus's tablet, and Zeus looks at them
and passes judgment on mortals? Not even the whole sky
would suffice if Zeus were writing down humanity's sins;
nor could he examine them and send
a penalty to each. But Justice
is somewhere here, close by, if you are willing to see.[114]

14b <An unidentified tragic poet>

I.3.14b

Woman, the gods give grief to those
human beings they hate, since
it is no hardship to them.[115]

15a Euripides, Phrixus

I.3.15a

Any mortal who thinks that, doing some evil
from day to day, he has escaped the gods' notice
thinks wrongly, and is caught in that belief
whenever Justice has leisure.[116]

114. The fragment challenges the picture of a celestial ledger, while insisting on Justice's nearness. It should not be made to say simply that justice does not exist. Wachsmuth separates the following three lines as a different excerpt.

115. The opening and the second line have disputed readings. The printed ponēron is taken here in the sense "toilsome" or "burdensome"; the line gives the speaker's claim about the gods, not an explanation endorsed by the translator.

116. The closing image gives Justice leisure to attend to the offender; it allows for delay without making delay an escape. The next line, joined to this passage in the manuscripts, is separated by Wachsmuth as excerpt 15b.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

15b <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.15b

Τιμωρίαν ἔτισεν ὧν ἔρξεν κακῶν.

16 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.16

Ὀξὺς θεῶν ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς τὰ πάντ’ ἰδεῖν.

17 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.17

Ἔσθ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστιν οὐχ ὁρώμενον
τοῖς ζῶσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ προσδοκώμενον
δαιμόνιον, ᾧ μέλει τι τοῦ θνητοῦ βίου.

18 <Εὐριπίδου> I.3.18

Δίκην δέδωκας· ὥστε τις κακουργίας
μή μοι τὸ πρῶτον βῆμ’ ἐὰν δράμῃ καλῶς,
νικᾶν δοκείτω τὴν Δίκην, πρὶν ἂν τέλος
γραμμῆς ἵκηται καὶ πέρας κάμψῃ βίου.

19 Διονυσίου I.3.19

Ὁ τῆς Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὡς δι’ ἡσύχου
λεύσσων προσώπου, πάνθ’ ὁμῶς ἀεὶ βλέπει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 55

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

15b <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.15b

He paid the penalty for the evils he had done.

16 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.16

Keen is the gods' eye to see all things.

17 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.17

There is, it seems, there is a divine power,
unseen and unexpected by us who live,
that has some care for mortal life.[117]

18 <Euripides> I.3.18

You have paid the penalty. So let no one,
if he runs the first stretch of wrongdoing well,
think he has beaten Justice, before he reaches
the finishing line and rounds the limit of his life.[118]

19 Dionysius I.3.19

The eye of Justice, gazing as though from a calm
countenance, sees all things alike, always.

117. The Greek postpones daimonion, "divine power," until the last line. The English brings it forward while retaining the emphatic repeated "there is."

118. Electra 953–956, in the wording printed by Wachsmuth, whose apparatus records a repair in the opening line. Wrongdoing is imagined as a race: early success does not settle the result.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

20 Σοφοκλῆς Αἴαντι I.3.20

Τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα
πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις
ἔφασχ' ὁ μάντις, ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσει
βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ.

21 Εὐριπίδου I.3.21

Οὗτοι προσελθοῦσ' ἡ Δίκη σε πώποτε
παίσει πρὸς ἦπαρ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων βροτῶν
τὸν ἄδικον, ἀλλὰ σῖγα καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ
στείχουσα μάρπτει τοὺς κακοὺς ἀεὶ βροτῶν.

22 Θεοδέκτου I.3.22

Ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν μέμφεται τὰ θεῖ', ὅτι
οὐκ εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ μετέρχεται
τοὺς μὴ δικαίους, πρόφασιν εἰσακουσάτω·
εἰ μὲν παραυτίκ' ἦσαν αἱ τιμωρίαι,
πολλοὶ διὰ φόβον κοὐ δι' εὐσεβῆ τρόπον
θεοὺς ἂν ηὖξον· νῦν δὲ τῆς τιμωρίας
ἄπωθεν οὔσης, τῇ φύσει χρῶνται βροτοί.
ὅταν δὲ φωραθῶσιν ὀφθέντες κακοί,
τίνουσι ποινὰς ὑστέροισιν ἐν χρόνοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 55-56

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

20 Sophocles, Ajax

I.3.20

For the seer said that excessive, profitless men
fall beneath grievous misfortunes sent by the gods:
whoever, born with a human nature,
then thinks beyond the measure of a human being.[119]

21 Euripides

I.3.21

Justice will never come up and strike you
in the liver, nor any other mortal
who does wrong; but, walking silently and with slow foot,
she always catches the wicked among mortals.[120]

22 Theodectes

I.3.22

Any mortal who blames divine things because
they pursue the unjust with time,
instead of at once, should hear the reason:
if punishments were immediate,
many would exalt the gods through fear,
not through a pious disposition. As it is, with punishment
far off, mortals act according to their nature.
But when they are found out and seen to be wicked,
they pay the penalty in later days.[121]

119. Ajax 758–761. The Greek shifts from the plural “bodies,” meaning persons, to the singular “whoever.” Its charge is a failure to keep one’s thoughts within human limits.

120. The vivid bodily blow contrasts with Justice’s quiet pursuit. The fragment does not promise that wrongdoers avoid punishment; its final line expressly affirms that they are caught.

121. The passage explains delay as revealing character beyond obedience produced by fear. The apparatus regards ophthentes, “seen,” in the penultimate line as corrupt and records proposed substitutes; the English retains its printed sense.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 55-56

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

23 Εὐριπίδου Ἀνδρομέδας I.3.23

Τὴν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ’ εἶναι Διὸς
ἐγγύς τε ναίειν τῆς βροτῶν τιμωρίας.

24 Αἰσχύλου I.3.24

Δράσαντι γάρ τοι καὶ παθεῖν ὀφείλεται.

25 Εὐριπίδης Ἀντιόπῃ I.3.25

Δίκα τοι δίκα χρόνιος, ἀλλ’ ὅμως
ὑποπεσοῦσ’ ἔλαθεν, ὅταν ἔχῃ τιν’ ἀσεβῆ βροτῶν.

26–27 Αἰσχύλου Βακχῶν I.3.26-27

Τό τοι κακὸν ποδῶκες ἔρχεται βροτοῖς
κατ’ ἀμπλάκημα τῷ περῶντι τὴν θέμιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 56-57

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

23 Euripides, Andromeda I.3.23

They say that Justice is the child of Zeus
and dwells close to the punishment of mortals.[122]

24 Aeschylus I.3.24

For one who has acted, suffering in return is due.[123]

25 Euripides, Antiope I.3.25

Justice, yes Justice, is slow; but nevertheless
she steals upon her prey unseen, when she has an impious mortal in her grasp.[124]

26–27 Aeschylus, Bacchae I.3.26-27

Swift-footed evil comes to mortals
for wrongdoing, to the one who crosses the bounds of right.[125]

122. The title Andromeda is the identification adopted by Wachsmuth; manuscript headings point instead to Andromache. Compare excerpt 33, where Justice is called the child of Time.

123. Wachsmuth marks this as a doubtful fragment in his reference to Aeschylus and records a closely similar line attributed elsewhere to Sophocles. The transmitted author-heading is retained.

124. The transmitted construction is compressed and its verbs have attracted conjectures. “Her prey” makes the image readable in English; it is not an additional object named in the Greek. The combination of delay and an unnoticed approach is retained.

125. The combined numbering 26–27 and the title Bacchae follow Wachsmuth’s printed heading. His apparatus reconstructs that title from a damaged manuscript heading; this is not a heading naming Euripides’s surviving Bacchae.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

28 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.28

Ὁρᾷς Δίκην ἄναυδον οὐχ ὁρωμένην
εὔδοντι καὶ στείχοντι καὶ καθημένῳ·
ἐξῆς δ’ ὀπαδεῖ δόχμιον, ἄλλοθ’ ὕστερον.

29 <Ἀδήλου κωμικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.29

Οὐδὲν καλύπτει νὺξ κακῶς εἰργασμένον,
ὅ τι δ’ ἂν ποιῇς ἀεὶ νόμιζ’ ὁρᾶν τινα.

30 Ἰξίονος I.3.30

Ἐχθρὸς μὲν ἀνήρ, ἀλλὰ τὴν Δίκην σέβω.

31 Ὁμήρου I.3.31

Οὐ γὰρ σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
ἀλλὰ δίκην τίνουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ’ ἀνθρώπων.

32 <Σοφοκλῆς> I.3.32

Ἀεὶ γὰρ εὖ πίπτουσιν οἱ Διὸς κύβοι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

28 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.28

You see Justice, voiceless, herself unseen
by one who sleeps or walks or sits;
she follows close, at one's side, at another time behind.[126]

29 <An unidentified comic poet> I.3.29

Night hides no deed done wrongly;
whatever you do, always suppose someone sees.

30 From Ixion I.3.30

The man is my enemy, but I revere Justice.[127]

31 Homer I.3.31

For the blessed gods do not love cruel deeds,
but honor justice and the rightful works of human beings.[128]

32 <Sophocles> I.3.32

For Zeus's dice always fall well.

126. The opening's "you see" beside "unseen" and the final line are awkward. Wachsmuth retains them while recording the judgment that the lines are either fragmentary or corrupt. "At one's side" interprets dochmion, literally obliquely or crosswise; it does not resolve the uncertainty.

127. Ixion is a play-title here, not the name of an author. Wachsmuth expressly declines to decide between Aeschylus and Euripides, both of whom wrote a play with that title.

128. Odyssey 14.83–84. In this construction tinousi means "honor" or "value," rather than "pay a penalty." The local contrast is between cruelty and right conduct.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 57-58

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

33 Εὐριπίδης Ἀντιόπῃ I.3.33

Τὴν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ’ εἶναι Χρόνου,
δείκνυσι δ’ ἡμῶν ὅστις ἔστ’ ἢ μὴ κακός.

34 Ἀρχιλόχου I.3.34

Ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος,
σὺ δ’ ἔργ’ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων ὁρᾷς
λεωργὰ κἀθέμιστα, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων
ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.

35 Εὐριπίδης Ἀρχελάῳ I.3.35

Τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πράσσομεν ὀρθῶς
τοῖς πράσσουσιν κακὸν ἦλθε.

36 <Σοφοκλῆς> I.3.36

Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τοιαῦθ’· ὅταν δέ τις θεῶν
βλάπτῃ, δύναιτ’ ἂν οὐδ’ ἂν ἰσχύων φυγεῖν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

33 Euripides, Antiope

I.3.33

They say that Justice is the child of Time;
she reveals who among us is wicked and who is not.[129]

34 Archilochus

I.3.34

Zeus, father Zeus, yours is the rule of heaven;
you look upon human deeds,
reckless and lawless; and among wild beasts
you care for outrage and for justice.[130]

35 Euripides, Archelaus

I.3.35

For what we do wrongly rightly
comes as evil upon those who do it.

36 <Sophocles>

I.3.36

Such, then, are these things. But when one of the gods
brings harm, not even a strong man could escape.[131]

129. Chronos is Time, not Kronos, Zeus's father. Compare excerpt 23: the collection preserves both parentages without reconciling their poetic claims.

130. The printed kathemista contracts kai athemista, "and lawless." Zeus's care extends even to beasts, unlike Hesiod's distinction in excerpt 1. The author-name follows Wachsmuth's correction of displaced manuscript headings, supported by the parallel in Clement of Alexandria.

131. Electra 696–697. The opening retains the fragment's connection to a preceding narrative now outside the excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

37 Σοφοκλῆς Αἴαντι I.3.37

Τὸ χρύσεον δὲ τᾶς Δίκας δέδορκεν
ὄμμα, τὸν δ’ ἄδικον ἀμείβεται.

38 Ἡσιόδου Θεογονίας I.3.38

Καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους,
αἵ τ’ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε παραβασίας ἐφέπουσιν·
οὐδέ ποτε λήγουσι θεαὶ δεινοῖο χόλοιο,
πρίν γ’ ἀπὸ τῷ δώωσι κακὴν ὅπιν ὅστις ἁμάρτῃ.

39 Εὐριπίδης Πολυείδῳ I.3.39

Οὐδεὶς παρανομῶν πρὸς θεοὺς ἐχέγγυος.

40 <Εὐριπίδου> I.3.40

Συγγνώμονάς τοι τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι δοκεῖς,
ὅταν τις ὅρκῳ θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν θέλῃ
ἢ δεσμὸν ἢ βίαια πολεμίων κακά,
ἢ παισὶν αὐθένταισι κοινωνῇ δόμων;
ἦτ᾽ἄρα θνητῶν εἰσιν ἀσυνετώτεροι,
ἢ τἀπιεικῆ πρόσθεν ἡγοῦνται δίκης.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

37 Sophocles, Ajax

I.3.37

Justice's golden eye keeps watch,
and repays the unjust.[132]

38 Hesiod, Theogony

I.3.38

And she bore the Fates and the Dooms, ruthless in punishment,
who pursue the transgressions of men and gods;
never do the goddesses cease from their terrible anger
until they pay back bitter retribution to whoever does wrong.[133]

39 Euripides, Polyidus

I.3.39

No lawbreaker has security against the gods.

40 <Euripides>

I.3.40

Do you think the gods are forgiving
when someone wishes, by an oath, to escape death,
imprisonment, or violent harm from enemies,
or shares a home with his children's killers?
Then either they have less understanding than mortals,
or they put leniency before justice.[134]

132. The heading "Ajax" and the fragment reference are retained as printed in the base edition; no line-location in the surviving play is supplied there.

133. Theogony 217 and 220–222, as identified in the printed heading. The mother is Night in the poem's surrounding genealogy. "Dooms" renders Kēres, personified powers of death and destruction; the excerpt's selection skips the intervening lines.

134. The argument is compressed and textually disputed. The line about sharing a home with one's children's killers was suspected by Hense of being an interpolation, but Wachsmuth retains it. The English follows the printed question and its ensuing alternatives without reconstructing a lost dramatic exchange.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

41 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.41

Μόνη ’στιν ἀπαραίτητος ἀνθρώποις Δίκη.

42 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.42

Μὴ μουσοποίει πρὸς τὸ νηπιώτερον·
πόρρω γὰρ ἐστὼς ὁ θεὸς ἐγγύθεν κλύει.

43 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.43

Ὅστις λέγει κάκ’ εὖ φρονῶν, σιγῇ στένει.

44 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.44

Ἄγει τὸ θεῖον τοὺς κακοὺς πρὸς τὴν δίκην.

45 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.45

Τὸ δὲ θεῶν κράτος μέγα κατ’ ἀνθρώπους,
ἄφρονες δ’ ὁπόσοι τὸ δίκαιον ἄγουσ’
ὑπὸ τᾶς ἀδίκου βιοτᾶς ἀφανές,
μέγα γὰρ ὄμμα δαιμόνων, οἷς τίνουσ’
ἀμοιβὰς κακῶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

41 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.41

Justice alone cannot be entreated by human beings.

42 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.42

Do not make your song too childish;
for the god, though standing far away, hears from close at hand.

43 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.43

Whoever speaks evil while thinking well groans in silence.[135]

44 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.44

The divine brings the wicked to justice.

45 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.3.45

Great is the gods' power over human beings;
foolish are all who hide what is just
beneath an unjust way of life.
For great is the eye of divine powers:
to them wrongdoers pay requital for their evils.[136]

135. The printed phrase "evil while thinking well" is a conjectural repair of the manuscript wording. Its precise situation is no longer clear. The English preserves the contrast rather than supplying an imagined speaker or motive.

136. The relative ois, "to whom," is taken with the divine powers; "wrongdoers" makes explicit the human subject understood with tinousi, "pay." The ending describes their payment of requital for their evils, while the opening stresses the gods' power.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

46 <Ὁμήρου> I.3.46

Καὶ Ζεὺς τοῖς ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπαίνει,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας.

47 <Εὐριπίδου Ἀρχελάου> I.3.47

Δοκεῖς τὰ θεῶν σὺ ξυνετὰ νικήσειν ποτὲ
καὶ τὴν Δίκην που μακρ’ ἀπῳκίσθαι βροτῶν;
ἣ δ’ ἐγγύς ἐστιν· οὐχ ὁρωμένη δ’ ὁρᾷ,
ὃν χρὴ κολάζειν τ’ οἶδεν· ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶσθα σύ,
ὁπόταν ἄφνω μολοῦσα διολέσῃ κακούς.

48a <Σοφοκλῆς> I.3.48a

Εἰ δείν’ ἔδρασας, δεινὰ καὶ παθεῖν σε δεῖ.

48b <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.3.48b

Δίκας δ’ ἐξέλαμψε θεῖον φάος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

46 <Homer>

I.3.46

And Zeus, angry with those men, rages
who violently give crooked judgments in the assembly.[137]

47 <Euripides, Archelaus>

I.3.47

Do you think you will ever defeat the gods' wise designs,
and that Justice has moved far away from mortals?
She is close at hand: unseen, she sees,
and knows whom she must punish. But you do not know
when she will suddenly arrive and destroy the wicked.[138]

48a <Sophocles>

I.3.48a

If you have done terrible things, you must also suffer terrible things.[139]

48b <An unidentified tragic poet>

I.3.48b

And the divine light of Justice shone forth.

137. Iliad 16.386–387, in the adapted wording printed here. "Crooked" judgments are rulings that bend what is right.

138. The first three lines are identified as belonging to Euripides's Archelaus by the parallel cited in Wachsmuth's apparatus. The English preserves the abrupt change from Justice's knowledge to the addressee's ignorance.

139. Wachsmuth supplies Sophocles from Theophilus, but explains that the earlier assignment of this line to Ajax arose from a displaced heading. The facing heading therefore names only the poet.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

49 Δημοσθένους I.3.49

Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ ἐπιορκοῦντα καὶ ψευδόμενον δύναμιν βεβαίαν κτήσασθαι. ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μὲν ἅπαξ καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει· καὶ σφόδρα γε ἤνθησεν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἂν τύχῃ· τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ.

50 Ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Ἀπομνημονευμάτων I.3.50

“Ἀλλ’ ὁρῶ”, φησί τις, “τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ λιμῷ καὶ ῥίγει ἀπολλυμένους”. Τοὺς δὲ μὴ καλοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾷς τρυφῇ καὶ ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίᾳ ἀπολλυμένους; “Ἀλλ’ αἰσχρὸν τὸ παρ’ ἄλλου τρέφεσθαι”. Καὶ τίς, ὦ κακόδαιμον, αὐτὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τρέφεται ἄλλος γε ἢ ὁ κόσμος;

Ὅστις γοῦν ἐγκαλεῖ τῇ προνοίᾳ ὅτι οἱ πονηροὶ οὐ διδόασι δίκην, ὅτι ἰσχυροί εἰσι καὶ πλούσιοι, ὅμοιόν τι δρᾷ ὥσπερ εἰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀπολωλεκότων αὐτῶν ἔλεγε μὴ δεδωκέναι δίκην αὐτούς, ὅτι οἱ ὄνυχες ὑγιεῖς εἶεν. Ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φημι πολὺ διαφέρειν μᾶλλον ἀρετὴν κακίας, ἢ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὀνύχων διαφέρουσιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 61-62

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

49 Demosthenes

I.3.49

One cannot acquire lasting power by injustice, perjury, and lies. Such things hold up for a single occasion and a short time; they may even flourish greatly in the hopes they raise. But in time they are exposed and collapse upon themselves.[140]

50 From the Recollections of Epictetus

I.3.50

“But I see,” someone says, “good and honorable people perishing from hunger and cold.” And do you not see those who are neither good nor honorable perishing from luxury, pretension, and lack of refinement? “But it is shameful to be fed by someone else.” And who, poor fellow, nourishes himself from his own resources, other than the cosmos?

Anyone who complains against providence that the wicked go unpunished because they are strong and rich is doing much the same as if, after they had lost their eyes, he said they had not been punished because their nails were sound. For I maintain that virtue surpasses vice far more than eyes surpass nails.[141]

140. Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac 10, as identified in the printed reference. The passage concerns the instability of power obtained through wrongdoing.

141. The argument treats moral degradation itself as a greater loss than bodily or financial harm. “Lack of refinement” renders apeirokalia, literally inexperience of what is fine. Wachsmuth flags kakias, “vice,” in the last sentence as corrupt, while retaining it; the English follows that printed comparison.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

51 <Ἡροδότου> I.3.51

Ἐν τῇ προτέρῃ νυκτὶ τῶν Παναθηναίων ἐδόκεε ὁ Ἵππαρχος ἄνδρα οἱ ἐπιστάντα μέγαν καὶ εὐειδέα αἰνίσσεσθαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα·

Τλῆθι λέων ἄτλητα παθὼν τετληότι θυμῷ·
οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀδικῶν τίσιν οὐκ ἀποτίσει.

52 Ἑρμῆς I.3.52

Δαίμων γάρ τις μεγίστη τέτακται, ὦ τέκνον, ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ παντὸς εἰλουμένη, πάντα περιορώσα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καθάπερ <γὰρ> ἐπὶ τῆς θείας τάξεως πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκη τέτακται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τέτακται ἡ δίκη, ταὐτὰ ἐκείνοις ἐνεργοῦσα. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ κρατεῖ τὴν τάξιν τῶν ὄντων ὡς θείων καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν μὴ θελόντων μηδὲ δυναμένων· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ θεῖον πλανηθῆναι, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀναμαρτεῖν συμβαίνει. ἡ δὲ δίκη τέτακται τιμωρὸς τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἁμαρτανόντων.

ἀνθρώπων γὰρ γένος <ἁμαρτωλόν>, ἅτε θνητὸν ὂν καὶ ἐκ κακῆς ὕλης συνεστώς· καὶ μάλιστα ἐκείνοις συμβαίνει τὸ ὀλισθαίνειν, οἷς θεοπτικὴ δύναμις οὐ πρόσεστι· τούτων δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐπικρατεῖ δίκη· καὶ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ ὑπόκεινται διὰ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεργείας, τῇ δὲ δίκῃ διὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἁμαρτίας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

51 <Herodotus>

I.3.51

On the night before the Panathenaea, Hipparchus dreamed that a tall and handsome man stood beside him and spoke these enigmatic verses:

"Endure, lion, unbearable suffering with an enduring heart;
no human being who does wrong will fail to pay retribution."[142]

52 Hermes

I.3.52

For a very great divine spirit has been appointed, my child, revolving at the center of the universe and surveying everything human beings do on earth. <For> just as providence and necessity have been appointed over the divine order, so Justice has been appointed over human beings, carrying out the same functions as they do. The former maintains the order of beings as divine, neither willing nor able to err: for the divine cannot go astray, and so it remains without error. Justice, however, has been appointed to punish those who do wrong on earth.[143]

For the human race is <liable to error>, being mortal and constituted of bad matter. It is especially those without a capacity to behold God who stumble, and over them Justice chiefly holds sway. They are subject to fate through the operations of coming-to-be, and to Justice through their wrongdoings in life.[144]

142. Herodotus V.56. The Panathenaea was an Athenian festival. The quotation is a dream-message in the historian's narrative; the repeated language of endurance is preserved.

143. The feminine description of the "divine spirit" introduces Justice. The reference to "the former" follows the Greek's singular pronoun after its mention of both providence and necessity; their joint ordering function is the contrast with human wrongdoing.

144. Wachsmuth supplies hamartōlon, "liable to error" or "sinful." The final distinction assigns different functions to fate and Justice. "Bad matter" is the fragment's own characterization of humanity's material constitution.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

53 Ἱεροκλέους (α′)

I.3.53a

Ἱεροκλέους ἐκ τοῦ Τίνα τρόπον θεοῖς χρηστέον.

Ἔτι προσδιαληπτέον καὶ ταῦθ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἄτρεπτοι καὶ ἀραρότες τοῖς κρίμασιν, ὥστε τοῦ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς δόξαντος μηδέποτε ἐξίστασθαι. Μία γάρ τις ἦν τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ἡ ἀμεταπτωσία καὶ βεβαιότης, ἣν εἰκὸς οὐχ ἥκιστα κἂν θεοῖς εἶναι παρέχουσαν τὸ ἱδρυμένον καὶ ἔμπεδον τῶν ἅπαξ αὐτοῖς δοξάντων. Ἐξ οὗ δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲ τὰς κολάσεις, ἃς ἔκρινέ τισιν ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ δαιμόνιον, πιθανὸν παρίεσθαι.

Καὶ γὰρ αὖ λογίσασθαι ῥᾴδιον, ὡς εἰ μεταβάλλουσιν οἱ θεοὶ τὰς αὐτῶν κρίσεις καὶ ὃν ἔγνωσαν κολάσαι παρίασιν ἀκόλαστον, οὔτε καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <ἂν> διοικοῖεν τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, οὔτε ἀπολογισμὸν εἰκότα φέρειν ἂν δύναιντο μετανοίας.

53 Ἱεροκλέους (β′)

I.3.53b

Καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικεν αὐτοσχεδίως καὶ κατ’ οὐδενὸς λέγειν ἡ ποιητική·

Καὶ <μὲν τοὺς> θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι,
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ’ ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβαίῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ,
καὶ τὸ·

στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
συνόλως τε πᾶν εἴ τι τούτοις εἴρηται παραπλησίως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

53 Hierocles (1)

I.3.53a

Hierocles, from How One Should Deal with the Gods.

We must also understand this about the gods: they are unchanging and firm in their judgments, so that they never depart from what they decided at the outset. Constancy and steadfastness are themselves among the virtues; it is reasonable that these should be present above all in the gods, giving settled stability to what they have once decided. It follows that the punishments which the divine has judged fit to impose on particular people are unlikely to be remitted.

For it is also easy to reason that, if the gods change their judgments and release unpunished someone they decided to punish, they <would> neither govern the affairs of the cosmos well and justly nor be able to give a reasonable account of their change of mind.[145]

53 Hierocles (2)

I.3.53b

Poetry seems to say such things offhand and with no real object in view:

“And <indeed them>, with sacrifices and gentle prayers,
with libation and the savor of burnt offerings, human beings turn aside
by entreaty, whenever someone transgresses and does wrong”;[146]
and the line:

“Even the gods themselves can be turned,”
and, in general, anything said in a similar way.

145. The title is translated from the Greek heading. The argument makes divine consistency the ground for the certainty of punishment. The following poetic quotations are cited by Hierocles as statements he rejects, not as supporting authorities.

146. Iliad 9.499–501 and 497, as quoted here. The supplied pronoun “them” refers to the gods. The phrase kat’ oudenos in the prose is difficult; “with no real object in view” takes it to deny a valid application to the gods, rather than silently supplying a new argument.

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

54 Ἐν ταὐτῷ

I.3.54

Ἀλλ’ οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο παρετέον, ὡς, εἰ καὶ μὴ κακῶν αἴτιοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ θεοί, τῶν γε τοιούτων ἔνια προσάπτουσί τισι καὶ περιβάλλουσιν ἀξίους σωματικαῖς τε ἐλαττώσεσι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐκτός, οὐ κακοηθείᾳ χρώμενοι, κἀξεπίτηδες δυσχρηστῆσαι ἄνθρωπον οἰόμενοι δεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τρόπῳ κολάσεως.

Καθάπερ γὰρ λοιμοὶ καὶ αὐχμοί, ἔτι δὲ ἐπομβρίαι καὶ σεισμοὶ καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιόνδε τὰ μὲν πολλὰ γίγνεται δι’ αἰτίας ἑτέρας τινὰς φυσικωτέρας, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν, ἐπειδὰν καιρὸς ᾖ δημοσίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὰ πολλῶν ἁμπλακήματα κολασθῆναι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πρὸς ἕνα χρῶνταί ποτε θεοὶ σωματικοῖς <τε> ἐλαττώμασι καὶ τοῖς <τῶν> ἐκτός, <ἐς> αὐτοῦ μέντοι κόλασιν, ἐπιστροφὴν δὲ καὶ προαίρεσιν ἀμείνω τῶν ἄλλων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

54 In the same work

I.3.54

Yet this too must not be passed over: although the gods are not responsible for evils, they do attach some things of that sort to certain people and subject those who deserve it to bodily losses and losses of external goods. They do this not out of malice, or because they think they ought deliberately to harm a human being, but by way of punishment.[147]

For plagues and droughts, excessive rains and earthquakes, and everything of that kind mostly occur through other, more natural causes, but sometimes also through the gods, when it is time for the transgressions of many to be punished publicly and collectively. In the same way the gods sometimes employ bodily losses and losses of external goods against an individual: <for> his punishment, but for the correction and better choice of others.

147. Hierocles distinguishes evil from bodily and external losses, which may serve as punishment; disasters, he says, mostly have natural causes. This gives no test for interpreting an individual case. The supplied te and tōn are absorbed into “bodily losses and losses of external goods”; es is marked as “for.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55a Πλάτωνος Νόμων

I.3.55a

Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεὸς (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος. τῷ δ’ ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός· ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος, ξυνέπεται ταπεινὸς [καὶ κεκοσμημένος]·

ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ, ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ, φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ’ ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ· καταλειφθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλους τοιούτους προσλαβὼν σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα ἅμα· καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις, μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ, ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55a Plato, Laws

I.3.55a

God, as the ancient saying has it, holds the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things, and brings his course straight to its fulfillment as he makes his circuit according to nature. Justice always follows him, punishing those who fall away from divine law. Anyone who is to prosper holds fast to her and follows humbly [and in orderly conduct].[148]

But someone lifted up by boastfulness, elated by wealth, honors, or bodily beauty, along with youth and folly, burns in his soul with insolence. Thinking he needs neither ruler nor guide, but is himself fit to lead others, he is left deserted by God. Once deserted, he takes others like himself along and runs riot, throwing everything into confusion. Many thought him someone of importance; but before long, after undergoing a punishment that Justice cannot be blamed for, he has utterly overturned himself, his household, and his city.

148. Laws IV, 715e–716b. Wachsmuth brackets “and in orderly conduct” as wording rejected by the editor Schanz. The translation preserves the brackets. Eudaimonēsein, rendered “prosper,” concerns living well, not merely acquiring wealth, which the next sentence treats as a possible occasion of arrogance.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55b Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Νόμων ι′ (α′)

I.3.55b.1

Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ θεοί τ’ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελοῦνται, ἔγωγ’ οὐ παντάπασι φαύλως ἂν ἡμῖν φαίην ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· τὸ δὲ παραιτητοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι, δεχομένους δῶρα, οὔτε τινὶ συγχωρητέον παντί τ’ αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν τρόπῳ ἐλεγκτέον. — Κάλλιστ’ εἶπες· ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.

— Φέρε καὶ πρὸς θεῶν αὐτῶν, τίνα τρόπον παραιτητοὶ γίγνοιντ’ ἂν ἡμῖν, εἰ γίγνοιντο αὖ; καὶ τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τινες ὄντες; ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν που γίγνεσθαι τοὺς γε διοικήσαντας τὸν ἅπαντα ἐνδελεχῶς οὐρανόν. — Οὕτως.

55b Τοῦ αὐτοῦ (β′)

I.3.55b.2

— Ἀλλ’ ἄρα τίσι προσφερεῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ τίνες <τούτοις>, ὧν δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν μείζοσιν ἐλάττονας; πότερον ἡνίοχοί τινες ἂν εἶεν τοιοῦτοι ζευγῶν ἁμιλλωμένων, ἢ πλοίων κυβερνῆται; τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀπεικασθεῖεν στρατοπέδων ἄρχουσί τισιν. Εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ νόσων πόλεμον εὐλαβουμένοις ἰατροῖς ἐοικέναι περὶ σώματα, ἢ γεωργοῖς περὶ φυτῶν γένεσιν, εἰωθυίας ὥρας χαλεπὰς διὰ φόβων προσδεχομένοις, ἢ καὶ ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55b The same author, Laws X (1)

I.3.55b.1

"That gods exist and care for human beings has, I would say, been demonstrated by us quite adequately. But we must concede to no one that they can be won over by wrongdoers through accepting gifts; we must refute that claim in every way we can." "Very well said; let us do as you say."

"Come then, by the gods themselves: how could they be won over by us, if they could be? What sort of beings would they be? Surely those who continually govern the entire heaven must be rulers." "Yes."[149]

55b The same author (2)

I.3.55b.2

"But which rulers do they resemble? Or who resembles <them>, among those lesser beings we can successfully compare with greater? Might they be like charioteers of racing teams, or helmsmen of ships? Perhaps they might also be compared to commanders of armies. They could resemble physicians guarding bodies against the assault of diseases, or farmers tending the growth of plants and fearfully awaiting the customary harsh seasons, or overseers of flocks."

149. Laws X, 905d–906b. "Won over" renders paraitētoi: gods allegedly persuaded to excuse wrongdoing by gifts. The excerpt assumes the preceding argument for divine existence and care, which is not reproduced here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55b Τοῦ αὐτοῦ (γ′) I.3.55b.3

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν μεστὸν μὲν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη. Ξύμμαχοι δ’ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες· ἡμεῖς δὲ αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων· φθείρει δ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης, σῴζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσιν.

55c Ἐν ταὐτῷ (α′) I.3.55c.1

Τίσιν οὖν δὴ τῶν προρρηθέντων ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους εἶναι φύλακας θεοὺς οὐκ ἂν καταγέλαστος γίγνοιτο ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν; πότερον κυβερνήταις, λοιβῇ τε οἴνου κνίση τε παρατρεπομένοις αὐτοῖς, ἀνατρέπουσι δὲ ναῦς τε καὶ ναύτας; — Μηδαμῶς.

— Ἀλλ’ οὔτι μὴν ἡνιόχοις ἐν ἁμίλλῃ ξυντεταγμένοις, πεισθεῖσιν ὑπὸ δωρεᾶς τὴν νίκην ἑτέροις ζεύγεσι προδοῦναι. — Δεινὴν γὰρ εἰκόνα λέγοις ἄν, λέγων τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

— Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς γε οὐδὲ ἰατροῖς οὐδὲ γεωργοῖς· οὐδὲ νομεῦσί μὴν οὐδέ τισι κυσὶ κεκηλημένοις ὑπὸ λύκων. — Εὐφήμει. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55b The same author (3)

I.3.55b.3

"For since we have agreed among ourselves that heaven is full of many good things and many of their opposites, with those that are not good more numerous, we say that such a battle is unending and requires extraordinary vigilance. Gods and divine spirits are our allies, while we in turn are the possessions of gods and divine spirits. Injustice and insolence joined with folly destroy us; justice and self-restraint joined with understanding save us, dwelling in the ensouled powers of the gods."[150]

55c In the same work (1)

I.3.55c.1

"Which of those just mentioned could anyone compare to the gods as guardians without becoming ridiculous? Helmsmen, perhaps, who are themselves swayed by libations of wine and the savor of burnt offerings, and so overturn ships and sailors?" "Certainly not."[151]

"Nor surely charioteers lined up for a race who are persuaded by a gift to betray the victory to other teams." "That would be a terrible image to use."

"Nor generals, physicians, or farmers; nor herdsmen, nor dogs bewitched by wolves." "Speak reverently! How could they be?"

150. The compact phrase pleionōn de tōn mē is read as "those that are not good being more numerous," carrying forward the contrast already stated. The final participle refers to the saving virtues. "Ensouled powers" retains the text's language rather than reducing it to an abstract claim about moral laws.

151. Laws X, 906b–907b. The examples expose what accepting gifts to overlook injustice would imply about divine guardianship. The mention of libation and sacrificial savor recalls the poetic picture quoted in excerpt 53, but here serves the argument against corruptibility.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55c Ἐν ταὐτῷ (β′) I.3.55c.2

— Ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντων φυλάκων εἰσὶ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τὰ μέγισθ’ ἡμῖν οἱ πάντες θεοί; — Πολύ γε.

— Τοὺς δὴ κάλλιστά τε πράγματα φυλάττοντας διαφέροντάς τε αὐτοὺς φυλακῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν κυνῶν χείρους καὶ ἀνθρώπων μέσων εἶναι φήσομεν, οἳ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν ποτε προδοῖεν ἕνεκα δώρων παρ’ ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν ἀνοσίως διδομένων; — Οὐδαμῶς· οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς ὁ λόγος τῶν τε περὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν ὄντων κινδυνεύει πᾶς ὁ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀντεχόμενος πάντων ἂν τῶν ἀσεβῶν κεκρίσθαι δικαιότατα κάκιστός τε καὶ ἀσεβέστατος εἶναι.

56 Πορφυρίου Περὶ Στυγός (α′) I.3.56a

Ἰνδοὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας τῆς Ἀντωνίνου, τοῦ ἐξ Ἐμίσων ἐν τῇ Συρίᾳ [ἀφικομένου] Βαρδισάνῃ τῷ ἐκ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας εἰς λόγους ἀφικόμενοι, ἐξηγήσαντο, ὡς ὁ Βαρδισάνης ἀνέγραψεν, εἶναί τινα λίμνην ἔτι καὶ νῦν παρ’ Ἰνδοῖς δοκιμαστήριον λεγομένην, εἰς ἣν, ἄν τις τῶν Ἰνδῶν αἰτίαν ἔχων τινὸς ἁμαρτίας ἀρνῆται, <εἰσάγεται>. Τῶν δὲ Βραχμάνων τινὲς δοκιμάζουσιν αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

Πυνθάνονται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ θέλει διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος γενέσθαι τὴν ἐξέτασιν, καὶ μὴ θέλοντα μὲν ὡς ὑπεύθυνον ἀποπέμπουσι τὴν δίκην ἀποτίσοντα· παραδεχόμενον δὲ τὴν βάσανον εἰσάγουσι μετὰ τῶν κατηγόρων· καταβαίνουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ, δοκιμασθησόμενοι μὴ συκοφαντῶσι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

55c In the same work (2) I.3.55c.2

"Are not all the gods our greatest guardians, concerned with our greatest affairs?" "By far."

"Then shall we say that those who guard the finest things, and themselves excel in the virtue of guardianship, are worse than dogs and ordinary human beings, who would never betray what is just for gifts impiously offered by unjust men?" "Certainly not. The claim is intolerable. Of all those involved in every sort of impiety, anyone who clings to this opinion might most justly be judged the worst and most impious of all."

56 Porphyry, On the Styx (1) I.3.56a

Indians who, in the reign of Antoninus, the emperor from Emesa in Syria [who had arrived], came into conversation with Bardisanes of Mesopotamia, gave the following account, as Bardisanes recorded it. Even now, they said, there is a lake among the Indians called the "place of testing." If an Indian accused of wrongdoing denies it, he <is brought into> this lake. Certain Brahmans test him in this way.[152]

They ask the man whether he wishes the examination to take place through the water. If he refuses, they send him away as liable to pay the penalty. If he accepts the ordeal, they bring him in together with his accusers; for these too go down into the water, to be tested as to whether their accusation is false.

152. The report is transmitted in layers: Stobaeus quotes Porphyry, who cites Bardisanes's account of conversations with Indian visitors. It is not Porphyry's eyewitness description. The redundant participle "having arrived," bracketed in the Greek by Wachsmuth, is rendered in brackets as "who had arrived"; the missing verb "is brought in" is editorially supplied. The excerpt itself identifies Antoninus by Emesa, without giving a modern regnal identification.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Πορφυρίου (β′) I.3.56b

Διέρχονται τοίνυν οἱ ἐπιβαίνοντες τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς ἕτερον μέρος τῆς λίμνης· τὸ βάθος δ’ ἐστὶν ἄχρι τῶν γονάτων παντὸς οἰουοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπιβάντος. Ὅταν δ’ <ὁ> κατηγορούμενος ἐπιβῇ, ἀναμάρτητος μὲν ὤν, ἀδεῶς διέρχεται ἄχρι τῶν γονάτων ἔχων τὸ ὕδωρ· ἁμαρτὼν δὲ ὀλίγον προβὰς βαπτίζεται μέχρι κεφαλῆς. Οἱ δὲ Βραχμᾶνες ἀνασπῶντες αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἐνάγουσι ζῶντα καὶ ἀξιοῦσι παιδευθῆναι χωρὶς θανατικῆς καταδίκης. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο σπανίως τῷ μηδένα τολμᾶν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὸ ἁμάρτημα διὰ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος γιγνόμενον ἔλεγχον.

56 Πορφυρίου (γ′) I.3.56c

Ἑκουσίων τοίνυν ἁμαρτημάτων δοκιμαστήριον Ἰνδοῖς τοῦτ’ ἔχειν τὸ ὕδωρ· ἀκουσίων δὲ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἑκουσίων καὶ ὅλως ὀρθοῦ βίου ἕτερον εἶναι, περὶ οὗ ὁ Βαρδισάνης τάδε γράφει· θήσω γὰρ τἀκείνου κατὰ λέξιν·

“Ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ σπήλαιον εἶναι αὐτόματον, μέγα, ἐν ὄρει ὑψηλοτάτῳ σχεδὸν κατὰ μέσον τῆς γῆς, ἐν ᾧ σπηλαίῳ ἐστὶν ἀνδριάς, ὃν εἰκάζουσι πηχῶν δέκα ἢ δώδεκα, ἐστὼς ὀρθός, ἔχων τὰς χεῖρας ἠπλωμένας ἐν τύπῳ σταυροῦ· καὶ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν τῆς ὄψεως αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἀνδρικόν, τὸ δ’ εὐώνυμον θηλυκόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ βραχίων ὁ δεξιὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ποὺς καὶ ὅλον τὸ μέρος ἀρσενικὸν καὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον θηλυκόν, ὡς ἰδόντα τινὰ ἐκπλαγῆναι τὴν σύγκρασιν, πῶς ἀδιαιρέτως ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀνομοιότητα <τήνδε> τῶν δύο πλευρῶν ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Porphyry (2)

I.3.56b

Those who enter the water then cross to another part of the lake. It is only knee-deep for anyone at all who enters it. When <the> accused enters, if he is innocent, he crosses fearlessly with the water up to his knees; but if he has done wrong, after going a little way he is submerged up to his head. The Brahmans pull him out of the water, hand him over alive to those bringing the case, and ask that he be punished without a death sentence.

They say that this happens rarely, because no one dares deny his wrongdoing in view of the exposure brought about by the water.[153]

56 Porphyry (3)

I.3.56c

Thus, they said, the Indians have this water as a test of voluntary wrongdoings. There is another test of both involuntary and voluntary wrongdoings, and of right living generally. About this Bardisanes writes as follows; I shall set down his own words.[154]

“They also said there was a large natural cave in a very high mountain, almost at the center of the earth. In this cave stands a statue, which they estimate at ten or twelve cubits, upright with its arms spread in the form of a cross. The right side of its face is male, the left female; likewise its right arm, right foot, and whole right side are male, and its left side female. A person seeing it is astonished at the blending: how <this> difference between the two sides can be seen, without division, in a single body.”[155]

153. The changing depth is a claim within the reported ordeal. “They say” in the second paragraph makes explicit the continuing reported speech of the Greek; it does not introduce another source.

154. The first person “I shall set down” belongs to Porphyry, introducing a quotation from Bardisanes. The quoted account continues across the following paired pages.

155. The passage gives a visual description without naming the statue’s deity. No identification is imposed here. A cubit is a forearm-based measure; the ancient estimate is retained rather than converted with spurious precision. Wachsmuth suspects that the final explanatory phrase may have begun as a reader’s annotation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Πορφυρίου (δ′) I.3.56d

Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδριάντι λέγουσι γεγλύφθαι περὶ τὸν μαζὸν τὸν δεξιὸν ἥλιον καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν σελήνην καὶ κατὰ τῶν δύο βραχιόνων .... τέχνῃ γεγλύφθαι ἀγγέλων ἀριθμὸν καὶ ὅσα ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τουτέστιν οὐρανὸν καὶ ὄρη καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ ὠκεανὸν καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα ἐστί. Τοῦτον τὸν ἀνδριάντα φασὶ δεδωκέναι τὸν θεὸν τῷ υἱῷ, ὁπηνίκα τὸν κόσμον ἔκτιζεν, ἵνα θεατὸν ἔχῃ παράδειγμα.

56 Πορφυρίου (ε′) I.3.56e

Ἐξήτασα δὲ (φησὶ) ποίας ἐστὶν ὕλης, καὶ διεβεβαιοῦτο ὁ Σανδάλης, ἐμαρτύρουν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, μηδένα εἰδέναι ποίας ὕλης ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐκεῖνος· οὔτε γὰρ χρυσός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀργύρεος οὔτε χάλκεος οὔτε λίθινος οὔτε ἄλλης ὕλης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παραπλήσιός ἐστι ξύλῳ στερεοτάτῳ καὶ ἀσηπτοτάτῳ· μὴ εἶναι δὲ ξύλον.

Προσετίθεσαν δὲ λέγοντες, ὅτι τῶν βασιλέων τις ἠθέλησεν ἀφελέσθαι τρίχα ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν τράχηλον αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἷμα ῥεῦσαι καὶ φοβηθῆναι τὸν βασιλέα ἐκεῖνον, ὡς μόλις εὐξαμένων τῶν Βραχμάνων ἀνακτήσασθαι ἑαυτόν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ κεφαλῇ τούτου λέγουσι θεοῦ ἄγαλμα εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ θρόνου τινὸς καθήμενον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Porphyry (4)

I.3.56d

"They say that on this statue a sun has been carved at the right breast and a moon at the left, and along both arms, with ... artistry, a number of angels have been carved, together with everything in the cosmos: heaven, mountains, sea, rivers, ocean, plants, animals, and, in a word, everything that exists. They say God gave this statue to his son when he was creating the cosmos, so that he might have a visible model."[156]

56 Porphyry (5)

I.3.56e

"I inquired," he says, "what material it was made of. Sandales firmly declared, and the others supported his testimony, that no one knew the material of that statue. It is neither gold nor silver nor bronze nor stone nor any other material, but resembles extremely hard and decay-resistant wood; yet it is not wood.[157]

"They added that one of the kings wished to remove a hair from those around its neck, and blood flowed. The king became so frightened that he scarcely recovered himself after the Brahmans had prayed. On its head, they say, there is an image of a god, seated as though on a throne."

156. The dots retain the printed gap before "artistry." Angelōn is rendered "angels," literally messengers, without identifying a particular religious system. The divine father, son, and model belong to the visitors' account as transmitted through Bardisanes and Porphyry.

157. The words "I inquired" belong to Bardisanes; "he says" is the framing voice of Porphyry. Sandales is the form of the informant's name printed by Wachsmuth, whose apparatus notes uncertainty about it. The apparently contradictory list of materials is preserved as part of the report.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Πορφυρίου (ς′)

I.3.56f

Λέγουσιν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καύμασιν ἱδροῦν ὅλον τὸν ἀνδριάντα τοῦτον καὶ ῥιπίζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Βραχμάνων καὶ παύεσθαι τοὺς ἱδρῶτας· καὶ εἰ μὴ ῥιπίζοιεν, πολὺν φέρειν ἱδρῶτα, ὡς βρέχεσθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν γῆν.

Ἐνδοτέρω δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ σπηλαίῳ μετὰ πολὺ διάστημα εἶναι σκότος, ἔνθα μετὰ λαμπάδων εἰσέρχονται οἱ βουλόμενοι καὶ εὑρίσκουσι θύραν τινά· ἐξ ἧς θύρας προέρχεται ὕδωρ καὶ λιμνάζει περὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τοῦ σπηλαίου· καὶ ὡς δοκιμάζοντες ἑαυτοὺς εἰσέρχονται διὰ τῆς θύρας ἐκείνης. Καὶ ὅσοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φαυλότητος τοῦ βίου εἰσέρχονται ἀνεμποδίστως εὐρυνομένης τῆς θύρας, καὶ εὑρίσκουσι πηγὴν μεγίστην ὕδατος πάνυ διαυγεστάτου καὶ ποτιμωτάτου, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὕδωρ ἐκεῖνο προέρχεται.

56 Πορφυρίου (ζ′)

I.3.56g

οἱ δὲ ἐν καταγνώσει ὄντες πολὺ θλίβουσιν εἰσελθεῖν διὰ τῆς θύρας ἐκείνης καὶ οὐ δύνανται στενουμένης αὐτοῖς· οἵτινες βιαζόμενοι ἐξομολογοῦνται ἐπὶ τῶν ἑτέρων εἴ τι ἥμαρτον, <καὶ> δέησιν ποιοῦνται ἵνα οἱ λοιποὶ εὔξωνται περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ νηστεύουσι χρόνον τινὰ ἱκανόν.”

Ἐκεῖ φησιν εἰρηκέναι <τοὺς> περὶ τὸν Σανδάλην συνάγεσθαι τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας ἡμέρᾳ μέν τινι τεταγμένῃ· ἀλλὰ εἶναι μέν τινας ἐκεῖ ἔχοντας τὴν διατριβήν, τοὺς δὲ ἀλλαχόθεν συνιέναι θέρους ὥρᾳ καὶ περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον πλεοναζούσης τῆς ὀπώρας ἐπί τε τὴν θέαν τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀλλήλοις συμμίξαι καὶ εἰς τὸ πεῖραν ἑαυτῶν λαβεῖν, εἰ δύνανται εἰσελθεῖν διὰ τῆς εἰρημένης θύρας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Porphyry (6)

I.3.56f

"They also say that in hot weather this whole statue sweats. The Brahmans fan it, and the sweating stops; if they did not fan it, it would produce so much sweat that the ground around it would become wet.

"Farther inside the cave, a considerable distance beyond the statue, there is darkness. Those who wish enter with torches and find a doorway. Water comes out of it and forms a pool in the innermost part of the cave. They pass through that doorway as a test of themselves. Those who are free from baseness in their lives enter unhindered, as the doorway widens, and find a very great spring of exceptionally clear and drinkable water, from which that water flows."[158]

56 Porphyry (7)

I.3.56g

"Those who stand condemned press hard to enter through that doorway but cannot, as it narrows against them. Under this constraint they confess before the others whatever wrong they have done, <and> ask the rest to pray for them. They fast for a considerable time."

He says that Sandales's companions reported that the Brahmans gather there on an appointed day. Some make their residence there; others come from elsewhere in summer and around autumn, when fruit is plentiful, to see the statue, to meet one another, and to test themselves as to whether they can pass through the doorway just described.[159]

158. The second ordeal concerns the conduct of an entire life, in contrast to the accusation of a particular voluntary offense in the first. The widening doorway and sweating statue remain explicitly parts of the reported narrative.

159. The quotation from 56c ends after the fasting; reported speech then resumes. The supplied tous is absorbed into "Sandales's companions." References to an appointed day and to seasons follow the printed text without reconstructing a festival calendar.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 69-70

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Πορφυρίου (η′)

I.3.56h

Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐκεῖ ζητήσεις λέγουσι περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐκείνῳ γλυφῆς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι ῥᾳδίως πάσῃ τῇ ἀνατυπώσει ἐπιστῆσαι, διά τε τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ ἐν πάσῃ χώρᾳ ὑπάρχειν.

Ἃ μὲν οὖν Ἰνδοὶ ἱστοροῦσι περὶ τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῖς δοκιμαστηρίου ὕδατος, ἔστι ταῦτα. Οἶμαι δὲ τούτου καὶ Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα μεμνῆσθαι τοῦ ὕδατος, τοῦ ἐν τῷ σπηλαίῳ λέγω. Γράφων γὰρ τοῖς Βραχμᾶσιν ὅρκον τινὰ ὀμνύει· “οὐ μὰ τὸ Ταντάλειον ὕδωρ, οὗ με ἐμνήσατε.” Οἶμαι γὰρ Ταντάλου λέγειν τοῦτο, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἐσπουδακότας κἄκ τούτου ποτὸν ἀρύσασθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 70

BOOK I CHAPTER 3

56 Porphyry (8)

I.3.56h

They say that discussions take place there about the carving on that body. For it is not easy to attend to the whole representation, both because its subjects are numerous and because not all animals and plants occur in every country.

Such, then, are the Indians' accounts of the testing water in their country. I think Apollonius of Tyana also mentioned this water: I mean the water in the cave. For, writing to the Brahmans, he swears an oath: "No, by the water of Tantalus, into whose mysteries you initiated me." I think he calls it the water of Tantalus because it continually punishes with anticipation those eager to reach it and draw a drink from it.[160]

160. The identification with Apollonius's "water of Tantalus" is Porphyry's inference, marked twice by "I think." The image invokes frustrated desire for water. It does not independently verify the preceding report. This closes chapter 3 in Wachsmuth's volume.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 4

Κεφάλαιον Δ′ I.4.heading

Περὶ ἀνάγκης <θείας> καθ’ ἣν ἀπαραιτήτως τὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται βούλησιν.

1 Μοσχίωνος Τηλέφου I.4.1

Ὦ καὶ θεῶν κρατοῦσα καὶ θνητῶν μόνη
Μοῖρ’, ὦ λιταῖς ἄτρωτε δυστήνων βροτῶν,
πάντολμ’ Ἀνάγκη, στυγνὸν ἡ κατ’ αὐχένων
ἡμῶν ἐρείδεις τῆσδε λατρείας ζυγόν.

2a Χαιρήμονος I.4.2a

Χρεία δ’ Ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἀπῴκισται πολύ.

2b Εὐριπίδου Βελλεροφόντῃ I.4.2b

Πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην πάντα τἄλλ’ ἐστ’ ἀσθενῆ.

2c <Σιμωνίδου> I.4.2c

Ἀνάγκᾳ δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

Chapter 4: On Necessity

I.4.heading

On <divine> necessity, through which what accords with God's will comes to pass inexorably.[161]

1 Moschion, Telephus

I.4.1

O Fate, who alone rule gods and mortals,
untouched by the prayers of wretched human beings,
all-daring Necessity, who press upon our necks
the hateful yoke of this servitude.[162]

2a Chaeremon

I.4.2a

Need has settled not far from Necessity.[163]

2b Euripides, Bellerophon

I.4.2b

Against necessity, everything else is powerless.

2c <Simonides>

I.4.2c

Not even gods fight against necessity.[164]

161. Wachsmuth supplies "divine" from Photius and the Laurentian table of contents. Anankē ranges from constraint or unavoidable circumstance to the personified power Necessity. The heading links it with God's will; some of the poems instead picture it as a power that even gods cannot resist.

162. Fate (Moira) and Necessity are addressed as one power in these lines. "Untouched" renders atrōte, literally "unwounded": prayers cannot pierce or move that power.

163. The image makes chreia, need or want, a near neighbor of anankē, compulsion. The source numbers this and the following four sayings as subdivisions of excerpt 2.

164. Wachsmuth supplies Simonides's name by comparison with Plato, Protagoras 345d. The wording of the facing Greek follows this edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 4

2d <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.4.2d

Ὁσίᾳ δ’ ἀνάγκη πολεμιωτάτη θεός.

2e <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.4.2e

Οὐδεὶς ἀνάγκης μεῖζον ἰσχύει νόμος.

3 <Εὐριπίδου> I.4.3

Ἐγὼ καὶ διὰ Μούσας
καὶ μετάρσιος ᾗξα καὶ
πλείστων ἀψάμενος λόγων
κρεῖσσον οὐδὲν Ἀνάγκας
εὗρον, οὐδέ τι φάρμακον.

4 Φιλήτα Ἑρμοῦ I.4.4

Ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἐπικρατεῖ ἀνδρὸς Ἀνάγκη,
ἥ ῥ’ οὐδ’ ἀθανάτους ὑποδείδιεν, οἵ τ’ ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ
ἔκτοσθεν χαλεπῶν ἀχέων οἴκους ἐκάμοντο.

5 Σοφοκλῆς Θυέστῃ I.4.5

Πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ Ἄρης ἀνίσταται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 4

2d <An unidentified tragic poet> I.4.2d

Yet Necessity is a goddess most hostile to piety.[165]

2e <An unidentified tragic poet> I.4.2e

No law has greater strength than necessity.

3 <Euripides> I.4.3

Through the Muses I soared
aloft, and, after touching
upon countless teachings,
I found nothing stronger than Necessity,
nor any remedy.[166]

4 Philetas, Hermes I.4.4

For mighty Necessity holds sway over man;
she fears not even the immortals, who on Olympus
built their homes beyond the reach of grievous pains.[167]

5 Sophocles, Thyestes I.4.5

Not even Ares rises up against necessity.[168]

165. “To piety” renders hosiai, the dative printed by Wachsmuth following Nauck. The apparatus records hosia, “sacred,” in the manuscripts. The supplied Latin heading “of an unknown tragic poet” is rendered in Greek and English here and in comparable headings.

166. Alcestis 962-966, as identified in the source. The speaker’s ascent through poetry and learning finds no cure for necessity. The excerpt breaks off before the original song’s further specification of remedies.

167. Hermes is the title of Philetas’s work in this heading; it is not an attribution to Hermes of the kind found later in the chapter.

168. Ares, the god of war, embodies the force that nevertheless cannot resist necessity.

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

6 Εὐριπίδης Λικυμνίῳ I.4.6

Τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐ λέγειν ὅσον ζυγόν.
…

7a Θαλῆς I.4.7a

Θαλῆς ἐρωτηθείς, Τί ἰσχυρότατον; εἶπεν· Ἀνάγκη, κρατεῖ γὰρ πάντων.

7b Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἄμμωνα I.4.7b

Ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν κρίσις βεβαία καὶ ἀμετάτρεπτος δύναμις προνοίας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

6 Euripides, Licymnius

I.4.6

The yoke of necessity: there is no telling how great it is.
…[169]

7a Thales

I.4.7a

Asked, “What is strongest?” Thales replied, “Necessity, for it rules everything.”

7b Hermes, from the writings to Ammon

I.4.7b

Necessity is a firm decree and an unalterable power of providence.[170]

169. The Greek is syntactically difficult. “There is no telling” gives the apparent force of ou legein without adopting one of the repairs recorded in the apparatus. The dots preserve the discontinuity printed after the line.

170. Here necessity executes providence rather than standing above it. Krisis, “decree,” can also mean judgment or decision. The attribution belongs to the Hermetic writings transmitted under the name Hermes.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 4

7c <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (α′) I.4.7c.1

Πυθαγόρας ἀνάγκην ἔφη περικεῖσθαι τῷ κόσμῳ.

Παρμενίδου καὶ Δημοκρίτου. οὗτοι πάντα κατ’ ἀνάγκην· τὴν δ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι εἱμαρμένην καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ κοσμοποιόν.

Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ’ ἀνάγκην, τὴν δ’ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἱμαρμένην· λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ· “Οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης.”

7c <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (β′) I.4.7c.2

Πλάτων ὁτὲ μὲν τὴν ὕλην, ὁτὲ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὴν ὕλην σχέσιν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς πρόνοιαν ἀνάγει, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἀνάγκην. Λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· “Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος.”

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς αἰτίαν χρηστικὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν στοιχείων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

7c <Aëtius, Opinions> (1)

I.4.7c.1

Pythagoras said that necessity surrounds the cosmos.

Parmenides and Democritus: these hold that everything happens by necessity, and that necessity is also fate, justice, providence, and the maker of the cosmos.[171]

Leucippus holds that everything happens by necessity, and that this is also fate. For he says in On Mind: “Nothing happens without a reason; everything happens from a rational ground and under necessity.”[172]

7c <Aëtius, Opinions> (2)

I.4.7c.2

Plato identifies necessity sometimes with matter, sometimes with the relation of the maker to matter. He refers some things to providence and others to necessity. Thus he says in the Timaeus: “The coming-to-be of this cosmos was mixed: it arose from the combination of necessity and intellect, with intellect ruling necessity.”[173]

Empedocles identifies it with the cause that makes use of the principles and the elements.[174]

171. The supplied heading identifies a collection of reported philosophical opinions (Aëtius I.25-26 in Wachsmuth’s reference), not verbatim statements by all the named thinkers. The grouping of Parmenides with Democritus and the identification with providence are retained as transmitted.

172. Logos here is rendered “rational ground,” and matēn “without a reason,” to preserve the contrast between an event without an account and an event determined by a ground or cause. This does not by itself make Leucippus’s necessity a benevolent purpose.

173. Timaeus 48a. The reported interpretation and its quotation are distinct: the first tells us how the compiler classifies Plato, while the quoted sentence describes the mixed origin of the cosmos.

174. Chrēstikē means capable of using or employing. The compressed report does not explain how this cause operates; “it” continues the topic of necessity.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 72-73

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

8 Ἑρμοῦ πρὸς τὸν υἱόν (α′) I.4.8a

Ὀρθῶς μοι πάντα εἶπας, ὦ πάτερ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι με ἀνάμνησον, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ τίνα <τὰ> κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ὁμοίως καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην;

Ἔφην εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν, ὦ Τάτ, τρία εἴδη ἀσωμάτων· καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἐστὶ νοητόν, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀχρώματον, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἀσώματον, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πρώτης καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τούτῳ ἐναντία σχηματότητες <αἷς> τοῦτο ὑποδέχεται. Τὸ γοῦν κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας πρός τινα λόγον καὶ ὑποδεχθέν, εὐθέως μεταβάλλεται εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος κινήσεως, τοῦτο δὲ εἴδωλόν ἐστι τοῦ νοήματος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.

8 Ἑρμοῦ πρὸς τὸν υἱόν (β′) I.4.8b

Τρίτον δέ ἐστιν εἶδος ἀσωμάτων, ὃ περὶ τὰ σώματά ἐστι συμβεβηκός, τόπος, χρόνος, κίνησις, σχῆμα, ἐπιφάνεια, μέγεθος, εἶδος· καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ δύο. Αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν ἰδίως ποιά, ἃ δὲ τοῦ σώματος. Τὰ μὲν ἰδίως ποιὰ τὸ σχῆμα, ἡ χρόα, τὸ εἶδος, ὁ τόπος, ὁ χρόνος, ἡ κίνησις· τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἴδιά ἐστι τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον σχῆμα καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον χρῶμα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεμορφωμένη μορφὴ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ τὸ μέγεθος· ταῦτά ἐστι τούτων μεταξύ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 73

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

8 Hermes, to his son (1)

I.4.8a

“You have explained everything rightly to me, father. But remind me once more: what things occur according to providence, what <things> according to necessity, and likewise according to fate?”

“I said, Tat, that there are three kinds of incorporeal things in us. One is intelligible: it is colorless, shapeless, bodiless, and derives from the first and intelligible substance itself.[175] There are also configurations in us opposed to this, <by means of which> it receives what comes to it. What is moved by intelligible substance toward a particular rational pattern and received is at once changed into another kind of movement; this is an image of the creator’s thought.[176]

8 Hermes, to his son (2)

I.4.8b

“A third kind of incorporeal things consists of what is incidental to bodies: place, time, movement, shape, surface, magnitude, and form. There are two distinctions within these: some are qualities in their own right, others belong to body. Qualities in their own right are shape, color, form, place, time, and movement. What belongs specifically to body is the shape that has been given shape and the color that has been imparted, as well as the form that has been formed, surface, and magnitude. These stand between those.[177]

175. The son is addressed as Tat. “Intelligible” describes what is apprehended by intellect rather than by bodily sensation; “incorporeal” means without body. These terms should not be collapsed into “invisible.”

176. The sentence about configurations is strained. The base edition supplies hais, “by means of which”; the English supplies the unstated object “what comes to it.” The apparatus suggests “we receive” for “it receives” and questions whether the final clause about the creator’s thought is an inserted explanation. The printed wording is retained.

177. The repetition of shape, color, and form distinguishes qualities considered in themselves from their realization in a body. The final “these” and “those” are obscure, and the apparatus records divergent readings. The English retains their indeterminacy rather than assigning a new set of referents.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 4

8 Ἑρμοῦ πρὸς τὸν υἱόν (γ′)

I.4.8c

Ἡ μὲν οὖν νοητὴ οὐσία, πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γενομένη, ἑαυτῆς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει καὶ τοῦ σῴζειν ἕτερον, αὐτὴν σῴζουσα, ἐπεὶ γ’ αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ὑπὸ ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἔστιν· ὑπολειφθεῖσα δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ αἱρεῖται τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν καὶ ἡ αἵρεσις αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόνοιαν [τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ κόσμου] γίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἄλογον πᾶν κινεῖται πρός τινα λόγον· καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον κατ’ ἀνάγκην, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην. Καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος τῶν κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ <κατ’> ἀνάγκην καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 73-74

BOOK I CHAPTER 4

8 Hermes, to his son (3)

I.4.8c

“Intelligible substance, then, when it has come to be with God, has authority over itself and the power to preserve another, while preserving itself, since that substance itself is not subject to necessity. But when left behind by God, it chooses bodily nature, and its choice takes place according to providence [and this of the cosmos].[178] Everything irrational moves toward some rational principle. The rational principle is according to providence; the irrational, according to necessity; and the properties incidental to body, according to fate. This is the account of what is according to providence, <according to> necessity, and according to fate.”[179]

178. “Left behind” follows hypoleiphtheisa as printed. The bracketed words are grammatically incomplete: Wachsmuth regards them as a gloss attached to what follows. They are translated literally and kept in brackets, not silently incorporated into a repaired sentence.

179. The passage distributes the three powers across different levels: rational principle, the irrational, and bodily properties. This is the dialogue’s explanation, not a uniform doctrine shared by every excerpt in chapters 4 and 5.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

Κεφάλαιον Ε′ I.5.heading

Περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ τῆς τῶν γινομένων εὐταξίας.

1 Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδος I.5.1

Μοῖραν δ’ οὔτινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν,
οὐ κακόν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὴν τὰ πρῶτα γένηται.

2 Εὐριπίδου Ἀνδρομέδας I.5.2

… τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐχ ὁρᾷς
ὅπῃ μοίρας διεξέρχεται;
στρέφει δ’ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως εἰς ἀμέραν.

3 Βακχυλίδου I.5.3

Θνατοῖσι δ’ οὐκ αὐθαίρετοι
οὔτ’ ὄλβος, οὔτ’ ἄκαμπτος ἄρης, οὔτε πάμφθερσις στάσις·
ἀλλ’ ἐπιχρίμπτει νέφος ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλαν
γαῖαν ἀ πάνδωρος αἶσα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

Chapter 5: Fate and the order of events

I.5.heading

On fate and the orderly arrangement of what comes to pass.[180]

1 Homer, Iliad

I.5.1

No man, I say, has ever escaped his fate,
neither coward nor brave, once he has been born.[181]

2 Euripides, Andromeda

I.5.2

… Do you not see the divine power,
how it passes through the allotments of fate?
It turns now this way, now that, from day to day.[182]

3 Bacchylides

I.5.3

Mortals cannot choose for themselves
prosperity, unyielding war, or all-destroying civil strife;
all-giving Fate brings a cloud close
now over one land, now another.[183]

180. The chapter's chief term, heimarmenē, is usually translated "fate." The poems also use Moira and Aisa, words associated with an allotted portion or lot. Personified Fate, the three Fates, and philosophical accounts of causal order remain distinguishable in the translation.

181. Iliad 6.488-489. Kakos and esthlos are rendered here as cowardly and brave, preserving the contrast in the warrior's speech rather than imposing an exclusively moral opposition between wicked and good.

182. The source begins the excerpt with dots. "Allotments of fate" renders the plural moiras; the apparatus records uncertainty over that form and over the wording of the final line. The English follows the printed text.

183. "All-giving" translates pandōros: Fate dispenses painful as well as welcome conditions. Arēs, the war-god's name, is used here for war; stasis is internal conflict or civil strife.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 74-75

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

4 Μενάνδρου I.5.4

Ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται
εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου.

5 Ἡσιόδου Θεογονίας I.5.5

Καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους,
Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἵτε βροτοῖσι
γινομένοισι διδοῦσιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε.

6 Εὐριπίδου Ἡρακλειδῶν I.5.6

Οὔτινά φημι θεῶν ἄτερ ὄλβιον, οὐ βαρύποτμον
ἄνδρα γενέσθαι.
…
μόρσιμα δ’ οὔτι φυγεῖν θέμις·
οὐ σοφίᾳ τις ἀπώσεται·
ἀλλὰ μάταν ὁ πρόθυμος ἀεὶ πόνον ἔξει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

4 Menander I.5.4

A divine spirit stands beside every man
from birth, his guide through the mysteries of life.[184]

5 Hesiod, Theogony I.5.5

And she bore the Fates and the ruthlessly avenging Keres,
Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who give to mortals
at their birth both good and evil as their portion.[185]

6 Euripides, Children of Heracles I.5.6

No man, I say, becomes prosperous or grievously fated
apart from the gods.
…
What is allotted may not be escaped;
no one will thrust it away by wisdom;
the eager man will always labor in vain.[186]

184. Mystagōgos is a guide who introduces someone to sacred mysteries. The metaphor presents the daimōn as an accompanying guide to life; it does not specify a complete theory of fate.

185. Theogony 217-219. The mother is Night in the surrounding Hesiodic passage. The Keres are powers associated with death and destructive fate. The quotation's grouping is retained without harmonizing it with other genealogies.

186. Children of Heracles 608-609 and 615-617. The separation between the two selections is already marked in Wachsmuth's text; the dots are not a new omission made by this translation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

7 Ἐκ τῶν Βίωνος Βουκολικῶν· εἰς Ὑάκινθον I.5.7

Ἀμφασία τόκα Φοῖβον ἔλεν τὸ σὸν ἄλγος ὁρῶντα,
δίζετο φάρμακα πάντα, σοφὰν δ’ ἐπεμαίετο τέχναν,
χρῖεν δ’ ἀμβροσίᾳ καὶ νέκταρι, χρῖεν ἐπάσας
ὠτειλάν· μοιραῖα δ’ ἀναλθέα τρώματα πάντα.

8 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.5.8

Μόνη γὰρ ἐν θεοῖσιν οὐ δεσπόζεται
Μοῖρ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ κρατεῖ.

9 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.5.9

Ὦ Μοῖρα κεδνῶν καὶ κακῶν κυνηγέτι.

10 Εὐριπίδου Πηλεῖ I.5.10

Κλύετ’ ὦ Μοῖραι, Διὸς αἵτε παρὰ
θρόνον ἀγχοτάτω θεῶν ἑζόμεναι.

11 Σοφοκλέους ἐκ Φαίδρας I.5.11

Περιώσι’ ἄφυκτά τε
μήδεα παντοδαπᾶν βουλᾶν ἀδαμαντίναις
ὑφαίνεται κερκίσιν αἶσα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 75-76

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

7 From Bion's Bucolic Poems: On Hyacinthus I.5.7

Speechlessness seized Phoebus then, as he saw your suffering.
He sought every remedy and called upon his skilled art;
he anointed you with ambrosia and nectar, anointed
the wound after chanting spells. But all wounds dealt by fate are incurable.[187]

8 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.5.8

Fate alone is ruled by none among the gods
or among human beings; she herself holds sway.

9 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.5.9

O Fate, huntress of the worthy and the wicked.

10 Euripides, Peleus I.5.10

Hear me, O Fates, who sit beside Zeus's
throne, nearest to him of all the gods.

11 Sophocles, from Phaedra I.5.11

Fate weaves with adamantine shuttles
inescapable designs that surpass
counsels of every kind.[188]

187. Phoebus is Apollo; the poem addresses the wounded Hyacinthus. Its contrast is between a healing god's art and a wound assigned by fate. The last line depends on several corrections recorded in the base edition; these are followed here.

188. The weaving image gives fate a fabric that cannot be undone. The compact construction is taken to mean that Fate's designs exceed every kind of counsel; "adamantine" describes the unyielding shuttles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

12 <Ἀδήλου λυρικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.5.12

Κλωθὼ Λάχεσίς τ’, εὐώλενοι
κοῦραι Νυκτός,
εὐχομένων ἐπακούσατ’ οὐράνιαι χθόνιαί τε δαίμονες·
ὦ πανδείμαντοι, πέμπετ’ ἄμμιν
ῥοδόκολπον Εὐνομίαν, λιπαροθρόνους τ’ ἀδελφάς, Δίκαν
καὶ στεφανηφόρον Εἰράναν·
πόλιν τε τάνδε βαρυφρόνων
λελάθοιτε συντυχιᾶν.

13 Σοφοκλῆς Φαίδρᾳ I.5.13

Ἔζης ἄρ’, οὐδὲ γῆς ἔνερθ’ ᾤχου θανών;
Οὐ γὰρ πρὸ μοίρας ἡ τύχη βιάζεται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 76-77

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

12 <An unidentified lyric poet> I.5.12

Clotho and Lachesis, fair-armed
daughters of Night,
hear those who pray, divine powers of heaven and earth.
O all-dreaded ones, send us
rose-bosomed Good Order and her sisters on shining thrones,
Justice and garland-bearing Peace;
and make this city forget
its grievous encounters with misfortune.[189]

13 Sophocles, Phaedra I.5.13

So you were alive, and had not gone dead beneath the earth?
For fortune cannot force its way ahead of fate.[190]

189. The author is left unidentified in the source. Eunomia, Dikē, and Eirēnē are translated as the personified Good Order, Justice, and Peace. The request is to relieve the city of the burden of affliction; it does not define how that relief is to occur.

190. Wachsmuth retains the Sophoclean heading and interprets the exchange as concerning Theseus's descent to the underworld. The two lines can be read as a question and an answer; the second distinguishes fortune (tychē) from the prior limit set by fate (moira).

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

14 Ἑρμοῦ (α′)

I.5.14a

Ἑπτὰ πολυπλανέες κατ’ Ὀλύμπιον ἀστέρες οὐδὸν
εἱλεῦνται, μετὰ τοῖσι δ’ ἀεὶ περινίσσεται αἰών·
νυκτιφανὴς Μήνη, στυγνὸς Κρόνος, Ἥλιος ἡδύς,
παστοφόρος Παφίη, θρασὺς Ἄρης, εὔπτερος Ἑρμῆς,
καὶ Ζεὺς ἀρχιγένεθλος, ἀφ’ οὗ φύσις ἐβλάστησεν.
Οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ μερόπων ἔλαχον γένος, ἔστι δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν
Μήνη, Ζεύς, Ἄρης, Παφίη, Κρόνος, Ἥλιος, Ἑρμῆς·

14 Ἑρμοῦ (β′)

I.5.14b

τοὔνεκ’ ἀπ’ αἰθερίοιο μεμερίσμεθα πνεύματος ἕλκειν
δάκρυ, γέλωτα, χόλον, γένεσιν, λόγον, ὕπνον, ὄρεξιν.
Δάκρυ μέν ἐστι Κρόνος, Ζεὺς <δ’> ἡ γένεσις, λόγος Ἑρμῆς,
θυμὸς Ἄρης, Μήνη δ’ ἄρ’ ὕπνος, Κυθέρεια δ’ ὄρεξις,
Ἠέλιός τε γέλως· τούτῳ γὰρ ἅπασα δικαίως
καὶ θνητὴ διάνοια γελᾷ καὶ κόσμος ἀπείρων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 77-78

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

14 Hermes (1)

I.5.14a

Seven far-wandering stars revolve across Olympus's threshold,
and with them eternity forever circles:
night-shining Moon, gloomy Cronus, sweet Sun,
bridal-chamber-bearing Paphian, bold Ares, well-winged Hermes,
and Zeus, first begetter, from whom nature sprang.
These same powers received the human race as their lot;
in us are Moon, Zeus, Ares, Paphian, Cronus, Sun, and Hermes.[191]

14 Hermes (2)

I.5.14b

Hence it is allotted to us to draw from the ethereal spirit
tears, laughter, anger, generation, speech, sleep, and desire.
Tears are Cronus; <and> Zeus is generation; speech is Hermes;
anger is Ares; Moon is sleep; Cytherea is desire;
and Sun is laughter: through him, fittingly,
every mortal mind laughs, and the boundless cosmos too.[192]

191. The seven are the Moon, Saturn, Sun, Venus, Mars, Mercury, and Jupiter, named as divine powers. Paphian and, below, Cytherea are names of Aphrodite. Pastophoros literally suggests bearing a bridal chamber or shrine; the English retains the bridal image without silently replacing the printed word with a conjecture.

192. The poem itself pairs the seven powers with human experiences; their order changes between its lists. Logos is "speech" in this poetic correspondence with Hermes. The angle brackets retain the supplied conjunction in the base edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

15 <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (α′) I.5.15a

<Χρύσιππος> μὴ διαφέρειν τοῦ εἱμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον, <τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι κίνησιν ἀΐδιον τῶν ὅλων> κατ’ ἐπιπλοκὴν τῶν μερῶν συνηρτημένην.

Ἡράκλειτος οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένης ἀπεφαίνετο λόγον τὸν διὰ οὐσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα. Αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως καὶ περιόδου μέτρον τεταγμένης. Πάντα δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, τὴν δ’ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκην· γράφει γοῦν· ‘ἔστι γὰρ εἱμαρμένα πάντως …’

15 <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (β′) I.5.15b

Πλάτων λόγον ἀΐδιον τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, καὶ νόμον ἀΐδιον τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως.

Ποσειδώνιος τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην.

Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως δύναμιν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν.

Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωικὸς θεὸν ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν εἱμαρμένην.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

15 <Aëtius, Opinions> (1)

I.5.15a

<Chrysippus> holds that what is compelled does not differ from what is fated, <and that fate is an everlasting movement of the whole>, connected through the interweaving of its parts.[193]

Heraclitus declared that the substance of fate is the rational principle that pervades the substance of the universe. This substance is the ethereal body, the seed of the universe's coming-to-be and the measure of its ordered cycle. Everything happens according to fate, and fate is also necessity. Thus he writes: "For things are altogether fated …"[194]

15 <Aëtius, Opinions> (2)

I.5.15b

Plato holds that the substance of fate is an everlasting rational principle and an everlasting law of the nature of the universe.

Posidonius places fate third, counting from Zeus: Zeus is first, nature second, and fate third.

Zeno the Stoic, in On Nature, calls it a power that moves matter in the same way and manner; it makes no difference to call this power providence or nature.

Antipater the Stoic declared that fate is God.[195]

193. The author-name and the longer clause are supplied in the base edition. Wachsmuth's apparatus explains that Diels restored them using parallel testimony. The brackets keep their reconstructed status visible.

194. This is a report about Heraclitus within the collection of opinions identified as Aëtius I.27-28. The quoted words are incomplete in the printed source. "Rational principle" renders logos without assuming that every doctrine in the report is a direct quotation from Heraclitus.

195. The repeated subject, fate, is often left implicit in the Greek. These brief reports distinguish a ranked sequence (Posidonius), interchangeable names (Zeno), and identification with God (Antipater); the English does not turn them into one statement.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

15 <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (γ′) I.5.15c

Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ κόσμου, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ὅρων καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων· Εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος, καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Μεταλαμβάνει δ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην, προστιθεὶς καὶ ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τασσομένας καθ’ ἑτέρας καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπιβολάς.

15 <Ἀετίου Δόξαι> (δ′) I.5.15d

Μοίρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ, Κλωθὼ καὶ Λάχεσιν καὶ Ἄτροπον. Λάχεσιν μέν, ὅτι ὃν κλῆρον λελόγχασιν ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἀπονέμεται· Ἄτροπον δέ, ὅτι ἀμετάτρεπτος καὶ ἀμετάβλητός ἐστιν ὁ καθ’ ἕκαστα διορισμὸς ἐξ ἀϊδίων χρόνων· Κλωθὼ δέ, ὅτι ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην διανέμησις καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα τοῖς κλωθομένοις παραπλησίως διεξέρχεται, κατὰ τὴν ἐτυμολογικὴν ἐξήγησιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἅμα καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων συμπαρισταμένων εὐχρήστως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

15 <Aëtius, Opinions> (3)

I.5.15c

Chrysippus holds that the substance of fate is a power of pneuma that governs the universe in order. He says this in the second book of On the Cosmos. In the second book of On Definitions, in his writings On Fate, and here and there in other works, he states it in various ways: fate is the rational principle of the cosmos, or the rational principle of what is governed by providence within the cosmos, or the rational principle according to which past events have happened, present events happen, and future events will happen.[196]

In place of "rational principle" he uses "truth," "cause," "nature," and "necessity," adding other names too, as terms applied to the same substance under different aspects.

15 <Aëtius, Opinions> (4)

I.5.15d

Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos are called Moirai, "Fates," from the apportionment made in accordance with them. Lachesis is so named because the lot allotted to each is assigned according to justice. Atropos is so named because the determination of each particular thing, established from everlasting ages, is unalterable and unchangeable. Clotho is so named because distribution according to fate, and the things that come to be, proceed in a manner like things being spun. Through this etymological explanation, the names and the realities are helpfully presented together.[197]

196. Pneuma literally means breath or a breath-like medium. The Greek describes fate as a dynamis pneumatikē, a power of pneuma; translating it simply as a "spiritual power" could wrongly suggest something expressly incorporeal. Logos is consistently "rational principle" within this report.

197. The explanations connect Moirai with apportioning, Lachesis with receiving a lot, Atropos with what cannot be turned, and Clotho with spinning. They are part of the ancient argument about fate, not independent demonstrations that these names prove the doctrine.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

16 Περὶ τῆς ὅλης οἰκονομίας· Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἀμοῦν I.5.16

Καὶ ἡ μὲν διακρατοῦσα τὸν ὅλον κόσμον πρόνοιά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ συνέχουσα καὶ περιέχουσα ἀνάγκη ἐστίν, εἱμαρμένη δὲ ἄγει καὶ περιάγει πάντα καταναγκάζουσα (φύσις γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἀναγκάζειν), αἰτία γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς βίου. Ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος πρῶτος ἔχει τὴν πρόνοιαν (πρῶτος γὰρ αὐτῆς τυγχάνει) …

Ἡ δὲ πρόνοια ἐξήπλωται ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, διότι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὸν στρέφονται καὶ κινοῦνται, ἀκάματον καὶ ἄπαυστον κίνησιν ἔχοντες· εἱμαρμένη δὲ διότι καὶ ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρόνοια προνοεῖ, εἱμαρμένη δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων διαθέσεως. Οὗτος νόμος ἄφυκτος, καθ’ ὃν πάντα τέτακται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 79-80

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

16 On the governance of the whole: Hermes, from the writings to Amoun

I.5.16

The power that sustains the whole cosmos is providence; the power that holds it together and encompasses it is necessity. Fate leads and carries everything around by compulsion (for its nature is to compel) and is the cause of life's coming-to-be and passing away. The cosmos, then, has providence first, for it is the first to receive it …[198]

Providence extends throughout heaven, because gods too revolve and move about it, their movement tireless and unceasing; and fate, because necessity too. Providence exercises foresight, while fate is the cause of the arrangement of the stars. This is an inescapable law according to which everything is ordered.[199]

198. The heading calls the addressee Amoun; Wachsmuth connects this name with Ammon elsewhere. The dots represent the gap marked by asterisks in the base edition. Its apparatus treats the following paragraph as the beginning of a new excerpt, although it remains under number 16.

199. "And fate, because necessity too" preserves an incomplete clause in the printed Greek. The apparatus proposes repairs and further gaps; none is silently substituted here. The relationships among the three powers are therefore less fully stated than the preceding paragraph's clear definitions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

17 Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Μακεδόνιον ἐπιστολῆς (α′) I.5.17a

Πάντα μὲν τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἑνί ἐστιν ὄντα, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον ὂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀρχῆς παράγεται, πολὺ δὲ διαφερόντως τὰ ὅλα αἴτια τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν παραδέχεται καὶ κατὰ μίαν συμπλοκὴν συνέχεται καὶ συναναφέρεται τῇ τῶν πολλῶν ἀρχῇ προϋπάρχοντα. Κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰτίων, πολυειδῶν ὄντων καὶ πολυμερεστάτων, ἠρτημένων τε ἀπὸ πλειόνων ἀρχῶν, ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὅλης αἰτίας τὸ πλῆθος ἐκκρέμαται, κατὰ μίαν δὲ σύνδεσιν πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλέκεται καὶ εἰς ἓν ἀνήκει τὸ περιεκτικώτατον τῆς αἰτίας κράτος ὁ σύνδεσμος τῶν πλειόνων αἰτίων.

17 Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Μακεδόνιον ἐπιστολῆς (β′) I.5.17b

Οὗτος τοίνυν εἷς εἱρμὸς <οὐ> συμπεφορημένος ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους, οὐδ’ ἐπισυνισταμένην ἀπὸ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ποιεῖται τὴν ἕνωσιν, οὐδὲ διαπεφόρηται ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα· κατὰ δὲ τὴν προηγουμένην καὶ προτεταγμένην αὐτῶν τῶν αἰτίων μίαν συμπλοκὴν ἐπιτελεῖ πάντα καὶ συνδεῖ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν μονοειδῶς ἀνάγει. Μίαν οὖν τάξιν, πάσας τάξεις ὁμοῦ περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀφοριστέον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 80-81

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

17 From Iamblichus's letter to Macedonius (1) I.5.17a

All beings have their being through the One; for even the first being itself is brought forth from the One at the outset. In a far more eminent way, the universal causes receive through the One their capacity to act, are held together in a single interweaving, and are referred back together to the principle of the many, in which they preexist.[200]

Accordingly, the causes concerned with nature, though of many kinds, divided into very many parts, and dependent on several principles, depend in their multiplicity on one universal cause. Through one connection all are interwoven with one another, and the bond of the many causes reaches back to the single, all-encompassing authority of the cause.

17 From Iamblichus's letter to Macedonius (2) I.5.17b

This single chain, then, is <not> assembled from the multiplicity. It does not produce a unity that arises subsequently from interweaving, nor is it dispersed among particulars. Rather, in accordance with the single interweaving of the causes themselves that precedes and stands before them, it brings everything to completion, binds everything together within itself, and refers everything back to itself in a single form.

Fate, therefore, must be defined as one order that embraces all orders together within itself.[201]

200. "The One" names the principle on which even the first being depends. The passage begins from that prior unity and uses it to explain how the many causes of natural events can form one order. "Universal causes" renders ta hola aitia, causes considered as wholes.

201. Wachsmuth supplies the crucial "not," crediting Usener. The argument makes unity prior to the many causes; it is not an aggregate created after they have been brought together. Eirmos, "chain," suggests their connected sequence.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 80-81

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

18 Ἐκ τῆς Ἰαμβλίχου πρὸς Σώπατρον ἐπιστολῆς I.5.18

Τῆς δ’ εἱμαρμένης ἡ οὐσία σύμπασά ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει· φύσιν δὲ λέγω τὴν ἀχώριστον αἰτίαν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀχωρίστως περιέχουσαν τὰς ὅλας αἰτίας τῆς γενέσεως, ὅσα χωριστῶς αἱ κρείττονες οὐσίαι καὶ διακοσμήσεις συνειλήφασιν ἐν ἑαυταῖς. Ζωή τε οὖν σωματοειδὴς καὶ λόγος γενεσιουργός, τά τε ἔνυλα εἴδη καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη, ἥ τε συντεθειμένη γένεσις ἀπὸ τούτων, κίνησίς τε ἡ τὰ πάντα μεταβάλλουσα καὶ φύσις ἡ τεταγμένως διοικοῦσα τὰ γιγνόμενα, ἀρχαί τε αἱ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τέλη καὶ ποιήσεις, καὶ αἱ τούτων συνδέσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τε καὶ αἱ τοῦ τέλους διέξοδοι συμπληροῦσι τὴν εἱμαρμένην.

19 Πλουτάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ ἡ τῶν μελλόντων πρόγνωσις ὠφέλιμος I.5.19

Τὸ γὰρ εἱμαρμένον ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαράβατον, “χὤπερ μόνον ὀφρύσι νεύσῃ, | καρτερὰ τούτῳ κέκλωστ’ ἀνάγκα” καὶ πεπρωμένη. Διὰ τοῦτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ Ἀδράστειαν καλοῦσιν, ὅτι πέρας ταῖς αἰτίαις ἠναγκασμένον ἐπιτίθησιν, ἀνέκφευκτος οὖσα καὶ ἀναπόδραστος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

18 From Iamblichus's letter to Sopater I.5.18

The whole substance of fate is in nature. By nature I mean the inseparable cause of the cosmos, which inseparably contains the universal causes of coming-to-be: all that the higher substances and ordered structures have embraced separately within themselves.[202]

Thus life in bodily form and the rational principle that produces coming-to-be; forms in matter and matter itself; the coming-to-be compounded from these; movement that changes everything and nature that governs events in order; the principles of nature, its ends, and its productive activities; their connections with one another from the beginning and the processes by which the end is reached: all these together constitute fate.

19 Plutarch, from Whether Foreknowledge of the Future Is Beneficial I.5.19

For what is fated is unalterable and cannot be transgressed: "And whatever he merely nods with his brows, for that strong necessity has been spun"; and so has destiny. For this reason they also call fate Adrasteia, because it imposes a necessary outcome upon causes, being inescapable and impossible to flee.[203]

202. "Inseparable" describes nature as a cause present within the cosmos, in contrast to the higher causes considered separately from it. The long enumeration gives fate the whole connected process of natural generation, change, and completion. "Ends" means goals or completions, not merely points at which activity stops.

203. The apparatus identifies an embedded lyric quotation; its divine subject is unnamed here. Keklōstai is passive: necessity "has been spun," rather than acting as the spinner. Adrasteia is explained as what cannot be escaped. The vertical stroke in the Greek marks the verse division.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

20 Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἄμμωνα I.5.20

Πάντα δὲ γίνεται φύσει καὶ εἱμαρμένῃ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τόπος ἔρημος προνοίας. Πρόνοια δέ ἐστιν αὐτοτελὴς λόγος τοῦ ἐπουρανίου θεοῦ. Δύο δὲ τούτου αὐτοφυεῖς δυνάμεις, ἀνάγκη καὶ εἱμαρμένη. Ἡ δὲ εἱμαρμένη ὑπηρετεῖ προνοίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, τῇ δὲ εἱμαρμένῃ ὑπηρετοῦσιν οἱ ἀστέρες. Οὔτε γὰρ εἱμαρμένην φυγεῖν τις δύναται, οὔτε φυλάξαι ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων δεινότητος. Ὅπλον γὰρ εἱμαρμένης οἱ ἀστέρες, κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην πάντα ἀποτελοῦσι τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

21 Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας I.5.21

Ἐπειδὴ δ’ οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ᾑρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ’ ἑκάστῳ, ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθὼ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἣν λαχὼν εἵλετο μοῖραν. ταύτης δ’ ἐφαψάμενον αὖθις ἐπὶ <τὴν> τῆς Ἀτρόπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτεὶ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον· καὶ δι’ ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

20 Hermes, from the writings to Ammon I.5.20

Everything happens by nature and fate, and no place is devoid of providence. Providence is the self-complete rational principle of the heavenly God. Necessity and fate are two powers native to him. Fate serves providence and necessity, and the stars serve fate. No one can escape fate or protect himself from the formidable power of the stars. For the stars are fate's instrument: in accordance with it, they bring everything to fulfillment in nature and for human beings.[204]

21 Plato, Republic I.5.21

When all the souls had chosen their lives, they approached Lachesis in the order in which they had drawn lots. She sent with each the divine spirit it had chosen, to guard its life and bring its choices to fulfillment.[205] This spirit first led the soul to Clotho, beneath her hand and the turning whirl of the spindle, confirming the lot the soul had chosen when its turn came. After contact with Clotho, the spirit led the soul on to <the> spinning of Atropos, making what had been spun irreversible. From there the soul went without turning back beneath the throne of Necessity. When it had passed through and the others had also passed through, all the souls traveled to the plain of Forgetfulness.[206]

204. "Self-complete" renders autotelēs, complete in itself. "Native to him" takes toutou to refer to the heavenly God, though the rational principle is also grammatically possible. Hoplon, "instrument," can also mean weapon; the following sentence specifies the stars' work as executing fate.

205. Republic 10.620d-621a, from the closing narrative about the souls' choice of lives. The order is significant: the souls choose, and the divine spirits then accompany them to confirm and fulfill those choices.

206. Masculine forms in the Greek can refer to the person whose soul is described, as well as to the guiding daimōn. The closing journey to Forgetfulness is assigned here to the soul. Spinning makes the chosen life irreversible. Lēthē means "Forgetfulness."

BOOK I CHAPTER 5

22 Ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῆς (α′) I.5.22a

Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγεσθαι πλὴν τοῦτο· οἱονεὶ ἀνίκητον οὖσαν, εἱμαρμένην δὲ διὰ τὸ εἴρεσθαί τε καὶ χωρεῖν ἀκωλύτως· πεπρωμένην δὲ διὰ τὸ πεπερατῶσθαι πάντα καὶ μηθὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄπειρον εἶναι· καὶ μοῖραν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεμερίσθαι, νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστῳ διανεμήσεως, ἀδράστειαν δὲ ἀναπόδραστον αἰτίαν οὖσαν κατὰ φύσιν, αἶσαν δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

22 From Aristotle's letter to Alexander (1) I.5.22a

I think that necessity too names nothing other than this: as though it were "unconquerable." It is called fate because things are linked together and proceed unhindered; destiny because everything has been bounded and nothing among existing things is unbounded; moira because things have been apportioned; nemesis from the distribution to each; adrasteia because it is by nature an inescapable cause; and aisa because it always exists.[207]

207. The heading attributes this to Aristotle's letter to Alexander; the source identifies the passage as On the Cosmos, chapter 7, beginning at 401b8. The explanation plays on similarities between Greek words: anankē/anikētos, heimarmenē/eiresthai, peprōmenē/peperatōsthai, moira/memeristhai, nemesis/dianemēsis, adrasteia/anapodrastos, and aisa/aei ousa. These are the author's explanatory wordplays, not equivalent derivations of the English terms. "This" continues a discussion of God outside the excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

22 Ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῆς (β′) I.5.22b

Τά τε περὶ τὰς μοίρας καὶ τὸν ἄτρακτον εἰς ταὐτά πως νεύει· τρεῖς μὲν αἱ μοῖραι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους μεμερισμέναι· νῆμα δὲ ἀτράκτου τὸ μὲν ἐξειργασμένον ἤδη, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, τὸ δὲ περιστρεφόμενον. τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μία τῶν μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἄτρεπτά ἐστι· κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις, εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λῆξις· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὼς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσα καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα, ὅπερ αἰνίττεται καὶ ὁ μῦθος. Πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν ὁ θεός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων· “Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει, κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 5

22 From Aristotle's letter to Alexander (2)

I.5.22b

The account of the Fates and the spindle also points in some way to these same things. The three Fates are allotted to the divisions of time. Of the spindle's thread, some is already finished, some is still to come, and some is being turned. One of the Fates, Atropos, is assigned to what has happened, because everything past is unalterable. Lachesis is assigned to the future, because the natural allotment awaits all things. Clotho is assigned to the present, completing and spinning for each what belongs to it. This is what the myth too hints at.[208]

All these are nothing other than God, as the noble Plato also says: "God, as the ancient saying has it, holding the beginning, the end, and the middle of existing things, accomplishes his course straight, moving around according to nature."[209]

208. This explanation distributes the three Fates across past, future, and present. Compare the different sequence of their activities in the preceding excerpt from Plato. Here a mythical image is read as a description of temporal order.

209. Laws 4.715e, quoted also at the beginning of I.3.55a. The wording here is translated as it stands in this excerpt, including the tension between proceeding straight and moving around. The identification of all the named powers with God is the conclusion of the present author's argument.

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

Κεφάλαιον Ϛ′ I.6.heading

Περὶ τύχης ἢ ταὐτομάτου.

1a Μενάνδρου Ὑποβολιμαίῳ I.6.1a

Παύσασθε νοῦν λέγοντες, οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον
ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τύχης
(εἴτ’ ἔστι τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον, εἴτε νοῦς)
τοῦτ’ ἐστι τὸ κυβερνῶν <ἅπαντα> καὶ στρέφον
καὶ σῷζον· ἡ πρόνοια δ’ ἡ θνητὴ καπνὸς
καὶ φλήναφος. πείσθητε, κοὐ μέμψεσθέ με·
πάνθ’ ὅσα ποιοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν,
τύχη ’στίν, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.

1b <Ἀδήλου κωμικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.1b

Τύχη κυβερνᾷ πάντα, ταύτην καὶ φρένας
δεῖ καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ θεὸν καλεῖν μόνην,
εἰ μή τις ἄλλως ὀνόμασιν χαίρει κενοῖς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

Chapter 6: Fortune and spontaneous occurrence

I.6.heading

On fortune or spontaneous occurrence.[210]

1a Menander, The Supposititious Child

I.6.1a

Stop talking of intelligence: human intelligence
counts for nothing. The power of Fortune
(whether it is a divine spirit or mind)
is what steers <everything>, turns it, and preserves it;
mortal foresight is smoke
and nonsense. Believe me, and you will not blame me:
whatever we make or say or do
is Fortune's work; our names are merely written on it.[211]

1b <An unidentified comic poet>

I.6.1b

Fortune steers everything. It alone
we should call intelligence, providence, and God,
unless one simply delights in empty names.[212]

210. Tychē can mean a person's fortune, personified Fortune, or chance as a cause. To automaton means what happens of itself, without an intention directed at that outcome. The translation uses "spontaneous occurrence" in the technical discussions and "what happens of itself" in less formal passages. Excerpt 17a explicitly distinguishes the two terms.

211. The title Hypobolimaios refers to a child passed off as someone else's. Pronoia here is mortal foresight, contrasted with Fortune's governing power. The final image treats people as the names attached to deeds whose real author is Fortune; it is a comic speaker's claim, not necessarily Menander's own doctrine.

212. Wachsmuth treats these lines as a separate excerpt by an unidentified comic poet. His apparatus rejects their earlier attachment to Menander's Hypobolimaios without sufficient evidence. The supplied Latin descriptive heading is rendered in Greek and English, as in the following anonymous excerpts.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

2 <Ἀδήλου κωμικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.2

Ἄπανθ’ ὁρῶ
ἅμα τῇ τύχῃ ῥέοντα μεταπίπτοντά τε.

3 <Ἀρχιλόχου> I.6.3

Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Περίκλεες, ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν.

4 <Ἀδήλου κωμικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.4

Ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εὔστοχόν τι βουλευτήριον
ταὐτόματον.

5 <Ἀδήλου κωμικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.5

Ἐπηρεαστικόν γέ τι
ταὐτόματόν ἐστι τῷ βίῳ.

6 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.6

Ἡ τὰ θνητῶν καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντ’ ἐπισκοποῦσ’ <ἀεὶ>
καὶ νέμουσ’ ἡμῶν ἑκάστῳ τὴν κατ’ ἀξίαν τύχη
[μερίδα].

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

2 <An unidentified comic poet> I.6.2

I see everything
flowing and changing together with fortune.

3 <Archilochus> I.6.3

Fortune and fate, Pericles, give a man everything.[213]

4 <An unidentified comic poet> I.6.4

Yet what happens of itself
is a kind of council that hits the mark.[214]

5 <An unidentified comic poet> I.6.5

What happens of itself
is certainly a spiteful thing in life.

6 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.6.6

Fortune, who <always> watches over all mortal and divine affairs,
and assigns to each of us the [portion]
that accords with our worth.[215]

213. The name Archilochus is supplied in the base edition. Pericles is the person addressed within the poem; the line does not identify him further.

214. Bouleutērion is a council chamber, used here as an image for deliberation; eustochon means successful in aiming. The joke gives deliberative skill to what happens without deliberation.

215. The excerpt is a description without a main verb. Wachsmuth prints merida, “portion,” in brackets as a suspected explanatory gloss; the English keeps it bracketed. The supplied “always” belongs to the editor’s reconstruction.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

7 Χαιρήμονος ἐξ Ἀχιλλέως Θερσιτοκτόνου I.6.7

Τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ’, οὐκ εὐβουλία.

8 Φιλήμονος I.6.8

Ἄλλος κατ’ ἄλλην δαιμονίζεται τύχην.

9 Μενάνδρου Κνιδίᾳ I.6.9

Ταὐτόματόν ἐστιν ὡς ἔοικέ που θεός,
σῴζει τε πολλὰ τῶν ἀοράτων πραγμάτων.

10 Μενάνδρου Ὑποβολιμαίῳ I.6.10

Οὐ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν αἰτίαν
κρίνων ἂν ὀρθῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τίς μοι δοκεῖ,
ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ ταὐτόματον ἔνθα χρήσιμον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

7 Chaeremon, from Achilles the Slayer of Thersites I.6.7

Mortal affairs are fortune's doing, not sound deliberation.

8 Philemon I.6.8

Each person is driven by a different fortune.[216]

9 Menander, The Woman of Cnidus I.6.9

What happens of itself is, it seems, a god,
and brings many unforeseen affairs safely through.[217]

10 Menander, The Suppositious Child I.6.10

I think one would be right to judge
that foresight is not the cause of every good:
there are occasions when what happens of itself is useful.[218]

216. Daimonizetai suggests being possessed or driven by a divine power. The English preserves the force of being acted upon without importing a specific account of possession.

217. "Unforeseen" interprets aorata, literally "unseen," in the context of events resolved without foresight. Wachsmuth prints Usener's correction of a damaged reading, supported by a parallel source.

218. This more qualified saying grants foresight a role while denying that it accounts for every beneficial result. The English rearranges the opening construction to make its scope clear: "not" qualifies "every good."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

11 Φιλήμονος Ἀποκαρτεροῦντι I.6.11

Νῦν δ’ οἶδ’ ἀκριβῶς τὴν τύχην, ὡς οὐ μία,
οὐδ’ ἔστι πρῴην, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων
ἡμῶν, ὅταν γινώμεθ’, εὐθὺς χἠ τύχη
προσγίνεθ’ ἡμῖν συγγενὴς τῷ σώματι·
κοὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον παρ’ ἑτέρου λαβεῖν τύχην.

12 <Εὐριπίδου> I.6.12

Τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα καὶ φρονεῖν νομίζομεν.

13 <Ἀδήλου λυρικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.6.13

Τύχα μερόπων ἀρχὰ
καὶ τέρμα, τὺ καὶ σοφίας θακεῖς ἕδρας
καὶ τιμὰν βροτέοις ἐπέθηκας ἔργοις·
καὶ τὸ καλὸν πλέον ἢ κακὸν ἐκ σέθεν,
ἅ τε χάρις λάμπει περὶ σὰν πτέρυγα χρυσέαν·
καὶ τὸ τεᾷ πλάστιγγι δοθὲν μακαριστότατον τελέθει.
τὺ δ’ ἀμαχανίας πόρον εἶδες ἐν ἄλγεσιν,
καὶ λαμπρὸν φάος ἄγαγες ἐν σκότῳ, προφερεστάτα θεῶν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

11 Philemon, The Man Who Starves Himself

I.6.11

Now I know precisely what fortune is: it is not one,
nor does it exist beforehand. Rather, with our bodies,
as soon as we are born, fortune too
comes to us, born together with the body;
one person cannot take another person's fortune.[219]

12 <Euripides>

I.6.12

We think the fortunate man is wise as well.[220]

13 <An unidentified lyric poet>

I.6.13

Fortune, beginning and end of humankind,
you sit upon wisdom's seats
and have set honor upon mortal works.
From you comes more good than evil,
and grace shines about your golden wing;
what is given in your balance becomes most blessed.
Amid pain you saw a way out of helplessness
and brought bright light into darkness, foremost of the gods.[221]

219. The passage gives each person a fortune that begins with bodily life. Prōiēn normally means "recently" or "the day before yesterday"; "beforehand" is a contextual reading here. Wachsmuth prints Bentley's conjecture for manuscript prōtē, "first." The line remains uncertain.

220. The supplied attribution is drawn by Wachsmuth from the scholia on Pindar, Nemean 1.13. The maxim distinguishes the appearance of wisdom that success confers from proof that wisdom caused it.

221. The source leaves this lyric poet unidentified, rejecting attempts to attach displaced author-headings to the hymn. Its favorable picture of Fortune belongs beside, rather than being reconciled with, the hostile or skeptical sayings elsewhere in the chapter. The text of several lines is reconstructed in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

14a Μενάνδρου Κεκρυφάλῳ I.6.14a

Ταὐτόματον ἡμῖν ἀφανὲς ὂν συλλαμβάνει.

14b <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Τιτθῇ> I.6.14b

Αὐτόματα γὰρ τὰ πράγματ’ ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον
ῥεῖ κἂν καθεύδῃς, ἢ πάλιν τοὐναντίον.

15 Χαιρήμονος I.6.15

Ἅπαντα νικᾷ καὶ μεταστρέφει τύχη,
οὐδεὶς δὲ νικᾷ μὴ θελούσης τῆς τύχης.

16 Αἰσχύλου I.6.16

Πάντων τύραννος ἡ τύχη ’στὶ τῶν θεῶν,
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὀνόματα ταῦτα πρόσκειται μάτην,
μόνη διοικεῖν γοῦν ἅπαντα βούλεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

14a Menander, The Hairnet I.6.14a

What happens of itself helps us, though it is unseen.

14b <The same author, The Nurse> I.6.14b

Affairs flow of themselves toward what benefits you,
even while you sleep, or again toward its opposite.[222]

15 Chaeremon I.6.15

Fortune conquers everything and turns it around;
no one wins unless Fortune wills it.

16 Aeschylus I.6.16

Fortune is tyrant over all the gods;
these other names are attached in vain,
for she alone intends to govern everything.[223]

222. Wachsmuth supplies the author and play from a parallel excerpt elsewhere in Stobaeus. The second line qualifies the first: unaided events can be favorable or unfavorable.

223. The Aeschylean heading is retained as Wachsmuth assigns it, though his reference also records the fragment among anonymous tragic lines. The passage makes a claim about Fortune's supremacy, not an editorial assertion about divine government.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17a <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων>

I.6.17a.1

Ἀριστοτέλης διαφέρειν τῆς τύχης τὸ αὐτόματον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις πάντως· τὸ δ’ αὐτόματον οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἔξω πράξεως· καὶ τὴν μὲν τύχην τῶν λογικῶν, τὸ δ’ αὐτόματον καὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων· καὶ τὴν μὲν τύχην προαιρέσεως συμβαίνειν, τὸ δ’ αὐτόματον ἀπροαιρέτως· καὶ τὴν μὲν τινος ὑπάρχοντος γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀλόγως, μηδενὸς ἔξω βουληθέντος.

17a <Ἀετίου>· συνέχεια

I.6.17a.2

Πλάτων τὴν τύχην ἀπεφαίνετο αἰτίαν ἐν ἀπροαιρέτοις κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ παρακολούθημα καὶ σύμπτωμα, καὶ προαιρέσεως κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πρόθεσιν ἐναλλακτικὴν σχέσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Aristotle

I.6.17a.1

Aristotle says that spontaneous occurrence differs from chance. What happens by chance belongs also to spontaneous occurrence and lies entirely within the sphere of action; spontaneous occurrence, however, is not necessarily by chance, since it also takes place outside action. Chance belongs to rational beings, whereas spontaneous occurrence belongs to rational beings, irrational beings, and inanimate things alike. Chance accompanies deliberate choice, whereas spontaneous occurrence takes place without choice. The former occurs when something is already in place; the latter without a rational plan, with nothing outside having willed it.[224]

17a <Aëtius>, continued: Plato

I.6.17a.2

Plato declared chance to be an incidental cause in things not chosen, an accompaniment and a coincidence, and an altered relation of choice with respect to the intention directed toward the end.[225]

224. The report treats chance as a narrower category within spontaneous occurrence. Chance accompanies a chosen action without making the accidental result itself an intended result. The final contrast is compressed: the Greek does not specify what is “already in place.” The apparatus compares Aristotle, Physics II.6.

225. The syntax of this report is uncertain. The translation follows Wachsmuth’s printed wording; his apparatus records a parallel text with “a coincidence of nature or choice.” The brief report should not be treated as a verbatim quotation from Plato.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 87

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17a <Ἀετίου>· συνέχεια

I.6.17a.3

Ἀριστοτέλης, αἰτίαν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἕνεκά τινος γινομένοις ἄστατον καὶ ἄδηλον. Καὶ ὑποθέσεις μὲν δύο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐνυπάρχειν, τάξιν τε καὶ ἀταξίαν, αἰτίας δὲ τέτταρας ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις, καθ’ ἃς ἅπαντα συνίσταται, νοῦν, φύσιν, ἀνάγκην, τύχην· καὶ τούτων διπλῆν ἑκάστην, τὴν μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασι, τὴν δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις· τελεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ μὲν πάντως, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. Τὴν δ’ εἱμαρμένην οὐκ αἰτίαν μέν, τρόπον δέ τινα αἰτίας, συμβεβηκότα πως τοῖς τῆς ἀνάγκης τεταγμένοις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 87-88

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17a <Aëtius>, continued: Aristotle

I.6.17a.3

Aristotle calls chance an incidental cause, unstable and obscure, in events arising from an impulse for the sake of some end. Two underlying conditions belong to the principles, order and disorder; and there are four causes in the universe, through which everything is constituted: intellect, nature, necessity, and chance.[226] Each of these is twofold, one form operating in human affairs and the other in other things. Some things come about invariably, others for the most part, and others differently at different times. Fate is not a cause, but a certain mode of causation, somehow incidental to the ordered operations of necessity.[227]

226. The four causes listed in this report are intellect, nature, necessity, and chance. This is not the familiar Aristotelian classification into material, formal, efficient, and final causes.

227. The last sentence's relation to the preceding account is difficult; the apparatus notes a disturbance at the end. "Mode of causation" renders tropos aitias, distinguishing a manner in which a cause operates from a further independent cause.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 87-88

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17b Πλάτωνος Νόμων δ′ I.6.17b.1

Ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσιν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν. ἢ γὰρ πόλεμός τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἢ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολὺν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίᾳ.

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προϊδών τις ἄρξειεν ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν δή, θνητὸν μὲν μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδέν, τύχας δ’ εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπινα πράγματα· τὸ δ’ ἔστι περὶ ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν πάντα ταῦτ’ εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως αὖ καὶ τόδε ἔστιν εὖ λέγοντα λέγειν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

17b Πλάτωνος· συνέχεια I.6.17b.2

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνᾷ ξύμπαντα. Ἡμερώτερον μὲν τρίτον ξυγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην· καιρῷ γὰρ χειμῶνος συλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μή, μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγ’ ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς;

Οὕτως.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἔχοι λόγον;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17b Plato, Laws IV (709a)

I.6.17b.1

No human being ever legislates anything; chances and misfortunes of every sort, falling upon us in every way, legislate everything for us. A war may force its way in, overthrow constitutions, and change laws; or the distress of severe poverty may do so. Diseases too compel many innovations, when plagues strike and when unfavorable seasons often persist over many years.

Someone who foresaw all this might begin by saying just what I said a moment ago: no mortal legislates anything, and practically all human affairs are matters of chance. One could say all this about seafaring, navigation, medicine, and generalship, and seem to be speaking well. Yet, in these very same matters, it is also possible to say the following and speak well.[228]

17b Plato, continued

I.6.17b.2

"What is that?"

"That God steers all things and, together with God, fortune and opportunity steer all human affairs. We should take a gentler view and concede that skill must follow these as a third factor. For, in the critical moment of a storm, I would reckon the assistance of navigational skill, as against its absence, a great advantage. Would you not?"[229]

"Yes."

"Then would not the same account hold in the other cases too?"

228. This argument first stresses how circumstances constrain human planning. The dialogue then qualifies it by making room for skilled action. Its two stages should be read together; the opening claim is not the excerpt's final conclusion.

229. Kairos is the timely or critical occasion; technē is practiced expertise. The storm example gives skill a real role even where the sailor does not control the conditions. The Greek's singular "steers" links the divine government and the accompanying factors in one construction.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17c <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων> I.6.17c

Θεόφραστος προσδιαρθροῖ ταῖς αἰτίαις τὴν κατὰ προαίρεσιν· φέρεται δέ πως εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν· ἐν ᾗ τόπον τεττάρων αἰτιῶν ποικίλων, προαιρέσεως <φύσεως> τύχης καὶ ἀνάγκης.

Ἐπίκουρος κατ' ἀνάγκην, κατὰ προαίρεσιν, κατὰ τύχην.

18 Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου Πυθαγορικῶν ἀποφάσεων I.6.18.1

Περὶ δὲ τύχης τάδ' ἔφασκον· εἶναι μέν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον μέρος αὐτῆς, γενέσθαι γὰρ ἐπίπνοιάν τινα παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, καὶ εἶναι φανερῶς κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν εὐτυχεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ἀτυχεῖς. καταφανέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτο <τῷ> τοὺς μὲν ἀπροβούλως καὶ εἰκῇ τι πράττοντας πολλάκις κατατυγχάνειν, τοὺς δὲ προβουλευομένους καὶ προνοουμένους ὀρθῶς τι πράττειν ἀποτυγχάνειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

17c <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.6.17c

Theophrastus further distinguishes, among the causes, the cause that operates through choice. He tends in some way toward the view that each thing's nature is its fate; within it there is room for four different causes: choice, <nature>, chance, and necessity.[230]

Epicurus: according to necessity, according to choice, according to chance.[231]

18 Aristoxenus, Pythagorean Statements

I.6.18.1

On fortune they used to say the following. There is also a certain divine element in it, since an influence from the divine comes upon some people, for better or for worse; and it is plainly on this very account that some are fortunate and others unfortunate. This is most evident <from the fact that> people acting without forethought and at random often succeed, while those who deliberate beforehand and take thought to act correctly fail.[232]

230. The supplied "nature" completes the list of four. The report associates fate with each thing's own nature while still allowing different kinds of cause a place within it.

231. This is an abbreviated list, without an expressed subject or verb. The translation preserves that form instead of supplying a complete doctrinal statement.

232. The heading presents Aristoxenus's report of Pythagorean sayings. "Influence" renders epipnoia, literally a breathing upon someone. The argument appeals to success and failure that diverge from the care taken in planning.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

18 Ἀριστοξένου· συνέχεια

I.6.18.2

Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕτερον τύχης εἶδος, καθ’ ὃ οἱ μὲν εὐφυεῖς καὶ εὔστοχοι, οἱ δὲ ἀφυεῖς τε καὶ ἐναντίαν ἔχοντες φύσιν βλάστοιεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐθυβολοῖεν ἐφ’ ὅ τι ἂν ἐπιβάλωνται, οἱ δὲ ἀποπίπτοιεν τοῦ σκοποῦ, μηδέποτε τῆς διανοίας αὐτῶν εὐστόχως φερομένης, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ταρασσομένης· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν σύμφυτον εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπείσακτον.

19 Εὐρύσω περὶ τύχας

I.6.19.1

Δοκεῖ δέ μοι τύχα καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τᾶς τύχας γινόμενον πᾶν οὐχ ὡς ὑπό τινος αἰτίας ἀφωρισμένας καὶ ὡς ὑποκειμένας γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπισυμβαῖνον καὶ ἐπισυνιστάμενον ἀτέραις τισὶν αἰτίαις. Ἃ τύχα ὧν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχας γινόμενον οὔθ’ ὡς φύσις ἐντὶ ὑπὸ φύσιός τε γινόμενον, οὔθ’ ὡς τέχνα καὶ φρόνασίς τις ἀνθρωπίνα καὶ θεία, ἀλλὰ ἐπισυμβαῖνον παραλόγως τε καὶ ἀπροαισθήτως τούτοις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

18 Aristoxenus, continued

I.6.18.2

There is also another kind of fortune, according to which some people grow up naturally gifted and good at hitting the mark, while others lack aptitude and have the opposite nature. The former hit their target in whatever they undertake; the latter miss the mark, their thinking never moving accurately toward its aim but always falling into confusion. This misfortune is innate, not introduced from outside.[233]

19 Eurysus, On Fortune

I.6.19.1

It seems to me that fortune, and everything that happens by fortune, comes about not through some definite, underlying cause, but as something incidentally occurring and arising alongside certain other causes. Fortune, then, and what happens by fortune are neither nature and what nature produces, nor skill and a kind of human or divine intelligence. They are something that occurs incidentally alongside these, contrary to calculation and without being foreseen.[234]

233. The second explanation turns to differences of natural aptitude. Its repeated images of aiming and missing describe how thought reaches, or fails to reach, a practical objective. The contrast with an influence from outside belongs to the passage itself.

234. The Greek retains the passage's Doric forms, including tycha for tychē. Its account begins by treating chance as incidental to other causes; the following paragraph connects such incidents with an irrational and disorderly nature.

BOOK I CHAPTER 6

19 Εὐρύσω· συνέχεια

I.6.19.2

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ δύο φύσιες ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τῷδε καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἐνυπάρχοντι ἐναντίαι ἀλλάλαις καὶ ταυτᾶν ἀ μὲν ἐντὶ ῥητὰ καὶ τεταγμένα καὶ λόγον ἔχουσα ποτὶ πάντα, ἀ δ’ ἄρρητος καὶ ἄτακτος καὶ ἄλογος καὶ οὐδεμίαν σύνταξιν ἔχουσα, αὐταυτόθεν φανερόν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχας καὶ τῶ αὐτομάτω γινόμενον γίνεται ἐμπεσούσας τᾶς ἀλόγω καὶ ἀτάκτω φύσιος ἐς τὰ πράγματα, πάντα δὲ τὰ σύστοιχα ταῖς καθόλου φύσεσιν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀντιδιαιρέονται [τὰ] πράγματα, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθοποιοῦ τινος φύσιος καὶ βασιλικᾶς ἐπικρατευούσας, τὰ δ’ ὡς κακοποιοῦ καὶ τυραννικᾶς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 6

19 Eurysus, continued

I.6.19.2

For there are two natures in this whole universe, opposed to one another. One is expressible, ordered, and rationally related to everything; the other is inexpressible, disordered, irrational, and without any arrangement. It is therefore immediately clear that what happens by fortune and spontaneous occurrence happens when the irrational and disorderly nature breaks into events. All [the] events that correspond to these universal natures are always divided into opposing classes, according to better and worse: some as though a beneficent, kingly nature were in control, others as though a maleficent, tyrannical nature were.[235]

235. “Expressible” and “inexpressible” render rhēta and arrhētos; their contrast accompanies the oppositions of order and disorder, reason and unreason. The political images distinguish beneficent rule from destructive domination. The Greek article marked for deletion is retained in square brackets on both sides.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

Κεφάλαιον Ζ′ I.7.heading

Ὅτι ἀλόγιστος ἡ φορὰ τῆς τύχης.

1 Μενάνδρου Κιθαριστοῦ I.7.1

Ὡς ποικίλον πρᾶγμ’ ἐστὶ καὶ πλάνον τύχη.

2 Μενάνδρου Προγάμων I.7.2

Τὸ τῆς τύχης τοι μεταβολὰς πολλὰς ἔχει.

3 <Μενάνδρου> I.7.3

Τυφλόν γε καὶ δύστηνόν ἐστιν ἡ τύχη.

4 Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι I.7.4

Τί δ’ ἂν φοβοῖτ’ ἄνθρωπος, ᾧ τὰ τῆς τύχης
κρατεῖ, πρόνοια δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς σαφής;

5 Μενάνδρου I.7.5

Οὐδὲν κατὰ λόγον γίγνεθ’ ὧν ποιεῖ τύχη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 7

Chapter 7: Fortune beyond calculation I.7.heading

That the course of fortune cannot be calculated.[236]

1 Menander, The Lyre Player I.7.1

What a shifting, wandering thing is fortune!

2 Menander, Progamōn I.7.2

The business of fortune, you know, has many changes.[237]

3 <Menander> I.7.3

Fortune is indeed a blind and wretched thing.[238]

4 Sophocles, Oedipus (977-978) I.7.4

Why should a person fear, when fortune's dealings
rule him, and there is certain foresight of nothing?[239]

5 Menander I.7.5

Nothing that fortune does comes about by calculation.

236. The heading concerns the inability to calculate fortune's course. The excerpts variously describe changeability, lack of rational order, and causes hidden from human calculation; these are related but distinct explanations.

237. The heading is reproduced as printed. Wachsmuth also refers this line to a fragment of Chaeremon, and his apparatus records competing forms of the play-title. The uncertain Greek title is left untranslated.

238. The attribution is supplied in the base edition. "Wretched" follows the printed dystēnon; the apparatus records conjectures that would instead describe fortune as difficult to rein in.

239. The reference is to Oedipus the King. The question turns the lack of reliable foreknowledge into an argument against fear; it does not say that the future contains no danger.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

6 Εὐριπίδου Ἑλένης I.7.6

Σκέψαι γάρ, ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἔχει τι ποικίλον
καὶ δυστέκμαρτον· εὖ δέ πως ἀναστρέφει
ἐκεῖσε κἀκεῖσ’ ἀναφέρων· ὁ μὲν πονεῖ,
ὁ δ’ οὐ πονήσας αὖθις ὄλλυται κακῶς,
βέβαιον οὐδὲν τῆς ἀεὶ τύχης ἔχων.

7a Μενάνδρου Ξενολόγῳ I.7.7a

Οὕτως ἀσυλλόγιστον ἡ τύχη ποιεῖ
τὸ συμφέρον τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου βίῳ·
οὐ χρῆται νόμοις καθ’ οὓς κρίνει πράγματα,
οὐδ’ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα “ταῦτ’ οὐ πείσομαι”.

7b <Εὐριπίδου Ἱππολύτῳ> I.7.7b

Πρὸς τὰς τύχας γὰρ τὰς φρένας κεκτήμεθα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

6 Euripides, Helen (711-715) I.7.6

Consider how changeful the god is,
how hard to fathom: how deftly he turns things about,
carrying them this way and that. One man toils;
another, without having toiled, then perishes miserably,
with nothing secure in his fortune from moment to moment.[240]

7a Menander, Xenologos I.7.7a

Fortune makes it so impossible to calculate
what, after all, is beneficial in a human life.
She uses no laws by which to judge affairs,
and no one living can say, “This will not happen to me.”[241]

7b <Euripides, Hippolytus (701)> I.7.7b

For the minds we have accord with our fortunes.[242]

240. The transmitted lines contrast toil with sudden ruin, without promising a proportionate relation between effort and outcome. “Deftly” renders eu in the description of reversal; it does not make the result morally good.

241. The third line has textual and metrical difficulties; the apparatus offers several repairs. The translation follows the printed text. The title Xenologos is retained in Greek transliteration.

242. The supplied heading separates this tragic verse from the preceding Menander excerpt. It connects a person’s state of mind with the circumstances that person experiences.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

8 Εὐριπίδου Δανάης I.7.8

Ἐς ταὐτὸν ἥκειν φημὶ τὰς βροτῶν τύχας,
τὸν θ’ ὃν καλοῦσιν αἰθέρ’, ὅστις ἐστὶ δή.
οὗτος θέρους τε λαμπρὸν ἐκλάμπει σέλας,
χειμῶνά τ’ αὔξει, συντιθεὶς πυκνὸν νέφος·
θάλλειν τε καὶ μή, ζῆν τε καὶ φθίνειν ποιεῖ·
οὕτω δὲ θνητῶν σπέρμα τῶν μὲν εὐτυχεῖ
λαμπρᾷ γαλήνῃ, τῶν δὲ συννέφει πάλιν·
ζῶσίν τε σὺν κακοῖσιν, οἱ δ’ ὄλβου μέτα
φθίνουσ’ ἐτείοις προσφερῶς μεταλλαγαῖς.

9a <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων> I.7.9a

Ἐπίκουρος ἄστατον αἰτίαν προσώποις, χρόνοις, τόποις.

Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ· ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον.

9b <Ἀνωνύμου> I.7.9b

Τύχη ἀτάκτου ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ προσηγορία.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

8 Euripides, Danaë I.7.8

I say that mortals' fortunes come to the same thing
as the one they call Aether, whoever he may be.
He shines with the bright radiance of summer
and raises winter storms, gathering thick cloud;
he makes things flourish or not, live or die away.
So the stock of some mortals prospers
in bright calm, while for others it clouds over again.
Some live amid troubles, while others with wealth
fade away, much like the changes of the year.[243]

9a <Aëtius, Opinions> I.7.9a

Epicurus calls chance a cause that varies with persons, times, and places.

Anaxagoras and the Stoics call it a cause obscure to human calculation. For some things occur according to necessity, others according to fate, others according to choice, others according to chance, and others according to spontaneous occurrence.[244]

9b <Anonymous> I.7.9b

Chance is a name for disorderly activity.[245]

243. Aether, the upper air or sky, is personified through the changing weather. The comparison concerns alternating conditions, not a stable correspondence between prosperity and survival. Eteiois in the last line means yearly or annual.

244. The report contrasts a cause's variability with its obscurity to human reasoning. The following list is retained as the compiler transmits it, without assuming that every distinction was used identically by all the named thinkers.

245. This short definition has no surviving author-heading. Wachsmuth separates it from the preceding report and does not accept the proposed attribution to Democritus recorded in his apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

10 Διωτογένεος Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ὁσιότατος I.7.10

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τέτορες αἰτίαι τὰ σύμπαντα περαίνοντι καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος ἐπιτίθεντι, φύσις καὶ νόμος καὶ τέχνα καὶ τύχα, καὶ τῶν μὲν … ἐξ ἄθεος ποτὶ ξυμφωνίαν πολιτικὰν φερόντων νόμος ἐπιστάτας καὶ δαμιουργός· τῶν δὲ διὰ φρονάσιος ἀνθρωπίνας τελευθέντων τέχνα <κα> λέγοιτο μάτηρ τε καὶ ἀγεμὼν ἦμεν· τῶν δὲ εἰκᾷ τε καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀπὸ τωὐτομάτω ὁμοίως ποτιπιπτόντων τοῖς χρηστοῖς τε καὶ πονηροῖς τύχαν τῶν τοιούτων αἰτίαν φασοῦμες· ταύταν δ’ οὔτ’ ἐν μέτρῳ οὔτ’ ἐν ὅρῳ τεταγμέναν καὶ πεφυρμένως ἕκαστα ποιεῖν· γενναθεῖσα δὲ δὴ ἐξ αὐταυτῶ γένεος ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 7

10 Diotogenes the Pythagorean, On Piety I.7.10

For four causes bring everything to completion and carry it to its end: nature, law, skill, and fortune. And of those things … law is the overseer and maker of what, through habit, conduces to civic harmony.[246] Skill <might> be called the mother and guide of things accomplished through human intelligence. As for events that fall at random and by happenstance, of themselves, alike upon good and bad people, we shall call fortune their cause. It is fixed within neither measure nor limit and does everything in a confused fashion. Though born from one and the same stock, it moves in both directions.[247]

246. The ellipsis marks a gap in the source. The opening list includes nature, but its corresponding explanation is missing; the translation does not fill the gap. The preserved Doric phrase ex atheos means “from habit.”

247. “In a confused fashion” follows Wachsmuth’s correction pephyrmenōs. The final sentence is compressed: “both directions” appears to refer to favorable and unfavorable results. Its wording is retained without turning the passage into a more systematic theory than the surviving text provides.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

Κεφάλαιον Η′ I.8.heading

Περὶ χρόνου οὐσίας καὶ μερῶν καὶ πόσων εἴη αἴτιος.

1 Σοφοκλέους I.8.1

Πάντ’ ἐκκαλύπτων ὁ χρόνος εἰς <τὸ> φῶς ἄγει.

2 Ξενοφάνους I.8.2

Οὔ τοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς παρέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

3 Φιλήμονος I.8.3

Ὦ Πάμφιλ’, ὁ χρόνος οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα
αὔξει βαδίζων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πράγματα.

4 <Χαιρήμονος> I.8.4

Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ὅ τι
οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ζητοῦσιν ἐξευρίσκεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

Chapter 8: Time

I.8.heading

On the nature and parts of time, and the many things of which it is a cause.[248]

1 Sophocles

I.8.1

Time uncovers everything and brings it into <the> light.

2 Xenophanes

I.8.2

The gods did not reveal everything to mortals from the beginning;
by searching, however, they discover better in time.[249]

3 Philemon

I.8.3

Pamphilus, as time walks on it makes
not only bodies grow, but troubles too.[250]

4 <Chaeremon>

I.8.4

There is nothing in human affairs
that those who search do not discover in time.[251]

248. The chapter combines poetic sayings about time's effects with philosophical definitions. Ousia asks what time is; the later reports answer in terms of motion, measure, number, and interval.

249. Mortals are the searchers in the second line. "Discover better" preserves the comparative: inquiry brings improvement, without a claim that it has reached a final, complete result.

250. Pragmata can mean affairs, difficulties, or troubles. The comic contrast with bodily growth favors "troubles" here, though the surrounding scene is absent.

251. These lines recur as excerpt 32, where Chaeremon's name is transmitted. The supplied heading here follows that parallel; both occurrences are retained.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 93-94

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

5 Ἀντιφάνους I.8.5

Μάλιστα δ’ ἐκπλήττει με τῶν συνειδότων
ὁ χρόνος, ὃν ἀεὶ λανθάνειν ἀμηχανῶ.

6 Θεοδέκτου I.8.6

Ἀλλ’, ὦ τάλαν Θυέστα, καρτέρει δάκνων
ὀργῆς χαλινόν· παρακελεύομαι δέ σοι
τεθηγμένῳ νῦν· ἀλλ’ ὁ μυρίος χρόνος
τὰ πάντ’ ἀμαυροῖ χὐπὸ χεῖρα λαμβάνει.

7 Ἀγάθωνος I.8.7

Οὐπώποτ’ ἠξίωσα χαρίσασθαι χρόνοις.

8 Μενάνδρου I.8.8

Πᾶν τοὔργον ὀρθῶς ἐκμαθεῖν χρόνου μέτα.

9 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.8.9

Ὦ δέσποτ’, ἄξι’ ἐστὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς βροτῶν
χρόνῳ σκοπεῖσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας πέρι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 94-95

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

5 Antiphanes

I.8.5

Of all who share the secret, time frightens me the most:
I cannot find a way to escape its notice forever.[252]

6 Theodectes

I.8.6

But, wretched Thyestes, endure: bite down
on anger's bridle. I urge this on you,
though you are sharpened to fury now; boundless time
dims everything and brings it under its hand.[253]

7 Agathon

I.8.7

I have never thought it right to court the times.[254]

8 Menander

I.8.8

To learn the whole affair correctly takes time.[255]

9 The same author

I.8.9

Master, it befits the wise among mortals
to examine the truth in the course of time.[256]

252. Time is personified as someone who knows what the speaker has done. Aei, "always" or "forever," makes concealment something that cannot last indefinitely.

253. The bridle figures restraint of anger; the next image presents the angry man as a sharpened blade. The printed text incorporates repairs to damaged wording.

254. "Court the times" interprets charisasthai chronois as accommodating prevailing circumstances. Both key words depend on editorial corrections; the isolated line gives no further context.

255. The Greek is an infinitival maxim, literally "to learn the whole affair correctly with time."

256. The heading links the lines to Menander. The apparatus questions their attribution and records uncertainty in the opening construction; the translation follows the printed text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

10 Κριτίου I.8.10

Ὁ χρόνος ἁπάσης ἐστὶν ὀργῆς φάρμακον.

11 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.11

Μετὰ τὴν σκιὰν τάχιστα γηράσκει χρόνος.

12 <Ἀδήλου ποιητοῦ> I.8.12

Πάλιν χρόνῳ τἀρχαῖα καινὰ γίγνεται.

13 Νικοστράτου Λακώνων I.8.13

Οὐκ ἔστι δυσαρεστότερον οὐδὲ ἓν χρόνου,
οὐδέποτ᾽ ἀρέσκει ταὐτὰ τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ.

14 Ἀγάθωνος I.8.14

Σοφὸν λέγουσι τὸν χρόνον πεφυκέναι.

15 <Σιμωνίδου> I.8.15

Οὐκ ἔστιν μεῖζων βάσανος χρόνου οὐδενὸς ἔργου,
ὃς καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνοις ἀνδρὸς ἔδειξε νόον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

10 Critias I.8.10

Time is a remedy for all anger.[257]

11 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.11

After a shadow, time grows old most quickly.

12 <An unidentified poet> I.8.12

In time, old things become new again.[258]

13 Nicostratus, The Spartans I.8.13

Nothing is harder to please than time:
the same things never please this god.

14 Agathon I.8.14

They say that time is wise by nature.

15 <Simonides> I.8.15

For no deed is there a greater test than time,
which has revealed even the mind within a man's breast.[259]

257. Wachsmuth retains the heading but suggests that Critias's name may belong to one of the following excerpts. The attribution is therefore not secure.

258. Wachsmuth leaves the poet unidentified rather than attaching this line to Nicostratus. The Latin descriptive headings for anonymous poets are rendered in Greek and English.

259. Basanos is a test or touchstone. The attribution to Simonides is supplied from the editorial evidence discussed by Wachsmuth; it is not an intact author-heading here.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 95-96

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

16 <Ἀδήλου λυρικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.16

Ὤφελεν ὡς ἀφανὴς οὕτω φανερώτατος εἶναι
καιρός, ὃς αὐξάνεται πλεῖστον ἀπ᾽ εὐλαβίης.

17 Σοφοκλέους I.8.17

Πρὸς ταῦτα κρύπτε μηδέν, ὡς ὁ πάνθ᾽ ὁρῶν
καὶ πάντ᾽ ἀκούων πάντ᾽ ἀναπτύσσει χρόνος.

18 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.18

Χρόνος, ὦ Χρόν᾽, ἅμα κραταιᾷ
χρημοσύνᾳ βιότου
πόλλ᾽ ἀνευρίσκεις σοφὰ μαιομένοις.

19 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.19

Οὐκ ἔστι πράσσοντάς τι μοχθηρὸν λαθεῖν·
ὀξὺ βλέπει γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ὃς τὰ πάνθ᾽ ὁρᾷ.

20 Εὐριπίδου Ἀλόπῃ I.8.20

Ὁ χρόνος ἅπαντα τοῖσιν ὕστερον φράσει,
λάλος ἐστὶν οὗτος, οὐκ ἐρωτῶσιν λέγει.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 96-97

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

16 <An unidentified lyric poet> I.8.16

Would that opportunity were as clearly visible as it is hidden,
opportunity, which grows most through watchful care.[260]

17 Sophocles I.8.17

In view of this, hide nothing: time, which sees
and hears everything, unfolds it all.[261]

18 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.18

Time, O Time, together with the mighty
need of life,
you discover many wise things for those who seek.[262]

19 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.19

Those who do something wicked cannot escape notice:
time sees keenly, for it sees everything.

20 Euripides, Alope I.8.20

Time will tell everything to those who come later;
he is a chatterbox, speaking even to those who do not ask.[263]

260. Kairos is the opportune or critical moment, distinct from time simply passing. The second line associates making the most of that moment with attentiveness. Wachsmuth rejects the earlier attachment of Agathon's name.

261. The apparatus identifies the lines through a parallel quotation as belonging to Sophocles's Hipponous. The seeing and hearing of personified time make it an inescapable witness.

262. "Need" follows chrēmosynāi, an editorial correction to a damaged word. The source leaves the tragic poet unidentified; the name Sophocles is assigned to the preceding excerpt.

263. The printed heading is retained, but Wachsmuth questions whether these comic-sounding lines belong to Euripides and whether the heading was displaced.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

21 Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίποδι I.8.21

Χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος,
κακὸν δὲ κἂν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ γνοίης μιᾷ.

22 Σιμωνίδου Ἐπιγραμμάτων I.8.22

Ὁ τοι χρόνος ὀξὺς ὀδόντας
πάντα καταψήχει καὶ τὰ βιαιότατα.

23 Σοφοκλῆς Αἴαντι I.8.23

Ἅπανθ’ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ’ ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται.
Κοὐκ ἔστ’ ἄελπτον οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ ἀλίσκεται
χὠ δεινὸς ὅρκος, χαί περισκελεῖς φρένες.

24 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> I.8.24

Πάνθ’ ὁ μέγας χρόνος μαραίνει.

25 Εὐριπίδου Ἱππολύτου I.8.25

Χρόνος διέρπων πάντ’ ἀληθεύειν φιλεῖ.

26 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.26

Χρόνος τὰ κρυπτὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἄγει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

21 Sophocles, Oedipus (614-615) I.8.21

Time alone reveals a just man,
but you could recognize a bad one in a single day.

22 Simonides, Epigrams I.8.22

Time, with his sharp teeth,
wears everything away, even the mightiest.

23 Sophocles, Ajax (646-649) I.8.23

Long, uncountable time brings forth all hidden things
and hides what has appeared.
Nothing is beyond expectation: even a dreadful oath
and stubborn minds are conquered.[264]

24 <The same author, Ajax (714)> I.8.24

Great time withers everything.

25 Euripides, Hippolytus I.8.25

Time, as it passes, tends to tell the truth about everything.

26 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.26

Time brings all hidden things into the light.

264. The image of capture applies to both an oath and a fixed resolve: neither is beyond time's power to alter. The excerpt presents a dramatic speaker's reflection on change.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

27 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.27

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν χρόνος
δείξει· μόνος γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων κριτής.

28 <Ἀδήλου τραγικοῦ ποιητοῦ> I.8.28

Χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα μηνύει ποτέ.

29 Φιλήμονος I.8.29

Χρόνῳ τὰ πάντα γίγνεται καὶ κρίνεται.

30 Χαιρήμονος I.8.30

Σχολῇ βαδίζων ὁ χρόνος ἀφικνεῖται τ<όπ>αν.

31 Μενάνδρου I.8.31

Οὐκ ἔστ’ ἄπιστον οὐδὲν ἐν θνητῷ βίῳ,
οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο· πολλὰ ποικίλλει χρόνος
παράδοξα καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ ζώντων τρόποι.

32 Χαιρήμονος I.8.32

Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ὅ τι
οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ζητοῦσιν ἐξευρίσκεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

27 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.27

But time will show these things;
for it alone is the judge of human beings.

28 <An unidentified tragic poet> I.8.28

Time eventually makes a just man known.

29 Philemon I.8.29

In time all things come to be and are judged.

30 Chaeremon I.8.30

Walking slowly, time reaches everything.[265]

31 Menander I.8.31

Nothing in mortal life is beyond belief,
nor could it be: time and the ways of living beings
weave many strange and marvelous things.[266]

32 Chaeremon I.8.32

There is nothing in human affairs
that those who search do not discover in time.

265. The last word contains an editorial supplement and remains difficult. “Reaches everything” follows the printed to pan, literally “the whole”; the apparatus offers alternatives including “reaches the end.”

266. Poikillei suggests making something varied or intricate. The final phrase adds living beings’ ways or dispositions to time as a source of unexpected events.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

33 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.8.33

Χρόνος μαλάσσει πάντα κἀξεργάζεται.

34 Φιλήμονος I.8.34

Ὅσαι τέχναι γεγόνασι, ταύτας, ὦ Λάχης,
πάσας ἐδίδαξεν ὁ χρόνος, οὐχ ὁ διδάσκαλος.

35 †Ἀναγενέους I.8.35

Ὁ πολὺς χρόνος πάντ’ ἐξελέγχει, Νικοφῶν.

36 Ἑρμίππου I.8.36

Ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν στρογγύλος τὴν ὄψιν, ὦ πονηρέ,
ἐντὸς δ’ ἔχων περιέρχεται κύκλῳ τὰ πάντ’ ἐν αὑτῷ·
ἡμᾶς δὲ τίκτει περιτρέχων τὴν γῆν ἀπαξάπασαν.
Ὀνομάζεται δ’ ἐνιαυτός, ὃν δὲ περιφερὴς τελευτὴν
οὐδεμίαν οὐδ’ ἀρχὴν <ἔχει>· κυκλῶν δ’ ἀεὶ τὸ σῶμα
οὐ παύεται δι’ ἡμέρας ὁσημέραι τροχάζων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

33 The same author

I.8.33

Time softens everything and works it to completion.

34 Philemon

I.8.34

All the arts that have arisen, Laches,
were taught by time, not by the teacher.

35 †Anagenes

I.8.35

Long time tests everything and brings it to light, Nicophon.[267]

36 Hermippus

I.8.36

He is round in appearance, you rascal,
and goes around in a circle, holding everything within himself.
He gives birth to us as he runs around the whole earth.
He is called the year; being circular, he <has>
no end and no beginning. Forever wheeling his body,
he never stops running through the day, day after day.[268]

267. The dagger marks a corrupt author-name. “Anagenes” only transliterates what is printed; it is not a secure identification. Exelenchei combines the ideas of testing and exposing.

268. The year is pictured as a circular living figure that brings the speakers into being. The isolated excerpt does not identify who “we” are. The long verse lines are preserved without imposing an English meter.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

37 Κλεοβούλου σοφοῦ τῶν αἰνιγμάτων

I.8.37

Εἷς ὁ πατήρ, παῖδες <δὲ> δυώδεκα· τῶν δὲ ἑκάστῳ
κοῦραι ἑξήκοντα, διάνδιχα εἶδος ἔχουσαι·
αἳ μὲν λευκαὶ ἔασιν ἰδεῖν, αἳ δ’ αὖτε μέλαιναι·
ἀθάναται δέ τ’ ἐοῦσαι ἀποφθινύθουσιν ἅπασαι.

38 Μοσχίωνος

I.8.38.1

Πρῶτον δ’ ἄνειμι καὶ διαπτύξω λόγῳ
ἀρχὴν βροτείου καὶ κατάστασιν βίου·
ἦν γάρ ποτ’ αἰὼν κεῖνος, ἦν ποθ’ ἡνίκα
θηρσὶν διαίτας εἶχον ἐμφερεῖς βροτοί,
ὀρειγενῆ σπήλαια καὶ δυσηλίους
φάραγγας ἐνναίοντες· οὐδέπω γὰρ ἦν
οὔτε στεγήρης οἶκος, οὔτε λαΐνοις
εὐρεῖα πύργοις ὠχυρωμένη πόλις·
οὐ μὴν ἀρότροις ἀγκύλοις ἐτέμνετο
μέλαινα καρποῦ βῶλος ὀμπνίου τροφός,
οὐδ’ ἐργάτης σίδηρος εὐιώτιδος
θάλλοντας οἴνης ὀρχάτους ἐτημέλει,
ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀκύμων †κωφεύουσα ῥέουσα γῆ.
βοραὶ δὲ σαρκοβρῶτες ἀλληλοκτόνους
παρεῖχον αὐτοῖς δαῖτας· ἦν δ’ ὁ μὲν Νόμος
ταπεινός, ἡ Βία δὲ σύνθρονος Διί,
ὁ δ’ ἀσθενὴς ἦν τῶν ἀμεινόνων βορά.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

37 Cleobulus the sage, Riddles

I.8.37

One father, <and> twelve sons; each of them has
sixty daughters, divided into two kinds in appearance:
some are white to look upon, others black;
though immortal, all of them pass away.[269]

38 Moschion

I.8.38.1

First I shall go back and unfold in words
human life's beginning and its condition.
There was once that age, there was a time
when mortals lived in ways resembling beasts,
dwelling in mountain caves and sunless
ravines. There was as yet
no roofed house, no broad city
fortified with towers of stone.
No curved ploughs cut the dark soil,
nurse of nourishing grain;
no laboring iron tended the flourishing
vineyards of wine that prompts the Bacchic cry.
The earth was barren, †deaf and flowing.[270]
Carnivorous feeding gave them feasts
in which they killed one another. Law was lowly,
while Violence shared the throne of Zeus,
and the weak were food for the stronger.[271]

269. The riddle can be read as the year, its twelve months, and thirty days paired with thirty nights in each month. The riddle uses a schematic month rather than asserting that every observed month has thirty days. Individual days pass, while the cycle continues.

270. The dagger marks a corrupt line. The literal "deaf and flowing" reproduces the printed words without claiming a coherent recovered sense; the apparatus proposes several incompatible repairs.

271. The poem gives time a civilizing role, moving from violence to agriculture, settled homes, and burial. Law and Violence are personified as rival powers.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

38 Μοσχίωνος· συνέχεια

I.8.38.2

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ τίκτων πάντα καὶ τρέφων χρόνος
τὸν θνητὸν ἠλλοίωσεν ἔμπαλιν βίον,
εἴτ’ οὖν μέριμναν τὴν Προμηθέως σπάσας,
εἴτ’ οὖν ἀνάγκην, εἴτε τῇ μακρᾷ τριβῇ
αὐτὴν παρασχὼν τὴν φύσιν διδάσκαλον,
τόθ’ εὑρέθη μὲν καρπὸς ἡμέρου τροφῆς
Δήμητρος ἀγνῆς, εὑρέθη δὲ Βακχίου
γλυκεῖα πηγή· γαῖα δ’ ἡ πρὶν ἄσπορος
ἤδη ζυγουλκοῖς βουσὶν ἠροτρεύετο.
ἄστη δ’ ἐπυργώσαντο καὶ περισκεπεῖς
ἔτευξαν οἴκους· καὶ τὸν ἠγριωμένον
εἰς ἥμερον δίαιταν ἤγαγον βίον·
κἀκ τοῦδε τοὺς θανόντας ὥρισεν νόμος
τύμβοις καλύπτειν, κἀπιμοιρᾶσθαι κόνιν
νεκροῖς ἀθάπτοις, μηδ’ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐᾶν
τῆς πρόσθε θοίνης μνημόνευμα δυσσεβοῦς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

38 Moschion, continued

I.8.38.2

But when time, which gives birth to everything and nourishes it,
changed mortal life to its opposite,
whether drawing on Prometheus's care,
or on necessity, or through long experience
making nature itself the teacher,
then the grain of holy Demeter was discovered
for cultivated food, and Bacchus's
sweet spring was found. Earth, once unsown,
was now ploughed by oxen drawing the yoke.
People fortified towns and built sheltered
houses; they brought a life grown wild
into a civilized way of living.
From then on law ordained that the dead
be covered in tombs and that dust be allotted
to unburied corpses, leaving no visible
reminder of the impious feasting of the past.[272]

272. The poem leaves several explanations of progress open: Prometheus's care, necessity, and nature teaching through experience. Demeter's grain and Bacchus's wine stand for cultivated food and drink. Burial closes the imagined transition away from cannibalism.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

39 Ἐκ τῶν Βίωνος Βουκολικῶν

I.8.39.1

“Εἴαρος, ὦ Μύρσων, ἢ χείματος, ἢ φθινοπώρω,
ἢ θέρεος τί τοι ἀδύ; τί δὲ πλέον εὔχεαι ἐλθεῖν;
ἢ θέρος, ἀνίκα πάντα τελείεται ὅσσα μογεῦμες;
ἢ γλυκερὸν φθινόπωρον, ὅκ’ ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ἐλαφρά;
ἢ καὶ χεῖμα δύσεργον; ἐπεὶ καὶ χείματι πολλοὶ
θαλπόμενοι θέλγονται ἀεργείᾳ τε καὶ ὄκνῳ.
ἦ τοι καλὸν ἔαρ πλέον εὔαδεν; εἰπὲ τί τοι φρὴν
αἱρεῖται; λαλέεν γὰρ ἐπέτραπεν ἁ σχολὰ ἀμίν.”

39 Βίωνος· συνέχεια

I.8.39.2

“Κρίνειν οὐκ ἐπέοικε θεήια ἔργα βροτοῖσι,
πάντα γὰρ ἱερὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀδέα· σεῦ δὲ ἕκατι
ἐξερέω, Κλεόδαμε, τό μοι πέλεν ἄδιον ἄλλων.
οὐκ ἐθέλω θέρος ἦμεν, ἐπεὶ τόκα μ’ ἅλιος ὀπτᾷ·
οὐκ ἐθέλω φθινόπωρον, ἐπεὶ νόσον ὥρια τίκτει·
οὖλον χεῖμα φέρον νιφετὸν κρυμώς τε φοβεῦμαι.
εἶαρ ἐμοὶ τριπόθατον ὅλῳ λυκάβαντι παρείη,
ἀνίκα μήτε κρύος μήθ’ ἅλιος ἄμμε βαρύνει·
εἴαρι πάντα κύει, πάντ’ εἴαρος ἀδέα βλαστῇ,
χά νὺξ ἀνθρώποισιν ἴσα καὶ ὁμοίως αὐώς.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

39 Bion, Bucolic Poems

I.8.39.1

"Myrson, which delights you: spring, winter, autumn,
or summer? Which do you most pray will come?
Summer, when all we labor for comes to fulfillment?
Sweet autumn, when hunger weighs lightly on people?
Or even winter, when work is hard? For in winter many,
keeping warm, delight in idleness and ease.
Or has lovely spring pleased you more? Tell me
what your heart chooses: our leisure lets us talk."[273]

39 Bion, continued

I.8.39.2

"Mortals should not sit in judgment on divine works,
for all these things are sacred and delightful. Yet for your sake,
Cleodamus, I shall tell what I find sweeter than the others.
I do not want summer, for then the sun scorches me;
I do not want autumn, for its seasonal fruits breed sickness;
I fear destructive winter, bringing snowfall and frost.
May much-desired spring stay with me the whole year,
when neither cold nor sun weighs upon us.
In spring everything conceives; in spring all sweet things sprout,
and for people night is equal to day."[274]

273. The question gives each season an attraction, including winter's release from work. Doric forms and the rustic dialogue are retained in the Greek.

274. The final line evokes the equality of day and night associated with spring. The claim about autumn fruit belongs to the speaker's seasonal preference. The Greek of several lines has been repaired by editors.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 101-102

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40a Ἀποφθέγματα I.8.40a

Θαλῆς ἐρωτηθείς, τί σοφώτατον; <ἔφη,> Χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ τὰ πάντα.

Περίανδρος ἐρωτηθείς, Τί πάντων αἴτιον; ἔφη, Χρόνος.

Θαλῆς ἔφησεν, ὅτι σαφέστατος ἔλεγχος πραγμάτων ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, οὗτος <γὰρ> τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐμφανίζει.

Εὐρυφῶν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸν διδάσκαλον παρ' ᾧ ἐπαιδεύθη, Παρὰ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἔφη.

40b <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων> I.8.40b.1

Πυθαγόρας τὴν σφαῖραν τοῦ περιέχοντος.

Ἐρατοσθένης τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πορείαν.

Οἱ Στωικοὶ χρόνου οὐσίαν αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν.

Οἱ πλείους ἀγένητον τὸν χρόνον.

Ξενοκράτης μέτρον τῶν γενητῶν, καὶ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40a Sayings

I.8.40a

Asked what is wisest, Thales <said,> “Time, for it discovers everything.”

Asked what is the cause of everything, Periander said, “Time.”

Thales said that time is the clearest test of all things, <for> it makes the truth manifest.

When Euryphon the physician was asked under which teacher he had been educated, he said, “Under time.”[275]

40b <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.8.40b.1

Pythagoras calls time the sphere of the surrounding heaven.

Eratosthenes calls it the sun’s course.

The Stoics identify the nature of time with motion itself.

Most thinkers hold that time is ungenerated.

Xenocrates calls it a measure of things that come to be, and everlasting motion.[276]

275. The modern heading “Sayings” groups four short anecdotes without adding an author. Euryphon’s answer makes accumulated experience his teacher; the other sayings present time as discoverer, cause, and test.

276. These are compressed reports rather than verbatim quotations. Their predicates differ: time is identified with a sphere, a course, motion, or a measure. The Stoic summary here is not silently harmonized with the more qualified accounts that follow.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40b <Ἀετίου>· συνέχεια I.8.40b.2

Μέτρον βραδύτητος ἢ τάχους εἶπε Χρύσιππος.

Ἑστιαῖος ὁ Περίνθιος φυσικὸς φορὰν ἄστρων πρὸς ἄλληλα.

Στράτων τὸ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἠρεμίᾳ ποσόν.

Ἐπίκουρος σύμπτωμα <συμπτωμάτων>, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ παρακολούθημα κινήσεων.

Ἀντιφᾶν καὶ Κριτόλαος νόημα ἢ μέτρον τὸν χρόνον, οὐδ’ ὑπόστασιν.

40c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου>· Ἀριστοτέλους I.8.40c

Τὸν δὲ χρόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, οὔτ’ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα οὔτε τελευτήν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον, εἶναι δὲ συνεχῆ καὶ διαιρετόν, λαμβάνεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ’ ὕστερον, ὅρον δ’ ὑπάρχειν ἑκατέρων τὸ νῦν, τοῦτο γὰρ νοεῖσθαι τοῦ μὲν προτέρου πέρας, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἀρχήν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40b <Aëtius>, continued I.8.40b.2

Chrysippus called it a measure of slowness or speed.

Hestiaeus of Perinthus, the natural philosopher, called it the movement of the stars relative to one another.

Strato called it the quantity in motion and rest.

Epicurus called it an accident <of accidents>, that is, an accompaniment of motions.

Antiphan and Critolaus called time a conception or measure, not an independently subsisting reality.[277]

40c <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle I.8.40c

Time is the number of motion in respect of before and after. It has neither beginning nor end, but always is and always comes to be. It is continuous and divisible, since one portion of it is taken as earlier and another as later. The now is the boundary of both: it is conceived as the end of what precedes and the beginning of what is to come.[278]

277. “Accident” here means an incidental property, not a mishap; the supplied “of accidents” is supported by a parallel cited in the apparatus. “Antiphan” renders the printed, uncertain name Antiphan; the apparatus records Antiphanes. Hypostasis is rendered “independently subsisting reality.”

278. “Number of motion” connects time with counting an ordered change, rather than equating it with motion itself. The “now” serves as a common boundary, not as an extended piece of time. The report is supplied under Arius Didymus’s name.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40d <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> I.8.40d

Οἱ Ἀριστοτελικοὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμὸν τῶν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ἀφοριζομένων κινήσεων, τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι μονάδα στάσεως ἐν κινήσει, κίνησιν δ’ οὐκ εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, οὐ μὴν <ἄνευ> κινήσεως· λέγεσθαι γὰρ κίνησιν βραδεῖαν καὶ ταχεῖαν, οὐκέτι δὲ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον. Ἔτι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τοὔλαττον ἀριθμῷ κρίνεσθαι, χρόνῳ δὲ τὴν πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω κίνησιν. Οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, οὐ μὴν κινήσεως κεχωρισμένος, ἀριθμὸν γὰρ εἶναι κινήσεως συνεχῆ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

40e <Ἀρείου Διδύμου>· Ζήνωνος I.8.40e

Ζήνων ἔφησε χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ὅπως ἔχει <ἕκαστα>. Κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ περαινόμενα ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ὄντα εἶναι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

40d <Arius Didymus>

I.8.40d

The Aristotelians call time the number of motions delimited by the now, and the now a unit of rest within motion. Time is not motion, yet neither is it <without> motion. For motion is called slow or swift, whereas time is called long or short instead. Further, more and less are judged by number, while greater and lesser motion are judged by time. Time, then, is not motion, yet it is not separate from motion: it is a continuous number of motion in respect of before and after.[279]

40e <Arius Didymus>: Zeno

I.8.40e

Zeno said that time is an interval of motion, and that this is both a measure and a criterion of speed and slowness, according to how <each thing> stands. In accordance with it, everything that comes to be or reaches completion does so, and things that exist have their being.[280]

279. The supplied "without" is essential to the argument. Motion can vary in speed; the duration by which it is measured is instead greater or smaller. "Unit of rest" belongs to the report's description of the now as a boundary within motion.

280. Diastēma, "interval," describes the extent associated with motion. This should be distinguished from the preceding Aristotelian definition through number, even though both connect time with measuring change.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

41 Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ

I.8.41.1

…

Ὡς καὶ περὶ τῶν τριῶν χρόνων εὑρεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτούς εἰσιν, οὔτε συνήνωνται· καὶ πάλιν συνήνωνται καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτούς εἰσιν. Ἐὰν χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ὑπολάβῃς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν ἐνεστάναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ παρεληλυθὼς γένοιτο· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποεχομένου τὸ ἐνεστὼς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος τὸ μέλλον ἔρχεται.

41 Συνέχεια

I.8.41.2

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον βασανίσαι, οὕτω λογισώμεθα· τὸν μὲν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον οἴχεσθαι εἰς τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι [τοῦτον], τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μηδέπω παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα συμπαρεῖναι ἐν τῷ μένειν. Ὃς γὰρ οὐχ ἕστηκε ῥοπὴν ἔχων, οὐδὲ κέντρου μονὴν [χρόνος], πῶς ἐνεστὼς εἶναι λέγεται ὁ μηδὲ ἑστάναι δυνάμενος; καὶ πάλιν ὁ παρεληλυθὼς συνάπτων τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ ὁ ἐνεστὼς τῷ μέλλοντι εἷς γίνεται (οὐ γὰρ χωρὶς αὐτῶν εἰσι) τῇ ταυτότητι καὶ τῇ ἑνότητι καὶ τῇ συνεχείᾳ. Οὕτω καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ διεστὼς γίνεται, εἷς ὢν καὶ ὁ αὐτός, χρόνος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

41 Hermes, from the writings to Tat

I.8.41.1

…

As one may also find concerning the three times: they neither exist separately nor are united; and again they are united and exist separately. If you suppose that the present is separate from the past, it cannot be present unless it has also become past; for the present comes from what is withdrawing, and the future comes from the present.[281]

41 Continued

I.8.41.2

If we must examine it further, let us reason as follows. Past time has departed into no longer being [this time]; future time does not exist because it is not yet present; but present time too does not remain with us by staying still. For [time] does not stand still even for a moment, nor has it the stability of a point. How, then, can what cannot even stand still be said to be present?[282] Yet again the past, joining the present, and the present, joining the future, become one through identity, unity, and continuity, since they are not separate from one another. Thus time, being one and the same, is both continuous and divided.

281. The source places a gap after the Hermetic heading. Wachsmuth doubts that the surviving discussion belongs to that heading and supposes that an intervening passage and another heading were lost. “The three times” means past, present, and future. The opening paradox is preserved rather than resolved by rewriting it.

282. The Greek plays on enestōs, “present,” and hestanai, “to stand.” “Present” does not retain that wordplay in English. The two bracketed words are marked for deletion in the base edition; the awkward redundant “[this time]” is retained to show the first.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου>· Ἀπολλοδώρου I.8.42.1

Ἀπολλόδωρος δ’ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ τέχνῃ οὕτως ὁρίζεται τὸν χρόνον· Χρόνος δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως διάστημα· οὕτως δ’ ἐστὶν ἄπειρος, ὡς ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἄπειρος λέγεται εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ παρεληλυθός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλλον. Ἐνεστάναι δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐνεστηκέναι λέγομεν κατὰ μείζονα περιγραφήν· καὶ ὑπάρχειν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος λέγεται, οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως.

42 Ποσειδωνίου I.8.42.2

Τὰ μέν ἐστι κατὰ πᾶν ἄπειρα, ὡς ὁ σύμπας χρόνος· τὰ δὲ κατά τι, ὡς ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος καὶ ὁ μέλλων· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν παρόντα μόνον ἑκάτερος πεπέρανται. Τὸν δὲ χρόνον οὕτως ὁρίζεται· διάστημα κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ὅπως ἔχει τὸ ἐπινοούμενον. <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πότε τοῦ χρόνου τὸν μὲν εἶναι παρεληλυθότα, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα, τὸν δὲ παρόντα, ὃς ἔκ τινος μέρους τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν αὐτῶν συνέστηκε· τὸν δὲ διορισμὸν σημειώδη εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐν πλάτει χρόνου καὶ οὐχὶ κατ’ ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. Λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ νῦν καὶ [κατὰ] τὸν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἴσθησιν χρόνον περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ παρεληλυθότος συνιστάμενον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 <Arius Didymus>: Apollodorus

I.8.42.1

Apollodorus, in his Treatise on Physics, defines time as follows. Time is the interval of the universe's motion. It is infinite in the sense in which number as a whole is said to be infinite. One part of it is past, another present, another future. Time as a whole is present in the way we speak of the year as present, using a broader delimitation. And time as a whole is said to have actuality, although none of its parts has actuality in the strict sense.[283]

42 Posidonius

I.8.42.2

Some things are infinite in every respect, like time as a whole; others in a particular respect, like past and future time, since each is bounded only on the side of the present. He defines time as an interval of motion or a measure of speed and slowness, according to the condition of what is conceived. <And> with regard to when, some time is past, some future, and some present. The present consists of a portion of the past and the future around their dividing boundary; the boundary itself is like a point. The now and similar expressions are conceived as referring to an extent of time, not to an exact delimitation. The now also denotes [in respect of] the smallest perceptible time formed around the boundary of future and past.[284]

283. The example of "the present year" uses a stretch containing both elapsed and future time. "In the strict sense" renders apartizontōs, contrasting precise delimitation with ordinary extended usage.

284. This distinguishes a boundary without duration from the smallest stretch we perceive as "now." Past and future are each bounded at the present but extend indefinitely in the opposite direction. The bracketed preposition is marked for deletion in the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 Χρυσίππου I.8.42.3

Ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, καθ’ ὃ ποτὲ λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος· ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν χρόνον κινεῖσθαί τε ἕκαστα καὶ εἶναι· εἰ μὴ ἄρα διττὸς λέγεται ὁ χρόνος, καθάπερ ἥ τε γῆ καὶ ἡ θάλαττα καὶ τὸ κενόν, τά τε ὅλα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτῶν. Ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ κενὸν πᾶν ἄπειρον εἶναι πάντῃ καὶ τὸν χρόνον πάντα ἄπειρον εἶναι ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἄπειρον εἶναι.

42 Χρυσίππου· συνέχεια I.8.42.4

Ἐμφανέστατα δὲ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι οὐθεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἡ τομὴ τῶν συνεχόντων ἐστί, κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην καὶ πᾶς χρόνος εἰς ἄπειρον ἔχει τὴν τομήν· ὥστε μηθένα κατ’ ἀπαρτισμὸν ἐνεστάναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι. Μόνον δ’ ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μέν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει …

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 Chrysippus

I.8.42.3

Chrysippus holds that time is an interval of motion, in which respect it is sometimes called a measure of speed and slowness; or the interval accompanying the universe's motion. Each thing moves and exists in accordance with time, unless, indeed, "time" is used in two senses, as are earth, sea, and void, for both their wholes and their parts. Just as void as a whole is infinite in every direction, so time as a whole is infinite in both directions: both past and future time are infinite.[285]

42 Chrysippus, continued

I.8.42.4

He states most explicitly that no time at all is present. For since continuous things can be divided without limit, every time likewise admits division without limit. Thus no time is present in the strict sense; it is called present only in an extended sense. Yet he says that only present time has actuality, while past and future time subsist but have no actuality at all. The qualification is like the statement that only predicates that actually apply have actuality: for example, walking is actual for me when I walk, but when I lie down or sit it is not actual …[286]

285. The two senses concern time as a whole and a particular stretch of time. The comparison with void relates the two directions of temporal extension to spatial extension, without saying that time and void are the same thing.

286. The report juxtaposes two claims: no duration is wholly present under exact division, but only the broadly conceived present is actual. Hyphestanai, "subsist," is distinguished from hyparchein, "have actuality." The example clarifies the latter through a predicate that applies now. The ellipsis marks a gap in the source.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 Συνέχεια· περὶ ὡρῶν I.8.42.5

Ἔαρ δὲ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ χειμῶνος ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου· ἢ τὴν μετὰ χειμῶνα ὥραν πρὸ θέρους. Θέρος δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλισθ’ ὑφ’ ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην. Μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μέν, πρὸ χειμῶνος δέ, κεκραμένην. Χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην ἢ τὸν περὶ γῆν ἀέρα κατεψυγμένον. Γίνεσθαι δὲ ἰσημερίας δύο καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τροπὰς δύο· ἰσημερίας μέν, ὅταν ἡ νὺξ καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἴσαι ὦσι· τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν ἔαρι γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μετοπώρῳ· τῶν δὲ τροπῶν τὰς μὲν θέρους, τὰς δὲ χειμῶνος.

42b <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων> I.8.42b

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ χειμῶνα μὲν γίγνεσθαι τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπικρατοῦντος τῇ πυκνώσει εἰς τὸ ἀνωτέρω βιαζομένου· θερείαν δὲ τοῦ πυρός, ὅταν εἰς τὸ κατωτέρω βιάζηται.

42c <Ἀετίου, Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων> I.8.42c.1

Ἐνιαυτός ἐστι Κρόνου μὲν ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδος τριάκοντα, Διὸς δώδεκα, Ἄρεος δυοῖν, Ἡλίου δώδεκα μῆνες· οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἀφροδίτης, ἰσόδρομοι γάρ· Σελήνης ἡμέραι τριάκοντα. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ τέλειος μὴν ἀπὸ φάσεως εἰς σύνοδον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42 Continued: the seasons

I.8.42.5

Spring is a season of the year blended from winter ending and summer beginning; or the season after winter and before summer. Summer is the season most thoroughly heated by the sun. Autumn is the blended season after summer and before winter. Winter is the season most thoroughly chilled, or the chilled air around the earth. Each year has two equinoxes and two solstices: equinoxes occur when night and day are equal, one in spring and the other in autumn; the solstices occur in summer and winter.[287]

42b <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.8.42b

Empedocles and the Stoics say that winter occurs when air predominates, being forced upward through condensation; summer occurs when fire predominates, as it is forced downward.[288]

42c <Aëtius, Opinions>: planetary years

I.8.42c.1

A year of Saturn is a circuit of thirty years; of Jupiter, twelve; of Mars, two; of the sun, twelve months. Mercury and Venus have the same period, for they travel at an equal rate. The moon's period is thirty days, for this is the complete month from appearance to conjunction.[289]

287. The seasonal definitions follow a textual gap and remain under the same numbered excerpt. "Blended" describes the temperate mixture between the hotter and colder seasons. Tropai, translated "solstices," literally means turnings.

288. This is the ancient physical explanation reported by the compiler. Its account in terms of air, fire, and condensation is preserved as such.

289. The divine names denote the celestial bodies. These are the periods as stated in the ancient report, not modern orbital measurements. "Appearance" and "conjunction" render phasis and synodos; the latter is the moon's conjunction with the sun.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42c <Ἀετίου>· συνέχεια I.8.42c.2

Γίγνεσθαι δὲ τὸν λεγόμενον μέγαν ἐνιαυτόν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς <αὐτοὺς> ἀφ' ὧν ἤρξαντο τῆς κινήσεως ἀφίκωνται τόπους. Τὸν δέ γε μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ ὀκταετηρίδι τίθενται, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐννεακαιδεκαετηρίδι, οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς τετραπλασίοις ἔτεσιν, οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἑξήκοντα <ἑνὸς δέουσιν>, ἐν οἷς Οἰνοπίδης καὶ Πυθαγόρας· οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ κεφαλῇ τοῦ Κρόνου, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ πλανητῶν ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς ἐξ ἄρκτου φορᾶς ἐπάνοδος.

Ἡράκλειτος ἐκ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἐνιαυτῶν ἡλιακῶν.

Διογένης ὁ Στωικὸς ἐκ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίων ἐνιαυτῶν τοσούτων, ὅσος ἦν ὁ καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἐνιαυτός.

43 Σκυθίνου, Περὶ φύσεως I.8.43

Χρόνος ἐστὶν ὕστατον καὶ πρῶτον πάντων καὶ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάντα καὶ ἐστὶν εἷς ἀεί· καὶ οὐκ εἶσιν ὁ παροιχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος αὐτῷ ἐναντίην ὁδὸν παρεωνιατῶν. Τὸ γὰρ αὔριον ἡ μὲν τῷ ἔργῳ χθὲς ἔσται, τὸ δὲ χθὲς αὔριον <ἦν>.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

42c <Aëtius>, continued: the great year

I.8.42c.2

The so-called great year occurs when the heavenly bodies return to the <same> positions from which they began their motion. Some place the great year in an eight-year cycle, others in a nineteen-year cycle, others in four times that number of years, and others in sixty <less one>, including Oenopides and Pythagoras. Others place it in the so-called "head of Saturn": this is the return of the seven planets, on that day, in their motion from the north.[290]

Heraclitus makes it eighteen thousand solar years.

Diogenes the Stoic makes it three hundred and sixty-five years, each as long as the year according to Heraclitus.[291]

43 Scythinus, On Nature

I.8.43

Time is the last and first of all things, contains all things within itself, and is always one. Time that has passed does not depart from what is, along a road opposite to itself [pareōniatōn: unresolved]. For tomorrow will in fact be yesterday, and yesterday <was> tomorrow.[292]

290. The passage gathers differing recurrence cycles under "great year." The obscure "head of Saturn" clause is translated closely; the wording about a day and motion from the north does not permit a confident reconstruction of the intended astronomical configuration.

291. The numbers and attributions are those of this report. Diogenes's unit is explicitly the much longer Heraclitean year, not an ordinary solar year.

292. The middle sentence and the words ē men in the last are textually obscure. The bracketed phrase is this translation's warning that pareōniatōn cannot be translated securely; the surrounding English is provisional. Wachsmuth records several conjectures, including attempts to recover verse, and supplies "was." No metrical reconstruction is substituted for his printed text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 107-108

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

44 Πλουτάρχου, Νουμᾶ καὶ Λυκούργου

I.8.44

Πολλοί εἰσιν, οἳ προστεθῆναι τὸν Ἰανουάριον καὶ Φεβρουάριον ὑπὸ Νουμᾶ τοὺς μῆνας λέγουσιν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ χρῆσθαι Ῥωμαίους δέκα μόνοις εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν βαρβάρων τρισὶ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀρκάδες μὲν τέτρασιν, ἓξ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες· Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ μηνιαῖος ἦν ὁ ἐνιαυτός, εἶτα τετράμηνος, ὥς φασί· δι' ὃ καὶ οἱ ταύτην τὴν χώραν οἰκοῦντες ἀρχαιότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ πλῆθος ἀμήχανον ἐτῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς γενεαλογίαις καταφέρουσιν, ἅτε δὴ τοὺς μῆνας εἰς ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν τιθέμενοι.

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου <καὶ Ἀετίου>

I.8.45.1

Πλάτων αἰῶνος εἰκόνα κινητήν, ἢ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως· γενητὸν δὲ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν· οὐσίαν δὲ χρόνου τὴν οὐρανοῦ κίνησιν· λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ οὕτως·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 108-109

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

44 Plutarch, Lives of Numa and Lycurgus I.8.44

Many say that Numa added the months January and February, and that originally the Romans used only ten months for the year, just as some non-Greek peoples use three, and among the Greeks the Arcadians use four and the Acarnanians six. The Egyptians, they say, had a year of one month and then of four months. This is why the inhabitants of that country seem to be the most ancient and bring down an extraordinary number of years in their genealogies: they count months as years.[293]

45 Plato, Timaeus, <with Aëtius> I.8.45.1

Plato calls time a moving image of eternity, or the interval of the universe's motion. It is generated in conception; its nature is the motion of heaven. For he says in the Timaeus as follows:[294]

293. The source identifies this passage as Numa 18 within the paired Lives. The claims about early calendars and Egyptian genealogies are Plutarch's reported explanation; the passage is not independent confirmation of those chronologies.

294. The opening is a report about Plato; the direct quotation begins in the next block (Timaeus 37c). The source supplies Aëtius's name alongside Plato's. "Generated in conception" renders kat' epinoian and belongs to the report's interpretation, not to Plato's quoted words.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 108-109

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου· συνέχεια I.8.45.2

Ὡς δὲ κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησε τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. Καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῷον ἀΐδιον, καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εἰς δύναμιν ἐπεχείρησε τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντελῶς τῷ γενητῷ προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκόνα δ’ ἐπενόει κινητήν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι καὶ διακοσμῶν οὐρανῷ ἅμα ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 109

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Plato, Timaeus, continued

I.8.45.2

When the father who begot it saw it moving and alive, a created image of the everlasting gods, he admired it. Delighted, he conceived the plan of making it still more like its model. As the model itself is an everlasting living being, so he attempted, as far as possible, to make this whole universe such a being too. Now the nature of that living being was eternal, and it was impossible to attach this character in its entirety to what had come to be. He therefore conceived the plan of making a moving image of eternity. As he put things in order, he made, together with heaven, an enduring image of eternity: eternity remains in unity, while its image advances according to number. This image is what we have named time.[295]

295. The model is the eternal living being; the universe is its created likeness. Aiōn is “eternity”; chronos is time in succession. Eternity remains in unity; its image advances numerically. Wachsmuth’s ouranōi hama is rendered “together with heaven.” The following passage contrasts “is,” “was,” and “will be.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 109

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου· συνέχεια I.8.45.3

Ἡμέρας δὲ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου καὶ τό τ’ ἦν καὶ ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη, ἃ δὴ φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον <οὐσίαν> οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἐστί τε καὶ ἔσται· τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει, τὸ δ’ ἦν τό τ’ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι· κίνησις γάρ ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου οὔτε γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι νῦν οὐδ’ εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι, τὸ παράπαν τε οὐδὲν ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσῆψεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα μιμουμένου καὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου γέγονεν εἴδη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Plato, Timaeus, continued

I.8.45.3

Days and nights, months and years did not exist before heaven came to be. At the time of its formation he contrived that they should come to be along with it. All these are parts of time, and “was” and “will be” are forms of time that have come to be. We mistakenly and unawares transfer them to everlasting <being>. For we say that it was, is, and will be, whereas in a true account only “is” belongs to it. “Was” and “will be” should be said of becoming as it proceeds in time, for it is motion. What always remains unchangingly the same should neither grow older nor younger through time, nor have come to be at some time, nor have now come to be, nor be going to exist hereafter. None at all of the conditions that becoming attaches to things moving within perception belongs to it. Rather, these have arisen as forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to number.[296]

296. The supplied ousia, “being,” makes explicit what receives the mistaken temporal predicates. “Becoming” translates genesis: coming into existence and undergoing change. The translation follows the wording transmitted here rather than replacing it with another text of Plato.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 109-110

BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου· συνέχεια I.8.45.4

Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε, τό τε γεγονὸς εἶναι γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι γιγνόμενον, ἔτι τε τὸ γενησόμενον εἶναι γενησόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ὧν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς λέγομεν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τάχ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι. Χρόνος δ᾽ οὖν μετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵν᾽ ἅμα γενηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς αἰωνίας φύσεως, ἵν᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν· ὁ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Plato, Timaeus, continued

I.8.45.4

There are also statements such as these: what has become is what has become; what is becoming is what is becoming; what will become is what will become; and what is not is what is not. None of these expressions is exact. But perhaps this is not the right occasion to discuss them with precision. Time, then, came to be together with heaven, so that, having come to be together, they might also be dissolved together, should they ever undergo dissolution. It was made after the model of eternal nature, to be as like that model as possible. For the model is in being throughout all eternity, while heaven, continually throughout all time, has come to be, is, and will be.[297]

297. The repeated “is” retains the difficulty that the speaker raises about predicating being of what becomes or is not. The final contrast returns to the model’s eternal being and heaven’s temporal existence. Dissolution is conditional here, not asserted as an event that must occur.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου· συνέχεια I.8.45.5

Ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, ἵνα γενηθῇ χρόνος, ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἔχοντα ἐπίκλην ἄστρα πλανητὰ εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονε. Σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφοράς, ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος ᾔειν, ἑπτὰ οὔσας, ὄντα ἑπτά· σελήνην μὲν εἰς τὸν περὶ γῆν πρῶτον, ἥλιον δ’ εἰς τὸν δεύτερον ὑπὲρ γῆς, ἑωσφόρον δὲ καὶ τὸν ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ λεγόμενον εἰς τὸν τάχει μὲν ἰσόδρομον ἡλίῳ κύκλον ἰόντας, τὴν δ’ ἐναντίαν εἰληχότας αὐτῷ δύναμιν· ὅθεν καταλαμβάνουσί τε καὶ καταλαμβάνονται κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἥλιός τε καὶ ὁ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ ἑωσφόρος. Τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οἷ δὴ καὶ δι’ ἃς αἰτίας ἱδρύσατο, εἴ τις ἐπεξίοι πάσας, ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὢν πλέον ἂν ἔργον ὧν ἕνεκα λέγεται παράσχοι.

45 Πλάτωνος, Τιμαίου· συνέχεια I.8.45.6

…

Ἔστι δ’ ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον κατανοῆσαι δυνατόν, ὡς ὅ γε τέλειος ἀριθμὸς χρόνου τὸν τέλειον ἐνιαυτὸν πληροῖ τότε, ὅταν ἁπασῶν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπερανθέντα τάχη σχῇ κεφαλὴν τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 8

45 Plato, Timaeus, continued I.8.45.5

From this reasoning and intention of the god concerning the creation of time, the sun, moon, and five other stars called wanderers came into being so that time might come to be, and so that its numbers could be distinguished and preserved. After making a body for each, the god set these seven bodies in the seven circuits traversed by the revolution of the Different: the moon in the first around the earth, the sun in the second above the earth, and the morning star and the star called sacred to Hermes in the circle that runs at the same speed as the sun, though they were allotted a power contrary to its own. Thus the sun, Hermes' star, and the morning star alike overtake and are overtaken by one another.[298] As for where he placed the others and all the reasons for doing so, an account of every detail, though incidental, would make more work than the subject for whose sake it is given.

45 Plato, Timaeus, continued I.8.45.6

…

Nevertheless, it is still possible to understand that the complete number of time fulfills the complete year when the relative speeds of all eight revolutions, having completed their courses together, reach their culmination, measured by the circle of the Same, which moves uniformly.[299]

298. The "wanderers" are the planets; the morning star is Venus and Hermes' star is Mercury. The Different is the name of a cosmic revolution in this account. Its seven circuits carry the seven named or implied wandering bodies, including sun and moon. The stated relations are those of Plato's cosmology.

299. The source jumps from Timaeus 38d to 39d; the ellipsis makes that break visible. The eight revolutions include the seven just discussed and the uniform circle of the Same. The "complete year" is their common cycle of return, to be compared with the differing great years reported above in excerpt 42c.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 9

Κεφάλαιον Θ′ I.9.heading

Περὶ Ἀφροδίτης οὐρανίας καὶ Ἔρωτος <θείου>.

1 <Εὐριπίδου> I.9.1

Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅση θεός;
ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἂν εἴποις οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἄν
ὅση πέφυκε κἀφ’ ὅσον διέρχεται.
Αὕτη τρέφει σὲ κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας βροτούς·
τεκμήριον δέ, μὴ λόγῳ μόνον μάθῃς,
ἔργῳ δὲ δείξω τὸ σθένος τὸ τῆς θεοῦ·
ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ’, ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον
ἄκαρπον αὐχμῷ νοτίδος ἐνδεῶς ἔχῃ·
ἐρᾷ δ’ ὁ σεμνὸς οὐρανὸς πληρούμενος
ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης ὕπο.
ὅταν δὲ συμμιχθῆτον εἰς ταὐτὸν δύο,
τίκτουσιν ἡμῖν πάντα κἀκτρέφουσ’ ἅμα,
ὅθεν βρότειον ζῇ τε καὶ θάλλει γένος.

2a Εὐριπίδου Οἰδίποδι I.9.2a

Ἑνὸς <δ’> ἔρωτος ὄντος οὐ μί’ ἡδονή·
οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

Chapter 9: Aphrodite and Love

I.9.heading

On Heavenly Aphrodite and <Divine> Love.[300]

1 <Euripides>

I.9.1

Do you not see how mighty a goddess Aphrodite is?
You could not even tell or measure
how great she is, or how far her power extends.
She nourishes you and me and all mortals.
Here is proof, so you need not learn by words alone:
I shall show the goddess's strength in what she does.
Earth longs for rain when its dry ground,
made barren by drought, is short of moisture;
and the august sky, filling with rain,
longs, under Aphrodite's influence, to fall upon the earth.
When the two mingle together,
together they bring forth and nourish everything for us,
by which the mortal race lives and flourishes.[301]

2a Euripides, Oedipus

I.9.2a

<Yet> though love is one, its pleasure is not one:
some love shameful things, others noble things.

300. "Divine" is supplied in the chapter heading from the ancient outlines cited by Wachsmuth. Erōs names both love as a desire and Love as a personified power or deity; the excerpts explore rather than erase this range.

301. Earth and sky are represented as lovers whose union produces sustenance. The attribution to Euripides is supplied from a parallel quotation cited in the apparatus; the extract does not name a play.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 111-112

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

2b <Εὐριπίδου Σθενεβοίᾳ> I.9.2b

Ὁ δ’ εἰς τὸ σῶφρον ἐπ’ ἀρετήν τ’ ἄγων ἔρως
ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώποισιν· ὧν εἴην ἐγώ.

3 Ἐκ τῶν Βίωνος βουκολικῶν I.9.3

Μοίσας Ἔρως καλέοι, Μοῖσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα φέροιεν·
μολπὰν ταὶ Μοῖσαί μοι ἀεὶ ποθέοντι διδοῖεν,
τὰν γλυκερὰν μολπάν, τᾶς φάρμακον ἄδιον οὐδέν.

4a Εὐριπίδου Δίκτυϊ I.9.4a

Φίλος γὰρ ἦν μοι καί μ’ Ἔρως εἶλέν ποτε
οὐκ εἰς τὸ μῶρον, οὐδέ μ’ εἰς Κύπριν τρέπων.

4b <Εὐριπίδου Θησεῖ> I.9.4b

Ἀλλ’ ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς Ἔρως
ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κἀγαθῆς·
καὶ χρῆν δὲ τοῖς βροτοῖσι τόνδ’ εἶναι νόμον,
τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἵτινές τε σώφρονες
ἐρᾶν, Κύπριν δὲ τὴν Διὸς χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 9

2b <Euripides, Stheneboea>

I.9.2b

But love that leads to self-restraint and virtue
is enviable among human beings; may I be one of them.[302]

3 From Bion's Bucolic Poems

I.9.3

May Love summon the Muses, and the Muses bring Love;
may the Muses give me, ever longing, song,
sweet song, than which no remedy is sweeter.[303]

4a Euripides, Dictys

I.9.4a

For he was dear to me, and Love once took hold of me,
without turning me to folly or to Cypris.[304]

4b <Euripides, Theseus>

I.9.4b

But there is another Love among mortals:
love for a soul that is just, restrained, and good.
And this ought to be the law for mortals:
to love those who are reverent and self-controlled,
and bid farewell to Cypris, Zeus's daughter.[305]

302. "One of them" refers to those who experience this love. Sōphron here means morally restrained or temperate. The play-title is supplied from the parallel evidence cited by Wachsmuth.

303. The wish joins poetic inspiration to desire: song is also its remedy. The Greek preserves the poem's Doric forms, including Moisai for the Muses.

304. Cypris is Aphrodite. Here the name stands for sexual desire, contrasted with the attachment the speaker describes. The source prints these two lines separately from the following five.

305. The heading Theseus is supplied from another Stobaean occurrence of the first two lines. Aphrodite as Zeus's daughter will reappear in the distinction between two Aphrodites in excerpt 13.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 9

5 Ἡσιόδου I.9.5

Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
<γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί,>
ἠδ' Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

6 Παρμενίδου I.9.6

Πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

7 <Ἀδήλου συγγραφέως> I.9.7

Οὐχ ἡ ἀνάγκη μόνον καὶ τὸ δόγμα ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ἐξορμᾷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ἐξεργάζεται τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἔρως· οὗτος καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τελεσίδρομον εἶναι ποιεῖ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

5 Hesiod, Theogony (116, 117, 120) I.9.5

First of all Chaos came to be; then
<broad-breasted Earth, the ever-secure seat of all,>
and Love, most beautiful among the immortal gods.[306]

6 Parmenides I.9.6

Love was devised first of all the gods.[307]

7 <An unidentified writer> I.9.7

It is not only necessity and conviction that spur us to be good, but also what accomplishes the greatest things in human life: love. Love also makes virtue run its course to the finish.[308]

306. Wachsmuth supplies the line about Earth from Hesiod. This is a selection of lines 116, 117, and 120, not an uninterrupted passage of the Theogony. Chaos names the primordial gap or chasm.

307. The Greek verb is active, “devised,” but its subject is not expressed in this isolated line. The English uses a passive construction to avoid supplying an agent whom the excerpt does not identify.

308. Telesidromos evokes a runner completing a course. The editor prints these words as anonymous prose, rejecting an earlier attempt to arrange them as tragic verse. The Latin author-heading is rendered in Greek and English.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 9

8 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου I.9.8

Ὥστε γε τοῦτο αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα, μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον· ἀλλὰ τόδε πρὸς ἐκείνῳ δείξας φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται. Ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἐπ᾽ εὐτυχίᾳ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται. ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή.

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.9.9

Ὃ μέντοι ἐζήτουν, ἔστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο· μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα. ἦ γάρ; - Ναί. - Μανίας δὲ εἴδη δύο· τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. - Πάνυ γε. - Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ᾽ αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμεν ἀρίστην εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

8 Plato, Phaedrus (245b-c) I.9.8

Let us therefore have no fear of this very thing; let no argument alarm us by threatening that we must choose a clear-headed friend in preference to one who is beside himself. Let it carry off the prize only after showing, in addition, that love is not sent by the gods for the benefit of lover and beloved. We, in turn, must prove the opposite: that this kind of madness is given by the gods to bring good fortune. The proof will be unconvincing to the clever, but convincing to the wise.[309]

9 In the same work (265a-b) I.9.9

“What I was looking for, however, is precisely this: we said that love was a kind of madness, did we not?” “Yes.”

“And there are two kinds of madness: one arising from human illnesses, the other from a divine departure from customary practices.” “Certainly.”

“We divided the divine kind into four parts belonging to four gods: we assigned prophetic inspiration to Apollo, initiation to Dionysus, poetic inspiration to the Muses, and the fourth to Aphrodite and Love. This last, the madness of love, we said was best.”[310]

309. “Madness” translates mania. The next excerpt distinguishes divinely inspired departures from ordinary behavior from states caused by illness. Here “clear-headed” renders sōphrōn in that contrast.

310. The “four gods” are four divine sources or groups: Aphrodite and Love share the fourth. Telestikē concerns religious initiation or rites, as distinct from prophecy and poetic inspiration.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 113-114

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

10 Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.9.10

Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος πτεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος· ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς γίγνεται.

11 <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.9.11

Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δή μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν Ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσι, θεοὶ δὲ ὃ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσεις· λέγουσι δὲ οἶμαί τινες Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἔρωτα, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον πάνυ ὑβριστικὸν καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον, ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὧδε·

τὸν δή τοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν,
ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα διὰ πτεροφύτορ’ ἀνάγκην.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 114

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

10 In the same work (249d-e) I.9.10

The whole argument has thus reached this point concerning the fourth kind of madness. When someone sees beauty here and is reminded of true beauty, he grows wings; as they grow, he longs to fly upward, yet cannot, and like a bird he looks above and neglects what is below. For this he is accused of being mad. The argument is that this inspiration is the best of all and comes from the best sources, both for the person who possesses it and for the one who shares in it; and that by participating in this madness the lover becomes a lover of beautiful people.[311]

11 <In the same work (252b-c)> I.9.11

This experience, beautiful youth to whom my speech is addressed, is what human beings call Love. When you hear what the gods call it, you will probably laugh, young as you are. Some of the Homeridae, I believe, recite two lines about Love from their secret verses. One of them is thoroughly outrageous and not especially metrical. Their hymn runs like this:[312]

Mortals, you know, call him winged Love;
the immortals call him Wing-love, because he compels wings to grow.[313]

311. The wings express the soul's movement toward the true beauty of which earthly beauty reminds it. Enthousiasis means divine inspiration or possession, more than ordinary "enthusiasm." The final wording follows Stobaeus's printed text, including its repetition of "lover."

312. The Homeridae, literally "sons of Homer," are invoked here as keepers of secret verses. The playful attribution and warning about the meter belong to Plato's speaker; the lines are not presented here as an authenticated quotation from Homer.

313. Pterōs, the divine name (printed in the accusative Pterōta), joins the sound of Erōs to the Greek word for a wing. "Wing-love" attempts to preserve the joke, followed by its explanation in the verse.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 114

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

12 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ>

I.9.12

Ἔφη Φαῖδρον ἀρξάμενον ἐνθένδε ποθὲν λέγειν, ὅτι μέγας θεὸς εἴη ὁ Ἔρως καὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις εἶναι τῶν θεῶν τίμιον, ἦ δ’ ὅς· τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γοναὶ γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὔτ’ εἰσὶν οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἰδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλὰ Ἡσίοδος πρῶτον μὲν χάος φησὶ γίγνεσθαι, μετὰ τὸ χάος δύο τούτω γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ἔρωτα. Ἡσιόδῳ δὲ καὶ Ἀκουσίλεως ξύμφησιν ἐν τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις εἶναι· πρεσβύτατός τε ὢν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιός ἐστιν.

13 Ἐν ταὐτῷ

I.9.13

Πάντες γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη. Μιᾶς μὲν οὔσης εἷς ἂν ἦν Ἔρως· ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἐστόν, δύο ἀνάγκη καὶ Ἔρωτας εἶναι. Πῶς δ’ οὐ δύο τὰ θεά; ἡ μὲν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν, ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα τὸν μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ξυνεργὸν πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ οὐράνιον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

12 <The same author, Symposium (178a-c)> I.9.12

He said that Phaedrus began more or less at this point: Love was a great god, wonderful among humans and gods in many other respects, but especially in his origin. “For being among the most ancient gods is an honor,” he said. “Here is the evidence: Love has no parents, nor does anyone, whether an ordinary person or a poet, name any. Hesiod says that Chaos came to be first, and after Chaos these two, Earth and Love. Acusilaus too agrees with Hesiod that Love is among the most ancient. And being most ancient, he is the cause of the greatest blessings for us.”[314]

13 In the same work (180d-e) I.9.13

We all know that Aphrodite does not exist without Love. If there were one Aphrodite, there would be one Love; but since there are two, there must also be two Loves. How could there fail to be two goddesses? The elder is motherless, a daughter of Uranus, whom we accordingly call Heavenly; the younger is the daughter of Zeus and Dione, whom we call Common. So the Love who assists the latter must rightly be called Common, and the other Heavenly.[315]

314. This is Phaedrus’s praise of Love, reported within Plato’s dialogue. Stobaeus abbreviates the passage: the verses of Hesiod and Parmenides quoted in Plato have already appeared separately as excerpts 5 and 6. The claim that Love is a god should be read alongside, rather than assimilated to, Diotima’s different argument in excerpt 17.

315. The distinction is made in Pausanias’s speech (Symposium 180c-185c). Ourania, “Heavenly,” echoes Ouranos, “Heaven” or “Uranus.” Pandēmos means “of all the people,” here “Common”; the next excerpt attaches an ethical distinction to the two names.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 114-115

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

14 Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.9.14

Οὕτω πᾶν πάντως γε καλὸν ἕνεκα ἀρετῆς χαρίζεσθαι. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρως καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκάζων ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τόν τε ἐρῶντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον· οἱ δ’ ἕτεροι πάντες τῆς ἑτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου.

15 Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.9.15

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸν Ἔρωτα δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς διελέσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς τε σώμασι τῶν πάντων ζῴων καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένοις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι, καθεωρακέναι μοι δοκῶ ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς ἡμετέρας τέχνης, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστὸς καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει καὶ κατὰ τἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα· ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. Ἡ γὰρ φύσις τῶν σωμάτων τὸν διπλοῦν ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν ὡς ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ. Ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρως, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

14 In the same work (185b-c) I.9.14

In this way, to grant every favor for the sake of virtue is certainly noble. This is the love belonging to the Heavenly goddess: it too is Heavenly, and of great worth both to a city and to private persons. It compels lover and beloved alike to take great care over their own virtue. All other loves belong to the other goddess, the Common one.[316]

15 In the same work (186a-b) I.9.15

I think he was right to distinguish Love as twofold. But Love is present not only in human souls in their attraction to beautiful people: it has many other objects and exists in other things too, in the bodies of all animals, in plants growing in the earth, and, one might say, in everything that exists. I believe I have learned from medicine, our own art, how great and wonderful the god is, and how he extends over everything in both human and divine affairs. I shall begin with medicine, to give our art its due honor. The nature of bodies contains this twofold love: we agree that what is healthy in the body differs from and is unlike what is diseased, and unlike things desire and love unlike objects. Thus the love present in what is healthy is one kind, and that in what is diseased another.[317]

316. Charizesthai, “grant favors,” concerns yielding to a lover. Pausanias’s conclusion makes the cultivation of virtue the condition of its nobility. The opening follows the fuller wording printed by Wachsmuth, including pan, “every” or “all.”

317. Eryximachus, the physician, extends Pausanias’s distinction to the natural world. His speech begins at Symposium 185e; the first sentence here refers back to Pausanias. “Love” now describes bodily attractions as well as human relationships.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 115-116

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

16 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · α′ I.9.16.1

Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ξύστασις μεστή ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος, ἃ νῦν δὴ λέγω, τά τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα, ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς ὕβρεως ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος καὶ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας γένηται, διέφθειρέ τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδίκησεν. οἵ τε γὰρ λοιμοὶ φιλοῦσι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια καὶ πολλὰ νοσήματα καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς. καὶ γὰρ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσῖβαι ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας περὶ ἄλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται ἐρωτικῶν, ὧν ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἄστρων τε φορὰς καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν ὥρας ἀστρονομία καλεῖται.

16 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · β′ I.9.16.2

Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ αἱ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἷς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ τέχνη, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία, οὐ περὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ἔρωτος φυλακήν τε καὶ ἴασιν. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἀσέβεια φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις τῷ κοσμίῳ ἔρωτι χαρίζηται μηδὲ τιμᾷ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἕτερον, καὶ περὶ γονέας καὶ ζῶντας καὶ τετελευτηκότας, καὶ περὶ θεούς· ἃ δὴ προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς ἐρῶντας καὶ ἰατρεύειν· καὶ ἔστιν αὖ ἡ μαντικὴ φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργὸς τῷ ἐπίστασθαι τὰ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτικά, ὅσα τείνει πρὸς θέμιν καὶ εὐσέβειαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

16 In the same work (188a-d), part 1

I.9.16.1

The constitution of the seasons of the year is also full of both these loves. When the things I have just mentioned, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, experience orderly love for one another and attain harmony and a temperate mixture, they bring a fruitful year and health to human beings, other animals, and plants, and do no harm. But when love accompanied by excess gains the upper hand in the seasons too, it destroys and injures many things. Plagues tend to arise from such conditions, along with many other diseases of various kinds in animals and plants. Frosts, hailstorms, and blights likewise result from the greed and disorder of these relations of love with one another. Knowledge of them in connection with the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year is called astronomy.[318]

16 In the same work, part 2

I.9.16.2

Moreover, all sacrifices and everything governed by the art of divination, that is, the communion of gods and human beings with one another, concern nothing other than the protection and healing of love. Every kind of impiety tends to arise when someone fails to gratify orderly love or honor and give it precedence in every action, and favors the other kind instead, in dealings with parents both living and dead, and with the gods. In these matters divination has been appointed to examine lovers and heal them. Divination in turn creates friendship between gods and human beings through its knowledge of human affairs of love, insofar as these tend toward divine law and reverence.[319]

318. In Eryximachus's account, orderly love produces a balanced mixture of hot, cold, dry, and moist; excessive love disrupts it. Pleonexia, "greed," literally seeking to have more, is extended metaphorically to these natural forces.

319. Medical imagery extends to religion. "Lovers" follows Vermehren's erōntas, replacing "Loves." "Reverence" renders the printed eusebeian; Wachsmuth's apparatus records the contrasting Plato reading asebeian, "impiety." These choices follow the text of this excerpt.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 116-117

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

16 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · γ′ I.9.16.3

Οὕτω πολλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει ξυλλήβδην μὲν ὁ πᾶς ἔρως· ὁ δὲ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς.

17 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · α′ I.9.17.1

Εὐδαίμονας λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ κεκτημένους; - Πάνυ γε. - Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας δι’ ἔνδειαν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστι; - Ὡμολόγηκα γάρ. - Πῶς ἂν οὖν θεὸς εἴη ὅ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος; - Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς γ’ ἔοικεν. - Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ Ἔρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις; - Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφην, ὁ Ἔρως εἴη; θνητός; - Ἥκιστα γε. - Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; - Ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα ἔφην, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. - Τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα; - Δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξὺ ἐστὶ θεοῦ καὶ θνητοῦ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

16 In the same work, part 3

I.9.16.3

Thus Love taken as a whole has vast and mighty power, or rather all power. But the love fulfilled in good things with self-restraint and justice, both among us and among the gods, has the greatest power. It provides us with every happiness and makes us able to associate and be friends with one another and with the gods, who are greater than we are.

17 In the same work (202c-203a), part 1

I.9.17.1

“Do you not call those who possess good and beautiful things happy?” “Certainly.”

“But you have admitted that Love desires beautiful and good things because he lacks those very things?” “I have.”

“How, then, could one who has no share in beautiful and good things be a god?” “He could not, it seems.”

“Do you see, then,” she said, “that you too do not consider Love a god?”

“What, then,” I said, “could Love be? Mortal?” “By no means.”

“What, then?” “As I said before, between mortal and immortal.”

“What is that, Diotima?” “A great spirit, Socrates: for everything of the spiritual order is between god and mortal.”[320]

320. Socrates recounts his conversation with Diotima (introduced at Symposium 201d). “Spirit” translates daimōn, and “the spiritual order” to daimonion. Here they designate intermediaries between gods and mortals, without implying evil spirits. This argument gives Love a different status from the god praised in excerpt 12.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 117-118

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

17 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · β′ I.9.17.2

Τίνα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; - Ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τε τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν· ἐν μέσῳ δ’ ὂν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. Διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερῶν τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδὰς καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. Θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς <ἀνθρώπους καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς> ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι. Καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σφοδρὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ περὶ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάναυσος. Οὗτοι δὴ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοί τε καὶ παντοδαποί εἰσιν, εἷς δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ Ἔρως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 118

BOOK I CHAPTER 9

17 In the same work, part 2

I.9.17.2

"With what power?" I asked.

"To interpret and carry across to the gods what comes from human beings, and to human beings what comes from the gods: from the former, prayers and sacrifices; from the latter, commands and recompense for sacrifices. Being between the two, it fills the interval, so that the whole is bound together with itself. Through it all divination proceeds, as does the art of sacred matters concerning sacrifices, initiations, incantations, and all prophecy and sorcery. A god does not mingle with a human being; through this intermediary all intercourse and conversation takes place for gods with <human beings, and with gods> for human beings, whether awake or asleep. A man devoted to such matters is spiritual; one skilled in something else, in crafts or some manual occupation, is a mere artisan.[321] These spirits are many and of every kind, and Love is one of them."

321. "Devoted" follows sphodros, "intense" or "zealous," printed here where Plato's text has sophos, "wise." Daimonios, "spiritual," recalls the daimōn's mediating role. Banausos, "mere artisan," expresses the speaker's devaluation of practical expertise in comparison with this religious knowledge.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 118

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

Κεφάλαιον Ι′ I.10.heading

Περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων τοῦ παντός.

1 Ἡσιόδου Θεογονίας I.10.1

Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ’, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ’ εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
Τάρταρά τ’ ἠερόεντα μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης.

2 Ὁμήρου I.10.2

Ὠκεανός θ’ ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

3 Ὀρφέως I.10.3

Ἓν <δὲ> δέμας βασίλειον, ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,
πῦρ <καὶ> ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ αἰθήρ, νύξ τε καὶ ἦμαρ.

4 <Ὁμήρου> I.10.4

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

Chapter 10: Principles and Elements

I.10.heading

On the principles and elements of the universe.[322]

1 Hesiod, Theogony (116-119)

I.10.1

First of all Chaos came to be; then
broad-breasted Earth, the ever-secure seat of all
the immortals who possess snowy Olympus's summit,
and misty Tartarus in the depths of the broad-pathed earth.[323]

2 Homer, Iliad (14.246)

I.10.2

And Oceanus, who is the source from which all have sprung.

3 Orpheus

I.10.3

<And> one sovereign body, within which all these circle:
fire <and> water and earth and aether, night and day.[324]

4 <Homer, Iliad (14.201)>

I.10.4

And Oceanus, source of the gods, and mother Tethys.[325]

322. Archai are origins or explanatory first principles; stoicheia are constituent elements. Their relation is itself disputed in the chapter, especially in excerpts 16b and 16c. The ancient elements should not be identified with the elements of modern chemistry.

323. Compare I.9.5, where the selection instead proceeds to Love. Here Tartarus, the deep region beneath the earth, completes the extract. Chaos is the primordial gap or chasm.

324. The excerpt presents the world's constituents within one sovereign body. Aether names the upper, luminous region of the sky; its precise physical role varies among the authors collected here. The attribution is the source's heading.

325. Oceanus and Tethys recur in excerpt 8 as a primordial married pair, and in 11b within an allegorical interpretation of Homer.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

5 Λίνου ἐκ τῶν Περὶ φύσεως κόσμου

I.10.5

Ὡς κατ᾽ ἔριν συνάπαντα κυβερνᾶται διὰ παντός·
ἐκ παντὸς δὲ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐκ πάντων τόπαν ἐστί.
Πάντα δ᾽ ἕν ἐστιν, ἕκαστον ὅλου μέρος, ἐν δ᾽ ἑνὶ πάντα,
ἐκ γὰρ ἑνός ποτ᾽ ἐόντος ὅλου τάδε πάντ᾽ ἐγένοντο·
ἐκ πάντων δέ ποτ᾽ αὖθις ἓν ἔσσεται ἐν χρόνου αἴσῃ,
αἰὲν ἓν ὂν καὶ πολλά· καὶ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀθρῆσαι
πολλάκις [δ᾽] ἔσται ταῦτα· καὶ οὔποτε πεῖρας ἔπεισιν
αἰεὶ πείρατ᾽ ἔχων· πήιον γένος ἔλλαχε ταὐτόν.
ὧδε γὰρ ἀθάνατος θάνατος περὶ πάντα καλύπτει
θνητὸς ἰὼν καὶ πᾶν θνήσκει φθαρτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπάρχον
φαντασίαις τ᾽ ἀλλοιοτρόποις καὶ σχήμασι μορφῆς
ἀλλάξει τρόπον, <ὡς> ἀποκρύπτεμεν ὄψιν ἁπάντων,
ἄφθορον ἔσσετ᾽ ἐόν τ᾽ αἰεί, καθὸ τῇδε τέτυκται.

6 <Πλουτάρχου>

I.10.6

Ὅμηρος δὲ σημαίνει τὴν ἀνάλυσιν εἰς τὰ γεννητικὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντὸς λέγων·

Ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

5 Linus, On the Nature of the World

I.10.5

Thus all things are ever governed through strife;
all things come from the whole, and the whole from all things.
All things are one, each a part of the whole, and all within one:
from what was once one whole all these things came to be,
and from all things one will again arise in time's allotted course,
always one and many, though not to be seen in the same state.
[And] these things will happen many times; no end will ever come,
though it always has limits; a [pēion: unresolved] kind has obtained the same.[326]
For thus immortal death envelops everything,
passing as mortal; all that is perishable dies, but what exists
will change its manner through varied appearances and shapes,
<so as> to conceal everything's aspect;
it will remain imperishable and ever-existent, as it is constituted here.[327]

6 <Plutarch>

I.10.6

Homer indicates dissolution into the generative elements of the universe when he says:

But may you all turn into water and earth![328]

326. The middle lines are damaged. The clause beginning pēion cannot be securely construed: genos means "kind" or "race," ellache "obtained by lot," and tauton "the same." The bracketed warning is supplied by this translation, and the surrounding English is provisional. The preceding masculine echōn, "having," also lacks a clear subject. Wachsmuth's apparatus records competing repairs.

327. The poem contrasts the death of perishable forms with an underlying existence that persists through change. "Immortal death" and "passing as mortal" preserve the printed paradox; the final lines also depend on editorial repairs. The source's square brackets mark the rejected connective de, rendered "[And]."

328. Iliad 7.99. The commentator reads the line as physical doctrine. Wachsmuth supplies Plutarch's name but identifies the source in his apparatus as a work transmitted under Plutarch's name rather than securely his.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

7 Ἡρακλείτου I.10.7

Ἐκ πυρὸς γὰρ τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ πάντα τελευτᾷ.

8 Ὀρφεύς I.10.8

Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος ἦρξε γάμοιο,
ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν.

9 Ἡσίοδος Θεογονίᾳ I.10.9

Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἶσον ἑαυτῇ
οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι,
ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί.

10 Φιλήμονος I.10.10

<Ὃν> οὐδὲ εἷς λέληθεν οὐδὲ ἓν ποιῶν,
οὐδ' αὖ ποιήσων, οὐδὲ πεποιηκὼς πάλαι,
οὔτε θεὸς οὔτ' ἄνθρωπος, οὗτός εἰμ' ἐγὼ
Ἀήρ, ὃν ἄν τις ὀνομάσειε καὶ Δία.
Ἐγὼ δ', ὃ θεοῦ 'στιν ἔργον, εἰμὶ πανταχοῦ,
ἐνταῦθ' ἐν Ἀθήναις, ἐν Πάτραις, ἐν Σικελίᾳ,
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πάσαισιν, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις
πάσαις, ἐν ὑμῖν πᾶσιν· οὐκ ἔστιν τόπος
οὗ μὴ 'στιν ἀήρ· ὁ δὲ παρὼν ἀπανταχοῦ
πάντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδε [πανταχοῦ παρών].

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

7 Heraclitus

I.10.7

For all things come from fire, and all things end in fire.[329]

8 Orpheus

I.10.8

Fair-flowing Oceanus was the first to institute marriage:
he married Tethys, his sister born of the same mother.

9 Hesiod, Theogony (126-128)

I.10.9

Earth first bore starry Heaven, equal to herself,
so that he might cover her on every side,
and be an ever-secure seat for the blessed gods.

10 Philemon

I.10.10

No one has escaped me in a single deed,
nor in what he will do, nor in what he did long ago,
neither god nor man. I am that watcher,
Air, whom one might also call Zeus.
I do what belongs to a god: I am everywhere,
here in Athens, in Patrae, in Sicily,
in every city, in every house,
in every one of you. There is no place
where air is absent; whoever is present everywhere
must necessarily know everything [being present everywhere].[330]

329. Although placed among poetic excerpts, this sentence is printed as prose. Wachsmuth connects it with the report that reappears below in excerpt 14; it need not be Heraclitus's own wording.

330. This repeats I.1.32, with fuller wording and an intact attribution. The relative pronoun "whom" is supplied at the beginning; English recasts the construction as "No one has escaped me ... I am that watcher." The final repetition is bracketed by the editor as intrusive.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

11a <Ἐμπεδοκλέους> I.10.11a

Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·
Ζεὺς ἀργής, Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος, ἠδ’ Ἀιδωνεύς,
Νῆστίς θ’, ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει, κρούνωμα βρότειον.
τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῖκος.

11b <Πλουτάρχου> · α′ I.10.11b.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Δία μὲν λέγει τὴν ζέσιν <καὶ> τὸν αἰθέρα, Ἥρην δὲ φερέσβιον τὴν γῆν· ἀέρα δὲ τὸν Ἀιδωνέα, ἐπειδὴ φῶς οἰκεῖον οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καταλάμπεται· Νῆστιν δὲ καὶ “κρούνωμα βρότειον” τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. Ἐκ τεσσάρων οὖν στοιχείων τὸ πᾶν, τῆς τούτων φύσεως ἐξ ἐναντίων συνεστώσης, ξηρότητός τε καὶ ὑγρότητος καὶ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ὑπὸ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀναλογίας καὶ κράσεως ἓν ἀπεργαζομένης τὸ πᾶν καὶ μεταβολὰς μὲν μερικὰς ὑπομενούσης, τοῦ δὲ παντὸς λύσιν μὴ ἐπιδεχομένης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

11a <Empedocles>

I.10.11a

First hear the four roots of everything:
shining Zeus, life-bearing Hera, and Aidoneus,
and Nestis, who with her tears moistens the mortal wellspring.
As these came together, Strife stood apart at the outermost edge.[331]

11b <Plutarch>, part 1

I.10.11b.1

By Zeus Empedocles means boiling heat <and> aether; by life-bearing Hera, earth; and by Aidoneus, air, because it has no light of its own but is illuminated by the sun, moon, and stars. By Nestis and "the mortal wellspring" he means seed and water.[332] The universe thus consists of four elements, whose nature is constituted by opposites: dryness and moisture, heat and cold. Through their proportion and mixture with one another, this nature makes the universe one, undergoing changes in its parts but admitting no dissolution of the whole.

331. The "roots" are the enduring constituents commonly called elements. "Mortal wellspring" is taken as the object of "moistens"; the Greek retains the source's intervening comma. The last line is a separate Empedoclean verse joined to the list here, as the source's verse references indicate. Its ex is read adverbially, "apart" or "outside." The next excerpt offers an interpretation of the divine names.

332. These identifications are those of the present commentator. They make divine genealogy into physical explanation: the names stand for constituents and their powers. As in excerpt 6, the supplied Plutarch-heading refers to the tradition of works transmitted under his name.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

11b <Πλουτάρχου> · β′ I.10.11b.2

Λέγει γὰρ οὕτως·

Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,
ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
Ὅμηρος δὲ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος τῶν τοῦ παντὸς μερῶν ἐν τούτοις αἰνίσσεται, ἐν οἷς φησιν ἡ Ἥρα·

Εἶμι γὰρ ὀψομένη πολυφόρβου πείρατα γαίης,
ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν·
τοὺς εἶμ’ ὀψομένη καί σφ’ ἄκριτα νείκεα λύσω.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.10.12.1

Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεφήνατο τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ ὕδατος γάρ φησι πάντα εἶναι καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλύεσθαι. Στοχάζεται δὲ πρῶτον ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἡ γονὴ ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὑγρὰ οὖσα. οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ὑγροῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. Δεύτερον, <ὅτι> πάντα φυτὰ ὑγρῷ τρέφεται καὶ καρποφορεῖ, ἀμοιροῦντα δὲ ξηραίνεται. Τρίτον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ταῖς τῶν ὑδάτων ἀναθυμιάσεσι τρέφεται καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

11b <Plutarch>, part 2

I.10.11b.2

For he says:

At one time all come together into one through Love,
at another each is borne apart by Strife's hatred.
Homer alludes to the friendship and strife of the universe's parts in these lines, in which Hera says:[333]

For I go to visit the limits of earth that feeds so many,
and Oceanus, source of the gods, and mother Tethys;
I go to visit them and settle their unresolved quarrels.

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Thales

I.10.12.1

Thales of Miletus declared water to be the principle of existing things: he says that everything comes from water and everything is dissolved into water. His first inference rests on this: the origin of all animals is their generative fluid, which is moist. It is accordingly reasonable that all things too should have their origin in moisture. Second, <that> all plants are nourished and bear fruit through moisture, but dry up when deprived of it. Third, that even the fire of the sun and stars is nourished by exhalations from waters, as is the world itself.[334]

333. The commentator connects Empedocles's Love and Strife with Homeric reconciliation. The Homeric excerpt joins Iliad 14.200-201 to 14.205, skipping the intervening lines; the printed reference is imprecise. The English follows the actual verses quoted.

334. This is a report of Thales's doctrine and its supposed reasons, not a surviving treatise by Thales. Wachsmuth supplies Aëtius's name for the compilation of opinions; the Latin heading is rendered in Greek and English. "Generative fluid" translates gonē, seed or semen.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.10.12.2

Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος φησι τῶν ὄντων <τὴν> ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθείρεσθαι. Διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνονται. Λέγει γοῦν διότι ἀπέραντόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ <ἡ> γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη. Ἁμαρτάνει δὲ μὴ λέγων τί ἐστι τὸ ἄπειρον. Τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν· οὐ δύναται δ’ ἡ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνέργεια, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ὑποκέηται.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.10.12.3

Ξενοκράτης συνεστάναι τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀενάου, ἀέναον τὴν ὕλην αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τοῦ πλήθους.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.10.12.4

Ξενοφάνης ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων εἶναι τὴν γῆν· γράφει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως·

Ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Anaximander I.10.12.2

Anaximander of Miletus, son of Praxiades, says that <the> principle of existing things is the unlimited: everything comes to be from it and perishes into it. Hence unlimited worlds are generated and perish again into that from which they arise. He says, then, that it is boundless so that <the> process of coming-to-be that takes place may never fail. But he errs in not saying what the unlimited is. The unlimited is nothing other than matter; yet matter cannot be activity unless an agent is presupposed.[335]

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Xenocrates I.10.12.3

Xenocrates holds that the universe is constituted from the One and the ever-flowing, using “ever-flowing” to allude to matter through its multiplicity.[336]

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Xenophanes I.10.12.4

Xenophanes holds that earth is the principle of everything; for he writes in On Nature:

For all things come from earth, and all things end in earth.

335. Apeiron means the unlimited or boundless. The criticism beginning “But he errs” is the reporter’s judgment, not Anaximander’s own admission. Its contrast is between material and acting cause. “Be activity” keeps the unusual printed predicate energeia; the apparatus records the proposed reading “be in actuality.”

336. The compressed explanation connects matter’s multiplicity with the term aenaon, “ever-flowing.” Wachsmuth notes that Stobaeus has inserted this report and the following Xenophanes excerpt from elsewhere into the sequence assigned to Aëtius.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Ἀετίου> · 5

I.10.12.5

Ἀναξιμένης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφήνατο, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι. Οἷον ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα, ἀὴρ οὖσα, συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει. Λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀὴρ καὶ πνεῦμα. Ἁμαρτάνει δὲ ἐξ ἁπλοῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος δοκῶν συνεστάναι τὰ ζῷα· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι· οἷον ἄργυρος οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 6

I.10.12.6

Ἀναξαγόρας Ἡγησιβούλου ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων τὰς ὁμοιομερείας ἀπεφήνατο. Τροφὴν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα μονοειδῆ ἄρτον καὶ ὕδωρ· καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τρέφεται φλέψ, ἀρτηρία, σάρξ, νεῦρα, ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια. Τούτων οὖν γιγνομένων ὁμολογητέον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερομένῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὔξεται. ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν ἐστι λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μόρια· <καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅμοια> τὰ μέρη εἶναι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τοῖς γεννωμένοις ὁμοιομερείας αὐτὰ ἐκάλεσε καὶ ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ὁμοιομερείας ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον νοῦν, τὸν πάντα διαταξάμενον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Anaximenes

I.10.12.5

Anaximenes of Miletus, son of Eurystratus, declared air to be the principle of existing things: everything comes to be from it and is dissolved back into it. “Just as our soul, being air, holds us together,” he says, “so breath and air encompass the whole world.” Air and breath are used as synonymous terms. But he errs in thinking that animals are constituted from simple, uniform air and breath: matter cannot stand as the sole principle of existing things; an acting cause must also be assumed. Silver, for example, is not enough for a cup to come into being unless there is an agent, namely the silversmith.[337]

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Anaxagoras

I.10.12.6

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, son of Hegesibulus, declared like-parted constituents to be the principles of existing things. We take in food of a uniform kind, bread and water, and from it veins, arteries, flesh, sinews, bones, and the other parts are nourished. Since this happens, we must admit that all existing things are present in the food we take in, and that everything grows from things that already exist. The food therefore contains parts discernible by reason. <And because> the parts in the food <are like> the things produced, he called them “like-parted constituents” and principles of existing things. He made these constituents matter, and mind, which arranged everything, the acting cause.[338]

337. Pneuma here is “breath,” explicitly equated with air by the report. The silversmith analogy belongs to the reporter’s criticism: a material alone does not explain the action that shapes it.

338. Homoiomereiai is the report’s technical term: constituents whose parts are like the substances they nourish or produce. The argument infers their presence even where they cannot be separately perceived. Nous, “mind,” is distinguished from these material constituents as the cause of arrangement. The English divides the supplied phrase to preserve its syntax.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.10.12.7

Ἀρχέλαος ἀέρα ἄπειρον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν πυκνότητα καὶ μάνωσιν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι πῦρ, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ.

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις ταῖς διαδοχαῖς γενόμενοι τὴν Ἰωνικὴν ἐκπληροῦσι φιλοσοφίαν, οὕτω προσαγορευθεῖσαν, διότι Μιλήσιος αὐτῆς κατῆρξεν ἀνήρ, ὁ Θαλῆς ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἰώνων μητροπόλεως.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 8 I.10.12.8

Φιλόλαος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος τὸ πέρας καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 9 I.10.12.9

Στράτων στοιχεῖα <θερμὸν> καὶ ψυχρόν.

12 <Ἀετίου> · 10 I.10.12.10

Πυθαγόρας Μνησάρχου Σάμιος, πρῶτος φιλοσοφίαν τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι προσαγορεύσας, ἀρχὰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὰς συμμετρίας τὰς ἐν τούτοις, ἅς τινας ἁρμονίας καλεῖ· τὰ <δ’> ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων σύνθετα στοιχεῖα· πάλιν δὲ τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. Σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς, ὁ θεός· ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Archelaus and the Ionian succession I.10.12.7

Archelaus posits unlimited air and its density and rarefaction: one of these is fire, the other water.[339]

These men, following one another in succession, make up Ionian philosophy, so called because its founder was a man of Miletus: Thales, from the Ionians' mother-city.

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Philolaus I.10.12.8

Philolaus the Pythagorean posits limit and the unlimited.[340]

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Strato I.10.12.9

Strato makes <the hot> and the cold the elements.

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Pythagoras: principles I.10.12.10

Pythagoras of Samos, son of Mnesarchus, who first called philosophy by that name, makes numbers and the proportions among them, which he calls harmonies, the principles; <and> the compounds formed from both, the elements. Again, he places the monad and the indefinite dyad among the principles. In his account, one principle tends toward the productive and formal cause, which is mind, or god; the other toward what is receptive and material, which is the visible world.[341]

339. The report leaves the last pair as "one ... the other" rather than explicitly matching each condition with its product. The succession that follows is the ancient account's classification of the thinkers.

340. The verb and the reference to principles are understood from the sequence. The opposition of limit and unlimited also appears in the surviving On Arithmetic at the beginning of this volume.

341. The monad is unity; the indefinite dyad is an indeterminate twofold principle. The report aligns them with acting, form-giving cause and receptive matter. This is a transmitted account under Pythagoras's name, not his own surviving exposition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Ἀετίου> · 11 I.10.12.11

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν φύσιν <τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ> δεκάδα· μέχρι γὰρ τῶν δέκα πάντες ἀριθμοῦσιν, ἐφ' ἃ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἀναποδίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν μονάδα. Καὶ τῶν δέκα πάλιν, φησίν, ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσιν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τετράδος καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν ἀναπληροῦται· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβάλῃ <τις> τὸν τῆς τετράδος, καὶ τῶν δέκα ὑπερεκπεσεῖται. Διὸ καὶ ἐπεφθέγγοντο οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὡς μεγίστου <ὅρκου> ὄντος τῆς τετράδος,

Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
παγὰν ἀενάου φύσιος ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσαν.

13 Θεανοῦς ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ εὐσεβείας I.10.13

Καὶ συχνοὺς μὲν Ἑλλήνων πέπυσμαι νομίσαι φάναι Πυθαγόραν ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ πάντα φύεσθαι. Οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀπορησίας ἔχεται, πῶς ἃ μηδὲ ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖται καὶ γεννᾶν. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ, κατὰ δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἔλεγε πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ὅτι ἐν ἀριθμῷ τάξις πρώτη, ἧς μετουσίᾳ κἀν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς πρῶτόν τι καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τἆλλα ἑπομένως τέτακται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 125-126

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

12 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Pythagoras: the tetractys

I.10.12.11

The nature <of number> is the decad: everyone counts up to ten and, having reached it, returns again to the unit. The power of ten, he says, is in four, since ten is completed from four and its parts; if <someone> goes beyond the number four, he will also overshoot ten. Hence the Pythagoreans would declare, treating the tetrad as the greatest <oath>:[342]

No, by him who handed down to our mind the tetractys,
which holds the source and root of ever-flowing nature![343]

13 Theano, On Piety

I.10.13

I have learned that many Greeks have supposed Pythagoras to have said that everything grows out of number. But this assertion involves a difficulty: how can things that do not even exist be conceived as generating things as well? He said that everything comes to be not out of number but according to number, because order is first present in number; by participation in that order, things that are counted are likewise arranged as first, second, and the rest in succession.[344]

342. The decad is ten, the tetrad four. The explanation sums 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; continuing with five would pass ten. It does not mean multiplying four by itself.

343. The tetractys is the arrangement of the first four numbers whose sum is ten. The oath invokes the person who transmitted it. “Our mind” renders the printed kephalāi, literally “our head”; the apparatus records psychāi, “soul,” in the parallel text.

344. The distinction is between number as a supposed material source and number as the order according to which things arise. The phrase about what does not exist is compressed and textually repaired in the base edition; the translation does not add a theory of numbers’ existence to resolve it. Theano is the transmitted author-name.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 125-126

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

14 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.10.14.1

Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἵππασος ἀρχὴν τῶν ἁπάντων τὸ πῦρ. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ παχυμερέστερον αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸ συστελλόμενον <γῆ> γίγνεται, ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς χύσει ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ἀναθυμιώμενον δὲ ἀέρα γίγνεσθαι. Πάλιν δὲ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ σώματα πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀναλύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει.

14 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.10.14.2

Μητρόδωρος Θεοκρίτου Χῖος τὰ ἀδιαίρετα καὶ τὸ κενόν.

Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα ἄπειρον.

Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα.

Λεύκιππος Μιλήσιος ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν.

Δημόκριτος τὰ ναστὰ καὶ κενόν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 126

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

14 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Heraclitus and Hippasus I.10.14.1

Heraclitus and Hippasus make fire the principle of everything. First, its coarser part contracts into itself and becomes <earth>; then earth, loosened by fire, melts to form water, and water, exhaled as vapor, becomes air. In turn, the world and all bodies are dissolved by fire in the conflagration.[345]

14 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Further accounts of the principles I.10.14.2

Metrodorus of Chios, son of Theocritus, posits the indivisibles and the void.

Diogenes of Apollonia, unlimited air.

Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, makes god and matter the principles, and the elements four.

Leucippus of Miletus makes the full and the void the principles and elements.

Democritus posits compact bodies and void.[346]

345. Ekpyrōsis, “conflagration,” is the burning up of the world in this reported account. The passage describes transformations among the ancient elements.

346. “The full” and “compact bodies” describe bodies without internal void. The terse catalogue supplies no account here of their shapes or combinations. Zeno’s distinction between principles and elements is developed further in excerpt 16c.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

14 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.10.14.3

Ἐπίκουρος ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, ἀμέτοχα κενοῦ, ἀγένητα, ἀδιάφθαρτα οὔτε θραυσθῆναι δυνάμενα οὔτε ἀλλοιωθῆναι. Εἴρηται δὲ ἄτομος οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλαχίστη, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ δύναται τμηθῆναι, ἀπαθὴς οὖσα καὶ ἀμέτοχος κενοῦ.

15 Ἑρμοῦ I.10.15

Ἡ γὰρ μονάς, οὖσα πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα, ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν ὡς ἂν ῥίζα καὶ ἀρχή, ἄνευ δὲ ἀρχῆς οὐδέν· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς, εἴ γε ἀρχή ἐστι τῶν ἑτέρων. [μονὰς] οὖσα οὖν ἀρχὴ πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἐμπεριέχει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐμπεριεχομένη· καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν γεννᾷ, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς γεννωμένη ἑτέρου ἀριθμοῦ. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀτελὲς καὶ διαιρετὸν καὶ αὐξητὸν καὶ μειωτόν· τῷ δὲ τελείῳ οὐδὲν τούτων γίγνεται. Αὕτη οὖν, ὦ Τάτ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν σοι ὑπογέγραπται τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκών.

16a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.10.16a.1

Ἔκφαντος Συρακούσιος, εἷς τῶν Πυθαγορείων, πάντων τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν. Τὰς γὰρ Πυθαγορικὰς μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικάς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

14 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Epicurus

I.10.14.3

Epicurus holds that the principles of existing things are bodies discernible by reason, containing no void, ungenerated and indestructible, incapable of being broken or altered. A body is called an atom not because it is the smallest, but because it cannot be cut, being unaffected and containing no void.[347]

15 Hermes

I.10.15

For the monad, being the principle and root of everything, is present in everything as its root and principle; without a principle there is nothing. A principle comes from nothing else, but from itself, if indeed it is the principle of other things. Being a principle, then, [the monad] contains every number, while being contained by none; and it generates every number, while being generated by no other number. Everything generated is incomplete, divisible, capable of increase and decrease; none of these things happens to what is complete. Such, then, Tat, is the image of god sketched for you as far as is possible.[348]

16a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Ecphantus

I.10.16a.1

Ecphantus of Syracuse, one of the Pythagoreans, makes indivisible bodies and the void the principles of everything. For he was the first to declare the Pythagorean units to be corporeal.[349]

347. Atomos means “uncuttable” or “indivisible.” The passage explains that name through the body’s resistance to division, rather than through a claim that it is the smallest conceivable magnitude. “Containing no void” concerns the atom’s interior.

348. The unit or monad serves as an image of a first principle: it gives rise to number without itself arising from another number. The conclusion identifies this as an image of god, not merely an arithmetic claim. Square brackets retain the editor’s rejection of the repeated word “monad.”

349. The report treats the units themselves as bodies. This differs from Theano’s insistence in excerpt 13 on things arising “according to number.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 126-127

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.10.16a.2

Πλάτων Ἀρίστωνος τρεῖς ἀρχάς, τὸν θεόν, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἰδέαν· ὑφ' οὗ, ἐξ οὗ, πρὸς ὅ. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς νοῦς ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ δὲ ὕλη τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, ἰδέα δὲ οὐσία ἀσώματος ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ.

16a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.10.16a.3

Ἀριστοτέλης Νικομάχου Σταγειρίτης ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶδος, ὕλην, στέρησιν· στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα, πέμπτον δέ τι σῶμα τὸ αἰθέριον, ἀμετάβλητον· στοιχεῖα δὲ τῶν γενητῶν κατὰ μὲν τὰς δυνάμεις θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ὑγρόν, ξηρόν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἐν αἷς καὶ περὶ ἃς ὑπάρχουσιν αὗται, τὰ τέσσαρα.

16a <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.10.16a.4

Διόδωρος ἐπίκλην Κρόνος τὰ ἀμερῆ σώματα ἄπειρα, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ἐλάχιστα· ἄπειρα μὲν κατ' ἀριθμόν, ὡρισμένα δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Plato

I.10.16a.2

Plato, son of Ariston, posits three principles: god, matter, and form; that by which, that out of which, and that with reference to which. God is the mind of the world; matter is what underlies coming-to-be and passing-away; form is an incorporeal being in the thoughts and representations of god.[350]

16a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Aristotle

I.10.16a.3

Aristotle of Stagira, son of Nicomachus, makes form, matter, and privation the principles. There are four elements, and a certain fifth body, the aetherial, which is unchanging. The elements of generated things, considered in their powers, are the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry; considered as the substances in which and about which these powers are found, they are the four elements.[351]

16a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Diodorus Cronus

I.10.16a.4

Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, posits infinitely many partless bodies, also called smallest bodies: infinite in number, but bounded in magnitude.[352]

350. The three compressed phrases distinguish the maker, the material, and the pattern. The placement of form in divine thought belongs to this ancient report's interpretation of Plato; this is not a direct quotation from a Platonic dialogue.

351. Privation is the absence of a form; the list distinguishes it from both the form and the underlying matter. The final distinction separates elemental qualities from the bodies that possess them. The aetherial fifth body is set apart as unchanging.

352. Amerē means "without parts." The qualification distinguishes an unlimited number of bodies from their limited individual size.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16b <Ἀετίου> · 1

I.10.16b.1

Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Πλάτωνα διαφέρειν ἡγοῦνται ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖα.

Θαλῆς δ' ὁ Μιλήσιος ταὐτὸν νομίζει ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖα. <Πλεῖστον δὲ ὅσον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα> ἐστι σύνθετα, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς φαμεν εἶναι οὔτε συνθέτους οὔτε ἀποτελέσματα· οἷον στοιχεῖα μὲν καλοῦμεν γῆν, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, πῦρ· ἀρχὰς δὲ λέγομεν διὰ τὸ οὐδὲν ἔχειν πρότερον ἐξ οὗ γεννᾶται, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ γεννᾶται. Τῆς δὲ γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔστι τινὰ πρότερον ἐξ ὧν γέγονεν, ὕλη ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος.

16b <Ἀετίου> · 2

I.10.16b.2

Λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τιμαίῳ· "βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας."

BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16b <Aëtius, Opinions>: principles and elements I.10.16b.1

The followers of Aristotle and Plato, then, consider principle and elements to differ.

Thales of Miletus considers principle and elements to be the same. <But they differ from one another very greatly. For the elements> are composite, whereas we say that principles are neither composite nor products. For example, we call earth, water, air, and fire elements; but we speak of principles because they have nothing prior to them from which they arise. Otherwise it will not be a principle; what it arises from will be the principle. Yet earth and water do have something prior to them from which they have arisen: matter without shape or form.[353]

16b <Aëtius, Opinions>: quotation from Plato I.10.16b.2

Accordingly, he says in the Timaeus: “For god wished everything to be good and nothing bad, so far as was possible. He therefore took over everything visible, which was not at rest but moving discordantly and without order, and brought it from disorder into order.”[354]

353. A principle, archē, is treated here as something prior to a composite or generated element. This account explains why the chapter’s different lists cannot all be read as lists of the same sort of thing. Angle brackets reproduce the passage supplied by the base editor.

354. The speaker cited is Plato, Timaeus 30a. The quotation presents the ordering of what is already moving; the preceding explanation of principles and elements is the reporter’s discussion.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.10.16c.1

Χρυσίππου. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας στοιχείων τοιαῦτά τινα ἀποφαίνεται, τῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγεμόνι Ζήνωνι κατακολουθῶν, τέτταρα λέγων εἶναι στοιχεῖα <πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἐξ ὧν συνίστασθαι πάντα καὶ ζῷα> καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαλύεσθαι. τὸ δὲ <πῦρ καὶ> κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἔσχατον πάντα χεόμενα διαλύεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὴν εἰς ἄλλο χύσιν ἢ ἀνάλυσιν·

16c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.10.16c.2

[συνίστασθαι δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ χεόμενα εἰς τοῦτο ἔσχατον τελευτᾶν· παρὸ καὶ στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι, ὃ πρῶτον ἔστηκεν οὕτως, ὥστε σύστασιν διδόναι ἀφ' αὑτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν λοιπῶν χύσιν καὶ διάλυσιν δέχεσθαι εἰς αὐτό]· κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον αὐτοτελῶς λεγομένου τοῦ πυρὸς στοιχείου· οὐ μετ' ἄλλου γάρ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρότερον καὶ μετ' ἄλλων συστατικὸν εἶναι, πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ' ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν. πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δ' ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 1 I.10.16c.1

Chrysippus. Concerning the elements derived from substance, he makes assertions of the following kind. Following Zeno, the leader of the school, he says that there are four elements, <fire, air, water, and earth, from which everything is constituted, both animals> and plants, the whole world and all that it contains, and into which they are dissolved. <Fire is also> called the element in the preeminent sense, because the rest are first constituted from it by transformation, and everything is finally dissolved into it by diffusion, while it does not admit of diffusion or dissolution into anything else.[355]

16c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 2 I.10.16c.2

[The rest are constituted from it and, as they diffuse, finally end in it. Hence an element is also said to be that which first stands in such a condition as to give rise to a constitution from itself and itself receive the diffusion and dissolution of the rest into itself.][356] On this account fire is called an element independently, since it is not so called together with another; on the former account it is constitutive together with others. First comes the transformation from fire into air by condensation; second, from air into water; third, as water condenses still further in due proportion, into earth. Again, as earth dissolves and diffuses, the first diffusion is into water, the second from water into air, and the third and last into fire.[357]

355. The account distinguishes the four elements as constituents from fire's special status as their source and final destination. "Substance" translates ousia; "diffusion" renders chysis, paired with the opposite process of condensation in the continuation. The Latin attribution to Arius Didymus is supplied by Wachsmuth and rendered in the headings.

356. The bracketed explanation is printed but rejected by Wachsmuth as a reader's explanatory addition. It is retained and translated here so that the status of the printed passage remains visible.

357. The sequence moves from fire to air, water, and earth by condensation, then returns in reverse by diffusion. "On the former account" refers to the four elements acting together as constituents.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3

I.10.16c.3

Λέγεσθαι <δὲ> πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Τριχῶς δὴ λεγομένου κατὰ Χρύσιππον τοῦ στοιχείου, καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τοῦ πυρός, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀνάλυσιν· καθ' ἕτερον δέ, καθὸ λέγεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ἀήρ, ὕδωρ, γῆ (ἐπεὶ διὰ τούτων τινὸς ἢ τινῶν ἢ καὶ πάντων τὰ λοιπὰ συνέστηκε, διὰ μὲν τῶν τεττάρων, ὡς τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα συγκρίματα, διὰ δυοῖν δέ, ὡς ἡ σελήνη διὰ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος συνέστηκε, δι' ἑνὸς δέ, ὡς ὁ ἥλιος, διὰ πυρὸς γὰρ μόνον, ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστιν εἰλικρινές),

16c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4

I.10.16c.4

κατὰ τρίτον λόγον λέγεται στοιχεῖον * * εἶναι ὃ πρῶτον συνέστηκεν οὕτως, ὥστε γένεσιν διδόναι ἀφ' αὐτοῦ ὁδῷ μέχρι τέλους καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὴν ἀνάλυσιν δέχεσθαι εἰς ἑαυτὸ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ ὁδῷ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 3

I.10.16c.3

<And> everything fiery is called fire, everything airy air, and likewise for the rest. According to Chrysippus, then, “element” is used in three ways. In one way it means fire, because the rest are constituted from it by transformation and undergo dissolution into it. In another way it is used when we speak of the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. For the rest are constituted through one, some, or all of these: through all four, as are animals and all compounds on earth; through two, as the moon is constituted through fire and air; or through one, as the sun is through fire alone, for the sun is pure fire.[358]

16c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 4

I.10.16c.4

In a third sense “element” is spoken of ... as being that which first stands constituted in such a way as to give rise from itself to a process of generation proceeding along a path to its end, and from that end to receive dissolution back into itself along a like path.[359]

358. These statements about the sun and moon belong to the ancient physical account. The three senses of “element” concern its role as origin and end, as a constituent body, and, in the continuation, as the starting point of a complete cycle.

359. The printed asterisks mark missing text after “element.” The English leaves that gap visible; the surviving words describe an outward process of generation and a corresponding return.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 5

I.10.16c.5

Γεγονέναι δ’ ἔφησε καὶ τοιαύτας ἀποδόσεις περὶ στοιχείου, ὡς ἐστὶ τό τε δι’ αὐτοῦ εὐκινητότατον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ <καὶ ὁ σπερματικὸς> λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀΐδιος δύναμις φύσιν ἔχουσα τοιαύτην, ὥστε αὐτήν τε κινεῖν κάτω πρὸς [γῆν] τὴν τροπὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τροπῆς ἄνω πάντῃ κύκλῳ, εἰς αὐτήν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ ἀφ’ αὐτῆς πάλιν ἀποκαθιστᾶσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῷ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 10

16c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 5

I.10.16c.5

He said that such definitions of element had also been given: it is that which moves most readily through itself, and the principle <and seminal> reason, and the eternal power whose nature is such that it moves itself downward toward [earth,] the turning point, and from the turning point upward through the entire circuit, consuming everything into itself and restoring everything from itself again in an ordered course.[360]

360. “Seminal reason” renders spermatikos logos: a generative rational principle, with the image of a seed’s productive power. The turning point belongs to the cycle of descent and return described above. “Earth” is bracketed as rejected in the printed text, and the supplied words distinguish “principle” from “seminal reason.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

Κεφάλαιον ΙΑ′ I.11.heading

Περὶ ὕλης.

1 <Ἀετίου> I.11.1

Ὕλη ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πάσῃ γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς.

2 Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ I.11.2

Καὶ γέγονεν, ὦ τέκνον, ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἦν, ὕλη γὰρ ἀγγεῖον γενέσεως ἐστί, γένεσις δὲ ἐνεργείας τρόπος τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ προόντος θεοῦ. Τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως λαμβάνουσα γέγονε καὶ τρεπτὴ ἐγένετο καὶ ἰδέας ἔσχε μορφοποιουμένη· ἐφέστηκε γὰρ αὐτῇ τρεπομένῃ ἡ τεχνιτεύουσα τὰς τῆς τροπῆς ἰδέας. Ἀγενησία οὖν τῆς ὕλης ἀμορφία ἦν, ἡ δὲ γένεσις τὸ ἐνεργεῖσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

Chapter 11: Matter

I.11.heading

On matter.

1 <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.11.1

Matter is what underlies every coming-to-be and passing-away, and all other changes.[361]

2 Hermes, From the Discourses to Tat

I.11.2

Matter, my child, has both come to be and already existed: for matter is a vessel of coming-to-be, and coming-to-be is a mode of activity of the ungenerated god who exists beforehand. Receiving the seed of coming-to-be, therefore, matter came to be, became capable of change, and acquired forms as it was shaped. For she who fashions the forms of change presides over matter as it changes.[362] Matter's ungenerated condition, then, was its lack of form; its coming-to-be was its being acted upon.[363]

361. Hylē, "matter," is defined by its role as what underlies change. The definition does not yet decide whether matter is itself a body, a question on which the later excerpts differ. Wachsmuth's supplied Latin attribution to Aëtius is rendered in the headings.

362. The feminine subject, "she who fashions," is not named in the printed Greek. The apparatus suggests supplying "fate," but Wachsmuth does not insert it into the text. The translation therefore leaves the agent unnamed.

363. The opening paradox is explained by distinguishing matter's prior formless condition from its acquisition of form. The closing passive energeisthai is rendered "being acted upon," preserving its contrast with the god's activity.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 130-131

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

3 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.11.3.1

Οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω καὶ Πυθαγόρου, λέγω δὲ τοὺς μέχρι τῶν Στωικῶν καταβεβηκότας σὺν Ἡρακλείτῳ, τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλης τὴν ὕλην ἀπεφήναντο.

Οἱ ἀπὸ Δημοκρίτου ἀπαθῆ τὰ πρῶτα, τὴν ἄτομον καὶ τὸ κενόν.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.11.3.2

Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην σωματοειδῆ, ἄμορφον, ἀνείδεον, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἄποιον, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει, δεξαμενὴν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ οἷον τιθήνην καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ μητέρα γίγνεσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 131

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

3 <Aëtius, Opinions>: change and impassibility I.11.3.1

Those in the lines of Thales and Pythagoras, by which I mean those extending down to the Stoics, together with Heraclitus, declared matter to be capable of transformation, alteration, and change, and fluid throughout its whole extent.

The followers of Democritus held the primary things, the atom and the void, to be unaffected.[364]

3 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Plato I.11.3.2

Plato held matter to be body-like, without shape or form, unconfigured and without quality, so far as its own nature is concerned; but it becomes a receptacle of forms, and, as it were, a nurse, an impression-receiving medium, and a mother.[365]

364. The report contrasts matter that changes throughout with first constituents that do not undergo change. Its broad grouping of thinkers belongs to the ancient compiler. Compare the account of indivisible bodies in I.10.14.

365. Sōmatoeidēs, "body-like," is the reporter's description. Ekmageion is a medium that receives impressions; "mold" can misleadingly suggest that it supplies a fixed shape of its own. The direct quotation from the Timaeus follows this summary.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 131

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

3 Πλάτωνος Τιμαίου · 1

I.11.3.3

“Ο αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως· ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ προσρητέον αὐτήν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως. Δέχεται γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ μορφὴν οὐδεμίαν ποτέ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίως εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς· ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κεῖται κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων. Φαίνεται δὲ δι’ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον.

3 Πλάτωνος Τιμαίου · 2

I.11.3.4

Τὰ δ’ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὃν εἰσαῦθις μέτιμεν. Ἐν δ’ οὖν τῷ παρόντι διανοηθῆναι <χρὴ> γένη τριττά, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. Καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπον τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δὲ ὅθεν πατρί, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

3 Plato, Timaeus (50b-c), part 1

I.11.3.3

"The same account applies to the nature that receives all bodies: we must always call it the same, for it never departs at all from its own capacity. It always receives everything, and has never in any respect or manner taken a form like any of the things that enter it. By nature it lies ready as an impression-receiving medium for everything, moved and variously shaped by what enters it; because of these things it appears different at different times.[366]

3 Plato, Timaeus (50c-d), part 2

I.11.3.4

What enters and leaves consists of imitations of the things that always are, impressed from them in a manner difficult to describe and wonderful, which we shall pursue on another occasion. For the present, then, we <must> conceive three kinds: what comes to be; that in which it comes to be; and that after whose likeness what comes to be arises. It is fitting to compare what receives to a mother, the source of the likeness to a father, and the nature between them to an offspring."[367]

366. The receptacle keeps its capacity to receive even while its appearances vary. The passage distinguishes having a fixed form of its own from being shaped by what enters it. The quotation continues in the next paired passage.

367. The analogy distinguishes the receptacle, the enduring pattern, and the generated likeness. The "father" here is the source of the likeness, not a new name introduced for the receptacle or for matter. The supplement chrē, "must," is restored from Plato in the base edition.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 131-132

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.11.4.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν ἀρχή τις ἐστὶ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, οὔτε δὴ κινούμενον ἡ ὕλη κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον οὔτε τὸ εἶδος. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀνείδεος, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἀεί, καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐ σῶμα, σωματικὴ δέ, τὸ δὲ καθάπαξ ἀσώματον. Οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὴν ὕλην φασίν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἐστερῆσθαι δοκεῖ τῶν περὶ σῶμα διαστάσεων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, ἃ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, σχήματος, χρώματος, βαρύτητος, κουφότητος, ὅλως πάσης ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.11.4.2

Εἰ γὰρ τούτων μετεῖχε, τῶν ποιῶν <ἂν> ἦν καὶ ποσῶν· οὐ μετειληφυῖα δὲ κατὰ λόγον σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, σωματικὴ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάσαις ὥσπερ ἐκμαγεῖον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν· ὃν τρόπον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον εἶναι τυγχάνει, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἴδους χωρισθέντος οὐ σῶμα. Δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνόδου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

4 <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle, part 1 I.11.4.1

Aristotle. Now since nature, considered conceptually, is a certain principle of motion and rest, neither matter, according to its own definition, nor form is something moved. For matter is without form, whereas form is always form; matter is not a body, though it is corporeal, whereas form is altogether incorporeal.[368] They say that matter is not a body, not only because it is held to lack the dimensions belonging to body, but because, according to its own definition, it also lacks many other things that bodies possess: shape, color, heaviness, lightness, and, in general, every quality and quantity.

4 <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle, part 2 I.11.4.2

For if it shared in these, it <would> be among things having quality and quantity. But, considered in its definition as not sharing in them, it would not be a body; it would be corporeal because it underlies all qualities like an impression-receiving medium. Just as form, abstracted from matter, is incorporeal, so matter too, when form is separated from it, is not a body. For the conjunction of both is needed for a body to subsist.[369]

368. This is a report under Aristotle's name, not a direct quotation identified from one of his works. The distinction between "not a body" and "corporeal" is explained in the continuation: matter underlies bodily qualities but, considered apart from form, is not itself a constituted body. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Arius Didymus.

369. The contrast is between matter and form considered separately and the body constituted by their conjunction. "Abstracted" and "considered in its definition" preserve the passage's conceptual distinctions without asserting that unformed matter is encountered as a separate physical object.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

5a <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.11.5a.1

Ζήνωνος. Οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω· τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. Διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον, ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷον περ καὶ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα.

5a <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.11.5a.2

Χρυσίππου Στωικοῦ. Τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ὑφισταμένων πρώτην ὕλην· ταύτην δὲ ἀΐδιον, οὔτε αὔξησιν οὔτε μείωσιν ὑπομένουσαν, διαίρεσιν δὲ καὶ σύγχυσιν ἐπιδεχομένην κατὰ μέρη, ὥστε φθορὰς γίγνεσθαι ἔκ τινων μερῶν εἴς τινα [οὐ] κατὰ διαίρεσιν, ἅμα κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῇ συγχύσει τινῶν γιγνομένων ἔκ τινων.

5b <Ἀετίου> I.11.5b

Οἱ δὲ ὕδωρ λέγοντες ἢ πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα ἢ γῆν τὴν ὕλην οὐκέτι ἄμορφον αὐτὴν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ σῶμα· οἱ δὲ τἀμερῆ καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἄμορφον.

Οἱ Στωικοὶ σῶμα τὴν ὕλην ἀποφαίνονται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

5a <Arius Didymus>: Zeno

I.11.5a.1

Zeno. Substance is the primary matter of all existing things. This, taken as a whole, is eternal and becomes neither greater nor less; its parts, however, do not always remain the same, but are divided and blended together. Through it runs the rational principle of the universe, which some call fate, just as the seed runs through the generative fluid.[370]

5a <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus

I.11.5a.2

Chrysippus the Stoic. It is the primary matter of things that subsist with a quality. This is eternal, undergoing neither increase nor decrease, but admitting division and blending in its parts, so that some parts pass away into others [not] through division, while at the same time, correspondingly, some arise from others through blending.[371]

5b <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.11.5b

Those who say that matter is water, fire, air, or earth no longer describe it as formless, but as a body; those who posit partless bodies and atoms describe it as formless.[372]

The Stoics declare matter to be a body.

370. The account distinguishes the persistence of matter as a whole from changes in its parts. Logos is the rational principle pervading it; the seed analogy describes that principle's presence and productive role. Compare I.10.16c, where the elements undergo a cycle of transformation.

371. "It" continues the definition of substance in the preceding report. The Greek sentence about division and blending has been textually repaired; the bracketed "not" is retained as a word rejected by Wachsmuth. Without it, division corresponds to passing-away and blending to coming-to-be. Neither changes the total amount of matter.

372. The condensed contrast uses "formless" without further explanation of its application to partless bodies and atoms. The final assertion that matter is a body should be kept distinct from the Aristotelian report in excerpt 4, where it is called corporeal but not a body.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 11

5c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> I.11.5c

Ποσειδωνίου. Ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ' αὐτήν, ἀεὶ δ' ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. Διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν <αὐτὴν> οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον.

6 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Παρμενίδου I.11.6

Ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἡ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοίη;

- Οὐδαμῶς.

- Κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἐστὶ μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.

- Ἔχει οὕτως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 11

5c <Arius Didymus>: Posidonius

I.11.5c

Posidonius. Posidonius said that the substance and matter of the universe is without quality and without form, insofar as it has no determinate shape or quality of its own in itself; yet it is always in some shape and quality. Substance differs from matter in conception alone, being <the same> in underlying reality.[373]

6 Plato, Parmenides (144b-c)

I.11.6

"Being, then, has been distributed over all the many things that are, and is absent from none of them, neither the smallest nor the greatest? Or is it unreasonable even to ask this? For how could being be absent from anything that is?"

"In no way."

"It has therefore been broken up into things as small and as great as possible, and of every sort, and has been divided more than anything else; the parts of being are unlimited."

"That is so."[374]

373. "Without quality" does not here mean that matter is ever found entirely unqualified: the passage expressly says that it always has some shape and quality. The distinction concerns what belongs to it in itself. Hypostasis, rendered "underlying reality," contrasts with epinoia, "conception."

374. Ousia is translated "being" here, rather than "substance," because the argument concerns what it is for anything to be. In the dialogue, this passage belongs to the deductions from the hypothesis that the one is (Parmenides 142b onward). Its placement under "Matter" does not make the passage itself a definition of physical matter.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

Κεφάλαιον ΙΒ′ I.12.heading

Περὶ ἰδεῶν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.12.1a.1

Ἰδέα ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀσώματος, αἰτία τῶν οἷα ἐστὶν αὐτὴ καὶ παράδειγμα τῆς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων αἰσθητῶν ὑποστάσεως, αὐτὴ μὲν ὑφεστῶσα καθ’ ἑαυτὴν [ἐν], εἰκονίζουσα δὲ τὰς ἀμόρφους ὕλας καὶ αἰτία γιγνομένη τῆς τούτων διατάξεως, πατρὸς ἐπέχουσα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τάξιν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.12.1a.2

Πυθαγόρας τὰ λεγόμενα εἴδη καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς καλουμένοις γεωμετρικοῖς ἐτίθετο ἀχώριστα τῶν σωμάτων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

Chapter 12: Forms

I.12.heading

On forms.

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>: the definition

I.12.1a.1

A form is an incorporeal substance, the cause of things being such as it itself is, and a pattern for the subsistence of sensible things constituted according to nature.[375] It subsists on its own [in], but impresses its likeness upon formless materials and becomes the cause of their ordering, occupying the position of a father in relation to sensible things.[376]

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Pythagoras

I.12.1a.2

Pythagoras placed the so-called forms and ideas in numbers, in their harmonies, and in what are called geometrical entities, holding them to be inseparable from bodies.[377]

375. Idea is rendered “form” here, rather than “idea” in the everyday sense of a thought. The opening phrase after “cause” is grammatically defective in the printed Greek. “Of things being such as it itself is” gives the apparent sense, supported by the fuller definition in excerpt 2a; it does not silently replace the facing text with a conjecture. Wachsmuth’s supplied Latin attribution to Aëtius is rendered in the headings.

376. The isolated en, “in,” is bracketed as rejected by Wachsmuth. The English retains it in brackets so that the editorial problem remains visible. The father analogy corresponds to the pattern’s role in the Timaeus passage quoted in I.11.3; matter there is compared to a mother.

377. The report uses both eidē and ideai, here distinguished as “forms” and “ideas” to retain the paired wording. It expressly adds “inseparable from bodies”; this qualification belongs to the ancient account under Pythagoras’s name.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

1b <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.12.1b.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ταύτας δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ποτέ μὲν εἶναι φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης δύο, τήν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ καὶ μορφὴν καλεῖ καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἐνέργειαν· οὕτως αὐτῷ πλούσιόν τε καὶ πολυώνυμόν ἐστι τὸ εἶδος.

Τοσοῦτο μὲν οὖν διαφέρειν τὸ εἶδος τῆς μορφῆς, ὅτι τὸ μέν ἐστι διῆκον διὰ βάθους, ἡ δ’ ἐπιπολαῖος· καὶ ἡ μὲν παραπλήσιος λευκότητι <τῇ> κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν, τὸ δὲ τῇ περὶ τὴν τοῦ γάλακτος οὐσίαν· ταὐτὸν δὲ εἶδος λέγεται, καθ’ ὅσον τὸ μὲν εἰδοποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ διαμορφοῖ τὴν ὕλην.

1b <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.12.1b.2

Ἐντελέχειαν <δ’> αὐτὸ προσεῖπεν ἤτοι διὰ τὸ ἐνδελεχῶς ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὅτι τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον παρέχεται τέλειον· ὁ γὰρ χαλκὸς ἀνδριὰς οὐδέπω, πλὴν ὅτι μὴ δυνάμει, διαπλασθεὶς δὲ καὶ τὴν πρόσφορον λαβὼν μορφὴν ἐντελεχείᾳ λέγεται· τότε γὰρ ἀπείληφε τὸ τέλος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

1b <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle, part 1

I.12.1b.1

Aristotle. Aristotle sometimes says that these principles are two, matter and form. He also calls form "shape," "actuality," "essence," "substance according to its account," and "activity": so rich in meaning and so variously named is form for him.[378]

Form, then, differs from shape in this respect: form extends through the depth, whereas shape lies on the surface. Shape is like whiteness <as found> in painting, while form is like the whiteness belonging to the substance of milk. Yet both are called form, insofar as one gives matter form and the other gives it shape.[379]

1b <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle, part 2

I.12.1b.2

<And> he called it "actuality" either because it exists continuously or because it renders complete each of the things that participate in it. For bronze is not yet a statue except potentially; once shaped and endowed with the appropriate form, however, it is called a statue in actuality, for it has then attained its end.[380]

378. The passage is a report of Aristotle's terminology, with an attribution to Arius Didymus supplied by Wachsmuth. Eidos, morphē, entelecheia, to ti ēn einai, ousia kata ton logon, and energeia are distinguished in English here because the report goes on to explain each expression.

379. The contrast is between a surface appearance and a determination extending through the thing. "Both are called form" interprets the compressed phrase tauton de eidos legetai; the report distinguishes form and shape while allowing them a common designation. The whiteness comparison follows Wachsmuth's repaired text, including his printed supplement.

380. Entelecheia, "actuality," is explained here through both endelechōs, "continuously," and teleion, "complete." These are the report's own verbal associations. The bronze example contrasts the capacity to become a statue with the completed statue; telos, "end," is the completion attained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

1b <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.12.1b.3

Τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι προσηγόρευσε παρὰ τὸ τῶν ὄντων ἐπιφέρειν ἑκάστῳ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι δύναμιν· οὐσίαν δὲ τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι διαλλάττει τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, ὡς ἀνδριὰς χαλκοῦ καὶ Θηρίκλειον ἀργύρου καὶ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ὁτιοῦν λίθου· τὸ γὰρ ᾧ περιττεύει ταῦτα τῆς ὕλης, ἐξ ἧς δεδημιούργηται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία. Ἐνέργειαν δὲ ἐκάλεσεν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν ἂν ἐνεργεῖν ἠδύνατο μὴ πρότερον εἰδοποιηθέν.

2a <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.12.2a.1

<Πλάτωνος.> Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν ὠδὶ διεξῄρχετο, τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ μέρος ὡρισμένα τινὰ παραδείγματα φάμενος εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, ἀφ' ὧν τὰς ἐπιστήμας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὅρους· παρὰ πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἄνθρωπόν τινα νοεῖσθαι καὶ παρὰ πάντας ἵππους ἵππον καὶ κοινῶς παρὰ τὰ ζῷα ζῷον ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον· ὃν τρόπον δὲ σφραγῖδος μιᾶς ἐκμαγεῖα γίγνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ συχνὰς εἰκόνας ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, οὕτω καὶ μιᾶς ἑκάστης ἰδέας αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων φύσεις παμπληθεῖς, τῆς μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας, <τῆς δὲ ἵππων ἵππους ἅπαντας>, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 12

1b <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle, part 3

I.12.1b.3

He called it “essence” because it confers on each existing thing the capacity to be; and “substance according to its account” because it differs from substance according to matter, as a statue differs from bronze, a Thericlean cup from silver, and any sculpted image from stone. For that by which these exceed the matter from which they have been fashioned is their substance according to its account.[381] He called it “activity” because none of the things that exist could act without first having been given form.[382]

2a <Arius Didymus>: Plato, part 1

I.12.2a.1

<Plato.> He expounded the forms as follows, saying that they are certain determinate patterns corresponding to the several natural sensible things, from which knowledge and definitions arise. For besides all human beings a certain human being is conceived, and besides all horses a horse, and, generally, besides living creatures a living creature that is ungenerated and imperishable. Just as many impressions come from one seal and many likenesses from one man, so from each single form come countless natures of sensible bodies: all human beings from the form of human beings, <and all horses from the form of horses>; the same account applies to the other things that exist by nature.[383]

381. To ti ēn einai, rendered “essence,” literally means “what it was to be.” “According to its account” distinguishes what the thing is as a formed object from its material: the cup, for example, from its silver. The cup’s particular name does not affect the comparison.

382. Energeia is rendered “activity” here to preserve its connection with energein, “to act,” and its distinction from entelecheia in the preceding explanation. The excerpt ends here in Wachsmuth; the manuscript repetition of the opening of excerpt 3, reported in his apparatus, is not printed a second time.

383. The singular human being, horse, and living creature are the intelligible patterns contrasted with their many sensible instances. Wachsmuth supplies the heading “Plato” and prints the supplemented horse example. This is an exposition attributed to Arius Didymus; a direct quotation from Plato follows in excerpt 2b.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 135-136

BOOK I CHAPTER 12

2a <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.12.2a.2

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀΐδιον οὐσίαν, αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἕκαστον εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἵα ἐστὶν αὐτή. Καθάπερ οὖν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ ἀρχέτυπα τῶν αἰσθητῶν προηγείσθαι συμβέβηκε σωμάτων, οὕτως τὴν πάσας ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιέχουσαν καλλίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν <τούδε παράδειγμα τοῦ κόσμου>.

2b Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδου I.12.2b

Λέγει γοῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ· “Ἀλλ’, ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 12

2a <Arius Didymus>: Plato, part 2

I.12.2a.2

A form is an eternal substance, the cause and principle of each thing's being such as the form itself is. Just as the particular forms have priority over sensible bodies as their archetypes, so the most beautiful and most perfect substance, containing all the forms within itself, is <the pattern of this world>.[384]

2b Plato, Parmenides (132c-d)

I.12.2b

He says, indeed, in the Parmenides as well: "But, Parmenides, this is how the matter seems most clearly to me: these forms stand in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are likenesses of them; and this participation of the other things in the forms is nothing other than their being made like them."[385]

384. The final words, "the pattern of this world," are supplied by Wachsmuth from the parallel text in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XI.23. The passage moves from the several patterns of natural things to a single comprehensive pattern. "Have priority" does not by itself specify an earlier moment in time.

385. In Plato's dialogue, Socrates makes this proposal to Parmenides, who immediately subjects it to objections about likeness and further forms (132d-133a). The extract presents a proposal within that argument, not the dialogue's unqualified conclusion. "Participation" renders methexis.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 136

BOOK I CHAPTER 12

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.12.3.1

Ζήνωνος <καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ>. Τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι. Τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα ὑποπιπτόντων εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, οἷον ἀνθρώπων, ἵππων, κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁπόσων λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι.

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.12.3.2

Ταύτας δὲ οἱ Στωικοὶ φιλόσοφοί φασιν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ἃς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 12

3 <Arius Didymus>: Zeno, part 1 I.12.3.1

Zeno <and his followers>. They say that concepts are neither somethings nor qualified things, but images in the soul that are, as it were, somethings and, as it were, qualified things. These were called “ideas” by the ancients. For the ideas are of things falling under the concepts: for example, human beings and horses, or, more generally, all living creatures and all the other things of which they say there are ideas.[386]

3 <Arius Didymus>: Zeno, part 2 I.12.3.2

The Stoic philosophers say that these do not subsist, and that we participate in the concepts but obtain the “cases,” which they call “appellations.”[387]

386. “Somethings” and “qualified things” retain the deliberately technical tina and poia. The qualification “as it were” distinguishes a concept’s representative content from the things it represents; the next sentence denies that the ideas themselves subsist. The words “and his followers” are supplied in the base edition.

387. The closing contrast is textually uncertain. Wachsmuth judges the wording scarcely sound and complete, and discusses possible repairs without inserting one. “Cases” renders ptōseis, and “appellations” prosēgoriai, a term also used for common nouns. The literal rendering here is provisional: the relation asserted between concepts and names cannot be securely recovered from the printed sentence.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 136-137

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

Κεφάλαιον ΙΓ′ I.13.heading

Περὶ αἰτίων.

1a <Ἀετίου> I.13.1a.1

Αἴτιόν ἐστι δι’ ὃ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ δι’ ὃ συμβαίνει τι. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὑπογραφικῶς.

Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἴτιον, ὑφ’ οὗ, ἐξ οὗ, πρὸς ὅ· κυριώτατον δ’ ἡγεῖται τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν.

1a Πλάτωνος Τιμαίου I.13.1a.2

Λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τιμαίῳ· “πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ’ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν ἔχειν. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ χράμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν· ὁπόταν δ’ εἰς τὸ γεγονός, γενητῷ παραδείγματι προσχρώμενος, οὐ καλόν.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

Chapter 13: Causes

I.13.heading

On causes.

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.13.1a.1

A cause is that because of which the result occurs, or because of which something happens. This suffices as an outline.[388]

Plato distinguishes cause in three ways: that by which, that from which, and that in relation to which. He considers the cause "by which" the most authoritative: this is the agent.[389]

1a Plato, Timaeus (28a-b)

I.13.1a.2

He says, indeed, in the Timaeus: "Again, everything that comes to be necessarily comes to be through some cause, for nothing can come to be without a cause. Whenever the craftsman, always looking toward what remains the same and using a pattern of that kind, fashions the form and power of his work, everything completed in this way must be beautiful. But whenever he looks toward what has come to be, using a generated pattern, it is not beautiful."[390]

388. Aition is introduced through the phrase di' ho, "that because of which." The brief opening gives a general characterization; later excerpts distinguish different kinds of causes. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius and identifies the following quotation as from Plato's Timaeus.

389. The three expressions distinguish an agent, material, and a pattern toward which the maker looks. The last is explained by the Timaeus quotation that follows. This is the reporter's classification of Plato's causes.

390. Dēmiourgos means a craftsman or maker. The distinction concerns the pattern used in making: an unchanging model or one that itself has come to be. Dynamis, "power," concerns what the fashioned thing can do, alongside its form. Compare the accounts of patterns in I.12.2a-b.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1b <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.13.1b.1

Πυθαγόρας τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἴτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως εἶναι.

1b <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.13.1b.2

Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφησε δηλοῦν ἕκαστον χρώμενον σχήμασι τῆς ἑρμηνείας τοιούτοις, τό τε ἐξ οὗ λέγοντα <τὴν ὕλην>, καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὃ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ δι’ ὃ τὸ τέλος.

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.13.1c.1

Ζήνωνος. Αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὅ· οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα· ἀδύνατον δ’ εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρεῖναι, οὗ δέ ἐστιν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1b <Aëtius, Opinions>: Pythagoras I.13.1b.1

Pythagoras held the primary causes to be incorporeal, but causes by participation or incidentally to belong to corporeal reality.[391]

1b <Aëtius, Opinions>: Aristotle I.13.1b.2

Aristotle said that each is made clear by using expressions of this kind: "that from which" signifies <matter>; "that by which," the agent; "that according to which," the form; and "that for the sake of which," the end.[392]

1c <Arius Didymus>: Zeno, part 1 I.13.1c.1

Zeno. Zeno says that a cause is that because of which; what it is a cause of is something that occurs. The cause is a body, whereas what it is a cause of is a predicate. It is impossible for the cause to be present without what it causes obtaining.[393]

391. The report distinguishes primary causes from things that count as causes in a derivative or incidental way. "Incidentally" renders kata symbebēkos; it need not mean that the result is random or uncaused.

392. These are the material, acting, formal, and final causes. "End" means the aim or purpose. Di' ho, rendered "because of which" in the opening definition, here has the purposive sense "for the sake of which." Wachsmuth prints "matter" as a supplement; he also notes that this Aristotelian report may belong to Didymus rather than Aëtius.

393. The contrast is between a bodily cause and what can be predicated of something as its effect: the next passage gives "to be alive" and "to be wise" as examples. Symbebēkos, rendered "something that occurs," here names the result; katēgorēma, "predicate," describes its logical form. "Obtaining" preserves the distinction from bodily existence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.13.1c.2

Τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἴτιόν ἐστι δι' ὃ γίνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περί τινα οὔσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν.

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.13.1c.3

Χρυσίππου. Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι' ὅ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, <οὗ δὲ αἴτιον μήτε ὂν μήτε σῶμα·> καὶ αἴτιον μὲν ὅτι, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον διά τι. Αἰτίαν δ' εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου, ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου.

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1c <Arius Didymus>: Zeno, part 2

I.13.1c.2

The meaning of this statement is as follows: a cause is that because of which something occurs. For example, being wise occurs because of wisdom, being alive because of soul, and being self-controlled because of self-control. For it is impossible for someone to possess self-control without being self-controlled, or soul without being alive, or wisdom without being wise.[394]

1c <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus

I.13.1c.3

Chrysippus. Chrysippus says that a cause is that because of which. The cause is an existent and a body, <whereas what it is a cause of is neither an existent nor a body.> The cause is a "because," and what it is a cause of a "because of something." An explanation is an account of a cause, or an account concerning the cause as a cause.[395]

394. The English keeps the relation between the nouns phronēsis and sōphrosynē and their corresponding verbs, phronein and sōphronein. The verbal infinitives are rendered as "being wise" and "being self-controlled" because the point is the condition that follows from possessing wisdom or self-control. The cause and the predicate are distinguished even where their names share the same root.

395. The supplied clause is restored by Wachsmuth on the basis of the following report of Posidonius. The terse contrast between hoti, "because," and dia ti, "because of something," follows his printed wording and accentuation. Aition names the cause; aitia, translated "explanation" here, names the account of it. The formulation is compressed and its interpretation remains difficult.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.13.1c.4

Ποσειδωνίου. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος, δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα.

1d <Ἀετίου> I.13.1d

Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἀκίνητον ἀπεφήναντο.

<Οἱ> Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡρίσαντο κινητόν.

Οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά.

2 Ὀκέλλου · 1 I.13.2.1

Ὄκελλος ἔφησεν εἶναι αἴτιον δι’ ὃ γίγνεταί τι. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νόμου οὕτως·

Συνέχει γὰρ τὰ μὲν σκάνεα τῶν ζῴων <ζωά>, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιον ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιος ὁ θεός· τὼς δ’ οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιος νόμος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

1c <Arius Didymus>: Posidonius

I.13.1c.4

Posidonius. Posidonius puts it this way: a cause of something is that because of which that thing occurs, or what acts first, or the originator of an action. The cause is an existent and a body, while what it is a cause of is neither an existent nor a body, but something that occurs and a predicate.[396]

1d <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.13.1d

Thales and those who followed him declared the first cause to be unmoved.

<The> Stoics defined the first cause as subject to motion.

The Peripatetics held that some causes are sensible and others intelligible.[397]

2 Ocellus, On Law, part 1

I.13.2.1

Ocellus said that a cause is that because of which something comes to be. For he says in On Law:

For <life> holds together the bodies of living creatures, and soul is its cause; harmony holds together the world, and god is its cause; concord holds together households and cities, and law is its cause.[398]

396. Calling the result “not an existent” does not mean that nothing happens. The account distinguishes the body that causes from the predicate that comes to apply, as in Zeno’s contrast between soul and living. The word on, “existent,” is being used within that distinction.

397. “Those who followed him” is the ancient report’s broad grouping. The contrast between akinēton and kinēton concerns being unmoved or subject to motion; “first” identifies causal primacy without specifying a first event in time. The Peripatetics are the school of Aristotle.

398. The analogy pairs a unifying condition with its cause: life with soul, harmony with god, concord with law. Zōa, the Doric form of “life,” is supplied in the base text from a manuscript correction. The excerpt’s Doric forms are retained in the Greek; its ascription to Ocellus is the transmitted attribution.

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

2 Ὠκέλλου · 2

I.13.2.2

Τίς ὢν αἰτία ἦν φύσις, τὸν μὲν κόσμον ἁρμόχθαι διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδέποκ᾽ ἐς ἀκοσμίαν ἐκβαίνειν, τὰς δὲ πόλιας καὶ τὼς οἴκως ὀλιγοχρονίως ἦμεν; Ὅσα μὲν ὦν γεννατὰ καὶ θνατὰ τὰν φύσιν, ἐξ ἃς συνέστακεν ὕλας, τὰν αὐτὰν αἰτίαν ἔχει τᾶς διαλύσιος· συνέστακε γὰρ ἐκ μεταβαλλοίσας καὶ ἀειπαθέος. Ἃ γὰρ τῶν γεννωμένων ἀπογέννασις σωτηρία τᾶς γενετείρας ὕλας.

2 Ὠκέλλου · 3

I.13.2.3

Τὸ δὲ ἀεικίνητον κυβερνῇ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀειπαθὲς κυβερνῆται· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τᾷ δυνάμι, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον· καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμφρον, τὸ δὲ γεννατὸν καὶ ἄλογον [τὸ μεταβάλλον].

BOOK I CHAPTER 13

2 Ocellus, On Law, part 2

I.13.2.2

What nature, then, was responsible for the world's being in harmony always and never falling into disorder, while cities and households endure only a short time?[399] Whatever things are generated and mortal by nature have, in the very matter from which they are constituted, the cause of their dissolution; for they are constituted from what changes and is always subject to being affected. The passing-away of generated things preserves the matter that gives them birth.[400]

2 Ocellus, On Law, part 3

I.13.2.3

What is always in motion governs, while what is always subject to being affected is governed. The former is prior in power, the latter posterior; the former is divine, possesses reason, and is intelligent, while the latter is generated and irrational [that which changes].[401]

399. The question follows Wachsmuth's text, which adopts Usener's ēn, "was," in place of the manuscripts' kai, "and." Nature is thus construed as the subject and "responsible" as the predicate. The contrast is between the enduring order of the world and the short lives of its mortal constituents.

400. Apogennasis is difficult here. "Passing-away" takes it as the undoing of generation, in the context of dissolution and the continued existence of matter. The same contextual interpretation is used by P. S. Horky, "Italic Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic Age," in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Philosophy (2023), pp. 12-13. The facing Greek retains Wachsmuth's word.

401. The passage contrasts what governs with what receives its action. Its phrase aeikinēton means "always in motion," not "unmoved"; the distinction from the unmoved first cause reported in excerpt 1d remains. The final words, "that which changes," are bracketed by Wachsmuth as an explanatory gloss rather than part of the continuous sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

Κεφάλαιον ΙΔ′ I.14.heading

Περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς τούτων τομῆς καὶ περὶ ἐλαχίστου.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.14.1a.1

Σῶμά ἐστι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, πλάτει, βάθει, μήκει· ἢ ὄγκος ἀντίτυπος, ὅσον ἐφ’ αὑτῷ.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.14.1a.2

Πλάτων μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον εἶναί τι φύσει ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ τόπῳ ὑπάρχον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ γενόμενον τότε νεῦσιν ἴσχειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς νεύσεως ῥοπὴν ἤτοι πρὸς βαρύτητα ἢ κουφότητα.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.14.1a.3

Ἀριστοτέλης βαρύτατον μὲν εἶναι τὴν γῆν, κουφότατον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἀέρα δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

Chapter 14: Bodies and their division

I.14.heading

On bodies, on their division, and on the smallest.

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Body

I.14.1a.1

A body is what has three dimensions: breadth, depth, and length; or a bulk that offers resistance, so far as depends on itself.[402]

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Plato

I.14.1a.2

Plato held that nothing is by nature either heavy or light when it is in its own place. When it comes to be in a place foreign to it, however, it then acquires an inclination, and from this inclination a tendency toward either heaviness or lightness.[403]

1a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Aristotle

I.14.1a.3

Aristotle held earth to be the heaviest and fire the lightest, while air and water are now one way, now the other.[404]

402. The two definitions emphasize extension and resistance respectively. Antitypos describes resistance to penetration. The qualification “so far as depends on itself” belongs to the second definition. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius, as he does for the other excerpts so labeled in this chapter.

403. The report makes heaviness and lightness depend on a body’s relation to its proper place. Neusis, “inclination,” and rhopē, “tendency,” describe its directed movement. Wachsmuth refers to Plato, Timaeus 62 and following; this is a summary, not a direct quotation from that dialogue.

404. Air and water occupy an intermediate position: the same element may be light in relation to one and heavy in relation to another. The terse “now one way, now the other” preserves the contrast in the report.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1b <Ἀετίου· περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους> I.14.1b

Καὶ δυνάμει μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μηδαμῶς.

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.14.1c.1

Τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν σωμάτων εἶναι τὰς ποιότητας ἁπλᾶς· διαιρεῖσθαι δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ συνεχῆ καλεῖσθαι· μεγέθη δ’ εἶναι μῆκος, πλάτος, βάθος· τὰ δ’ ἔχοντα μέγεθος ἓξ ὑπάρχειν, σῶμα, τόπον, ἐπιφάνειαν, γραμμήν, κίνησιν, χρόνον.

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.14.1c.2

ἐπιφάνειαν δ’ εἶναι σώματος πέρας δυσὶν ὁριζομένην διαστάσεσι· γραμμὴν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας πέρας κατὰ μίαν διάστασιν. σῶμα δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶ <τὸ> τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν τόπον εἰσὶν αὗται, προσθετέον τό τε μετ’ ἀντερείσεως καὶ τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον ἕτερον εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον [σῶμα]· πληρωτικὸν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ τόπου τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦ σώματος δεκτικόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1b <Aëtius: Aristotle>

I.14.1b

And bodies can be divided without limit potentially, but by no means actually.[405]

1c <Arius Didymus: Aristotle>, part 1

I.14.1c.1

The qualities of simple bodies are simple. Magnitudes and things possessing magnitude are divisible without limit; these are also called continuous. The magnitudes are length, breadth, and depth; and there are six things possessing magnitude: body, place, surface, line, motion, and time.[406]

1c <Arius Didymus: Aristotle>, part 2

I.14.1c.2

A surface is the boundary of a body, defined by two dimensions; a line is the boundary of a surface in one dimension. A body, then, is <that which> has the three dimensions. Since these also apply to place, one must add that a body offers resistance and does not admit another [body] into the same place. For a body fills a place, just as a place receives a body.[407]

405. “Potentially” means that division can always be carried farther; “actually” would mean an infinite division already accomplished. The contrast does not deny that particular divisions can occur.

406. The report distinguishes magnitude from what possesses it. Its list includes motion and time as continua as well as spatial things. The attribution to Arius Didymus and identification of Aristotle as the subject are supplied in the base edition.

407. Three dimensions alone do not distinguish body from place in this account; resistance and exclusion of another body are added. Wachsmuth supplies the article rendered “that which” and brackets the later “body” as a dispensable addition. The English moves that bracketed noun beside “another” for intelligibility.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.14.1c.3

ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν τὰ σώματα ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ἐν ταύταις διαφορὰς ἀποτελεῖσθαι τάς τε τῶν δραστικῶν καὶ τὰς τῶν παθητικῶν φύσεις.

1d <Ἀετίου· περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους> I.14.1d

Μηδὲν δὲ πῦρ κυκλοτερῶς φύσει κινεῖσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα.

1e <Ἀετίου> I.14.1e

Χρύσιππος ἔφασκε τὰ σώματα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῖς σώμασι προσεοικότα, οἷον ἐπιφάνειαν, γραμμήν, τόπον, κενόν, χρόνον· εἰς ἄπειρόν τε τούτων τεμνομένων οὔτε σῶμα ἐξ ἀπείρων σωμάτων συνέστηκεν οὔτ' ἐπιφάνεια οὔτε γραμμὴ οὔτε τόπος <οὔτε κενὸν οὔτε χρόνος>.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1c <Arius Didymus: Aristotle>, part 3

I.14.1c.3

Bodies act and are acted upon through incorporeal powers; for the natures of things capable of acting and of things capable of being acted upon are constituted according to the differences in these powers.[408]

1d <Aëtius: Aristotle>

I.14.1d

No fire moves naturally in a circle; only the fifth body does so.[409]

1e <Aëtius, Opinions>: Chrysippus

I.14.1e

Chrysippus said that bodies are divisible without limit, as are things resembling bodies, such as surface, line, place, void, and time. Yet although these are divisible without limit, a body is not composed of infinitely many bodies, nor is a surface, a line, or a place <or void or time> so composed.[410]

408. The powers are expressly called incorporeal. This belongs to the report about Aristotle; it should not be merged with the Stoic account of bodily causes in the preceding chapter. “Being acted upon” renders paschein, which need not involve pain.

409. The “fifth body” is distinguished from the four elements. Wachsmuth points out that Aristotle himself calls the celestial substance the “first body”; “fifth” is the reporter’s designation, retained here.

410. The contrast is between endless divisibility and composition from an already infinite collection. In the compressed second clause, the corresponding constituents of surfaces, lines, and the rest are left implicit. Wachsmuth prints “or void or time” as a supplement, while noting an alternative of deleting these two items from the earlier list.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 141-142

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1f <Ἀετίου> · 1

I.14.1f.1

Οἱ Στωικοὶ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κοῦφα, πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα· δύο δὲ βαρέα, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. Κοῦφον γὰρ ὑπάρχει φύσει, ὃ νεύει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου μέσου, βαρὺ δὲ τὸ εἰς μέσον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ' εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ' αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται.

1f <Ἀετίου> · 2

I.14.1f.2

Ἐπίκουρος ἀπερίληπτα εἶναι τὰ <ἄτομα> σώματα. καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δὲ ἁπλᾶ· τά τε ἐξ ἐκείνων συγκρίματα βάρος ἔχειν. Κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄτομα τότε μὲν κατὰ στάθμην, τότε δὲ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν· τὰ δὲ ἄνω κινούμενα κατὰ πληγὴν καὶ ἀποπαλμόν.

1f <Ἀετίου> · 3

I.14.1f.3

Δημόκριτος τὰ πρῶτά φησι σώματα (ταῦτα δ' ἦν τὰ ναστά) βάρος μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν, κινεῖσθαι <δὲ> κατ' ἀλληλοτυπίαν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ. Δυνατὸν εἶναι κοσμιαίαν ὑπάρχειν ἄτομον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1f <Aëtius, Opinions>: The Stoics

I.14.1f.1

The Stoics held two of the four elements to be light, fire and air, and two heavy, water and earth. For what inclines away from its own center is light by nature, while what inclines toward the center is heavy. Light near the earth moves in a straight line; light in the aether moves in a circle.[411]

1f <Aëtius, Opinions>: Epicurus

I.14.1f.2

Epicurus held <atomic> bodies to be imperceptible. The primary bodies, moreover, are simple; and the compounds formed from them have weight.[412] The atoms move sometimes along a plumb line, sometimes by a swerve; those that move upward do so through impact and rebound.[413]

1f <Aëtius, Opinions>: Democritus

I.14.1f.3

Democritus says that the primary bodies (these were the solid bodies) have no weight, <but> move through collisions with one another in the infinite. It is possible for an atom to be as large as a world.[414]

411. “Light” first renders kouphon, the opposite of heavy; in the final sentence it renders phōs, luminous light. The Greek changes words. The distinction between straight and circular movement belongs to the ancient account of earthly and celestial regions.

412. Aperilēpta, literally “not to be grasped,” is taken here in a perceptual sense. “Atomic” is supplied in the base edition. The following sentence is textually troubled, as Wachsmuth’s apparatus records; this translation follows his printed punctuation and takes “simple” as a predicate. The syntax does not securely establish how the primary bodies are connected to the statement about weight. Compare Aëtius I.12.5, collected as Epicurus, fragment 275 Usener.

413. A stathmē is a measuring line, here a plumb line marking straight downward movement. Parenklisis names the swerve away from that course; upward movement is separately assigned to a blow and rebound.

414. Nasta means solid or compact bodies. The startling claim of a world-sized atom distinguishes indivisibility from smallness: “atom” need not mean a tiny object in this report. The denial of weight is also retained as reported, without harmonizing it with other ancient accounts.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1g <Ἀετίου> I.14.1g

Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε περὶ τἀμερῆ ἵστασθαι τὴν τομήν.

1h <Ἀετίου> I.14.1h

Στράτων μὲν προσεῖναι τοῖς σώμασι φυσικὸν βάρος, τὰ δὲ κουφότερα τοῖς βαρυτέροις ἐπιπολάζειν, οἷον ἐκπυρηνιζόμενα.

1i <Ἀετίου> I.14.1i

Οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω καὶ Πυθαγόρου παθητὰ <τὰ> σώματα καὶ τμητὰ εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ πάντα τὰ συνεχῆ, γραμμήν, ἐπιφάνειαν, στερεὸν σῶμα, τόπον, χρόνον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1g <Aëtius, Opinions>: Democritus I.14.1g

The same thinker said that division stops at things without parts.[415]

1h <Aëtius, Opinions>: Strato I.14.1h

Strato held that bodies possess natural weight, but that the lighter float above the heavier, as though squeezed out like fruit stones.[416]

1i <Aëtius, Opinions>: Thales and Pythagoras I.14.1i

The followers of Thales and Pythagoras held <the> bodies to be capable of being affected and divisible without limit, and likewise all continuous things: line, surface, solid body, place, and time.[417]

415. "The same thinker" refers to Democritus. Wachsmuth adopts tamerē, "things without parts," in place of the manuscripts' ta merē, "the parts." The contrast is with the unlimited division asserted elsewhere in this chapter.

416. Ekpyrēnizomena evokes the expulsion of a fruit's stone or kernel. The image explains the rise of lighter bodies by their being forced out by heavier ones; it does not require them to lack weight.

417. Pathēta means capable of undergoing an affection or change. The attribution groups together "those from" Thales and Pythagoras; it should be read as the reporter's classification, rather than a quotation of either founder.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

Ἐπιγραφή

I.14.minimum

Περὶ ἐλαχίστου.

1k <Ἀετίου> · 1

I.14.1k.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα, οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων ὁμοιομερῆ.

Ἡράκλειτος πρὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς δοκεῖ τισι ψήγματα καταλείπειν.

1k <Ἀετίου> · 2

I.14.1k.2

Ξενοκράτης καὶ Διόδωρος ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ὡρίζοντο.

Ἡρακλείδης θραύσματα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

Subsection heading I.14.minimum

On the smallest.[418]

1k <Aëtius, Opinions>: Empedocles and Heraclitus I.14.1k.1

Empedocles said that before the four elements there are smallest fragments, as it were elements before the elements, with parts of the same kind.[419]

Heraclitus seems to some to leave filings prior to the One.[420]

1k <Aëtius, Opinions>: Other accounts I.14.1k.2

Xenocrates and Diodorus defined the smallest things as without parts.

Heraclides defined them as fragments.[421]

418. Wachsmuth places this transmitted phrase here as a subsection title. Elachiston is “the smallest” or “minimum”; the reports that follow ask what the smallest constituents are and whether they have parts.

419. Homoiomerē means having like parts. The report posits fragments prior to the four elements, without explaining whether this priority is temporal or structural. Its unusual formulation is retained rather than assimilated to another account of Empedocles.

420. Psēgmata are scrapings or filings. “Seems to some” explicitly marks this as an interpretation of Heraclitus; the text does not directly quote him or identify the interpreters.

421. “Without parts” translates amerē, as in the preceding report of Democritus. The final Greek is only a name and “fragments”; the English supplies the governing words from the preceding sentence. The passage offers classifications, not their supporting arguments.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1l <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.14.1l.1

Σῶμά ἐστι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, πλάτει, βάθει, μήκει· ταῦτα δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ μῆκος εἶναι λέγεσθαι τὸ μέγιστον διάστημα τοῦ σώματος, ὅτε δὲ μόνον τὸ κάτωθεν ἄνω· καὶ πλάτος ὅτε <μὲν> τὸ δεύτερον διάστημα, ὅτε δὲ τὸ ἐκ δεξιᾶς καὶ ἐξ εὐωνύμου· καὶ βάθος ὅτε μὲν τὸ εἰς ἑαυτὸ διάστημα, ὅτε δὲ τὸ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω·

1l <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.14.1l.2

κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρότερον λόγον οὔτε τῶν σφαιρῶν οὔτε τῶν τετραγώνων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐδὲν τῶν διαστημάτων τούτων ἐχόντων, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον παντὸς σώματος τὰς τρεῖς ἔχοντος διαστάσεις διὰ τὸ κατὰ πᾶσαν θέσιν ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πίπτειν αὐτό.

2 Παρμενίδου I.14.2

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 14

1l <Arius Didymus: The Stoics>, part 1 I.14.1l.1

A body is what has three dimensions: breadth, depth, and length. These terms are used in more than one way. Sometimes length is said to be the greatest extent of a body, sometimes only its extent from below upward; and breadth is sometimes <on the one hand> the second extent, sometimes the extent to right and left; and depth is sometimes its inward extent, sometimes the extent forward and backward.[422]

1l <Arius Didymus: The Stoics>, part 2 I.14.1l.2

According to the first account, neither spheres nor square bodies and similar things have any of these extents; according to the second, every body has the three dimensions, since in every position it falls under this account.[423]

2 Parmenides I.14.2

From every side like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,
equally balanced from the center in every direction; for it must be
neither any greater nor any smaller here or there.[424]

422. The first usage begins by ranking extents; the second names directions. “Inward extent” follows Wachsmuth’s to eis heauto diastēma, a difficult phrase. His apparatus records Usener’s alternative “the smallest extent,” which would complete the ranking explicitly. The facing Greek retains the printed reading and the supplied men, rendered “on the one hand.”

423. The first usage cannot distinguish a uniquely greatest and second extent in such symmetrical bodies. The claim is therefore about the applicability of the dimensional names under that definition, not a denial that spheres have spatial extension. Tetragōna, literally “square things,” is rendered “square bodies” in this three-dimensional context.

424. These verses compare what-is to a sphere, emphasizing balance and the absence of greater or lesser being in different directions. The comparison should not by itself be turned into a statement about the shape of the earth. Wachsmuth also cites Plato, Sophist 244e, for the transmission of this passage; the Greek here follows the supplied scan.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

Κεφάλαιον ΙΕ′ I.15.heading

Περὶ σχημάτων.

1 Ὁμήρου I.15.1

Τόσσον ἔνερθ’ Ἀΐδεω ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ’ ἀπὸ γαίης.

2a <Ἀνωνύμου ποιητοῦ> I.15.2a

Ἀλλ’ ὅγε πάντοθεν ἶσος <ἐὼν> καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων.

2b <Ἐμπεδοκλέους> I.15.2b

σφαῖρος κυκλοτερής, μονίῃ περιηγέϊ γαίων.

3a Ἐπιγραφή I.15.3a

Πορφυρίου.

BOOK I CHAPTER 15

Chapter 15: Shapes I.15.heading

On shapes.

1 Homer, Iliad 8.16 I.15.1

As far beneath Hades as heaven is from earth.[425]

2a <An unidentified poet> I.15.2a

But it, <being> equal on every side and wholly boundless.[426]

2b <Empedocles> I.15.2b

a rounded Sphere, rejoicing in surrounding solitude.[427]

3a Surviving attribution I.15.3a

From Porphyry.[428]

425. The line describes Tartarus in Zeus's threat to the other gods at the beginning of Iliad 8. Stobaeus extracts the comparison of distances; the name Tartarus belongs to the surrounding Homeric passage.

426. The subject is not identified within the surviving line. Wachsmuth prints the attribution as anonymous and supplies eōn, "being." His apparatus discusses attribution to Parmenides or Empedocles, but he does not join this line to the following Empedoclean verse. The English preserves that separation and the unfinished construction.

427. Sphairos, "Sphere," is the name used in this Empedoclean verse. Moniē denotes solitude or being alone; the adjoining adjective gives it an encompassing quality. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution and adopts several readings from parallel witnesses. This fragment remains a separate quotation from 2a.

428. Only this attribution survives here. Wachsmuth states that the manuscripts retain the name in their margins but no text of the excerpt. It is therefore not used to attribute the following definition to Porphyry.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

3b <Ἀετίου> I.15.3b

Σχῆμά ἐστιν ἐπιφάνεια καὶ περιγραφὴ καὶ πέρας σώματος.

4 Πλάτωνος I.15.4

Πλάτων ἔφησε σφαιροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον ὑπάρχειν. Λέγει γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· “Σχῆμα δ’ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ συγγενές· τῷ δὲ πάντα ζῷα ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχειν μέλλοντι ζῴῳ πρέπον ἂν εἴη σχῆμα τὸ περιειληφὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πάνθ’ ὁπόσα σχήματα. Διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές, ἐκ μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιότατόν τε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου.”

5 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 1 I.15.5.1

Τοῦ γὰρ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ σφαιροειδοῦς ὄντος, ὅσα μὲν ἀφιστῶτα ἴσον τοῦ μέσου γέγονεν ἔσχατα, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ χρὴ ἔσχατα προσπεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὰ αὐτὰ μέτρα τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀφεστηκὸς ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ νομίζειν δεῖ πάντων εἶναι· τοῦ δὴ κόσμου ταύτῃ πεφυκότος τί τῶν εἰρημένων ἄνω τις ἢ κάτω τιθέμενος [οὐ] οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ δόξει τὸ μηδὲν προσῆκον ὄνομα λέγειν;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

3b <Aëtius, Opinions>

I.15.3b

A shape is the surface, outline, and boundary of a body.[429]

4 Plato, Timaeus 33b

I.15.4

Plato said that the world is spherical. For he says in the Timaeus: "He gave it the shape fitting and akin to it. For a living creature destined to contain all living creatures within itself, the fitting shape would be one containing within itself all the shapes there are. So he turned it into a rounded sphere, equidistant from the center to its extremities in every direction, the most complete of all shapes and the most like itself; for he judged likeness immeasurably more beautiful than unlikeness."[430]

5 Plato, Timaeus 62d-63a, part 1

I.15.5.1

For since the whole heaven is spherical, all the extremities that lie at an equal distance from the center must be alike in their character as extremities; and the center, equally distant from the extremities, must be understood to lie directly opposite all of them. Since the world is constituted in this way, if someone designates any of these as "up" or "down," will he [not] not rightly be thought to use a wholly unsuitable name?[431]

429. Perigraphē means the outline or circumscription of something. The definition treats shape in terms of the boundary of a body. The attribution to Aëtius is supplied by Wachsmuth, as are the Aëtian attributions in excerpt 6.

430. The maker is the craftsman of the Timaeus; the creature fashioned is the world itself. Etorneusato evokes shaping something on a lathe. The passage relates the sphere's symmetry and completeness to the world's inclusion of all living creatures. The comparison concerns likeness within the shape, not a comparison between two separate worlds.

431. The transmitted heading is "In the same work." The argument concerns whether a spherical whole has an intrinsically upper or lower region. Wachsmuth brackets a duplicated negative before the ordinary rhetorical question. The bracketed "not" should be omitted when reading the continuous English; the question then expects assent.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

5 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 2 I.15.5.2

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μέσος ἐν αὐτῷ τόπος οὔτε κάτω πεφυκὼς οὔτε ἄνω λέγεσθαι δίκαιος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐν μέσῳ· ὁ δὲ πέριξ οὔτε δὴ μέσος, οὔτε ἔχων διάφορον αὐτοῦ μέρος ἕτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἤ τι τῶν καταντικρύ. τοῦ δὲ ὁμοίως πάντῃ πεφυκότος ποῖά τις ἐπιφέρων ὀνόματα αὐτῷ ἐναντία καὶ πῇ καλῶς ἂν ἡγοῖτο λέγειν;

5 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 3 I.15.5.3

εἰ γάρ τι καὶ στερεὸν εἴη κατὰ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς ἰσοπαλές, εἰς οὐδὲν ἄν τί ποτε τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐνεχθείη διὰ τὴν πάντῃ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸ πορεύοιτό τις ἐν κύκλῳ, πολλάκις ἂν στὰς ἀντίπους ταὐτὸν αὐτοῦ κάτω καὶ ἄνω προσείποι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον, καθάπερ εἴρηται νῦν δή, σφαιροειδὲς ὂν τόπον τινὰ κάτω, τὸν δὲ ἄνω λέγειν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔμφρονος.

6a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.15.6a.1

Οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου [τὸν κόσμον] σφαιρικὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων· μόνον δὲ τὸ ἀνώτατον πῦρ κωνοειδές.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

5 Plato, Timaeus 62d-63a, part 2

I.15.5.2

For its central region cannot properly be called naturally either down or up, but simply in the middle. The surrounding region is not the middle, and no part of it differs from another in its relation to the center or to any of the parts opposite. When something is alike in every direction, what contrary names could someone apply to it, and on what grounds could he consider himself to be speaking correctly?[432]

5 Plato, Timaeus 62d-63a, part 3

I.15.5.3

For even if a solid body were evenly balanced at the center of the whole, it would never move toward any of the extremities, because they are alike in every direction. Yet if someone were to travel in a circle around that same body, repeatedly taking a position with his feet pointing the opposite way, he would call the same part of it both down and up. For since the whole is spherical, as was just said, no sensible person would say that it has one region below and another above.[433]

6a <Aëtius, Opinions>: The Pythagoreans

I.15.6a.1

The followers of Pythagoras held [the world] the shapes of the four elements to be spherical; only the uppermost fire is conical.[434]

432. The contrast is between the center and the surrounding boundary. “Up” and “down” would assign contrary directional properties to regions that are alike in relation to the center. The discussion continues the chapter’s concern with symmetry rather than denying differences of position relative to a particular observer.

433. Antipous describes standing with the feet oppositely directed. As the observer changes position around the central body, the same region receives opposite local designations. “Evenly balanced” translates isopales, also used in the Parmenidean verses at the end of chapter 14.

434. “The world” is bracketed for deletion in the base text and has no grammatical role in the resulting sentence. The contrast distinguishes the shapes of the four elements from the form assigned to the uppermost fire. “Conical” means shaped like a cone.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.15.6a.2

Ἀναξαγόρας τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ πολυσχήμονα.

Οἱ ἀπὸ Λευκίππου τὰ ἄτομα πολυσχήμονα.

6a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.15.6a.3

Κλεάνθης μόνος τῶν Στωικῶν τὸ πῦρ ἀπεφήνατο κωνοειδές.

Ζήνων ἔφασκε τὸ πῦρ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν κινεῖσθαι.

6b <Ἀετίου> I.15.6b

Οἱ Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο.

Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος σφαιροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον.

6c <Ἀετίου> I.15.6c

Διογένης καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ἔφασαν, μετὰ τὸ συστῆναι τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐγκλιθῆναί πως τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἰς τὸ μεσημβρινὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, ἴσως ὑπὸ προνοίας, ἵν᾽ ἃ μὲν ἀοίκητα γένηται, ἃ δὲ οἰκητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ εὐκρασίαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Anaxagoras and Leucippus

I.15.6a.2

Anaxagoras held the things with like parts to have many shapes.

The followers of Leucippus held the atoms to have many shapes.[435]

6a <Aëtius, Opinions>: Cleanthes and Zeno

I.15.6a.3

Cleanthes alone among the Stoics declared fire to be conical.

Zeno said that fire moves in a straight line.[436]

6b <Aëtius, Opinions>: The world's shape

I.15.6b

The Stoics declared the world to be spherical.

Leucippus and Democritus held the world to be spherical.[437]

6c <Aëtius, Opinions>: Diogenes and Anaxagoras

I.15.6c

Diogenes and Anaxagoras said that, after the world had formed and brought living creatures out of the earth, the world somehow tilted of its own accord toward its southern part, perhaps through providence, so that some regions of the world would become uninhabitable and others habitable, according to cold, scorching heat, and a temperate mixture.[438]

435. Homoiomerē means things whose parts are of the same kind. Wachsmuth exchanges the objects of these two reports: the manuscripts assign atoms to Anaxagoras and things with like parts to Leucippus. His printed correction, followed here, preserves the order of the philosophers.

436. The two statements concern different things: the shape of fire and the direction of its motion. The report singles out Cleanthes within the Stoic school. Compare the statements about fire and circular motion in chapter 14.

437. Kosmos here denotes the ordered world described by each account. The shared predicate "spherical" does not make their accounts of its constituents or formation identical.

438. The report retains both "of its own accord" and "perhaps through providence"; the translation does not resolve their tension. The last three terms concern climatic conditions and habitability. Here ekpyrōsis is rendered "scorching heat," rather than the destruction of an entire world by fire.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6d <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.15.6d.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔλεγε μὴ διὰ παντὸς ἑστῶτας εἶναι μηδ’ ὡρισμένους τοὺς τόπους τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ πανταχῶς ἀλλήλων μεταλαμβάνειν.

6d <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.15.6d.2

Τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος εἴξαντος τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου ὁρμῇ ἐπικλιθῆναι τὰς ἄρκτους καὶ τὰ μὲν βόρεια ὑψωθῆναι, τὰ δὲ νότια ταπεινωθῆναι, καθὸ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον.

Καὶ δεξιὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ τὰ κατὰ τὸν θερινὸν τροπικόν, ἀριστερὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸν χειμερινόν.

6e <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.15.6e.1

Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, Ἀριστοτέλης δεξιὰ τοῦ κόσμου τὰ ἀνατολικὰ μέρη, ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως [διὰ τὰς ἀνατολάς], ἀριστερὰ δὲ τὰ δυτικά.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6d <Aëtius, Opinions>: Empedocles, part 1 I.15.6d.1

Empedocles said that the regions of the elements are not always fixed or bounded, but share in one another in every way.[439]

6d <Aëtius, Opinions>: Empedocles, part 2 I.15.6d.2

When the air yielded to the sun's impetus, the Bears tilted, the northern regions rose, and the southern regions sank; the whole world was correspondingly inclined.[440]

Its right-hand regions are those along the summer tropic, and its left-hand regions those along the winter tropic.[441]

6e <Aëtius, Opinions>: Right and left I.15.6e.1

Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle held the eastern regions of the world to be its right side, from which motion begins [because of the risings], and the western regions its left.[442]

439. The wording describes a mutual occupation of regions rather than permanent, exclusive allotments. "In every way" follows Wachsmuth's pantachōs; his apparatus records other proposals, including pantachou, "everywhere." Excerpt 6d gathers three short reports, separated in the base edition.

440. The Bears are the northern constellations. The passage explains a tilt of the heavens through the action of the sun upon the air. Its compressed final clause extends the inclination to the world as a whole.

441. The summer and winter tropics mark the sun's northern and southern turning circles. This orientation differs from the next report, which assigns right and left to east and west.

442. The motion is described from the side where the heavenly bodies rise. Wachsmuth brackets "because of the risings" as an addition to be omitted; the English retains it within the same editorial signs.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6e <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.15.6e.2

Οὔθ’ ὕψος δέ φασιν οὔτε βάθος ἔχειν τὸν κόσμον, καθ’ ὃν λόγον ὕψος μὲν λέγεται τὸ κάτωθεν ἄνω διάστημα, βάθος δὲ τὸ ἄνωθεν κάτω. Μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν οὕτως διαστημάτων λεγομένων περὶ τὸν κόσμον διὰ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέσον αὐτὸν συνεστάναι, ἀφ’ οὗ πρὸς ἅπαν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς ὃ πανταχόθεν ταὐτό.

7 Φιλολάου Βάκχαι · 1 I.15.7.1

Ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐστιν. Ἤρξατο δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἄχρι τοῦ μέσου, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω ἐστὶ τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω.

7 Φιλολάου Βάκχαι · 2 I.15.7.2

Τοῖς γὰρ κάτω τὸ κατωτάτω μέγα ἐστὶν ὥσπερ τὸ ἀνωτάτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. Πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέσον κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν ἑκάτερα, ὅσα μὴ μετενήνεκται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 15

6e <Aëtius, Opinions>: Height and depth I.15.6e.2

They say that the world has neither height nor depth, in the sense in which height means extension from below upward, and depth extension from above downward. For none of the extensions so named applies to the world, because it is constituted around its own center, from which it extends in every direction and toward which it is the same from every side.[443]

7 Philolaus, Bacchae, part 1 I.15.7.1

The world is one. It began to come into being as far as the middle; and from the middle upward, through the same things as below, are the things above the middle, lying opposite those below.[444]

7 Philolaus, Bacchae, part 2 I.15.7.2

For those below, what is lowest is great, just as what is highest is; and the rest likewise. For both stand in the same relation to the middle, insofar as they have not been displaced.[445]

443. The denial is qualified by a particular definition of height and depth. It does not deny the world's spatial extent. The final phrase is compressed: the translation takes it to describe the same relation to the center from all sides. Compare Plato's argument in excerpt 5 and the two definitions of dimensions in I.14.1l.

444. The title Bacchae is transmitted with the attribution to Philolaus. The wording of this excerpt is difficult. "As far as" retains Wachsmuth's achri; "from" (apo) is a proposed correction in his apparatus. The following clause also has disputed wording and punctuation. This deliberately close rendering preserves the printed text's uncertainty rather than presenting a securely reconstructed account of formation from the center.

445. "Great" renders the printed mega, but the sense of this sentence is not secure. Wachsmuth records conjectures such as mesa, "middle things," and meros, "part," as well as deletions, without adopting them. The general comparison is between positions above and below the center; the English does not silently substitute a conjecture for the troublesome word. The final qualification translates the printed mē, "not."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

Κεφάλαιον ΙϚ′ I.16.heading

Περὶ χρωμάτων.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.16.1.1

Χρῶμά ἐστι ποιότης σώματος ὁρατὴ προηγουμένως.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.16.1.2

<Οἱ> Πυθαγόρειοι χροιὰν ἐκάλουν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος, τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν χρωμάτων λευκόν τε καὶ μέλαν, ἐρυθρόν τε καὶ ὠχρόν· τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων παρὰ τὰς <ποιὰς> μίξεις τῶν στοιχείων, τὰς δὲ τῶν ζῴων παρὰ τὰς ποικιλίας τῶν τροφῶν καὶ τῶν ἀέρων.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.16.1.3

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς χρῶμα εἶναι ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ τοῖς πόροις τῆς ὄψεως ἐναρμόττον. Τέτταρα δὲ τοῖς στοιχείοις ἰσάριθμα, λευκόν, μέλαν, ἐρυθρόν, ὠχρόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 16

Chapter 16: Colors I.16.heading

On colors.

1 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Definition I.16.1.1

Color is a quality of a body that is visible in the primary sense.[446]

1 <Aëtius>: The Pythagoreans I.16.1.2

<The> Pythagoreans called the surface of a body its hue. They held the kinds of color to be white and black, red and pale yellow; differences of color arise from the <particular kinds of> mixture of the elements, and those in living creatures from differences in their foods and the airs around them.[447]

1 <Aëtius>: Empedocles I.16.1.3

Empedocles declared color to be what fits the passages of sight. There are four colors, equal in number to the elements: white, black, red, and pale yellow.[448]

446. The definition singles out color as a direct object of sight. Proēgoumenōs means primarily or in the first instance. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius for all of excerpt 1; the subdivisions used here separate its individual reports without changing their order.

447. Ōchron is rendered “pale yellow” throughout this chapter, distinct from Plato’s xanthon below. Wachsmuth retains ōchron here and in the reports of Empedocles and Democritus, although his apparatus considers it corrupt and mentions the proposed reading chlōron. The article and poias, “of what kind,” are editorial supplements. The final clause concerns variations of color in living creatures.

448. Poroi are passages or pores. The definition makes the fit between what reaches the eye and the passages of sight central to color perception. The report equates the number of colors with the number of elements without assigning each color to a particular element. Wachsmuth omits a manuscript repetition here of the preceding explanation involving mixtures and variations of food.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

1 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.16.1.4

Πλάτων φλόγα ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.16.1.5

Ἀρίσταρχος Σάμιος μαθηματικός, ἀκουστὴς Στράτωνος, φῶς εἶναι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπιπῖπτον.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.16.1.6

Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς τὰ χρώματα πρώτους εἶναι σχηματισμοὺς τῆς ὕλης.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.16.1.7

Δημόκριτος φύσει μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρῶμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄποια, τά τε ναστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κεχρῶσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, ὧν ἡ μέν ἐστι τάξις, ὁ δὲ σχῆμα, ἡ δὲ θέσις· παρὰ ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ φαντασίαι. Τούτων δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν χρωμάτων τέτταρες αἱ διαφοραί, λευκοῦ, μέλανος, ἐρυθροῦ, ὠχροῦ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

1 <Aëtius>: Plato

I.16.1.4

Plato held color to be a flame coming from bodies, with particles commensurate with sight.[449]

1 <Aëtius>: Aristarchus

I.16.1.5

Aristarchus, the Samian mathematician and pupil of Strato, held color to be light falling upon the underlying objects.[450]

1 <Aëtius>: Zeno

I.16.1.6

Zeno the Stoic held colors to be the primary configurations of matter.[451]

1 <Aëtius>: Democritus

I.16.1.7

Democritus held that no color exists by nature: the elements, both the solid units and the void, lack qualities. Their compounds, however, are colored through arrangement, configuration, and orientation, which mean, respectively, order, shape, and position; for appearances arise from these. Of these colors as they appear to us there are four varieties: white, black, red, and pale yellow.[452]

449. Symmetra describes a relation of size suitable for vision, rather than requiring all the particles to be exactly equal. The fuller quotation from the Timaeus in excerpt 2 distinguishes particles that are smaller, larger, and equal in size to those of the visual stream.

450. The report identifies Aristarchus by his place of origin and his connection with Strato. Hypokeimena here denotes the objects receiving the light. Compare the statement about bodies in darkness later in this excerpt.

451. Schēmatismoi are configurations or ways in which something is formed. “Primary” renders prōtous; the compressed report does not explain whether this priority is temporal or explanatory.

452. The solid units are the atoms. The denial of qualities concerns the elements, whereas color belongs to their compounds as perceived. Rhythmos here has the older sense of form or configuration, explicitly glossed by schēma, “shape.” The three Greek terms are retained in Wachsmuth’s order, including protropē, “orientation.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

1 <Ἀετίου> · 8 I.16.1.8

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος τὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ σώματα χρόαν οὐκ ἔχειν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 9 I.16.1.9

Ἀριστοτέλης πέρας ἐν ὡρισμένῳ διαφανεῖ, διαφανὲν δὲ ὕλην εἶναι διηθημένην καθαρὰν καὶ ἀμιγῆ, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ κινητικὸν χρῶμα ὑπάρχειν· ἐν δὲ τῷ σκότῳ τὰ σώματα χρόαν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχειν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ μηδαμῶς· πολὺ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε μὴ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 10 I.16.1.10

Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰ στοιχεῖα κεχρῶσθαι φυσικῶς, οἱ δὲ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ ποιότητος μετέχειν τὰ πρῶτα, οἱ δὲ τὰ ἄτομα πάντα συλλήβδην ἄχροα, ἐξ ἀποίων δὲ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν τὰς αἰσθητὰς ὑποφαίνουσι γίγνεσθαι ποιότητας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

1 <Aëtius>: Epicurus and Aristarchus I.16.1.8

Epicurus and Aristarchus held that bodies in darkness have no hue.[453]

1 <Aëtius>: Aristotle I.16.1.9

Aristotle held color to be a boundary within a delimited transparent body. The transparent, he said, is matter that has been filtered, pure and unmixed; and color is what sets this very thing in motion.[454] Bodies in darkness have hue potentially, but in no way actually; there is a great difference between having none and not being seen.[455]

1 <Aëtius>: A comparison of accounts I.16.1.10

Some of the other thinkers hold that the elements are naturally colored; others that the primary things with like parts possess quality; and others that all atoms, without exception, are colorless. These last suggest that sensible qualities arise from things without qualities, which are apprehended by reason.[456]

453. Wachsmuth adopts Usener's correction sōmata, "bodies," for the transmitted chrōmata, "colors," both here and in the following Aristotelian report. The statement here is unqualified; the next account introduces a distinction between potentiality and actuality.

454. Compare Aristotle, On Sense 3, 439a-439b, on color and the boundary of the transparent in bodies. "Filtered" follows the printed diēthēmenēn, a reading Diels suspected of corruption, as Wachsmuth's apparatus records. The summary is translated as it stands rather than replaced with Aristotle's own fuller formulation.

455. Dynamis and energeia distinguish a capacity from its realization. The final sentence separates absence of hue from absence of its visible manifestation. This qualification is preserved alongside, rather than used to rewrite, the preceding report about Epicurus and Aristarchus.

456. The three groups are not named in this concluding comparison. Homoiomerē are things whose parts are of the same kind; compare the report about Anaxagoras in I.15.6a. The last clause belongs to the account that makes atoms colorless and contrasts rational apprehension of their constituents with sense perception of qualities.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 1

I.16.2.1

Τέταρτον γὰρ δὴ λοιπὸν ἔτι γένος ἡμῖν αἰσθητικῶν, ὃ διελέσθαι δεῖ συχνὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ποικίλματα κεκτημένον, ἃ ξύμπαντα μὲν χρόας ἐκαλέσαμεν, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὄψει σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν· ὄψεως δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν αὐτῶν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῆς γενέσεως ὀλίγα ἐρρήθη.

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 2

I.16.2.2

Τῇδε οὖν τῶν χρωμάτων πέρι μάλιστα εἰκὸς πρέποι τ’ ἂν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ λόγον διεξελθεῖν· τὰ φερόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μόρια ἐμπίπτοντά τε εἰς τὴν ὄψιν τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μείζω, τὰ δὲ ἴσα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς ὄψεως μέρεσιν εἶναι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἴσα ἀναίσθητα, ἃ δὴ καὶ διαφανῆ λέγομεν·

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 3

I.16.2.3

τὰ δὲ μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω, τὰ μὲν συγκρίνοντα, τὰ δὲ διακρίνοντα αὐτήν, τοῖς περὶ τὴν σάρκα θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν στρυφνοῖς καὶ ὅσα θερμαντικὰ ὄντα δριμέα ἐκαλέσαμεν ἀδελφὰ εἶναι, τά τε λευκὰ καὶ τὰ μέλανα, ἐκείνων παθήματα γεγονότα ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει τὰ αὐτά, φανταζόμενα δὲ ἄλλα διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. Οὕτως οὖν αὐτὰ προσρητέον, τὸ μὲν διακριτικὸν τῆς ὄψεως λευκόν, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ μέλαν,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 1

I.16.2.1

For there is still a fourth class of sensible objects left for us to distinguish, containing many variations within itself. All these together we have called colors: a flame streaming from each body, with particles commensurate with sight so as to produce perception. A little was said earlier about sight itself and the causes of its coming into being.[457]

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 2

I.16.2.2

The most likely and fitting way to develop a reasonable account of colors would therefore be this: of the particles carried from other things and striking the visual stream, some are smaller, some larger, and some equal in size to the parts of sight itself. Those of equal size are imperceptible, and these we call transparent.[458]

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 3

I.16.2.3

The larger and smaller particles, which respectively compress and disperse the visual stream, are akin to the hot and cold things affecting flesh, and to the astringent things affecting the tongue and all those heating things that we called pungent. White and black are the same affections as these, arising in a different sphere, though for these reasons they appear different. We should therefore name them accordingly: what disperses the visual stream is white, and its opposite is black.[459]

457. The reference to what was said earlier belongs to Plato's dialogue, not to a missing passage of Stobaeus's chapter. In this account opsis, "sight," includes a physical visual stream: the subsequent discussion speaks of its particles and of fire issuing from the eyes.

458. The particles are compared with the material constituents of sight, not with the visible size of the entire eye. "Transparent" describes the absence of a perceptible disturbance in this case. The account is expressly offered as likely or reasonable.

459. Synkrinein and diakrinein describe bringing together and separating: the larger particles compress, the smaller disperse. Plato compares the same kinds of physical action across sight, touch, and taste. "A different sphere" renders en allō genei, a different class or domain of sensation.

BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 4 I.16.2.4

τὴν δὲ ὀξυτέραν φορὰν καὶ γένους πυρὸς ἑτέρου προσπίπτουσαν καὶ διακρίνουσαν τὴν ὄψιν μέχρι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, αὐτάς τε τῶν ὀμμάτων τὰς διεξόδους βίᾳ διωθοῦσαν καὶ τήκουσαν, πῦρ μὲν ἀθρόον καὶ ὕδωρ, ὃ δάκρυον καλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἐκχέουσαν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὖσαν πῦρ, ἐξ ἐναντίας ἁπαντῶσαν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκπηδῶντος πυρὸς οἷον ἀπὸ ἀστραπῆς, τοῦ δὲ εἰσιόντος καὶ περὶ τὸ νοτερὸν κατασβεννυμένου, παντοδαπῶν ἐν τῇ κυκήσει ταύτῃ γιγνομένων χρωμάτων, μαρμαρυγὰς μὲν τὸ πάθος προσείπομεν, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον λαμπρόν τε καὶ στίλβον ἐπωνομάσαμεν.

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 5 I.16.2.5

Τὸ δὲ τούτων αὖ μεταξὺ πυρὸς γένος, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων ὑγρὸν ἀφικνούμενον καὶ κεραννύμενον αὐτῷ, στίλβον δὲ οὔ, τῇ δὲ διὰ τῆς νοτίδος αὐγῇ τοῦ πυρὸς μιγνυμένῃ, χρῶμα ἔναιμον παρασχομένῃ τοὔνομα ἐρυθρὸν λέγομεν. Λαμπρὸν δὲ ἐρυθρῷ λευκῷ τε μιγνύμενον ξανθὸν γέγονε.

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 6 I.16.2.6

Τὸ δὲ ὅσον μέτρον ὅσοις, οὐδ’ εἴ τις εἰδείη, νοῦν ἔχει τὸ λέγειν, ὧν μήτε τινὰ ἀνάγκην μήτε τὸν εἰκότα λόγον καὶ μετρίως ἄν τις εἰπεῖν εἴη δυνατός·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 4

I.16.2.4

But a more piercing rush of another kind of fire strikes and disperses the visual stream all the way to the eyes, forcibly thrusting through and melting the very passages of the eyes. It pours from them a rush of fire together with water, which we call tears; and, itself being fire, it meets what comes from the opposite direction. One fire leaps out as if from a lightning flash, while the other enters and is quenched in the moisture, and all sorts of colors arise in this commotion. We have called this experience “dazzling flashes,” and have named what produces it “bright” and “glittering.”[460]

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 5

I.16.2.5

There is also a kind of fire intermediate between these, which reaches the moisture of the eyes and mixes with it, but does not glitter. As the gleam of fire mixes through the moisture and produces a bloodlike color, we give it the name “red.” Brightness mixed with red and white produces golden yellow.[461]

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 6

I.16.2.6

As for how much of each is mixed with how much, it makes no sense to state it even if one knew, since one could give neither a necessary explanation nor even a moderately satisfactory likely account of these proportions.[462]

460. The description distinguishes fire issuing from the eyes from fire entering them. Marmarygai are flickering or dazzling flashes; lampron and stilbon name the brightness and glitter that produce the experience. Brightness subsequently appears as a component in the account of color mixtures.

461. “Golden yellow” renders xanthon, whose range can include tawny and golden tones. It is distinguished here from ōchron, “pale yellow,” and pyrrhon, “flame red,” in the mixtures below. These English labels are approximate equivalents; the passage also treats brightness as something mixed with colors.

462. The passage withholds numerical proportions for the mixtures it describes. It distinguishes a necessary explanation from an account that is merely likely, while declining to supply either for the exact quantities.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 7

I.16.2.7

ἐρυθρὸν δὲ δὴ μέλανι λευκῷ τε κραθὲν ἀλουργοῦν· ὄρφνινον δὲ ὅταν τούτοις μεμιγμένοις καυθεῖσί τε μᾶλλον συγκραθῇ μέλαν· πυρρὸν δὲ ξανθοῦ τε καὶ φαιοῦ κράσει γίγνεται, φαιὸν δὲ λευκοῦ τε καὶ μέλανος· τὸ δὲ ὠχρὸν λευκοῦ ξανθῷ μιγνυμένου· λαμπρῷ δὲ λευκὸν συνελθὸν καὶ εἰς μέλαν κατακορὲς ἐμπεσὸν κυανοῦν χρῶμα ἀποτελεῖται· κυανοῦ δὲ λευκῷ κεραννυμένου γλαυκόν· πυρροῦ δὲ μέλανι πράσιον.

2 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 8

I.16.2.8

Τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀπὸ τούτων σχεδὸν δῆλα, αἷς ἂν ἀφομοιούμενα μίξεσι διασῴζοι τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον. Εἰ δέ τις τούτων ἔργῳ σκοπούμενος βάσανον λαμβάνοι, τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ θείας φύσεως ἠγνοηκὼς ἂν εἴη διάφορον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 16

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 7

I.16.2.7

Red blended with black and white produces purple; and a dusky hue results when these have been mixed and burned and black is blended in more strongly. Flame red comes from a mixture of golden yellow and gray, and gray from white and black; pale yellow comes from white mixed with golden yellow.[463]

White combined with brightness and plunged into an intense black produces dark blue; dark blue mixed with white produces pale blue; and flame red mixed with black produces leek green.[464]

2 Plato, Timaeus 67c-68d, part 8

I.16.2.8

From these examples it is fairly clear to which mixtures the remaining colors may be likened so as to preserve the likelihood of the account. But if someone were to investigate these matters in practice and put them to the test, he would be failing to recognize the difference between human and divine nature.[465]

463. Halourgoun is purple, associated with purple dye; orphninon, rendered “dusky,” emphasizes darkness and does not securely identify a single modern shade. Pyrrhon, here “flame red,” belongs to a range of fiery or tawny reds, whereas phaion is the gray or dusky mixture of white and black.

464. The Greek terms are kyanoun, glaukón, and prasion. “Dark blue” and “pale blue” preserve the contrast produced here by adding white; glaukón can also carry gray or greenish associations. Prasion evokes the color of a leek. The stated combinations are retained as Plato gives them, including flame red with black.

465. Eikōs mythos is a likely account or story. Stobaeus’s quotation ends at this contrast between human and divine nature. In the continuation of Plato’s dialogue, the contrast is explained through the divine capacity to combine many things into one and resolve one into many; that continuation is not added to the excerpt here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

Κεφάλαιον ΙΖ′ I.17.heading

Περὶ μίξεως καὶ κράσεως.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.17.1.1

Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κράσεις εἶναι τὰς τῶν στοιχείων μίξεις κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.17.1.2

<Οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Δημόκριτον> τὰς κράσεις κατὰ παράθεσιν γίγνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.17.1.3

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 17

Chapter 17: Mixture and Blending I.17.heading

On mixture and blending.

1 <Aëtius, Opinions>: Thales I.17.1.1

Thales and his followers held blends to be mixtures of the elements through alteration.[466]

1 <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras and Democritus I.17.1.2

<The followers of Anaxagoras and Democritus> held that blends arise through the juxtaposition of the elements.[467]

1 <Aëtius>: Empedocles and Xenocrates I.17.1.3

Empedocles and Xenocrates construct the elements out of smaller masses, which are the smallest things and, as it were, elements of elements.[468]

466. Mixis and krasis are rendered “mixture” and “blending.” Their precise relation varies among the reports; excerpt 4 distinguishes them more narrowly. Alloiōsis means alteration, here contrasted with the juxtaposition described next. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius for all of excerpt 1.

467. The entire subject is supplied in the base edition from the parallel report in the Opinions attributed to Plutarch, I.17. Parathesis means placing things beside one another; the report contrasts this with alteration of the elements themselves.

468. The wording posits constituents more fundamental than the things ordinarily called elements. Onkoi are masses or bodies; the report does not call them atoms. “Smaller” follows the printed mikroterōn, although Wachsmuth notes a parallel reading meaning “smallest.” The English takes the final clause to describe the constituent masses.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

1 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.17.1.4

Πλάτων τὰ μὲν τρία σώματα τρεπτὰ εἰς ἄλληλα, πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ· τὴν δὲ γῆν εἴς τι τούτων ἀμετάβλητον.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> I.17.2

Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.

Τὰ μὲν σώματα φασι θρυπτόμενα κατὰ μικρὰ μόρια παρατίθεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, τοῖς δ’ ἀσωμάτοις λόγοις, εἴ τινές εἰσι λόγοι, συγκιρνᾶσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 17

1 <Aëtius>: Plato I.17.1.4

Plato held that the three bodies, fire, air, and water, can change into one another, but that earth cannot change into any of them.[469]

2 <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle I.17.2

Aristotle and his followers.[470]

They say that bodies, when broken into small parts, are placed beside one another, but are blended with respect to their incorporeal principles, if indeed there are such principles.[471]

469. Compare Timaeus 54b-56e: the geometrical constituents of fire, air, and water allow their transformation into one another, whereas earth is constructed from a different kind of triangle. The qualification concerns conversion into the other elements, not an absolute inability of earth to undergo any change.

470. The attribution to Arius Didymus is supplied by Wachsmuth for excerpts 2-4. “Aristotle and his followers” is the surviving heading within this excerpt. This short report is translated as transmitted and edited here, rather than expanded into a reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory.

471. Logoi is rendered “principles,” though the word can also mean accounts or formulas. Wachsmuth prints Diels’s conjectural dative, tois asōmatois logois, in place of an accusative. The English construes this as “with respect to their incorporeal principles”; the exact relation remains compressed. The parenthetical doubt is retained, although Heeren deleted it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.17.3.1

Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· “τοιαύτην δὲ δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται, τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, [καὶ] ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίγνεσθαι, λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μῖξιν <καὶ> κρᾶσιν γίγνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῇ σώματος ὅλου δι’ ὅλου τινὸς ἑτέρου διερχομένου.”

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.17.3.2

Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. Τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον, εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

3 <Arius Didymus>: Zeno

I.17.3.1

Zeno explicitly declared as follows: “The ordering of the whole out of its substance in a cycle must occur in this way: when fire changes through air into water, some of it settles and earth forms, [and] while of the remainder some stays water, air arises from what evaporates; and as the air becomes finer, fire is kindled.[472] Mixture <and> blending occur through the transformation of the elements into one another, one entire body passing through the entirety of another.”[473]

3 <Arius Didymus>: Cleanthes, part 1

I.17.3.2

Cleanthes speaks somewhat as follows: when the whole has been turned to flame, its center first contracts, and then the adjoining parts are extinguished throughout. When the whole has become moist, the outermost fire, encountering resistance from the center, turns back in the opposite direction. Then, turning in this way, it grows upward, he says, and begins to order the whole.[474]

472. Periodos here is the cosmic cycle, not the orbit of a single heavenly body. The text moves from fire through air to water, then describes the formation of earth and the renewed production of air and fire. The clause about air becoming finer is Wachsmuth’s emendation of a damaged reading.

473. The first bracketed “and” is rejected by the editor; the second, in angle brackets, is supplied. The concluding clause asserts passage of a whole body through another whole body, rather than an arrangement of separate particles beside one another.

474. The sequence describes a return from the fiery condition to an ordered world. Synizein is to settle or contract; antitypein is to resist or strike back. The report speaks both of the whole becoming moist and of fire at its extremity: the translation preserves that compressed description.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.17.3.3

καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἰεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνον μὴ παύεσθαι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ᾧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται.

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.17.3.4

Καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων [εἰς] ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

3 <Arius Didymus>: Cleanthes, part 2 I.17.3.3

As it continually carries out such a cycle and ordering, the tension in the substance of all things never ceases.[475] For just as all the parts of a single individual grow from seeds at their proper times, so too the parts of the whole, among which are animals and plants, grow at their proper times.[476]

3 <Arius Didymus>: Cleanthes, part 3 I.17.3.4

And just as certain principles of the parts come together into a seed and are mixed, and are separated again when the parts have come into being, so all things arise from one, and from all things one is compounded [into], as the cycle proceeds in an orderly and harmonious way.[477]

475. The opening construction is difficult. This rendering takes fire as the implicit subject of "carrying out," while "tension" is the subject of "never ceases." Wachsmuth follows the correction ton ... tonon, an accusative, in place of the transmitted genitive tou ... tonou. His apparatus also records a proposal to insert "the fire" after the participle; the facing Greek does not add those words.

476. Tonos is tension or tautness, here a continuing condition within the substance of the world. The comparison treats the development of the whole through the pattern of an individual's growth, with parts appearing at their appropriate times.

477. The logoi here are principles of the developing parts, gathered in the seed before those parts emerge distinctly. The rejected eis, "into," is retained in brackets after the English verb; it should be omitted in a continuous reading. The remaining construction makes "one" the thing compounded from all things.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.17.4.1

Χρύσιππος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι διεβεβαιοῦτο· εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίνεσθαι κἀπὶ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτόν.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.17.4.2

Ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κίνησις κατὰ μόνους γίνεται τοὺς νομίζοντας τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ σύγχυσιν καὶ σύστασιν καὶ σύμμιξιν καὶ σύμφυσιν καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. Διαφέρειν γὰρ ἀρέσκει τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στωικῆς αἱρέσεως παράθεσιν, μῖξιν, κρᾶσιν, σύγχυσιν.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.17.4.3

Παράθεσιν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σωμάτων συναφὴν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σωρῶν ὁρῶμεν, ἐν οἷς πυροί τε καὶ κριθαὶ καὶ φακοὶ καὶ εἴ τινα τούτοις ἄλλα παραπλήσια περιέχεται καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν ψήφων καὶ ἄμμων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus, part 1 I.17.4.1

Chrysippus firmly maintained something of this kind: what exists is breath moving itself toward itself and out of itself, or breath moving itself forward and backward. Breath is specified because it is said to be air in motion; something analogous occurs with aether too, so that it also falls under a common account.[478]

4 <Arius Didymus>: Kinds of combination I.17.4.2

Such motion occurs only on the account of those who hold that substance admits every kind of change: fusion, composition, mixing, growing together, and the like. For the followers of the Stoic school hold that juxtaposition, mixture, blending, and fusion differ from one another.[479]

4 <Arius Didymus>: Juxtaposition I.17.4.3

Juxtaposition is contact between bodies at their surfaces, as we observe in heaps containing wheat, barley, lentils, and anything else of that kind, and in the pebbles and sand on beaches.[480]

478. Pneuma means breath or wind. The account treats it as bodily and describes its opposed motions; it is not presented as an immaterial spirit. “What exists” translates to on. The final clause extends the same account to aether. Logos here means an account or description, rather than the developmental principles mentioned by Cleanthes.

479. The four terms in the second sentence are parathesis, mixis, krasis, and synchysis. The following definitions specify their differences. “Fusion” is used for synchysis because the final definition involves alteration of the original qualities into a new quality; it does not mean simply melting a solid.

480. The examples leave the constituent bodies beside one another, meeting at their boundaries. This prepares the contrast with the complete mutual extension described under mixture.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.17.4.4

Μῖξιν δ’ εἶναι δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν δι’ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχει καὶ τοῦ πεπυρακτωμένου σιδήρου, ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ <δι’> ὅλων γίγνεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων τὴν ἀντιπαρέκτασιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῶν ἔχειν· δι’ ὅλων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν ἀντιπαρεκτείνουσιν, ἀρέσκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 5 I.17.4.5

Κρᾶσιν δὲ εἶναι λέγουσι δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ὑγρῶν δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων ὑπομενουσῶν· [Τὴν μὲν μῖξιν καὶ ἐπὶ ξηρῶν γίγνεσθαι σωμάτων, οἷον πυρὸς καὶ σιδήρου, ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὴν σώματος· τὴν δὲ κρᾶσιν ἐπὶ μόνων φασὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑγρῶν·]

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Arius Didymus>: Mixture

I.17.4.4

Mixture is the mutual extension of two or more bodies through one another in their entirety, while their inherent qualities persist, as happens with fire and glowing iron; for in these cases the mutual extension occurs <through> the whole of the bodies.[481] The same holds for the souls within us: they extend throughout the whole of our bodies, for these thinkers hold that body extends through body.[482]

4 <Arius Didymus>: Blending

I.17.4.5

Blending, they say, is the mutual extension of two or more liquid bodies throughout one another, while their qualities persist. [Mixture occurs also in dry bodies, such as fire and iron, and the soul and the body that contains it; blending, however, they say occurs only in liquids.][483]

481. Antiparektasis denotes mutual extension or coextension. Both the completeness of the interpenetration and the persistence of the constituents' qualities belong to the definition. Wachsmuth supplies di', "through," in the repeated explanation of the fire-and-iron example.

482. The example of the soul applies the same bodily account to an organism. The soul extends through the body rather than occupying a separate compartment beside it. This is the position reported here, distinct from the reference to incorporeal principles in excerpt 2.

483. The bracketed sentences summarize the distinction between mixture and blending. Wachsmuth rejects them as a marginal explanation that entered the text: they repeat what precedes and interrupt the connection with the next "for." They remain visible in both languages; the continuous argument runs from the persistence of qualities directly to the following examples.

BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 6 I.17.4.6

συνεκφαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν συγκραθέντων ὑγρῶν ποιότητα, οἷον οἴνου, μέλιτος, ὕδατος, ὄξους, τῶν παραπλησίων. Ὅτι δ’ ἐπὶ τοιούτων κράσεων διαμένουσιν αἱ ποιότητες τῶν συγκραθέντων, πρόδηλον ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐπιμηχανήσεως ἀποχωρίζεσθαι ταῦτα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων. Ἐὰν γοῦν σπόγγον ἠλαιωμένον καθῇ τις εἰς οἶνον ὕδατι κεκραμένον, ἀποχωρίσει τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ οἴνου ἀναδραμόντος τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς τὸν σπόγγον.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 7 I.17.4.7

Τὴν δὲ σύγχυσιν δύο <ἢ> καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴν εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔχει τῶν μύρων καὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν φαρμάκων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 17

4 <Arius Didymus>: Qualities retained

I.17.4.6

For the quality of each of the liquids blended together is manifested along with the others in the blend, as in wine, honey, water, vinegar, and the like.[484] That the qualities of the blended constituents persist in such blends is evident from their often being separated from one another by some contrivance. Thus, if someone lowers an oiled sponge into wine blended with water, he will separate the water from the wine, as the water rises into the sponge.[485]

4 <Arius Didymus>: Fusion

I.17.4.7

Fusion is the alteration of two <or> more qualities belonging to bodies, producing another quality different from them, as happens in the compounding of perfumes and medicinal preparations.[486]

484. The argument concerns the continued identity of the constituents' qualities even when the liquids extend through one another. Their recoverability is offered as evidence that those qualities have survived the blending.

485. The oiled sponge is an ancient example used to support separability; the translation preserves the report's claim. Compare Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 185-186, where the same example appears. Philo's proposed explanation involving the sponge's origin in water is not part of this excerpt.

486. This final definition turns on the production of a new quality, unlike blending, in which the earlier qualities persist. Wachsmuth supplies ē, "or." His apparatus records that the manuscripts next repeat a passage of Posidonius belonging to I.20.7; he omits that duplication, and this chapter ends here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

Κεφάλαιον ΙΗ′ I.18.heading

Περὶ κενοῦ καὶ τόπου <καὶ χώρας>.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.18.1a.1

Οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω φυσικοὶ πάντες τὸ κενὸν ὡς ὄντως κενὸν ἀπέγνωσαν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · Ἐμπεδοκλῆς I.18.1a.2

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

Οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντὸς κενὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περιττόν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.18.1a.3

Δημόκριτος καὶ ἕτεροι, Λεύκιππος, Μητρόδωρος, Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἄτομα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

Chapter 18: Void, Place, and Space

I.18.heading

On void and place <and space>.[487]

1a <Aëtius>: The natural philosophers

I.18.1a.1

All the natural philosophers from Thales onward rejected the void as something truly empty.[488]

1a <Aëtius>: Empedocles

I.18.1a.2

Empedocles.

No part of the whole is empty, nor is anything superfluous.[489]

1a <Aëtius>: The atomists

I.18.1a.3

Democritus and others, Leucippus, Metrodorus, and Epicurus, held that atoms are infinite in number, whereas the void is infinite in extent.[490]

487. Kenon, topos, and chōra are rendered “void,” “place,” and “space” to preserve the distinctions discussed below. Their definitions vary among the reports. Wachsmuth restores “and space” in the heading from Photius and the ancient table of contents; the words are absent from the principal manuscripts.

488. The report makes a broad claim, then places a contrasting account of the atomists immediately after Empedocles’s verse. “Truly empty” means devoid of body, not merely lacking a particular visible occupant. The attribution to Aëtius is supplied in the base edition.

489. The single verse denies both a void within the whole and anything superfluous. Peritton can mean excess or surplus; the translation does not supply an additional cosmological argument.

490. The two kinds of infinity are explicitly distinguished: the number of atoms and the spatial extent of the void. The report does not say that any individual atom is infinitely large.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

1b <Ἀετίου> I.18.1b

Στράτων ἐξωτέρω μὲν ἔφη τοῦ κόσμου μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἐνδοτέρω δὲ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. Τόπον δὲ εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τοῦ περιεχομένου.

1c <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.18.1c.1

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τετάρτῳ Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως γράφει· “εἶναι δέ φασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενὸν καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἀναπνέοντι.” Ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου φιλοσοφίας πρώτῳ γράφει, τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἕνα, ἐπεισάγεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνον τε καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὃ διορίζει ἑκάστων τὰς χώρας ἀεί.

1c <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.18.1c.2

Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις λέγει, τόπον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μένει τε καὶ κινεῖται τὰ σώματα, πλήρη μέν, ὅταν πανταχόθεν περιέχῃ τὸ σῶμα, κενὸν δέ, ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχῃ τὸ παράπαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

1b <Aëtius>: Strato I.18.1b

Strato said that there is no void outside the world, but that one can come into being within it. Place is the interval between what contains and what is contained.[491]

1c <Aëtius>: Aristotle on the Pythagoreans I.18.1c.1

Aristotle writes in the fourth book of the Physics: “The Pythagoreans say that void exists and enters the heaven from the infinite breath, as though the heaven were breathing.”[492] In the first book of On the Philosophy of Pythagoras, he writes that the heaven is one, and that time, breath, and the void are brought into it from the infinite; the void continually separates the spaces belonging to individual things.[493]

1c <Aëtius>: Place and void I.18.1c.2

Elsewhere too he says that place is the unmoving boundary of what contains, or that in which bodies remain and move: full when it encloses the body on every side, empty when it has absolutely nothing in itself.[494]

491. The wording allows void to arise inside the world while denying it outside. Strato’s definition of place as an interval should be distinguished from the boundary definition in the next report.

492. The first quotation corresponds to Physics IV.6, 213b22-24. It reports a Pythagorean view rather than Aristotle’s own position. Pneuma is “breath”; the breathing image belongs to the account itself.

493. The second passage is testimony from a separately titled work of Aristotle. “Spaces” renders the plural chōras. The void functions here as a separator. Wachsmuth notes that part of excerpt 1c may derive from Arius Didymus; the printed attribution is therefore not certain for every clause.

494. The boundary definition is followed by a broader description of place as what bodies occupy. The contrast between full and empty explains the terms; it does not establish the actual existence of void, which the next sentences deny.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

1c <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.18.1c.3

Τόπον μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν καὶ σῶμα, κενὸν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ μόνον πρὸς νόησιν· ἀναιρετικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατ' ἐνδελέχειαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τῆς τε τῶν ὄντων συμπαθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἀλληλουχίας· τὰς δὲ κινήσεις γίνεσθαι τὰς κατὰ τόπον [κατὰ τὸ πρότερον] ἀντιπερισταμένων ἀλλήλοις τῶν σωμάτων. Ἄπειρον δὲ οὐθὲν ἀπολείπει οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οὔτε κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος.

1d <Ἀετίου> I.18.1d

Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἔξω δ' αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον. Διαφέρειν δὲ κενόν, τόπον, χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον.

1e Θαλῆς I.18.1e

Θαλῆς ἐρωτηθείς, Τί τὸ μέγιστον; ἔφησε, Τόπος· τἆλλα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, τὸν δὲ κόσμον οὗτος περιέχει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

1c <Aëtius>: Motion without void

I.18.1c.3

Place and body, then, must exist, but void does not exist at all, except as an object of thought; for its nature, if actually realized, would destroy both the mutual responsiveness of existing things and the continuity of bodies.[495] Motions occur from place to place [in respect of what comes before] as bodies successively take one another's places.[496] He admits nothing infinite, either in number or in extent.[497]

1d <Aëtius>: Zeno

I.18.1d

Zeno and his followers held that there is no void within the world, but an infinite void outside it. Void, place, and space differ: void is an absence of body; place is what is occupied by body; space is what is occupied in part.[498]

1e Thales

I.18.1e

When Thales was asked, "What is the greatest thing?" he replied, "Place: the world contains everything else, but place contains the world."[499]

495. The contrast with an object of thought guides "if actually realized." The printed phrase is kat' endelecheian, whose relation here to actuality rather than continuance is difficult; the Greek spelling is retained. Sympatheia is mutual responsiveness or shared affection, and allēlouchia is the connected succession of bodies.

496. The bracketed phrase kata to proteron is rejected by Usener in the base edition. The account makes movement possible by reciprocal displacement, without an intervening void; the rejected words should be omitted in a continuous reading.

497. This is the report's compressed conclusion. It should not be expanded into a denial of every sense of infinity in Aristotle.

498. Erēmia is absence or being bereft: the definition makes body the criterion of occupation. Keep this threefold distinction separate from Epicurus's report in 4a and the questioning formulation in Chrysippus's report in 4d.

499. This is an attributed saying. Its superlative rests on the relation of container to contained; it is not given here as a developed geometrical argument.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 1

I.18.2.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν.

<ΈΡΜ.> Πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον, ὦ Ἀσκληπιέ, οὐκ ἔν τινι κινεῖται καὶ ὑπό τινος;

<ΆΣΚ.> Μάλιστα.

<ΈΡΜ.> Οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ μεῖζον εἶναι <τὸ> ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται <ἢ> τὸ κινούμενον;

<ΆΣΚ.> Ἀνάγκη.

<ΈΡΜ.> Ἰσχυρότερον ἄρα τὸ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου;

<ΆΣΚ.> Ἰσχυρότερον γάρ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Hermes: Motion and its setting

I.18.2.1

From the writings of Hermes addressed to Asclepius.[500]

<Hermes> Everything that moves, Asclepius, moves in something and is moved by something, does it not?

<Asclepius> Certainly.

<Hermes> Must not <that> in which it moves be greater <than> the moving thing?

<Asclepius> It must.

<Hermes> Then what moves it is stronger than what is moved?

<Asclepius> Yes, stronger.[501]

500. This dialogue is transmitted under the name of Hermes and corresponds to the opening of Corpus Hermeticum II. The supplied speaker labels are absent from Stobaeus's principal manuscripts; the editor distributes the speeches using the separate Hermetic tradition. Asclepius is the addressee in Stobaeus's heading, although the apparatus records Tat in other witnesses.

501. The argument distinguishes where motion occurs from what causes it. "That" represents the supplied Greek article and "than" the supplied comparative particle. The translation preserves the dialogue's successive premises without treating them as established physical laws.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 2

I.18.2.2

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἐναντίαν δὲ ἔχειν φύσιν ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται τῇ τοῦ κινουμένου;

<ΑΣΚ.> Καὶ πάνυ.

<ΕΡΜ.> Μέγας οὖν οὗτος <ὁ> κόσμος, οὗ μεῖζον οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα;

<ΑΣΚ.> Ὡμολόγηται.

<ΕΡΜ.> Καὶ στιβαρός; πεπλήρωται γὰρ ἄλλων σωμάτων μεγάλων πολλῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ὅσα ἐστὶ σώματα;

<ΑΣΚ.> Οὕτως ἔχει.

<ΕΡΜ.> Σῶμα δὲ ὁ κόσμος;

<ΑΣΚ.> Σῶμα.

<ΕΡΜ.> Καὶ κινούμενον;

<ΑΣΚ.> Μάλιστα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Hermes: The world as body I.18.2.2

<Hermes> And must that in which something moves have a nature opposite to the nature of the moving thing?

<Asclepius> Most certainly.

<Hermes> This world, then, is great, since no body is greater than it?

<Asclepius> That is agreed.

<Hermes> And solidly packed? For it is filled with many other great bodies, or rather with all the bodies there are?

<Asclepius> That is so.

<Hermes> And the world is a body?

<Asclepius> A body.

<Hermes> And one that moves?

<Asclepius> Certainly.[502]

502. Stibaros describes something solid or compact; here the next clause explains it by the bodies that fill the world. The Greek article before “world” is supplied by comparison with the Hermetic text. English “this world” absorbs that article and has no separate word to bracket.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 3

I.18.2.3

<ΕΡΜ.> Πηλίκον οὖν δεῖ τὸν τόπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται καὶ ποταπὸν τὴν φύσιν; Οὐ πολὺ μείζονα, ἵνα δυνηθῇ δέξασθαι τῆς φορᾶς τὴν συνέχειαν καὶ μὴ θλιβόμενον τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς στενότητος ἐπίσχῃ τὴν κίνησιν;

<ΑΣΚ.> Παμμέγεθές τι χρῆμα, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε.

<ΕΡΜ.> Ποταπῆς δὲ φύσεως; τῆς ἐναντίας ἄρα, ὦ Ἀσκληπιέ; σώματι δὲ ἐναντία φύσις τὸ ἀσώματον;

<ΑΣΚ.> Ὁμολόγηται.

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 4

I.18.2.4

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἀσώματος οὖν ὁ τόπος, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον ἢ <τὸ> θεῖόν ἐστιν ἢ ὁ θεός. Τὸ δὲ θεῖον λέγω νῦν οὐ τὸ γενητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγένητον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

2 Hermes: Incorporeal place

I.18.2.3

<Hermes> How large, then, must the place in which it moves be, and what must its nature be? Must it not be much greater, so that it can accommodate the continuity of its movement, and the moving thing does not stop moving because it is cramped by the narrowness?

<Asclepius> Something immensely great, Trismegistus.

<Hermes> And of what nature? The opposite nature, then, Asclepius? And the nature opposite to body is the incorporeal?

<Asclepius> That is agreed.[503]

2 Hermes: The divine and God

I.18.2.4

<Hermes> Place, then, is incorporeal, and the incorporeal is either <the> divine or God. By the divine I now mean what has not come into being, rather than what has come into being.[504]

503. Trismegistus, “thrice greatest,” is the title by which Asclepius addresses Hermes. The argument moves from the need for room to the claim that the containing place has a nature opposite to body. This premise belongs to this dialogue, not to every account collected in the chapter.

504. The distinction between “the divine” and “God” is retained. Genēton and agenēton concern coming into being; the printed spelling uses a single n, while the apparatus records forms with double n. The extract stops here before the dialogue’s further discussion.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 1 I.18.3.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

<ΈΡΜ.> Οὐδὲ ἓν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ κενὸν τῷ τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγῳ· τὸ δὲ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἠδύνατο εἶναι ὄν, εἰ μὴ μεστὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἦν· τὸ γὰρ ὑπάρχον κενὸν οὐδέποτε γενέσθαι δύναται.

<ΆΣΚ.> Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν κενά τινα, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε, οἷον κάδος καὶ κέραμος καὶ ληνὸς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ παραπλήσια;

3 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 2 I.18.3.2

<ΈΡΜ.> Φεῦ τῆς πολλῆς πλάνης, <ὦ> Ἀσκληπιέ· τὰ μᾶλλον πληρέστατα καὶ μεστότατα, ταῦτα κενὰ ἡγῇ εἶναι;

<ΆΣΚ.> Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε;

<ΈΡΜ.> Οὐ σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ἀήρ;

<ΆΣΚ.> Σῶμα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 From the same work: Empty vessels I.18.3.1

From the same work.

<Hermes> Not one of the things that exist is empty, by the very account of its existence. What exists could not be an existing thing unless it were full of existence; for what exists can never become empty.[505]

<Asclepius> Are there not some empty things, then, Trismegistus, such as a jar, an earthenware pot, a vat, and other things of that kind?[506]

3 Hermes: Air as body I.18.3.2

<Hermes> What a great error, <O> Asclepius! Do you think that these things, which are instead utterly full and packed, are empty?

<Asclepius> What do you mean, Trismegistus?

<Hermes> Is air not a body?

<Asclepius> It is a body.[507]

505. This second extract resumes later in Corpus Hermeticum II, at section 10. The argument links being empty with being deprived of existence. The separate Hermetic text has additional wording about nonbeing; the apparatus records it, but it is not supplied in Stobaeus's excerpt.

506. The examples are ordinary containers. Lēnos is a vat or trough, often a wine vat; the translation retains Stobaeus's reading rather than substituting the different examples found in other witnesses.

507. The reply challenges the ordinary description of a container as empty when it contains no visible liquid or solid: it still contains air. The supplied vocative particle is shown as "O" here and below; unmarked Greek vocatives are normally rendered without that English interjection.

BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 3 I.18.3.3

<Ἑρμ.> Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σῶμα οὐ διὰ πάντων διήκει τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάντα διῆκον πληροῖ; σῶμα δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων κεκραμένον συνέστηκε; Μεστὰ οὖν πάντα ἐστίν, ἃ σὺ φῂς κενά, τοῦ ἀέρος, εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων σωμάτων· καὶ συμβαίνει ὁ ἐναντίος λόγος ἐκφαίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἃ σὺ φῂς μεστά, ταῦτα πάντα κενά ἐστι τοῦ ἀέρος ἐκείνων ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων σωμάτων στενοχωρουμένων καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τόπον δέξασθαι τὸν ἀέρα. Ταῦτα οὖν, ἃ σὺ φῂς <κενά>, κοῖλα δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, οὐ κενά· ὑπάρξει γὰρ μεστά ἐστιν ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος.

3 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 4 I.18.3.4

<Ἀσκ.> Ἀναντίρρητος ὁ λόγος, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε. Τὸν οὖν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται τὸ πᾶν, τί εἴπωμεν;

<Ἑρμ.> Ἀσώματον, <ὦ> Ἀσκληπιέ.

<Ἀσκ.> Τὸ οὖν ἀσώματον <τί> ἐστι;

<Ἑρμ.> Νοῦς <καὶ λόγος>, ὅλος ἐξ ὅλου ἑαυτὸν ἐμπεριέχων, ἐλεύθερος σώματος παντός, ἀπλανής, ἀπαθής, ἀναφής, αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἑστώς, συγχωρητικὸς πάντων καὶ σωτήριος τῶν ὄντων, οὗ ὥσπερ ἀκτῖνές εἰσι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀρχέτυπον φῶς, τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τῆς ψυχῆς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 Hermes: Hollow rather than empty I.18.3.3

<Hermes> Does this body not pass through all existing things and fill everything it passes through? And is body not constituted by a blend of the four? Everything you call empty is therefore full of air; and if full of air, then full of the four bodies.[508] The contrary account then emerges: everything you call full is empty of air, because those things are crowded with other bodies and have no room to receive the air. So the things you call <empty> should be called hollow, not empty; for in their actual existence they are full of air and breath.[509]

3 Hermes: Mind and reason I.18.3.4

<Asclepius> The argument cannot be refuted, Trismegistus. What, then, shall we call the place in which the whole moves?

<Hermes> Incorporeal, <O> Asclepius.

<Asclepius> <What>, then, is the incorporeal?

<Hermes> Mind <and reason>, a whole wholly enclosing itself, free of every body, unerring, unaffected, intangible, standing in itself, making room for all things and preserving what exists. Its rays, as it were, are the good, truth, archetypal light, and the archetype of the soul.[510]

508. “The four” are the elemental bodies, conventionally fire, air, water, and earth. The inference here treats the air occupying a vessel as itself involving a blend; the translation preserves this compressed claim.

509. The opposition turns on what a container is empty of. Pneuma is rendered “breath” beside “air,” without imposing the account of pneuma given by Chrysippus in the previous chapter. Wachsmuth supplies “empty” in the penultimate sentence.

510. Nous is mind or intellect; logos here is reason. “What” and “and reason” are supplied from the separate Hermetic tradition. Wachsmuth likewise follows that tradition for “intangible” and “light,” where Stobaeus’s manuscripts have “invisible” and “of breath/spirit.” The image is of archetypal light, not a physical ray. The assignment of these questions and answers follows Wachsmuth’s restoration of the speakers.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 5 I.18.3.5

<ΑΣΚ.> Ὁ οὖν θεὸς τί ἐστιν;

<ΕΡΜ.> Ὁ μηδὲ ἓν τούτων ὑπάρχων, ὢν δὲ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τούτοις αἴτιος καὶ πᾶσι καὶ ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων πάντων.

4a <Ἀετίου> I.18.4a

Ἐπίκουρος ὀνόμασι [πᾶσιν] παραλλάττειν κενόν, τόπον, χώραν.

4b <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.18.4b.1

Οἱ <ἀπὸ> Πυθαγόρου ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου κενόν, εἰς ὃ ἀναπνεῖ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἐξ οὗ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

3 Hermes: God as cause

I.18.3.5

<Asclepius> What, then, is God?

<Hermes> He who is none of these things, yet is the cause of their being, for all of them and for each and every existing thing.[511]

4a <Aëtius>: Epicurus

I.18.4a

Epicurus held that void, place, and space differ in their names [all of them].[512]

4b <Aëtius>: The Pythagoreans

I.18.4b.1

Those <of the school> of Pythagoras held that there is void outside the world, into which the world breathes and from which it draws breath.[513]

511. The answer distinguishes God as cause from the incorporeal described immediately before. Stobaeus's extract ends here, within the longer discussion in Corpus Hermeticum II. The speaker assignments and several readings are restored in the base edition with help from that parallel tradition.

512. The short report locates the difference in terminology. The bracketed pasin, "all," is rejected by Usener; it is retained visibly in translation but should be omitted in a continuous reading. Contrast the separate definitions attributed to Zeno in 1d.

513. Apo is supplied by Diels to complete the expression for Pythagoras's followers. Both directions of the breathing image are preserved; the report connects the world with the void surrounding it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4b <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.18.4b.2

Οἱ Στωικοὶ εἶναι κενόν, εἰς ὃ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἀναλύεται ὁ κόσμος, ἄπειρον ὄν.

Ποσειδώνιος ἔφησε τὸ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἄπειρον, ἀλλ' ὅσον αὔταρκες εἰς διάλυσιν.

4c <Ἀετίου καὶ Πλάτωνος> · 1 I.18.4c.1

Πλάτων τόπον εἶναι τὸ μεταληπτικὸν τῶν εἰδῶν, ὅπερ εἴρηκε μεταφορικῶς τὴν ὕλην, καθάπερ τινὰ τιθήνην καὶ δεξαμενήν. Κενὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μήτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου, μήτε ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ.

4c Πλάτωνος Τίμαιος · 2 I.18.4c.2

Λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ οὕτως· "Τῶν δὲ δὴ τεττάρων ἓν ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις· ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς συνέστησεν αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστάς, μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολιπών, τάδε διανοηθείς, πρῶτον μέν, ἵνα ὅλον ὅ τι μάλιστα ζῷον τέλειον ἐκ τελείων τῶν μερῶν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἓν ἄτε οὐχ ὑπολελειμμένων ἐξ ὧν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον γένοιτ' ἄν."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4b <Aëtius>: The Stoics and Posidonius I.18.4b.2

The Stoics held that there is void, infinite in extent, into which the world is dissolved at the conflagration.

Posidonius said that what lies outside the world is not infinite, but only large enough to accommodate its dissolution.[514]

4c <Aëtius and Plato>: The receptacle I.18.4c.1

Plato held that place is what receives the forms: by this he meant matter, speaking figuratively of it as a kind of nurse and receptacle. There is no void either outside the world or within it.[515]

4c Plato, Timaeus: The complete world I.18.4c.2

For he says in the Timaeus: “The constitution of the world has taken each of the four in its entirety. Its maker constituted it from all the fire, water, air, and earth, leaving outside no part of any of them, nor any power. He had these things in mind: first, that it should be, as fully as possible, a complete living whole composed of complete parts; and further, that it should be one, since nothing had been left from which another such world could arise.”[516]

514. Ekpyrōsis is the world’s conflagration, its resolution into fire. Posidonius’s qualification concerns the extent available outside the world; it directly limits the infinite void asserted in the preceding report.

515. This is the compiler’s account of Plato, before the direct quotation. Its identification of the receptacle with matter is retained as the report’s interpretation. “Nurse” and “receptacle” describe what receives; they do not identify it with a particular visible body. The base edition assigns this section to Aëtius and Plato’s Timaeus.

516. Timaeus 32c-33a. The quotation explains the world’s completeness and uniqueness by its inclusion of all four elemental bodies. The excerpt stops before Plato’s further reason, freedom from aging and disease, then resumes at 33b in the next unit. No intervening text is supplied.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4c Πλάτωνος Τίμαιος · 3 I.18.4c.3

“Λεῖον δὲ κύκλῳ πᾶν ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ ἀπηκριβοῦτο πολλῶν χάριν. Ὀμμάτων τε γὰρ ἐπεδεῖτο οὐδέν, ὁρατὸν [τε] γὰρ οὐθὲν ἔξωθεν ὑπελείπετο· οὐδ’ ἀκοῆς, οὐδὲ <γὰρ> ἀκουστόν· πνεῦμά τε οὐκ ἦν περιεστὼς δεόμενον ἀναπνοῆς.”

4d <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.18.4d.1

Χρυσίππου. Τόπον δ’ εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος ἢ τὸ οἷόν <τε> κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι’ ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπό τινος <εἴτε> ὑπό τινων.

4d <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.18.4d.2

Ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ οἵου τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος τί μὲν κατέχηται, τί δὲ μή, τὸ ὅλον <οὔτε> κενὸν ἔσεσθαι οὔτε τόπον, ἕτερον δέ τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν τοῖς κενοῖς ἀγγείοις λέγεσθαι παραπλησίως, τὸν δὲ τόπον τοῖς πλήρεσι· χώραν δὲ πότερον τὸ μεῖζον οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ οἷον μεῖζον ἀγγεῖον σώματος, ἢ τὸ χωροῦν μεῖζον σῶμα;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4c Plato, Timaeus: Nothing outside

I.18.4c.3

"He finished its whole exterior smooth all around, for many reasons. It had no need of eyes, [and] for nothing visible remained outside; nor of hearing, <for> there was nothing audible; and there was no surrounding air that required breathing in."[517]

4d <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus on place

I.18.4d.1

Chrysippus. Chrysippus declared that place is what is occupied throughout by an existing thing, or what is <capable of> being occupied by an existing thing and is occupied throughout, whether by one thing <or> by several.[518]

4d Chrysippus: Partial occupation

I.18.4d.2

If, of what can be occupied by an existing thing, one part is occupied and another is not, the whole will be <neither> void nor place, but something different that has no name. For "void" is spoken of by analogy with empty vessels, and "place" by analogy with full ones.[519] As for "space," is it the larger thing capable of being occupied by an existing thing, like a larger vessel for body, or that which accommodates a larger body?[520]

517. Timaeus 33b-c. Wachsmuth rejects te, "and," after "visible" and supplies gar, "for," before "audible," following Plato's text. The rejected word is placed before "for" in English and should be skipped when reading continuously. The last clause describes the absence of external air for the world to breathe. The excerpt ends here.

518. The attribution to Arius Didymus is supplied; "Chrysippus" is the transmitted heading. The second formulation combines capacity for occupation with actual occupation throughout. Diels supplies te to complete hoion te, "capable of"; the other supplied word completes "whether ... or."

519. The base edition restores "neither," adjusts the construction of "will be ... place," and reads "vessels" in place of the transmitted "causes." These repairs make the empty/full comparison explicit. The unnamed partially occupied whole is not silently identified with Zeno's "space" in 1d.

520. The question is preserved as a question. Chōra is "space," while chōroun means making room for or accommodating. The compressed alternatives contrast the larger containing capacity with capacity to contain a larger body; no answer is supplied in the excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4d <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.18.4d.3

Τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ' εἶναι· τὸν δὲ τόπον πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι. Καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν πεπερασμένον εἶναι, οὕτως τὸ ἀσώματον ἄπειρον, ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ἄπειρος καὶ τὸ κενόν.

4d <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.18.4d.4

Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ μηδενός, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· περατοῦται δ' αὖ τοῦτο ἐκπληρούμενον· τοῦ δὲ πληροῦντος ἀρθέντος οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ νοῆσαι πέρας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 18

4d Chrysippus: Limits and infinity I.18.4d.3

Void, then, is said to be infinite, for what is outside the world is of that kind; but place is finite, because no body is infinite. Just as the corporeal is finite, so the incorporeal is infinite, for both time and void are infinite.[521]

4d Chrysippus: The absence of a boundary I.18.4d.4

For just as nothingness is no boundary, so neither is there a boundary of nothingness, such as void is. In its own subsistence it is infinite; yet it becomes bounded when it is filled. Once what fills it is removed, no boundary of it can be conceived.[522]

521. The passage measures occupied place by the body occupying it. The following generalization about the incorporeal is illustrated by time and void. It is retained beside the preceding statement about finite place, without adding a qualification that the Greek does not provide.

522. “Nothingness” renders to mēden, while hypostasis is “subsistence.” The argument treats void as absence of body, then makes its delimitation depend on what fills it. The difficult first sentence follows Wachsmuth’s corrected text, including Canter’s “no” and Usener’s “neither”; it is not replaced with an additional argument. This is the end of chapter 18.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

Κεφάλαιον ΙΘ′ I.19.heading

Περὶ κινήσεως.

1 <Ἀετίου> · Πυθαγόρας I.19.1.1

Πυθαγόρου. Κίνησίς ἐστι διαφορότης ἢ ἑτερότης ἐν ὕλῃ, ᾗ ἐστιν ὕλη. Οὗτος πάσης κινήσεως κοινὸς ὅρος.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.19.1.2

Δημόκριτος ἓν γένος κινήσεως τὸ κατὰ παλμὸν ἀπεφαίνετο. Ἐπίκουρος δύο εἴδη κινήσεως, τὸ κατὰ στάθμην καὶ τὸ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἳ καὶ τέταρτον εἶδος εἰσάγουσι, τὸ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ γένεσιν. Ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ τὴν διανοητικὴν προστιθέασι, μέχρι γὰρ τῶν πέντε προὔβησαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

Chapter 19: Motion

I.19.heading

On motion.[523]

1 <Aëtius>: Pythagoras

I.19.1.1

Of Pythagoras. Motion is difference or otherness in matter, insofar as it is matter. This is a common definition of every kind of motion.[524]

1 <Aëtius>: Kinds of motion

I.19.1.2

Democritus declared that there is one kind of motion, motion by vibration. Epicurus distinguished two kinds, motion along a plumb line and motion by a swerve.[525] Some introduce a fourth kind as well, motion in respect of substance, that is, coming into being. Others add intellectual motion too, carrying the number up to five.[526]

523. Kinēsis can include alteration and growth as well as movement from place to place. “Motion” is retained as the chapter’s governing term; individual extracts specify its extent. Phora is usually rendered “locomotion” where it is distinguished from other changes.

524. The heading attributes this definition to Pythagoras; it does not establish that these are his own words. “Insofar as” preserves the qualification attached to matter. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution of the collected report to Aëtius.

525. Palmos is a shaking or vibration; the printed text retains it rather than the proposed reading “blow” or “impact.” The plumb line gives the image of straight motion, while parenklisis denotes a deviation or swerve.

526. The jump to “fourth” is in the source. Wachsmuth explains the count by taking Democritus’s kind as the first and Epicurus’s two as the next two; another proposal assumes that a third kind has dropped out. No missing item is silently supplied here. “Intellectual” renders dianoētikē.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.19.1.3

Διόδωρος ὁ Κρόνος κεκινῆσθαι μέν τι, κινεῖσθαι δὲ μηδέν.

Ἡράκλειτος ἠρεμίαν μὲν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνῄρει, κίνησιν δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀπεδίδου.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.19.1.4

Ἡρόφιλος κινήσεως τὴν μὲν λόγῳ θεωρητήν, τὴν δὲ αἰσθητήν.

Ἀσκληπιάδης πᾶσαν κίνησιν αἰσθητὴν ἀπεφήνατο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

1 <Aëtius>: Diodorus and Heraclitus I.19.1.3

Diodorus Cronus held that something has moved, but nothing is moving.[527]

Heraclitus excluded rest and stillness from the universe, assigning motion to all things.

1 <Aëtius>: Reason and perception I.19.1.4

Herophilus distinguished motion apprehended by reason from motion apprehended by the senses.

Asclepiades declared that all motion is perceptible.[528]

527. The paradox turns on the Greek tenses: the perfect kekinēsthai presents motion as accomplished, while the present kineisthai presents it as occurring. The report gives the claim without the argument for it.

528. Logōi theōrētē contrasts rational apprehension with sense perception. These compressed reports distinguish ways in which motion is known; they do not supply a further list of bodily movements.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

1 <Ἀετίου> · Ἀριστοτέλης I.19.1.5

Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν κίνησιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τοῦ δυνάμει κινητοῦ ᾗ κινητόν. Τῶν δὲ κινήσεων τὰς μὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὰς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τὰς δὲ κατὰ τόπον. Κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποσὸν αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν, ἐν προσθέσει τινὶ θεωρουμένην καὶ ἀφαιρέσει· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ μεταβολήν, ὡς τὴν ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν, ἐκ γλυκέος εἰς πικρόν· κατὰ δὲ τόπον, ἣν ἰδιώτερον φορὰν ὠνόμασε, καθ' ὃν ἐξ οὗ εἰς ὃ μεταβαίνει τὰ κινούμενα.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.19.1.6

Ταύτης δὲ τρεῖς εἶναι διαφοράς, ὧν δύο μὲν ἁπλᾶς, τήν τε κατ' εὐθεῖαν καὶ τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ, μίαν δὲ μικτήν· <κατ'> εὐθεῖαν μὲν τὴν ἄνω καὶ κάτω κατά τε κουφότητα καὶ βαρύτητα τῶν σωμάτων, ἐν κύκλῳ δὲ τὴν περιφερῆ, μικτὴν δὲ τὴν κατ' ἔγκλισιν· τῆς δὲ κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὸ μέσον· πυρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τοῦ πέμπτου [ὅλου] περὶ τὸ μέσον. Τούτοις δὲ πληροῦσθαι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

1 <Aëtius>: Aristotle on actuality

I.19.1.5

Aristotle held that motion is the actuality of what is potentially movable, insofar as it is movable.[529] Some motions concern quantity, others quality, and others place. In quantity there are increase and decrease, observed in some addition and subtraction; in quality, alteration and change, as from hot to cold or sweet to bitter; and in place, the motion he more specifically called locomotion, in which moving things pass from one place to another.[530]

1 <Aëtius>: Paths and elements

I.19.1.6

There are three varieties of locomotion, two simple, straight and circular, and one mixed. Motion <along> a straight line is upward or downward according to the lightness or weight of bodies; circular motion goes round; mixed motion is oblique.[531] Locomotion proceeds either away from the center, toward the center, or around the center: fire and air move away from it, earth and water toward it, and the fifth [whole] around it. With these the entire world is filled.[532]

529. The qualification “insofar as it is movable” belongs to the definition: motion is the exercise of a capacity for change. The wording is repaired in the base edition with reference to Physics III.2, 202a8. Wachsmuth suggests that this Aristotelian portion of excerpt 1 may derive from Arius Didymus.

530. The reference printed with “locomotion” is Physics VIII.7, 260a28. The distinction among quantity, quality, and place explains why the chapter’s “motion” is broader than a change of location.

531. The preposition “along” is supplied in the Greek. “Oblique” follows Canter’s correction kat’ enklisin. It describes the mixed path in this account; it is not the parenklisis, or swerve, mentioned in the report on Epicurus.

532. “The fifth” is the fifth elemental body, placed beside earth, water, air, and fire. Wachsmuth adopts Usener’s repair tou pemptou and brackets holou, “whole,” as rejected wording. Omit the bracketed word in a continuous reading.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 1

I.19.2.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν.

<ΕΡΜ.> Πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν κινουμένῳ κινεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑστῶτι· καὶ τὸ κινοῦν δὴ ἕστηκεν, ἀδυνατοῦν συγκινεῖσθαι.

<ΑΣΚ.> Πῶς οὖν, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε, τὰ ἐνθάδε συγκινεῖται τοῖς κινουμένοις; τὰς γὰρ σφαίρας ἔφης τὰς πλανωμένας κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς σφαίρας.

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 2

I.19.2.2

<ΕΡΜ.> Οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη, ὦ Ἀσκληπιέ, συγκίνησις, ἀλλ' ἀντικίνησις· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐναντίως ἀλλήλαις. Ἡ δὲ ἐναντίωσις τὴν ἀντέρεισιν τῆς κινήσεως ἑστῶσαν ἔχει· ἡ γὰρ ἀντιτυπία στάσις φορᾶς. Διὸ καὶ αἱ πλανώμεναι σφαῖραι ἐναντίως κινούμεναι ἀλλήλαις ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς, τῇ ἐναντίᾳ ὑπαντήσει περὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα ἑστῶσαν αὐτὴν ὑπ' αὐτῆς κινοῦνται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Hermes: What makes motion possible

I.19.2.1

From Hermes, from the discourse addressed to Asclepius.[533]

<Hermes> Everything that moves moves in something stationary, not in something moving. And what imparts motion is itself stationary, being unable to move together with what it moves.

<Asclepius> How, then, Trismegistus, do things here move together with moving things? For you said that the wandering spheres are moved by the sphere of the fixed stars.[534]

2 Hermes: Opposed motions

I.19.2.2

<Hermes> This, Asclepius, is not joint motion but countermotion: the spheres do not move alike, but in opposition to one another. Their opposition keeps the resistance to their motion stationary, for resistance brings locomotion to a standstill. Thus the wandering spheres, moved in opposition to one another by the sphere of the fixed stars, are moved by opposition itself, through their contrary encounter, around that opposition which itself stands still.[535]

533. The extract corresponds to Corpus Hermeticum II.6-9, between the passages collected in chapter 18. The speaker labels are supplied by Wachsmuth using the separate Hermetic tradition. Trismegistus means “thrice greatest.”

534. The “wandering” spheres are those of the planets, distinguished from the sphere of the fixed stars. “Fixed” describes the stars’ relation to one another, not an absence of motion in their sphere. The dialogue itself immediately asks how motion can depend on what is stationary.

535. The last sentence is textually and syntactically difficult. Wachsmuth alters the relations among the spheres to “one another, by the fixed sphere”; the separately transmitted Hermetic text has different wording. This translation takes the final pronouns as referring to “opposition,” retaining the argument that opposed motions depend on a stable resistance. It does not resolve the sentence into a more precise astronomical mechanism.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 3 I.19.2.3

Τὰς γὰρ ἄρκτους ταύτας, ἃς ὁρᾷς μήτε δυνούσας μήτε ἀνατελλούσας, περὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ στρεφομένας, οἴει κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι;

<ΑΣΚ.> Κινεῖσθαι, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε.

<ΕΡΜ.> Κίνησιν ποίαν, ὦ Ἀσκληπιέ;

<ΑΣΚ.> Τὴν περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναστρεφομένην.

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἡ δὲ περιφορὰ ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησίς ἐστιν ὑπὸ στάσεως κατεχομένη· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ κωλύει τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτό, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐναντία φορὰ ἕστηκεν ἑδραία, ὑπὸ τῆς ἐναντιότητος στηριζομένη.

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 4 I.19.2.4

Παράδειγμα δέ σοι ἐπίγειον τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐμπῖπτον φράσω· τὰ ἐπίγεια ζῷα, οἷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγω, νηχόμενα θεώρησον· φερομένου γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος ἡ ἀντιτυπία τῶν ποδῶν καὶ τῶν χειρῶν στάσις γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ μὴ συγκατενεχθῆναι τῷ ὕδατι.

<ΑΣΚ.> Σαφὲς τὸ παράδειγμα, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Hermes: The Bears

I.19.2.3

For those Bears you see neither setting nor rising, but turning about the same point: do you think they move or stand still?

<Asclepius> They move, Trismegistus.

<Hermes> With what sort of motion, Asclepius?

<Asclepius> Motion that turns around the same point.

<Hermes> Revolution is motion around the same point, held in place by stillness. For going around it prevents going beyond it. So too the opposed motion stands firm, supported by the opposition.[536]

2 Hermes: The swimmer

I.19.2.4

I will give you an earthly example visible to your eyes. Consider land animals swimming: a human being, for instance. As the water flows, the resistance of the feet and hands provides the person with stability, preventing them from being swept along with the water.

<Asclepius> The example is clear, Trismegistus.[537]

536. The Bears are the constellations Ursa Major and Ursa Minor, described here as circling without rising or setting. The argument locates stability in a circular course's fixed reference point and bounds. Its pairing of motion with stillness continues the preceding claim about opposition.

537. Antitypia, "resistance," repeats the term used in the account of the spheres. The swimmer's stasis is stability against the current. Wachsmuth prints "land animals" from the parallel Hermetic text in place of the manuscripts' "mortal animals."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 5

I.19.2.5

<ΕΡΜ.> Πᾶσα οὖν κίνησις ἐν στάσει καὶ ὑπὸ στάσεως κινεῖται. Ἡ οὖν κίνησις τοῦ κόσμου καὶ παντὸς ζῴου ὑλικοῦ οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν κατεκτὸς [τοῦ κόσμου] συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντὸς [εἰς τὸ κατεκτός], τῶν νοητῶν, ψυχῆς ἢ πνεύματος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀσωμάτου. Σῶμα γὰρ <σῶμα> ἔμψυχον οὐ κινεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα κἂν ᾖ ἄψυχον.

2 Ἑρμοῦ · 6

I.19.2.6

<ΑΣΚ.> Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε; Τὰ οὖν ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὰ <ἄλλα> πάντα ἄψυχα οὐ σώματά ἐστι <τὰ κινοῦντα>;

<ΕΡΜ.> Οὐδαμῶς, <ὦ> Ἀσκληπιέ. Τὸ γὰρ ἔνδον τοῦ σώματος, τοῦ κινοῦντος, τὸ ἔμψυχον, οὐ σῶμα ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ἀμφότερα κινοῦν καὶ τὸ τοῦ βαστάζοντος καὶ τὸ τοῦ βασταζομένου. διόπερ ἄψυχον οὐκ ἄψυχον κινήσει. ὁρᾷς γοῦν καταβαρυνομένην τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν <μόνη> δύο σώματα φέρῃ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

2 Hermes: Motion from within

I.19.2.5

<Hermes> All motion, then, takes place in stillness and through stillness. Accordingly, the motion of the world and of every material living creature is brought about not by things outside [the world], but by things within [toward the outside], intelligible things: soul or breath or some other incorporeal thing.[538] For a body does not move an ensouled <body>, nor indeed any body at all, even if it is without soul.[539]

2 Hermes: The carrier and the burden

I.19.2.6

<Asclepius> What do you mean, Trismegistus? In the case of wood, stones, and all <other> things without soul, are not bodies <what moves them>?

<Hermes> By no means, <O> Asclepius. For what is within the moving body, the ensouled principle, is no body: it is what moves both bodies, that of the carrier and that of the thing carried.[540] Hence a thing without soul will not move a thing without soul. You see, then, how the soul is weighed down when it <alone> carries two bodies.

538. The two bracketed phrases are rejected in the base edition; omit them in a continuous reading. “Intelligible” means apprehended by thought. Here pneuma, “breath,” is placed among incorporeal causes; this particular account should not be assimilated to the Stoic accounts of bodily pneuma elsewhere in the collection.

539. Wachsmuth supplies the second “body” from the Hermetic tradition. To synolon is taken adverbially, “at all,” so that the denial extends from ensouled bodies to bodies without soul. The following exchange tests this denial through the familiar act of carrying an object.

540. “The ensouled principle” renders to empsychon, Wachsmuth’s correction of to apsychon, “the soulless.” The distinction is between the inner source of motion and the two bodies it moves. The bracketed supplements clarify the question and the soul’s bearing the load. The extract ends here without adding the conclusion transmitted in the longer Hermetic text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.19.3.1

Χρυσίππου. Κίνησιν δέ φησιν εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος μεταβολὴν κατὰ τόπον ἢ ὅλῳ ἢ μέρει, ἢ μεταλλαγὴν ἐκ τόπου ἢ καθ' ὅλον ἢ κατὰ μέρος. Καὶ ἄλλως· κίνησιν μεταλλαγὴν κατὰ τόπον ἢ σχῆμα· φορὰν δὲ μετέωρον κίνησιν ὀξεῖαν, μονὴν δὲ τὸ μὲν οἷον ἀκινησίαν σώματος, τὸ δ' οἷον σώματος σχέσιν κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως νῦν τε καὶ πρότερον.

3 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.19.3.2

Πολλαχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν μονήν, διὸ καὶ πολλοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον σημαινόμενον ἀποδίδοσθαι ὅρους. Τὰς δὲ πρώτας κινήσεις εἶναι δύο, τήν τε εὐθεῖαν καὶ τὴν καμπύλην· διὰ τούτων δὲ πολλαχῶς μιγνυμένων γίνεσθαι πολλὰς κινήσεις καὶ διαφερούσας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

3 <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus

I.19.3.1

Of Chrysippus. Chrysippus says that motion is a change of place, of a whole or a part; or a shift from a place, either as a whole or in part. Again, motion is a change in place or shape; locomotion is a rapid motion aloft.[541] Rest may be, as it were, a body's immobility, or a body's disposition remaining the same and in the same manner now as before.[542]

3 Chrysippus: Primary motions

I.19.3.2

Motion and rest are spoken of in many senses, and for that reason many definitions are given, according to each meaning. There are two primary motions, straight and curved; from their combinations in different ways arise many distinct motions.[543]

541. The unusual qualification "aloft" follows the printed meteōron, a correction of meteōrou. The alternative proposal "from above" is recorded in the apparatus but not adopted. This definition of phora is more restricted than the general use of "locomotion" in the preceding Aristotelian report.

542. Monē is remaining or rest; schesis is a disposition or the way a body is held. The report expressly offers more than one definition, as the next sentences explain. The attribution to Arius Didymus is supplied by the editor (physical fragment 22 in Diels).

543. Kampylē means curved, a broader term than circular. The multiplicity of motions is explained through combinations of two primary paths; this is separate from the preceding observation that the words "motion" and "rest" have several meanings.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 165-166

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Ζήνων I.19.4.1

Ζήνωνος. Τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντων τῶν κατ' ἰδίαν ἕξιν συνεστώτων τὰ μέρη τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου μέσον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου· διόπερ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κόσμου τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα· ταὐτὸν δ' αἴτιον εἶναι καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μονῆς ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ, καὶ τῆς γῆς παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ περὶ τὸ τούτου κέντρον καθιδρυμένης ἰσοκρατῶς.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.19.4.2

Οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ· τείνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτά πως ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τὴν δὲ σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι· φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.19.4.3

Παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδ' αὐτόν φασι τὸν κόσμον βάρος ἔχειν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ σύστασιν ἔκ τε τῶν βάρος ἐχόντων στοιχείων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀβαρῶν. Τὴν δ' ὅλην γῆν καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ἔχειν ἀρέσκει βάρος· παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν διὰ τὸ τὴν μέσην ἔχειν χώραν (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου τούτου μένειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

4 <Arius Didymus>: Zeno on the center I.19.4.1

Of Zeno. In all things within the world that are constituted with their own cohesive state, the parts have their motion toward the center of the whole; the same holds for the world itself. Hence it is rightly said that all parts of the world have their motion toward its center, especially those that have weight. The same cause also accounts for the world's remaining at rest in infinite void, and likewise for the earth's being established in equilibrium about the world's center.[544]

4 Zeno: Weightless bodies I.19.4.2

A body does not necessarily have weight: air and fire are weightless. Yet these too tend in some way toward the center of the world's entire sphere, while forming their mass toward its circumference; for they naturally move upward, since they have no share in weight.[545]

4 Zeno: The world and the earth I.19.4.3

Similarly, they say that the world itself has no weight, because its entire constitution consists both of elements with weight and of weightless ones. They hold that the earth as a whole has weight in itself; but because of its position, occupying the central region, it remains in that place, since bodies of this kind move toward the center.[546]

544. Hexis is the state or disposition that holds a thing together; the argument extends from individual wholes to the world. "In equilibrium" renders isokratōs, literally with equal strength or power. The report concerns Zeno of the Stoic school, and its infinite surrounding void agrees with the Stoic account in chapter 18.

545. The qualification "in some way" matters. The text combines a tendency toward the center with the upward movement and peripheral accumulation of air and fire. It does not explain the mechanism here. "Tend" follows Diels's correction teinesthai.

546. The report's plural "they say" is retained despite its heading "Of Zeno." It distinguishes the world as a whole from the earth within it. The claim that the whole world lacks weight is transmitted as given, without an added calculation of how its elements balance.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.19.5.1

Ἀπολλοδώρου. Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ τέχνῃ κίνησιν εἶναι μεταβολὴν κατὰ τόπον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ὅλῳ ἢ [τοῖς] μέρεσι· σχέσιν δὲ συνοχὴν κατὰ τόπον ἢ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ ἴσχεσθαι τοιοῦτο· γένη δὲ κινήσεως εἶναι πρῶτα δύο, τήν τε κατ' εὐθεῖαν καὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον. Τούτων δὲ εἴδη γίνεσθαι πλείονα.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.19.5.2

Περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ κινήσεις γίνεσθαι πολλὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, οἷον περιπατεῖν καὶ τρέχειν μὴ ἐκβαίνοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, καὶ ἅμα κινεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐπ' εὐθεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ πλάγια καὶ τὴν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὴν ὄπισθεν καὶ τὴν εἰς δεξιὰν καὶ ἀριστερὰν καὶ ἐγκύκλιον, καὶ ταχέως ἅμα καὶ βραδέως, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πλεόντων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίως τούτοις διακειμένων συντυγχάνειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

5 <Arius Didymus>: Apollodorus

I.19.5.1

Of Apollodorus. Apollodorus, in his Treatise on Physics, says that motion is a change in place or shape, in a whole or in [the] parts. Disposition is a holding together in place or shape, and being held in such a way.[547] There are two primary kinds of motion, straight and circular; these have a number of species.[548]

5 Apollodorus: Simultaneous motions

I.19.5.2

Many motions can occur in the same thing and in the same place: for example, someone can walk and run without leaving that same place, and can move at once straight ahead, sideways, forward, backward, right, left, and in a circle, and both quickly and slowly at once, as happens with people sailing and others in similar circumstances.[549]

547. Schesis is “disposition,” as in the preceding account of Chrysippus. The final words of its definition, to ischesthai toiouto, are difficult; “being held in such a way” gives their likely force while retaining the printed reading. The apparatus records several proposed repairs. The article before “parts” is rejected by Diels.

548. Physikē technē denotes a systematic treatise or handbook on nature. Wachsmuth rearranges excerpts 5-7 so that the quotations from Plato stand together; the numbering here follows his printed order.

549. The sailing example makes room for different motions of one thing within a moving setting, such as a person moving aboard a vessel. That illustration helps interpret “the same place”; the passage does not say that all these directions are one undifferentiated motion in a single respect.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.19.5.3

Ὥσπερ δὲ παντὸς σώματος ἐλέγομεν μέρος εἶναι σῶμα καὶ πάσης ἐπιφανείας ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ πάσης γραμμῆς γραμμὴν καὶ παντὸς τόπου τόπον καὶ παντὸς χρόνου χρόνον, οὕτως καὶ πάσης κινήσεως κίνησιν εἶναι ῥητέον καὶ πάσης σχέσεως σχέσιν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν.

6 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῶν Παρμενίδου I.19.6

Ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν, αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις;

Ναί.

7 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου I.19.7

Ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὅλον κινεῖσθαι ζῷον, ἀτάκτως μὴν ὅπῃ τύχοι προϊέναι καὶ ἀλόγως, τὰς ἓξ ἁπάσας κινήσεις ἔχον· εἴς τε γὰρ τὸ πρόσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν καὶ πάλιν εἰς δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά, κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω καὶ πάντῃ κατὰ τοὺς ἓξ τόπους πλανώμενα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

5 Apollodorus: Parts of motions I.19.5.3

Just as we said that a part of every body is a body, of every surface a surface, of every line a line, of every place a place, and of every time a time, so we must say, by the same analogy, that a part of every motion is a motion and of every disposition a disposition.[550]

6 Plato: From the Parmenides I.19.6

For if it were moving, it would either change place or undergo alteration, since these are the only kinds of motion?

Yes.[551]

7 The same: From the Timaeus I.19.7

Thus the living creature as a whole moved, but went wherever chance led, without order or reason, possessing all six motions: forward and backward, again right and left, downward and upward, wandering every way through the six directions.[552]

550. The word "part," expressed at the beginning of the Greek sequence, governs the following comparisons as well. Thus a portion of a line is a line; the statement is not identifying its endpoint as a line. The same relation is extended to motion and disposition.

551. Parmenides 138b. In the dialogue, Parmenides is testing consequences concerning the One. The pronoun's subject belongs to that argument; this short extract gives the distinction between local movement and alteration without its full setting.

552. Timaeus 43b. The context is the soul's embodiment in a mortal creature and the disorder caused by bodily influx and external impacts. The six motions are directions of movement. They should not be confused with six distinct categories of change, or with the orderly circular motion assigned elsewhere to the world.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

8 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Θεαιτήτου I.19.8

Καί μοι λέγε· ἆρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ, ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

Ἔγωγε.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν ἔστω εἶδος· ὅταν δὲ ᾖ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος κινήσεως φάναι;

Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν.

Δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 1 I.19.9.1

Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλα οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ’ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς τι, καὶ μικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ τι, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

8 The same: From the Theaetetus

I.19.8

Tell me: do you call it motion when something passes from one place to another, or turns around in the same place?

I do.

Let this, then, be one kind. But when it remains in the same place and grows old, or changes from white to black, or from soft to hard, or undergoes some other alteration, ought we not to call that another kind of motion?

We certainly must.

I therefore distinguish these two kinds of motion: alteration, and revolution.[553]

9 In the same work: Being and becoming

I.19.9.1

I shall give an account that is far from trivial: nothing is one thing in itself, and you could not correctly call anything a definite thing or something of a definite quality. If you call something large, it will also appear small; if heavy, light; and so with everything, since nothing is one definite thing or has a definite quality. All things arise from locomotion, motion, and blending with one another. We wrongly speak of these things as “being”; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming.[554]

553. Theaetetus 181c-d, a discussion between Socrates and Theodorus. Wachsmuth retains periphoran, “revolution,” where the usual Platonic text has phoran, “locomotion”; his apparatus also considers whether the closing specification is a gloss. The translation preserves the printed term even though the first question includes a broader movement from place to place. Dialogue turns are separated without adding speaker names to the Greek.

554. Theaetetus 152d-153d supplies this longer extract. Socrates is developing an account connected with Protagoras’s position for examination with Theaetetus. Its language should not be presented without qualification as Plato’s own final doctrine. The contrast is between stable being and continual becoming.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 2 I.19.9.2

Καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφέρονται, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, <ὃς> εἰπών,

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν
πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 3 I.19.9.3

Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τοῦτο δ’ ἡ κίνησις. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

Πῶς δ’ οὔ;

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Plato: Poets and philosophers

I.19.9.2

On this all the wise agree, one after another, except Parmenides: Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the foremost poets in each kind of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy.[555] <Homer, who> said,

Ocean, origin of the gods, and mother Tethys,
said that all things are offspring of flow and motion. Who, then, could dispute with so great an army, with Homer as its general, and escape ridicule?[556]

That would not be easy, Socrates.

9 Plato: Motion and generation

I.19.9.3

Indeed not, Theaetetus. These too are sufficient signs in support of the account: motion produces what seems to be and what comes into being, whereas stillness produces nonbeing and destruction. For heat and fire, which generate and govern the other things, are themselves generated by movement and friction; that is motion. And the race of living creatures also springs from these same things.[557]

Of course.

555. The enlistment of poets and thinkers belongs to Socrates' presentation of the argument. Homer is placed at the head of "tragedy" here, although his surviving poems are epics; the category in this sentence is not a modern classification of literary genres.

556. The verse is Iliad 14.201. Ocean and Tethys are read as sources of flowing water, and their parenthood is made to support the claim about motion. The relative pronoun "who" is supplied in the Greek; "Homer" is repeated in the English to make its reference clear. The military image culminates in Homer as general.

557. The argument takes generation through movement and friction as evidence for the wider thesis. "What seems to be" retains dokoun, which Wachsmuth prints although another editor proposed deleting it. The shorter exchange in Stobaeus omits a question and answer about the production of fire found in the separate Platonic text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 168-169

BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 4 I.19.9.4

Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σῴζεται;

Ναί.

Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶται μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ’ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;

Ἔοικεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Plato: Exercise of body and soul I.19.9.4

And what of bodily condition? Is it not ruined by stillness and idleness, but generally preserved by exercise and motion?

Yes.

And the state of the soul: does it not acquire knowledge, preserve itself, and improve through learning and practice, which are motions, while through stillness, which is lack of practice and learning, it learns nothing and forgets whatever it has learned?

Certainly.

Then motion is the good for both soul and body, and the opposite is the contrary?

So it seems.[558]

558. Hexis here is the condition of body or soul. The argument extends the term “motion” to learning and practice. In the last question the Greek leaves “the opposite” compressed: stillness is associated with the opposite of good. This is a step in the dialogue’s argument, not a universal practical rule about bodily rest.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 5 I.19.9.5

Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπόλλυσι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σῴζει· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ σῴζεται ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δοθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον [τὰ] ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 19

9 Plato: The golden chain

I.19.9.5

Shall I also tell you of windless weather, calm seas, and the like: how these still conditions cause decay and destruction, while their opposites preserve? And, pressing the argument to its crowning point, shall I insist that by the golden chain Homer means nothing other than the sun?[559] He shows that so long as the revolution and the sun continue moving, all things among gods and human beings exist and are preserved; but if this should come to a standstill, as though that were granted, everything would perish, and, as the saying goes, all would be turned upside down.[560]

559. The golden chain alludes to Iliad 8.18-27, where Zeus challenges the other gods to pull him down and claims that he could draw them up with earth and sea. Its identification with the sun is the interpretation proposed in this Platonic speech.

560. The printed dothen means “given” or “granted,” whereas the apparatus records dethen, “bound,” in other Platonic witnesses. “As though that were granted” is a tentative construal as a hypothetical concession; the wording remains difficult. The rejected article ta has no separate counterpart in the English idiom and remains visible on the Greek page. Stobaeus’s extract ends before Theaetetus’s next reply.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

Κεφάλαιον Κ′ I.20.heading

Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

1a <Ἀετίου> I.20.1a

Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος ἀνῄρουν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν διὰ τὸ νομίζειν τὸ πᾶν ἀκίνητον.

1b Ἡράκλειτος I.20.1b

Ἡράκλειτος φησιν, ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει· καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.

1c <Ἀετίου> I.20.1c

Πλάτων φθαρτὸν μὲν τὸν κόσμον, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει, αἰσθητὸν γὰρ εἶναι, διότι καὶ σωματικόν, οὐ μὴν φθαρησόμενόν γε προνοίᾳ καὶ συνοχῇ θεοῦ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

Chapter 20: Coming into Being and Passing Away I.20.heading

On coming into being and passing away.

1a <Aëtius>: Parmenides and Melissus I.20.1a

Parmenides and Melissus denied coming into being and passing away, because they held the whole to be unmoving.[561]

1b Heraclitus: The river I.20.1b

Heraclitus says that everything moves on and nothing remains; and, comparing existing things to the flow of a river, he says that you could not step twice into the same river.[562]

1c <Aëtius>: Plato I.20.1c

Plato held the world to be perishable so far as its nature is concerned, for it is perceptible because it is also bodily; nevertheless, it will not perish, owing to God's providence and his holding it together.[563]

561. Genesis and phthora mean coming into being and passing away; in the following reports they are also rendered "generation" and "destruction." Their scope includes the formation and dissolution of things, not merely birth and death. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius here and in 1c, 1d, 1f, and 1g.

562. This is drawn from Plato, Cratylus 402a, where Socrates reports Heraclitus's view. As Wachsmuth notes, it is an insertion from Plato, not part of the surrounding Aëtian material. The river saying is thus presented through Plato's report, rather than as a securely verbatim quotation from Heraclitus's book.

563. The report distinguishes being capable of dissolution from actually being dissolved. Synochē is the holding together or cohesion supplied by God. Compare the passages from the Timaeus collected below in excerpts 9 and 10.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1d <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.20.1d.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πάντες, ὅσοι κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν σωμάτων κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως. Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι.

1d <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.20.1d.2

Πυθαγόρας καὶ πάντες, ὅσοι παθητὴν τὴν ὕλην ὑποτίθενται, κυρίως γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς γίνεσθαι· ἐκ γὰρ ἀλλοιώσεως τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἀναλύσεως [γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς] παράθεσιν καὶ μῖξιν, κρᾶσίν τε καὶ σύγχυσιν γίνεσθαι.

1e <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.20.1e.1

Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν, οἵα πρότερον ἦν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1d <Aëtius>: Combination and separation I.20.1d.1

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and all who construct worlds by gathering together finely divided bodies introduce combinations and separations, but not generation and destruction in the strict sense. For these occur, on their account, not in respect of quality through alteration, but in respect of quantity through aggregation.[564]

1d <Aëtius>: Alterable matter I.20.1d.2

Pythagoras and all who posit matter capable of being affected hold that generation and destruction occur in the strict sense. For from the alteration, transformation, and dissolution of the elements [of generation and destruction] arise juxtaposition and mixture, blending and fusion.[565]

1e <Arius Didymus>: The world as seed I.20.1e.1

Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus hold that substance changes into fire as though into a seed, and that from this the world's ordering is once again brought to completion just as it was before.[566]

564. The compiler groups these philosophers by the persistence of their underlying constituents. The grouping does not make their constituents identical: the text says "finely divided bodies," not that every thinker listed posits atoms. The contrast is between qualitative alteration and quantitative aggregation.

565. The four kinds of combination use the vocabulary explained in chapter 17, though this report does not give those definitions. Wachsmuth rejects "of generation and destruction" with reference to the parallel text. The intrusive words remain bracketed in both languages and should be skipped in a continuous reading.

566. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Arius Didymus, physical fragment 36 in Diels. Fire is compared to a seed from which the ordered world develops again; the return to fire does not mean that substance becomes nothing. Compare the reports of the cosmic cycle in I.17.3.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1e <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.20.1e.2

Παναίτιος πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολήν.

1f <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.20.1f.1

Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν σελήνην μέρος τοῦ κόσμου παθητικὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ περίγεια κηραίνεται.

Ξενοφάνης, Παρμενίδης, Μέλισσος ἀγένητον καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ ἄφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον.

1f <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.20.1f.2

[Καὶ] οἱ φάμενοι δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν αἰώνιον ὑπάρχειν περιοδευτικοὺς εἶναι φασι χρόνους, καθ’ οὓς κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως γίγνεσθαι πάντα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν διασῴζεσθαι τοῦ κόσμου διάταξίν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1e <Arius Didymus>: Panaetius

I.20.1e.2

Panaetius considers the eternity of the world more plausible, and more acceptable to him, than the transformation of all things into fire.[567]

1f <Aëtius>: The perishable region

I.20.1f.1

Aristotle declared that the portion of the world beneath the moon is subject to being affected; in it, things around the earth also suffer decay.[568]

Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus held the world to be ungenerated, eternal, and imperishable.

1f <Aëtius>: Recurring periods

I.20.1f.2

[And] those who say that the world's ordering is everlasting also say that there are recurring periods in which everything takes place in the same respects and in the same way, and the same arrangement and ordering of the world is preserved.[569]

567. The comparative wording matters: the report presents Panaetius's preference for one account over another. It should not be strengthened into a demonstration of the impossibility of conflagration.

568. The Aristotelian report restricts susceptibility to decay to the region below the moon. The following sentence reports a different account of the world as a whole. "Ungenerated" distinguishes having no origin from continuing without an end.

569. No philosopher is named in this sentence. The translation leaves its proponents anonymous and does not silently attach the claim to the preceding names. Wachsmuth rejects the initial kai, "and."

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1f <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.20.1f.3

Ἀναξίμανδρος, Ἀναξιμένης, Ἀναξαγόρας, Ἀρχέλαος, Διογένης, Λεύκιππος φθαρτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

Καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ φθαρτὸν τὸν κόσμον, κατ' ἐκπύρωσιν δέ.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν κόσμον <γίνεσθαι καὶ> φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀντεπικράτειαν τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας.

1f <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.20.1f.4

Δημόκριτος φθείρεσθαι τὸν κόσμον τοῦ μείζονος τὸν μικρότερον νικῶντος.

Ἐπίκουρος πλείστοις τρόποις τὸν κόσμον φθείρεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς φυτὸν καὶ πολλαχῶς.

1g <Ἀετίου> I.20.1g

Φιλόλαος διττὴν εἶναι τὴν φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου, τὸ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πυρὸς ῥυέντος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σεληνιακοῦ περιστροφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀποχυθέντος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

1f <Aëtius>: Destruction of worlds I.20.1f.3

Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes, and Leucippus held the world to be perishable.

The Stoics too held the world to be perishable, but through conflagration.[570]

Empedocles held that the world <comes into being and> perishes through the alternating dominance of Strife and Love.[571]

1f <Aëtius>: Democritus and Epicurus I.20.1f.4

Democritus held that a world perishes when the larger overcomes the smaller.[572]

Epicurus held that a world perishes in very many ways: like an animal, like a plant, and in many other ways.

1g <Aëtius>: Philolaus I.20.1g

Philolaus held that the destruction of the world is twofold: in one case, when fire streams down from heaven; in the other, through lunar water poured out by the revolution of the air.[573]

570. Ekpyrōsis is the world's transformation into fire. The general heading "the Stoics" here should be read alongside the distinct opinion of Panaetius just recorded in 1e.

571. The supplied words "comes into being and" are printed by Wachsmuth. Antepikrateia expresses reciprocal or alternating ascendancy; the two powers are named neikos, Strife, and philia, Love.

572. The larger and smaller are understood as worlds. The report is compressed and does not describe how one overcomes another. The following analogies likewise assert several possible modes of destruction without specifying their mechanisms.

573. The second mechanism is obscure. The rendering follows the printed text, including "through water"; it does not substitute another explanation of the moon's role. Wachsmuth repairs the passage using its repetition at I.21.6d and a parallel source. This report differs from the claim of imperishability attributed to Philolaus in the next excerpt.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 171-172

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

2 Φιλολάου Περὶ ψυχᾶς · 1

I.20.2.1

Φιλολάου Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχᾶς.

Φιλόλαος ἄφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον εἶναι. Λέγει γοῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχᾶς·

Παρὸ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα· οὔτε γὰρ ἐντοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτᾶς εὑρεθήσεται οὔτ’ ἐκτοσθεν, φθεῖραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα· ἀλλ’ ἦς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ ἐς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τῶ συγγενέος καὶ κρατίστω καὶ ἀνυπερθέτω κυβερνώμενος.

2 Φιλολάου Περὶ ψυχᾶς · 2

I.20.2.2

Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν τᾶς κινάσιός τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐὼν καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ φύσι διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχᾶς αἰδίω· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλατον αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐντί· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τᾶς τὸ ὅλον περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι <τᾶς> σελάνας περαιοῦται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τᾶς σελάνας μέχρι τᾶς γᾶς·

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

2 Philolaus, On the Soul: An imperishable world I.20.2.1

From On the Soul, by Philolaus the Pythagorean.[574]

Philolaus held the world to be imperishable. Thus he says in On the Soul:

"For this reason it remains imperishable and unwearied for endless eternity. Neither within it nor outside it will any other cause be found more powerful than that soul and capable of destroying it.[575] Indeed, this world endures from eternity to eternity, one world governed by one kindred power, supreme and unsurpassable."

2 Philolaus: Two regions of the world I.20.2.2

"The world also possesses the principle of motion and change, being one and continuous, pervaded by nature's breath and carried around by an eternal principle. One part of it is unchanging, while another changes. The unchanging part extends from the soul that encompasses the whole as far as <the> moon; the changing part, from the moon as far as the earth."[576]

574. This is the traditional attribution. The excerpt, conventionally fragment 21, is generally treated as a later work written under Philolaus's name, rather than secure evidence for the historical Philolaus. Its Doric forms are retained. See C. A. Huffman, "Philolaus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 1.4; L. Zhmud, "What is Pythagorean in the Pseudo-Pythagorean Literature?", Philologus 163 (2019), 72-94, section 4.

575. The Greek autas, "her" or "it," is feminine and has no explicit antecedent in the surviving opening. "That soul" is an interpretive clarification, suggested by the title and the later mention of the world-encompassing soul. The masculine pronouns refer to the world.

576. The distinction concerns the unchanging celestial region and the changing region below the moon. The former is still described as moving in a circle: "unchanging" here is not equivalent to motionless. "By an eternal principle" follows the emended ex archas aidiō printed by Wachsmuth. The base edition places a dash before this paragraph; no missing words are supplied.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 172-173

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

2 Φιλολάου Περὶ ψυχᾶς · 3

I.20.2.3

ἐπεὶ δέ γα καὶ τὸ κινέον ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεόμενον ὡς τὸ κινέον ἄγει οὕτω διατίθεται, ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν· καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκωμα πᾶν τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τᾷ δυνάμι καὶ ὑπερέχον τὸ δ’ ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμενον· τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τῶ μὲν ἀεὶ θέοντος θείω τῶ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γενατῶ, κόσμος.

2 Φιλολάου Περὶ ψυχᾶς · 4

I.20.2.4

Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγεν, κόσμον εἶμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τᾶς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος. Καὶ ὁ μὲν εἷς ἀεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ καὶ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά· καὶ τὰ ἐν φθορᾷ ἐόντα καὶ φύσι καὶ μορφᾷ σᾠζεται τᾷ γονᾷ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν [μορφὰν] ἀποκαθιστάντα τῷ γεννάσαντι πατρὶ καὶ δαμιοεργῷ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 173

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

2 Philolaus: The mover and the moved

I.20.2.3

“Since the mover revolves from eternity to eternity, while what is moved takes its condition from the way the mover leads it, the one must be ever moving and the other ever undergoing affection. The one is wholly the province of mind and soul, the other of generation and change.[577] The one is prior in power and superior; the other is posterior and subordinate. What is composed of both of these, the ever-running divine and the ever-changing generated, is the world.”[578]

2 Philolaus: Continuity through generation

I.20.2.4

“It is therefore right to say that the world is an eternal activity of God and of generation, in accordance with the coordinated sequence of changing nature.[579] The world, being one, always endures in the same state and the same way; but the things that come into being and perish are many. Even things undergoing destruction are preserved in their nature and form through generation, restoring the same [form] once again to the father and craftsman who begot them.”[580]

577. “Province” is a tentative rendering of anakōma, a difficult word. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records Boeckh’s interpretation as rule or dominion, alongside doubts about the transmitted reading. The translation preserves the contrast without treating the noun’s meaning as certain.

578. The passage distinguishes the active and affected components, then identifies the world with their combination. “Ever moving” follows aeikinaton; it should not be substituted with an unmoved mover imported from a different philosophical account.

579. The genitives “of God and of generation” are both retained. The compressed phrase about synakolouthia is understood as the coordinated succession of natural changes; the passage joins divine activity with continuing generation.

580. Continuity of nature and form is distinguished from the perishing of individual things. Wachsmuth rejects the repeated “form” as an explanatory addition, while recording an alternative supplement, “nature and form.” It remains visible in brackets; the retained “the same” points back to what is preserved.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

3 Ὀκέλλου · 1 I.20.3.1

Ὀκέλλου.

Ὄκελλος ἀΐδιον τὸν κόσμον· ᾧδι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τᾶς τῶ παντὸς φύσιος λέγει·

Ἔτι δὲ <τὸ ἄναρχον> καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτατον καὶ τῶ σχήματος καὶ τᾶς κινάσιος καὶ τῶ χρόνω καὶ τᾶς ὠσίας τοῦτο πιστοῦται, διότι ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἄφθαρτος. Ἃ τε γὰρ τῶ σχήματος ἰδέα κύκλος, οὗτος δὲ πάντοθεν ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, διόπερ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτατος· ἅ τε τᾶς κινάσιος κατὰ κύκλον, αὕτα δὲ ἀπαράβατος καὶ ἀδιέξοδος·

3 Ὀκέλλου · 2 I.20.3.2

ὅ τε χρόνος ἄπειρος, ἐν ᾧπερ ἁ κίνασις, διὰ τὸ μήτε ἀρχὰν εἰληφέναι τὸ κινούμενον μήτε τελευτὰν λαψεῖσθαι· ἅ γε μὰν ὠσία τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνέκβατος καὶ ἀμετάβλατος διὰ τὸ μήτε ἀπὸ τῶ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μήτε ἀπὸ τῶ βέλτιονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον πεφυκέναι μεταβάλλεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 173-174

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

3 Ocellus: No beginning or end

I.20.3.1

Ocellus.[581]

Ocellus held the world to be eternal, for he says this in On the Nature of the Universe:

“Further, <the absence of a beginning> and the absence of an end in its shape, motion, time, and substance confirm that the world is ungenerated and imperishable. For its shape is a circle, which is equal and alike on every side, and therefore has neither beginning nor end. Its motion too is circular, undeviating and admitting no exit.”[582]

3 Ocellus: Time and substance

I.20.3.2

“Time, in which the motion occurs, is infinite, because what moves has neither received a beginning nor will receive an end. The substance of things, moreover, admits no departure from its condition and no change, since it is not by nature capable of changing either from worse to better or from better to worse.”[583]

581. On the Nature of the Universe belongs to the literature written under the names of earlier Pythagoreans. The traditional attribution to Ocellus is preserved here. See Zhmud, “What is Pythagorean in the Pseudo-Pythagorean Literature?”, Philologus 163 (2019), section 4. Wachsmuth identifies this first quotation as I.15 in Mullach’s division.

582. The base edition restores “the absence of a beginning” from the separately transmitted treatise. Adiexodos, rendered “admitting no exit,” describes the circular course as having no way out or terminal passage. The argument proceeds by analogy among shape, movement, time, and substance.

583. Ōsia is the Doric form of ousia, “substance.” “Admits no departure from its condition” renders anekbatos, pairing it with “unchanging.” The claim concerns the universe’s substance; the next passage distinguishes this enduring ground from generation within it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

3 Ὀκέλλου · 3 I.20.3.3

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὸ μὲν γένεσις τὸ δὲ αἰτία γενέσιος, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ὅπου μεταβολὰ καὶ ἔκβασις τῶ ὑποκειμένω, αἰτία δὲ γενέσιος ὅπου ταυτότας καὶ ὑπόστασις τῶ ὑποκειμένω, φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὰν αἰτίαν τὰν γενέσιος τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ <τὸ> κινεῖν ἐστι, περὶ δὲ τὸ δεχόμενον τὰν γένεσιν τό τε πάσχειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

4 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> I.20.4

Πράτως γὰρ ὕλα τὸ πανδεχές, κοινὸν γὰρ ὑπόκειται πᾶσιν· ὥστε πρᾶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητόν, ἀρχά· δεύτερον δὲ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, οἷον θερμότας καὶ ψυχρότας καὶ ὑγρότας καὶ ξηρότας· τρίτον δὲ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γᾶ καὶ ἀήρ, ταῦτα γὰρ μεταβάλλοντι ἐς ἄλλαλα, αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις <οὐ> μεταβάλλοντι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

3 Ocellus: Generation and its cause I.20.3.3

"Since within the universe there is, on the one hand, generation and, on the other, its cause, and generation occurs where the underlying subject changes and departs from its condition, while the cause of generation is found where the underlying subject retains its identity and persists, it is clear that acting and imparting motion belong to the cause of generation, whereas being affected and being moved belong to what receives generation."[584]

4 <The same author>: Matter, qualities, elements I.20.4

For first comes matter, which receives everything, since it underlies all things in common. Thus, first there is what is potentially a perceptible body, a principle;[585] second, the oppositions, such as heat and cold, wetness and dryness; third, fire, water, earth, and air. These change into one another, but the oppositions do <not> change into one another.[586]

584. The excerpt now moves to II.1 of the treatise in Mullach's division. Hypokeimenon is the underlying subject; hypostasis here is its persistence or stable subsistence. The contrast is between the cause that acts and the recipient that undergoes change. A supplied Greek article before "imparting motion" has no separate English equivalent.

585. Ocellus, II.6 in Mullach's division. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution "the same author." The clause ending archā, "a principle," is awkward; his apparatus questions its wording and suggests deleting archā. The rendering is tentative and retains the printed word. The three levels are matter, opposing qualities, and elemental bodies.

586. The negative "not" is supplied from witnesses to Ocellus's treatise. The distinction is between bodies that acquire different qualities and the opposed qualities themselves: a body can become cold, but heat as such does not become coldness.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 174-175

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

5 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 1 I.20.5.1

Παντελὴς δὲ φθορὰ τᾶς περὶ τὰν γᾶν διακοσμάσιος οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε ἐσεῖταί ποκα. Διὸ καὶ τοῖς λέγοντεσσι τὰν τᾶς Ἑλλανικᾶς ἱστορίας ἀρχὰν ἀπὸ Ἰνάχω ἦμεν τῶ Ἀργείου ποθεκτέον οὕτως, ὡς οὐκ ἀπό τινος ἀρχᾶς πράτας ἀλλὰ τᾶς γενομένας μεταβολᾶς κατ' αὐτόν.

5 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 2 I.20.5.2

Πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη καὶ γέγονε καὶ ἐσεῖται βάρβαρος ἁ Ἑλλάς, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μόνον γινομένα μετανάστατος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' αὐτᾶς τᾶς φύσιος, οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε μείονος αὐτᾶς γινομένας, ἀλλὰ καινοτέρας ἀεὶ καὶ ποθ' ἁμὲ ἀρχὰς λαμβανοίσας.

5 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 3 I.20.5.3

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶ ὅλω καὶ παντός, ἔτι δὲ γενέσιος καὶ φθοράσιος τᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένας, ὥς τ' ἔχει ὥς θ' ἕξει τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τᾶς μὲν ἀεικινάτω φύσιος ἐάσας τᾶς δ' ἀειπαθέος, <καὶ> τᾶς μὲν ἀεὶ κυβερνώσας τᾶς δὲ κυβερνωμένας, ἱκανῶς εἴρηταί μοι διὰ τούτων.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 175-176

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

5 <The same author>: Human beginnings I.20.5.1

Complete destruction of the ordering around the earth has never occurred and never will. Accordingly, those who say that Greek history begins with Inachus of Argos must be understood to mean that it begins, not from some absolute first beginning, but from the change that occurred in his time.[587]

5 Ocellus: Recurring changes I.20.5.2

For Greece has often already become, and will again become, a land of non-Greeks, its population displaced not only by human beings but also by nature herself. Nature becomes neither greater nor smaller, but continually takes on beginnings that are new and relative to us.[588]

5 Ocellus: The enduring order I.20.5.3

Concerning the whole and the universe, and also the generation and destruction occurring within it, how things stand and how they will stand for all eternity, with one nature ever moving and the other ever affected, <and> one always governing and the other governed, I have said enough in these remarks.[589]

587. Ocellus, III.4-5 in Mullach's division; the attribution to the same author is supplied. Inachus supplies a conventional starting point for Argive history. The argument distinguishes the beginning of a remembered historical sequence from the first existence of the world or of human beings.

588. Barbaros marks the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks; it need not imply a loss of civilization. The second sentence takes "herself" to refer to nature, and "relative to us" qualifies the apparent beginnings. The claim is that local historical renewals occur within an enduring natural whole.

589. The conclusion returns to the contrast between active and receptive nature. "And" is supplied in the base edition from the separately transmitted Ocellus. The Doric participle easas is understood as "being," rather than as the superficially similar form meaning "having left."

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 175-176

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Ἀρισταίου · 1 I.20.6.1

Ἀρισταίου.

Ἀρισταῖος ἔφησεν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἁρμονίας οὕτως·

Ἐπεὶ δὲ <ἀ> ἀρχά, ἅτε δὴ οὖσα ἀρχά, πρὸ παντός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀγένητος καὶ αὐτοτελής, (οὔτε γὰρ αἰ μεθ’ ἀτεροῦ τι ἦς, ὑπάρχοι κα ἔτι πρὸ παντός· οὔτε γενομένα ποκὰ [καὶ] ἔκ τινος [οὔτε γὰρ] ἀγένητός κα εἴη ἔτι, οὐδὲ μὰν ἀρχά τε καὶ αἰτία τῶν γενομένων, [οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοτελής,] ἀτέρου γάρ τινός ποτιδεηθήσεται τῶ σῴζοντος αὐτὰν καὶ κινάσοντος),

6 Ἀρισταίου · 2 I.20.6.2

δῆλον δή, ὡς αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰν ἀρχὰ ἀγένητός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ αἰτία γενέσιός τε καὶ κινάσιος, καὶ κινέουσα πάντα αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτᾶς [φύσις] ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοτελέα παρεχομένα τἆλλα αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτᾶς αὐτοτελής ἐστι. Εἰκόνες δὲ καὶ ὁμοιώσεις τᾶς ἀρχᾶς ταύτας καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσι γινομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχναν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Aristaeus: The first principle I.20.6.1

Aristaeus.[590]

Aristaeus said that the world is imperishable, for he speaks as follows in On Harmony:

"Since <the> principle, precisely because it is a principle, is prior to everything, ungenerated, and self-sufficient (for if it came after anything else, it would no longer be prior to everything; nor, if it ever came into being [also] from something, [for neither] would it still be ungenerated, or indeed the principle and cause of generated things, [for neither would it be self-sufficient,] since it would need something else to preserve it and set it in motion),"[591]

6 Aristaeus: The source of motion I.20.6.2

"it is clear that the principle in itself is ungenerated and eternal, and is the cause of generation and motion. It is itself what moves everything from itself [nature], and, providing other things with self-sufficiency from itself, is itself self-sufficient.[592] Images and likenesses of this principle occur both among things that come into being naturally and among those produced by art."

590. The name is restored by Wachsmuth from variant forms in the manuscripts. The work is presented under the name of a Pythagorean Aristaeus; the attribution should not be taken as establishing its early date. Zhmud discusses Aristaios among names used in the later Pythagorean tradition (Philologus 163 [2019], section 4, note 75).

591. Autotelēs, literally complete in itself, is rendered "self-sufficient." Several words are rejected by the base editor and remain bracketed. In particular, Wachsmuth removes the repeated denial of self-sufficiency because the parenthesis is meant to establish the principle's necessary self-sufficiency. Skipping the bracketed words gives the continuous argument.

592. The English continues the sentence begun in the preceding unit. "Nature" is rejected by Wachsmuth as intrusive, though another editor proposed "motion" instead. The repeated "itself" and "from itself" express the principle's independence from an external cause.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 176-177

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Ἀρισταίου · 3

I.20.6.3

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀθάνατον τὸ ἀκάματον, τὸ δὲ ἀκάματον τὸ μὴ κάμνον <κινοῦν>, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τοιοῦτος, <ἀεὶ> κινέων γα τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν, φανερόν, ὡς ἀΐδιος κα εἴη ὁ κόσμος. Αἰ γὰρ ἀρχὰν λαψεῖται διακοσμάσιος, ἔκαμέ ποκα τὸ κινέον αὐτὸν κατ’ ἄμπανσιν διακοσμάσιος. Αἰ δέ γα κάμνοι καὶ ἀμπαύνοιτο τὸ κινέον, φθαρτὸν καὶ γενητὸν ὑπάρχον καὶ αὐτὸ πέρας ἕξει κινάσιος, καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν διακοσμάσιος·

6 Ἀρισταίου · 4

I.20.6.4

ὥστ’ ἀνάγκα ἤτοι γένεσιν ἀναιρεῖν, ἢ γεννᾶν ἐκ τῶ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον καταλείπεται ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρατον εἶμεν. Λέγοιτο δέ κα ἁρμονία φύσιος, ὅτι πάντα κατὰ λόγον φύεται τὸν ταύτας * * ποταλλήλως, ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας ποτὶ τὰν τέχναν, οὕτως θεὸς ποθ’ ἁρμονίαν. Ἃ τε γὰρ τέχνα ἐστὶ λόγος καὶ ἰδέα τῶν γινομένων καὶ <ἁ> φύσις.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 177

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Aristaeus: The untiring mover

I.20.6.3

"Since what is immortal is untiring, and what is untiring does not tire <as it moves things>, and God is of this kind, <always> moving the whole and the universe, it is clear that the world must be eternal.[593] For if it is to receive a beginning of its ordering, what moves it must at some time have tired, in a cessation of that ordering. And if the mover were to tire and rest, it would be perishable and generated, and its own motion would have an end, as would the ordering of the whole and the universe."[594]

6 Aristaeus: Harmony and nature

I.20.6.4

"Thus one must either deny generation or produce things from what does not exist; or else the remaining alternative is that this world is immortal and ageless.[595] It might be called a harmony of nature, because everything grows according to its rational order ... in relation to one another: as the craftsman stands to his art, so God stands to harmony.[596] For art, and likewise nature, is the rational principle and form of things that come into being."

593. "As it moves things" and "always" represent the supplements kinoun and aei in the base edition. The argument links the unceasing activity of the divine mover with the continuity of the ordered world.

594. The sentence about a beginning is difficult. The rendering keeps the printed future "is to receive" and past "tired." A beginning of ordering is treated as implying an earlier interruption; the text then argues that a mover capable of rest could also cease altogether. The temporal wording is not silently regularized.

595. The wording "produce things from what does not exist" retains the active verb gennan. The first two alternatives are presented as unacceptable consequences of denying an everlasting ordered world; the excerpt does not supply separate refutations of them.

596. A gap is explicitly marked in the base edition after "its." The ellipsis preserves that gap; the exact connection with "in relation to one another" is lost. Logos is rendered "rational order" or "rational principle" according to the construction. In the final clause the article before physis, "nature," is supplied in Greek; it has no separate English equivalent.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Ἀρισταίου · 5 I.20.6.5

Τὸ μὲν ἔργον ἁμαρτάνεται [ἐν] τοῖς τεχνίταις, ὅκκα παραλλάξῃ τὸν τᾶς τέχνας λόγον· τὰ δὲ γινόμενα φύσι φθείρεται, πηρὰ καὶ ἄναρθρα γινόμενα, ὅκκα παραλλάξῃ τὸν τᾶς ἁρμονίας λόγον.

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.20.7.1

Ποσειδωνίου. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ φθορὰς καὶ γενέσεις τέτταρας εἶναί φησιν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένας. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐκ ὄντα, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρόσθεν, ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὖσαν. Τῶν δ’ εἰς ὄντα γινομένων μεταβολῶν τὴν μὲν εἶναι κατὰ διαίρεσιν, τὴν δὲ κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ σύγχυσιν, τὴν δ’ ἐξ ὅλων, λεγομένην δὲ κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

6 Aristaeus: Failure and dissolution I.20.6.5

"The craftsman's work fails when it departs from the rational principle of the art; things that come into being naturally perish, becoming impaired and disjointed, when they depart from the rational principle of harmony."[597]

7 <Arius Didymus>: Posidonius on change I.20.7.1

Posidonius. Posidonius says that there are four kinds of destruction and generation, taking place from existing things into existing things.[598] For, as we said earlier, they rejected coming to be from what does not exist and passing into what does not exist, as processes that never occur. Of changes into existing things, one is by division, another by alteration, another by fusion, and another from wholes, called dissolution.[599]

597. The analogy joins successful craftsmanship to natural coherence: failure occurs when the product departs from the ordering principle. Wachsmuth rejects en, "in," before the dative "craftsmen." It remains bracketed in Greek; it has no separate place in the idiomatic English possessive construction.

598. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Arius Didymus, physical fragment 27 in Diels. The manuscripts also repeat this material at the end of chapter 17; the base edition prints it here. "As we said earlier" refers to the source's fuller discussion, not to an added explanation in this edition. The plural "they" is preserved, with the Stoics understood.

599. "From wholes" renders the difficult ex holōn as printed; a proposed change to "through wholes" is not adopted. Analysis is the breaking up or dissolution of a whole. The fourfold list describes transformations among existing things, rather than creation from nothing or disappearance into nothing.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.20.7.2

Τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι, τὰς δ’ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γινομένους. Ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συμβαίνειν. Τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ’ ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων συμβαίνειν.

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.20.7.3

Ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν, οἷον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι. Διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, <ὡς> ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναίρεσιν ἐπιδεχομένων ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων.

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.20.7.4

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν φησι δύο εἶναι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια, τὸ μέν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν, τὸ δέ <τι> κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ. Τοῦτο γάρ, ὡς πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι·

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 Posidonius: Substance and qualified things I.20.7.2

Of these, change by alteration occurs in substance, while the other three occur in what are called qualified things, which come to be in substance. Corresponding processes of generation also take place. For substance neither increases nor decreases by addition or subtraction, but is only altered, as happens with numbers and measures.[600]

7 Posidonius: Individual persistence I.20.7.3

<But> individually qualified things, such as Dion and Theon, undergo both increase and decrease. Thus each one's quality persists from its coming into being until its destruction, <as> in animals, plants, and similar things that admit of destruction.[601]

7 Posidonius: Two constituents I.20.7.4

In individually qualified things, he says, there are two receptive constituents: one in respect of the subsistence of substance, the other <one> in respect of the subsistence of the qualified thing. For this latter, as we have often said, admits increase and decrease.[602]

600. Ousia, "substance," is distinguished from a poios, a thing with a certain quality. The latter may begin or cease to exist while underlying substance persists. The comparison with numbers and measures is compressed and unexplained in the excerpt; the translation does not supply an example or a mathematical theory to resolve it.

601. Idiōs poion is something characterized by an individual quality: Dion or Theon, rather than merely a quantity of material. The claim allows growth and loss of material without the immediate loss of individual identity. Both connective supplements are printed in the base edition.

602. The phrase dektika moria, "receptive constituents," is left close to the Greek. It distinguishes the substantial constitution from the qualified individual; it does not necessarily divide an organism into two spatial compartments. "This latter" takes touto to refer to the qualified thing, as the preceding contrast requires. Hypostasis is rendered "subsistence."

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 5 I.20.7.5

μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταὐτὸν τό τε ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν [ὁ] ἐξ ἧς ἐστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μηδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ’ ἕτερά τινων λεγόμενα δεῖ καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μηδ’ ἐν μέρει θεωρεῖσθαι.

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 6 I.20.7.6

Τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τό τε κατὰ τὸ ἰδίως ποιὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, δῆλον εἶναί φησιν ὁ Μνήσαρχος· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ταὐτὰ συμβεβηκέναι. Εἰ γάρ τις πλάσας ἵππον, λόγου χάριν, συνθλάσειεν, ἔπειτα κύνα ποιήσειεν, εὐλόγως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἰδόντας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἦν πάλαι, νῦν δ’ ἔστιν· ὥσθ’ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ λεγόμενον τόδε καὶ <τὸ> ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 Posidonius: Nonidentity and difference I.20.7.5

The individually qualified thing is not identical with the substance of which it consists; yet neither is it a different thing, but only not identical, because it is part of substance and occupies the same place. Things said to be different from others must also be spatially separate and must not be regarded as parts of them.[603]

7 Mnesarchus: The modeled figure I.20.7.6

Mnesarchus says that the nonidentity of a thing considered as individually qualified and a thing considered as substance is evident; for identical things must have the same attributes.[604] If someone, for example, modeled a horse, crushed it, and then made a dog, we could reasonably say on seeing it, “This did not exist before, but now it does.” Hence “this” said of the qualified thing differs from <“this”> said of the substance.[605]

603. The passage uses “different,” heteron, in a restricted sense requiring spatial separation and exclusion of a part-whole relation. Accordingly it denies identity without affirming that stronger kind of difference. The rejected masculine article ho has no coherent English equivalent; it remains bracketed on the Greek page.

604. Mnesarchus is introduced within the same excerpt, following the discussion of Posidonius. The argument tests identity by whether the same predicates hold of each subject: the material existed earlier, but the newly modeled dog did not.

605. The material used for modeling is not named in the Greek, so “clay” has not been inserted. The contrast concerns the referents of the demonstrative “this.” The supplied Greek article before “of the substance” is represented by the repeated English “this.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 7 I.20.7.7

Καθόλου νομίζειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀπίθανον εἶναι φαίνεται· πολλάκις γὰρ συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, εἰ τύχοι, τῆς Σωκράτους, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτην μηδέπω ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀναίρεσιν ὑπομένειν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, αὐτὸν δὲ μηκέτ' εἶναι.

8 Πλάτωνος Τίμαιος · 1 I.20.8.1

Πλάτωνος ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ.

[Ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλεται.] Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸ καὶ πῇ καὶ τί περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκότως διαπορηθέντες ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πρῶτον μὲν ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν πηγνύμενον, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, λίθους καὶ γῆν γιγνόμενον ὁρῶμεν, τηκόμενον δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενον αὖ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα, ξυγκαυθέντα δὲ ἀέρα πῦρ, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ πῦρ ξυγκριθὲν καὶ κατασβεσθὲν εἰς ἰδέαν τε ἀπιὸν αὖθις ἀέρος [πῦρ],

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

7 Mnesarchus: Socrates and his substance I.20.7.7

In general, it seems implausible to suppose that we are identical with our substances. For it often happens that the substance exists before the birth of, say, Socrates, while Socrates himself does not yet exist; and after Socrates's destruction the substance persists, while he himself no longer exists.[606]

8 Plato, Timaeus: The cycle of elements I.20.8.1

Plato, in the Timaeus.[607]

[That the elements change into one another.] How, then, and in what way, are we to discuss this very matter, and what might we reasonably say about them after examining the difficulties? First, we see what we have just called water, when it solidifies, becoming, as we suppose, stones and earth; and this same thing, when it melts and separates, becoming breath and air; air, when set alight, becoming fire; and, conversely, fire, when condensed and extinguished, passing back again into the form of air [fire].[608]

606. The example extends the modeled figure's distinction to a human individual. "Destruction" translates anairesis, the removal or cessation of the individual. The argument here concerns the different histories of a person and the substance constituting him; it is not expanded into a separate account of the soul.

607. Timaeus 49b-c. The opening bracketed statement is a summary that Wachsmuth rejects as a reader's marginal annotation, not part of Plato's sentence. The language "as we suppose" is retained: this is the preliminary account of observable transformations within the discussion of the receptacle.

608. Wachsmuth rejects the second occurrence of "fire," which interrupts the account of fire returning to air. Pneuma, paired with air, is rendered "breath." The account is not silently harmonized with the later geometrical restriction on earth's conversion into the other elements (compare I.17.1.4).

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

8 Πλάτωνος Τίμαιος · 2 I.20.8.2

καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα ξυνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον νέφος καὶ ὁμίχλην, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον συμπιλουμένων ῥέον ὕδωρ, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ γῆν καὶ λίθους αὖθις, κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὡς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν. Οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὂν ὁτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως διισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖταί τις ἑαυτόν; οὐκ ἔστιν·

8 Πλάτωνος Τίμαιος · 3 I.20.8.3

ἀλλ’ ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν· ἀεὶ ὃ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί· μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτέ μηδὲν ὡς τιν’ ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ ‘τόδε’ καὶ ‘τοῦτο’ προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι· φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ ‘τόδε’ καὶ ‘τοῦτο’ καὶ τὴν τῷδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

8 Plato: No stable “this”

I.20.8.2

And again we see air coming together and thickening into cloud and mist, and from these, as they are still more compressed, flowing water, and from water earth and stones once more; so, as it appears, they pass generation on to one another in a circle. Since each of these never presents itself as the same, which of them could anyone firmly insist is this particular thing and not something else without putting himself to shame? There is none.[609]

8 Plato: “This” and “such”

I.20.8.3

By far the safest course is to state the matter as follows: whatever we continually observe coming to be now in one way, now in another, as with fire, we should on each occasion call “such” fire, rather than “this”; and water likewise always “such,” rather than “this.” Nor should we ever speak of anything else of this kind as possessing stability, when we point to it with the words “this here” and “this,” thinking that we are indicating something. For it slips away, refusing to abide the expression “this here,” “this,” “to this,” or any expression that indicates these things as stable existences.[610]

609. Timaeus 49c-d. The question moves from the observed cycle to the difficulty of assigning an enduring identity to any one changing appearance. The repeated qualification “as it appears” belongs to the Greek.

610. Timaeus 49d-e. The contrast is between a demonstrative claiming a stable particular and a description of a recurring character. The excerpt stops here; in the fuller dialogue the discussion continues with what receives the changing appearances. The Greek varies the case of the demonstrative, hence the unusual English “to this.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 20

9a <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.20.9a

Ὅτι δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἀΐδιον, δηλοῖ σαφῶς· λέγει γοῦν ἐν <τῷ> Τιμαίῳ οὕτως·

Ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων καὶ τοιούτων καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τεττάρων τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα ἐγενήθη δι' ἀναλογίας ὁμολογῆσαν, φιλίαν τε ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, ὥστε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ξυνελθὸν ἄλυτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνδήσαντος γενέσθαι.

9b <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.20.9b

Χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως, ἵν' ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα <χρόνον> γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

9a <In the same work>: The world's bond

I.20.9a

He makes it clear that the universe is eternal, for he says this in the Timaeus:[611]

"From these constituents, of this kind and four in number, the body of the world came into being, brought into agreement by proportion. From them it acquired friendship, so that, united into the same whole with itself, it became indissoluble by anyone other than the one who bound it together."[612]

9b <In the same work>: Time and eternity

I.20.9b

Time, then, came into being together with heaven, so that, having been born together, they might also be dissolved together, if they should ever undergo dissolution; and it came into being after the model of the everlasting nature, so that it might resemble that model as closely as possible. For the model is in being for all eternity, while heaven, throughout the whole of <time>, has come to be, is, and will be.[613]

611. The introduction is the compiler's interpretation; the quotation is Timaeus 32c. Wachsmuth supplies the heading "in the same work" and the Greek article before the dialogue's title. The translation does not turn the compiler's claim of eternity into a claim that Plato here denies generation.

612. The four constituents are fire, air, water, and earth. Proportion explains their unity, while the final exception reserves to the maker the power to undo the bond. The Greek describes a world that came into being but cannot be dissolved by another agent.

613. Timaeus 38b-c. The condition "if ... ever" is preserved: dissolution is not predicted. The final contrast opposes the model's abiding being to heaven's existence across time. Wachsmuth supplies "time" from Plato. The antecedent of the earlier masculine "it" can be read in relation to time or heaven; the final masculine subject is understood here as heaven.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 180-181

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

10 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 1 I.20.10.1

Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γιγνόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν· τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν θέλειν κακοῦ.

10 Ἐν ταὐτῷ · 2 I.20.10.2

Διὸ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστέ, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε.

BOOK I CHAPTER 20

10 In the same work: The maker's address

I.20.10.1

"Gods of gods, works whose maker and father I am: what comes into being through me cannot be dissolved while I will it so.[614] Everything that has been bound can indeed be loosened; yet to wish to dissolve what has been well fitted together and is in a good condition belongs to an evil being."[615]

10 Plato: A bond stronger than death

I.20.10.2

"Therefore, since you too have come into being, you are not altogether immortal or indissoluble. Nevertheless, you will certainly not be dissolved or meet with death as your lot, for you have received in my will a bond still greater and more sovereign than those with which you were bound together when you came into being."[616]

614. Timaeus 41a-b: the maker addresses the generated gods. The compressed opening "gods of gods" is retained; it is often understood as "gods, offspring of gods." The relation of "works" to the preceding relative clause is difficult. The English gives the general sense without inserting an unmarked genealogy.

615. The statement distinguishes a composite thing's capacity to be dissolved from the goodness of the maker who preserves it. The qualification "while I will it so" follows Stobaeus's wording; the gods' continued existence depends upon that will.

616. "Not altogether" qualifies the gods' intrinsic immunity from death: as things that have come into being, they are capable of dissolution. Their actual preservation is guaranteed by the maker's will. This assurance, rather than a denial of their generation, concludes the chapter.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

Κεφάλαιον ΚΑ′ I.21.heading

Περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰ ἔμψυχος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος καὶ ποῦ ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πόθεν τρέφεται.

1 Πλάτωνος · 1 I.21.1.1

Πλάτων τὸν κόσμον ἔφησε ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε, ὅτι τε ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τρέφεται, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν οὐρανῷ τίθεται. Λέγει γοῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ·

1 Πλάτωνος · 2 I.21.1.2

Βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον· θέμις δὲ οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἐστὶ τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο, πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

Chapter 21: The World and Its Governance I.21.heading

On the world: whether it has a soul and is governed by providence, where its ruling part is, and whence it is nourished.[617]

1 Plato: The world as a living being I.21.1.1

Plato said that the world is a living being endowed with soul and intelligence, and that it is nourished from itself; he places the world's ruling part in heaven. Thus he speaks as follows in the Timaeus:[618]

1 Plato: From disorder to order I.21.1.2

For God wished everything to be good and nothing bad, so far as possible. He therefore took over all that was visible, which was not at rest but moving discordantly and without order, and brought it out of disorder, judging the former condition altogether better than the latter. For it neither was nor is right for the best to do anything but what is most beautiful.[619]

617. The heading asks several connected questions about the world as a living and ordered whole. Hēgemonikon, "ruling part," is the directing center of such a whole; the following authors locate it differently. Kosmos is usually "world" here, while to pan is "the all" or "the universe" where the distinction matters.

618. The introductory report belongs to the compiler's presentation. The quotation that follows is Timaeus 30a-b, where the speaker Timaeus explains why divine craftsmanship places intelligence within soul and soul within body. The statement about nourishment is illustrated separately in excerpt 2.

619. "The former condition" is order, understood as the goal. Wachsmuth's Stobaean text has "out of disorder" without the explicit "into order" familiar from the continuous text of Plato. The translation preserves that shorter wording rather than silently adding the missing expression.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 181-182

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

1 Πλάτωνος · 3

I.21.1.3

Λογισάμενος οὖν εὕρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαί ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δὲ αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ. Διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅ τι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. Οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.

2 Ἐν ταὐτῷ

I.21.2

Ἀπῄει τε γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ προσῄει αὐτῷ ποθέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 182

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

1 Plato: Intelligence, soul, and body I.21.1.3

On reflection, then, he found that among things naturally visible, no work without intelligence could ever be more beautiful than one possessing intelligence, when whole is compared with whole; and that intelligence, in turn, cannot come to anything without soul. Through this reasoning he fashioned the universe, putting intelligence in soul and soul in body, so that the work he had accomplished might be as beautiful and as excellent as its nature allowed. Thus, according to the likely account, we must say that this world truly came to be a living being endowed with soul and intelligence through God's providence.[620]

2 In the same work: Self-nourishment I.21.2

For nothing went out of it, nor did anything come into it from anywhere, since there was nothing outside it. It was fashioned by art to provide itself with its own wasting away as nourishment, and to undergo and perform all its processes within itself and by itself.[621]

620. The "likely account" qualifies the kind of explanation offered; it is not omitted in favor of an unqualified assertion. "Whole compared with whole" limits the comparison to complete works, rather than comparing any arbitrary part with another.

621. Timaeus 33c-d; Wachsmuth cites 33c. "Outside it" makes explicit the sense of the compressed "for there was not": no external material remained to enter the world. Its own losses are recycled as nourishment.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

3a <Ἀετίου> I.21.3a

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου περίδρομον εἶναι περιγραφὴν τοῦ πέρατος τοῦ κόσμου.

Σέλευκος ὁ Ἐρυθραῖος καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἄπειρον τὸν κόσμον.

Διογένης καὶ Μέλισσος τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄπειρον, τὸν δὲ κόσμον πεπεράνθαι.

3b <Ἀετίου> I.21.3b

Οἱ Στωικοὶ διαφέρειν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον· πᾶν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σὺν τῷ κενῷ τῷ ἀπείρῳ, ὅλον δὲ χωρὶς τοῦ κενοῦ τὸν κόσμον. Μήτε αὔξεσθαι δὲ μήτε μειοῦσθαι τὸν κόσμον, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὅτε μὲν παρεκτείνεσθαι πρὸς πλείονα τόπον, ὅτε δὲ συστέλλεσθαι. Ἀπὸ γῆς δὲ ἄρξασθαι τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κέντρου, ἀρχὴ δὲ σφαίρας τὸ κέντρον.

3c <Ἀετίου> I.21.3c

Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον <καὶ> προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον.

Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος οὐδέτερα τούτων, φύσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

3a <Aëtius>: The world's boundary I.21.3a

Empedocles held that the sun's circuit traces the boundary of the world.

Seleucus of Erythrae and Heraclides of Pontus held the world to be unlimited.

Diogenes and Melissus held the all to be unlimited, but the world to be bounded.[622]

3b <Aëtius>: The all and the whole I.21.3b

The Stoics distinguish the all from the whole: the all includes the unlimited void, while the whole is the world apart from the void. The world neither increases nor diminishes, though in its parts it sometimes extends into a greater space and sometimes contracts. The world's generation began from earth, as from a center; and the center is the starting point of a sphere.[623]

3c <Aëtius>: Soul and providence I.21.3c

All the others held the world to have a soul <and> to be governed by providence.

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus held neither of these views: the world is constituted from atoms by a nature without reason.[624]

622. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to Aëtius for excerpts 3a-c and 6a-f. The distinction between "the all" and a bounded "world" belongs to this report and is preserved even where it sits uneasily with other accounts of the named thinkers.

623. The report places expansion and contraction beside the denial of increase and diminution. The distinction allows changes in spatial extension without an increase or loss of the world's constituent substance; compare the discussions of substance and growth in I.20.7.

624. "All the others" is the report's broad classification, qualified by more differentiated accounts later in this chapter. "Without reason" means without a rational directing agency, not without natural processes. The conjunction is supplied from the parallel doxographical text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

4 <Πλουτάρχου> · 1 I.21.4.1

Ὅμηρός φησι πεπερασμένον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, δηλοῦται δὲ διὰ τούτων·

Τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἔμμορε τιμῆς.
Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐνὶ στίχῳ διαρρήδην ἐδήλωσεν, τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς μοίρας διελεῖν. Καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει·

4 <Πλουτάρχου> · 2 I.21.4.2

Ἤτοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ
παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ᾽ ἔλαχεν ζόφον ἠερόεντα,
Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἔλαχ᾽ οὐρανὸν <εὐρὺν> ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι,
γαῖα δ᾽ ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος,
ὡς τῶν ἐν μέσῳ φύσεων πεποιημένος τὴν νέμησιν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα καὶ περατοῦντα ἀνέμητα καταλελοιπώς. Καὶ εἶναι τὴν γῆν μὲν κατωτάτω πάντων, τὸν δὲ Ὄλυμπον ἀνωτάτω δεδήλωκεν ἐν τούτῳ·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

4 <Plutarch>: Homer's bounded world I.21.4.1

Homer says that the world is bounded; this is shown in these words:

All things are divided three ways; each has his share of honor.
He has thus stated this expressly in a single line, for the unlimited cannot be divided into portions. He indicates the same thing also in the following words:[625]

4 <Plutarch>: The allotted regions I.21.4.2

When the lots were shaken, I won the gray sea for my lasting home;
Hades won the misty darkness,
Zeus won the <broad> heaven in the aether and the clouds;
but earth and high Olympus remain common to us all.
Thus he has allotted the regions in between, leaving the outermost and bounding regions unallotted. And he has shown that earth is lowest of all and Olympus highest in the following passage:[626]

625. Iliad 15.189, spoken by Poseidon about the division among himself, Zeus, and Hades. Wachsmuth identifies the surrounding interpretation with the work On the Life and Poetry of Homer transmitted under Plutarch's name, chapters 94 and 103; the attribution is to Pseudo-Plutarch. The cosmological argument belongs to that interpreter.

626. Iliad 15.190-193. The act of shaking lots belongs to the opening of the second Greek line; English moves it into the first line for clarity. "Broad" is supplied from Homer. The prose takes earth and Olympus as the lower and upper limits of the divided regions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

4 <Πλουτάρχου> · 3 I.21.4.3

Ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι,
αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ᾽ αὐτῇ τε θαλάσσῃ·
σειρὴν μέν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο
δησαίμην, τὰ δέ κ᾽ αὖτε μετήορα πάντα γένοιτο.
Τὴν γὰρ γῆν μετέωρον γενήσεσθαί φησιν ἐξ ἕδρας ἀνασπασθεῖσαν ὡς τὴν κατωτάτω [ὡς τὴν ἀνωτάτω].

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.21.5.1

Χρυσίππου. Κόσμον δ᾽ εἶναί φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Λέγεται δ᾽ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.21.5.2

Τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν λεγομένου κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπομένον· περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. Τὸ γὰρ τῆς πάσης οὐσίας πυκνότατον ὑπέρεισμα πάντων εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὅνπερ τρόπον ἐν ζῴῳ τὰ ὀστέα, τοῦτο δὲ καλεῖσθαι γῆν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

4 <Plutarch>: Zeus's chain

I.21.4.3

But if I in my turn were minded to pull with a will,
I would pull you up, earth itself and sea itself with you;
then I would fasten the chain around a peak of Olympus,
and all would hang suspended in the air.
For he says that earth will be suspended, pulled up from its seat as the lowest region [as the highest region].[627]

5 <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus on "world"

I.21.5.1

From Chrysippus. Chrysippus says that the world is a system consisting of heaven, earth, and the natures within them; or the system consisting of gods, human beings, and the things that have come into being for their sake. In another sense, God is called "world," as that according to which the ordering of the world arises and is brought to completion.[628]

5 <Arius Didymus>: The world's support

I.21.5.2

Of the world so called in respect of its ordering, one part revolves around the center and another stays in place: the aether revolves, while earth, the liquids upon it, and air stay in place. For the densest part of all substance naturally supports everything, as bones do in an animal; this is called earth.[629]

627. Iliad 8.23-26: Zeus challenges the gods to pull against him on a chain. "You" is implicit in the quotation's context. Wachsmuth rejects "as the highest region" as an alternative reading intruded beside "as the lowest region"; both remain visible, with the rejected wording in square brackets.

628. Wachsmuth supplies Arius Didymus, physical fragment 31 in Diels, as the source of this report. The two definitions concern the ordered system; the additional use of "world" names the divine principle of its ordering. "Natures" here refers to the constituent kinds of things.

629. The comparison with bones presents the earth as a structural support within a living whole. "Stays in place" expresses the contrast with celestial revolution; it does not imply that every process in earth, water, and air is motionless.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3

I.21.5.3

Περὶ δὲ ταύτην τὸ ὕδωρ περικεχύσθαι σφαιρικῶς, ὁμαλωτέραν τὴν ἰσχὺν διειληχός. Τῆς γὰρ γῆς ἐξοχάς τινας ἐχούσης ἀνωμάλους διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς ὕψος ἀνηκούσας, ταύτας δὴ νήσους καλεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διηκούσας ἠπείρους προσηγορεῦσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἀγνοίας τοῦ περιέχεσθαι καὶ ταύτας πελάγεσι μεγάλοις.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4

I.21.5.4

Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἐξῆφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα, καὶ περικεχύσθαι σφαιρικῶς· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιότατον ὄντα καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον. Τὸν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν λεγόμενον κόσμον εἰς ταύτας διακεκρίσθαι τὰς φύσεις· τὸ δὲ περιφερόμενον αὐτῷ ἐγκυκλίως αἰθέρα εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄστρα καθίδρυται, τά τε ἀπλανῆ καὶ τὰ πλανώμενα, θεῖα τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 5

I.21.5.5

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπλανῶν ἄστρων ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα ἑπτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι, πάντα δὲ τὰ πλανώμενα ταπεινότερα τῶν ἀπλανῶν. Τετάχθαι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῆ ἐπὶ μιᾶς ἐπιφανείας, ὡς καὶ ὁρᾶται· τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης σφαίρας· περιέχεσθαι δὲ πάσας τὰς τῶν πλανωμένων ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαίρας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

5 <Arius Didymus>: Seas and continents I.21.5.3

Water is poured spherically around earth, having its force more evenly distributed. For earth has certain uneven projections rising up through the water, and these are called islands; those extending farther have been called continents, through ignorance of the fact that they too are surrounded by great seas.[630]

5 <Arius Didymus>: Air, aether, and stars I.21.5.4

Air rises from the water as though evaporated, and is poured spherically around it; from air comes aether, which is most rarefied and most pure. The world so called in respect of its ordering is divided into these natures. What revolves in a circle around it is aether, in which the stars are established, both the fixed and the wandering, divine in nature, endowed with soul, and governed according to providence.[631]

5 <Arius Didymus>: The celestial spheres I.21.5.5

The number of fixed stars cannot be grasped, while the wandering stars are seven in number, and all the wandering stars lie below the fixed stars. The fixed stars are arranged upon a single surface, as is also observed; the wandering stars occupy separate spheres, and all their spheres are enclosed by the sphere of the fixed stars.[632]

630. “Force” renders the printed ischyn, a difficult reading. Wachsmuth records conjectures meaning “flow,” “nature,” and “disposition,” but retains “force”; the translation follows his text. The account treats continents as very large islands surrounded by ocean.

631. The “wandering” stars are the planets in the ancient sense; the following list includes sun and moon. The “fixed” stars keep their mutual positions while their sphere revolves. These categories belong to the report’s model of the heavens.

632. “Below” means nearer the world’s center. The passage distinguishes an unascertainable number of fixed stars from the definite seven wanderers; it does not expressly call the number of fixed stars infinite.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 6 I.21.5.6

Τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ὑψηλοτάτην εἶναι μετὰ τὴν <τῶν> ἀπλανῶν τὴν τοῦ Κρόνου, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν τοῦ Διός, εἶτα τὴν τοῦ Ἄρεος, ἑξῆς δὲ τὴν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης, εἶτα τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου, ἐπὶ πάσι δὲ τὴν τῆς σελήνης, πλησιάζουσαν τῷ ἀέρι. Διὸ καὶ ἀερωδεστέραν φαίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα διατείνειν τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς δύναμιν εἰς τὰ περίγεια.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 7 I.21.5.7

Ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν σελήνην τὴν τοῦ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ φερομένου ἀέρος, εἶτα τὴν <τοῦ> ὕδατος, τελευταίαν δὲ τὴν τῆς γῆς, περὶ τὸ μέσον σημεῖον τοῦ κόσμου κειμένης, ὃ δὴ τοῦ παντός ἐστι κάτω, ἄνω δὲ τὸ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ κύκλῳ πάντῃ.

6a <Ἀετίου> I.21.6a

Ἔκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ προνοίας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

5 <Arius Didymus>: The planets in order

I.21.5.6

Of the wandering stars, the highest sphere, following that <of> the fixed stars, is Saturn's; after it comes Jupiter's, then Mars's, next Mercury's, then Venus's, then the sun's, and last of all the moon's, adjoining the air. Hence the moon also appears more airlike, and its power reaches the regions about earth most strongly.[633]

5 <Arius Didymus>: The center and "down"

I.21.5.7

Below the moon lies the sphere of the air carried beneath it, then that of water, and last that of earth, which lies about the central point of the world. This is the "down" of the universe; "up" is the direction from it toward the circumference on every side.[634]

6a <Aëtius>: Ecphantus

I.21.6a

Ecphantus held that the world is constituted from atoms, but is governed by providence.[635]

633. The order is the one printed in this report: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, sun, moon. It has not been rearranged to match another ancient scheme. The Greek planetary names are Cronus, Zeus, Ares, Hermes, and Aphrodite; conventional English names are used.

634. The phrase hyp' autou pheromenou is difficult: the masculine pronoun does not agree with "moon." "Carried beneath it" gives the apparent spatial sense, without establishing the pronoun's reference. Wachsmuth records several proposed repairs. The supplied Greek article before "water" has no separate natural English equivalent.

635. This report combines atomic constituents with providential government, unlike the atomist account in excerpt 3c. It illustrates why the chapter's reports should not be forced into a single division between atomism and divine governance.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

6b <Ἀετίου>

I.21.6b

Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτε ἔμψυχον ὅλον δι᾽ ὅλου οὔτε λογικὸν οὔτε νοερὸν οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐράνια πάντων τούτων κοινωνεῖν, σφαίρας γὰρ περιέχειν ἐμψύχους καὶ ζωτικάς, τὰ δὲ περίγεια μηδενὸς αὐτῶν, τῆς δ᾽ εὐταξίας κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ προηγουμένως μετέχειν. Εἰ δὲ τρέφεται ὁ κόσμος, καὶ φθαρήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδεμιᾶς δεῖται τροφῆς, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀΐδιος.

6c <Ἀετίου> · 1

I.21.6c.1

Πυθαγόρας φησὶ γενητὸν κατ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν τὸν κόσμον, οὐ κατὰ χρόνον. Ὃς καὶ πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. Ἄρξασθαι δὲ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου ἀπὸ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ πέμπτου στοιχείου.

6c <Ἀετίου> · 2

I.21.6c.2

Πέντε δὲ σχημάτων ὄντων στερεῶν, ἅπερ καλεῖται καὶ μαθηματικά, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγονέναι τὴν γῆν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς πυραμίδος τὸ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀκταέδρου τὸν ἀέρα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ εἰκοσαέδρου <τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δωδεκαέδρου> τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖραν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

6b <Aëtius>: Aristotle

I.21.6b

Aristotle held that the world is not throughout its whole extent endowed with soul, reason, or intelligence, or governed by providence. For the heavenly regions share in all these things, containing ensouled and living spheres, while the regions about earth share in none of them; they participate in good order incidentally, not primarily. If the world is nourished, it will also perish; but it needs no nourishment, and for that reason is eternal.[636]

6c <Aëtius>: Pythagoras and cosmic order

I.21.6c.1

Pythagoras says that the world is generated in conception, not in time. He was also the first to call the enclosure of all things a kosmos, from the order within it. The generation of the world began from fire and the fifth element.[637]

6c <Aëtius>: Five solid figures

I.21.6c.2

There are five solid figures, also called mathematical figures. He says that earth came from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, <water> from the icosahedron, <and> the sphere of the universe <from the dodecahedron>.[638]

636. This is a doxographical summary attributed to Aristotle, not a quotation from a named Aristotelian work. Its contrast concerns the cosmic regions and their governance; the statement about the earthly region should not be expanded into a denial that individual terrestrial animals have souls.

637. “In conception” distinguishes an explanatory account of how the world is constituted from an event at a first moment in time. The report assembles several claims under Pythagoras’s name. Kosmos can mean “order”; the claim of first naming is the ancient compiler’s, not an independently established priority. The fifth element is not defined here.

638. The five are the regular solids: the “pyramid” is the tetrahedron. The supplement restoring water and the dodecahedron comes from the parallel doxographical tradition. The scheme resembles Plato’s Timaeus 53c-55c; here it is transmitted under Pythagoras’s name.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

6d <Ἀετίου> I.21.6d

Φιλόλαος ἔφησε τὸ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πυρὸς ῥυέντος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σεληνιακοῦ περιστροφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀποχυθέντος εἶναι τὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις τροφὰς τοῦ κόσμου. Τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν τῷ μεσαιτάτῳ πυρί, ὅπερ τρόπεως δίκην προϋπεβάλλετο τῇ τοῦ παντὸς <σφαίρᾳ> ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός.

6e <Ἀετίου> I.21.6e

Κλεάνθης ὁ Στωικὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου.

Ἀρχέδημος τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο.

6f <Ἀετίου> I.21.6f

Ἡράκλειτος οὐ κατὰ χρόνον εἶναι γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν.

Ἐπίδικος ὑπὸ φύσεως γεγενῆσθαι τὸν κόσμον.

Ἀρχέλαος ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ἐμψυχρίας συστῆναι τὸν κόσμον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

6d <Aëtius>: Philolaus I.21.6d

Philolaus said that the exhalations, arising partly from fire flowing from heaven and partly from lunar water poured out through the revolution of the air, are the world's nourishment. Its ruling part is in the fire at the very center, which the craftsman God laid down first, like a keel, beneath the <sphere> of the universe.[639]

6e <Aëtius>: Where the ruling part lies I.21.6e

Cleanthes the Stoic said that the ruling part of the world is in the sun.

Archedemus declared that the ruling part of the world is in earth.[640]

6f <Aëtius>: Accounts of formation I.21.6f

Heraclitus held that the world is generated not in time but in conception.

Epidicus held that the world came into being through nature.

Archelaus held that the world was constituted through heat and cooling.[641]

639. The obscure fire and lunar-water wording also appears in I.20.1g, there in a report about destruction. Here it concerns nourishment. The central fire is likened to a ship's keel, the structural foundation laid first; "sphere" is supplied by the editor. The imagery is transmitted as a report about Philolaus.

640. The reports give distinct locations for the directing center. Archedemus is the name retained by Wachsmuth; his apparatus rejects an earlier alteration to Archidamus.

641. The printed names are retained. Wachsmuth notes a tentative conjecture "Heraclides" for "Heraclitus" and a variant of "Epidicus." "Heat and cooling" follows the editor's repairs of corrupt readings. A stray repetition from I.10.12, noted in the apparatus but omitted from the base text, is not inserted here.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 186-187

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7a Φιλολάου Περὶ κόσμω I.21.7a

Ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ κα εἴη. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ᾽ ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλον τάρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων περαίνοντα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντά τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φαίνεται.

7b <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> I.21.7b

Καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι. Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου.

7c <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> I.21.7c

Ὁ γα μὰν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἴδεα, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων μιχθέντων, ἀρτιοπέρισσον. Ἑκατέρω δὲ τῶ εἴδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ὡς ἕκαστον αὐταυτὸ σημαίνει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7a Philolaus, On the World: Limiters I.21.7a

All things that are must be either limiting or unlimited, or both limiting and unlimited; they could not be unlimited alone. Since, then, they plainly consist neither wholly of limiters nor wholly of unlimiteds, it is clear that both the world and the things within it were fitted together from limiters and unlimiteds. Things in actual experience show this too. Those made from limiters appear limiting, those from limiters and unlimiteds both limiting and not limiting, and those from unlimiteds unlimited.[642]

7b <The same author>: Number and knowledge I.21.7b

Indeed, all things that are known have number. For without it nothing can be either conceived or known.[643]

7c <The same author>: Kinds of number I.21.7c

Number has two kinds of its own, odd and even, and a third formed from the mixture of both, even-odd. Each of the two kinds has many forms, as each thing itself indicates.[644]

642. This is Philolaus fragment 2 in modern numbering. Excerpts 7a-d and 8 belong to the generally accepted core of his fragments, unlike the On the Soul extract in I.20.2; see C. A. Huffman, "Philolaus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §§1.3-1.4. Perainonta is active, "things that limit," rather than simply things already bounded. The Doric forms are retained on the Greek side.

643. Philolaus fragment 4. "Have number" is the wording of this fragment; it has not been replaced by the different proposition "are numbers." Wachsmuth supplies "the same author" for 7b-d and 8; these headings refer back to Philolaus.

644. Philolaus fragment 5. The fragment names but does not define the "even-odd." Its last clause is textually difficult; "as each thing itself indicates" follows Wachsmuth's printed wording without supplying a particular example or theory of the third kind.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7d <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 1

I.21.7d.1

Περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἁρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· Ἃ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀΐδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὰν ἁ φύσις, θεία ἐντὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίναν ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν, πλὰν γα ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἦς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γιγνωσκόμενον ὑφ᾽ ἁμῶν γενέσθαι, μὴ ὑπαρχοίσας τᾶς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων.

7d <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 2

I.21.7d.2

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ᾽ ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆμεν, αἰ μὴ ἁρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ὠτινιῶν τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. Τὰ μὲν ὧν ὅμοια καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσολαχῆ ἀνάγκα τᾷ τοιαύτᾳ ἁρμονίᾳ συγκεκλεῖσθαι, αἰ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7d <The same author>: Nature and knowing

I.21.7d.1

Concerning nature and harmony, the situation is this. The being of things, which is eternal, and indeed nature itself, is divine and admits of no human knowledge, except that none of the things that are and are known by us could have come into being unless the being of the things from which the world was constituted, both the limiters and the unlimiteds, already existed.[645]

7d <The same author>: Why harmony is needed

I.21.7d.2

Since the principles that already existed were neither alike nor of the same kind, they could not have been brought into order unless harmony had arisen in addition, however it arose. Things alike and of the same kind had no need of harmony; but things unlike, of different kinds, and unequally allotted must be bound together by such a harmony if they are to be held within an ordered world.[646]

645. Philolaus fragment 6. Estō is the Doric term rendered “being.” The opening is substantially repaired in the base edition; the English takes “nature itself” as a restatement of “the being of things.” The restriction on knowledge still permits the inference that the constituents of the world must already have existed.

646. Harmonia means a fitting or joining together; the next passage gives it the specific musical sense of an octave. “Unequally allotted” renders isolachē with the preceding negative, following a conjecture retained by Wachsmuth. The phrase “however it arose” leaves the origin of harmony unspecified.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7d <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 3 I.21.7d.3

Ἁρμονίας δὲ μέγεθός ἐντι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δὲ δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν μεῖζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόῳ· ἐντὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐπὶ μέσαν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσας ἐπὶ νεάταν δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐν μέσῳ μέσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον· ἁ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, <τὸ> διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον.

7d <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> · 4 I.21.7d.4

Οὕτως ἁρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ <δύο> διέσιες, δι᾽ ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις.

8 <Τοῦ αὐτοῦ> I.21.8

Τὸ πρᾶτον ἁρμοσθέν, τὸ ἕν, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τᾶς σφαίρας ἑστία καλεῖται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

7d <The same author>: The musical intervals I.21.7d.3

The extent of the octave is a fourth and a fifth; the fifth exceeds the fourth by a tone of nine to eight. For from hypatē to mesē is a fourth, from mesē to neatē a fifth, from neatē to tritē a fourth, and from tritē to hypatē a fifth. The interval between mesē and tritē is nine to eight. The fourth is four to three, the fifth three to two, and the octave two to one.[647]

7d <The same author>: Tones and remainders I.21.7d.4

Thus the octave comprises five tones of nine to eight and <two> dieses; the fifth comprises three tones of nine to eight and one diesis.[648]

8 <The same author>: The hearth I.21.8

The first thing fitted together, the one at the center of the sphere, is called the hearth.[649]

647. The traditional terms syllaba and di' oxeian mean the fourth and fifth here; harmonia and dia pasān both designate the octave. Hypatē and neatē are its lower and upper notes, with mesē and tritē between them. The ratios combine by multiplication: (4/3) × (3/2) = 2. The supplied Greek article before dia pasān has no separate English equivalent.

648. Here a diesis is the small remainder needed to complete these intervals, with ratio 256:243, not half of an equal-tempered modern tone. "Two" is supplied from the parallel in Nicomachus. Wachsmuth does not add the further sentence about the fourth that some editions include. Compare Huffman, "Philolaus," §2.2, on fragment 6a.

649. Philolaus fragment 7. The hearth is the central fire, not the earth or sun. The wording links its formation with the fitting together discussed above. "The one" is retained without turning it into an explicitly named abstract first principle.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Τάτ · 1 I.21.9.1

<TAT> Ἐπεί μοι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν γενικοῖς λόγοις ὑπέσχου δηλῶσαι περὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἓξ δεκανῶν, νῦν μοι δήλωσον περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς τούτων ἐνεργείας.

<ΕΡΜ.> Οὐδεὶς φθόνος, ὦ Τάτ, καὶ ὁ κυριώτατος πάντων λόγος καὶ κορυφαιότατος οὗτος ἂν εἴη· σὺ δὲ νόει οὕτως. Ἔφαμέν σοι περὶ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου, τοῦ καὶ ζῳοφόρου, καὶ τῶν πέντε πλανητῶν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τοῦ ἑκάστου τούτων κύκλου.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 2 I.21.9.2

<TAT> Ἔφης γάρ, ὦ Τρισμέγιστε.

<ΕΡΜ.> Οὕτως βούλομαί σε νοεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἓξ δεκανῶν μεμνημένον ἐκείνων, ἵν᾽ εὔγνωστός σοι καὶ ὁ περὶ τούτων λόγος γένηται.

<TAT> Μέμνημαι, ὦ πάτερ.

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἔφαμέν που, ὦ τέκνον, περιεκτικὸν τῶν ἁπάντων εἶναι σῶμα· ἐννόησον οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ κυκλοειδὲς σχῆμα· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει τὸ πᾶν.

<TAT> Τοιοῦτον σχῆμα νοῶ οὕτως ὡς λέγεις, ὦ πάτερ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes, From the Discourse to Tat

I.21.9.1

<TAT> In your earlier general discourses you promised to explain the thirty-six decans to me. Now explain them and their activity.

<HERMES> I withhold nothing, Tat; this would be the most authoritative and highest of all discourses. Understand it in this way. We spoke to you about the zodiacal circle, also called the sign-bearing circle, and about the five planets, the sun, the moon, and the circle of each of them.[650]

9 Hermes: Preparing the image

I.21.9.2

<TAT> You did indeed, Trismegistus.

<HERMES> I want you to understand the thirty-six decans in the same way, remembering those earlier matters so that the account of these too may be clear to you.

<TAT> I remember, father.

<HERMES> We said, my child, that there is a body enclosing everything. Picture for yourself a circular shape, for that is how the universe is formed.

<TAT> I picture such a shape just as you describe it, father.[651]

650. This dialogue belongs to the writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus; it is commonly numbered Stobaean Hermetic excerpt VI. Wachsmuth supplies the speaker labels throughout. The decans are thirty-six astral powers; their roles are developed below. Zōiophoros means “bearing figures” or “sign-bearing,” referring here to the zodiac.

651. Trismegistus means “thrice greatest.” The passage builds a mental picture before explaining the heavenly motions. Kyklos may denote a circle or the circuit of a sphere; the English retains “circle” where the Greek uses it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 3

I.21.9.3

<ΕΡΜ.> Ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν κύκλον τοῦ σώματος τούτου τετάχθαι τοὺς τριάκοντα ἓξ δεκανούς, μέσους τοῦ παντὸς κύκλου <καὶ> τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ, διορίζοντας ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς κύκλους, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον μὲν κουφίζοντας τὸν ζωδιακόν, [καθορίζοντας,] συμφερομένους <δὲ> τοῖς πλάνησι, καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλὰξ τοῖς <θ'> ἑπτά·

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 4

I.21.9.4

καὶ τὸ μὲν περιεκτικὸν ἐπέχειν σῶμα (ἔσχατον γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἐν τῇ φορᾷ, αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὄν, τῷ τάχει)· ἐπισπεύδειν δὲ τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἄλλους κύκλους διὰ τὸ βραδυτέραν κίνησιν κινεῖσθαι τοῦ παντὸς κύκλου. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς κινεῖσθαι καὶ <τὸν> τοῦ παντός.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 5

I.21.9.5

Νοήσωμεν οὖν καὶ [τὰς] τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ <τοῦ> παντὸς τὸν κύκλον, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἐν κόσμῳ ἅπαντα ὡσπερεὶ φύλακας αὐτοὺς περιϊστασθαι, καὶ συνέχοντας τὰ πάντα καὶ τηροῦντας τὴν τῶν πάντων εὐταξίαν.

<ΤΑΤ> Οὕτως γὰρ νοῶ, πάτερ, ἐξ ὧν λέγεις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: The place of the decans

I.21.9.3

<HERMES> Beneath the circle of this body are stationed the thirty-six decans, between the circle of the universe <and> the zodiacal circle. They mark off both circles and, as it were, hold up that zodiacal circle [define its bounds], <while> moving along with the wanderers; they equal the power of the universe's motion <and>, in alternation, that of the seven.[652]

9 Hermes: Regulating the circles

I.21.9.4

They hold back the encompassing body, for by itself it would reach an extreme in the speed of its motion; but they hasten the other seven circles, because these move more slowly than the circle of the universe. Accordingly, they must move, as must <the circle> of the universe.[653]

9 Hermes: Guardians of order

I.21.9.5

Let us therefore conceive of them as guardians stationed around the circle of the seven and <of the> universe, or rather around everything in the world, holding all things together and preserving the good order of them all.

<TAT> That is how I understand it, father, from what you say.[654]

652. The Greek account of the motions is difficult. "In alternation" renders enallax; its exact force is uncertain. Wachsmuth supplies the conjunction before "seven," whose Greek form is elided, and rejects "define its bounds" as an alternative reading beside "hold up." The translation retains these choices rather than reconstructing a smoother astronomical system.

653. The contrast is read here as the decans restraining the encompassing body and accelerating the seven circles. The parenthesis is corrupt and conjecturally repaired in Wachsmuth; "reach an extreme" is a cautious rendering of eschaton. The final sentence is also awkward, and the editor suspects a gap. Its minimal stated sense is retained; no missing explanation is invented.

654. "Them" refers to the decans. The singular "circle" is retained from the repaired Greek. The rejected article tas has no separate English rendering; its presence in the Greek records the grammatical disturbance in the transmitted sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 6 I.21.9.6

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἔτι δὲ νόησον, Τάτ, ὅτι καὶ ἀπαθεῖς εἰσιν, ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες πάσχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπεχόμενοι τὸν δρόμον στηρίζουσιν οὔτε κωλυόμενοι ἀναποδίζουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἡλίου σκέπονται, ἅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες· ἐλεύθεροι δὲ ὄντες ὑπεράνω πάντων ὥσπερ φύλακες ἀκριβεῖς καὶ ἐπίσκοποι τοῦ παντὸς περιέχονται τῷ νυχθημέρῳ τὸ πᾶν.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 7 I.21.9.7

<ΤΑΤ> Ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ οὗτοι, ὦ πάτερ, ἔχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνέργειαν;

<ΕΡΜ.> Τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ τέκνον. Εἰ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐνεργοῦσι, πῶς οὐ καὶ ἡμῖν; καὶ καθ᾽ ἕνα ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ; Οὕτως, ὦ τέκνον, τῶν καθολικῶς πάντων συμβαινόντων τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐστίν, οἷον (ὃ λέγω νόησον) βασιλειῶν μετατροπαί, πόλεων ἐπαναστάσεις, λιμοί, λοιμοί, ἀμπώτεις θαλάσσης, γῆς σεισμοί, οὐδὲν τούτων, ὦ τέκνον, χωρὶς τῆς τούτων ἐνεργείας γίνεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: Unimpeded motion I.21.9.6

<HERMES> Understand further, Tat, that they are unaffected by what happens to the other stars. They are not checked in their course and brought to a standstill, nor hindered and made to move backward; nor are they hidden by the sun's light, as the other stars are. Free above them all, like vigilant guardians and overseers of the universe, they encircle the all through the course of night and day.[655]

9 Hermes: Their action upon human beings I.21.9.7

<TAT> Then do these too, father, exert an influence upon us?

<HERMES> The greatest, my child. If they act upon those stars, how could they fail to act upon us too, both upon each individual and upon us collectively? Thus, my child, the effective agency in everything that happens on a general scale comes from these: for example, consider what I say, changes of kingdoms, uprisings of cities, famines, plagues, ebbings of the sea, earthquakes. None of these, my child, occurs apart from their activity.[656]

655. The account contrasts the decans with stations, retrograde motion, and loss of visibility in sunlight. The printed hypo means they are hidden "by" the sun's light. It has not been changed to "from" the light or explained as an eclipse. These are claims within the dialogue's astral cosmology.

656. Energeia denotes active operation or influence, not energy in a modern physical sense. The clause introducing collective events is grammatically damaged; its causal sense is clear enough, though Wachsmuth discusses possible repairs. Ampōteis is "ebbings" or recessions of the sea, not an explicit term for tidal waves.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 8 I.21.9.8

Ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις νόησον· εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι μὲν ἐπιστατοῦσιν ἐκείνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἑπτά ἐσμεν, οὐ νοεῖς καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τινα ἐκείνων φθάνειν ἐνέργειαν, ἤτοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἢ δι᾽ ἐκείνων;

<ΤΑΤ> Τίς <δ᾽ ἂν> αὐτοῖς εἴη, ὦ πάτερ, ὁ τοῦ σώματος τύπος;

<ΕΡΜ.> Τούτους οὖν καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴδιόν τι ἐστὶ γένος τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων οὔτε ἄλλα σώματα ἔχοντες ἐξ ἰδίας τινὸς ὕλης οὔτε ψυχῇ κινούμενοι ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργειαί εἰσι τῶν τριάκοντα ἓξ τούτων θεῶν.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 9 I.21.9.9

Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις νόησον, ὦ Τάτ, ἐνέργημα τούτων, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν σπερματίζουσιν ἃς καλοῦσι τάνας, τὰς μὲν σωτηρίους, τὰς δὲ ὀλεθριωτάτας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: Daemons as activities I.21.9.8

Consider this also: if these govern those, and we in turn are subject to the seven, do you not see that some activity of theirs reaches us too, either from the decans themselves or through the seven?

<TAT> <Then> what <might> their bodily form be, father?

<HERMES> Most people call these daemons. For daemons are not a distinct kind, possessing different bodies made from some matter of their own, nor moved by soul as we are; they are activities of these thirty-six gods.[657]

9 Hermes: The tanas I.21.9.9

Consider also this effect of theirs, Tat: they sow in the earth those called tanas, some saving, others utterly destructive.[658]

657. The translation identifies the decans and seven in the first sentence for clarity. Wachsmuth suspects something missing before the answer about daemons: its “these” shifts the discussion toward the decans’ activities or agents. That abrupt transition remains. “Daemons” here does not necessarily mean evil spirits.

658. Tanas is an obscure name, retained without identifying its referents more precisely than the passage allows. The Greek uses feminine forms. G. R. S. Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes III, excerpt IX, note 49:4, proposed connecting it with Titans, but that conjecture requires changes to the text and is not adopted here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 10 I.21.9.10

Ἔτι καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ φερόμενοι ἀστέρες γεννῶσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπολειτουργούς, <οὓς> καὶ ὑπηρέτας καὶ στρατιώτας ἔχουσιν. Οὗτοι δὲ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων μιγνύμενοι φέρονται ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι αἰωρούμενοι, τὸν τούτου τόπον ἀναπληροῦντες, ὅπως μηδεὶς ᾖ τόπος ἄνω κενὸς ἀστέρων, συγκοσμοῦντες τὸ πᾶν, ἐνέργειαν ἰδίαν ἔχοντες, ὑποτεταγμένην δὲ <τῇ> τῶν τριάκοντα ἓξ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἐξ ὧν καὶ κατὰ τὰς χώρας φθοραὶ γίνονται τῶν ἄλλων ἐμψύχων ζῴων καὶ ἡ πληθὺς τῶν λυμαινομένων ζῴων τοὺς καρπούς.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 11 I.21.9.11

Ὑπὸ δὲ τούτους ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη ἄρκτος, κατὰ μέσον τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ, ἐξ ἀστέρων συγκειμένη ἑπτά, ἔχουσα ἀντίζυγον ἑτέραν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς. Ταύτης μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ καθάπερ ἄξονος, μηδαμοῦ μὲν δυνούσης μηδὲ ἀνατελλούσης, μενούσης δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, [τῆς] περὶ <τὸ> αὐτὸ στρεφομένης, ἐνεργούσης δὲ τὴν <τοῦ> ζῳοφόρου κύκλου <περιφοράν>, παραδιδοῦσαν τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς νυκτὸς ἡμέρᾳ, ἀπὸ <δ᾽> ἡμέρας νυκτί.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: Subordinate stars

I.21.9.10

Stars moving in heaven also generate subordinate workers for them, <whom> they have as servants and soldiers. These, mingled by those others, are carried aloft in the aether, filling its region so that no place above is empty of stars. They help order the universe, possessing an activity of their own, yet one subordinated to the activity of the thirty-six. From them come the destruction of other ensouled creatures in the various regions, and the multitude of creatures that ravage crops.[659]

9 Hermes: The Bear and the daily turning

I.21.9.11

Beneath these is the so-called Bear, at the middle of the zodiac, consisting of seven stars, with another Bear as its counterpart above its head. Its action is like that of an axle: it neither sets nor rises anywhere, but remains in the same place, turning about that same point and producing the <revolution> of the sign-bearing circle, which hands this whole universe from night to day <and> from day to night.[660]

659. The pronouns and the phrase “mingled by those others” are difficult. “For them” is understood as referring to the decans; “these” then refers to the subordinate workers. The hierarchy is explicit at its close: subordinate activity depends on the thirty-six. A supplied Greek article before their activity needs no separate English word.

660. The Bears are conventionally understood as the Great and Little Bear. “At the middle of the zodiac” is the text’s difficult spatial description; it has not been changed to a position on the ecliptic. “Revolution” is supplied; the supplied and rejected Greek articles are visible on the facing page. The feminine “which hands” is taken with the revolution, rather than silently corrected to agree with the Bear.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 12 I.21.9.12

Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶν ἄλλος χορὸς ἀστέρων, οὓς ἡμεῖς προσηγοριῶν οὐ κατηξιώσαμεν, οἱ δὲ μεθ᾽ ἡμᾶς μιμησάμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ προσηγορίας τούτοις θήσονται.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 13 I.21.9.13

Κάτωθεν δὲ τῆς σελήνης εἰσὶν ἕτεροι ἀστέρες φθαρτοί, ἀργοί, πρὸς ὀλίγον χρόνον συνιστάμενοι, εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενοι, οὓς καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁρῶμεν διαλυομένους, τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν ἔχοντας τοῖς ἀχρήστοις τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ζῴων, ἐπὶ ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν γίνεται ἢ ἵνα μόνον φθαρῇ, οἷον τὸ τῶν μυιῶν γένος καὶ τῶν ψύλλων καὶ τῶν σκωλήκων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοίων·

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 14 I.21.9.14

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Τάτ, οὔτε ἡμῖν οὔτε τῷ κόσμῳ χρήσιμά ἐστι, τοὐναντίον δὲ λυπεῖ ἐνοχλοῦντα, παρακολουθήματα ὄντα τῆς φύσεως καὶ κατὰ τὸ περισσὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἔχοντα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενοι ἀστέρες τὸν μὲν ἄνω τόπον οὐ καταλαμβάνουσιν (ἀδυνατοῦσι γὰρ ὡς κάτωθεν ἀνιόντες), πολὺ δὲ <τὸ> ἐμβριθὲς ἔχοντες, ἑλκόμενοι κάτω ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ὕλης διαχέονται ταχέως καὶ διαλυθέντες πίπτουσι πάλιν εἰς γῆν μηδὲν <ἕτερον> ἐνεργήσαντες, ἢ μόνον ὀχλήσαντες τῷ ὑπὲρ γῆν ἀέρι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: An unnamed company

I.21.9.12

After this comes another company of stars, which we have not thought worthy of names; but those who come after us will themselves give them names by imitation.[661]

9 Hermes: Perishable lights below the moon

I.21.9.13

Below the moon are other stars, perishable and inactive, which cohere for a short time, exhaled from earth itself into the air above it. We see them dissolve. Their nature resembles that of the useless creatures on earth, which come into being for nothing other than merely to perish, such as flies, fleas, worms, and other similar kinds.[662]

9 Hermes: Nature's by-products

I.21.9.14

For those creatures, Tat, are useful neither to us nor to the world. On the contrary, they cause distress and trouble, being by-products of nature and owing their generation to its surplus. In the same way, the stars exhaled from earth do not reach the upper region, since they cannot do so when rising from below. Having great weight and being drawn downward by their own matter, they quickly disperse and, once dissolved, fall back to earth, having done nothing <else> but disturb the air above it.[663]

661. Choros can suggest a chorus or an ordered company. "By imitation" is left general: Wachsmuth understands the names as imitating the things named, whereas the wording does not identify particular constellations or future namers.

662. "Stars" here includes transient luminous phenomena, apparently shooting stars, rather than only what modern astronomy calls stars. "Inactive" contrasts them with the effective astral powers above. The sentence about coming into being has irregular grammar in the printed text; the translation takes the comparison as referring to the creatures just mentioned.

663. The claim that these creatures are useless is the speaker's judgment within this cosmology. Parakolouthēmata describes incidental products accompanying nature's processes. The text explains the transient lights through earthly exhalation and weight; the supplied article before "weight" requires no separate English equivalent.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 15 I.21.9.15

Ἕτερόν ἐστι γένος, ὦ Τάτ, τὸ τῶν καλουμένων κομητῶν, κατὰ καιρὸν ἐπιφαινομένων καὶ πάλιν μετὰ χρόνον ὀλίγον ἀφανῶν γινομένων, μήτε ἀνατελλόντων μήτε δυνόντων μήτε διαλυομένων, οἵτινες φανεροὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ κήρυκες καθολικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων γίνονται μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι· οὗτοι δὲ τὸν τόπον ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τὸν κύκλον τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 16 I.21.9.16

Ἐπὰν οὖν μέλλῃ τι τῷ κόσμῳ συμβαίνειν, οὗτοι φαίνονται <καὶ> φανέντες ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, πάλιν ὑπὸ τὸν κύκλον ἐλθόντες τοῦ ἡλίου ἀφανεῖς μένουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀπηλιώτῃ φανέντες <ἄλλοι>, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν τῷ βορρᾷ, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν τῷ λιβί, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν τῷ νότῳ· μάντεις δὲ τούτους προσηγορεύσαμεν. Καὶ ἀστέρων ἥδε φύσις.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 17 I.21.9.17

[Ἀστέρες δὲ ἄστρων διαφορὰν ἔχουσιν. Ἀστέρες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ αἰωρούμενοι, ἄστρα δὲ τὰ ἐγκείμενα ἐν τῷ σώματι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, συμφερόμενα δὲ τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐξ ὧν δώδεκα ζῴδια προσηγορεύσαμεν.]

BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: Comets as heralds

I.21.9.15

There is another kind, Tat, the so-called comets. They appear at the appointed occasion and become invisible again after a short time, neither rising nor setting nor dissolving. They become visible messengers and heralds of general events that are about to occur. Their region lies below the circle of the sun.[664]

9 Hermes: Appearances in the quarters

I.21.9.16

Whenever something is about to happen to the world, these appear <and>, after appearing for a few days, pass again beneath the sun's circle and remain invisible. <Some> appear in the east, others in the north, others in the southwest, and others in the south. We have called them diviners. Such is the nature of the stars.[665]

9 Hermes: A bracketed distinction

I.21.9.17

[Stars differ from star-groups. Stars are those borne aloft in heaven; star-groups are those embedded in the body of heaven and carried along with it, twelve of which we have named zodiacal signs.][666]

664. Komētai means "long-haired" stars, hence comets. The dialogue distinguishes them from the dissolving lights below the moon and attributes a prophetic function to them. Apotelesmata, "events" or "outcomes," carries the sense of effects brought to fulfillment in this astrological account.

665. The directions are named by winds. Lips conventionally denotes the southwest wind, so the printed libi is rendered "southwest," even though this produces an uneven list of quarters. "Beneath" follows hypo here, as in the preceding description of the comets' region.

666. Wachsmuth brackets this entire paragraph as an ancient gloss, following Usener. Both asteres and astra can ordinarily mean "stars"; "star-groups" makes the gloss's special distinction readable in English, without imposing it on every occurrence of either word elsewhere in the volume.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 18 I.21.9.18

Ὁ ταῦτα μὴ ἀγνοήσας ἀκριβῶς δύναται νοῆσαι τὸν θεόν, εἰ δὲ καὶ τολμήσαντα δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ αὐτόπτης γενόμενος θεάσασθαι καὶ θεασάμενος μακάριος γενέσθαι.

<TAT> Μακάριος ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὦ πάτερ, ὁ τοῦτον θεασάμενος.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 19 I.21.9.19

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, ὦ τέκνον, τὸν ἐν σώματι τούτου εὐτυχῆσαι. Δεῖ δὲ προγυμνάζειν αὐτοῦ τινα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνθάδε, ἵνα ἐκεῖ γενομένη, ὅπου αὐτὴν ἔξεστι θεάσασθαι, ὁδοῦ μὴ σφαλῇ. Ὅσοι δὲ ἄνθρωποι φιλοσώματοί εἰσιν, οὗτοι οὐκ ἄν ποτε θεάσαιντο τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ὄψιν. Οἷον γάρ ἐστι κάλλος, ὦ τέκνον, τὸ μήτε σχῆμα μήτε χρῶμα μήτε σῶμα ἔχον.

9 Ἑρμοῦ · 20 I.21.9.20

<TAT> Εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τι, ὦ πάτερ, χωρὶς τούτων καλόν;

<ΕΡΜ.> Μόνος ὁ θεός, ὦ τέκνον, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μεῖζόν τι ὄν, τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ὄνομα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 21

9 Hermes: From understanding to vision

I.21.9.18

Whoever has not remained ignorant of these things can understand God precisely; and, if one may venture to say so, can even behold him in direct vision and, having beheld him, become blessed.

<TAT> Truly blessed, father, is the one who has beheld him.[667]

9 Hermes: Preparing the soul

I.21.9.19

<HERMES> But it is impossible, my child, for someone in a body to attain this good fortune. One must train one's soul beforehand here, so that when it arrives there, where it is permitted to behold, it may not lose its way. Those who are lovers of the body could never behold the vision of the beautiful and good. What beauty there is, my child, in that which has neither shape nor color nor body![668]

9 Hermes: Beauty without body

I.21.9.20

<TAT> Could anything be beautiful apart from these, father?

<HERMES> God alone, my child; or rather, that which is something greater: the name of God.[669]

667. The dialogue moves from knowledge of the celestial order to knowledge and vision of God. Autoptēs means seeing for oneself; the following exchange clarifies that the culminating vision is not ordinary bodily sight.

668. "Here" and "there" contrast preparation in embodied life with the soul's eventual vision; the excerpt does not specify a physical location for "there." Wachsmuth expressly takes the final sentence as an exclamation, not the question printed by earlier editors. That punctuation is followed here.

669. The closing phrase places the "name of God" after "that which is something greater." Its compressed relation to the preceding answer remains difficult. The translation preserves the wording and stops at Stobaeus's actual excerpt boundary, without supplying an explanation or extending the dialogue.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

Κεφάλαιον ΚΒ′ I.22.heading

Περὶ τάξεως τοῦ κόσμου· <εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν.>

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.22.1a.1

Παρμενίδης στεφάνας εἶναι περιπεπλεγμένας ἐπαλλήλους, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ, τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυκνοῦ· μικτὰς δὲ ἄλλας <ἐκ> φωτὸς καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τούτων· καὶ τὸ περιέχον δὲ πάσας τείχους δίκην στερεὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ᾽ ᾧ πυρώδης στεφάνη· καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον πασῶν περὶ ὃ πάλιν πυρώδης·

1a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.22.1a.2

τῶν δὲ συμμιγῶν τὴν μεσαιτάτην ἁπάσαις αἰτίαν πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἥντινα καὶ δαίμονα κυβερνῆτιν καὶ κληδοῦχον ἐπονομάζει, δίκην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

Chapter 22: The Ordering of the World

I.22.heading

On the ordering of the world; <whether the all is one.>[670]

1a <Aëtius>: Parmenides' rings

I.22.1a.1

Parmenides held that there are rings wound one about another in succession, one made of the rarefied and another of the dense, with others between them mixed <from> light and darkness. What encloses them all, like a wall, is solid, and beneath it lies a fiery ring; the region at the very center of them all is likewise solid, with another fiery ring around it.[671]

1a <Aëtius>: The governing goddess

I.22.1a.2

Of the mixed rings, the middlemost is the cause of all motion and generation for them all. He also names it the governing goddess and key-holder, Justice and Necessity.[672]

670. The second part of the title is supplied here by Wachsmuth from the evidence of Photius and the contents tradition. It is also transmitted as a separate heading within this chapter, before excerpt 3a. The first part concerns the arrangement of the world's regions; the second concerns the number of worlds and their relation to the all.

671. Stephanai means "wreaths" or "crowns," here rendered "rings." The central region's solidity is understood from the preceding clause: the Greek does not repeat "solid." This is a later report about Parmenides, not a surviving verse quotation. Its compressed arrangement should not be treated as an unambiguous diagram of his cosmology.

672. The feminine "which" refers back to the middlemost mixed ring. The report connects it with divine governance under several names; it does not simply identify this ring with the solid central region of the preceding sentence. Wachsmuth's wording follows editorial repairs in the clause describing it as the cause of motion and generation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.22.1a.3

Καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἀπόκρισιν εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα, διὰ τὴν βιαιοτέραν αὐτῆς ἐξατμισθέντα πίλησιν, τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς ἀναπνοὴν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν κύκλον· συμμιγῆ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι τὴν σελήνην, τοῦ τ᾽ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ πυρός. Περιστάντος δ᾽ ἀνωτάτω πάντων τοῦ αἰθέρος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῷ τὸ πυρῶδες ὑποταγῆναι τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ κεκλήκαμεν οὐρανόν, ὑφ᾽ ᾧ ἤδη τὰ περίγεια.

1b <Ἀετίου> I.22.1b

Ἀριστοτέλης πρῶτον αἰθέρα ἀπαθῆ, πέμπτον τι σῶμα, μεθ᾽ ὃν παθητὰ πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ, τελευταίαν δὲ γῆν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1a <Aëtius>: Air, fire, and the moon I.22.1a.3

Air is a separation from earth, vaporized through its more violent compression, while the sun and the circle of the Milky Way are an exhalation of fire. The moon is a mixture of both, air and fire. Aether stands around everything at the highest level; beneath it is arranged the fiery region that we have called heaven, and beneath this lie the regions about earth.[673]

1b <Aëtius>: Aristotle's five bodies I.22.1b

Aristotle places first aether, unaffected by change, a certain fifth body; after it come the changeable bodies, fire, air, water, and last of all earth.[674]

673. Apokrisis is a separation or product separated out, not creation from nothing. The "circle of the Milky Way" is the visible band across the sky. Here aether stands above the fiery heaven; the chapter preserves other authors' different uses of these same cosmic terms.

674. "First" gives the order from the outside inward; "fifth" distinguishes aether from the familiar four elemental bodies. Apathēs contrasts with the bodies susceptible to alteration below it. It does not mean that aether lacks motion: circular motion is expressly affirmed in the next report.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1c <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> I.22.1c

Περιέχεσθαι δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ἔνθα τὰ θεῖα διανενεμημένα κατὰ σφαίρας ἵδρυται τῶν λεγομένων ἀπλανῶν τε καὶ πλανωμένων ἀστέρων. Ὅσας δὲ εἶναι τὰς σφαίρας, τοσούτους ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοὺς κινοῦντας θεοὺς ταύτας, ὧν μέγιστον τὸν πάσας περιέχοντα, ζῷον ὄντα λογικὸν καὶ μακάριον, συνεκτικὸν καὶ προνοητικὸν τῶν οὐρανίων. Συνεστάναι δὲ τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τοῦτον δὲ οὔτε βαρὺν οὔτε κοῦφον οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε φθαρτὸν οὔτε αὐξόμενον οὔτε μειούμενον ἐς ἀεὶ διαμένειν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, πεπερασμένον καὶ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἔμψυχον, κινούμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον ἐγκυκλίως.

1d <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.22.1d.1

Φιλόλαος πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ περὶ τὸ κέντρον, ὅπερ ἑστίαν τοῦ παντὸς καλεῖ καὶ Διὸς οἶκον καὶ μητέρα θεῶν, βωμόν τε καὶ συνοχὴν καὶ μέτρον φύσεως· καὶ πάλιν πῦρ ἕτερον ἀνωτάτω, τὸ περιέχον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1c <Arius Didymus>: The celestial spheres I.22.1c

These bodies are enclosed by aether, where the divine bodies are established, distributed among the spheres of the so-called fixed and wandering stars. There are as many gods moving these spheres as there are spheres. Greatest among them is the one enclosing them all, a rational and blessed living being, holding the heavenly things together and exercising providence over them.[675] The stars and heaven are constituted from aether. This is neither heavy nor light, neither generated nor perishable, neither increasing nor diminishing; it remains forever unchanging and unaltered, bounded, spherical, and endowed with soul, moving in a circle around the center.[676]

1d <Aëtius>: Philolaus's central fire I.22.1d.1

Philolaus places fire in the middle, about the center, calling it the hearth of the all, the house of Zeus, the mother of the gods, and nature's altar, bond, and measure. There is also another fire at the highest level, enclosing everything.[677]

675. Wachsmuth identifies this as Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 9 in Diels, reporting Aristotle. The description of an all-enclosing living god and providence belongs to this report; it is not presented here as a direct quotation from an Aristotelian treatise.

676. "This" follows the masculine pronoun referring to aether. The report combines its material qualities with those of the ensouled celestial whole. The sentence beginning with the stars' constitution is repeated in I.23.2; Wachsmuth explicitly notes that repetition.

677. The central fire and the enclosing fire are distinguished. "Hearth" identifies the center of the cosmic household; the report gives it several religious and structural names. This central fire is also distinct from the sun, which appears among the bodies moving around it in the following sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1d <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.22.1d.2

Πρῶτον δ᾽ εἶναι φύσει τὸ μέσον, περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δέκα σώματα θεῖα χορεύειν, οὐρανόν, τοὺς ε′ πλανήτας, μεθ᾽ οὓς ἥλιον, ὑφ᾽ ᾧ σελήνην, ὑφ᾽ ᾗ τὴν γῆν, ὑφ᾽ ᾗ τὴν ἀντίχθονα, μεθ᾽ ἃ σύμπαντα τὸ πῦρ, ἑστίας περὶ τὰ κέντρα τάξιν ἐπέχον.

1d <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.22.1d.3

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω μέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἐν ᾧ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων, Ὄλυμπον καλεῖ· τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ Ὀλύμπου φοράν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας μεθ᾽ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης τετάχθαι, κόσμον. Τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτοις ὑποσέληνόν τε καὶ περίγειον μέρος, ἐν ᾧ τὰ τῆς φιλομεταβόλου γενέσεως, οὐρανόν. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰ τεταγμένα τῶν μετεώρων γίνεσθαι τὴν σοφίαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων τὴν ἀταξίαν τὴν ἀρετήν, τελείαν μὲν ἐκείνην, ἀτελῆ δὲ ταύτην.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1d <Aëtius>: Ten bodies in their dance I.22.1d.2

The center is first by nature, and ten divine bodies dance around it: heaven, the five planets, after them the sun, beneath it the moon, beneath that the earth, and beneath earth the counter-earth. After all these comes the fire, occupying the position of a hearth about the central points.[678]

1d <Aëtius>: Three regions and two excellences I.22.1d.3

He calls the highest part of the enclosure Olympus, where the elements have their purity; the region beneath Olympus's revolution, in which the five planets are arranged together with sun and moon, he calls the world. The region beneath these, below the moon and around earth, where the processes of ever-changing generation take place, he calls heaven. Wisdom concerns the ordered things aloft, while virtue concerns the disorder of things coming into being: the former is complete, the latter incomplete.[679]

678. The count is heaven plus five planets, sun, moon, earth, and counter-earth: ten orbiting bodies, with the central fire additional. The printed numeral is five. Heaven here represents the outer stellar region. "Central points" retains the Greek plural kentra; the account nevertheless speaks of one cosmic center. Counter-earth is a further body in this system, not the opposite hemisphere of our earth.

679. The report now uses "heaven" for the lowest region, although it used the same word at the head of the preceding list. Both uses are retained. It also joins cosmology to a distinction between wisdom and virtue; that classification is reported under Philolaus's name, not assumed to be a verbatim fragment of his own work.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 196-197

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1e <Ἀετίου> I.22.1e

Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος χιτῶνα κύκλῳ καὶ ὑμένα περιτείνουσι τῷ κόσμῳ, διὰ τῶν ἀγκιστροειδῶν ἀτόμων συμπεπλεγμένον.

Ἐπίκουρος ἐνίων μὲν κόσμων ἀραιὸν τὸ πέρας, ἐνίων δὲ πυκνόν, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέν τινα κινούμενα, τὰ δ᾽ ἀκίνητα.

1f <Ἀετίου καὶ Πλάτωνος> · 1 I.22.1f.1

Πλάτων τὸν ὁρατὸν κόσμον γεγονέναι παράδειγμα τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου. Τοῦ δὲ ὁρατοῦ προτέραν μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὸ σωματοειδές, τὸ ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν καὶ γῆς πρῶτον, ὕδατος δὲ καὶ ἀέρος δεύτερον.

1f <Ἀετίου καὶ Πλάτωνος> · 2 I.22.1f.2

Λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τιμαίῳ οὕτως· Τῶν δὲ δὴ τεττάρων ἓν ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις· ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς συνέστησεν αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστάς, μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολείπων, τάδε διανοηθείς, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῷον τέλειον ἐκ τελείων τῶν μερῶν εἴη, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕν, ἅτε οὐχ ὑπολελειμμένων ἐξ ὧν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον γένοιτ᾽ ἄν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

1e <Aëtius>: The boundaries of worlds I.22.1e

Leucippus and Democritus stretch a covering and membrane all around the world, interwoven from hook-shaped atoms.

Epicurus holds that some worlds have a rarefied boundary and others a dense one; some of these boundaries move, while others are motionless.[680]

1f <Aëtius and Plato>: Soul before body I.22.1f.1

Plato held that the visible world came into being as a copy of the intelligible world. Of the visible world, soul is prior, and after it comes the bodily part, constituted first from fire and earth, and second from water and air.[681]

1f <Aëtius and Plato>: No remainder outside I.22.1f.2

Thus he says in the Timaeus: The world's constitution has taken each of the four in its entirety. For the one who composed it composed it from all fire, water, air, and earth, leaving outside no part or power of any of them. His intention was, first, that it should be, so far as possible, a whole and perfect living being made of complete parts; and, further, that it should be one, since nothing remained from which another such being could arise.[682]

680. The covering is made by the interlocking shapes of atoms. In the Epicurean clause, the neuter words for things moving or motionless are taken as referring to boundaries. Compare Epicurus's Letter to Pythocles, preserved in Diogenes Laërtius 10.88, for the similar description of a world's boundary.

681. Paradeigma usually means a model or pattern, but LSJ, under this word, expressly records the later sense "copy" with this doxographical sentence as its example. The report therefore does not reverse Plato's relation between intelligible model and visible world. Soul's priority is distinct from the order in which the bodily constituents are listed.

682. Timaeus 32c-d. The compiler's introduction gives way here to a quotation. The argument is that the maker uses all the available constituents, leaving none for another world. Stobaeus ends this excerpt before Plato's further explanation concerning freedom from age and disease.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

2 <Πλουτάρχου> · 1 I.22.2.1

Ὅμηρος τὸν αἰθέρα τοῦ ἀέρος ὑψηλότερον εἶναί φησιν, εἴρηκε δὲ οὕτως·

Εἰς ἐλάτην ἀναβὰς περιμήκετον, ἥ τότ᾽ ἐν Ἴδῃ
μακροτάτη πεφυυῖα δι᾽ ἠέρος αἰθέρ᾽ ἵκανεν.

2 <Πλουτάρχου> · 2 I.22.2.2

Ἐπέκεινα δὲ τοῦ αἰθέρος τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο· λέγει γὰρ τοιώδε·

Ὣς οἳ μὲν μάρναντο, σιδήρειος δ᾽ ὀρυμαγδὸς
χάλκεον οὐρανὸν ἶκε δι᾽ αἰθέρος ἀτρυγέτοιο.

2 <Πλουτάρχου> · 3 I.22.2.3

Ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τὸν Ὄλυμπον ὑπάρχειν κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν τινα καὶ θειότητα· φησὶ γὰρ οὕτως·

Ἠερίη δ᾽ ἀνέβη μέγαν οὐρανὸν Οὔλυμπόν τε.
Τὸ γὰρ ἀπωτάτω τῆς γῆς καὶ μήτε τὴν σκιὰν αὐτῆς μήτε τὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις προσδεχόμενον, ὡς ἀειλαμπὲς καὶ ὁλολαμπὲς Ὄλυμπον οἱ παλαιοὶ προσηγόρευσαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

2 <Plutarch>: Aether above air

I.22.2.1

Homer says that aether is higher than air, expressing it thus:

Climbing a towering fir, which then on Ida
had grown tallest, reaching through air into aether.[683]

2 <Plutarch>: Heaven beyond aether

I.22.2.2

He declared that heaven lies beyond aether, for he says this:

So they fought, and the iron din
reached the bronze heaven through the unharvested aether.[684]

2 <Plutarch>: Olympus above all

I.22.2.3

Olympus lies above all, with a certain eminence and divinity; for he says:

At dawn she ascended great heaven and Olympus.
For the ancients named the region farthest from earth, which receives neither its shadow nor its exhalations, Olympus, as being ever-bright and wholly bright.[685]

683. Iliad 14.287-288. Wachsmuth assigns this interpretation to the work On the Life and Poetry of Homer transmitted under Plutarch's name, chapter 95; it is Pseudo-Plutarch. The argument draws a sequence of cosmic regions from Homer's poetic descriptions. The expanded epic form pephyuia is retained in the Greek.

684. Iliad 17.424-425. "Unharvested" gives the literal agricultural image in atrygetos, an epic epithet also used of the sea; its precise force is debated. The interpreter uses the din's passage through aether to heaven as evidence for their relative positions.

685. Iliad 1.497. The derivation of Olympus from perpetual or complete brightness is the ancient interpreter's explanation of the name. It is retained as part of the argument, without treating it as an established historical etymology.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 197-198

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

2 <Πλουτάρχου> · 4

I.22.2.4

Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν δηλοῦται ἐν οἷς φησι τοιώσδε·

Οὔλυμπόνδ᾽, ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἔμμεναι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ᾽ ὄμβρῳ
δεύεται, οὐδὲ χιὼν ἐπικίδναται, ἀλλὰ μάλ᾽ αἴθρη
πέπταται ἀνέφελος, λευκὴ δ᾽ ἐπιδέδρομεν αἴγλη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

2 <Plutarch>: The gods' secure dwelling I.22.2.4

This is also shown by the very words in which he speaks as follows:

To Olympus, where they say the gods' dwelling stands forever secure,
never shaken by winds, nor ever drenched
with rain; no snow spreads over it, but cloudless clear sky
opens wide, and white radiance plays across it.[686]

686. Odyssey 6.42-45. The verse division is preserved, though the English sentence flows across its lines. The opening prose has the compressed "by these very things/words," rendered as a reference to the quoted language; Wachsmuth considers a different reading in his apparatus but does not adopt it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

Εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν

I.22.subheading

Εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν.

3a <Ἀετίου> · 1

I.22.3a.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κόσμον ἕνα· οὐ μέντοι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντὸς μέρος· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὕλην.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἕνα κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, ὃν δὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔφασαν εἶναι τὸ σωματικόν.

3a <Ἀετίου> · 2

I.22.3a.2

Μητρόδωρος, ὁ καθηγητὴς Ἐπικούρου, φησὶν ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐν μεγάλῳ πεδίῳ ἕνα στάχυν γενηθῆναι καὶ ἕνα κόσμον ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 22

Whether the All Is One

I.22.subheading

Whether the all is one.[687]

3a <Aëtius>: One world and the all

I.22.3a.1

Empedocles held that there is one world, but that the world is not the all: it is only a small part of the all, while the remainder is matter.

The Stoics declared that there is one world, which they also identified with all that is corporeal.[688]

3a <Aëtius>: A single ear of grain

I.22.3a.2

Metrodorus, the teacher of Epicurus, says that it is absurd for a single ear of grain to grow in a great field, and for a single world to arise in the unlimited.[689]

687. This heading is transmitted at this point in the manuscripts, unlike its supplied occurrence at the start of the chapter. The following accounts distinguish one world from all that exists, and then contrast one world with infinitely many worlds.

688. The Stoic qualification “corporeal” is decisive: it does not identify the world with the all including incorporeal void. Compare I.21.3b, where the world without the surrounding void is called the whole. The Empedoclean report, by contrast, places matter outside the one world.

689. “Teacher of Epicurus” is the designation transmitted in this report, not a secure identification to be inferred from the name alone. Diogenes Laërtius 10.13-14 preserves other accounts of Epicurus’s teachers, including Nausiphanes; 10.22 places the well-known Metrodorus of Lampsacus among his associates. The wording here is not silently changed to “pupil.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

3a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.22.3a.3

Ὅτι δὲ ἄπειρος κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ <ὅδε> ὁ κόσμος πεπερασμένος, τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια πάντα ἄπειρα ἐξ ὧν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη ἀπείρους εἶναι. Ὅπου γὰρ <ἀπέραντα> τὰ αἴτια, ἐκεῖ καὶ <τὰ> ἀποτελέσματα. Αἴτια δὲ ἤτοι αἱ ἄτομοι ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα.

3b <Ἀετίου> I.22.3b

Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ἔκφαντος, Παρμενίδης, Μέλισσος, Ἡράκλειτος, Ἀναξαγόρας, Πλάτων, Ἀριστοτέλης, Ζήνων ἕνα τὸν κόσμον.

Ἀναξίμανδρος, Ἀναξιμένης, Ἀρχέλαος, Ξενοφάνης, Διογένης, Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος ἀπείρους κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατὰ πᾶσαν περιαγωγήν.

3c <Ἀετίου> I.22.3c

Τῶν ἀπείρους ἀποφηναμένων τοὺς κόσμους Ἀναξίμανδρος τὸ ἴσον αὐτοὺς ἀπέχειν ἀλλήλων, Ἐπίκουρος ἄνισον εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν κόσμων διάστημα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

3a <Aëtius>: Unlimited causes and worlds I.22.3a.3

That worlds are unlimited in number is clear from the causes being unlimited. For if <this> world is bounded, but all the causes from which this world has arisen are unlimited, there must be unlimited worlds. For where the causes are <unlimited>, so too are the results. The causes are either the atoms or the elements.[690]

3b <Aëtius>: One world or infinitely many I.22.3b

Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Ecphantus, Parmenides, Melissus, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno held that there is one world.

Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaus, Xenophanes, Diogenes, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus held that there are infinitely many worlds in the unlimited, in every circuit.[691]

3c <Aëtius>: The distances between worlds I.22.3c

Among those who declared that the worlds are infinitely many, Anaximander held that they are equally distant from one another, while Epicurus held that the intervals between worlds are unequal.[692]

690. The first Greek sentence has singular apeiros, “unlimited,” although the sense requires worlds in the plural. Wachsmuth identifies an old error and cites apeiroi as the intended wording; the translation gives that sense while retaining the printed Greek. The supplied article before “results” needs no separate English bracket. The argument counts worlds, rather than making each world spatially unlimited.

691. The lists are the report’s classification, not a claim that all members of each group held an identical theory. “In every circuit” follows the printed periagōgē, a difficult expression. Wachsmuth records peristasis in the parallel tradition; no particular cycle or spatial arrangement is silently supplied here.

692. The contrast concerns spacing, not the number or size of the worlds. The statement of equal distances is retained without imposing a geometrical reconstruction that the brief report does not supply.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

3d Πλάτωνος · 1 I.22.3d.1

Πλάτων ἕνα τὸν κόσμον ἀπεφήνατο· λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ οὕτως· Πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; Ἕνα· εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται. Τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα μεθ᾽ ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴη.

3d Πλάτωνος · 2 I.22.3d.2

Πάλιν γὰρ <ἂν> ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνω δέοι ζῷον, οὗ μέρος ἂν εἰήτην ἐκείνω· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνοιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τόδ᾽ ἂν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὀρθότερον.

3d Πλάτωνος · 3 I.22.3d.3

Ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ᾽ εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἐστί τε καὶ ἔτ᾽ ἔσται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 22

3d Plato: One heaven and its model I.22.3d.1

Plato declared that there is one world, for he says in the Timaeus: Have we then rightly spoken of one heaven, or would it have been more correct to speak of many, indeed infinitely many? One, if it is to have been fashioned according to its model. For that which contains all intelligible living beings could never be a second alongside another.[693]

3d Plato: What would contain two models? I.22.3d.2

For there <would> then have to be another living being enclosing those two, of which both would be parts; and this world would more correctly be said to have been made like that enclosing being, rather than like those two.[694]

3d Plato: A single, uniquely generated heaven I.22.3d.3

So that this world might resemble the all-complete living being in its singleness, the maker therefore made neither two worlds nor infinitely many; instead, this one uniquely generated heaven has come into being, exists, and will continue to exist.[695]

693. Timaeus 31a-b. The introductory attribution belongs to the compiler. The "model" is the intelligible living being that includes all intelligible living beings; the argument concerns its uniqueness and the visible world's likeness to it. Here paradeigma has its usual sense "model," unlike its use for a copy in excerpt 1f.

694. The dual forms refer to the supposed pair of intelligible models. If a further living being contained both, that more inclusive being would be the appropriate model for the world. The supplied an marks the hypothetical statement; the repaired dual verb is also noted in Wachsmuth's apparatus.

695. Monogenēs emphasizes that this generated heaven is unique, with no second of its kind. The Greek says that it has come into being as well as that it will continue to exist; neither part is suppressed. "All-complete" follows Wachsmuth's correction from Plato in place of the manuscripts' "incomplete." This is the end of chapter 22.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 23

Κεφάλαιον ΚΓ′ I.23.heading

Περὶ τῆς οὐρανοῦ οὐσίας καὶ διαιρέσεως.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.23.1.1

Ἀναξιμένης καὶ Παρμενίδης τὴν περιφορὰν τὴν ἐξωτάτω τῆς γῆς εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.23.1.2

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς στερέμνιον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐξ ἀέρος παγέντος ὑπὸ πυρὸς κρυσταλλοειδῶς, τὸ πυρῶδες καὶ τὸ ἀερῶδες ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ἡμισφαιρίων περιέχοντα.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.23.1.3

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ μίγματος.

Παρμενίδης, Ἡράκλειτος, Στράτων, Ζήνων πύρινον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 23

Chapter 23: The Substance and Division of Heaven I.23.heading

On the substance and division of heaven.

1 <Aëtius>: The outermost circuit I.23.1.1

Anaximenes and Parmenides held that heaven is the outermost circuit around the earth.[696]

1 <Aëtius>: Empedocles' solid heaven I.23.1.2

Empedocles held that heaven is a solid mass, made of air solidified by fire like ice, containing the fiery and the airy in each of its hemispheres.[697]

1 <Aëtius>: Mixture and fire I.23.1.3

Anaximander held that it is made from a mixture of hot and cold.

Parmenides, Heraclitus, Strato, and Zeno held that heaven is fiery.[698]

696. Periphora can signify a circular course or circuit. The report places heaven at the outermost circuit around earth; it does not assert that earth itself revolves. The supplied attribution to Aëtius identifies the doxographical source reconstructed by the editor, here II.11.

697. The ice comparison describes the resulting solidity, although fire is said to cause it. LSJ, under krystalloeidēs, gives "like ice" and cites this very report, Placita II.11.2, for the adverb. "In each" follows the printed hekaterōi; the translation does not redistribute fire and air between separate hemispheres.

698. Hot and cold are the opposed constituents named in Anaximander's compressed report. Parmenides appears again because the earlier sentence described heaven's position, while this one describes its substance. The grouped names do not imply identical cosmologies.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 23

2 <Ἀετίου καὶ Διδύμου> · 1 I.23.2.1

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκ πέμπτου σώματος.

Λέγει γοῦν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως καὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγοις οὕτως.

2 <Ἀετίου καὶ Διδύμου> · 2 I.23.2.2

Συνεστάναι δὲ τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος· τοῦτον δὲ οὔτε βαρὺν οὔτε κοῦφον οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε φθαρτὸν οὔτε αὐξόμενον οὔτε μειούμενον ἐς ἀεὶ διαμένειν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, πεπερασμένον καὶ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἔμψυχον, κινούμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον ἐγκυκλίως.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.23.3.1

Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεμερίσθαι τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ σφαῖραν εἰς κύκλους πέντε, οὕστινας προσαγορεύουσι ζώνας· καλεῖται δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀρκτικός τε καὶ ἀειφανής, ὁ δὲ θερινὸς τροπικός, ὁ δὲ ἰσημερινός, ὁ δὲ χειμερινὸς τροπικός, ὁ δὲ ἀνταρκτικός τε καὶ ἀφανής.

BOOK I CHAPTER 23

2 <Aëtius and Didymus>: A fifth body I.23.2.1

Aristotle held that heaven is made from a fifth body.[699]

For he speaks as follows in his works Physics and On Heaven:[700]

2 <Aëtius and Didymus>: The enduring aether I.23.2.2

The stars and heaven are constituted from aether. This is neither heavy nor light, neither generated nor perishable, neither increasing nor diminishing; it remains forever unchanging and unaltered, bounded, spherical, and endowed with soul, moving in a circle around the center.[701]

3 <Aëtius>: Five celestial circles I.23.3.1

Thales, Pythagoras, and his followers held that the sphere of the whole heaven is divided into five circles, which they call zones. Of these, one is called arctic and always visible; another, the summer tropic; another, the equator; another, the winter tropic; and another, antarctic and invisible.[702]

699. The fifth body is aether, distinguished from earth, water, air, and fire. Wachsmuth attributes the first statement to Aëtius II.11.3 and the following account to Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 9 in Diels. The latter is the same source used in I.22.1c.

700. "Heaven" in the title follows Spengel's correction, adopted by Wachsmuth, of the manuscripts' autou, "his own." Despite the introductory "he speaks as follows," what follows is an indirect report of Aristotelian doctrine, not an authenticated verbatim passage from either treatise.

701. This passage repeats the latter part of I.22.1c, as Wachsmuth explicitly notes. The repetition is preserved. "This" refers grammatically to aether, whose qualities are combined with those of the ensouled celestial whole. Unchanging substance and circular movement are both affirmed.

702. These are circles of the sky. The arctic and antarctic circles mark the limits of the always visible and never visible regions for a northern observer; they are not the modern geographical polar circles. The two tropics correspond to the sun's northern and southern solsticial limits. "His followers" refers to Pythagoras.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 200-201

BOOK I CHAPTER 23

3 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.23.3.2

Λοξὸς δὲ [ἐν] τοῖς τρισὶ μέσοις ὁ καλούμενος ζῳδιακὸς ὑποβέβληται, παραψαύων τῶν μέσων τριῶν. Πάντας δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὁ μεσημβρινὸς πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀντικρὺ τέμνει.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.23.3.3

Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ἐπινενοηκέναι λέγεται τὴν λόξωσιν τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ κύκλου· ἥντινα Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χῖος ἐπίνοιαν ὡς ἰδίαν σφετερίζεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 23

3 <Aëtius>: Zodiac and meridian I.23.3.2

The so-called zodiacal circle is set obliquely to the three middle circles, touching those three.[703] The meridian cuts all of them at right angles, from the Bears to the opposite side.[704]

3 <Aëtius>: Who discovered the obliquity? I.23.3.3

Pythagoras is said to have been the first to discover the obliquity of the zodiacal circle; Oenopides of Chios appropriates this discovery as his own.[705]

703. The three middle circles are the two tropics and the equator. “Touching” translates parapsauōn: the zodiacal circle meets the equator by crossing it and the tropics at its northern and southern extremes. The printed [en], “in,” is rejected by the editor and remains visible on the Greek side; the English follows the sentence without it.

704. The Bears are the northern constellations, here indicating the north. The meridian is a great circle through the celestial poles. “All of them” refers to the five parallel circles of the preceding list, which it intersects at right angles; the oblique zodiac is not a sixth parallel circle.

705. Obliquity here concerns the zodiacal circle’s inclination to the celestial equator. The accusation of appropriation belongs to this ancient report. Other testimonies differ: Diodorus I.98.3 says that Oenopides learned about the sun’s inclined circle from Egyptian priests. For the competing accounts, see István Bodnár, Oenopides of Chius (2007), pp. 3-6 and 24. The statement is not a secure modern finding about priority. This is the end of chapter 23.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

Κεφάλαιον ΚΔ′ I.24.heading

Περὶ οὐσίας ἄστρων καὶ σχημάτων, κινήσεώς τε καὶ ἐπισημασίας.

1a <Ἀετίου> I.24.1a

Θαλῆς γεώδη μέν, ἔμπυρα δὲ τὰ ἄστρα.

1b <Ἀετίου> I.24.1b

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πύρινα ἐκ τοῦ πυρώδους, ὅπερ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχων [ἐξανέλαμψεν ἤτοι] ἐξανέθλιψε κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διάκρισιν.

Καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας συνδεδέσθαι τῷ κρυστάλλῳ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἀνεῖσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

Chapter 24: The Stars

I.24.heading

On the substance and shapes of the stars, their motion and weather signs.[706]

1a <Aëtius>: Thales

I.24.1a

Thales held that the stars are earthy, but on fire.[707]

1b <Aëtius>: Empedocles

I.24.1b

Empedocles held that the stars are fiery, formed from the fiery substance which air contained within itself and squeezed out at the first separation.[708]

The fixed stars are fastened to the icy vault, while the planets are unattached.[709]

706. “Stars” in this chapter can include the planets, sun, and moon. Episēmasia concerns weather signs or the changes of weather associated with celestial appearances. The reports disagree about both their causes and their relation to stellar risings and settings.

707. Earthy composition and being on fire are distinct claims. The brief report does not say that the stars consist simply of the element fire. The supplied Aëtius labels identify the editor’s reconstructed doxographical source.

708. The rejected words [exanelampsen ētoi], approximately “flashed forth, that is,” remain on the Greek side. Following Wachsmuth’s deletion, the English renders the retained verb “squeezed out.” The printed subject is air; the apparatus records a proposed substitution of aether.

709. Krystallos means ice or crystal. “Icy vault” connects this compressed wording with Empedocles’ heaven of air solidified like ice in I.23.1.2. “Fixed” describes the stars’ mutual arrangement and attachment, not absence of the heaven’s common rotation; the wandering stars are the planets.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 201-202

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1c <Ἀετίου> I.24.1c

Ἀναξαγόρας τὸν περικείμενον αἰθέρα πύρινον μὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τῇ δὲ εὐτονίᾳ τῆς περιδινήσεως ἀναρπάσαντα πέτρους ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς <καὶ> καταφλέξαντα τούτους ἠστερωκέναι.

Ἀπ᾽ ἀνατολῶν δὲ ἐπὶ δυσμὰς φέρεσθαι πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας.

1d <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.1d.1

Διογένης κισηροειδῆ τὰ ἄστρα, διαπνοίας δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπυρα.

1d <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.1d.2

Συμπεριφέρεσθαι δὲ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἄστροις ἀφανεῖς λίθους καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ ἀνωνύμους, πίπτοντας δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι, καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς πυρωδῶς κατενεχθέντα ἀστέρα πέτρινον.

1e <Ἀετίου> I.24.1e

Δημόκριτος πέτρους.

Καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἀπλανῆ, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς πλανήτας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1c <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras I.24.1c

Anaxagoras held that the surrounding aether is fiery in substance, and that by the force of its whirling it snatched rocks up from the earth <and> set them ablaze, turning them into stars.

All the stars travel from east to west.[710]

1d <Aëtius>: Diogenes' porous stars I.24.1d.1

Diogenes held that the stars are like pumice; he considers them vents through which the world breathes, and says that they are incandescent.[711]

1d <Aëtius>: Unseen stones I.24.1d.2

Unseen stones revolve together with the visible stars and, for that very reason, have no names. They often fall to earth and are extinguished, like the stony star that fell in a blaze at Aegospotami.[712]

1e <Aëtius>: Democritus I.24.1e

Democritus held that the stars are rocks.

The fixed stars come first, and after them the planets.[713]

710. The aether is the agent that lifts and ignites the rocks. The final sentence reports the common east-to-west motion of the heavens. A contrary motion of the planets appears later in 2b under a different attribution; these reports are not harmonized.

711. The pumice comparison suggests a porous substance. Diapnoiai is literally breathings-through or outlets for breath; the image treats the world as having channels through which something passes. "Incandescent" renders diapyra, thoroughly heated or glowing with fire.

712. The falling "stony star" is a report of a meteorite. Compare Plutarch, Life of Lysander 12, which also describes a large stone falling at Aegospotami. The contrast between visible stars and unnamed stones belongs to the ancient account.

713. The second clause gives an order of position, proceeding from the outer stellar region toward the planets. The source supplies no distances in this report.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1f <Ἀετίου> I.24.1f

Ἀρχέλαος μύδρους ἔφησεν εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας, διαπύρους δέ.

1g <Ἀετίου> I.24.1g

Ἀναξίμανδρος πιλήματα ἀέρος τροχοειδῆ, πυρὸς ἔμπλεα, κατά τι μέρος ἀπὸ στομίων ἐκπνέοντα φλόγας.

Καὶ ἀνωτάτω μὲν πάντων τὸν ἥλιον τετάχθαι, μετ᾽ αὐτὸν δὲ τὴν σελήνην· ὑπὸ δὲ αὐτοὺς τὰ ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας.

1h <Ἀετίου> I.24.1h

Μητρόδωρος ὁμοίως περὶ σχήματος τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεφήνατο.

1i <Ἀετίου> I.24.1i

Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος πιλήματα πυρὸς τὰ ἄστρα.

Τρέφεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 202-203

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1f <Aëtius>: Archelaus I.24.1f

Archelaus said that the stars are masses of stone or metal, glowing hot.[714]

1g <Aëtius>: Anaximander's wheels I.24.1g

Anaximander held that the stars are wheel-shaped condensations of air, full of fire, breathing flames through openings at certain points.

The sun is placed highest of all, the moon after it; beneath them are the fixed stars and the planets.[715]

1h <Aëtius>: Metrodorus I.24.1h

Metrodorus too made a similar pronouncement about the shape of the stars.[716]

1i <Aëtius>: Condensed fire I.24.1i

Parmenides and Heraclitus held that the stars are condensations of fire.

The stars are nourished by the exhalation rising from earth.[717]

714. Mydros commonly denotes a lump of metal, but can also refer to stone. LSJ cites mydros diapyros for a red-hot mass of either material. The added diapyrous expressly emphasizes the heat.

715. Pilēmata suggests compressed or felted masses. The account connects the visible flames with openings in the enclosing wheels. Its order places sun and moon above both fixed stars and planets, unlike the arrangements in several neighboring reports.

716. "Shape" is what Stobaeus's text says. Wachsmuth's apparatus regards the phrase about shape as an inattentive addition by Stobaeus, since the parallel report concerns the stars' arrangement. The transmitted wording is retained rather than silently changed to "order."

717. Anathymiasis is an exhalation or vapor rising from below. The nourishment image makes the stars' continuing fire dependent on material supplied from earth. Aristotle's report in 1m explicitly denies the need for such nourishment.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 202-203

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1k <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.1k.1

Ἀναξιμένης πυρίνην μὲν τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἄστρων, περιέχειν δέ τινα καὶ γεώδη σώματα συμπεριφερόμενα τούτοις ἀόρατα.

Ἥλων δὲ δίκην καταπεπηγέναι τὰ ἄστρα τῷ κρυσταλλοειδεῖ.

1k <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.1k.2

Τὰς δὲ ἐπισημασίας γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὸν ἥλιον μόνον.

Οὐχ ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν δὲ ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτὴν στρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας.

1l <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.1l.1

Πλάτων ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείστου μέρους πυρίνους, μετέχοντας δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων.

Κοινῶς δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅλον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τρέφεσθαι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 203

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1k <Aëtius>: Anaximenes' starry heaven I.24.1k.1

Anaximenes held that the stars are fiery in nature, but that their region also contains certain earthy bodies, invisible and revolving together with them.[718]

The stars are fixed like nails into the ice-like vault.[719]

1k <Aëtius>: Weather and motion I.24.1k.2

The weather signs occur through the sun alone.

The stars turn around the earth, rather than beneath it.[720]

1l <Aëtius>: Plato on composition I.24.1l.1

Plato held that the stars consist chiefly of fire, but also partake of the other elements.

The whole world, together with the stars, is nourished from itself.[721]

718. "Their region" makes explicit the enclosure understood with periechein, "contain." The compressed construction does not name its subject. Compare Hippolytus, Refutation I.7, which places earthy bodies in the region of the stars, moving with them.

719. The Greek has only the substantivized adjective krystalloeidei, "the ice-like" or "crystalline"; "vault" identifies the heavenly support understood here. The nail image concerns attachment. The edition's lettering passes from 1i to 1k, without an omitted passage.

720. The distinction between going around earth and passing beneath it is explicit. Compare Hippolytus, Refutation I.7, where the motion is likened to turning a cap around the head and the sun's concealment is explained without its passing below earth.

721. The world is self-sustaining as a whole: the clause does not require an external store of nourishment. The reflexive "itself" follows the printed αὐτοῦ. Compare Timaeus 33c-d on the world providing its own nourishment. This remains the doxographer's summary.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1l <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.1l.2

Καὶ πρῶτον μετὰ γε τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν θέσιν φαίνωνα λεγόμενον τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου, δεύτερον φαέθοντα τὸν τοῦ Διός, τρίτον πυρόεντα τὸν τοῦ Ἄρεος, τέταρτον ἑωσφόρον τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδέτης, πέμπτον στίλβοντα τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, ἕκτον ἥλιον, ἕβδομον σελήνην.

Τὰς δὲ ἐπισημασίας τάς τε χειμερινὰς καὶ τὰς θερινὰς κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἄστρων ἐπιτολάς τε καὶ δυσμὰς γίνεσθαι.

1m <Ἀετίου καὶ Διδύμου> · 1 I.24.1m.1

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος γεγενῆσθαι τὰ ἄστρα.

Μὴ δεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ οὐράνια τροφῆς, οὐ γὰρ φθαρτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἀΐδια εἶναι.

1m <Ἀετίου καὶ Διδύμου> · 2 I.24.1m.2

Πάντα δὲ κινεῖσθαι, τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἡμῶν καλούμενα πλανήτας ὑπὸ τὸν ζῳδιακὸν κύκλον, λοξὸν ὄντα καὶ τῶν τροπικῶν ἐφαπτόμενον, τὰ δὲ ἀπλανῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ φανεροῦ παρήκοντα μέχρι τοῦ ἀφανοῦ· οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ αὐτῶν τῆς γῆς εἶναι μείζονα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1l <Aëtius>: Order and seasonal signs

I.24.1l.2

First, after the position of the fixed stars, comes the star of Cronus, called Phaenon; second, that of Zeus, Phaethon; third, that of Ares, Pyroeis; fourth, that of Aphrodite, Eosphorus; fifth, that of Hermes, Stilbon; sixth, the sun; and seventh, the moon.[722]

Weather signs, both wintry and summery, occur in accordance with the risings and settings of the stars.

1m <Aëtius and Didymus>: Aristotle

I.24.1m.1

Aristotle held that the stars are constituted from the fifth body.

The heavenly bodies need no nourishment, since they are eternal, not perishable.[723]

1m <Aëtius and Didymus>: Celestial motion

I.24.1m.2

All of them move: those we call planets beneath the zodiacal circle, which is oblique and touches the tropics; the fixed stars extend from the always visible region as far as the unseen. Not a few of them are larger than earth.[724]

722. The five divine names correspond to Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury. Their descriptive names mean approximately Shining, Radiant, Fiery, Dawn-bringer, and Gleaming. This is the order ascribed to Plato in this report; it should not be substituted for the distinct ordering in Timaeus 38d. Sun and moon complete the seven wandering bodies.

723. The fifth body is aether, as in chapters 22-23. “Are constituted” renders gegenēsthai in the context of the next statement’s eternal bodies. Wachsmuth combines Aëtius II.13.13 and II.17.5 with Arius Didymus’s epitome, physical fragment 8.

724. The extent from the always visible to the unseen describes the distribution of the fixed stars across the sky, not a claim that each circumpolar star becomes invisible. The zodiac’s obliquity and contact with the tropics were described in I.23.3. The opening “all” includes fixed stars in the common celestial motion.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 203-204

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1n <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.1n.1

Ξενοφάνης ἐκ νεφῶν μὲν πεπυρωμένων· σβεννυμένους δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναζωπυρεῖν νύκτωρ καθάπερ τοὺς ἄνθρακας. τὰς γὰρ ἀνατολὰς καὶ τὰς δύσεις ἐξάψεις εἶναι καὶ σβέσεις.

1n <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.1n.2

Τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων φαινομένους οἷον ἀστέρας, οὓς καὶ Διοσκούρους καλοῦσί τινες, νεφέλια εἶναι, κατὰ τὴν ποιὰν κίνησιν παραλάμποντα.

1o <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.1o.1

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν, γῆν περιέχοντα <καὶ> ἀέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰθέρι. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς φέρεσθαι, κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων.

1o <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.1o.2

Ἐπίκουρος οὐδὲν ἀπογινώσκει τούτων, ἐχόμενος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

1n <Aëtius>: Xenophanes' rekindled clouds I.24.1n.1

Xenophanes held that the stars are formed from clouds set on fire. Extinguished each day, they are rekindled at night like coals; for their risings and settings are kindlings and extinctions.[725]

1n <Aëtius>: Lights on ships I.24.1n.2

The starlike lights that appear on ships, which some also call the Dioscuri, are little clouds that flash according to the particular character of their motion.[726]

1o <Aëtius>: Each star a world I.24.1o.1

Heraclides and the Pythagoreans held that each star is a world, containing earth <and> air in the boundless aether. These doctrines are also reported in the Orphic writings, for they make each star into a world.[727]

1o <Aëtius>: Epicurus leaves possibilities open I.24.1o.2

Epicurus rules out none of these accounts, keeping to what is possible.[728]

725. This account explains disappearance and reappearance through the extinction and renewal of fire. The translation retains its contrast with accounts in which the same luminous bodies continue their journeys while hidden from view.

726. The Dioscuri are Castor and Polydeuces, or Pollux, divine twins associated with sailors. Compare Plutarch, Lysander 12.1, for twin lights over a ship. The phenomenon resembles what is now called St. Elmo's fire, an atmospheric electrical glow; the explanation by little clouds belongs to Xenophanes' report.

727. "The Orphic writings" is the report's collective attribution to works circulated under Orpheus's name. No particular Orphic poem is identified here. "World" renders kosmos, with earth and air specified as contents; it should not be equated without qualification with a modern solar system.

728. This sentence permits possible explanations rather than asserting all the preceding theories as a single doctrine. The scope of "these" is left as compressed in the source.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 204-205

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

2a <Ἀετίου> I.24.2a

Ξενοκράτης κατὰ μιᾶς ἐπιφανείας οἴεται κεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας.

Οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Στωικοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἑτέρων τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐν ὕψει καὶ βάθει.

2b <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.24.2b.1

Τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς μὲν ὡς Πλάτων φασίν εἶναι τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἀστέρων, τινὲς δὲ μέσον πάντων τὸν ἥλιον.

2b <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.24.2b.2

Ταὐτὸν δὲ πεπονθέναι τῷ ἑωσφόρῳ τὸν στίλβωνα, ἰσοδραμεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῷ ἡλίῳ καὶ συμπεριφέρεσθαι αὐτῷ· καὶ τότε μὲν προανατέλλοντα ἑωσφόρον φαίνεσθαι, τότε δὲ ἐπικαταδυόμενον ἕσπερον καλεῖσθαι.

2b <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.24.2b.3

Τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας τοῖς ἀπλανέσιν ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀνατολὰς ἀντιφέρεσθαι.

Τούτῳ δὲ συνομολογεῖ καὶ Ἀλκμαίων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

2a <Aëtius>: One surface or different depths I.24.2a

Xenocrates thinks that the stars lie on a single surface.

The other Stoics place some before others, at different heights and depths.[729]

2b <Aëtius>: Astronomers' arrangements I.24.2b.1

Some of the mathematical astronomers say that the stars are arranged as Plato describes; others put the sun in the middle of them all.[730]

2b <Aëtius>: Mercury, Venus, and the sun I.24.2b.2

Stilbon is in the same condition as Eosphorus: they keep pace with the sun and revolve along with it. At one time the planet rises before it and appears as a morning star; at another it sets after it and is called an evening star.[731]

2b <Aëtius>: The planets' contrary course I.24.2b.3

The planets travel from west to east, contrary to the fixed stars.

Alcmaeon agrees with this as well.[732]

729. "The other Stoics" is the transmitted wording, although Xenocrates was an Academic, not a Stoic. Wachsmuth suspects that words were lost before this clause. The translation preserves the awkward transition without supplying a missing philosopher or doctrine.

730. Mathematikoi here means those studying the mathematical arrangement and motions of the heavens. A middle position in the sequence of celestial bodies does not by itself establish a heliocentric system. The preceding Platonic arrangement is given in 1l.

731. Stilbon is Mercury and Eosphorus is Venus. The report compares their courses with the sun's, without specifying a modern orbital mechanism. After its plural "they," the Greek shifts to a singular participle; "the planet" preserves that general wording. Morning and evening appearances can describe either planet here.

732. The contrary course is the planets' movement relative to the stellar background, distinguished from the sky's common daily revolution. Alcmaeon's agreement attaches to this claim; it need not endorse every preceding arrangement or explanation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 24

2c <Ἀετίου> I.24.2c

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν σφαιρῶν, ἐφ᾽ ᾗν ἕκαστος ἐμβέβηκε.

Καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων καὶ τῶν σφαιρῶν, ἐφ᾽ ᾗν ἕκαστος βέβηκε, φέρεσθαι.

2d <Ἀετίου> I.24.2d

Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι <Στωικοὶ> σφαιρικοὺς αὐτούς, Κλεάνθης δὲ κωνοειδεῖς.

2e <Ἀετίου> I.24.2e

Παρμενίδης πρῶτον μὲν τάττει τὸν ἑῷον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ νομιζόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἕσπερον, ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι· μεθ᾽ ὃν τὸν ἥλιον, ὑφ᾽ ᾧ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πυρώδει ἀστέρας, ὅπερ οὐρανὸν καλεῖ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

2c <Aëtius>: What carries the stars? I.24.2c

Aristotle held that they are carried by the spheres on which each is mounted.

Anaximander likewise held that they are carried by the circles and spheres on which each is set.[733]

2d <Aëtius>: Spheres and cones I.24.2d

The other <Stoics> held that the stars are spherical, but Cleanthes that they are cone-shaped.[734]

2e <Aëtius>: Parmenides' ordering I.24.2e

Parmenides places first the morning star, which he considers to be the same as the evening star, in aether; after it the sun; and beneath the sun the stars in the fiery region, which he calls heaven.[735]

733. "They are carried" is understood in the first elliptical sentence from the surrounding discussion. The reading "on which each is mounted" follows Diels's repair of its damaged wording. Both circles and spheres remain in the Anaximander report, without an attempted reconstruction of his machinery.

734. "Stoics" is supplied by the editor from the parallel tradition. The comparison concerns the shapes of the stars themselves, not the shapes of their paths.

735. The morning and evening star are identified as one body, Venus. The different placements of aether and fiery heaven recall the report on Parmenides in I.22.1a. "First" gives the order of the listed regions, not a claim about which star formed first.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 24

3 <Ἀετίου> I.24.3

Μητρόδωρος ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμπεσθαι.

Στράτων καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ ἄστρα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεσθαι.

Διότιμος Τύριος, ὁ Δημοκρίτειος, τὴν αὐτὴν τούτοις εἰσηνέγκατο γνώμην.

4 <Ἀετίου> I.24.4

Εὔδοξος καὶ Ἄρατος τὰς ἐπισημασίας κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἄστρων ἐπιτολὰς γίνεσθαι. Λέγει γοῦν Ἄρατος ἐν τοῖς Φαινομένοις οὕτως·

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήματ᾽ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν
ἄστρα διακρίνας· ἐσκέψατο δ᾽ εἰς ἑνιαυτὸν
ἀστέρας, οἵ κε μάλιστα τετυγμένα σημαίνοιεν.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Ποσειδωνίου I.24.5.1

Ἄστρον δὲ εἶναί φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος σῶμα θεῖον ἐξ αἰθέρος συνεστηκός, λαμπρὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐδέποτε στάσιν ἔχον, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ φερόμενον ἐγκυκλίως· ἰδίως δὲ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἄστρα λέγεσθαι· διαφέρειν δὲ ἀστέρα ἄστρου· εἰ μὲν γάρ τίς ἐστιν ἀστήρ, καὶ ἄστρον ὀνομασθήσεται δεόντως, οὐ μὴν ἀνάπαλιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

3 <Aëtius>: Light received from the sun I.24.3

Metrodorus held that all the fixed stars receive their light from the sun.

Strato too held that the stars are illuminated by the sun.

Diotimus of Tyre, the follower of Democritus, put forward the same opinion as they did.[736]

4 <Aëtius>: Eudoxus and Aratus I.24.4

Eudoxus and Aratus held that weather signs occur in accordance with the risings of the stars. Thus Aratus says in the Phaenomena:[737]

For he himself established signs in heaven,
setting the stars apart; and for the year he devised
stars that would give the surest signs.

5 <Arius Didymus>: Posidonius I.24.5.1

Posidonius says that a celestial body is a divine body constituted from aether, bright and fiery, never at rest but always moving in a circle. In particular, the sun and moon are called celestial bodies. A star differs from a celestial body: if something is a star, it will also properly be called a celestial body, but not conversely.[738]

736. The description of Diotimus as a follower of Democritus follows Diels's correction, adopted in the printed text. The manuscripts have a corrupt designation for which the apparatus records other conjectures. The claims about stellar illumination are retained as the named authors' opinions.

737. Phaenomena 10-12. "He" is Zeus, named at the poem's beginning. The quotation stops here in Stobaeus; Aratus's next line specifies signs of the seasons for human beings. Tetugmena conveys the reliability of the indications. The poem's larger context concerns timely agricultural work.

738. The argument distinguishes astēr, rendered "star," from the broader astron, rendered "celestial body" in this passage. Elsewhere both Greek words can be translated "star," but that would conceal the distinction here. Posidonius's fiery aether should not be equated with Aristotle's fifth body merely because the same noun is used. Wachsmuth identifies excerpt 5 with Arius Didymus, physical fragment 32.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Χρυσίππου · 1 I.24.5.2

Ἀνατολὴν δ᾽ εἶναί φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Φυσικαῖς τέχναις ὑπεροχὴν ἄστρου ὑπὲρ γῆς, δύσιν δὲ κρύψιν ἄστρου ὑπὸ γῆν. Γίγνεσθαι δ᾽ ἅμα τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν πρὸς ἄλλους τε καὶ ἄλλους.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Χρυσίππου · 2 I.24.5.3

Ἐπιτολὴν δὲ <τὴν> ἄστρου ἅμα ἡλίῳ ἀνατολήν, δύσιν δὲ τὴν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύσιν. Διχῶς γὰρ λέγεσθαι δύσιν, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀνατολήν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτολήν.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Χρυσίππου · 3 I.24.5.4

Κυνὸς δ᾽ ἐπιτολὴν ἅμα ἡλίῳ κυνὸς ἀνατολήν, δύσιν δὲ κυνὸς ἅμα ἡλίῳ κυνὸς ἀπόκρυψιν ὑπὸ γῆν. Τὸν δ᾽ ὅμοιον λόγον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πλειάδος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 24

5 <Arius Didymus>: Rising and setting I.24.5.2

Chrysippus says in his Treatises on Natural Philosophy that rising is a celestial body's emergence above earth, and setting its concealment beneath earth. The same bodies rise and set simultaneously for different observers.[739]

5 <Arius Didymus>: Rising with the sun I.24.5.3

By epitolē he means <the> rising of a celestial body together with the sun, and by setting its setting together with the sun. For "setting" is used in two senses: one corresponding to ordinary rising, the other to rising with the sun.[740]

5 <Arius Didymus>: The Dog and the Pleiades I.24.5.4

The Dog's epitolē is its rising together with the sun, and the Dog's setting is its disappearance beneath earth together with the sun. The same account applies to the Pleiades.[741]

739. The title renders Physikai technai, literally systematic arts or manuals concerning nature. The simultaneous rising and setting are relative to observers in different places, not simultaneous events at a single observer's horizon.

740. Anatolē is ordinary rising, whereas epitolē is defined here by its relation to the sun. The same Greek word dysis serves as the counterpart of both. The translation keeps the definition "together with the sun"; it does not replace it with the different observational condition of first visibility in dawn twilight.

741. The Dog here is the Dog Star, Sirius. The singular pleias is a collective designation of the Pleiades. These familiar seasonal markers illustrate the preceding definitions; the passage gives no calendar dates.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 24

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · Ἀπολλοδώρου I.24.5.5

Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ θεῶν Πυθαγόρειαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ τοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι φωσφόρον τε καὶ ἕσπερον δόξαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 24

5 <Arius Didymus>: Apollodorus

I.24.5.5

Apollodorus, in the second book of On the Gods, says that the opinion identifying the Light-bringer and the Evening Star as the same body is Pythagorean.[742]

742. Phōsphoros, Light-bringer, is another name for the Morning Star. Compare the identification ascribed to Parmenides in 2e. Apollodorus assigns the opinion to the Pythagorean tradition here; the sentence does not settle who first made the discovery. This is the end of chapter 24.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

Κεφάλαιον ΚΕ′ I.25.heading

Περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου καὶ μεγέθους σχήματός τε καὶ τροπῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ σημείων καὶ κινήσεως.

1a <Ἀετίου> I.25.1a

Ξενοφάνης ἐκ νεφῶν πεπυρωμένων εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. Ἔκλειψιν δὲ γίνεσθαι κατὰ σβέσιν· ἕτερον δὲ πάλιν ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς γίνεσθαι. Παριστόρηκε δὲ καὶ ἔκλειψιν ἡλίου ἐφ᾽ ὅλον μῆνα καὶ πάλιν ἐντελῆ, ὥστε τὴν ἡμέραν νύκτα φανῆναι.

1b <Ἀετίου> I.25.1b

Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς γέγραφεν, ἐκ πυριδίων μὲν τῶν συναθροιζομένων <ἐκ> τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροιζόντων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

Chapter 25: The Sun

I.25.heading

On the sun's substance, size, shape, turnings, eclipse, signs, and motion.[743]

1a <Aëtius>: Xenophanes

I.25.1a

Xenophanes held that the sun consists of clouds set ablaze. An eclipse occurs when it is extinguished; another sun comes into being again at sunrise. He also recorded an eclipse of the sun lasting a whole month, and another that was complete, so that day appeared as night.[744]

1b <Aëtius>: Theophrastus' report

I.25.1b

Theophrastus wrote in his Physical Studies that the sun consists of small particles of fire which gather together <from> moist exhalation and, by their gathering, make up the sun.[745]

743. The sun's "turnings" (tropai) are its reversals of northward or southward progress at the solstices. The reports offer different physical causes for them. "Signs" includes the weather indications treated in the concluding Aratus passage.

744. The extraordinary month-long eclipse is retained as the report states it. It is not identified here with a particular historical event or silently reduced to a normal solar eclipse. Compare Xenophanes' extinguished and rekindled stars in I.24.1n.

745. Wachsmuth identifies this as Theophrastus' testimony about Xenophanes, presented by Stobaeus as a separate opinion. The supplied preposition follows the parallel Placita text. Wachsmuth cites Theophrastus, fragment 16 in Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 492.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

1c <Ἀετίου> I.25.1c

Ἀναξίμανδρος κύκλον εἶναι ὀκτωκαιεικοσαπλασίονα τῆς γῆς, ἁρματείῳ τροχῷ παραπλήσιον, ἔχοντα κοίλην περιφέρειαν, πλήρη πυρός, κατά μέρος ἐκφαίνουσαν διὰ στομίου τὸ πῦρ ὥσπερ διὰ πρηστῆρος. Καὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἴσον εἶναι τῇ γῇ· τὸν δὲ κύκλον ἀφ᾽ οὗ τὴν ἐκπνοὴν ἔχει καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ περιφέρεται εἶναι τοῦ προειρημένου μεγέθους. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ στομίου τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκπνοῆς ἀποκλειομένου.

1d <Ἀετίου> I.25.1d

Ἀναξιμένης πύρινον ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἥλιον ἀπεφήνατο. Ὑπὸ πεπυκνωμένου δὲ ἀέρος καὶ ἀντιτύπου ἐξωθούμενα τὰ ἄστρα τὰς τροπὰς ποιεῖσθαι. Πλατὺν δ᾽ εἶναι τῷ σχήματι.

1e <Ἀετίου> I.25.1e

Παρμενίδης καὶ Μητρόδωρος πύρινον ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἥλιον.

1f <Ἀετίου> I.25.1f

Ἀντιφῶν πῦρ ἐπινεμόμενον μὲν τὸν περὶ τὴν γῆν ὑγρὸν ἀέρα, ἀνατολὰς δὲ καὶ δύσεις ποιούμενον, τῷ τὸν μὲν ἐπικαιόμενον αἰεὶ προλείπειν, τοῦ δ᾽ ὑπονοτιζομένου πάλιν ἀντέχεσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

1c <Aëtius>: Anaximander's fiery wheel I.25.1c

Anaximander held that there is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the earth, resembling a chariot wheel. Its rim is hollow and full of fire, which it reveals at one point through an opening, as through a bellows nozzle.[746] The sun itself is equal in size to the earth; the circle from which its fiery breath comes, and by which it is carried around, has the size already stated. An eclipse occurs when the opening through which the fire breathes out is closed.

1d <Aëtius>: Anaximenes I.25.1d

Anaximenes declared that the sun is fiery. The heavenly bodies make their turnings when pushed away by air that has become dense and resistant. The sun is flat in shape.[747]

1e <Aëtius>: Parmenides and Metrodorus I.25.1e

Parmenides and Metrodorus held that the sun is fiery.

1f <Aëtius>: Antiphon I.25.1f

Antiphon held that the sun is fire feeding upon the moist air around the earth. It rises and sets as it continually leaves behind the air being burned and takes hold again of air becoming moist.[748]

746. The report distinguishes the visible sun from the much larger wheel carrying its fire. The bellows comparison renders prēstēr, an implement that blows or jets fire; the parallel cited in the apparatus expressly adds "tube." No modern distance or diameter is substituted for the ancient ratio.

747. The middle sentence has the plural "heavenly bodies"; the last returns to the singular sun. Platys here describes a broad, flat shape, in contrast with the spherical sun attributed to the Pythagoreans below.

748. The rising and setting are explained by a shifting supply of fuel. The verbs describe fire spreading through the moist air, abandoning one portion and attaching itself to another.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

1g <Ἀετίου> I.25.1g

Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἑκαταῖος ἄναμμα νοερὸν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. Σκαφοειδῆ δ᾽ εἶναι, ὑπόκυρτον. Γίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἔκλειψιν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σκαφοειδοῦς στροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἄνω γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ κυρτὸν κάτω πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν ὄψιν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἔχειν “εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου”.

1h <Ἀετίου> I.25.1h

Ἀλκμαίων πλατὺν εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον.

1i <Ἀετίου> I.25.1i

Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι σφαιροειδῆ τὸν ἥλιον. Ἔκλειψιν δὲ γίγνεσθαι σελήνης αὐτὸν ὑπερχομένης.

2 Πορφυρίου I.25.2

Πορφυρίου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων.

Καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος τὸν ἐναντίον τῷ πόλῳ ποιεῖται δρόμον [ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τἀναντία περιφέρειν] αὐτὸς ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς φερόμενος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

1g <Aëtius>: Heraclitus and Hecataeus I.25.1g

Heraclitus and Hecataeus held that the sun is an intelligent kindling of fire arising from the sea. Its shape is that of a bowl, slightly convex. An eclipse occurs when the bowl turns, bringing its hollow side upward and its convex side downward toward our sight. Its size is “the breadth of a human foot.”[749]

1h <Aëtius>: Alcmaeon I.25.1h

Alcmaeon held that the sun is flat.

1i <Aëtius>: The Pythagoreans I.25.1i

The Pythagoreans held that the sun is spherical. An eclipse occurs when the moon passes in front of it.[750]

2 Porphyry, from On Images I.25.2

From Porphyry’s On Images.

Just as the sun too follows a course contrary to the revolving heavens, itself moving from west to east.[751]

749. The bowl has a hollow inner surface and a convex outer surface. The turning hides the luminous hollow from the observer. The foot comparison is translated as printed, without adding a viewing distance. “Intelligent” renders noeron; the report’s attribution is retained.

750. Hyperchesthai describes the moon’s passage across the sun as seen by an observer. The English expresses the obscuration without implying that the moon lies farther away than the sun.

751. Polos here denotes the revolving sky. The sun’s contrary course is its movement against the stars. Wachsmuth brackets as an interpolation, following Usener, the words “as though the sun appears to carry heaven around in the opposite direction.” They remain on the Greek side but are not incorporated into the translated sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3a <Ἀετίου> I.25.3a

Ἀναξαγόρας μύδρον ἢ πέτρον διάπυρον εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. Τροπὴν δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἀνταπώσει τοῦ πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις ἀέρος, ὃν αὐτὸς συνωθῶν ἐκ τῆς πυκνώσεως ἰσχυροποιεῖ.

3b <Ἀετίου> I.25.3b

Θαλῆς γεώδη τὸν ἥλιον. Ἐκλείπειν δὲ αὐτὸν τῆς σελήνης ὑπερχομένης κατὰ κάθετον, οὔσης φύσεως γεώδους· βλέπεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο κατοπτρικῶς ὑποτιθέμενον τῷ δίσκῳ.

3c <Ἀετίου> I.25.3c

Διογένης κισηροειδῆ τὸν ἥλιον, εἰς ὃν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἀκτῖνες ἐναποστηρίζονται. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀντιπίπτοντος τῇ θερμότητι ψυχροῦ σβέννυσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3a <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras I.25.3a

Anaxagoras held that the sun is a glowing mass or a red-hot stone. Its turning occurs through the counterthrust of the air in the north, which the sun itself compresses and strengthens by making it dense.[752]

3b <Aëtius>: Thales I.25.3b

Thales held that the sun is earthy. It is eclipsed when the moon, which is earthy in nature, passes directly in front of it. This can be seen by means of a mirror placed beneath the disk.[753]

3c <Aëtius>: Diogenes I.25.3c

Diogenes held that the sun is like pumice, with rays from the aether becoming lodged in it. It is extinguished by the cold that confronts its heat.[754]

752. “In the north” is literally “toward the Bears,” the northern constellations. Mydros can denote a heated mass of metal or stone; compare I.24.1f. The report makes the sun itself create the resisting air that turns it back.

753. The final clause is grammatically compressed and has variant constructions in the apparatus. The English takes it to refer to observing the event by reflection, with a mirror understood after “placed beneath.” It does not add a claim that the eclipse itself is produced by a reflection.

754. The porous sun receives rays from outside itself. The second statement is printed under Diogenes without an explicit subject heading for turnings or eclipses; the translation preserves its claim of extinction.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3d <Ἀετίου> I.25.3d

Φιλόλαος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος ὑαλοειδῆ τὸν ἥλιον, δεχόμενον μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πυρὸς τὴν ἀνταύγειαν, διηθοῦντα δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τό τε φῶς καὶ τὴν ἀλέαν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ διττοὺς ἡλίους γίγνεσθαι, τό τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πυρῶδες καὶ τὸ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πυροειδὲς κατὰ τὸ ἐσοπτροειδές· εἰ μή τις καὶ τρίτον λέξει, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνόπτρου κατ᾽ ἀνάκλασιν διασπειρομένην πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐγήν.

3e <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.25.3e.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, πῦρ ὃν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τοῦ κόσμου, πεπληρωκὸς τὸ ἡμισφαίριον, αἰεὶ κατ᾽ ἀντίκρυ τῇ ἀνταυγείᾳ ἑαυτοῦ τεταγμένον· τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον, ἀνταύγειαν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ, τῷ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ θερμομιγοῦς πεπληρωμένῳ, ἀπὸ κυκλοτεροῦς τῆς γῆς κατ᾽ ἀνάκλασιν γιγνομένην εἰς τὸν ἥλιον κρυσταλλοειδῆ, συμπεριελκομένην τῇ κινήσει τοῦ πυρίνου. Ὡς δὲ βραχέως εἰρῆσθαι συντεμόντι ἀνταύγειαν εἶναι τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν πυρὸς τὸν ἥλιον.

3e <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.25.3e.2

Τροπὴν δὲ γίγνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς περιεχούσης αὐτὸν σφαίρας κωλυόμενον ἄχρι παντὸς εὐθυπορεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τροπικῶν κύκλων. Ἴσον δὲ τῇ γῇ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνταύγειαν. Ἔκλειψιν δὲ γίνεσθαι σελήνης αὐτὸν ὑπερχομένης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3d <Aëtius>: Philolaus' reflected sunlight I.25.3d

Philolaus the Pythagorean held that the sun is glass-like. It receives the radiance of the fire in the world and filters both light and warmth through to us. Thus there are, in a sense, two suns: the fiery substance in heaven, and the fire-like appearance derived from it through the mirror-like body. Unless one also counts a third: the radiance scattered toward us by reflection from the mirror.[755]

3e <Aëtius>: Empedocles' two suns I.25.3e.1

Empedocles held that there are two suns. The original is fire in one hemisphere of the world, filling that hemisphere and always stationed directly opposite its own reflection. The visible sun is a reflection in the other hemisphere, which is filled with air mixed with heat. This reflection is produced from the rounded earth onto the crystal-like sun, and is carried around with the movement of the fiery hemisphere. To put it briefly, the sun is a reflection of the fire surrounding the earth.[756]

3e <Aëtius>: Turnings, size, and eclipse I.25.3e.2

Its turning occurs because the sphere enclosing it and the tropic circles prevent it from continuing straight onward indefinitely. The sun formed by reflection is equal in size to the earth. An eclipse occurs when the moon passes in front of it.[757]

755. The report distinguishes the source of fire, its mirror-like recipient, and the light reaching us. Its imagery combines filtering through glass with reflection from a mirror. The translation retains both descriptions instead of turning them into one precise modern optical model.

756. "Crystal-like sun" follows Wachsmuth's printed hēlion krystalloeidē. The compressed account leaves the exact reflecting arrangement difficult to reconstruct. "Fiery hemisphere" makes explicit the referent of the final "fiery"; no replacement of "sun" with "heaven" has been made in the Greek or English.

757. The size statement expressly concerns the reflected, visible sun, not the original fire filling a hemisphere. The tropic circles mark the limits of the sun's northward and southward travel.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3f <Ἀετίου> I.25.3f

Ἐπίκουρος γήινον πύκνωμα τὸν ἥλιόν φησιν εἶναι κισηροειδῶς καὶ σπογγοειδῶς ταῖς κατατρήσεσιν ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἀνημμένον. Τηλικοῦτον δὲ ἡλίκος φαίνεται, ἢ μικρῷ τινι μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω.

3g <Ἀετίου> I.25.3g

Παρμενίδης τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοῦ γαλαξίου κύκλου ἀποκριθῆναι, τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀραιοτέρου μίγματος, ὃ δὴ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυκνοτέρου, ὅπερ ψυχρόν.

3h <Ἀετίου> I.25.3h

Δημόκριτος μύδρον ἢ πέτρον διάπυρον. Τροπὴν δὲ γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιφερούσης αὐτὸν δινήσεως.

3i <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.25.3i.1

Κλεάνθης ἄναμμα νοερὸν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης τὸν ἥλιον. Περὶ δὲ τῶν τροπῶν φασι κατὰ τὸ διάστημα τῆς ὑποκειμένης τροφῆς· ὠκεανὸς δ᾽ ἐστὶ * * ἧς τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3f <Aëtius>: Epicurus

I.25.3f

Epicurus says that the sun is a compact earthy mass, lit by fire through its pores as in pumice or a sponge. It is as large as it appears, or a little larger or smaller.[758]

3g <Aëtius>: Parmenides

I.25.3g

Parmenides held that the sun and moon separated out of the Milky Way: the sun from the thinner mixture, which is hot, and the moon from the denser mixture, which is cold.[759]

3h <Aëtius>: Democritus

I.25.3h

Democritus held that the sun is a glowing mass or a red-hot stone. Its turning results from the whirling motion that carries it around.

3i <Aëtius>: Cleanthes and nourishment

I.25.3i.1

Cleanthes held that the sun is an intelligent kindling of fire arising from the sea. As for its turnings, they say that these follow the extent of the nourishment beneath it. Ocean is ... whose exhalation it feeds upon.[760]

758. The final qualification offers a small range around the apparent size. The report does not supply a viewing distance or an angular measurement from which a modern diameter could be calculated.

759. The “milky circle” is the Milky Way. This account describes the origins of sun and moon by separating mixtures with opposed density and temperature.

760. The break after “Ocean is” marks missing wording, not an omission by the translator. The surviving feminine “whose” lacks a secure antecedent. The plural “they say” is also retained: the parallel Placita attributes these reports to the Stoics collectively. Wachsmuth prints “turnings” as a correction of “nourishments.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3i <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.25.3i.2

Συγκαταφέρεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἥλιον κινούμενον ἕλικα ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ ἐπί τε ἄρκτου καὶ νότου, ἅπερ ἐστὶ πέρατα τῆς ἕλικος· ἄλλοι δὲ ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας αὐτὸν κινεῖσθαι τὴν ἕλικα οὐ περὶ σφαῖραν ποιοῦντα, περὶ δὲ κύλινδρον.

3k <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.25.3k.1

Ἀρίσταρχος τὸν ἥλιον ἵστησι μετὰ τῶν ἀπλανῶν, τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον καὶ κατὰ τὰς ταύτης ἐγκλίσεις σκιάζεσθαι.

3k <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.25.3k.2

Ξενοφάνης πολλοὺς εἶναι ἡλίους καὶ σελήνας κατὰ τὰ κλίματα τῆς γῆς καὶ ἀποτομὰς καὶ ζώνας. Κατὰ δέ τινα καιρὸν ἐκπίπτειν τὸν δίσκον εἴς τινα ἀποτομὴν τῆς γῆς οὐκ οἰκουμένην ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ οὕτως ὡσπερεὶ κενεμβατοῦντα ἔκλειψιν ὑποφαίνειν· ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς τὸν ἥλιον εἰς ἄπειρον μὲν προϊέναι, δοκεῖν δὲ κυκλεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

3i <Aëtius>: A spiral course

I.25.3i.2

The sun is carried along while moving in a spiral within the sphere, from the equator toward both north and south, which are the limits of the spiral. Others say that it advances in a straight direction, tracing its spiral around a cylinder rather than a sphere.[761]

3k <Aëtius>: Aristarchus

I.25.3k.1

Aristarchus makes the sun stationary along with the fixed stars, while the earth moves around the solar circle and is put in shadow according to its inclinations.[762]

3k <Aëtius>: Xenophanes' many suns

I.25.3k.2

Xenophanes held that there are many suns and moons corresponding to the earth's regions, divisions, and zones. At a certain time the disk falls into some division of the earth uninhabited by us, and thus, as though stepping into emptiness, presents the appearance of an eclipse. He also held that the sun proceeds onward without limit, but appears to move in a circle because of its distance.[763]

761. The spiral combines revolution with a changing north-south position. In the second description, straight advance is understood along the cylinder while the revolving path winds around it. This makes the compressed contrast readable without identifying the unnamed "others."

762. The text names the earth as the moving body, and "its" refers to the earth. The shadow clause is obscure in this eclipse context; it is retained without replacing earth with moon or reconstructing a complete theory. "Along with" expresses shared immobility, not necessarily a shared distance. The lettering passes from 3i to 3k.

763. Klimata denotes geographical regions or belts, rather than climate in the modern sense of weather averages. The comparison "as though stepping into emptiness" preserves the image without making it an explicit assertion of an atomistic void.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 1 I.25.4.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκ πέμπτης οὐσίας τὸν ἥλιον. Πυροῦσθαι δὲ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ σφόδρα γίνεσθαι θερμὸν ἀνίσχοντός τε τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ πλησιάζοντος ἡμῖν, οὐ διὰ τὸ πύρινον εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα παράτριψιν ὑποβεβλημένου αὐτοῦ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ παρακειμένου·

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 2 I.25.4.2

οὔτε δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ὁτιοῦν πῦρ εἶναι· σφαιροειδῆ μὲν γὰρ τούτων τὰ σχήματα, πυρὸς δὲ ἐκτός· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὸ μέσον οἰκείαν εἶναι κίνησιν πυρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου· οὔτε τὴν τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς φθορᾶς· οὐδὲ τὴν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ διαμονήν, τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τῆς ὕλης. Ἐκ πέμπτης ἄρα τινὸς καὶ διαφερούσης τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίας τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 3 I.25.4.3

Καὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἡμέραν ἀπεργάζεσθαι ὑπὲρ γῆν ἰόντα, νύκτα δὲ χωρήσαντα ὑπὸ γῆν. Καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου τῶν τροπικῶν ἐφαψάμενον βραχυτάτην ποιεῖν τὴν ἡμέραν, μακροτάτην δὲ τὴν νύκτα· θατέρου δὲ ἀνάπαλιν· τοῦ δ᾽ ἰσημερινοῦ ἰόντα τε καὶ ἀπιόντα, διαθεῖν δὲ τὸν ἴδιον <ἐν> ἐνιαυτῷ κύκλον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

4 <Arius Didymus, Epitome>: Aristotle I.25.4.1

Aristotle's view. Aristotle held that the sun consists of a fifth substance. As the sun rises and approaches us, the air becomes fiery and intensely hot, because of the speed of the sun's movement and its friction against the air lying beneath and alongside its course, rather than because the sun's substance is fire.[764]

4 Aristotle: Why the stars are not fire I.25.4.2

Neither the sun nor any of the other stars is fire. Their shapes are spherical, and they have no share in fire. For fire's natural movement is away from the center, not around it; its power is to destroy animals and plants, not to make them grow. Nor can it persist by itself, since fire cannot be separated from its fuel. Heaven and everything within it therefore consist of a certain fifth substance, different from fire.[765]

4 Aristotle: Day and the year I.25.4.3

The sun produces day as it travels above the earth, and night when it passes beneath it. On reaching one of the tropics it makes the day shortest and the night longest; at the other, the reverse. It passes the equator on its outward and return journeys, and completes its own circuit <in> a year.[766]

764. Compare Aristotle, On the Heavens II.7, 289a, on heat produced in the underlying air by celestial motion. The fifth substance is distinguished from earth, water, air, and fire. The supplied source heading corresponds to Arius Didymus, physical fragment 10 in Diels, p. 450.

765. The argument contrasts celestial circular motion and life-sustaining effects with the upward motion and destructive power of ordinary fire. Hylē can mean material or fuel; "fuel" suits the claim that fire cannot persist by itself. The terse clause about spherical shapes is retained without supplying a missing theory of fire's shape.

766. The equator clause is compressed. Wachsmuth asks in the apparatus whether "equality of day and night" should be supplied, but does not insert it in the text; neither does this translation. The tropics are the celestial circles marking the sun's seasonal limits.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

4 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 4 I.25.4.4

Ἔκλειψιν δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου φαίνεσθαι σελήνης ὑποδραμούσης ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν κύκλον καὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ὄψεσιν ἀντιφραττούσης, προσγειοτάτην γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων· ὁπότ᾽ οὖν κατὰ διάμετρον ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν γένοιτο, ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἀκτῖσιν ἐπιπροσθεῖν, ὥστε τοσοῦτον τόπον ἀφώτιστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τῆς γῆς, ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἐπίσχῃ τὸ σκίασμα, παρ᾽ ὃ καὶ μήτε κατὰ πᾶν κλίμα τῆς γῆς μήτε κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὥραν μήτε ἐπὶ πολὺν ἄγαν τόπον διατείνειν τὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἐκλείψεως πάθος.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 1 I.25.5.1

Ζήνωνος. Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιόν φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ἕκαστον εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, πύρινον πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ. Δύο γὰρ γένη πυρός, τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον καὶ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικόν, αὐξητικόν τε καὶ τηρητικόν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστι καὶ ζῴοις, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχή· τοιούτου δὴ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄστρων οὐσίαν·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

4 Aristotle: The moon's shadow

I.25.4.4

An eclipse of the sun is seen when the moon runs beneath the same circle and blocks our view, for it is nearer the earth than the other stars. Whenever it comes directly beneath the sun, it intercepts the rays falling from the sun toward the earth, leaving unlit as much of the earth as its shadow covers. Consequently, a solar eclipse does not extend to every region of the earth, occur at the same hour everywhere, or cover an exceedingly large area.[767]

5 <Arius Didymus, Epitome>: Zeno

I.25.5.1

Zeno's view. Zeno says that the sun, the moon, and each of the other stars possess intelligence and understanding, and consist of a craftsmanlike fire. For there are two kinds of fire: one without craft, which converts its fuel into itself; the other craftsmanlike, promoting growth and preservation, such as exists in plants and animals and constitutes nature and soul. It is fire of this kind that makes up the substance of the stars.[768]

767. The report explains the limited geographical visibility of a solar eclipse through the moon's intervening shadow. "Directly beneath" renders the alignment expressed by kata diametron; it is a relation among sun, moon, and earth.

768. Technikon describes fire that acts methodically and constructively, like a craftsperson. This Stoic distinction answers the objection that ordinary fire consumes living things: the stellar fire is assigned a different character. The source heading corresponds to Arius Didymus, physical fragment 33 in Diels, p. 467.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 2 I.25.5.2

τὸν δὲ ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην δύο φοράς φέρεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἀπ᾽ ἀνατολῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀνατολήν, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν τῷ κόσμῳ ζῴδιον ἐκ ζῳδίου μεταβαίνοντας. Τὰς δ᾽ ἐκλείψεις τούτων γίγνεσθαι διαφόρως, ἡλίου μὲν περὶ τὰς συνόδους, σελήνης δὲ περὶ τὰς πανσελήνους. Γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τὰς ἐκλείψεις καὶ μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους.

5 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> · 3 I.25.5.3

Χρυσίππου. Χρύσιππος τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι τὸ ἀθροισθὲν ἔξαμμα νοερὸν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς θαλάσσης ἀναθυμιάματος, σφαιροειδῆ δὲ εἶναι τῷ σχήματι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

5 Zeno: Two motions and eclipses I.25.5.2

The sun and moon undergo two motions: one in which the world carries them from rising to rising, and another contrary to the world's motion, as they pass from one zodiacal sign into another.[769] Their eclipses occur differently: the sun's at conjunctions, the moon's at full moons. In both cases the eclipses may be greater or smaller.[770]

5 Chrysippus I.25.5.3

Chrysippus' view. Chrysippus held that the sun is an intelligent blaze gathered together from the sea's exhalation, and that it is spherical in shape.[771]

769. "From rising to rising" preserves the source's repeated anatolē: a complete daily circuit, not merely an eastward journey. The second motion is the separate progress of sun and moon through the zodiac.

770. Conjunction is the apparent meeting of sun and moon, at new moon. The report specifies the phase at which an eclipse can occur; it does not say that every conjunction or full moon produces one. Greater and smaller refer to differences in the extent of the eclipse.

771. The condensed vapor supplies the fiery substance. This report resembles the sea-fed kindling attributed to Cleanthes in 3i, while explicitly describing the sun as spherical.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

6 Εὐριπίδης I.25.6

Εὐριπίδης πῦρ εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. Λέγει γοῦν ἐν Φοινίσσαις

Ἥλιε θοαῖς ἵπποισιν εἰλίσσων φλόγα,
ἐν δὲ Φαέθοντι

Θερμὴ δ᾽ ἄνακτος φλὸξ ὑπερτέλλουσα γῆς.

7 <Πλουτάρχου> · 1 I.25.7.1

Ὅμηρος μὴ εἶναι πῦρ τὸν ἥλιον, ἀλλὰ φῶς καθαρώτατον. Δείκνυσι δὲ τοῦτο σαφῶς διὰ τῶν ἐπῶν· λέγει γὰρ οὕτως·

Σείων Πηλιάδα μελίην κατὰ δεξιὸν ὦμον
δεινήν, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαλκὸς ἐλάμπετο εἴκελος αὐγῇ
ἢ πυρὸς αἰθομένου ἢ ἠελίου ἀνιόντος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

6 Euripides: The sun's flame I.25.6

Euripides held that the sun is fire. At any rate, he says in The Phoenician Women:[772]

Sun, wheeling your flame with swift horses,
and in Phaethon:[773]

And the lord's hot flame rising above the earth.

7 <Plutarch>: Homer on light I.25.7.1

Homer held that the sun is the purest light, rather than fire. He makes this clear through his verses, for he says:[774]

Brandishing the fearsome Pelian ash by his right shoulder,
while the bronze gleamed all around, like the radiance
of either blazing fire or the rising sun.[775]

772. The Phoenician Women 3, from Jocasta's opening address to the Sun. The compiler treats a dramatic image as evidence about the sun's substance; it need not be a formal physical doctrine of Euripides.

773. Phaethon, fragment 776 in Nauck's numbering, as cited by Wachsmuth. The single quoted line is retained as a fragment, without supplying its lost dramatic setting.

774. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution by comparison with the work On the Life and Poetry of Homer, chapters 104 and following, transmitted under Plutarch's name. His apparatus expressly treats the author as Pseudo-Plutarch.

775. Iliad 22.133-135 describes Achilles approaching Hector. The "Pelian ash" is his ash-wood spear from Mount Pelion. The following argument turns on Homer's pairing of two alternatives, fire or sun.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

7 <Πλουτάρχου> · 2 I.25.7.2

Τί οὖν φαίνεται ποιῶν ἄλλο, ἢ τῇ διαζεύξει μαρτυράμενος, ὅτι πῦρ οὐ νομίζει τὸν ἥλιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον μὲν πυρός, φαινόμενον δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς πυρώδη διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα καὶ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ᾗ μιγνύμενον ἐρυθραίνεται πᾶν τὸ λαμπρόν;

8 (4) Φιλόλαος I.25.8

Φιλολάου ἐκ Βακχῶν.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 822-831 I.25.9.1

Μὴ οἱ ποικίλλοιτο νέον βάλλοντος ἀρούρας
κύκλος, ὅτ᾽ εὐδίου κεχρημένος ἤματος εἴης,
μηδέ τι σῆμα φέροι, φαίνοιτο δὲ λιτὸς ἁπάντῃ.
Εἰ δ᾽ αὔτως καθαρόν μιν ἔχοι βουλύσιος ὥρη,
δύνοι δ᾽ ἀνέφελος μαλακὴν ὑποδείελος αἴγλην,
καί κεν ἐπερχομένης ἠοῦς ἔθ᾽ ὑπεύδιος εἴη.
Ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁππότε κοῖλος ἐειδόμενος περιτέλλῃ,
οὐδ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἀκτίνων αἱ μὲν νότον, αἱ δὲ βορῆα
σχιζόμεναι βάλλωσι, τὰ δ᾽ αὖ περὶ μέσσα φαείνῃ·
ἀλλά που ἢ ὑετοῖο διέρχεται ἢ ἀνέμοιο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

7 The inference from Homer

I.25.7.2

What else, then, does he appear to be doing, except attesting by this disjunction that he considers the sun different from fire? It appears fiery at its risings because of moisture and exhalation, which redden everything bright that mingles with them.[776]

8 (4) Philolaus: A surviving heading

I.25.8

From Philolaus' Bacchae.[777]

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 822-831

I.25.9.1

When you have need of a day of fair weather,
may his disk show no varied colors as he first strikes the fields,
nor bear any mark, but appear clear all around.[778]
If the hour of unyoking finds him just as pure,
and at evening he sets cloudless, with a gentle glow,
he may still bring fair weather when dawn returns.[779]
But not when he rises with a hollow-seeming disk,
nor when his rays divide, some striking south, some north,
while the parts around the middle shine:
then he is passing through rain or wind.

776. This is the commentator's inference from the word "or," followed by a physical explanation of the red sunrise. Homer's simile itself does not explicitly formulate either claim. The English divides the long rhetorical question for readability.

777. Only the heading survives here, as Wachsmuth's apparatus states. No passage from the Bacchae follows it. The parenthetical 4, and 5 on the next entry, preserve the older excerpt numbering printed alongside Wachsmuth's.

778. Aratus, Phaenomena 822-891: seventy lines, printed here in ten consecutive blocks. The attribution is supplied by Wachsmuth. The sun is the unexpressed subject at the excerpt's opening; the first two English lines reverse their order to make the wish clear.

779. The "hour of unyoking" is evening, when working oxen are released. The poem reads the sun's appearance as a weather sign; it does not present a theory of its physical composition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 832-839

I.25.9.2

Σκέπτεο δ᾽ εἴ κέ τοι αὐγαὶ ὑπείκωσ᾽ ἠελίοιο
αὐτὸν ἐς ἠέλιον (τοῦ γὰρ σκοπιαὶ καὶ ἄρισται),
εἴ τί που <ἢ> καὶ ἔρευθος ἐπιτρέχει, οἷά τε πολλὰ
ἑλκομένων νεφέων ἐρυθαίνεται ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα,
ἢ εἴ που μελανεῖ· καί τοι τὰ μὲν ὕδατος ἔστω
σήματα μέλλοντος, τὰ δ᾽ ἐρευθέα πάντ᾽ ἀνέμοιο·
εἴ γε μὲν ἀμφοτέρων ἄμυδις κεχρωσμένος εἴη,
καί κεν ὕδωρ φορέοι καὶ ὑπηνέμιος τανύοιτο.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 840-846

I.25.9.3

Εἰ δέ τοι ἢ ἀνιόντος ἢ αὐτίκα δυομένοιο
ἀκτῖνες συνίωσι καὶ ἀμφ᾽ ἑνὶ πεπλήθωσιν,
ἦ ποτε καὶ νεφέων πεπιεσμένος ἦ ὅγ᾽ ἐς ἠῶ
ἔρχηται παρὰ νυκτὸς ἢ ἐξ ἠοῦς ἐπὶ νύκτα,
ὕδατί κεν κατιόντι παρατρέχοι ἤματα κεῖνα.
Μηδ᾽ ὅτε οἱ ὀλίγη νεφέλη πάρος ἀντέλλῃσι,
τὴν δὲ μετ᾽ ἀκτίνων κεχρημένος αὐτὸς ἀερθῇ,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 832-839

I.25.9.2

Look toward the sun himself, if his rays allow you
(for he offers the best observations),
to see whether <either> a blush runs across him, as often
he reddens here and there when clouds trail past,
or whether he darkens somewhere. Let those dark patches
be signs of coming rain, and all the red ones signs of wind.
If he is colored with both at once,
he may bring rain and stretch out beneath the wind.[780]

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 840-846

I.25.9.3

If, as he rises or just as he sets,
his rays meet and cluster around a single spot,
or if, hemmed in by clouds, he comes to dawn
from night, or passes from dawn into night,
those days may run beside descending rain.
And when a small cloud rises before him,
and after it he lifts himself, with few rays,[781]

780. The supplied ē, rendered “either,” is restored from the independent Aratus tradition and anticipates the following “or.” The poem distinguishes darkening, redness, and their combination. The conditional wording about the sun’s rays belongs to the ancient verse.

781. This block ends within a sentence completed by the next block’s first line. Wachsmuth prints kechrēmenos, “lacking” or “in need of,” in line 846; his apparatus records kechrōsmenos, “colored,” in other Aratus witnesses. The English follows the printed reading.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 847-853 I.25.9.4

ἀμνηστεῖν ὑετοῖο. Πολὺς δ᾽ ὅτε οἱ περὶ κύκλος
οἷον τηκομένῳ ἐναλίγκιος εὐρύνηται,
πρῶτον ἀνερχομένοιο καὶ ἂψ ἐπὶ μεῖον ἴῃσιν,
εὔδιός κε φέροιτο· καὶ εἴ ποτε χείματος ὥρῃ
ὠχρήσαι κατιών· ἀτὰρ ὕδατος ἡμερινοῖο
γινομένου, κατόπισθε περὶ νέφεα σκοπέεσθαι
κὰδ δὴ δυομένου τετραμμένος ἠελίοιο.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 854-861 I.25.9.5

Ἦν μὲν ὑποσκιάῃσι μελαινομένῃ εἰκυῖα
ἠέλιον νεφέλη, ταὶ δ᾽ ἀμφί μιν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
ἀκτῖνες μεσσηγὺς ἑλισσόμεναι διχόωνται,
ἦ τ᾽ ἂν ἔτ᾽ εἰς ἠῶ σκέπαος κεχρημένος εἴης.
Εἰ δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀνέφελος βάπτοι ῥόον ἑσπερίοιο,
ταὶ δὲ κατερχομένου νεφέλαι καὶ ἀποιχομένοιο
πλησίαι ἑστήκωσιν ἐρευθέες, οὔ σε μάλα χρὴ
αὔριον οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ νυκτὶ περιτρομέειν ὑετοῖο·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 847-853

I.25.9.4

do not forget the rain. But when a great circle about him
spreads wider, as though melting,
at his first rising, and then shrinks again,
he may bring fair weather; so too if, in winter,
he pales as he descends. But when rain has fallen by day,
look afterward at the surrounding clouds,
turning toward the sun as he goes down.[782]

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 854-861

I.25.9.5

If a cloud, seeming to darken, shades the sun,
and the rays between them bend and divide
to either side around it,
you may still need shelter when dawn comes.
But if he dips cloudless into the western stream,
and as he sinks, or after he is gone,
nearby clouds stand red, you need not greatly fear
rain tomorrow or during the night.[783]

782. The last three lines follow the supplied text, hydatos hēmerinoio ginomenou, “when daytime rain has occurred.” This is not silently changed into a prediction of rain on the following day. The intervening observation concerns the appearance of a widening and shrinking circle around the rising sun.

783. The “western stream” evokes Ocean at the sun’s setting. The contrast is between a dark cloud obstructing the sun and red clouds nearby while the sun itself sets clear. The poem assigns different weather signs to these arrangements.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 862-868 I.25.9.6

ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότ᾽ ἠελίοιο μαραινομένῃσιν ὁμοῖαι
ἐξαπίνης ἀκτῖνες ἀπ᾽ οὐρανόθεν τανύωνται,
οἷον ἀμαλδύνονται, ὅτε σκιάῃσι κατ᾽ ἰθὺ
ἱσταμένη γαίης τε καὶ ἠελίοιο σελήνη.
οὐδ᾽ ὅτε οἱ ἐπέχοντι φανήμεναι ἠῶθι πρὸ
φαίνονται νεφέλαι ὑπερευθέες ἄλλοθεν ἄλλαι,
ἄρραντοι γίγνονται ἐπ᾽ ἤματι κείνῳ ἄρουραι.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 869-876 I.25.9.7

Μηδ᾽ αὖτως, ἔτ᾽ ἐόντι πέρην ὁπότε προταθεῖσαι
ἀκτῖνες φαίνονται ἐπίσκιοι ἠῶθι πρό,
ὕδατος ἢ ἀνέμοιο κατοισομένου λελαθέσθαι.
Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν κεῖναι μᾶλλον κνέφαος φορέοιντο
ἀκτῖνες, μᾶλλόν κεν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατι σημαίνοιεν·
εἰ δ᾽ ὀλίγος τανύοιτο περὶ δνόφος ἀκτίνεσσιν,
οἷόν που μαλακαὶ νεφέλαι φορέουσι μάλιστα,
ἦ τ᾽ ἂν ἐπερχομένοιο περιδνοφέοιντ᾽ ἀνέμοιο.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 877-879 I.25.9.8

Οὐδὲ μὲν ἠελίου σχεδόθεν μελανεῦσαι ἅλωαι
εὔδιοι· ἀσσότεραι δὲ καὶ ἀστεμφὲς μελανεῦσαι
μᾶλλον χειμέριαι· δύο δ᾽ ἂν χαλεπώτεραι εἶεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 862-868 I.25.9.6

But fear it when the sun's rays suddenly stretch from heaven
as though their light were fading,
just as they weaken when the moon casts shade,
standing in line between the earth and sun.[784]
Nor, when he delays appearing before dawn
and deeply reddened clouds show here and there,
do the fields remain unwetted on that day.

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 869-876 I.25.9.7

Likewise, when he is still beyond the horizon,
and rays stretching ahead look shadowed before dawn,
do not forget the rain or wind that may come down.
If those rays carry deeper darkness,
they give a stronger sign of rain;
but if only a little gloom spreads around the rays,
such as soft clouds especially carry,
they may be shrouded in the gloom of approaching wind.[785]

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 877-879 I.25.9.8

Dark halos close to the sun promise no fair weather;
closer ones, dark without a break, foretell a greater storm;
and two may mean harsher weather still.[786]

784. "Fear it" carries forward the verb and rain from the preceding lines. The eclipse is a comparison for the dimming of sunlight; these verses do not themselves predict an eclipse from the clouds.

785. "Beyond the horizon" makes explicit the perspective of perēn, "beyond," while the sun has not yet appeared. The degrees of darkness differentiate the poem's signs for rain and wind.

786. Halōai are rings or halos. "Dark without a break" renders the persistent, unrelieved darkness suggested by astemphes. These are the poem's prognostics, presented as ancient observational lore.

BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 880-886 I.25.9.9

Σκέπτεο δ᾽ ἢ ἀνιόντος ἢ αὐτίκα δυομένοιο
εἴ πού <οἱ> νεφέων, τὰ παρήλια κικλήσκονται,
ἢ νότου ἠὲ βορῆος ἐρεύθεται ἢ ἑκάτερθεν.
μηδ᾽ οὕτω σκοπιὴν ταύτην ἀμενηνὰ φυλάσσειν·
οὐ γάρ, ὅτ᾽ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ὁμοῦ περὶ μέσσον ἔχωσιν
ἠέλιον κεῖναι νεφέλαι σχεδὸν ὠκεανοῖο,
γίγνεται ἀμβολίη Διόθεν χειμῶνος ἰόντος.

9 (5) <Ἀράτου Φαινομένων> · 887-891 I.25.9.10

Εἴ γε μὲν ἐκ βορέαο μί᾽ οἴη φοινίσσοιτο,
ἐκ βορέω πνοιάς κε φέροι, νοτίη δὲ νότοιο,
ἢ καί που ῥαθάμιγγες ἐπιτροχόωσ᾽ ὑετοῖο.
Ἑσπερίοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπίτρεπε σήμασι τούτοις·
ἑσπερόθεν γὰρ ὁμῶς σημαίνεται ἐμμενὲς αἰεί.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 25

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 880-886 I.25.9.9

Watch as he rises or just as he sets,
whether any of the clouds called parhelia <beside him>
redden to the south or north, or on both sides.
Do not keep a careless watch on this sign:
for when those clouds on either side together
hold the sun between them, close to Ocean,
the storm coming from Zeus does not delay.[787]

9 <Aratus, Phaenomena>: 887-891 I.25.9.10

If just one to the north turns crimson,
it may bring northern gusts; a southern one, winds from the south,
or perhaps the drops of rain come hurrying on.
Put still greater trust in these signs at evening:
from the west their message is always steady and consistent.[788]

787. Parhelia means appearances beside the sun, commonly called mock suns or sundogs. Aratus describes them here as clouds and retains Zeus in the weather language. The supplied oi, “for him” or “beside him,” follows the independent Aratus text cited in the apparatus.

788. The final two lines give special weight to signs at sunset, in the west. The excerpt ends at Phaenomena 891; Stobaeus’s next chapter concerns the moon.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

Κεφάλαιον ΚϚ′ I.26.heading

Περὶ σελήνης οὐσίας καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος <φωτισμῶν τε καὶ περὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ἐμφάσεως καὶ περὶ ἀποστημάτων καὶ σημείων>.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.1a.1

Ἀναξίμανδρος κύκλον εἶναι ἐννεακαιδεκαπλάσιον τῆς γῆς, ὅμοιον ἁρματείῳ <τροχῷ>, κοίλην ἔχοντα τὴν ἀψῖδα καὶ πυρὸς πλήρη, καθάπερ τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου, κείμενον λοξόν, ὡς κἀκεῖνον, ἔχοντα μίαν ἐκπνοήν, οἷον πρηστῆρος αὐλόν· ἐκλείπειν δὲ κατὰ τὰς τροπὰς τοῦ τροχοῦ.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.1a.2

Ἀναξιμένης πυρίνην τὴν σελήνην.

1b <Ἀετίου> I.26.1b

Παρμενίδης πυρίνην. Ἴσην δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ, καὶ γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ φωτίζεται.

1c <Ἀετίου> I.26.1c

Ἡράκλειτος σκαφοειδῆ τῷ σχήματι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

Chapter 26: The Moon

I.26.heading

On the moon's substance, size, and shape, <its illumination, eclipse, appearance, distances, and signs>.[789]

1a <Aëtius>: Anaximander

I.26.1a.1

Anaximander held that there is a circle nineteen times the size of the earth, resembling a chariot <wheel>, with a hollow rim full of fire, like the sun's circle. Like that circle, it lies obliquely, with a single outlet, like the tube of a bellows. An eclipse occurs through the wheel's turnings.[790]

1a <Aëtius>: Anaximenes

I.26.1a.2

Anaximenes held that the moon is fiery.

1b <Aëtius>: Parmenides

I.26.1b

Parmenides held that it is fiery, and equal in size to the sun, for it is illuminated by the sun.[791]

1c <Aëtius>: Heraclitus

I.26.1c

Heraclitus held that its shape is that of a bowl.

789. Wachsmuth supplies the latter part of the heading from Photius, Bibliotheca 167, 112b12 and following. "Appearance" concerns the markings visible on the moon; "signs" concerns indications of weather. The supplied wording remains marked on both sides.

790. Compare the sun's twenty-eightfold circle in I.25.1c. The present passage gives nineteen, retains the distinction between the wheel and its outlet, and attributes eclipse to its turnings. In I.26.3 Anaximander's eclipse is described as closure of the outlet. The supplied "wheel" comes from the parallel Placita.

791. The causal "for" is in the printed Greek, although illumination does not establish equal size. Wachsmuth flags the connection as problematic. The translation preserves it instead of supplying an unstated argument.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1d <Ἀετίου> I.26.1d

Ξενοφάνης νέφος εἶναι πεπιλημένον.

1e <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.1e.1

Θαλῆς γεώδη τὴν σελήνην ἀπεφήνατο.

Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος στερέωμα διάπυρον, ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ πεδία καὶ ὄρη καὶ φάραγγας.

Διογένης κισηροειδὲς ἄναμμα τὴν σελήνην.

1e <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.1e.2

Ἴων σῶμα τῇ μὲν ὑελοειδές, διαυγές, τῇ δὲ ἀφεγγές.

Βήρωσος ἡμιπύρωτον σφαῖραν τὴν σελήνην.

1e <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.26.1e.3

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ὄκελλος γῆν ὁμίχλῃ περιεχομένην.

Πυθαγόρας κατοπτροειδὲς σῶμα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1d <Aëtius>: Xenophanes I.26.1d

Xenophanes held that it is a compacted cloud.

1e <Aëtius>: Earthy and fiery bodies I.26.1e.1

Thales declared that the moon is earthy.

Anaxagoras and Democritus held that it is an incandescent solid body, containing plains, mountains, and ravines.

Diogenes held that the moon is a kindled mass resembling pumice.[792]

1e <Aëtius>: Ion and Berossus I.26.1e.2

Ion held that it is a body partly glass-like and transparent, partly without light.[793]

Berossus held that the moon is a sphere with half of it on fire.[794]

1e <Aëtius>: Mist and reflection I.26.1e.3

Heraclides and Ocellus held that it is earth surrounded by mist.

Pythagoras held that it is a mirror-like body.

792. The account combines a solid lunar surface with incandescence. Diogenes' pumice comparison likewise concerns a porous physical body; compare his account of the sun in I.25.3c.

793. The name Ion follows Wachsmuth's text. His apparatus records proposed replacements, Alcmaeon and Antiphon, but also notes that Photius's list of authors names Ion here.

794. The half-burning sphere supplies the physical background to Berossus' explanation below: the moon darkens when its unburned portion turns toward us.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1f <Ἀετίου> I.26.1f

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἀέρα συνεστραμμένον νεφοειδῆ, πεπηγότα ὑπὸ πυρός, ὥστε σύμμικτον. Δισκοειδῆ δὲ τῷ σχήματι.

Τινὲς δὲ κυλινδροειδῆ.

1g <Ἀετίου> I.26.1g

Πλάτων ἐκ πλείονος τοῦ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν σελήνην.

1h <Ἀετίου> I.26.1h

Ἀριστοτέλης σελήνην ἐν μεθορίοις ἀέρος τεταγμένην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης οὐσίας μετέχουσαν ἐν μηνὶ περιέρχεσθαι τὸν ἴδιον κύκλον. Ἐλάττονα δὲ τῆς γῆς εἶναι τῷ μεγέθει.

1i <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.26.1i.1

Ζήνων τὴν σελήνην ἔφησεν ἄστρον νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, πύρινον δὲ πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1f <Aëtius>: Empedocles and other shapes I.26.1f

Empedocles held that it is air compressed into a cloud-like mass and solidified by fire, so that it is a mixture. Its shape is disk-like.

Others held that it is cylindrical.[795]

1g <Aëtius>: Plato I.26.1g

Plato held that the moon consists predominantly of fire.

1h <Aëtius>: Aristotle I.26.1h

Aristotle held that the moon, stationed at the boundaries of the air and sharing in the fifth substance, completes its own circuit in a month. It is smaller in size than the earth.[796]

1i <Arius Didymus>: Zeno I.26.1i.1

Zeno said that the moon is an intelligent and wise heavenly body, fiery with a craftsmanlike fire.[797]

795. The unnamed advocates of a cylindrical moon are distinct from Empedocles' disk-shaped moon. The compressed account makes fire responsible for the air's solidification.

796. The fifth substance is the celestial aether, distinguished from earth, water, air, and fire. The Greek says "boundaries of the air"; the additional words "and of the aether," proposed in the apparatus, are not printed or inserted here.

797. "Craftsmanlike" renders technikon, the Stoic description of fire that acts methodically to form and sustain things. Compare the fuller distinction between kinds of fire in I.25.5. Wachsmuth assigns this and the following report to Arius Didymus, physical fragment 34.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1i <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.26.1i.2

Κλεάνθης πυροειδῆ τὴν σελήνην, πιλοειδῆ δὲ τῷ σχήματι.

1k <Ἀετίου> I.26.1k

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Στωικῶν μικτὴν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Μείζονα δὲ τῆς γῆς, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἥλιον. Σφαιροειδῆ δὲ τῷ σχήματι· σχηματίζεσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν πολλαχῶς, καὶ γὰρ πανσέληνον γινομένην καὶ διχότομον καὶ ἀμφίκυρτον καὶ μηνοειδῆ.

1l <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.26.1l.1

Χρύσιππος τὸ ἀθροισθὲν ἔξαμμα μετὰ τὸν ἥλιον νοερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ποτίμων ὑδάτων ἀναθυμιάματος· διὸ καὶ τούτοις τρέφεσθαι. Σφαιροειδῆ δὲ εἶναι.

1l <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.26.1l.2

Μῆνα δὲ καλεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ δρόμου αὐτῆς περίοδον. Μείς δ᾽ ἐστί, φησί, τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

1i <Arius Didymus>: Cleanthes

I.26.1i.2

Cleanthes held that the moon is fire-like, but shaped like a felt cap.[798]

1k <Aëtius>: Posidonius and the Stoics

I.26.1k

Posidonius and most of the Stoics held that the moon is a mixture of fire and air. It is larger than the earth, as is the sun. Its shape is spherical, but it takes on many appearances: full, half, gibbous, and crescent.[799]

1l <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus

I.26.1l.1

Chrysippus held that the moon is an intelligent fiery mass gathered, next after the sun, from the exhalation arising from fresh waters; hence it is also nourished by them. It is spherical.[800]

1l <Arius Didymus>: Month and visible moon

I.26.1l.2

A month is the name given to the completion of its course. A "visible moon," he says, is the part of the moon appearing to us, or the moon with a part of it appearing to us.[801]

798. Wachsmuth prints piloeidē, "felt-cap-shaped," following Lipsius' correction of pēloeidē, "clay-like." The unusual shape belongs to the adopted Greek reading.

799. The report distinguishes the moon's spherical body from its changing visible phases. "Gibbous" renders amphikyrton, convex on both sides, for a phase between half and full. The lettering follows the source, which passes from i to k.

800. Potima means waters fit to drink, in contrast with the sea that nourishes the sun in I.25.5. "Next after the sun" preserves the report's compressed ordering without assigning a precise interval or distance.

801. The text moves from mēn, "month," to meis, here the visible moon or its visible portion. The related words can overlap in other contexts. Keeping the distinction makes sense of the two definitions; compare LSJ, s.v. meis, sense II.2, which cites Chrysippus for the visible part of the moon.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

2 Περὶ φωτισμῶν I.26.2.heading

Περὶ δὲ φωτισμῶν αὐτῆς.

2 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.2.1

Ἀναξίμανδρος, Ξενοφάνης, Βήρωσος ἴδιον αὐτὴν ἔχειν φῶς.

Ἀριστοτέλης ἴδιον μέν, ἀραιότερον δέ πως.

Οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀμαυροφανές, ἀεροειδὲς γάρ.

2 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.2.2

Ἀντιφῶν ἰδιοφεγγῆ μὲν τὴν σελήνην, τὸ δ᾽ ἀποκρυπτόμενον περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῆς προσβολῆς τοῦ ἡλίου ἀμαυροῦσθαι, πεφυκότος τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον ἀμαυροῦν· ὃ δὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα.

2 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.26.2.3

Θαλῆς πρῶτος ἔφη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεσθαι. Πυθαγόρας, Παρμενίδης, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ἀναξαγόρας, Μητρόδωρος ὁμοίως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

2 On its illumination

I.26.2.heading

On its illumination.

2 <Aëtius>: The moon's own light

I.26.2.1

Anaximander, Xenophanes, and Berossus held that the moon has light of its own.

Aristotle held that it has its own light, but somehow more rarefied.

The Stoics held that its light appears dim, since it is air-like.[802]

2 <Aëtius>: Antiphon

I.26.2.2

Antiphon held that the moon shines with its own light, but that its hidden portion is dimmed by the impact of the sun's rays: the stronger naturally obscures the weaker. The same thing happens with the other heavenly bodies.[803]

2 <Aëtius>: Illumination by the sun

I.26.2.3

Thales was the first to say that the moon is illuminated by the sun. Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Metrodorus held the same view.[804]

802. The last two reports are elliptical, with "light" understood from the first. The translation retains "more rarefied" without supplying an explicit comparison absent from the Greek.

803. This account explains invisibility by the overpowering effect of brighter light. Its own-light theory differs from the borrowed-light explanation that follows.

804. The claim of priority for Thales is the claim made by the transmitted report. It is retained as part of that report, rather than independently established here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

2 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.26.2.4

Ἡράκλειτος ταὐτὸν πεπονθέναι τήν τε σελήνην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον. Σκαφοειδεῖς δὲ ὄντας τοῖς σχήμασι τοὺς ἀστέρας, δεχομένους τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐγάς, φωτίζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν, λαμπροτέρως μὲν τὸν ἥλιον, ἐν καθαρωτέρῳ γὰρ ἀέρι φέρεσθαι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐν θολωτέρῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀμαυροτέραν φαίνεσθαι.

3 Περὶ ἐκλείψεως I.26.3.heading

Περὶ δὲ ἐκλείψεως σελήνης.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.3.1

Ἀναξίμανδρος τοῦ στομίου τοῦ περὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἐπιφραττομένου.

Βήρωσος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ ἀπυρώτου μέρους.

Ἀλκμαίων, Ἡράκλειτος, Ἀντιφῶν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σκαφοειδοῦς στροφὴν καὶ τὰς περικλίσεις.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.3.2

Τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινὲς κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλειον ἱστορίαν καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ὀπουντίου ἀπόφασιν ἀντιφράξει τότε μὲν τῆς γῆς, τότε δὲ τῆς ἀντίχθονος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

2 <Aëtius>: Heraclitus I.26.2.4

Heraclitus held that the same thing happens to both moon and sun. The heavenly bodies are shaped like bowls: receiving the radiance from moist exhalation, they become luminous to our sight. The sun shines more brightly because it moves through purer air; the moon moves through murkier air and therefore appears dimmer.[805]

3 On lunar eclipse I.26.3.heading

On eclipse of the moon.[806]

3 <Aëtius>: Closures and turnings I.26.3.1

Anaximander held that eclipse occurs when the opening on the wheel is blocked.

Berossus held that it occurs when the unburned portion turns toward us.

Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, and Antiphon held that it occurs through the turning and tilting of the bowl-shaped body.

3 <Aëtius>: Earth and counter-earth I.26.3.2

Some Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle's account and Philip of Opus' statement, held that eclipse occurs through the interposition sometimes of the earth, sometimes of the counter-earth.[807]

805. The difference in brightness is attributed to the surrounding air. Compare the bowl-shaped sun and moon in I.25.1g and I.26.1c.

806. This section includes both eclipses and the moon's regular monthly disappearance. Some reports distinguish the two; others explain them through the same physical process. "Conjunction" below is the moon's coming together with the sun in the sky.

807. The counter-earth is another body in the Pythagorean cosmic scheme. Aristotle, On the Heavens II.13, reports theories in which the earth and other unseen bodies circle the center, and these bodies can obstruct the moon. The report here also names Philip of Opus as a source.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 220-221

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

3 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.26.3.3

Τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων εἰσί τινες οἷς ἔδοξε κατ᾽ ἐπινέμησιν φλογὸς κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαπτομένης τεταγμένως, ἕως <ἂν> τὴν τελείαν πανσέληνον ἀποδῷ, καὶ πάλιν ἀναλόγως μειουμένης μέχρι τῆς συνόδου καθ᾽ ἣν τελείως σβέννυται.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.26.3.4

Ξενοφάνης καὶ τὴν μηνιαίαν ἀπόκρυψιν κατὰ σβέσιν.

3 <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.26.3.5

Θαλῆς, Ἀναξαγόρας, Πλάτων, οἱ Στωικοὶ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς συμφώνως τὰς μὲν μηνιαίους ἀποκρύψεις συνοδεύουσαν αὐτὴν ἡλίῳ καὶ περιλαμπομένην ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δ᾽ ἐκλείψεις εἰς τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς ἐμπίπτουσαν, μεταξὺ [μὲν] ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀστέρων γενομένης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἀντιφραττομένης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

3 <Aëtius>: Fire spreading and dying out I.26.3.3

Some of the more recent thinkers held that it happens through the spreading of a flame, kindled little by little in an orderly way until it produces the completely full moon, then correspondingly diminishing until conjunction, when it is entirely extinguished.[808]

3 <Aëtius>: Xenophanes I.26.3.4

Xenophanes held that the monthly disappearance too occurs through extinction.

3 <Aëtius>: Conjunction and the earth's shadow I.26.3.5

Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics, in agreement with the mathematical astronomers, held that the moon undergoes its monthly disappearances when it is in conjunction with the sun and bathed in its light. Eclipses occur when it falls into the earth's shadow, the earth having come between the two heavenly bodies; or rather, when the moon is blocked off.[809]

808. Although placed under eclipse, this report describes the entire waxing and waning cycle. Wachsmuth supplies the modal particle an from the parallel Placita; it has no separate natural English equivalent.

809. The final clause, "or rather, when the moon is blocked off," is textually corrupt according to Wachsmuth's apparatus. A proposed reconstruction makes it refer instead to a solar eclipse caused by the moon. That conjecture has not replaced the printed text here. The bracketed men, rejected by Diels, remains visible on the Greek side and is not incorporated into the English.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

3 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.26.3.6

Ἀναξαγόρας, ὡς φησι Θεόφραστος, καὶ τῶν ὑποκάτω τῆς σελήνης ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε σωμάτων ἐπιπροσθούντων.

Χρύσιππος ἐκλείπειν τὴν σελήνην τῆς γῆς αὐτῇ ἐπιπροσθούσης καὶ εἰς σκιὰν αὐτῆς ἐμπίπτουσαν.

4 Περὶ ἐμφάσεως I.26.4.heading

Περὶ δὲ ἐμφάσεως αὐτῆς.

4 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.4.1

Τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινὲς μέν, ὧν ἐστι Φιλόλαος, τὸ γεωφανὲς αὐτῆς εἶναι διὰ τὸ περιοικεῖσθαι τὴν σελήνην, καθάπερ τὴν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν γῆν, ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς μείζοσι καὶ καλλίοσιν. Εἶναι γὰρ πεντεκαιδεκαπλάσια τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς ζῷα τῇ δυνάμει, μηδὲν περιττωματικὸν ἀποκρίνοντα, καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν τοσαύτην τῷ μήκει.

4 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.4.2

Ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ σελήνῃ ἔμφασιν ἀνάκλασιν εἶναι τῆς πέραν τοῦ διακεκαυμένου κύκλου τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν θαλάττης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

3 <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras and Chrysippus I.26.3.6

Anaxagoras, as Theophrastus says, held that at times eclipse also occurs when bodies below the moon obstruct it.[810]

Chrysippus held that the moon is eclipsed when the earth obstructs it and it falls into the earth's shadow.

4 On its visible appearance I.26.4.heading

On its visible appearance.

4 <Aëtius>: An inhabited moon I.26.4.1

Some Pythagoreans, including Philolaus, held that the moon looks earthy because it is inhabited all around, like our own earth, by animals and plants that are larger and finer. Its animals have fifteen times the power of ours and discharge no waste; its day is also fifteen times as long.[811]

4 <Aëtius>: A reflection of the sea I.26.4.2

Others held that the appearance seen in the moon is a reflection of the sea lying beyond the torrid belt of the earth we inhabit.[812]

810. Wachsmuth identifies the Theophrastus testimony as Physical Opinions, fragment 19 in Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 493. The additional bodies are reported without being identified here.

811. The report gives fifteenfold power, not explicitly fifteenfold bodily dimensions. It makes a separate claim about the length of the lunar day. The description of animals and plants is retained as an ancient speculation about lunar inhabitants.

812. The "torrid belt" is the region conceived as scorched by the sun. This account locates the cause of the moon's markings on earth, through reflection.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 221-222

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

4 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.26.4.3

Ἀναξαγόρας ἀνωμαλότητα συγκρίματος διὰ τὸ ψυχρομιγὲς ἅμα καὶ γεῶδες, τὰ μὲν ἐχούσης ὑψηλά, τὰ δὲ ταπεινά, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα. Καὶ παραμεμίχθαι τῷ πυροειδεῖ τὸ ζοφῶδες, ὧν τὸ πάθος ὑποφαίνει τὸ σκιερόν· ὅθεν ψευδοφανῆ λέγεσθαι τὸν ἀστέρα.

4 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.26.4.4

Δημόκριτος ἀποσκίασμά τι τῶν ὑψηλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ μερῶν· ἄγκη γὰρ αὐτὴν ἔχειν καὶ νάπας.

Παρμενίδης διὰ τὸ παραμεμίχθαι τῷ περὶ αὐτὴν πυρώδει τὸ ζοφῶδες, ὅθεν ψευδοφανῆ τὸν ἀστέρα καλεῖ.

4 <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.26.4.5

Οἱ Στωικοὶ διὰ τὸ ἀερομιγὲς τῆς οὐσίας μὴ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἀκήρατον τὸ σύγκριμα.

Ἀριστοτέλης μὴ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἀκήρατον τὸ σύγκριμα διὰ τὰ πρόσγεια ἀερώματα τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὃν προσαγορεύει σῶμα πέμπτον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

4 <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras

I.26.4.3

Anaxagoras held that it results from unevenness of composition, because the moon is both mixed with cold and earthy: some of its parts are high, others low, others hollow. The dark substance is mixed with the fire-like substance, and their condition produces the shadowy appearance. Hence the heavenly body is called “deceptive in appearance.”[813]

4 <Aëtius>: Democritus and Parmenides

I.26.4.4

Democritus held that it is a kind of shadow cast by the high parts of the moon, since it has ravines and valleys.

Parmenides held that it occurs because the dark substance is mixed with the fiery substance in the moon; hence he calls the heavenly body “deceptive in appearance.”

4 <Aëtius>: Stoic and Aristotelian mixtures

I.26.4.5

The Stoics held that its composition is not pure because its substance is mixed with air.

Aristotle held that its composition is not pure because of the earthward formations of air in the aether, which he calls the fifth body.[814]

813. “Deceptive in appearance” renders the printed pseudophanē. The report combines uneven terrain with a mixture of dark and fiery constituents to explain what is seen. The translation does not replace this word with the variant “false-shining” proposed for the similar Parmenides report below.

814. “Formations of air” is a provisional rendering of the difficult aerōmata retained in Wachsmuth’s text. His apparatus records conjectures including “residues” and “sweepings.” The precise physical claim remains uncertain; the translation does not silently substitute one of those conjectures.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

4 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.26.4.6

Οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ ἀνώμαλον συγκριτικὸν αἰτιῶνται. Καθάπερ οὖν τῶν προσαυγαζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου νεφῶν τὰ μὲν ἀραιότερα μέρη λαμπρότερα φαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πυκνότερα ἀμαυρότερα, οὕτως καὶ τῆς σελήνης ἐοικυίας μὲν νεφελοειδεῖ πιλήματι, προσαυγαζομένης δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.

4 <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.26.4.7

Ξενοφάνης τὸν μὲν ἥλιον χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζῴων γένεσίν τε καὶ διοίκησιν, τὴν δὲ σελήνην παρέλκειν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

4 <Aëtius>: Uneven density

I.26.4.6

Those who follow mathematical astronomy attribute it to uneven composition. Just as the thinner parts of clouds illuminated by the sun appear brighter and the denser parts dimmer, so too with the moon: it resembles a compacted, cloud-like mass and is illuminated by the sun.[815]

4 <Aëtius>: Xenophanes on usefulness

I.26.4.7

Xenophanes held that the sun is useful for the coming into being and ordering of the world and of the animals in it, whereas the moon is superfluous.[816]

815. Pilēma is something compressed or felted together. The comparison explains the contrast between brighter and darker portions through variations in density, using sunlit clouds as the model.

816. The final report in this section turns from visible markings to the usefulness of sun and moon. Parelkein here means to be unnecessary or superfluous.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

5 Περὶ ἀποστημάτων I.26.5.heading

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀποστημάτων.

5 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.26.5.1

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς διπλάσιον ἀπέχειν τῆς σελήνης ἀπὸ <τῆς> γῆς ἤπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.

Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὀκτωκαιδεκαπλάσιον.

5 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.26.5.2

Ἐρατοσθένης τὸν ἥλιον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς σταδίων μυριάδας [μυριάδων] τετρακοσίας καὶ στάδια ὀκτάκις μύρια· τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς μυριάδας ἑβδομήκοντα ὀκτὼ σταδίων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 26

5 On distances

I.26.5.heading

On distances.

5 <Aëtius>: Ratios of distance

I.26.5.1

Empedocles: a distance twice as great, of the moon from <the> earth as from the sun.[817]

Those who follow mathematical astronomy: eighteen times as great.[818]

5 <Aëtius>: Eratosthenes

I.26.5.2

Eratosthenes held that the sun is distant from the earth by four hundred myriads of stadia plus eighty thousand stadia, and that the moon is distant from the earth by seventy-eight myriads of stadia.[819]

817. The Greek construction is damaged: “of the moon” is genitive where the infinitive needs a subject, and Wachsmuth calls the wording seriously disordered. This deliberately fragmentary English preserves the surviving terms and their order; it does not establish a reliable ratio. The parallel Placita II.31.1 gives a different arrangement of the distances. The supplied article before “earth” is Meineke’s addition.

818. The following eighteenfold statement supplies no explicit subject or distances of its own. Its intended comparison cannot securely be recovered merely by treating the damaged preceding sentence as sound.

819. A myriad is ten thousand. With the bracketed myriadōn excluded, as in Wachsmuth’s text, these figures are 4,080,000 and 780,000 stadia. The apparatus says Diels rejected the extra word as a variant of the preceding myriadas. Keeping it would drastically change the number; no more familiar estimate is substituted here. Stadia are retained rather than converted into a modern unit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

5 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.26.5.3

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τοῦ ὕψους τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀνάτασις, πλείονα εἶναι τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλάτος διάστασιν, κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μᾶλλον ἀναπεπταμένου διὰ τὸ ᾧῷ παραπλησίως τὸν κόσμον κεῖσθαι.

5 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.26.5.4

Βόηθος δὲ πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν δέχεται τὸ ἀναπεπταμένον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

6 (2) Σημεῖα σελήνης I.26.6.heading

Σημεῖα σελήνης.

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀράτου Φαινομένων.

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 778-782 I.26.6.1

Σκέπτεο δὴ πρώτην κεράων ἑκάτερθε σελήνην·
ἄλλοτε γάρ τ᾽ ἄλλη μιν ἐπιγράφει ἕσπερος αἴγλη,
ἄλλοτε δ᾽ ἀλλοῖαι μορφαὶ κερόωσι σελήνην
εὐθὺς ἀεξομένην, αἱ μὲν τρίτῃ, αἱ δὲ τετάρτῃ·
τάων καὶ περὶ μηνὸς ἐφεσταότος κε πύθοιο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

5 <Aëtius>: Empedocles' broad heaven I.26.5.3

Empedocles held that the distance across heaven is greater than the height from earth to heaven, that is, its upward extent from us. Heaven is more widely spread in that direction because the world is arranged in a shape resembling an egg.[820]

5 <Aëtius>: Boethus I.26.5.4

Boethus, however, accepts this greater breadth as an appearance, not as an actual condition.

6 (2) Signs from the moon I.26.6.heading

Signs from the moon.

From Aratus' Phaenomena.[821]

6 Aratus, lines 778-782 I.26.6.1

First observe the moon on either side, at her horns:
evening's radiance paints her differently at different times,
and changing shapes give horns to the moon
as soon as she waxes, one on the third day, another on the fourth;
from these you may learn about the month now begun.[822]

820. The report now concerns the world's overall shape and the apparent breadth of heaven. It compares a horizontal span with the upward distance from the observer; the translation preserves that comparison without imposing a modern geometrical reconstruction.

821. The excerpt comprises Phaenomena 778-817, all forty lines of which follow. The numbers 6 (2) reproduce Wachsmuth's principal numbering and the older alternative. The subject is weather prediction from the moon's shape, color, and surrounding halos.

822. The "horns" are the pointed ends of the crescent. The third and fourth days belong to the lunar month, whose opening appearances provide the signs considered in the next lines. The English keeps the poem's feminine personification of the moon.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 783-787

I.26.6.2

Λεπτὴ μὲν καθαρή τε περὶ τρίτον ἦμαρ ἐοῦσα
εὔδιός κ᾽ εἴη· λεπτὴ δὲ καὶ εὖ μάλ᾽ ἐρευθὴς
πνευματίη· παχίων δὲ καὶ ἀμβλείῃσι κεραίαις
τέτρατον ἐκ τριτάτοιο φόως ἀμενηνὸν ἔχουσα
ἢ νότῳ ἀμβλύνεται ἢ ὕδατος ἐγγὺς ἐόντος.

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 788-795

I.26.6.3

Εἰ δέ κ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων κεράων τρίτον ἦμαρ ἄγουσα
μήτε τι νευστάζῃ μήθ᾽ ὑπτιόωσα φαείνῃ,
ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθὰς ἑκάτερθε περιγνάμπτουσα κεραίας,
ἐσπέριοί κ᾽ ἄνεμοι κείνην μετὰ νύκτα φέροιντο.
Εἰ δ᾽ αὖτως ὀρθὴ καὶ τέτρατον ἦμαρ ἀγινοῖ,
ἦτ᾽ ἂν χειμῶνος συναγειρομένοιο διδάσκοι.
εἰ δέ κέ οἱ κεράων τὸ μετήορον εὖ ἐπινεύῃ,
δειδέχθαι βορέω, ὅτε δ᾽ ὑπτιάῃσι, νότοιο.

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 796-798

I.26.6.4

Αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν τριτόωσαν ὅλος περὶ κύκλος ἑλίσσῃ
πάντῃ ἐρευθόμενος, μάλα κεν τότε χείμερος εἴη·
μείζονι δ᾽ ἂν χειμῶνι πυρώτερα φοινίσσοιτο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Aratus, lines 783-787

I.26.6.2

Slender and clear around the third day,
she promises fair weather; slender but deeply red,
she promises wind. If thicker, with blunted horns,
she shows a feeble light from the third day into the fourth,
her light is dulled by the south wind or by rain close at hand.[823]

6 Aratus, lines 788-795

I.26.6.3

If on her third day, at both her horns,
she neither nods forward nor shines leaning back,
but curves her horns upright on either side,
winds from the west may blow after that night.
If she brings the fourth day still upright in the same way,
she warns that a storm is gathering.
If the higher of her horns bends well forward,
expect a north wind; if it leans back, a south wind.[824]

6 Aratus, lines 796-798

I.26.6.4

But when, on her third day, a complete circle surrounds her,
red all around, she gives a strong sign of storm;
for a greater storm, her crimson would burn more fiercely.[825]

823. The signs turn on three features together: the crescent's thickness, the sharpness of its horns, and its color or brightness. Notos is the south wind; "water" in the last line means rain.

824. The nodding and leaning describe the crescent's orientation. Hesperioi means "western" here, so the winds in line 791 come from the west. The last pair contrasts the north wind, Boreas, with the south wind, Notos.

825. The encircling ring is a halo. The degree of redness is treated as an indication of the storm's severity. Further distinctions among halos conclude the excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 799-804

I.26.6.5

Σκέπτεο δ᾽ ἐς πληθὺν τε καὶ ἀμφότερον διχόωσαν,
ἠμὲν ἀεξομένην, ἠδ᾽ ἐς κέρας αὖθις ἰοῦσαν·
καί οἱ ἐπὶ χροιῇ τεκμαίρεο μηνὸς ἑκάστου.
Πάντῃ μὲν καθαρῇ κε μάλ᾽ εὔδια τεκμήραιο·
πάντα δ᾽ ἐρευθομένῃ δοκέειν ἀνέμοιο κέλευθον,
ἄλλοθι δ᾽ ἄλλο μελαινομένῃ δοκέειν ὑετοῖο.

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 805-810

I.26.6.6

Σήματα δ᾽ οὐ μάλα πᾶσιν ἐπ᾽ ἤμασι πάντα τέτυκται·
ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα μὲν τριτάτῃ τε τεταρταίῃ τε πέλονται
μέσφα διχαζομένης, διχάδος γε μὲν ἄχρις ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν
σημαίνει διχόμηνον, ἀτὰρ πάλιν ἐκ διχομήνου
ἐς διχάδα φθιμένην· δέχεται μὲν αὐτίκα τετρὰς
μηνὸς ἀποιχομένου, ἡ δὲ τριτάτη ἀπιόντος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Aratus, lines 799-804

I.26.6.5

Observe her at the full and at both of her half phases,
both as she grows and as she returns again to a crescent;
each month, draw your conclusions from her color.
If wholly clear, you may confidently infer fair weather;
if red all over, look for the wind's advance,
and if darkening here and there, look for rain.[826]

6 Aratus, lines 805-810

I.26.6.6

Not all signs have their force on every day:
those occurring on the third and fourth days
give indications until the half moon; those of the half moon
reach to full moon itself; then from the full moon
to the waning half. Next comes the fourth day
of the departing month, then the third of the departing month.[827]

826. The two half phases are those before and after full moon. The poem extends the use of color signs beyond the early crescent, then assigns the signs to successive portions of the month.

827. Days near the end of the month are counted backward. The final "departing" translates the printed apiontos. Wachsmuth's apparatus approves Vossius' correction epiontos, "coming," which would take the sequence to the third day of the new month; that correction is not adopted in his main text. The repetition in the English therefore reflects a difficulty in the supplied Greek, not a second independently established forecast period.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Ἀράτου · στ. 811-817

I.26.6.7

Εἰ δέ κέ μιν περὶ πᾶσαν ἅλωαι κυκλώσωνται
ἢ τρεῖς ἠὲ δύω περικείμεναι ἠὲ μί᾽ οἵη,
τῇ μὲν ἰῇ ἀνέμοιο γαληναίης τε δοκεύειν,
ῥηγνυμένῃ ἀνέμοιο, μαραινομένῃ δὲ γαλήνης·
ταὶ δύο δ᾽ ἂν χειμῶνι περιτροχάοιντο σελήνην·
μείζονα δ᾽ ἂν χειμῶνα φέροι τριέλικτος ἁλωή,
καὶ μᾶλλον μελανεῦσα, καὶ εἰ ῥήγνυτο μᾶλλον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 26

6 Aratus, lines 811-817

I.26.6.7

If halos circle all around her,
three encircling rings, or two, or only one,
use the single ring to watch for wind or calm:
wind if it breaks, calm if it fades away.
Two rings may run around the moon as a sign of storm;
a halo wound three times would bring a greater storm,
greater still if it darkens, and greater if it breaks.[828]

828. The prediction depends on the number of rings and on whether they darken, break, or fade. The excerpt ends at line 817; the following summing-up line of Aratus is not present in this Stobaeus selection. Chapter 27 then turns to the Milky Way.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 27

Κεφάλαιον ΚΖ′ I.27.heading

Περὶ γάλακτος.

1 <Ἀετίου> I.27.1

Κύκλος ἐστὶ νεφελοειδής, ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀέρι διὰ παντὸς φαινόμενος, διὰ δὲ τὴν λευκόχροιαν ὀνομαζόμενος γαλαξίας.

2 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.27.2.1

Τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἱ μὲν ἔφασαν ἀστέρος εἶναι διάκαυσιν, ἐκπεσόντος μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἕδρας, δι᾽ οὗ δὲ περιέδραμε χωρίον κυκλοτερῶς αὐτὸ περιφλέξαντος ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ Φαέθοντα ἐμπρησμοῦ· οἱ δὲ τὸν ἡλιακὸν ταύτῃ φασὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς γεγονέναι δρόμον.

2 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.27.2.2

Τινὲς δὲ κατοπτρικὴν εἶναι φαντασίαν τοῦ ἡλίου τὰς αὐγὰς πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνακλῶντος, ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῆς ἴριδος ἐπὶ τῶν νεφῶν συμβαίνει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 27

Chapter 27: The Milky Way

I.27.heading

On the Milky Way.[829]

1 <Aëtius>: The milky circle

I.27.1

It is a cloud-like circle, continually visible in the air and called the Milky Way because of its white color.

2 <Aëtius>: A fiery track

I.27.2.1

Some Pythagoreans said that it is the scorching caused by a star which fell from its own station and burned in a circle the region through which it ran, at the time of the conflagration associated with Phaethon. Others say that the sun originally followed this course.[830]

2 <Aëtius>: Reflection

I.27.2.2

Others held that it is a mirror-like appearance produced by the sun reflecting its rays toward the heavens, just as happens with the rainbow on the clouds.[831]

829. The Greek heading literally means “On Milk.” The opening description explains the related name galaxias by the band’s white color. Wachsmuth prints galaktos in the heading, while recording the alternative galaxiou in his apparatus.

830. Aristotle, Meteorology I.8, likewise reports these two Pythagorean explanations: a fallen star associated with Phaethon, and an earlier path of the sun. The account here preserves both as alternatives.

831. Katoptrikē refers to an effect like that of a mirror. The printed account describes reflection of the sun’s rays; its comparison with the rainbow explains the intended kind of appearance.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 27

3 <Ἀετίου> I.27.3

Μητρόδωρος διὰ τὴν πάροδον τοῦ ἡλίου, τοῦτον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον.

4 <Ἀετίου> I.27.4

Παρμενίδης τὸ τοῦ πυκνοῦ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ μίγμα γαλακτοειδὲς ἀποτελέσαι χρῶμα.

5 <Ἀετίου> I.27.5

Ἀναξαγόρας τὴν σκιὰν τῆς γῆς κατὰ τόδε τὸ μέρος ἵστασθαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὅταν ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν ὁ ἥλιος γενόμενος μὴ πάντα περιφωτίζῃ.

6 <Ἀετίου> I.27.6

<Δημόκριτος> πολλῶν καὶ μικρῶν καὶ συνεχῶν ἀστέρων συμφωτιζομένων ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὴν πύκνωσιν συναυγασμόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 27

3 <Aëtius>: Metrodorus I.27.3

Metrodorus held that it is due to the sun's passage, for this is the sun's circle.[832]

4 <Aëtius>: Parmenides I.27.4

Parmenides held that the mixture of the dense and the rarefied produced a milk-like color.[833]

5 <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras I.27.5

Anaxagoras held that the earth's shadow occupies this part of the heavens when the sun, having passed beneath the earth, does not illuminate everything.[834]

6 <Aëtius>: <Democritus> I.27.6

<Democritus> held that it is the combined radiance of many small, closely gathered stars, illuminating one another because of their density.[835]

832. Unlike the preceding Pythagorean account, this brief report does not explicitly call the solar course an earlier one. Its compressed wording is retained.

833. Density and rarefaction also distinguish the materials of the sun and moon in the Parmenides report at I.25.3g, where both bodies are said to have separated from the Milky Way.

834. In the fuller parallel at Aristotle, Meteorology I.8, the earth's shadow shields certain stars from sunlight, allowing their own light to remain visible. Aristotle attributes that explanation to Anaxagoras and Democritus; this report names Anaxagoras alone. Wachsmuth adopts Heeren's correction "beneath the earth" with support from Aristotle.

835. The name Democritus is an editorial supplement, supplied by Canter from the parallel Placita III.1; it is absent from the manuscripts cited here as F and P. The angle brackets preserve that distinction.

BOOK I CHAPTER 27

7 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.27.7.1

Ἀριστοτέλης ἀναθυμιάσεως ξηρᾶς ἔξαψιν πολλῆς τε καὶ συνεχοῦς.

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2 I.27.7.2

Τὸν γὰρ κύκλον ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ θεωρεῖσθαι μέγιστον ὄντα, πλήρη τῶν μεγίστων ὑπάρχειν καὶ λαμπροτάτων ἄστρων καὶ ἔτι τῶν σποράδων καλουμένων, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα συνεχῶς πλείστην περὶ τοῦτον ἀθροίζεσθαι τὸν τόπον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμίασιν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν τοῦ γάλακτος φαντασίαν.

8 <Ἀετίου> I.27.8

Ποσειδώνιος πυρὸς σύστασιν, ἄστρου μὲν μανωτέραν, αὐγῆς δὲ πυκνοτέραν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 27

7 <Aëtius>: Aristotle I.27.7.1

Aristotle held that it is the ignition of a dry exhalation, abundant and continuous.[836]

7 <Arius Didymus>: The star-filled circle I.27.7.2

For the circle in which it seems to appear is a great circle, full of the largest and brightest stars, as well as those called “scattered.” Because of these, a very great quantity of exhalation from the earth continually gathers about this region and produces the appearance of the Milky Way.[837]

8 <Aëtius>: Posidonius I.27.8

Posidonius held that it is a formation of fire, more rarefied than a star but denser than a ray of light.[838]

836. “Exhalation” renders anathymiasis, matter rising from the earth. The report makes this rising material the fuel of the luminous phenomenon. Compare Aristotle’s account in Meteorology I.8.

837. Wachsmuth’s source heading combines Aëtius and Arius Didymus; the apparatus follows Diels in assigning this expanded explanation to Arius. “Great circle” renders megistos, literally “greatest”: a circle whose plane passes through a sphere’s center. The comparison with the star-filled circle also occurs in Aristotle, Meteorology I.8.

838. The contrast concerns the density of the fiery formation. Wachsmuth prints pyros, “of fire,” from the parallel Placita in place of the manuscripts’ pros.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

Κεφάλαιον ΚΗ′ I.28.heading

Περὶ κομητῶν καὶ διαϊττόντων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.28.1a.1

Τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινὲς μὲν ἀστέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸν κομήτην τῶν οὐκ αἰεὶ μὲν φαινομένων, διὰ δέ τινος διωρισμένου χρόνου περιοδικῶς ἀνατελλόντων· ἄλλοι δὲ ἀνάκλασιν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὄψεως πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον παραπλησίαν ταῖς κατοπτρικαῖς ἐμφάσεσιν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.28.1a.2

Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος σύνοδον ἀστέρων δυοῖν ἢ καὶ πλειόνων κατὰ συναυγασμόν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.28.1a.3

Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς ξηρᾶς ἐκ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως διάπυρον σύστασιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 28

Chapter 28: Comets and shooting stars

I.28.heading

On comets, shooting stars, and similar phenomena.[839]

1a <Aëtius>: Periodic stars and reflection

I.28.1a.1

Some Pythagoreans say that a comet is a star belonging to those which are not always visible but rise periodically at a definite interval. Others held that it is a reflection of our sight toward the sun, resembling appearances in mirrors.[840]

1a <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras and Democritus

I.28.1a.2

Anaxagoras and Democritus held that it is a conjunction of two or more stars whose radiance combines.

1a <Aëtius>: Aristotle

I.28.1a.3

Aristotle held that it is an incandescent formation of the dry exhalation from the earth.[841]

839. The chapter groups luminous appearances described by their visible shapes and behavior. Komētēs means “long-haired,” from komē, “hair”; the translation uses “comet,” while retaining the hair imagery in the explanations below.

840. The reflection is explicitly of “our sight.” Wachsmuth connects this second account with Hippocrates of Chios; compare Aristotle, Meteorology I.6, which names Hippocrates and his pupil Aeschylus. The source here introduces it only with “others.”

841. The same terrestrial exhalation explains the Milky Way in I.27.7. “Formation” here renders systasis, the gathering of material into a body or mass.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1a · 4 I.28.1a.4

* * κομήτας δὲ ὅταν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξαφθῇ καὶ πρὸς πλείονα διαμένῃ χρόνον, τοῦ μὲν ἀστέρος φαινομένου κάτωθεν, τῆς δὲ κόμης ἄνωθεν ἐπιλαμπούσης· πωγωνίας δὲ ὅταν ἔμπαλιν ὁ μὲν ἀστὴρ ἄνωθεν θεωρῆται, ἡ δὲ κόμη κάτωθεν, παρεχομένη τῷ σχήματι πώγωνος ἔμφασιν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.28.1a.5

Στράτων ἄστρου φῶς περιληφθὲν νέφει πυκνῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λαμπτήρων γίνεται.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.28.1a.6

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς νέφος μετάρσιον ὑπὸ μεταρσίου φωτὸς καταυγαζόμενον. Ὁμοίως δ᾽ αἰτιολογεῖ πωγωνίαν, δοκίδας, κίονα καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, καθάπερ ἁμέλει πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ παρὰ τοὺς τοῦ νέφους ταῦτα γίνεσθαι σχηματισμούς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1a Comets and bearded stars

I.28.1a.4

[Gap in the text.] They are comets when the material is kindled more extensively and lasts for a longer time, with the star appearing below and the hair shining above; they are bearded stars when, conversely, the star is seen above and the hair below, its shape giving the appearance of a beard.[842]

1a <Aëtius>: Strato

I.28.1a.5

Strato held that it is the light of a star enclosed in a dense cloud, as happens with lamps.

1a <Aëtius>: Heraclides of Pontus

I.28.1a.6

Heraclides of Pontus held that it is a cloud aloft, illuminated by light aloft. He gives a similar explanation of a bearded star, beams, a pillar, and related phenomena: as indeed do all the Peripatetics, he holds that these arise from the shapes assumed by the cloud.[843]

842. Wachsmuth marks a gap before this classification and rejects its continuous attribution to Aristotle. He favors Posidonius, comparing the account of upper hair and a lower beard in Pliny, Natural History II.89; he also records Diels's suggestion of Arius Didymus as the source. The attribution remains uncertain.

843. "Beams" means shapes like wooden beams, rather than rays of light; the Greek is dokides. "Pillar" translates kiōn. The explanation makes the cloud's shape responsible for the differing appearances.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1a <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.28.1a.7

Ἐπιγένης πνεύματος ἀναφορὰν γεωμιγοῦς πεπυρωμένου.

Βόηθος ἀέρος ἀνημμένου φαντασίαν.

Διογένης ἀστέρας εἶναι τοὺς κομήτας.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 8 I.28.1a.8

Ἀναξαγόρας τοὺς καλουμένους διάττοντας ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος σπινθήρων δίκην καταφέρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ παραυτίκα σβέννυσθαι.

Μητρόδωρος τὴν εἰς τὰ νέφη τοῦ ἡλίου βίαιον ἔμπτωσιν πολλάκις σπινθηρίζειν.

1a <Ἀετίου> · 9 I.28.1a.9

Ξενοφάνης πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα νεφῶν πεπυρωμένων συστήματα ἢ κινήματα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1a <Aëtius>: Three further accounts I.28.1a.7

Epigenes held that it is an upward rush of wind mixed with earth and set on fire.

Boethus held that it is an appearance of ignited air.

Diogenes held that comets are stars.[844]

1a <Aëtius>: Shooting stars and sparks I.28.1a.8

Anaxagoras held that the so-called shooting stars fall from the aether like sparks, and for this reason are extinguished at once.

Metrodorus held that the sun's violent impact upon the clouds often produces sparks.[845]

1a <Aëtius>: Xenophanes I.28.1a.9

Xenophanes held that all such phenomena are formations or movements of clouds set on fire.[846]

844. The first account involves pneuma, wind or a current of air, carrying earthy material. Diogenes' brief statement, omitted by manuscript P but printed by Wachsmuth, classifies comets as stars without adding a mechanism.

845. The second report says "the sun's impact," without explicitly naming its rays. The first distinguishes these short-lived sparks from the more persistent phenomena described elsewhere in the chapter.

846. The printed kinēmata means "movements." Wachsmuth records Zeller's conjecture pilēmata, "compacted masses," but does not adopt it; the translation follows the printed text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1b · 1 I.28.1b.1

Χαλδαίοις μὲν δὴ λόγος περὶ κομητῶν ὧδε γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι εἰσί τινες καὶ ἄλλοι ἔξω τῶν φαινομένων πλανητῶν ἀστέρες, οἳ τέως μὲν ἀφανεῖς εἰσιν, ὅτι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἄνω που ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν φέρονται, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ταπεινωθέντες ὤφθησαν οὕτως ὡς ξένοι ἐνεχθέντες εἰς τὰ ὅλα· καὶ τούτους κομήτας καλεῖν φίλον τοῖς οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀστέρων εἰσίν. ἀφανίζεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἀνενεχθῶσιν εἰς τὴν σφῶν χώραν, δύντες εἰς τὸ βάθος τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὥσπερ εἰς τὸν τοῦ πελάγους βυθὸν οἱ ἰχθῦς.

1b · 2 I.28.1b.2

Οἱ δὲ ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων ἢ θυέλλης ἀναφέρεσθαί τινα γεώδη ἐς τὸν ἄνω ἀέρα ἐδόξασαν καὶ ταῦτα ἐκπυρωθέντα καὶ εἰς τὴν δίνην ἐμπεσόντα τοῦ αἰθέρος ξυμπερινοστεῖν τῷ παντὶ ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἔπειτα ἀπαναλωθέντα πρὸς τοῦ πυρὸς ἀφανῆ καθίστασθαι, καὶ τοὺς κομήτας δὴ καλουμένους ἀστέρας ταῦτα εἶναι.

1b · 3 I.28.1b.3

Δημοκρίτου δὲ ὁ λόγος λεγόμενός ἐστιν, ὡς κατ᾽ ἀντίλαμψιν τῶν πλανωμένων ἀστέρων πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς οἱ κομῆται ξυνίστασθαι δοκοῦσι, καθάπερ πλειόνων κατόπτρων ἀντιλαμπόντων σφίσιν ἤδη τινὰ ὤφθη ἀστεροειδῆ φαντάσματα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

1b The Chaldean account I.28.1b.1

The Chaldeans are said to understand comets in this way: there are other stars besides the visible planets. For a time they are invisible because they travel somewhere very far above us; but they have also been seen after descending, as though strangers had been brought into the universe. Those who do not know that these too belong to the multitude of stars like to call them comets. They seem to disappear when they are carried back up to their own region, sinking into the depths of the aether as fish sink into the depths of the sea.[847]

1b Earthy material carried aloft I.28.1b.2

Others supposed that certain earthy materials are carried by winds or a tempest into the upper air. Set on fire and caught in the whirl of the aether, they revolve with the universe for a time; then, consumed by the fire, they become invisible. These are the stars called comets.[848]

1b The account attributed to Democritus I.28.1b.3

The account attributed to Democritus is that comets seem to form through the mutual reflection of the wandering stars with one another and with the fixed stars, just as star-like images have sometimes been seen when several mirrors reflect into one another.[849]

847. This account makes disappearance a withdrawal into an inaccessible depth, rather than destruction. Section 1b has no separate author-heading in the text. Wachsmuth notes Meineke's attribution to Arrian, but judges the material closer to Posidonius; neither name has been inserted here.

848. The whirl, dinē, carries the burning material along with the cosmic revolution. In this account disappearance follows consumption of the material, unlike the return to a remote region described immediately before.

849. "Wandering stars" means planets; the fixed stars supply the contrasting class. This report emphasizes mutual reflection, whereas I.28.1a.2 describes a conjunction with combined radiance. Their different formulations are retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 1 I.28.2.1

Ἀρριανός φησιν· “Ὅσα δὲ μένει ἐπὶ χρόνον τὰ μέν πως ξυμπεριφερόμενα τῷ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν πλάνην πλανώμενα, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ κομῆται ἀστέρες καὶ λαμπάδες καὶ πωγωνίαι καὶ πίθοι καὶ δοκίδες, καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα ἑκάστῃ ἰδέᾳ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας λαχόντα.”

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 2 I.28.2.2

* * “Τεκμήριον δὲ ὅτι μὴ παραυτίκα διαφθείρεται, ὡς εἴ γε ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξυνίσταντο, ταχεῖα ἂν ἐγίγνετο αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ ἡ σβέσις. Ὅτι δὲ πρόσκαιρά ἐστιν, ἡ φθορὰ αὐτῶν ἐδήλωσε,

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 3 I.28.2.3

καὶ ὅτι πρὸς ἄρκτοις μᾶλλόν τι ἢ ἄλλῃ χώρᾳ ξυνίσταται τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν φέρει, ἔνθα παχύς τε ὁ ἀὴρ [καὶ] μᾶλλον καὶ ξύστασις οὐ ῥᾳδία, φορηθῆναι πρὸς τὴν οὖ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Arrian: Persistent appearances I.28.2.1

Arrian says: “Those which remain for a time, some carried along in a fashion with the heavens, others wandering on a course of their own, are comets, torches, bearded stars, jars, and beams, each receiving its name from a resemblance in shape.”[850]

2 Arrian: Duration and destruction I.28.2.2

[Gap in the text.] “Evidence is the fact that they do not perish at once: if they formed in the air, they would be quickly extinguished in its cold. That they are temporary is shown by their destruction.[851]

2 Arrian: A damaged argument about the north I.28.2.3

And the fact that they form more toward the north than in another region of the heavens also bears upon this: there the air is thicker and formation is not easy; to be carried toward the ... [text corrupt].[852]

850. The author-heading “Arrian” is printed without editorial brackets; Wachsmuth records it in the margin of manuscript P. The closing Greek construction is uneven and has attracted several corrections; its clear general sense is that resemblance supplies each name. The definitions return at the end of the extract.

851. Wachsmuth marks a gap before “Evidence.” The precise claim for which the first sentence offers evidence is therefore missing. Its surviving argument distinguishes lasting for a time from being permanent.

852. The connection of the northern location to the argument is uncertain. The printed ending, phorēthēnai pros tēn ou, cannot be construed as a complete sentence. Wachsmuth discusses, but does not print, a conjecture involving “earth”; the translation does not silently adopt it. The rejected kai, “and,” remains bracketed on the Greek side.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 4 I.28.2.4

Φέρονταί τε ἀτάκτως οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν κομητῶν, ἐπινεμόμενοι, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὴν ἄνω ἀναφερομένην τροφὴν καὶ ταύτῃ ἐφομαρτοῦντες.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 5 I.28.2.5

Ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἀστεροειδής ἐστι, καθότι ἐς σφαῖραν ξυνάγεσθαι πέφυκε πᾶν, ὅσον πυροειδές· ἡ δὲ κόμη αὐγοειδής, τῶν μὲν ὥσπερ ἄφετος ἀνειμένη, τῶν δὲ ἐπ᾽ εὐθὺ ἰοῦσα καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄνω μᾶλλόν τι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀστέρος τεινομένη.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 6 I.28.2.6

Οἱ δὲ πίθοι ὀλιγάκις πεφήνασι, καθότι πλείονος δέονται ξυναγωγῆς πυρός. Ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἐστὶν οἳ ξὺν κόμῃ ἐφάνησαν, ἐπειδὰν περὶ αὐτοὺς <ἡ τοῦ> ἀέρος ἀναφορὰ πυκνωθεῖσα ξυναφὲς ἐργάσηται τῆς κόμης τὸ εἴδωλον, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλως ξυναφεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἄστροις φαίνονται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Arrian: Movement and nourishment I.28.2.4

Most comets move irregularly, feeding, as it seems to me, on the nourishment carried upward and following its course.[853]

2 Arrian: The head and its hair I.28.2.5

Their head is star-like, since everything of a fiery nature tends to gather into a sphere. Their hair is like a ray of light: in some it spreads loosely, as though unbound; in others it runs straight and stretches somewhat upward from the star.[854]

2 Arrian: Jars and fringed fixed stars I.28.2.6

Jars have appeared only rarely, since they require a greater gathering of fire. Some of the fixed stars too have appeared with hair, when <the> rising air around them, becoming dense, produces an image of hair attached to them, just as halos appear attached to the stars themselves.[855]

853. The nourishment is the material that sustains the fire. The account explains an irregular path by the changing supply of this material.

854. “Head” renders archē, literally a beginning or starting point, here contrasted with the trailing or spreading hair. The text retains this word, rather than Wyttenbach’s proposed morphē, “form.” The spherical shape is explained by the stated tendency of fiery material.

855. “Jars” names a shape, explained more fully below. Usener supplies the two Greek articles hē tou to repair the construction concerning the rising air; they are represented by the bracketed “the.” The comparison with halos explains an appearance of attachment to a star.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 7 I.28.2.7

Ἤδη δὲ καὶ πλησίον ἡλίου ξυστάντες κομῆται οἳ μὲν ἔφθησαν ἀφανισθῆναι πρὶν τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν καταστῆναι ἐμφανῆ· οἳ δὲ ἐκλείποντος ἡλίου ἐξεφάνησαν, οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐπικαταδύνοντες τῷ ἡλίῳ, πρόσθεν, οἷα δὴ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τῶν αὐγῶν καταλαμπόμενοι, τῷ μὴ ἐμφανεῖς καθίστασθαι.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 8 I.28.2.8

Ὥστε ἐκεῖνος ἂν κρατοίη ὁ λόγος <ὁ> ἀποφαίνων ἀέρος πιλήματα, ἀποθλιβόμενα καὶ ἐμπίπτοντα ἐς τὰ κατωτέρω καὶ τῷ ἀέρι ξυναφῆ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ἐξαφθέντα, ἔστ᾽ ἂν ὑπάρχῃ περὶ αὐτοὺς ἡ τροφή, ξυμμένειν τε καὶ ξυμπερινοστεῖν τῷ αἰθέρι.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Arrian: Visibility near the sun

I.28.2.7

Some comets formed near the sun have disappeared before their coming into being became visible. Others have come into view during an eclipse of the sun, and others while setting after it, having previously, as one would expect, been overwhelmed by its rays, so that they were not visible.[856]

2 Arrian: The proposed physical explanation

I.28.2.8

Thus the account <which> declares the following would prevail: compacted masses of air are squeezed out and fall into the lower parts of the aether adjoining the air; once kindled, they persist and revolve with the aether for as long as nourishment remains around them."[857]

856. The closing phrase, "so that they were not visible," renders the difficult printed dative construction. Wachsmuth records Usener's view that it may be an explanatory gloss, or that its article needs correction, but leaves it in the text.

857. Pilēmata denotes masses compressed or felted together. The account locates them in the lower aether next to the air. Usener's supplied article makes the following participle describe the account; it is represented by "which."

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 230

BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 9

I.28.2.9

Καὶ ταῦτα, ὅπως ἂν τύχῃ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδέας ἐπικλήζεσθαι ἕκαστον, κομήτας μέν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ὥσπερ κόμη ἐς τὰ κύκλῳ ἀπολάμπει αὐγὴ πυρός· πωγωνίας δὲ ἀφ᾽ ὅτων ἐς πώγωνος σχῆμα ἀπήρτηται αὐγὴ ἐς τὸ ἐπιθάτερα· πίθους δὲ ὅσα μεγάλα, κυκλοτερῆ καί τι καὶ βάθους ἐν σφισιν ἐξέφηνε· δοκοὺς δὲ αὖ καὶ λαμπάδας καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ εἴδους <ἐφ᾽ ὅ>τῳ ἐπιφημίζονται.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 10

I.28.2.10

“Φαίνεται δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ ἑσπέριον καὶ ἑῷον, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιφανῆ φαίνεται. Ἀμφιφανῆ δὲ κλῄζουσιν, ὅσα περὶ πρῶτα τῆς νυκτὸς φανέντα πρὸς δύσει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ νυκτί, πρὶν ἡμέραν ἐπιλαβεῖν, ἔφθη ἀνασχόντα.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 230-231

BOOK I CHAPTER 28

2 Names derived from shapes I.28.2.9

Each of these receives its name from whatever shape it happens to have: comets, when a radiance of fire shines out all around like hair; bearded stars, when the radiance hangs to one side in the shape of a beard; jars, when the appearances are large and circular and display some depth within themselves; and beams and torches, from their resemblance in form to the things <after which> they are named.[858]

2 Arrian: Evening and morning appearances I.28.2.10

"Each of these appears both in the evening and in the morning; some also appear at both times. They call those visible at both times which, after appearing toward the west at the beginning of the night, have risen again during that same night, before daylight arrives."[859]

858. Wachsmuth sets this sentence outside the quotation marks surrounding the preceding and following passages, although it remains within section 2. The supplied letters eph' ho repair the final relative expression; English marks the corresponding "after which." Dokous, like dokides above, refers to wooden beams.

859. Amphiphanē means visible at both appearances just specified: near the start of the night in the west, and again before daybreak. The closing definition is retained as the account's description of the phenomenon.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 230-231

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

Κεφάλαιον ΚΘ′ I.29.heading

Περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν πρηστήρων τυφώνων.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.29.1.1

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ταῦτ᾽ εἶπε συμβαίνειν· ὅταν γὰρ περιληφθὲν νέφει παχεῖ βιασάμενον ἐκπέσῃ τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ κουφότητι, τόθ᾽ ἡ μὲν ῥῆξις τὸν ψόφον, ἡ δὲ διαστολὴ παρὰ τὴν μελανείαν τοῦ νέφους τὸν διαυγασμὸν ἀποτελεῖ.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.29.1.2

Ἀναξιμένης ταὐτὰ τούτῳ παρατιθεὶς τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης, ἥτις σχιζομένη ταῖς κώπαις παραστίλβει.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.29.1.3

Μητρόδωρος, ὅταν εἰς νέφος πεπηγὸς ὑπὸ πυκνότητος ἐμπέσῃ πνεῦμα, τῇ μὲν συνθραύσει τὸν κτύπον ἀποτελεῖ, τῇ δὲ πληγῇ καὶ τῷ σχισμῷ διαυγάζει, τῇ δ᾽ ὀξύτητι τῆς φορᾶς, προσλαμβάνον τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότητα, κεραυνοβολεῖ· τοῦ δὲ κεραυνοῦ τὴν ἀσθένειαν εἰς πρηστῆρα περιίστησιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

Chapter 29: Thunder and lightning I.29.heading

On thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, fiery whirlwinds, and whirlwinds.[860]

1 <Aëtius>: Anaximander I.29.1.1

Anaximander said that these phenomena arise from wind. When wind enclosed in a thick cloud forces its way out through the fineness of its particles and its lightness, the rupture produces the noise, while the opening produces the flash against the darkness of the cloud.[861]

1 <Aëtius>: Anaximenes I.29.1.2

Anaximenes held the same view, adducing what happens at sea, where the water sparkles as the oars cleave it.

1 <Aëtius>: Metrodorus I.29.1.3

Metrodorus held that, when wind strikes a cloud solidified by its density, the shattering produces the crash, while the impact and splitting produce a flash. Through the swiftness of its motion, taking on additional heat from the sun, it discharges a thunderbolt; the weakening of the thunderbolt turns it into a fiery whirlwind.

860. Astrapē is the lightning flash; keraunos is the striking thunderbolt. “Fiery whirlwind” and “whirlwind” render prēstēr and typhōn, but the authors distinguish these phenomena in different ways. Their definitions, including differences in the role of fire, are preserved below.

861. Pneuma here is wind or a current of air. The bracketed Aëtius attribution is Wachsmuth’s editorial identification of the source, not an author-heading transmitted as part of the excerpt.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 231-232

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.29.1.4

Ἀναξαγόρας, ὅταν <τὸ> θερμὸν εἰς τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμπέσῃ, (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αἰθέριον μέρος εἰς ἀερῶδες,) τῷ μὲν ψόφῳ βροντὴν ἀποτελεῖ, τῷ δὲ παρὰ τὴν μελανείαν τοῦ νέφους χρώματι τὴν ἀστραπήν· τῷ δὲ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει τοῦ φωτὸς τὸν κεραυνόν· τῷ δὲ πολυσωματωτέρῳ πυρὶ τὸν τυφῶνα· τῷ δὲ νεφελομιγεῖ τὸν πρηστῆρα.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.29.1.5

Ἀρχέλαος ταὐτὸ λέγει παρατιθεὶς τὸ τῶν διαπύρων λίθων καθιεμένων εἰς ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ πάθος.

Ξενοφάνης ἀστραπὰς γίνεσθαι λαμπρυνομένων τῶν νεφῶν κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.29.1.6

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔμπτωσιν φωτὸς εἰς νέφος ἐξείργοντος τὸν ἀνθεστῶτα ἀέρα, οὗ τὴν μὲν σβέσιν καὶ τὴν θραῦσιν κτύπον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὴν δὲ λάμψιν ἀστραπήν· κεραυνὸν δὲ τὸν τῆς ἀστραπῆς τόνον.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.29.1.7

Διογένης ἔμπτωσιν πυρὸς εἰς νέφος ὑγρόν, βροντὴν μὲν τῇ σβέσει ποιοῦν, τῇ δὲ λαμπηδόνι τὴν ἀστραπήν. συναιτιᾶται δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Aëtius>: Anaxagoras I.29.1.4

Anaxagoras held that, when <the> hot enters the cold (that is, a portion of aether enters a portion of air), its noise produces thunder, and its color against the darkness of the cloud produces lightning. The quantity and magnitude of the light produce a thunderbolt; fire with a greater bodily mass produces a whirlwind, and fire mixed with cloud a fiery whirlwind.[862]

1 <Aëtius>: Archelaus and Xenophanes I.29.1.5

Archelaus gives the same account, adducing what happens when red-hot stones are lowered into cold water.

Xenophanes held that lightning occurs when clouds become bright in their motion.

1 <Aëtius>: Empedocles I.29.1.6

Empedocles held that light falls into a cloud and excludes the air that resists it. Its quenching and breaking up produce a crash, and its shining produces lightning; a thunderbolt is the intensity of the lightning.[863]

1 <Aëtius>: Diogenes I.29.1.7

Diogenes held that fire falls into a wet cloud, producing thunder as it is quenched and lightning by its flash. He also regards wind as a contributing cause.

862. The article before “hot” is supplied by Meineke. In this account even the typhōn, translated “whirlwind,” involves fire; it is the mixture with cloud that distinguishes the prēstēr. The terms do not carry one fixed classification throughout the chapter.

863. The report is highly compressed. The relative “its” most naturally connects the quenching and shining with the light, although “air” intervenes in the Greek. Tonos, rendered “intensity,” conveys tension or force.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀετίου> · 8 I.29.1.8

Ἡράκλειτος βροντὴν μὲν κατὰ συστροφὰς ἀνέμων καὶ νεφῶν καὶ ἐμπτώσεις πνευμάτων εἰς τὰ νέφη, ἀστραπὰς δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀναθυμιωμένων ἐξάψεις, πρηστῆρας δὲ κατὰ νεφῶν ἐμπρήσεις καὶ σβέσεις.

Λεύκιππος πυρὸς ἐναποληφθέντος νέφεσι παχυτάτοις ἔκπτωσιν ἰσχυρὰν βροντὴν ἀποτελεῖν ἀποφαίνεται.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 9 I.29.1.9

Δημόκριτος βροντὴν μὲν ἐκ συγκρίματος ἀνωμάλου, τὸ περιειληφὸς αὐτὸ νέφος πρὸς τὴν κάτω φορὰν ἐκβιαζομένου· ἀστραπὴν δὲ σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς τὰ γεννητικὰ τοῦ πυρὸς διὰ τῶν πολυκένων ἀραιωμάτων ταῖς παρατρίψεσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναλιζόμενα διηθεῖται·

1 <Ἀετίου> · 10 I.29.1.10

κεραυνὸν δὲ ὅταν ἐκ καθαρωτέρων καὶ λεπτοτέρων, ὁμαλωτέρων τε καὶ πυκναρμόνων, καθάπερ αὐτὸς γράφει, γεννητικῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ φορὰ βιάσηται· πρηστῆρα δ᾽, ὅταν πολυκενώτερα συγκρίματα πυρὸς ἐν πολυκένοις κατασχεθέντα χώραις καὶ περιοχαῖς ὑμένων ἰδίων σωματοποιούμενα τῷ πολυμιγεῖ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ βάρος ὁρμὴν λάβῃ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Aëtius>: Heraclitus and Leucippus I.29.1.8

Heraclitus held that thunder arises from the whirling together of winds and clouds and currents of air entering the clouds; lightning from the ignition of exhaled matter; and fiery whirlwinds from clouds catching fire and being extinguished.

Leucippus declares that the violent escape of fire enclosed in very thick clouds produces thunder.

1 <Aëtius>: Democritus on thunder and lightning I.29.1.9

Democritus held that thunder arises from an irregular aggregate which forces the cloud enclosing it to move downward. Lightning is a collision of clouds, through which the constituents that generate fire, gathered together by friction, are filtered through rarefied spaces containing many voids.[864]

1 <Aëtius>: Democritus on bolts and whirlwinds I.29.1.10

A thunderbolt occurs when the movement of the constituents that generate fire forces its way through, these being purer and finer, more uniform and closely fitted together, as he himself writes. A fiery whirlwind occurs when aggregates of fire containing more voids are confined in regions full of voids and within their own enclosing membranes; taking bodily form through their varied mixture, they acquire an impulse in the direction of weight.[865]

864. Synkrima, “aggregate,” denotes a composite mass. The description explains the phenomenon through the arrangement, friction, and passage of material constituents; “voids” translates the repeated reference to empty spaces within these structures.

865. “In the direction of weight” retains baros, the printed reading: downward, where weight tends. Wachsmuth explicitly defends it against Diels’s proposed bathos, “depth.” The membranes and the bodily formation belong to this account’s description of the composite structures.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀετίου> · 11 I.29.1.11

Χρύσιππος ἀστραπὴν ἔξαψιν νεφῶν ἐκτριβομένων ἢ ῥηγνυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος, βροντὴν δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν τούτων ψόφον· ἅμα δὲ γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι βροντήν τε καὶ ἀστραπήν, πρότερον δὲ τῆς ἀστραπῆς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ὀξυτέραν εἶναι τὴν ὅρασιν·

1 <Ἀετίου> · 12 I.29.1.12

ὅταν δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος φορὰ σφοδροτέρα γένηται καὶ πυρώδης, κεραυνὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅταν δὲ ἄθρουν ἐκπέσῃ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἧττον πεπυρωμένον, πρηστῆρα γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον ᾖ πεπυρωμένον τὸ πνεῦμα, τυφῶνα.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 13 I.29.1.13

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξ ἀναθυμιάσεως καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι τῆς ξηρᾶς. Ὅταν οὖν ἐντύχῃ μὲν τῇ ὑγρᾷ, παραβιάζηται δὲ τὴν ἔξοδον, τῇ μὲν παρατρίψει καὶ τῇ ῥήξει τὸν ψόφον, τῇ δ᾽ ἐξάψει τῆς ξηρότητος τὴν ἀστραπὴν παρίστησι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Aëtius>: Chrysippus on sight and sound

I.29.1.11

Chrysippus held that lightning is the ignition of clouds rubbed against one another or torn apart by wind, and that thunder is the resulting noise. Thunder and lightning occur simultaneously in the air, but we perceive the lightning first because sight is quicker than hearing.[866]

1 <Aëtius>: Chrysippus on degrees of heat

I.29.1.12

When the movement of the wind becomes more violent and fiery, a thunderbolt is produced. When the wind bursts out in a compact mass and is less intensely ignited, a fiery whirlwind occurs; when the wind is still less intensely ignited, a whirlwind.

1 <Aëtius>: Aristotle

I.29.1.13

Aristotle held that these phenomena too arise from the dry exhalation. When it encounters the moist exhalation and forces its way out, the friction and rupture produce the noise, while the ignition of the dry matter produces lightning.

866. The account distinguishes the simultaneous occurrence of the two events from the order in which we perceive them. The comparative oxutera can mean keener or swifter; the context concerns the priority of sight. Arrian's account below instead places the production of lightning after thunder.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀετίου> · 14 I.29.1.14

Στράτων θερμοῦ ψυχρῷ παρείξαντος, ὅταν ἐκβιασθὲν τύχῃ, τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι, βροντὴν μὲν ἀπορρήξει, φάει δ᾽ ἀστραπήν, τάχει δὲ κεραυνόν, πρηστῆρας δὲ καὶ τυφῶνας τῷ πλεονασμῷ τῷ τῆς ὕλης, ἣν ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν ἐφέλκεται, θερμοτέραν μὲν ὁ πρηστήρ, ταχυτέραν δὲ ὁ τυφών.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 15 I.29.1.15

Οἱ Στωικοὶ βροντὴν μὲν προσκρουσμὸν νεφῶν, ἀστραπὴν δὲ ἔξαψιν ἐκ παρατρίψεως, κεραυνὸν δὲ σφοδροτέραν ἔκλαμψιν, πρηστῆρα δὲ νωθεστέραν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Aëtius>: Strato

I.29.1.14

Strato held that these phenomena occur when the hot yields to the cold and is forced out: thunder through the breaking away, lightning through the light, and a thunderbolt through the speed. Fiery whirlwinds and whirlwinds arise through an excess of the material that each draws along with it: hotter material in a fiery whirlwind, faster material in a whirlwind.[867]

1 <Aëtius>: The Stoics

I.29.1.15

The Stoics held that thunder is a collision of clouds, lightning an ignition caused by friction, a thunderbolt a more violent flash, and a fiery whirlwind a more sluggish one.

867. The source prints tachuteran, “faster,” agreeing with “material.” The apparatus records the alternative pachuteran, “thicker,” from a parallel tradition. Although “thicker” might seem easier here, this translation retains Wachsmuth’s printed reading.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.29.1.16

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἀριστοτέλης τυφῶνας μέν, ὅταν ἐκνεφίας δινούμενος καταφέρηται. Τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα κωλυόμενον μὲν εἰς ὀρθὸν ἰέναι παρ᾽ ἀντίπνοιαν ἢ ψῦχος ἢ πάχος ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν, ἐλαυνόμενον δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ κατόπιν ἐπεισιόντος, ἀναστρέφειν εἰλούμενον ἐν τῷ νέφει κύκλῳ καὶ συγκατάγειν ἐπὶ γῆν ἑαυτῷ τὸ νέφος· εἶθ᾽ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντύχῃ φερόμενον, σφοδρῶς ἀναρπάζειν καὶ πάλιν ἀπορρίπτειν, τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάθος οἷον ἐκνεφίαν ἄπεπτον.

1 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.29.1.17

Πρηστῆρας δ᾽, ὅταν βιαίως κατιὸν ἐκπυρωθῇ τὸ πνεῦμα κατὰ τὴν φοράν, συνεμπίπρασθαι γὰρ τὸν ἀέρα <τῇ> πυρώσει χρωματιζόμενον, διὸ καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκλάμπειν· ἀναρπάζειν δὲ καὶ περιτρέπειν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτους, ὥσπερ πυρώδεις ὄντας τυφῶνας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle on whirlwinds I.29.1.16

Aristotle's view. Aristotle held that whirlwinds occur when a squall descends in a whirl. The wind, prevented from going straight by a contrary wind, cold, density, or some other cause, and driven on by what comes up behind it, turns back and coils in a circle within the cloud, bringing the cloud down to earth with it. Then, as it moves, it violently snatches up whatever it encounters and throws it down again: the phenomenon is, as it were, an undigested squall.[868]

1 Aristotle on fiery whirlwinds I.29.1.17

Fiery whirlwinds occur when the wind, descending violently, catches fire in its motion. The air burns along with it, taking its color from <the> burning, and for this reason it shines out even at night. These too snatch up and overturn things in the same way, being, as it were, whirlwinds of fire.[869]

868. Wachsmuth identifies this longer report with Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 12; the transmitted heading names Aristotle. It closely parallels Meteorology III.1. Eknephias is a squall issuing from a cloud; "undigested" preserves apepton, the metaphor for a process that has not fully developed.

869. The article before "burning" is supplied by Usener. The explanation connects the visible glow with air ignited during the violent downward movement.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3 I.29.1.18

Κεραυνὸν δ᾽, ὅταν πολὺ καὶ λεπτὸν περιληφθὲν ἐν τοῖς νέφεσι πνεῦμα πυρωθὲν ἐκθλιφθῇ καὶ μετ᾽ ἰσχυρᾶς ἐπὶ γῆν κατασκήψῃ φορᾶς, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ πάνυ λεπτὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἐπικαῖον, ἀργῆτα λέγεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς· ἐὰν δ᾽ ἧττον, ἐπικαῖον, ψολόεντα. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα καὶ πρὶν ἐκπυρῶσαι φερόμενον οἴχεσθαι διὰ τάχους, ὡς μηδ᾽ ἐπιμελᾶναί τι τῶν ὑποκειμένων· τὸν δὲ οἷον καὶ βραδύτερον, ἐπιχρῶσαι μὲν ὥσπερ ἀπ᾽ αἰθάλου, παρενεχθῆναι δὲ μηδὲν ἀφανίσαντα.

1 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.29.1.19

Διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀντιτυπήσαντα φλέγεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ εἰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀραιότητας ὑποδεξάμενα μηδὲν πάσχειν. Ἤδη γοῦν ἀσπίδος πληγείσης τακῆναι μὲν τὸ χάλκωμα, τὸ δὲ ξύλον μηδὲν παθεῖν, φθάσαντος τοῦ πνεύματος διὰ τὴν τῆς ὕλης μανότητα πρὸ τῆς καύσεως διεκδραμεῖν· καὶ δι᾽ ἱματίων ὁμοίως διελθὸν οὐ κατέκαυσεν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τρύχος ἐποίησε. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διετάττετο οὕτως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

1 Aristotle on bright and smoky thunderbolts I.29.1.18

A thunderbolt occurs when a large quantity of fine wind enclosed in the clouds is ignited, squeezed out, and hurled to earth with powerful momentum. If it is exceedingly fine and therefore does not scorch, it is called “bright,” in the poets’ language; if it is less fine and does scorch, “smoky.” The former, because of its fineness, passes swiftly on before it can set anything alight, without even blackening anything beneath it. The latter, being somewhat slower, stains things as though with soot, but passes by without destroying anything.[870]

1 Aristotle on resistance and passage I.29.1.19

Hence things that resist it are burned, while those that admit it into their pores suffer no harm. Thus, when a shield was struck, its bronze covering melted but the wood suffered no harm: because the material was porous, the wind passed through before burning could occur. Likewise, when it passed through clothing, it did not burn it up but reduced it to something like rags. Such was his account of these matters.[871]

870. The poetic names are argēs, “bright,” and psoloeis, “smoky” or “sooty.” Here the distinction concerns the effects left by the bolt: no darkening, or a soot-like stain. The account explains these effects through the fineness and speed of the moving wind.

871. The shield and clothing examples also occur in Aristotle, Meteorology III.1. The contrast is between resistance that delays passage and porosity that permits it. Arrian repeats a related explanation below, with gold inside a wooden box.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 1 I.29.2.1

Ὅσοι δὲ ξηροὶ ἀτμοί, ῥυέντες μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνέμους εἰργάσαντο, ἐν νέφει δὲ ἀποληφθέντες, ἔπειτα ῥηγνύντες βίᾳ τὸ νέφος βροντάς τε καὶ ἀστραπὰς ἐξέφηναν· ἐκπίπτοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ μέγα, διάπυροι μὲν κεραυνοί· ἀθρόοι δὲ καὶ ἡμίπυροι πρηστῆρες· ὅσοι δὲ ἔρημοι πυρὸς τυφῶνες· οἱ δὲ ἔτι ἀνειμένοι ἐκνεφίαι· κατασκήψαντες δὲ ἐς γῆν ξύμπαντα ταῦτα σκηπτοὶ κλῄζονται.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 2 I.29.2.2

Οὐ δι᾽ ἴσου δὲ αἱ κοιλότητες τῶν νεφῶν καὶ <αἱ> ῥήξεις αἱ ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς βροντὰς ἔχουσιν.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 3 I.29.2.3

Ἀστραπὴ δὲ ὑπὸ τῇ ῥήξει ἐκτρίβεται καὶ ἐξάπτει τὸ πνεῦμα, ὡς ἐκλάμψαι ἐπὶ μέγα. Καὶ γίγνεται μὲν ἀστραπὴ μετὰ βροντήν, ὀξυτέρα δὲ τοσόνδε, ὅσον ὄψις ἀκοῆς ὀξύτερον· καθότι ἀκοὴ μὲν πελαζούσης τῆς φωνῆς αἰσθάνεται, ὄψις δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον αὐτὸ ἐκπέμπεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Arrian: Dry vapors and their forms I.29.2.1

Dry vapors, flowing forth at once, produce winds; but when they are trapped in a cloud and then violently burst it open, they give rise to thunder and lightning. When they burst out on a great scale, those that are incandescent are thunderbolts; those that are compact and half burning are fiery whirlwinds; those without fire are whirlwinds; and those still loose are squalls.[872] When they strike the earth, all these are called “striking bolts.”[873]

2 Arrian: Cavities and ruptures I.29.2.2

The cavities of clouds and <the> ruptures occurring in them do not produce thunder to the same degree.[874]

2 Arrian: Why the flash is seen first I.29.2.3

Lightning is produced by friction during the rupture and ignites the wind, making it flash out over a great extent. Lightning occurs after thunder, but it is quicker by as much as sight is quicker than hearing: hearing perceives the sound as it approaches, whereas sight is sent out toward the visible object itself.[875]

872. “Still loose” translates eti aneimenoi provisionally. Wachsmuth calls the phrase corrupt and suggests, without printing it, a reading meaning “still coiling.” The Greek retains the printed words; the precise distinction intended here remains uncertain.

873. Skēptoi is related to the verb kataskēptein, to swoop or strike down. Here it is a collective name for these phenomena when they strike the ground.

874. The printed ou di’ isou, “not equally,” supplies a comparison whose exact point is not developed. It does not specify which produces more thunder. Usener supplies the article before “ruptures.”

875. This explanation treats sight as something sent out to its object, while sound must approach the hearer. It therefore differs both from the simultaneous production described under Chrysippus and from an explanation in terms of light traveling from the flash to the observer.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 4 I.29.2.4

Κεραυνὸς δὲ ὅτι πνεῦμά ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τῶνδε τεκμηριῶσαι παρέχει· ῥήγνυσί τε ἐστὶν ἃ τῶν ἐντυχόντων, καὶ * * περιδινηθῆναι οἷά τε καὶ διικνεῖται, <δι’> ὧν οὐκ ἄν τι ἄλλο, ὅ τι μὴ πνεῦμα, διέλθοι.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 5 I.29.2.5

Ὡς δὲ ἔμπυρον πνεῦμά ἐστι, δηλοῖ μὲν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἡ ὄψις ὅτῳ ἐγγὺς κατέσκηψε, πῦρ γὰρ φαίνεται. Ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἐργάζεται ἐδήλωσε· περιφλέγει γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ τῶν πελασάντων, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξάπτει πάντῃ καὶ ἀπολείπεται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἴχνη, οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ πυρὶ ἐκκαύσαντι ἐσβεσμένῳ.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 6 I.29.2.6

Ἐκνεφίας δὲ ἄνεμος, ἐπὰν δινούμενος ἐκπέσῃ, νέφους ῥαγέντος, τυφὼν κλῄζεται. Γίγνεται δὲ ἡ δίνη ὧδε· ἐπειδὰν κώλυμα ἐν τῷ νέφει ἐγχριμφθῇ τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπ’ εὐθὺ ἐκπεσεῖν τὴν πνοήν, ἀναστρέφεταί τε καὶ ἀνειλεῖται ἐς αὐτήν. Εἴργεται δὲ ὑπὸ πάχους νεφέλης ἐπ’ εὐθὺ ἐκπεσεῖν ἢ κρύους ἀποστρέψαντος ἢ ἀντιπεσούσης ἄλλης πνοῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Arrian: Evidence that a thunderbolt is wind I.29.2.4

That a thunderbolt is wind may be inferred from the following evidence: it breaks apart some of the things it encounters, and [gap in the text] capable of being whirled around; and it penetrates <through> things that nothing other than wind could pass through.[876]

2 Arrian: Evidence that the wind is fiery I.29.2.5

That it is fiery wind is shown even by its appearance to anyone near whom it has struck, for it appears as fire. Its effects have also made this clear: it scorches some of the things it approaches and sets others wholly alight, leaving traces like those left by a fire that has burned and then gone out.

2 Arrian: How a whirlwind forms I.29.2.6

A squall wind, when it bursts out in a whirl after a cloud has ruptured, is called a whirlwind. The whirl arises in this way: when an obstacle within the cloud blocks the current from issuing straight out, the current turns back and coils upon itself. It is prevented from escaping straight ahead by the thickness of the cloud, by cold that turns it back, or by another current striking against it.

876. The words following the gap no longer form a complete construction. Usener suggests lost words meaning “it whirls around the things,” but Wachsmuth prints only the gap, which remains unfilled here. The supplied di’, “through,” repairs the following clause.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 7 I.29.2.7

Οὕτω τοι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖαι θύελλαι ἀναστρέφονταί τε καὶ ἀνειλούμεναι αὖθις ἄνω ἀναφέρονται, ἐπειδὰν δὴ ἐγχρίμψας τόπος τις γῆς ἀνακόψῃ τῆς πνοῆς τὴν ἐπ᾽ εὐθὺ ὁρμήν.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 8 I.29.2.8

Καὶ δῖναι ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ὕδατος ταὐτὸ τοῦτό εἰσι· φερόμενον γὰρ εὐθείᾳ τὸ ὕδωρ οὔποτ᾽ ἂν δινηθείη· ἀντιπεσόντος δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλου πρὸς τὴν φορὰν ἀναστρέφει ἡ ῥοή, ἀναστραφεῖσα δὲ ἐς κύκλον ἐπικάμπτει ὑπὸ τῇ ῥύμῃ, ὅτι μὴ οἵα τε ἐπ᾽ εὐθὺ ἐς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἐκφέρεσθαι.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 9 I.29.2.9

Οἱ δὲ τυφῶνες καὶ τῆς νεφέλης τὸ πολὺ ἐς τὸ κάτω σὺν ἕλικι ἐπάγουσιν ἅμα σφίσι· καὶ προσπεσόντες τῇ γῇ ἀναρπάζουσιν ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντύχωσιν, ἀντικοπτομένης τῆς ῥύμης, ὡς ξὺν τῇ αὐτῇ ἕλικι ἀναστρέφεσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ναῦς ἤδη ἅμα τῷ φόρτῳ ἐμπεσόντες ἐξῆραν ἐπὶ μέγα ἔξω τῆς θαλάσσης.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Arrian: Tempests checked by the ground I.29.2.7

Thus too, at different times, tempests of different kinds turn back and, coiling upon themselves, are carried upward again when some part of the ground in their path checks the wind's straight onward rush.[877]

2 Arrian: The analogy of river eddies I.29.2.8

Eddies of water in rivers are the very same thing. Water moving in a straight course would never whirl; but when one thing or another obstructs its movement, the stream turns back. Once turned back, it bends into a circle under its own momentum, since it cannot move straight in the opposite direction.[878]

2 Arrian: The lifting force of whirlwinds I.29.2.9

Whirlwinds also bring much of the cloud down with them in a spiral. When they strike the ground, they snatch up whatever they encounter: their momentum is checked, so that they turn back in the same spiral. They have even struck ships and lifted them, cargo and all, high out of the sea.

877. The opening words are defective: pros does not fit the surviving construction. The translation gives the intelligible general sense without supplying a missing object for it. A different reconstruction in a separately edited Arrian text refers to spring; that reading is not printed in the source used here.

878. The analogy explains circular motion by obstruction and continued momentum. Rhumē, translated "momentum," is the force or rush of the moving current; it is used of both wind and water.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 10 I.29.2.10

Κεραυνῶν δὲ πολλαὶ ἰδέαι τε καὶ ὀνόματά εἰσιν. Οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ψολόεντες, οἱ δὲ ἀργῆτες κλῄζονται, σκηπτοί τε ὅσοι κατασκήπτουσι, καὶ αἰγίδες ὅσοι ἐν συστροφῇ ἀέρος καταφέρονται, ἕλικες δὲ ὅσοι ἐς ἑλικοειδῆ γραμμὴν διάττουσι.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 11 I.29.2.11

Καὶ δὴ ὅσοι μὲν μὴ πάντῃ ὀξέως ἐκπεσόντες ὕλῃ ἐνέτυχον καυσίμῳ, ἔκαυσάν τε αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῇ διατριβῇ καὶ αὐτοὶ κατεσβέσθησαν τῷ ἔργῳ· ὅσοι δὲ ξὺν πολλῷ τῷ τάχει κατέσκηψαν, οὗτοι πρὶν ἐκκαῦσαι διῆξαν ὥστε ἡμίπυρα ἐστὶν ἃ ὑπολελεῖφθαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν· οἱ δὲ καὶ αἰθαλώσαντες μόνον διῆλθον.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 12 I.29.2.12

Οἱ δὲ ἔτι καὶ τῶνδε ὀξύτεροι οὐδὲ ἓν ἐξεργάσασθαι ἔφθασαν, ἀλλὰ ἀραιᾷ μὲν ὕλῃ εἰ καὶ πάνυ καυσίμῳ ἐντυχόντες διεχώρησαν μόνον· ἀντιτύπῳ δὲ εἰ πελάσειαν ἐνσχεθέντες κατειργάσαντό τε αὐτὴν καὶ διέφθειραν· ὥστε κυτίδος μὲν ξύλου μαλθακοῦ ἀψάμενοι διῆξαν, ἀπαθῆ ἀπολιπόντες· τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἔτηξαν τὸ ἐνόν, ὅτι ἐσχέθησαν ἐν τῷ χρυσίῳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Arrian: Names of thunderbolts

I.29.2.10

There are many forms and names of thunderbolts. Some are called smoky, others bright; those that strike down are called striking bolts, those that descend in a whirling mass of air are called aegides, and those that dart along a spiral line are called spirals.[879]

2 Arrian: Speed and burning

I.29.2.11

Those which burst out without great speed and encounter combustible material burn it because they linger, and are themselves extinguished in the process. Those which strike with great speed pass through before burning it up, so that some things are left half burned by them; others pass through after merely blackening things with soot.[880]

2 Arrian: The box and its gold

I.29.2.12

Those still swifter than these have no time to produce any effect at all: when they encounter porous material, even if it is highly combustible, they merely pass through it. But if they meet resistant material, they are held within it, act upon it, and destroy it. Thus, when they struck a box of soft wood, they passed through and left it unharmed, but melted the gold inside because they were detained in the gold.[881]

879. Aegides is retained as a technical name and defined by the passage itself. The text here reads “air,” aeros, following Meineke’s correction; the manuscripts have “fire,” puros. The later distinction between smoky and bright bolts returns to the effects they leave behind.

880. “Are themselves extinguished” follows Wachsmuth’s printed katesbesthēsan, his correction of the manuscripts’ kateschethēsan, “were held.” The distinction matters because the sentence describes what happens to the bolt itself during combustion.

881. The governing contrast is between porous and resistant material. The explanation attributes the melting to the bolt’s being delayed inside the gold; it does not formulate a theory of electrical conductivity. Compare the shield example in the preceding report of Aristotle.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 13 I.29.2.13

Καὶ χιτῶνα ἤδη οὐκ ἔκαυσαν, ἀλλὰ ἐτρύχωσαν μόνον· καὶ διὰ μὲν κεράμου διῆλθον, τὸ δὲ ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτῷ διεφόρησαν. Τούτων ξυμπάντων οἱ μὲν λαμπροὶ ἀργῆτες· ὅσοι δὲ καταιθαλώσαντες τὰ πελάσαντά σφισιν ἐπαύσαντο, οὗτοι δὴ ψολόεντες ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ ἐκλήθησαν.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 14 I.29.2.14

Καὶ οἱ μὲν εὐθείᾳ κατασκήψαντες εἰς τὸ ἔμπαλιν τῇ αὐτῇ εὐθείᾳ ἀνῆξαν· οἱ δὲ ἐκ πλαγίου ἐμπεσόντες πρὸς ἴσην γωνίαν ἄνω ἀναφέρονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῖ, οἱ δὲ διπλοῖ κατέσκηψαν.

2 Ἀρριανοῦ · 15 I.29.2.15

πλεῖστοι δὲ ἦρος καὶ μετοπώρου καὶ ἅμα βιαιότεροι περί τε πλειάδος καὶ ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολήν, ὅτι ἐν κινήσει καὶ παθήμασι πολυειδέσιν ὁ ἀὴρ τῇδε τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐστίν, οἷα δὴ οὔτε ὑπὸ κρύει πεπηγὼς οὔτε ὑπὸ τῷ θερινῷ ἡλίῳ ἐκκεκαθαρμένος. Τοιγάρτοι καὶ ἐν χώραις ὅσαι νιφετώδεις καὶ ψυχραὶ καὶ ὅσαι αὖ κεκαυμέναι ὑπὸ ἡλίῳ <εἰ> κατασκήπτουσιν, οἱ κατασκήψαντες ἐν θαύμασιν ἀναφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐν Κελτοῖς καὶ παρ᾽ Αἰγυπτίοις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 29

2 Arrian: Traces left by a strike

I.29.2.13

They have also left a tunic unburned, merely reducing it to rags; and they have passed through an earthenware vessel while scattering its contents. Among all these, the luminous ones are “bright”; those that ceased after blackening with soot whatever came near them were called “smoky” from what they did.

2 Arrian: The course of the strike

I.29.2.14

Those that strike straight down dart back in the opposite direction along the same straight line; those that strike obliquely are carried upward at an equal angle. Some strike singly, others doubly.[882]

2 Arrian: Seasons and climates

I.29.2.15

They are most numerous in spring and autumn, and also more violent around the rising of the Pleiades and of Arcturus, because at this season the air is in motion and undergoes changes of many kinds: it is neither congealed by cold nor cleared by the summer sun. Accordingly, in regions that are snowy and cold, and in those scorched by the sun, <if> thunderbolts strike, the strikes are counted among marvels, as among the Celts and the Egyptians.[883]

882. The account describes an upward return following the downward strike. “At an equal angle” belongs to its comparison of oblique descent and ascent. The brief distinction between single and double strikes is not further explained.

883. The risings of the Pleiades and Arcturus serve as seasonal markers. The passage connects frequency with a changing condition of the air and rarity with climatic extremes. The conditional “if” is supplied by Usener; it keeps the claim about exceptional strikes conditional.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

3 Μίλωνος Φυσικῶν

I.29.3

Ἀστραπαί εἰσι διτταί, ἡ μὲν ἡμερινή, ἡ δὲ νυκτερινή. Γίγνεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμερινὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, ὅταν ῥαγῇ τὸ ὕδωρ ὑποφαινομένου αὐτοῦ· λαμπρὰ δὲ οὐ φαίνεται, ὥσπερ ἡ νυκτερινή, ὅτι ἐν φάει γίγνεται· ἡ δὲ νυκτερινὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄστρων γίγνεται, ὅταν ῥαγῇ τὸ ὕδωρ ὑποφαινομένων αὐτῶν· λαμπρὰ δὲ φαίνεται, ὅτι ἐν ζόφῳ γίγνεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 29

3 From Milon's Physics

I.29.3

There are two kinds of lightning, one by day and the other by night.[884] Daytime lightning is produced by the sun when the water breaks open and the sun shows through. It does not appear bright as nighttime lightning does, because it occurs in the light. Nighttime lightning is produced by the stars when the water breaks open and they show through; it appears bright because it occurs in darkness.[885]

884. The name Milon follows the printed heading, supported by manuscript P and by the author-list preserved in Photius, as cited in Wachsmuth's apparatus. The alternative Philo is not adopted. Physika is a work on natural philosophy.

885. The Greek says "water," not "cloud." This is understood here as the intervening moisture whose opening allows the sun or stars to show through. The translation retains that wording and the passage's contrast between brightness in daylight and in darkness.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

Κεφάλαιον Λ′ I.30.heading

Περὶ ἴριδος περὶ ἅλω καὶ παρηλίου καὶ ῥάβδων.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 1 I.30.1.1

Τῶν μεταρσίων παθῶν τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν γίνεται, οἷον ὄμβρος, χάλαζα, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἔμφασιν, ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχοντα ὑπόστασιν· αὐτίκα γοῦν πλεόντων ἡμῶν ἡ ἤπειρος κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. Ἔστιν οὖν κατ᾽ ἔμφασιν ἡ ἶρις.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 2 I.30.1.2

Πλάτων φησὶ Θαύμαντος αὐτὴν γεναλογῆσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὸ θαυμάσαι ταύτην. Ὅμηρος·

Ἠύτε πορφυρέην νεφέλην θνητοῖσι τανίσσει.
Καὶ ἐμυθεύσαντό τινες αὐτὴν ταύρου κεφαλὴν ἔχουσαν ἀναρροφεῖν τοὺς ποταμούς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

Chapter 30: Rainbows and halos

I.30.heading

On the rainbow, halos, mock suns, and rods.[886]

1 <Aëtius>: Substance and appearance

I.30.1.1

Of the phenomena aloft, some arise as substantial formations, such as rain and hail; others arise as appearances, having no substantial existence of their own. For example, when we are sailing, the mainland seems to move. The rainbow, then, is an appearance.[887]

1 <Aëtius>: Iris, wonder, and poetry

I.30.1.2

Plato says that people traced her descent from Thaumas because they wondered at her.[888] Homer says:

As he spreads a purple cloud for mortals.[889]
Some also told the story that she has a bull's head and sucks up rivers.

886. "Rods," rhabdoi, are straight streaks of rainbow-like color, defined at the chapter's end. A mock sun, parēlios, is an appearance resembling the sun beside it; a halo is the ring described around a luminous celestial body.

887. Hypostasis here is a thing's substantial existence, contrasted with emphasis, an appearance. The distinction concerns whether the visible phenomenon is itself a separate body. The bracketed Aëtius heading is Wachsmuth's editorial identification of the source.

888. Theaetetus 155d. Iris names both the rainbow and its divine personification. Plato connects Thaumas, her father, with thauma, "wonder," in a passage about philosophy's beginning in wonder. The present report applies that wordplay to the rainbow.

889. Iliad 17.547. The Homeric text normally has irin, "rainbow," where Wachsmuth prints nephelēn, "cloud," in Stobaeus. It also has a different form of the verb "stretch." The facing text and translation retain this version. The implied subject is Zeus, named in Homer's following line.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Ἀετίου> · 3 I.30.1.3

Πῶς οὖν γίγνεται; Ὁρῶμεν δὴ κατὰ γραμμάς, ἢ κατ᾽ εὐθείας ἢ κατὰ καμπύλας ἢ κατὰ ἀνακλωμένας, γραμμὰς δὴ λόγῳ θεωρητὰς καὶ ἀσωμάτους.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 4 I.30.1.4

Κατὰ μὲν οὖν εὐθείας ὁρῶμεν τὰ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν λίθων τῶν διαυγῶν καὶ κεράτων, λεπτομερῆ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα. <Κατὰ> καμπύλας δὲ γραμμὰς καθ᾽ ὕδατος βλέπομεν· κάμπτεται γὰρ ἡ ὄψις βίᾳ διὰ τὴν πυκνοτέραν τοῦ ὕδατος ὕλην· διὸ καὶ τὴν κώπην ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ μακρόθεν καμπτομένην βλέπομεν.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 5 I.30.1.5

Τρίτος τρόπος τοῦ βλέπειν τὰ ἀνακλώμενα, ὡς τὰ κατοπτρικά. Ἔστιν οὖν τὸ τῆς ἴριδος πάθος τοιοῦτον. δεῖ γὰρ ἐπινοῆσαι τὴν ὑγρὰν ἀναθυμίασιν εἰς νέφος μεταβάλλουσαν, εἶτα ἐκ τούτου κατὰ βραχὺ εἰς μικρὰς ῥανίδας νοτιζούσας. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ἥλιος γένηται ἐν δυσμαῖς, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἶριν ἄντικρυς ἡλίου φαίνεσθαι· τότε γὰρ ἡ ὄψις προσπεσοῦσα ταῖς ῥανίσιν ἀνακλᾶται, ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἶριν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Aëtius>: Three paths of sight I.30.1.3

How, then, does it arise? We see along lines, either straight, bent, or reflected: lines apprehensible by reason and without bodily substance.[890]

1 <Aëtius>: Straight and bent paths I.30.1.4

Along straight lines we see things in air, and things through transparent stones and horn, for all these consist of fine particles. <Along> bent lines we see things beneath water: sight is forcibly bent because the material of water is denser. This is also why, from a distance, we see an oar in the sea as bent.[891]

1 <Aëtius>: Reflection from droplets I.30.1.5

The third manner of seeing concerns reflected things, such as images in mirrors. The phenomenon of the rainbow is of this kind. We must conceive of the moist exhalation changing into cloud, and then gradually from cloud into small, moist droplets. When the sun is in the west, the rainbow must appear opposite the sun: sight then strikes the droplets and is reflected, so producing the rainbow.

890. The account distinguishes paths of vision from material bodies. Its subsequent explanation speaks of sight itself as bent or reflected. This terminology is retained, rather than replaced with an account of light rays entering the eye.

891. Wachsmuth supplies kata, “along,” before the second kind of line. Horn is included among materials through which something can be seen. The explanation attributes the bending of sight in water to the greater density of the medium.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Ἀετίου> · 6 I.30.1.6

Εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ ῥανίδες οὐ σχήματος μορφαί, ἀλλὰ χρώματος. Καὶ ἔχει τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φοινικοῦν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἁλουργὲς καὶ πορφυροῦν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον κυανοῦν καὶ πράσινον.

1 <Ἀετίου> · 7 I.30.1.7

Μήποτε τὸ φοινίκινον, ὅτι ἡ λαμπρότης τοῦ ἡλίου προσπεσοῦσα καὶ ἡ λαμπηδὼν ἀκραιφνὴς ἀνακλωμένη ἐρυθρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ φοινίκειον χρῶμα· τὸ δεύτερον μέρος ἐπιθολούμενον καὶ ἐκκαιόμενον μᾶλλον τῆς λαμπηδόνος διὰ τὰς ῥανίδας, ἁλουργές <ἄνεσις γὰρ τοῦ ἐρυθροῦ τοῦτο· ἔτι δὲ πάλιν ἐπιθολούμενον> τὸ δροσίζον εἰς πράσινον μεταβάλλει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Aëtius>: The three colors

I.30.1.6

The droplets present images of color, not of shape. The first part is scarlet, the second sea-purple and purple, and the third dark blue and green.[892]

1 <Aëtius>: Changes in radiance

I.30.1.7

Perhaps the scarlet arises because the sun's brightness strikes the droplets and its radiance, reflected without admixture, produces a red and scarlet color. The second part, becoming clouded and more burned out in its radiance through the droplets, is sea-purple.[893] <For this is a weakening of the red; and, becoming clouded yet again,> the dew-like moisture changes to green.[894]

892. The compressed Greek literally calls the droplets "forms not of shape, but of color"; the translation understands this as what their reflections present. Halourges, "sea-purple," and porphyroun, "purple," are both retained. This order differs from the scarlet, green, and sea-purple of the Aristotelian account below.

893. The printed ekkaiomenon refers to burning; "burned out in its radiance" is a tentative rendering of a difficult construction. The parallel in Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita III.5 (894e), reads ekluomenon, "weakened." That smoother wording has not replaced the supplied edition's Greek.

894. Heeren supplies the words in angle brackets from the parallel Placita account. The following drosizon, "dew-like moisture," is Diels's correction from the parallel transmitted under Galen's name; the manuscripts here have diorizon, "that which marks off." These editorial decisions are retained as printed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 239-240

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Ἀετίου> · 8 I.30.1.8

Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο δοκιμάσαι δι᾽ ἔργων· εἰ γάρ τις ἄντικρυ στὰς τοῦ ἡλίου λάβῃ ὕδωρ καὶ πυτίσῃ, αἱ δὲ ῥανίδες ἀνάκλασιν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον λάβωσιν, εὑρήσει γινομένην ἶριν. Καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες δὲ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν, ὅταν εἰς τὸν λύχνον ἀποβλέψωσιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 240

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

1 <Aëtius>: A test with sprayed water I.30.1.8

This can be tested in practice. If someone stands opposite the sun, takes water, and sprays it from the mouth, and the droplets produce a reflection toward the sun, that person will find a rainbow forming. People with inflamed eyes also experience this when they look toward a lamp.[895]

895. Putizein means to spit or spray liquid from the mouth. The second example concerns a colored appearance seen around a lamp by affected eyes. Both examples are offered as comparisons with the atmospheric phenomenon, not as separate kinds of celestial body.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1

I.30.2.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἅλω δὲ καὶ ἴριδας καὶ παρήλιον καὶ ῥάβδους καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐμφάσεις ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας γίνεσθαι· πάντα γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα τῆς ὄψεως ἀνάκλασιν, διαφέρειν δὲ τοῖς τρόποις καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ὡς ἔχειν συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάκλασιν.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 2

I.30.2.2

Ἅλω μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ ἥλιον φαίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ σελήνην καὶ καθόλου περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ τῶν ἄστρων καὶ οὐθὲν ἧττον ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτὸς καὶ περὶ μεσημβρίαν ἢ δείλην· ἔωθεν δ᾽ ἐλαττονάκις καὶ περὶ δύσιν. Συμβαίνειν δ᾽, ὅταν διὰ τοῦ πέριξ ἀέρος ἀχλυώδους ὄντος ἐπιλάμπηται τὸ φῶς αὐτῶν, ὥσθ᾽ ὅλον ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν κύκλον· περιφανῆ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ σφαιρικὴν κατὰ τὴν ἔμφασιν τὴν ἅλω.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 3

I.30.2.3

Ταύτης δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐπιμένουσαν ὑετὸν σημαίνειν, τὴν δὲ διασπασθεῖσαν πνεῦμα, τὴν δὲ μαραινομένην εὐδίαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Arius Didymus>: Aristotle on reflection I.30.2.1

Aristotle's view. Halos, rainbows, mock suns, rods, and the other phenomena that are appearances arise from the same cause. All are reflections of sight, differing in their modes, in the surfaces from which the reflection occurs, and in the conditions under which it takes place.[896]

2 Aristotle: Where halos appear I.30.2.2

A halo appears around the sun and the moon, and generally around bright stars, no less by day than by night, at midday or in the afternoon; less often in the morning and around sunset. It occurs when their light shines through the surrounding air while it is hazy, so that the whole circle is seen: the halo is visible all around and round in appearance.[897]

2 Aristotle: Halos as weather signs I.30.2.3

A halo that persists signifies rain; one that breaks apart, wind; and one that fades, fair weather.[898]

896. Wachsmuth identifies the source as Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 14. The heading names Aristotle; the report paraphrases material from Meteorology III.2-6. Its successive explanations concern the differing conditions of reflection.

897. Sphairikē, literally "spherical," describes the halo's appearance here. The preceding reference to seeing the whole circle supplies the context for "round"; the report treats it as an appearance, not as a solid sphere.

898. Meteorology III.3 gives the corresponding explanation in terms of continued condensation, dispersal by wind, and the failure of the moisture to condense further. These are the weather signs asserted by the ancient account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 4 I.30.2.4

Ἶριν δὲ περὶ μόνον ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην συνίστασθαι, γίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ, ὀλιγάκις δὲ καὶ πάνυ διὰ πολλοῦ. Κύκλον δὲ μηδέποτε φαίνεσθαι τῆς ἴριδος μηδὲ μεῖζον ἡμικυκλίου τμῆμα. Ποικίλην δ᾽ ἔχειν τὴν ἔμφασιν διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὄψεως ἀνάκλασιν φοινικοῦν καὶ πράσινον καὶ ἁλουργὸν προσπίπτειν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς χρῶμα.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 5 I.30.2.5

Φοινικοῦν μέν, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρὸν ἐν μέλανι καὶ διὰ μέλανος ὁρώμενον τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖ χρόαν. τοῖς γοῦν θεωμένοις τὸν ἥλιον δι᾽ ὁμίχλης ἢ διὰ καπνοῦ δοκεῖν ἐρυθρὸν εἶναι· ἢ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν χλωρῶν ξύλων φλόγα πεφοινιγμένην διὰ τὸ πολὺν αὐτῇ καταμεμῖχθαι καπνόν.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 6 I.30.2.6

κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐξωτάτω καὶ μείζονα περιφέρειαν τῆς ἴριδος ἐμφαίνειν τὸ φοινικοῦν· διὰ γὰρ μέλανος τοῦ νέφους ἀνακλωμένην τὴν ὄψιν πρὸς λαμπρότατον ὄντα τὸν ἥλιον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοιούδε χρώματος. Τὴν δὲ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην περιφέρειαν διὰ τὴν τῆς ὄψεως ἀσθένειαν τό τε πράσινον καὶ τὸ ἁλουργὲς ἐμφαίνειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 Aristotle: The rainbow's extent and colors I.30.2.4

A rainbow forms only in connection with the sun and moon. It occurs at night too, but rarely and at very long intervals. The rainbow never appears as a complete circle or as an arc greater than a semicircle. Its appearance is varied because, as sight is reflected, scarlet, green, and sea-purple color reaches us from it.[899]

2 Aristotle: Brightness seen through darkness I.30.2.5

It is scarlet because something bright, seen against darkness and through darkness, produces such a hue. Thus the sun appears red to those who view it through mist or smoke; or the flame from green wood appears scarlet because much smoke is mixed with it.[900]

2 Aristotle: The outer and inner bands I.30.2.6

For this reason the outermost and largest band of the rainbow displays scarlet: sight, reflected through the darkness of the cloud toward the sun in its great brilliance, apprehends a color of this kind. The second and third bands display green and sea-purple because of the weakness of sight.[901]

899. "In connection with" renders peri here without making the rainbow a ring around the sun, as the halo is. The account includes the rare lunar rainbow and asserts the semicircular limit. Its three color terms and their order are preserved.

900. "Green wood" means fresh, unseasoned wood. The comparison makes the dark intervening material responsible for the changed appearance of brightness. The two examples are joined by the printed ē, "or," rather than a conjectured "and."

901. The differing colors are explained through a weakening of sight in reflection. "Bands" renders the successive periphereiai, the arcs or circumferences distinguished within the bow.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 7 I.30.2.7

Τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον εἶναι τὴν ἶριν ἔμφασιν ἡλίου τμήματος ἢ σελήνης ἐν νέφει κοίλῳ καὶ δεδροσισμένῳ κατὰ κύκλου περιφέρειαν ὁρωμένην. Γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε διπλήν, ὡς τὴν ἑτέραν ἀμαυροτέραν φαίνεσθαι καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας ἱσταμένην τῇ προτέρᾳ καὶ τῇ θέσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἀντεστραμμένην.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 Aristotle: The double rainbow I.30.2.7

In general, the rainbow is an appearance of a portion of the sun or moon in a hollow cloud moistened with dew, seen along the circumference of a circle. Sometimes it is double: the second appears fainter, is consistently set over against the first, and has its colors arranged in the reverse order.[902]

902. The reversal concerns the order of the colored bands in the two bows. Meteorology III.4 likewise distinguishes the fainter outer rainbow and its reversed sequence. The present report gives the description without reproducing the full optical argument.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 8 I.30.2.8

Παρηλίους δὲ καὶ ῥάβδους γίνεσθαι μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας, οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίως ἔχοντος τοῦ νέφους. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀχλυῶδες ᾖ καὶ ὁμαλές, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὑδατῶδες καὶ πυκνόν, ὡς ἀπὸ χαλκοῦ κατόπτρου λείου κλωμένην πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον τὴν ὄψιν λευκοῦ ποιεῖν φαντασίαν. παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἡλίῳ κατά τε τὴν χρόαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα φαίνεσθαι τὸν παρήλιον.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 9 I.30.2.9

τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὁμαλότητα τοῦ νέφους αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ χρώματος, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνάκλασιν τῆς ὄψεως τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου, διὰ τῆς ἀχλυώδους ἐμφάσεως προσπίπτουσαν ἀθρόως πρὸς πεπυκνωμένον, ὥσπερ ἔνοπτρον, οὐδέπω μὲν ὂν ὕδωρ, ἐγγὺς δ᾽ ὑπάρχον τῆς πρὸς ὕδωρ μεταβολῆς.

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 10 I.30.2.10

διὸ καὶ σημεῖον ὕδατος εἶναι τὸν παρήλιον· καὶ μᾶλλον γε τὸν νότιον τοῦ βορείου παρὰ τὸ μᾶλλον μεταβάλλειν εἰς ὕδωρ τὸν νότιον ἀέρα τοῦ πρὸς ἄρκτον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 Aristotle: The appearance of a mock sun

I.30.2.8

Mock suns and rods arise from the same cause, though the cloud is not in the same condition. When it is hazy and uniform, and also watery and dense, sight is bent back toward the sun as from a smooth bronze mirror and produces an appearance of white. For the mock sun appears similar to the sun in both color and shape.[903]

2 Aristotle: The cloud as a mirror

I.30.2.9

The uniformity of the cloud accounts for the color, and the reflection of sight for the sun's appearance through the haze. This reflection falls all together upon something condensed, like a mirror, which is not yet water but is close to changing into water.[904]

2 Aristotle: A sign of rain

I.30.2.10

Hence a mock sun is also a sign of rain, and a southern one more so than a northern one, because southern air changes into water more readily than the air toward the north.[905]

903. The cloud acts as the reflecting surface. Wachsmuth retains katoptron, "mirror," against Diels's proposed deletion, observing that the passage is a paraphrase of Aristotle rather than an exact quotation.

904. The Greek construction is compressed and uneven. The translation takes "the sun's appearance through the haze" as what the second clause explains, and "falls all together" with the reflected sight. Wachsmuth notes that part of the phrase is absent from manuscript P; the wording printed in his text is retained.

905. The weather sign follows from the preceding claim that the reflecting cloud is close to becoming water. "Southern" and "northern" distinguish the positions of the mock suns in this explanation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 11 I.30.2.11

Γίνεσθαί τε περὶ τε [τὰς] ἀνατολὰς τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ περὶ δύσεις, οὐκ ἄνωθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων, καθάπερ καὶ τὰς ῥάβδους. Εἶναι δὲ δὴ τὰς καλουμένας ῥάβδους ἰριοειδεῖς εὐθείας ἐμφάσεις περὶ τὸν ἀέρα συνισταμένας δι᾽ ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν ἐνοπτριζόντων νεφῶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 30

2 Aristotle: Position and the nature of rods

I.30.2.11

Mock suns occur around sunrise and sunset, at the sides rather than above, as rods do also. The so-called rods are straight, rainbow-like appearances formed in the air through the unevenness of the reflecting clouds.[906]

906. The Greek retains Wachsmuth's brackets around the rejected article tas. The final distinction is between the uniform reflecting cloud of a mock sun and the uneven cloud responsible for the colored streaks called rods.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

Κεφάλαιον ΛΑ′ I.31.heading

Περὶ νεφῶν ὁμίχλης ὑετῶν δρόσου χιόνος πάχνης χαλάζης.

1 Ἀναξιμένης I.31.1

Ἀναξιμένης νέφη μὲν γίνεσθαι παχυνθέντος ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ ἀέρος, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπισυναχθέντος ἐκθλίβεσθαι τοὺς ὄμβρους· χιόνα δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὸ καταφερόμενον ὕδωρ παγῇ· χάλαζαν δ᾽ ὅταν συμπεριληφθῇ τι τῷ ὑγρῷ πνευματικόν.

2 Ἀναξαγόρας I.31.2

Ἀναξαγόρας νέφη μὲν καὶ χιόνα παραπλησίως, χάλαζαν δ᾽ ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν παγέντων νεφῶν προωσθῇ τινα πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ἃ δὴ ταῖς καταφοραῖς ἀποψυχρόμενα στρογγυλοῦται.

3 Μητρόδωρος I.31.3

Μητρόδωρος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑδατώδους ἀναφορᾶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος συνίστασθαι τὰ νέφη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

Chapter 31: Clouds and precipitation I.31.heading

On clouds, mist, rain, dew, snow, frost, and hail.[907]

1 Anaximenes I.31.1

Anaximenes says that clouds form when the air thickens further; when it is drawn still more closely together, showers are squeezed out. Snow forms when the falling water freezes, and hail when something airy is enclosed together with the moisture.[908]

2 Anaxagoras I.31.2

Anaxagoras gives a similar account of clouds and snow. Hail forms when portions of frozen clouds are thrust toward the earth; as these cool during their descent, they become rounded.[909]

3 Metrodorus I.31.3

Metrodorus says that clouds are formed by the air from the upward movement of watery matter.[910]

907. Pachnē is frost, often rendered “hoarfrost.” The chapter preserves differing accounts of its relation to dew and snow; these distinctions are retained in the separate reports. Wachsmuth identifies the source of the first five numbered excerpts as Aëtius, III.4.

908. The printed text assigns freezing falling water to snow and the enclosure of airy matter to hail. Wachsmuth notes that “snow” and “hail” appear to have exchanged places, comparing Hippolytus, Refutation I.7.7, and the report below. The translation preserves his printed order.

909. “A similar account” is the report’s brief reference to what precedes; it supplies no further account of clouds or snow here. The formation and rounding of hail are stated separately.

910. The air is the agent in the printed reading hypo tou aeros, “by the air.” Diels’s correction hypo replaces the manuscript’s epi. Anaphora describes the rising or carrying upward of the watery material.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

4 Ξενοφάνης I.31.4

Ξενοφάνης ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότητος ὡς ἀρκτικῆς αἰτίας τὰν τοῖς μεταρσίοις συμβαίνειν· ἀνελκομένου γὰρ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὸ γλυκὺ διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν διακρινόμενον νέφη τε συνιστάνειν ὁμιχλούμενον καὶ καταστάζειν ὄμβρους ὑπὸ πιλήσεως καὶ διατμίζειν τὰ πνεύματα. γράφει γὰρ διαρρήδην·

πηγὴ δ᾽ ἔστι θάλασσ᾽ ὕδατος.

5 Ἐπίκουρος I.31.5.1

Ἐπίκουρος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων· στρογγυλαίνεσθαι <δὲ> τὴν χάλαζαν <καὶ> τὸν ὑετὸν ἀπὸ τῆς μακρᾶς καταφορᾶς ὑποπεπλασμένον.

5 · ῥῆσις ἀθετουμένη I.31.5.2

[Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔμπτωσιν φωτὸς εἰς νέφος.]

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

4 Xenophanes I.31.4

Xenophanes says that phenomena aloft occur through the sun's heat as their initiating cause. When moisture is drawn up from the sea, the fresh portion separates because of the fineness of its particles, forms clouds as it becomes mist, drips down in showers under compression, and gives off winds as vapor.[911] For he writes expressly:

The sea is the source of water.[912]

5 Epicurus I.31.5.1

Epicurus says that they arise from atoms. <And> hail becomes rounded, <as does> rain, molded in the course of its long descent.[913]

5 continued: Rejected wording I.31.5.2

[Empedocles: light falling into a cloud.][914]

911. Glyky, literally "sweet," distinguishes the fresh component from the sea's salt water. The report traces cloud, rain, and wind to moisture raised by solar heat. The compressed final phrase, diatmizein ta pneumata, presents the winds as a vaporous outflow.

912. Wachsmuth cites this as Xenophanes, fragment 11 in Karsten's edition. It is the opening of the verse also known as fragment B30. Only the words quoted here are included.

913. The opening has "atoms," atomōn, not the conjectured atmōn, "vapors." The two connectives in angle brackets are supplied in the edition. The final participle is masculine, agreeing with "rain"; the translation retains that connection in this compressed statement.

914. Wachsmuth brackets this entire sentence as rejected, following Diels, who regards it as an erroneous repetition from chapter 29. It is reproduced within brackets on both sides so that its status remains visible. It should not be read as a secure explanation of rain or hail by Empedocles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

5 · συνέχεια μετὰ χάσμα I.31.5.3

* * καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν ἀποτελεῖν παρῶσαν τὰ νέφη, ὄμβρους δὲ διάχεαν, χάλαζαν δὲ πιλῆσαν, χιόνα δὲ συμπεριλαβόμενόν τι τοῦ ἀερώδους.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

5 continued: A fragment after a gap

I.31.5.3

* * and it produces wind by pushing the clouds aside, showers by dispersing them, hail by compressing them, and snow by enclosing some airy matter with them.[915]

915. The printed gap leaves the subject and attribution uncertain. Karsten proposed a lost reference to Aristotle's dry, smoky exhalation; Diels connected the words with Epicurus, an interpretation Wachsmuth rejects. Neither attribution has been inserted into the text. The participles describe what the missing subject does to the clouds.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.31.6.1

<Ἀριστοτέλους.> Ἐκ δὲ τῆς ὑγρᾶς καὶ ἀτμώδους <ἀναθυμιάσεως> ὑετούς τε καὶ δρόσους καὶ πάχνας, ὁμίχλας τε καὶ νέφη καὶ χιόνας καὶ χαλάζας.

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 2 I.31.6.2

ὑετοὺς μὲν γίνεσθαι τῆς ἀναδιδομένης ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀτμίδος <ἐν> τοῖς ἄνω τόποις συνισταμένης κατὰ πύκνωσιν καὶ τρεπομένης εἰς ὕδωρ, εἶτα φερομένης ἀθρόως ἐπὶ γῆν διὰ τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τοῦ ἀναγαγόντος αὐτὴν θερμοῦ· σκεδασθείσης δ᾽ εἰς μικρὰ μόρια καλεῖσθαι ψεκάδας·

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 3 I.31.6.3

πρὸ τοῦ δὲ μετεωρισθῆναι σφόδρα κατενεχθείσης διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀναγαγόντος αὐτὴν πυρὸς ὀλιγότητα προσονομάζεσθαι δρόσον καὶ πάχνην· πάχνην μέν, ὅταν παγῇ πρὶν εἰς ὕδωρ συγκριθῆναι (γίνεσθαι δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ ἐν τόποις μᾶλλον χειμερινοῖς)· δρόσον δ᾽, ὅταν τὸ συνιστάμενον ὑγρὸν νύκτωρ ψυχθὲν ἅμα τοῖς ὄρθροις ἐπὶ γῆν ἐπιφέρεται·

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Arius Didymus>: The moist exhalation I.31.6.1

<Aristotle's view.> From the moist and vaporous <exhalation> come rain, dew, frost, mist, clouds, snow, and hail.[916]

6 <Aristotle>: Rain and drizzle I.31.6.2

Rain forms when the vapor rising from the earth gathers through condensation <in> the upper regions and turns into water. It then falls in a mass to earth because the heat that raised it has left it. When it is scattered into small portions, it is called drizzle.[917]

6 <Aristotle>: Dew and frost I.31.6.3

When it descends before rising very high, because there is little of the fire that raised it, it receives the names dew and frost. It is frost when it freezes before gathering into water (this occurs in winter and in places with a more wintry climate); it is dew when the moisture that is forming cools during the night and settles on the earth at dawn.[918]

916. Wachsmuth identifies Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 11, as the source. "Aristotle's" is supplied by Diels and "exhalation" by Wachsmuth. The report summarizes Meteorology I.9-12, with the compression and difficulties noted below.

917. The account makes the withdrawal of the raising heat a cause of the water's descent. Psekades are fine rain-drops, collectively "drizzle." Diels supplies the preposition en, "in."

918. Following Wachsmuth's note, sphodra, "very," is taken with "rising," not with the force of descent. Here frost is vapor frozen before it becomes liquid water. Chrysippus below defines frost as frozen dew; the different explanations have not been harmonized.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 4 I.31.6.4

διὸ καὶ πλείστην πίπτειν δρόσον καὶ πάχνην περὶ τὰ ἕλη καὶ τὰς λίμνας καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς ἐναύλους καὶ κοίλους τῶν τόπων· ἀνάγεσθαί τε γὰρ πλεῖστον ὑγρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων χωρίων καὶ καταψύχεσθαι μᾶλλον.

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 5 I.31.6.5

Τὴν δ᾽ ἀθρόαν ἀνάδοσιν λέγεσθαι τῆς ἀτμίδος ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν παχυνθεῖσαν ὁμίχλην, οἷον ἀραιὰν καὶ ἄγονον ὕδατος νεφέλην, ὡς ἂν προσυνισταμένην ταύτης καὶ προδιαλυομένην καὶ σημεῖον οὖσαν εὐδίας· τὴν δὲ μετεωρισθεῖσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον καὶ συγκριθεῖσαν νεφέλην.

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 6 I.31.6.6

πάντα δὲ περὶ γῆν ταῦτα γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πόρρω τὴν ἀτμίδα μετεωρίζεσθαι κατισχύειν. ἐν γοῦν τοῖς ὑψηλοτάτοις ὄρεσιν οὐδὲν γίνεσθαι τούτων. αἴτιον <δ᾽> ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν κοίλων ἀνάγεται καὶ ἐφύδρων ἡ ἀτμὶς τόπων· ὥστε καθάπερ φορτίον πλεῖον φέρουσαν ἢ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν τὴν ἀνάγουσαν θερμότητα μὴ δύνασθαι μετεωρίζειν ἐπὶ πολὺν ἄγαν τόπον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγὺς οὖσαν ἔτι τῆς γῆς μεθιέναι πάλιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 244-245

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Aristotle>: Where dew and frost gather

I.31.6.4

Hence dew and frost fall most abundantly around marshes, lakes, and rivers, and especially in places with channels and hollows. For the greatest amount of moisture rises from such places, and it cools more.

6 <Aristotle>: Mist and cloud

I.31.6.5

A mass of rising vapor, when only slightly thickened, is called mist: a kind of thin cloud that bears no water, forming earlier than cloud and dispersing earlier, and serving as a sign of fair weather. When it rises farther and gathers together, it is called cloud.[919]

6 <Aristotle>: The burden carried by heat

I.31.6.6

All these occur near the earth because the vapor cannot rise very far. On the highest mountains, at any rate, none of them occurs. <And> the reason is that vapor rises chiefly from hollow, water-rich places: the heat that raises it is like something carrying a burden beyond its strength. It cannot lift it to a very great height, but, while it is still near the earth, lets it fall back upon it.[920]

919. “Bears no water” renders agonos hydatos, literally “barren of water”: the mist does not yield rain in this explanation. Its earlier formation and dispersal are stated relative to the cloud.

920. The claim about “all these” is broader than Aristotle’s immediate discussion of frost in Meteorology I.10. The wording of this abridgment is retained. Meineke supplies de, “and.” Words obscured in the supplied scan at the start of p. 245 were checked in the University of Toronto scan of the same 1884 edition.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 244-245

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 7 I.31.6.7

Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὰ νέφη τόπου τρία φοιτᾶν σώματα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὕδωρ καὶ χιόνα καὶ χάλαζαν· ὧν δύο μὲν ἀναλογίας ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα παρὰ τὸ διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας γίνεσθαι τοῖς κάτω, διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι. Χιόνα γὰρ καὶ πάχνην εἶναι ταὐτόν, καὶ ὑετὸν καὶ δρόσον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πολύ, τὸ δ᾽ ὀλίγον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὑετὸν ἐκ πολλῆς ἀτμίδος γίνεσθαι ψυχομένης, τὴν δὲ δρόσον ἐξ ὀλίγης, ἐφήμερον γὰρ αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὴν σύστασιν.

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 8 I.31.6.8

ὁμοίως χιόνα καὶ πάχνην· χιόνα μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῆξιν νέφους, ἀτμίδος δὲ τὴν πάχνην· διὸ ἢ χώρας ἢ ὥρας ψυχρᾶς σημεῖον γίνεσθαι τὴν χιόνα.

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 9 I.31.6.9

Χάλαζαν δὲ κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς εὐδιεινοτέραις συμβαίνειν χώραις ἢ ὥραις, θέρους γοῦν μάλιστα καὶ μετοπώρου γίνεσθαι, χειμῶνος δ᾽ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὅταν ἧττον ᾖ ψῦχος· εἶναι δὲ τὴν χάλαζαν τοῦ καταφερομένου πῆξιν ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν ὕδατος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 245

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Aristotle>: Rain and dew compared

I.31.6.7

From the region of the clouds three bodies come down to us: water, snow, and hail. Two of these have corresponding counterparts, since they arise from the same causes as the phenomena below, differing in degree and in greater or smaller quantity. For snow and frost are the same, as are rain and dew, except that the one is abundant and the other scanty. Rain forms from much vapor as it cools, whereas dew forms from little, since its gathering takes place within a day.[921]

6 <Aristotle>: Snow and frost compared

I.31.6.8

The same applies to snow and frost: snow is the freezing of cloud, frost the freezing of vapor. Hence snow is a sign of either a cold region or a cold season.

6 <Aristotle>: Hail and the seasons

I.31.6.9

Hail, by contrast, occurs in milder regions or seasons. It occurs chiefly in summer and autumn, rarely in winter, and then when the cold is less intense. Hail is the freezing of water that is falling from the clouds.[922]

921. The two pairs are snow with frost, and rain with dew. Hail has no lower counterpart in this comparison. “Within a day” renders ephēmeron, referring to the brief period in which the vapor for dew gathers. The obscured beginning of this paragraph was verified in the same-edition Toronto scan.

922. The report prints “summer and autumn,” which is preserved. Aristotle’s fuller discussion in Meteorology I.12 gives spring and autumn the greater frequency, with summer less frequent. The abridgment’s seasonal statement has not been silently altered to match the parallel.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Ἀριστοτέλους> · 10 I.31.6.10

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς καὶ καπνώδους πόρρω διατεινούσης καὶ μετεωριζομένης, ὡς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις διὰ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς τῶν οὐρανίων ἐμπίπρασθαι, τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

6 <Aristotle>: The dry exhalation

I.31.6.10

From the dry and smoky exhalation, extending far and rising aloft, so that for this reason it is often ignited by the movement of the heavenly bodies, each of the things mentioned earlier is produced.[923]

923. This abrupt conclusion shifts back to dry exhalation. “The things mentioned earlier” has no clear immediate reference in this excerpt on moist phenomena. Wachsmuth attributes the confused connection to Stobaeus’s excerpting. The sentence is retained, with its reference left unresolved.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

7 <Ἀρείου Διδύμου> · 1 I.31.7.1

Χρυσίππου. Χρύσιππος ἔφησε τὴν ὁμίχλην νέφος διακεχυμένον, ἢ ἀέρα πάχος ἔχοντα· δρόσον δὲ ἐξ ὁμίχλης καταφερόμενον ὑγρόν· ὑετὸν δὲ φορὰν ὕδατος ἐκ νεφῶν· ὄμβρον δὲ λάβρου ὕδατος καὶ πολλοῦ ἐκ νεφῶν φοράν·

7 Χρυσίππου · 2 I.31.7.2

χάλαζαν δὲ ὑετοῦ πεπηγότος διάθρυψιν· χιόνα δὲ νέφος πεπηγὸς ἢ νέφους πῆξιν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πεπηγὸς ὕδωρ κρύσταλλον· πάχνην δὲ δρόσον πεπηγυῖαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

7 <Arius Didymus>: Chrysippus's definitions I.31.7.1

Chrysippus's view. Chrysippus said that mist is dispersed cloud, or air possessing thickness; dew is moisture descending from mist; rain is a fall of water from clouds; and a downpour is a fall of violent and abundant water from clouds.[924]

7 Chrysippus: Frozen forms of water I.31.7.2

Hail is the breaking up of frozen rain; snow is frozen cloud, or the freezing of cloud; water frozen on the earth is ice; and frost is frozen dew.[925]

924. The source is identified editorially as Arius Didymus's epitome, physical fragment 35. Hyetos is rain; ombros is distinguished here as a more forceful, abundant fall, rendered "downpour."

925. Krystallos here means ice, not rock crystal. The sequence distinguishes a process, the breaking up or freezing of material, from the resulting frozen body; both formulations of snow are retained.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 1 I.31.8.1

Ἀρριανός φησι τὴν ὁμίχλην, <ὅτι> ἡ μὲν πρὸ νέφους ξυνίσταται πρὶν ἐξαναστῆναι, ἐπιπολὺ δὲ ἀπὸ νέφους ἐκχυθέντος καὶ σκεδασθέντος· γίγνεται δὲ ταῦτα, εἰ μὴ κρατήσειεν αὐτῶν ὁ ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα ὅσα ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανός.

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 2 I.31.8.2

Ἀπὸ δὲ νεφελῶν, ὅσαι μὲν μὴ ἄγαν πιληθεῖσαι ξυνέστησαν, ψεκάδες καταφέρονται ἐπὶ γῆν καὶ εἰς ταύτας διαλύονται ὁμίχλαι τε καὶ νεφελῶν ὅσαι μανώτεραι· ὅσαι δὲ ἐπὶ μέγα ξυστᾶσαι εἰς ὕδωρ μετέβαλον, ὑετοὺς ἐκ νεφῶν γεννῶσι.

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 3 I.31.8.3

Καὶ ὁμίχλαι μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῇ γῇ ἐφιζάνουσιν, ἅτε δὴ κεχυμένης τε ἔτι καὶ ἀξυστάτου τῆς ἀτμίδος· αἱ νεφέλαι δὲ αἴρονται εἰς τὸ ἄνω, οὐ μὴν ὑπὲρ εἴκοσίν γε ἀπὸ γῆς σταδίους οὐδὲ αὗται ἀναφέρονται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Arrian: Two origins of mist

I.31.8.1

Arrian says of mist <that> some forms before cloud, before rising up, but much of it comes from cloud that has spread out and dispersed. These things occur if the sun, the other stars in the sky, and the sky itself do not prevail over them.[926]

8 Arrian: Drizzle and rain

I.31.8.2

From clouds that have formed without being too closely compressed, fine drops descend to earth; both mists and the less dense clouds dissolve into these. But clouds that have gathered in a great mass and changed into water produce rains from clouds.

8 Arrian: How high clouds rise

I.31.8.3

Mists generally settle upon the earth, since their vapor is still dispersed and has not gathered together. Clouds rise upward, though even these are not carried more than twenty stadia above the earth.[927]

926. Usener supplies hoti, “that.” The supplied image loses several words near the top of p. 246; they were verified in the Toronto scan of the same edition. The printed indicative xynistatai and the qualification about the sun, stars, and sky are retained.

927. The stadion is an ancient measure of length. The stated ceiling of twenty stadia belongs to this account and is preserved as an ancient claim. The contrast rests on the dispersed state of mist and the gathered state of cloud.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 4 I.31.8.4

Ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀρῶν ὅσα ὑπὲρ εἴκοσί γε ἀπὸ γῆς σταδίους ἀνέχει ἐς εὐθὺ (ἔστι δὲ καὶ εὐαρίθμητα ταῦτα ἔν γε τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς τόποις) οὔτε ὑόμενα ὤφθη ποτὲ οὔτε καταπνεόμενα, οὐδὲ νεφέλη ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἰζάνουσα.

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 5 I.31.8.5

ἀλλὰ τῆς Οἴτης γε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀκρωρείᾳ θύεσθαι ὅσα ἔτη λόγος καὶ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ Φιλοκτήτῃ εἰς μνήμην τοῦ παλαιοῦ παθήματος καὶ τὴν τέφραν ἐπὶ τῇ πυρκαιᾷ ἐν χώρᾳ μένειν.

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 6 I.31.8.6

εἶναι γὰρ τὸν ἄνω ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα λεπτόν τε ἤδη καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ αὐγοειδῆ· καὶ ταῦτα διαφορεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀτμοὺς ὅσοι πορρωτέρω ὑπεραναφέρονται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Arrian: The highest mountains

I.31.8.4

That mountains rising vertically more than twenty stadia above the earth (and these are few in number, at least in our part of the world) have never been seen receiving rain or being swept by wind, nor has a cloud been seen above them or settling on them.[928]

8 Arrian: The ashes on Oeta

I.31.8.5

Indeed, there is a report that sacrifices are offered each year on the summit of Oeta to both Heracles and Philoctetes, in memory of the suffering of old, and that the ash on the pyre remains in its place.[929]

8 Arrian: The air above

I.31.8.6

For the air high above the earth is already fine, clear, and luminous; and in this way the vapors that are carried farther upward are dispersed.[930]

928. The clause begins abruptly with hoti, “that.” Wachsmuth sees this and the repeated hoti clauses below as traces of an epitomator’s summary. The fragmentary form is retained rather than recast as a direct observation by Arrian.

929. The story links the two heroes with Heracles’s pyre on Oeta. Here the supposedly undisturbed ash serves as evidence for the claim that the mountaintop is beyond wind and rain. Logos marks the account as something reported.

930. Wachsmuth retains tauta in the sense of tautē, “in this way,” instead of inserting dia, “because of these things.” The luminous upper air is part of the explanation given for the dispersal of vapor.

BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 7 I.31.8.7

Ὅση δὲ λεπτὴ ἀτμὶς μὴ ἐπὶ μέγα ἀρθεῖσα ἐσκεδάσθη, ἀλλὰ ψυχθεῖσα κατηνέχθη ἐπὶ γῆν, δρόσος γίγνεται· πρὸς ἡλίου δὲ ἐπικαυθεῖσα ἐρυθαίνεται ἢ μελαίνεται· καὶ τοῦτο μίλτον <ἢ> φοινιάδα μὲν τὸ ἐρυθρὸν αὐτοῦ, ἐρυσίβην δὲ ὅ τι περ καὶ μέλαν καλοῦσι·

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 8 I.31.8.8

παγεῖσα δὲ καὶ πεσοῦσα ἐπὶ γῆν, πάχνη γίνεται. Καὶ ἔτι ὅ τι περ πάχνη πρὸς δρόσον, τοῦτο χιὼν πρὸς ὑετόν. Ὅτι καὶ τὸ νέφος ξυνελθὸν μὲν ἄνευ πήξεως εἰς ὑετὸν διακρίνεται, παγὲν δὲ εἰς νιφετὸν ξυνάγεται.

8 Ἀρριανοῦ · 9 I.31.8.9

Ὅτι πρὶν παντελῶς ἐς ὕδωρ ξυστῆναι τὴν νεφέλην φθάνει παγῆναι ἐς χιόνα, καὶ ἡ χρόα τῆς χιόνος τεκμηριῶσαι παρέχει, λευκή τε γὰρ καὶ αὐγοειδής ἐστιν· ὅτι πρὶν τραπῆναι ἐς ὕδωρ παγεῖσα θρύπτεται, οἷα δὴ οὐ σμικρὰν μοῖραν [οὐ] πνεύματος φωτοειδοῦς ὄντος ξυνεπιλαμβάνουσα· ἔνθεν τε ἀφρῷ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τὴν χρόαν ἔοικεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἀφρῷ πολύ τι ἔνι πνεύματος· δηλοῦσι δὲ πομφόλυγες αἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφρῶν οἷα δὴ ἐπιζέουσαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

8 Arrian: Dew and its colors

I.31.8.7

Any fine vapor that, instead of rising far and dispersing, cools and descends to earth becomes dew. Scorched by the sun, it turns red or black. They call its red form miltos <or> phoinias, and whatever is black erysibē.[931]

8 Arrian: Frost and snow

I.31.8.8

When it freezes and falls to earth, it becomes frost. And further, snow stands to rain just as frost does to dew. That cloud too, when it gathers without freezing, separates into rain, but when frozen gathers into snowfall.[932]

8 Arrian: Why snow is white

I.31.8.9

That the cloud freezes into snow before it has fully gathered into water can also be inferred from snow's color, for it is white and luminous. This is because it freezes and breaks up before turning into water, enclosing with it no small share of airy matter, which is luminous. Hence its color very closely resembles foam, since foam too contains a great deal of airy matter, as the bubbles seething upon it show.[933]

931. The Greek names are retained because their ordinary senses do not fully explain this passage: miltos denotes red ochre or ruddle, while erysibē denotes blight or mildew; phoinias is the red form named here. The text explains these appearances as altered dew. Usener restores milton and supplies ē, "or"; these printed decisions are retained.

932. The printed kai eti, "and further," is retained, as is the abrupt "that" clause. The comparison distinguishes condensation without freezing from the frozen condition, rather than treating every form of falling water alike.

933. The Greek retains brackets around the rejected second ou, "not." Pneuma is rendered "airy matter" in this explanation of snow and foam; the report calls it light-like or luminous. The English follows the argument as printed without replacing it with a modern account of reflected light.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

9 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 1 I.31.9.1

Τὸ πυρὶ μεμιγμένον ὕδωρ, ὅσον λεπτόν, ὑγρόν τε διὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν κυλινδούμενον ἐπὶ γῆς ὑγρὸν λέγεται, μαλακόν τε αὐτῷ τὰς βάσεις ἧττον ἑδραίας οὔσας ἢ τὰς γῆς ὑπείκειν·

9 Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου · 2 I.31.9.2

τοῦτο ὅταν πυρὸς ἀποχωρισθὲν ἀέρος τε μονωθῇ, γέγονε μὲν ὁμαλώτερον, ξυνέωσται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξιόντων εἰς αὐτό, παγέν τε οὕτως τὸ μὲν ὑπὲρ γῆς μάλιστα παθὸν τοιαῦτα χάλαζα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ γῆς κρύσταλλος· τὸ δὲ ἧττον ἡμιπαγές τε ὂν ἔτι, τὸ μὲν ὑπὲρ γῆς αὖ χιών, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ γῆς ξυμπαγὲν ἐκ δρόσου γενόμενον πάχνη λέγεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 31

9 Plato, from the Timaeus: Fluid and soft

I.31.9.1

Of water mixed with fire, whatever is fine is called fluid because of its motion and the course it takes as it rolls over the earth; and it is called soft because its bases, being less stable than those of earth, give way.[934]

9 Plato: Hail, ice, snow, and frost

I.31.9.2

When this water is separated from fire and isolated from air, it becomes more uniform and is pressed in upon itself by the constituents that leave it. When it freezes in this way, what undergoes these changes most fully above the earth is hail; on the earth it is ice. What undergoes them less fully and is still half-frozen is called snow when above the earth, and frost when it forms from dew and congeals on the earth.[935]

934. Timaeus 59d-e. “Bases” belongs to Plato’s account of the geometric bodies assigned to the elements; it concerns the stability of their surfaces. The Greek wording here is compressed, with hygron, “fluid,” repeated. The translation states the two explanations of the names “fluid” and “soft.”

935. The departing constituents are the fire and air just mentioned. Plato classifies the results by both the degree of freezing and their position above or upon the earth. These categories close the chapter; the next chapter turns to winds.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 32

Κεφάλαιον ΛΒ′ I.32.heading

Περὶ ἀνέμων.

<Ἀετίου καὶ Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλης · 1 I.32.1

Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως τὴν πρώτην ἀναφοράν· γίνεσθαι δέ ποτε τῇ ξηρᾷ πρὸς τὴν ὑγρὰν μῖξιν. πνεῦμα μὲν ἐκ πολλῶν συνιουσῶν ἀναθυμιάσεων. -

Συνέχεια I.32.2

Τὸν γὰρ ἄνεμον μὲν εἶναι ξηρᾶς ἀναδόσεως πλῆθος κινούμενον περὶ γῆν· τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκνεφίας ἀνέμους, ὅταν ἀθρόον καὶ πυκνὸν φερόμενον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὸ πλέον ἀναλύσῃ τοῦ νέφους τῇ σφοδρότητι τῆς ῥύμης. τὸ γὰρ τάχος τῆς ἐκκρίσεως ποιεῖν τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἰσχύν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 32

Chapter 32: On winds

I.32.heading

On winds.

<Aëtius and Didymus.>[936]

Aristotle: The origin of wind

I.32.1

Aristotle identifies wind with the first rising of dry exhalation.[937] At times, however, the dry exhalation mixes with the moist. A current of wind comes from many exhalations gathering together.[938] -

Wind and squalls

I.32.2

For wind is a mass of dry exhalation moving around the earth.[939] Squalls arise when this material moves as a dense mass and, through the violence of its rush, dissolves the greater part of the cloud into itself. For the speed of its discharge produces the wind's strength.[940]

936. Wachsmuth's bracketed Latin source-heading, translated here, identifies Aëtius (III.7.4) and Didymus. His apparatus credits Diels with recognizing that excerpts from the two sources have been joined. The printed division is retained between the two passages below.

937. The opening is abbreviated: the English supplies "identifies wind with" from the subject of the chapter. Aristotle's name is printed without brackets; the apparatus records it as a marginal addition in manuscript P. Anaphora means a rising or carrying upward.

938. The dry and moist exhalations are the two kinds distinguished in the preceding chapter. Compare Aristotle, Meteorology II.4, on their coexistence and the formation of wind from many exhalations. The translation preserves "at times" as this abridgment states it.

939. Compare Meteorology II.4, 361a31 and following. The printed peri gēn is "around the earth," rather than the variant epi gēn, "over the earth." Anadōsis, literally a giving or rising up, here denotes the exhaled material in motion.

940. Eknephiai are winds bursting from cloud, rendered "squalls." The compressed clause is taken to describe the moving material absorbing the cloud as it dissolves; "into itself" preserves eis heauto. Compare Meteorology III.1 on a dense discharge and its speed. Obscured letters in the supplied image were checked in the Toronto scan of the same 1884 edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTERS 33-35

Κεφάλαιον ΛΓ′ I.33.heading

Περὶ γῆς εἰ μία καὶ πεπερασμένη καὶ ποίου μεγέθους καὶ περὶ θέσεως αὐτῆς.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛΔ′ I.34.heading

Περὶ σχήματος γῆς.

deest.

Κεφάλαιον ΛΕ′ I.35.heading

Πότερα μένει ἡ γῆ ἢ κινεῖται.

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTERS 33-35

Chapter 33: The earth

I.33.heading

On the earth: whether it is one and finite, how large it is, and its position.

Text missing.[941]

Chapter 34: The shape of the earth

I.34.heading

On the shape of the earth.

Text missing.[942]

Chapter 35: Rest or motion

I.35.heading

Whether the earth remains at rest or moves.

Text missing.[943]

941. Wachsmuth prints the Latin deest, “is missing,” beneath each of the headings of chapters 33-35. The headings are absent from manuscripts F and P; his apparatus cites the index of the Laurentian florilegium, section Γ, entries 16-18. No text is supplied for these lost chapters.

942. The restored heading identifies the subject but preserves none of the answers once collected under it. The Latin notice on the facing page belongs to the modern editor.

943. The title asks about the motion of the earth itself. The next surviving chapter distinguishes that question from the shaking of particular regions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Κεφάλαιον ΛϚ′ I.36.heading

Περὶ σεισμῶν γῆς.

1 · <Ἀετίου> I.36.1

Πλάτων πάσης κινήσεως ἓξ εἶναι περιστάσεις, ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ἐπὶ δεξιὰ καὶ θάτερα, πρόσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν. Κατ᾽ οὐδεμίαν <δὲ> τούτων ἐνδέχεσθαι τὴν γῆν κινεῖσθαι, ἐν τῷ πανταχόθεν κατωτάτῳ κειμένην μένειν ἀκίνητον, ἅτε δὴ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἐξαίρετον ἐς τὸ ῥέψαι μᾶλλον· τόπους δὲ αὐτῆς κατὰ ἀραιότητα σαλεύεσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Chapter 36: On earthquakes

I.36.heading

On earthquakes.[944]

1 · <Aëtius>: Plato

I.36.1

Plato says that every movement has six possible directions: up and down, to the right and to the opposite side, forward and backward.[945] <But> the earth cannot move in any of these directions. Lying at the point that is lowest from every side, it remains motionless, since it has no special reason to incline in one direction rather than another. Particular regions of it, however, are shaken because of their porosity.[946]

944. The heading is restored with evidence from the Laurentian florilegium's index, Γ.19. Two excerpts follow: a report attributed to Plato and a longer account of Aristotle's explanation. Their distinct accounts are retained.

945. The bracketed attribution translates Wachsmuth's Latin source-heading: Aëtius III.15.10. This is a report of a doctrine, not a verbatim passage from a Platonic dialogue. The supplemented "but" follows Heeren's addition from the parallel Placita text.

946. "Lowest from every side" denotes a central position. Compare Plato, Phaedo 108e-109a, on the earth's stability at the center. The report distinguishes the unmoving earth as a whole from local shaking in porous regions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

2 · <Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς> I.36.2.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ σεισμοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ μυκήματα καὶ χάσματα τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς τὰς ἀραιότητας κατὰ τῆς γῆς ῥυείσης καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀθρόας ἐμπτώσεις τρόμους καὶ βρασμοὺς περὶ αὐτὴν ἀπεργαζομένης. Ὡς γὰρ ὁρμήσασαν ἔξω τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἄνεμον ποιεῖν σφοδρόν, οὕτως εἴσω καθειρχθεῖσαν τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς φορᾶς διακραδαίνειν τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἀποληφθῇ.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.2

Συνέχεσθαι <δὲ> τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐν τῇ γῇ διά τε πύκνωσιν τῆς ἐπιφανείας καὶ διὰ κατάψυξιν καὶ διὰ ξηρασίαν. Ὅθεν καὶ νηνεμίας οὔσης ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι τοὺς σεισμοὺς τῆς τῶν ἀνέμων ὁρμῆς εἴσω τραπείσης·

Συνέχεια I.36.2.3

καὶ νυκτὸς μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν ψύξιν καὶ περὶ τὸν ὄρθρον· τοὺς γὰρ ἀνέμους τότε τῆς πνοῆς ἄρχεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἀποστρέφειν <τὸ> κατὰ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἀνιὸν πνεῦμα· καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἔστιν ὅτε περὶ μεσημβρίαν· τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως ἐπικρατοῦντα κατακλείειν αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν γῆν·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

2 · <From the epitome of Arius Didymus> I.36.2.1

Aristotle's account.[947] Aristotle says that earthquakes, rumblings, and fissures arise when dry exhalation flows into porous spaces beneath the earth and, rushing in en masse, produces trembling and upheaving in it. For just as the exhalation creates a violent wind when it rushes outward, so, when imprisoned inside, the force of its movement shakes the regions in which it is trapped.[948]

Air held beneath the surface I.36.2.2

<And> this force is held within the earth by the compactness of its surface, by cooling, and by dryness. Hence earthquakes generally occur when the air is still, because the winds' impetus has turned inward.[949]

Night, dawn, and midday I.36.2.3

They occur more often at night, because of the cold, and around dawn: the winds then begin to blow and turn back toward the earth <the> current of air rising with the exhalation. In daytime they sometimes occur around noon, since the sun overpowers the exhalation and confines it within the earth.[950]

947. Wachsmuth identifies this excerpt as Arius Didymus, physical fragment 13 in Diels (p. 453). The bracketed source-heading is translated into both languages. The separate attribution "Aristotle's" is part of the printed Greek.

948. Compare Aristotle, Meteorology II.8. Dry exhalation, which forms wind above ground, is here made responsible for shaking below ground. Mykēmata literally suggests bellowing or roaring; brasmos conveys a seething or heaving movement.

949. The explanation links still air above ground to moving air beneath it: the wind's force has been redirected. The connecting particle in angle brackets is supplied by Heeren in the base edition.

950. The times of occurrence are explained within the same theory of exhalation driven inward. Diels supplies the article "the" on printed p. 250. Faint portions of that page were checked against the Toronto scan of the same 1884 edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Συνέχεια I.36.2.4

καὶ ἔαρος καὶ μετοπώρου μᾶλλον (ἀνωμάλους γὰρ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς ὥρας· τὸ γὰρ θέρος καὶ τὸν χειμῶνα, τὸ μὲν διὰ τὸν πάγον, τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀλέαν ἀκίνητον ποιεῖν τὸν ἀέρα διὰ τὸ τὸ μὲν ἄγαν εἶναι ξηρόν, τὸν δὲ ἄγαν ψυχρόν)· καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐχμοῖς, ὅτε μάλιστα πνευματώδης ὁ ἀήρ· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι τὸν αὐχμόν, ξηρᾶς πλῆθος ἀναθυμιάσεως.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.5

Ἀπελαυνομένης οὖν τῆς ἀτμίδος εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ καθειργνυμένης σφυγμὸν γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τρόμον, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπομβρίαις ἐπιφραττομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐξομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ὑετῶν καὶ πυκνουμένης, ὥστε κατὰ τὴν πρόσπτωσιν ἰσχυρῶς κινεῖν καὶ σείειν,

Συνέχεια I.36.2.6

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπάντρους καὶ σομφοὺς ἔχουσι τοὺς κάτω τόπους ἢ καὶ παρακειμένην ῥοώδη θάλατταν διὰ τὸ θύραθεν πλεῖον ὑποδέχεσθαι πνεῦμα καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν θάλατταν προσπίπτουσαν ἀπωθεῖν εἰς τὴν γῆν τὸ πεφυκὸς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀποπνεῖν πνεῦμα καὶ σκεδάννυσθαι· περὶ γοῦν τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ τὴν Ἀχαιΐαν καὶ τῆς Εὐβοίας τὰς κοιλάδας πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους γίνεσθαι σεισμούς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Seasons and drought

I.36.2.4

They are also more frequent in spring and autumn (for these seasons are changeable; summer and winter make the air motionless, the one through frost and the other through heat, because summer is excessively dry and winter excessively cold).[951] They occur also during droughts, when the air is most full of wind; for drought is precisely a mass of dry exhalation.

Imprisoned vapor and heavy rain

I.36.2.5

Thus, when vapor is driven into the earth and imprisoned, a throbbing and trembling arise in it. Earthquakes occur also during heavy rains, when moisture and cold seal the earth, and the exhalation inside is increased and compressed by the rains, so that its impact moves and shakes the earth violently.[952]

Cavities and neighboring seas

I.36.2.6

They occur also in places whose underground regions are cavernous and spongy, or which have a sea with strong currents beside them. Such places admit more air from outside; moreover, the sea, as it strikes against them, drives back into the earth the air that would naturally breathe out from it and disperse. Thus there are many great earthquakes around the Peloponnese and Achaia, and in the valleys of Euboea.[953]

951. The printed order is crossed: “summer and winter” is followed by “the one through frost, the other through heat.” The final adjectives then return to summer as dry and winter as cold. The English retains this irregularity rather than silently rearranging the Greek.

952. The sequence on printed p. 250, lines 10-23, is disrupted. Usener proposes moving the first clause here, together with “so that ... violently,” to just before the bodily comparison below (I.36.2.7). Wachsmuth approves in his apparatus but leaves the printed order unchanged. This translation follows that order. “Vapor” renders atmis, the word used at this point.

953. The two conditions are cavities that admit air and an adjacent sea that obstructs its escape. The regional examples belong to this ancient explanation of why some places shake more frequently or strongly.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Συνέχεια I.36.2.7

Ὡς γὰρ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν πολλάκις τὸ διαπνεόμενον ἔξω πνεῦμα παλινδρομῆσαν εἴσω παλμὸν παρέχει καὶ σφυγμὸν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτω τὸ περιληφθὲν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν κλονούμενον περὶ τοὺς πόρους καὶ διεγκοπτόμενον σπασμοὺς καὶ σεισμοὺς ἀποτελεῖν.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.8

Συμβαίνειν δὲ καὶ τὰ μυκήματα ποτὲ μὲν μετὰ σεισμῶν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ χωρίς, τοῦ πνεύματος ἠχοῦντος, ὥστ᾽ ἐξακούεσθαι ψόφον τινὰ καὶ βόμβον ἐπιμήκιστον, ὁπότε διὰ τῶν σηράγγων διαυλοδρομεῖ παρατριβόμενον μηδ᾽ ἐξιόν.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.9

Τά τε χάσματα μετὰ σεισμῶν. ἤδη γοῦν τινας σεισμοὺς μὴ πρότερον λῆξαι, πρὶν ἢ διαρραγῆναι τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἐγένοντο, βιασαμένου τοῦ περιληφθέντος πνεύματος περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον ὥσπερ ἐκνεφίου τινὸς ἀνέμου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν Ποντικὴν Ἡράκλειαν καὶ τὸν ἔτι πρότερον γενόμενον περὶ τὴν ἱερὰν καλουμένην Αἰόλου νῆσον·

BOOK I CHAPTER 36

A comparison with the body

I.36.2.7

For just as the breath that we breathe outward often turns back inward and causes palpitation and throbbing in our bodies, so the air enclosed in the earth, jostled about its passages and interrupted in its movement, produces convulsions and earthquakes.[954]

Subterranean rumbling

I.36.2.8

Rumblings sometimes accompany earthquakes and sometimes occur without them. The air resounds, so that a noise and a very prolonged booming can be heard, whenever it runs back and forth through the underground tunnels, rubbing against them without escaping.[955]

Fissures and escaping air

I.36.2.9

Fissures, too, accompany earthquakes. Indeed, some earthquakes have not ceased until the regions where they occurred split open, as the enclosed air forced its way out like a squall. Such were the earthquake around Heracleia on the Pontus and the still earlier one around the island of Aeolus called Sacred.[956]

954. The comparison treats the earth's passages as analogous to those of a body. Palmos and sphygmos denote palpitation and pulsation; spasmos carries the bodily image of a convulsion into the description of an earthquake.

955. Diaulodromei evokes a course run out and back. The air's repeated movement and friction within enclosed tunnels explain why sound may be heard even without a perceptible earthquake.

956. Compare Meteorology II.8. "Sacred" translates hiera, the island-name Hiera in the fuller account. Eknephios is the cloud-bursting wind rendered "squall" in chapter 32.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Συνέχεια I.36.2.10

ἐν ταύταις γὰρ ὑπὸ σεισμῶν οἰδήματα τῆς γῆς γενέσθαι μεγάλα, καὶ ταῦτα διαρραγέντα πολὺν ἄνεμον ἐκπεφυσηκέναι καὶ φέψαλον, ὥστε κατατεφρῶσαι πλησίον οὖσαν τὴν τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλιν.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.11

Τὰς δὲ ποντίους λεγομένας νήσους ἧττον σείεσθαι τῶν προσγείων διὰ τὸ καταψύχεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τῆς θαλάττης τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμίασιν.

Συνέχεια I.36.2.12

Τεκμήριον δ᾽ εἶναι τοῦ ῥεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν τὸ πνεῦμα, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν οἷς γίνεται προσημαίνειν ἠχοῦντος, εἶτα τὸ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον πάθος· ἀμαυρότερον γὰρ καὶ ἀχλυώδη φαίνεσθαι χωρὶς νέφους, ὑπονοστεῖν ἀρχομένου τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν γῆν τοῦ λεπτύνοντος τὸν ἀέρα καὶ διακρίνοντος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Swelling ground and cinders

I.36.2.10

For in these places earthquakes produced great swellings of the ground. When these burst open, they blew out a great quantity of wind and cinders, covering the nearby city of the Liparians with ash.[957]

Islands in the open sea

I.36.2.11

The islands called open-sea islands shake less than those near the mainland, because the great mass of sea cools the exhalation from the earth.[958]

Sound and a dim sun

I.36.2.12

Evidence that air flows beneath the earth comes, first, from the warning it gives by resounding in the places where earthquakes occur,[959] and then from what happens to the sun. For the sun appears dimmer and misty, though there is no cloud, when the current that thins and disperses the air begins to retreat beneath the earth.[960]

957. The abridgment says “in these places,” although Aristotle’s fuller account attaches the ashfall near Lipara to the island event. The plural is retained without harmonizing the geography. Phepsalos denotes burning fragments or cinders.

958. Pontious here means islands out at sea, contrasted with those close to land. It does not mean islands in the Pontus, despite the earlier mention of Pontic Heracleia.

959. The first clause is grammatically uneven. The English takes the resounding air as giving warning where the earthquakes occur. Usener proposes a rearrangement involving “the places”; that proposal is recorded in the apparatus but not adopted in the printed text.

960. The account distinguishes pneuma, a moving current, from aēr, the air it thins and disperses. Its withdrawal underground is offered as the reason for the cloudless haze.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Συνέχεια

I.36.2.13

πρός τε τούτοις τὸ πρὸ τῶν ὀρθρίων σεισμῶν νηνεμίαν γίνεσθαι καὶ ψῦχος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ξυμβαίνειν διὰ τὴν εἴσω τῶν ἀνέμων μετάρροιαν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως ἀπουσίαν.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν σεισμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὴν γῆν παθημάτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 36

Calm and cold before dawn

I.36.2.13

Further evidence is the calm and cold that precede early-morning earthquakes: the calm occurs because the winds flow back inward, and the cold because the warm exhalation is absent.[961]

So much for earthquakes and the other disturbances affecting the earth.

961. “Early-morning” follows Diels’s correction orthriōn, printed by Wachsmuth, for aithriōn, “in clear weather.” The correction is supported by Aristotle, Meteorology II.8, 367a21. The closing sentence ends the excerpt and the chapter.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 37

Κεφάλαιον ΛΖ′ I.37.heading

Περὶ θαλάττης <πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστι πικρά>.

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 37

Chapter 37: On the sea

I.37.heading

On the sea: <how it was formed and why it is bitter>.

Text missing.[962]

962. Wachsmuth restores the heading from the Laurentian florilegium's index, Θ.1. The words in angle brackets are absent from Photius's shorter title. "Bitter" renders pikra, describing the taste of seawater. Deest is the editor's Latin notice that the chapter's text is missing; none is reconstructed here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 38

Κεφάλαιον ΛΗ′ I.38.heading

Πῶς ἀμπώτιδες καὶ πλήμμυραι γίνονται.

<Ἀετίου.>

1 · Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης I.38.1

Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν πνευμάτων κινοῦντος καὶ περιφέροντος· ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἐμβαλλόντων μὲν προωθουμένην ἀνοιδεῖν τὴν Ἀτλαντικὴν θάλασσαν καὶ κατασκευάζειν τὴν πλήμμυραν, καταληγόντων δ᾽ ἀντιπερισπωμένην ὑποβαίνειν, ὅπερ εἶναι τὴν ἄμπωτιν.

2 I.38.2

<Εὐ>ήνιος [Μεσήνιος] ἠλίῳ καὐτὸς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνατίθησι, καθ᾽ οὓς μὲν ἂν τόπους γένηται τῆς γῆς πλημμύροντι τὰ πελάγη, ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ παραποστὰς ὑποσυνέλκοντι. ταῦτα δὲ συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς ἑῴας καὶ τὰς μεσημβρινὰς ἐκκλίσεις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 38

Chapter 38: Ebb and flood tides

I.38.heading

How ebb and flood tides arise.

<Aëtius.>[963]

1 · Aristotle and Heraclides

I.38.1

Aristotle and Heraclides attribute them to the sun, which sets most of the winds in motion and carries them around. When these winds strike it, the Atlantic sea is pushed forward and swells, producing the flood tide; when they subside, it is drawn back and sinks, which is the ebb tide.[964]

2 · The sun's presence and withdrawal

I.38.2

<Eu>enios [Messenian][965] likewise assigns the cause to the sun: it makes the seas rise in flood in those regions of the earth where it comes to be, and draws them back from those from which it happens to move away. These effects occur around the morning and midday turnings.[966]

963. The bracketed Latin source-heading, translated here, identifies Aëtius III.17.1-9. The Laurentian florilegium, A.38, preserves a fuller chapter than manuscripts F and P: excerpts 2-4 and 6-9 are absent from those two witnesses. All nine reports printed by Wachsmuth are translated below.

964. The opening Greek leaves "attribute them" understood from the chapter's subject. The immediate force acting on the sea is wind; the sun initiates its movement. These are reported opinions under the two philosophers' names, not direct quotations from identified works.

965. The name is textually uncertain. Wachsmuth prints Elter's restoration Euēnios, based on Photius's list of authors, and rejects "Messenian" as a divergent written form of the damaged name. The brackets preserve those decisions. Meineke had instead proposed identifying the author as Dicaearchus of Messene; that is not the text printed here.

966. Ekkliseis means turnings or deviations. "Morning" and "midday" take the adjectives temporally in this solar context; they can also mean "eastern" and "southern." The compressed wording does not establish precisely what these turnings are. The English leaves that uncertainty open.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 38

3 · Πυθέας I.38.3

Πυθέας ὁ Μασσαλιώτης τῇ πληρώσει τῆς σελήνης καὶ τῇ μειώσει τὰς ἑκατέρου τούτων αἰτίας ἀνατίθησιν.

4 · Ποσειδώνιος I.38.4

Ποσειδώνιος ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς σελήνης κινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνέμους, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων τὰ πελάγη, ἐν οἷς τὰ προειρημένα γίνεσθαι πάθη.

5 · Πλάτων I.38.5

Πλάτων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰώραν φέρεται τῶν ὑδάτων. εἶναι γάρ τινα φυσικὴν αἰώραν διά τινος ἐγγείου τρήματος περιφέρουσαν τὴν παλίρροιαν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς ἀντικυμαίνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη.

6 · Τίμαιος I.38.6

Τίμαιος ὁ Ταυρομενίτης τοὺς ἐμβάλλοντας ποταμοὺς εἰς τὴν Ἀτλαντικὴν διὰ τῆς Κελτικῆς ὀρεινῆς αἰτιᾶται προωθοῦντας μὲν ταῖς ἐφόδοις, ὑφέλκοντας δὲ ταῖς ἀναπαύλαις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 38

3 · Pytheas I.38.3

Pytheas of Massalia assigns the causes of these two effects to the moon's becoming full and to its waning.[967]

4 · Posidonius I.38.4

Posidonius says that the winds are moved by the moon, and the seas by the winds; in the seas the effects already mentioned then occur.[968]

5 · Plato I.38.5

Plato favors the oscillation of the waters as the explanation. For there is a natural oscillation that carries the returning flow through an opening in the earth, causing the seas to surge in opposite directions.[969]

6 · Timaeus I.38.6

Timaeus of Tauromenium assigns the cause to the rivers that flow through the mountainous Celtic country into the Atlantic: they push the sea forward with their onrushes and draw it back during their pauses.[970]

967. The two effects are flood and ebb. Plērōsis denotes filling or becoming full, and meiōsis diminution. This brief report links the opposite tidal movements to the lunar cycle without specifying the mechanism or a detailed timetable.

968. This report gives a chain of causes: moon, winds, sea, tides. The winds mediate the moon's influence, whereas the preceding notice of Pytheas does not state an intervening cause.

969. Aiōra is a swinging or oscillating motion. Compare Phaedo 111d-112d, where waters move through connected underground passages and rise and fall through the great chasm called Tartarus. This is a compressed report, not the dialogue's wording. "Plato" is a marginal attribution in manuscript P according to Wachsmuth's apparatus.

970. The rivers are the grammatical subjects of both "push forward" and "draw back"; the sea is the understood object. The account attributes the alternating movement to variations in river inflow.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 38

7 · Κράτης I.38.7

Κράτης ὁ γραμματικὸς τὸν ἀντισπασμὸν τῆς θαλάσσης αἰτιᾶται.

8 · Ἀπολλόδωρος I.38.8

Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κερκυραῖος τὰς ἐκ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ παλιρροίας.

9 · Σέλευκος I.38.9

Σέλευκος ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀντιγεγραφὼς Κράτητι, κινῶν καὐτὸς τὴν γῆν, ἀντικόπτειν αὐτῆς τῷ δίνῳ φησὶ τὴν περιστροφὴν τῆς σελήνης· τοῦ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν σωμάτων ἀντιπερισπωμένου πνεύματος καὶ ἐμπίπτοντος εἰς τὸ Ἀτλαντικὸν πέλαγος κατὰ λόγον οὕτω συγκυμαίνεσθαι τὴν θάλασσαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 38

7 · Crates I.38.7

Crates the grammarian assigns the cause to the sea's counter-pull.[971]

8 · Apollodorus I.38.8

Apollodorus of Corcyra assigns the cause to returning currents from the Ocean.[972]

9 · Seleucus I.38.9

Seleucus the mathematician, who wrote against Crates and himself also sets the earth in motion, says that the moon's revolution works against the earth's rotation.[973] The air between the two bodies is drawn in the opposite direction and falls upon the Atlantic sea; in this way the sea is made to surge in correspondence with it.[974]

971. Antispasmos means a pull in the opposite direction or a drawing back. This single sentence gives no further mechanism. The final report below says that Seleucus wrote against Crates.

972. The verb is left unstated in Greek and is carried over from the preceding entry. Palirroiai are flows that turn back or return; the report locates their source in the Ocean.

973. The Greek makes "the moon's revolution" the subject of "works against," with the earth's whirling motion as what it opposes. The notice explicitly gives motion to the earth, but does not here describe an orbit around the sun.

974. The intermediary is pneuma, moving air or wind between earth and moon. "In correspondence" renders kata logon in the account's description of the sea's response. The related report in the Placita III.17 likewise retains this role for moving air.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 253

BOOK I CHAPTER 39

Κεφάλαιον ΛΘ′ I.39.heading

Περὶ ὑδάτων.

<Ἀρείου Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς.>

Ἀριστοτέλους · 1 I.39.1.1

Ἀριστοτέλους. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων δυνάμεις καὶ τοὺς χυλοὺς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας ποιότητας, ὡς εἰπεῖν συλλαβόντι, γίνεσθαι παρὰ τρεῖς αἰτίας. Ἢ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν τῆς γῆς διαφοράν· (ἐν οἵᾳ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ καὶ δι᾽ οἵας ἂν ῥέῃ, τοιοῦτον ἴσχειν τὸν χυλόν, οἷον ἁλυκὸν ἢ νιτρῶδες ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὁποιονοῦν·)

2 I.39.1.2

ἢ παρὰ τὴν τῆς καπνώδους καὶ πυρώδους ἀναθυμιάσεως μῖξιν· (ἀπολίθωσιν γὰρ καὶ πῆξιν ἁλῶν καὶ νίτρων, ἔτι τε βαρύτητας καὶ κουφότητας καὶ παχύτητας καὶ λεπτότητας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ καπνώδους μῖξιν·) ἢ παρὰ τὸν ἀέρα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 253-254

BOOK I CHAPTER 39

Chapter 39: On waters

I.39.heading

On waters.

<From the epitome of Arius Didymus.>[975]

Aristotle's account · 1

I.39.1.1

Aristotle's account. The properties of waters, their tastes, and all their other qualities arise, to sum the matter up, from three causes.[976] Either they are due to differences in the earth (for each water takes on a taste corresponding to the kind of earth in which it lies and through which it flows: salty, alkaline, bitter, or any of the other tastes);[977]

2 · Exhalation and air

I.39.1.2

or they are due to the admixture of a smoky and fiery exhalation (for the admixture of what is hot and smoky produces petrification and the solidification of salts and alkalis, as well as heaviness and lightness, thickness and thinness, and the other properties); or they are due to the air.[978]

975. Wachsmuth's supplied Latin heading, translated on both sides, identifies the epitome of Arius Didymus, physical fragment 14a in the additions to Diels, p. 854. The Greek attribution "Aristotle's account" follows. It stands in the margin of manuscript F and in the text of P. The chapter is one continuous excerpt; the numbered subdivisions below are for comparison of the facing text.

976. Dynameis, here "properties," are the powers or characteristics by which waters act or differ; the term need not refer specifically to medicinal effects. Chyloi are tastes or flavors in this passage, as the following examples show.

977. "Alkaline" renders nitrōdes, like nitron, the mineral alkali also called soda. It is a description of taste in the ancient account. Compare the lexicon's identification of the Chalastra variety of nitron as soda (LSJ, s.v. Chalastraîos).

978. The exhalation is a material rising from the earth. Compare Aristotle, Meteorology II.3, on dry exhalation and the earthy admixtures that alter water's taste. That parallel helps explain the theory; this epitome is not a quotation of that passage. "Thickness" follows the printed pachytētas, contrasted with thinness; the apparatus also records a reading meaning swiftness.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 253-254

BOOK I CHAPTER 39

3 I.39.1.3

θερμότητας δὲ καὶ ψυχρότητας καὶ παρὰ τὴν γῆν [μέν] γίνεσθαι, δι᾽ οἵας ἂν ῥέῃ καὶ ἐν οἵᾳ <ἂν> γίνηται. Θερμὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν κατακεκαυμένην καὶ τὴν ξηρὰν καὶ τὴν ἀσφαλτώδη ποιεῖν·

4 I.39.1.4

ψυχρὰ δ᾽, ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, <εἶναι τὰ ἐν> τοῖς ναματιαίοις, ὡς δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τὰ κατὰ βάθους [ὡς ἐπίπαν], ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετάλλοις (πόρρω γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου), πλὴν ἐὰν πυρώδης ὁ τόπος ᾖ· (δεῖ γὰρ ἀφεστάναι τῶν θερμῶν, τοῦ τ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ γῇ)·

5 I.39.1.5

καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς διά τε τὰ πνεύματα καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ψυχρότητα· καὶ <τὰ> ἐν τοῖς συσκίοις καὶ πνευματώδεσι (ψύχεται γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, διὸ καὶ κοπέντων δένδρων ἔνια θερμὰ γίνεσθαι)·

BOOK I CHAPTER 39

3 · Heat and the ground I.39.1.3

Heat and cold also arise [indeed] from the earth, according to the kind through which the water flows and in which it <may> be.[979] For burnt, dry, and bituminous earth makes waters warm;

4 · Springs and depths I.39.1.4

whereas cold waters, speaking generally, <are those in> places with flowing springs; more particularly, those at a depth [as a general rule],[980] such as those in mines (for they are far from the sun), unless the place is fiery (for the waters must be removed from sources of heat, both the heat in the air and that in the earth);[981]

5 · Height, shade, and wind I.39.1.5

also those in high places, because of the winds and especially because of the coldness of the air; and <those> in deeply shaded and windy places (for they are cooled by both, which is also why some become warm when trees are cut down);[982]

979. Wachsmuth rejects the particle men, represented by "[indeed]," and adopts Meineke's supplemented an with ginētai, reflected in "<may> be." The transition is difficult: air has just been named as the third cause, but the text immediately returns to the earth. The apparatus records other proposed repairs; the translation follows the printed text.

980. The words "<are those in>" reproduce Wachsmuth's supplement. "As a general rule" is bracketed because Usener regarded it as a gloss on "speaking generally." Both decisions remain visible. "Places with flowing springs" supplies the understood noun with namatiaiois.

981. Metalla means mines here. The reason given for their cold water is distance from the sun, with an explicit exception for heat within the ground. The parenthesis makes separation from both sources of heat a condition of cold water.

982. The list still describes cold waters. "Both" refers to shade and wind; the example of felled trees illustrates the removal of shade. The bracketed "those" reflects the supplied Greek article ta.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 39

6 I.39.1.6

καὶ τὰ διαπνοὰς ἔχοντα φαραγγώδεις καὶ ὑπάντρους (τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα διαυλωνίζον ταύτῃ ψύχει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς λάκκοις)·

7 I.39.1.7

καὶ <τὰ> διὰ πάγους ῥέοντα καὶ ἐνίκμου (ψυχρὸν γὰρ ὁ λίθος καὶ μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος).

8 I.39.1.8

Εἰ δ᾽ ὥσπερ γλυκὺ πᾶν ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ ψυχρόν (οἰκεῖα γὰρ ἄμφω τῆς φύσεως), ἡ θερμότης ὡς ἡ τῶν χυλῶν ποιότης γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων.

9 I.39.1.9

Συμβαίνει δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου μὴ εἶναι τοῦ ὕδατος καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἄλλων δυνάμεσι διαφέρειν, εἴπερ τὰ μὲν τὴν γῆν, τὰ δὲ τὸ πῦρ, τὰ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα ποιεῖν συμβέβηκεν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 39

6 · Air passages I.39.1.6

also those with air passages like ravines and caves (for the wind, channeled through in this way, cools them, as it does in wells);[983]

7 · Moist rock I.39.1.7

and <those> that flow through rock, moist rock at that (for stone is cold, and such stone especially so).[984]

8 · Water's own nature I.39.1.8

But if all water is cold just as it is fresh (for both belong to its nature), its heat, like the quality of its tastes, would arise from other things.[985]

9 · The source of the differences I.39.1.9

Thus this argument too implies that water has no difference in itself, but differs through the powers of other things, if indeed some effects are produced by earth, others by fire, and others by air.[986]

983. Diaulōnizon describes air passing through as through a pipe or channel. The comparison concerns cooling by a draft. Lakkoi can mean pits or wells; "wells" is used here in the discussion of water.

984. The printed wording is grammatically uneven: pagous is accusative plural, while enikmou, "moist," is genitive singular. Wachsmuth asks whether pagou should be read, but does not put that change into the text. The Greek retains his printing; the English gives the apparent sense. Although pagos can also mean frost, the following reference to stone supports "rock" here.

985. "Fresh" renders glyky, literally "sweet," in the contrast with salty or otherwise flavored water. The claim concerns water's own nature, before the acquired qualities discussed above. The conditional opening follows Usener's repair as printed by Wachsmuth. "Like" follows Wachsmuth's hōs, which compares the origin of heat with that of taste.

986. The conclusion returns to the three causes named at the beginning. It distinguishes water considered in itself from the differing qualities produced in it by other things. Wachsmuth understands the preceding "other things" (heterōn) in the same sense as "other things" (allōn) here, rather than as other hot or cold waters.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 254-255

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

Κεφάλαιον Μ′ I.40.heading

Περὶ τοῦ παντός.

Ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῆς.

1 I.40.1.1

<κεφ. 2> Κόσμος μὲν οὖν ἐστι σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις περιεχομένων φύσεων. Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἑτέρως, ἡ τῶν ὅλων τάξις τε καὶ διακόσμησις ὑπὸ θεοῦ τε καὶ διὰ θεῶν φυλαττομένη.

2 I.40.1.2

Ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον [καὶ] ἀκίνητόν τε καὶ ἑδραῖον <ἡ> φερέσβιος εἴληχε γῆ, παντοδαπῶν ζῴων δεσπόζουσα καὶ μήτηρ· τὸ δὲ ὕπερθεν αὐτῆς πᾶν τε καὶ πάντῃ πεπερατωμένον εἰς τὸ ἄνω τὸ τῶν θεῶν οἰκητήριον οὐρανὸς ὠνόμασται· πλήρης δ᾽ ὢν σωμάτων θείων, ἃ δὴ καλεῖν ἄστρα εἰώθαμεν, κινούμενος κίνησιν ἀίδιον ἐν περιαγωγῇ καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ συγχορεύει πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπαύστως δι᾽ αἰῶνος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 255-256

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

Chapter 40: On the universe

I.40.heading

On the universe.

From Aristotle's letter to Alexander.[987]

1 · Two senses of cosmos

I.40.1.1

<Chapter 2> The cosmos, then, is a system composed of heaven and earth and the natures contained within them. "Cosmos" is also used in another sense: the arrangement and ordering of all things, maintained by God and through gods.[988]

2 · Earth and heaven

I.40.1.2

Its center, [and] motionless and firmly set, has fallen to <the> life-bearing earth, mistress and mother of every kind of animal. Everything above it, bounded on every side toward the upper region, the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. Filled with divine bodies, which we are accustomed to call stars, it moves eternally in revolution and dances in a circle with them all, unceasingly through all time.[989]

987. The source identifies this as De mundo (On the Cosmos), chapters 2-5. The treatise was transmitted under Aristotle's name; most modern scholars regard its author as someone else, hence "Pseudo-Aristotle." Its date remains disputed. See Betegh and Gregorić, "Multiple Analogy in Ps.-Aristotle, De mundo 6," Classical Quarterly 64 (2014), opening discussion. The attribution printed here is Stobaeus's heading. Wachsmuth's chapter markers refer to De mundo; the square-bracketed chapter 4 marker is a cross-reference, not rejected text; the numbered subdivisions in this translation are for comparison of the facing text.

988. Kosmos can name both the universe and its orderly arrangement. The printed Greek has singular "God" followed by plural "gods"; these are preserved. Wachsmuth's apparatus records a singular "through God" in other witnesses to De mundo. The English does not harmonize the two forms.

989. The rejected "and" and supplied article follow Wachsmuth. The earth is stationary at the center in this account. The wording about the upper boundary is compressed; the translation retains the supplied edition's "toward the upper region." "Mistress and mother" follows its despozousa kai mētēr, rather than the different wording of the parallel text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 255-256

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

3 I.40.1.3

Τοῦ δὲ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου σφαιροειδοῦς ὄντος καὶ κινουμένου, καθάπερ εἶπον, ἐνδελεχῶς, δύο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκίνητά ἐστι σημεῖα καταντικρὺ ἀλλήλοις, καθάπερ τόρνῳ κυκλοφορουμένης σφαίρας, παραμένοντα καὶ συνέχοντα τὴν σφαῖραν, περὶ ἃ ὁ πᾶς ὄγκος κύκλῳ στρέφεται. Καλοῦνται δὲ οὗτοι πόλοι, δι᾽ ὧν εἰ νοήσαιμεν ἐπεζευγμένην εὐθεῖαν, ἥντιν᾽ ἄξονα καλοῦσι, διάμετρος ἔσται τοῦ κόσμου, μέσην μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν γῆν, τοὺς δὲ δύο πόλους πέρατα.

4 I.40.1.4

Τῶν δ᾽ ἀκινήτων πόλων τούτων ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ φανερός ἐστιν, ὑπὲρ κορυφὴν ὢν κατὰ <τὸ> βόρειον κλίμα, ἀρκτικὸς καλούμενος, <ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν ἀεὶ κατακέκρυπται, κατὰ τὸ νότιον, ἀνταρκτικὸς καλούμενος.>

5 I.40.1.5

Οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα <καλοῦμεν>, οὐχ, ὡς τινες, διὰ τὸ πυρώδη οὖσαν αἴθεσθαι, πλημμελοῦντες περὶ τὴν πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἀπηλλαγμένην δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ θεῖν κυκλοφορουμένην, στοιχεῖον οὖσαν ἕτερον τῶν τεττάρων ἀκήρατόν τε καὶ θεῖον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

3 · The celestial axis

I.40.1.3

Since the whole heaven and cosmos is spherical and moves continuously, as I have said, there must be two motionless points directly opposite one another. As with a sphere revolving on a lathe, they remain fixed and hold the sphere together, while its entire bulk turns in a circle around them. These are called poles. If we imagine a straight line joining them, which is called the axis, it will be a diameter of the cosmos, with the earth at its center and the two poles as its ends.[990]

4 · The two poles

I.40.1.4

Of these motionless poles, one is always visible, above us toward <the> northern region, and is called the arctic pole; <the other is always hidden beneath the earth, toward the south, and is called the antarctic pole.>[991]

5 · The fifth element

I.40.1.5

The substance of heaven and the stars <we call> aether, not, as some do, because it is fiery and burns, thereby misunderstanding a power that is very far removed from fire, but because it always runs in a circular course. It is an element different from the four, uncorrupted and divine.[992]

990. The poles and axis belong to the revolving celestial sphere in this geocentric description. The lathe is the mechanical comparison used to make the fixed axis and revolving mass intelligible.

991. This is the observer's northern perspective: "above us" need not mean directly at the zenith. Wachsmuth supplies the article; the entire clause about the southern pole was restored by Heeren from De mundo. Arctic and antarctic mean the pole of the Bear and its opposite.

992. The author contrasts two explanations of aithēr: from aithesthai, "to burn," and from aei thein, "always to run." The latter is an ancient explanatory wordplay. The four other elements are earth, water, air, and fire. "We call" is restored from the parallel treatise.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 256

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

6 I.40.1.6

Τῶν γε μὴν ἐμπεριεχομένων ἄστρων τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῶς τῷ σύμπαντι οὐρανῷ συμπεριφέρεται τὰς αὐτὰς ἕδρας ἔχοντα· μέσος δὲ ὁ ζῳοφόρος καλούμενος κύκλος ἐγκάρσιος ὢν διὰ τῶν τροπικῶν διέζωσται, κατὰ μέρη διῃρημένος εἰς δώδεκα ζῳδίων χώρας· τὰ δὲ πλανητὰ ὄντα οὔτε τοῖς προτέροις ὁμοταχῶς κινεῖσθαι πέφυκεν οὔτε [ἐν] ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑτέροις καὶ ἑτέροις κύκλοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν προσγειότερον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀνώτερον.

7 I.40.1.7

Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀπλανῶν πλῆθος ἀνεξερεύνητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις, καίπερ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κινουμένων ἐπιφανείας τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ· τὸ δὲ τῶν πλανητῶν εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη κεφαλαιούμενον ἐν τοσούτοις ἐστὶ κύκλοις ἐφεξῆς κειμένοις, ὥστ᾽ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀνώτερον μείζω τοῦ ὑποκάτω εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἑπτὰ ἀλλήλοις περιέχεσθαι· πάντας γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαίρας περιειλῆφθαι. συνεχῆ δὲ ἀεὶ τὴν θέσιν ταύτην εἶναι μέχρις οὗ αἰθὴρ ὁρίζεται, τὰ θεῖα ἐμπεριέχων σώματα καὶ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως τάξιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

6 · Fixed and wandering stars

I.40.1.6

Of the stars contained in it, some revolve with the whole heaven without wandering, keeping the same positions. Around its middle, the circle called the zodiac runs obliquely through the tropics, divided into twelve regions of signs. The wandering stars, however, naturally move neither at the same speed as the former nor [in] one another,[993] but in distinct circles, one nearer the earth and another higher up.

7 · Nested circles

I.40.1.7

The multitude of fixed stars is beyond human discovery, although they move on a single surface, that of the whole heaven. The wandering stars, seven in all, occupy as many circles set one after another, so that each higher circle is larger than the one beneath it, and the seven are enclosed within one another. All are enclosed by the sphere of the fixed stars. This arrangement extends continuously to the limit of aether, which contains the divine bodies and the ordering of their motion.[994]

993. The intrusive en, “in,” is rejected in the source and retained in brackets here. Without it, the sense is “nor at the same speed as one another.” Fixed stars keep their relative positions; the wandering bodies have distinct motions. “Zodiac” renders zōiophoros, literally the figure-bearing circle.

994. The seven wandering bodies in this ancient scheme include the sun and moon along with the five planets visible to the unaided eye. Wachsmuth notes that the separate text of De mundo treats the arrangement more fully. The shorter passage preserved here is translated without importing the omitted detail.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 256-257

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

8 I.40.1.8

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν αἰθέριον καὶ θείαν φύσιν, ἥντινα τεταγμένην ἀποφαίνομεν, ἔτι δὲ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον καὶ ἀπαθῆ, συνεχής ἐστιν ἡ δι᾽ ὅλων παθητή τε καὶ τρεπτή, καὶ τὸ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν, φθαρτή τε καὶ ἐπίκηρος.

9 I.40.1.9

Ταύτης δὲ αὐτῆς πρώτη ἐστὶν ἡ λεπτομερὴς καὶ φλογώδης οὐσία, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰθερίου πυρουμένη διὰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς κινήσεως· ἐν δὲ τῇ πυρώδει καὶ τῇ ἀτάκτῳ λεγομένῃ τὰ σέλα διάττει καὶ φλόγες ἀκοντίζονται καὶ δοκίδες τε καὶ βόθυνοι καὶ κομῆται λεγόμενοι στηρίζονταί τε καὶ σβέννυνται πολλάκις.

10 I.40.1.10

Ἐξῆς δὲ ταύτης ὁ ἀὴρ ὑποκέχυται, ζοφερὸς ὢν καὶ παγετώδης τὴν φύσιν, ὑπὸ <δ᾽> ἐκείνης λαμπόμενος ἅμα καὶ καιόμενος λαμπρότερός τε γίνεται καὶ ἀλεεινός. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῆς παθητῆς ὄντι καὶ αὐτῷ δυνάμεως <καὶ> παντοδαπῶς ἀλλοιουμένῳ νέφη συνίστανται καὶ ὄμβροι καταράττουσι χιόνες τε καὶ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι πνοιαί τε ἀνέμων καὶ τυφώνων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ βρονταὶ καὶ ἀστραπαὶ καὶ πτώσεις κεραυνῶν μυρίων τε γνόφων συμπληγάδες.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 257-258

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

8 · The changeable region

I.40.1.8

Immediately after the ethereal and divine nature, which we declare to be ordered, and also unchanging, unalterable, and unaffected, comes the nature that is throughout subject to affection and change and, to speak generally, to destruction and death.[995]

9 · The fiery layer

I.40.1.9

First within this nature is the substance of fine particles and flame, kindled by the ethereal substance because of the latter's magnitude and the swiftness of its motion. In this substance, called fiery and disorderly, lights shoot across, flames are hurled out, and the appearances called beams, pits, and comets repeatedly take up a position and are extinguished.[996]

10 · Air and weather

I.40.1.10

Beneath this substance air is spread out. It is naturally dark and icy, <but>, illuminated and heated by that substance, it becomes brighter and warm. In air, which itself belongs to the nature subject to affection <and> is altered in every way, clouds form, rains pour down, and there are snows, frosts, hail, blasts of winds and whirlwinds, as well as thunder, lightning, falling thunderbolts, and the collision of countless masses of darkness.[997]

995. The distinction is between the changeless celestial region and the region where things undergo alterations, come into being, and perish. "Affection" here means being acted upon or undergoing a change, not an emotion.

996. "Magnitude" follows the printed megethos; Usener proposed a different reading referring to proximity. The named lights are classified by appearance, not by modern astronomical categories. Comets are placed in the changeable region here; beams and pits receive further explanation later in the excerpt.

997. The supplied conjunctions are retained. Gnophos denotes darkness or a dark cloud; the closing image is of dense storm masses colliding. The author groups ordinary weather and violent storms within the same mutable layer.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 257-258

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

11 I.40.1.11

<κεφ. 3> Ἐξῆς δὲ τῆς ἀερίου φύσεως γῆ τε καὶ θάλασσα ἐρήρεισται, φυτοῖς τε βρύουσα καὶ ζῴοις, πηγαῖς τε καὶ ποταμοῖς τοῖς μὲν ἀνὰ γῆν ἐλιττομένοις, τοῖς δὲ ἀνερευγομένοις εἰς θάλατταν. Πεποίκιλται δὲ χλόαις μυρίαις, ὄρεσί τε ὑψηλοῖς, βαθυξύλοις τε δρυμοῖς καὶ πόλεσιν, ἃς τὸ σοφὸν ζῷον ἄνθρωπος ἱδρύσατο, νήσοις τε ἐναλίοις.

12 I.40.1.12

Τὴν μὲν οὖν οἰκουμένην ὁ πολὺς λόγος εἵς τε νήσους καὶ ἠπείρους διεῖλεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι καὶ ἡ σύμπασα μία νῆσός ἐστιν, ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς καλουμένης θαλάσσης περιρρεομένη· πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἄλλας <εἰκὸς> τῇδε ἀντιπόρθμους ἀπῳκίσθαι, τὰς μὲν μείζους αὐτῆς, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους, ἡμῖν δὲ πάσας πλὴν τῆσδε ἀοράτους.

13 I.40.1.13

Ὅπερ γὰρ αἱ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νῆσοι πρὸς ταῦτα τὰ πελάγη πεπόνθασι, τοῦτο ἥδε ἡ οἰκουμένη πολλαί τε ἕτεραι πρὸς σύμπασαν τὴν θάλατταν. Καὶ αὗται μὲν μεγάλαι τινές εἰσι νῆσοι μεγάλοις περικλυζόμεναι πελάγεσιν. Ἡ δὲ σύμπασα τοῦ ὑγροῦ φύσις ἐπιπολάζουσα κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὑγροῦ ποιότητας καὶ τὰ κοιλώματα, τὰς καλουμένας ἀναπεφυκυῖα οἰκουμένας, ἐξῆς ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀερίου μάλιστα φύσεως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

11 · Land and sea

I.40.1.11

<Chapter 3> Next to the nature of air, earth and sea are set in place, abounding in plants and animals, springs and rivers, some winding through the land and others pouring into the sea. This region is varied with countless stretches of green growth, high mountains, deeply wooded forests, cities founded by the wise animal, the human being, and islands in the sea.

12 · The inhabited world as an island

I.40.1.12

The common account divides the inhabited world into islands and continents, overlooking the fact that the whole of it is itself a single island, surrounded by the sea called the Atlantic. <It is likely> that many others lie apart from it across the water, some larger and some smaller, all invisible to us except this one.[998]

13 · The surrounding waters

I.40.1.13

For the relation of our local islands to these seas is the relation of this inhabited world, and many others, to the entire sea. These are great islands washed round by great seas. The whole body of liquid, lying at the surface according to the properties of liquid and the hollows, with the so-called inhabited worlds growing up from it, would be for the most part next to the nature of air.[999]

998. Oikoumenē is the inhabited world known to the author and his readers. The other great land masses are inferred by analogy; the passage does not claim to have observed them. “It is likely” is supplied by Wachsmuth from De mundo. The Atlantic here is the surrounding Ocean, broader than the modern ocean bearing that name.

999. The final sentence is textually difficult. The printed “properties of liquid” differs from the separate text of De mundo, and anapephykuia, “having grown up,” does not fit smoothly with its object. The English makes the apparent picture explicit: land masses emerge amid the waters, whose upper surface adjoins the air. The Greek is retained without adopting an unprinted repair.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 258

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

14 I.40.1.14

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βυθοῖς κατὰ τὸ μεσαίτατον τοῦ κόσμου ἐρηρεισμένη <γῆ πᾶσα καὶ πεπιεσμένη> συνέστηκεν ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀσάλευτος· καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ πᾶν ὃ καλοῦμεν κάτω.

15 I.40.1.15

Πέντε δὲ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα, ἐν πέντε χώραις σφαιρικῶς <ἐγκείμενα, περιεχομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος τῇ μείζονι> (λέγω δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὕδατι, ὕδατος δὲ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος δὲ ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι) τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συνεστήσατο· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνω πᾶν θεῶν ἀπέδειξεν οἰκητήριον, τὸ κάτω δὲ ἐφημέρων ζῴων. Αὐτοῦ γε μὴν τούτου τὸ μὲν ὑγρόν ἐστιν, ὃ καλεῖν ποταμοὺς καὶ νάματα καὶ θαλάσσας εἰθίσμεθα, τὸ δὲ ξηρόν, ὃ γῆν τε καὶ ἠπείρους καὶ νήσους ὀνομάζομεν.

16 I.40.1.16

Τῶν δὲ νήσων αἱ μέν εἰσι μεγάλαι, καθάπερ σύμπασα ἡ οἰκουμένη λέλεκται πολλαί τε ἕτεραι μεγάλοις περιρρεόμεναι πελάγεσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐλάττους, φανεραὶ δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐντὸς οὖσαι. Καὶ τούτων αἱ μὲν ἀξιόλογοι, Σικελία τε καὶ Εὔβοια καὶ Κύπρος, Σαρδὼ <καὶ> Κύρνος, Κρήτη τε [καὶ Πελοπόννησος] καὶ Λέσβος· αἱ δὲ ὑποδεέστεραι, ὧν αἱ μὲν Σποράδες <καὶ> Κυκλάδες, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως ὀνομάζονται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

14 · The center below

I.40.1.14

After these, in the depths at the very center of the cosmos, <the whole earth, compacted together,> stands firmly set, motionless and unshaken. This is the entire region of the cosmos that we call “below.”[1000]

15 · The five regions

I.40.1.15

These five elements, <situated> spherically in five regions, <the smaller always enclosed by the larger> (I mean earth within water, water within air, air within fire, and fire within aether), constitute the entire cosmos. They mark out the whole upper region as the dwelling of gods, and the lower as that of creatures of a day. Of this lower region, one part is wet, which we are accustomed to call rivers, streams, and seas; another is dry, which we name land, continents, and islands.[1001]

16 · Islands of the inner sea

I.40.1.16

Of the islands, some are great, as the whole inhabited world has been said to be, and many others surrounded by great seas; others are smaller, visible to us, and situated within. Among these, the notable ones are Sicily, Euboea, Cyprus, Sarda <and> Kyrnos, Crete [and the Peloponnese], and Lesbos. Others are lesser: some are called the Sporades <and> Cyclades, while others have other names.[1002]

1000. The bracketed words restore a clause absent from the Stobaeus manuscripts, using De mundo. “Below” is defined by the center of this spherical arrangement, not by an absolute direction outside it.

1001. “Creatures of a day” renders ephēmerōn zōiōn, emphasizing the transience of mortal life. Wachsmuth restores the explanation of the nested regions from De mundo; it remains bracketed in both languages.

1002. Sarda and Kyrnos are Sardinia and Corsica. “Within” refers to the inner sea, the Mediterranean. The Peloponnese is a peninsula; Heeren rejected its inclusion here, and Wachsmuth retains it in square brackets. Both supplied conjunctions are also shown.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 258-259

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

17 I.40.1.17

Πέλαγος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης Ἀτλαντικόν τε καὶ Ὠκεανὸς καλεῖται, περιρρέων ἡμᾶς· ἐντὸς δὲ πρὸς δύσεις στενοπόρῳ διανεῳγὼς στόματι, ταῖς Ἡρακλείοις λεγομέναις στήλαις, τὸν εἴσρουν εἰς τὴν ἔσω θάλασσαν ὡς ἂν εἰς λιμένα ποιεῖται· κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ ἐπιπλατυνόμενος ἀναχεῖται, μεγάλους περιλαμβάνων κόλπους ἀλλήλοις συναφεῖς.

18 I.40.1.18

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγεται ἐγκεκολπῶσθαι ἐν δεξιᾷ εἰσπλέοντι τὰς Ἡρακλείους στήλας διχῶς εἰς τὰς καλουμένας Σύρτεις, ὧν τὴν μὲν μεγάλην, τὴν δὲ μικρὰν καλοῦσιν· ἐπὶ θάτερα δὲ οὐκέθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἀποκολπούμενος τρία ποιεῖ πελάγη, τό τε Σαρδονικὸν καὶ τὸ Γαλατικὸν λεγόμενον καὶ Ἀδρίαν, ἐξῆς δὲ τούτων ἐγκάρσιον τὸ Σικελικόν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ Κρητικόν, συνεχὲς <δ᾽> αὐτῷ τῇ μὲν τὸ Αἰγύπτιον καὶ Παμφύλιον καὶ Σύριον, τῇ δὲ τὸ Αἰγαῖόν τε καὶ Μυρτῷον.

19 I.40.1.19

Ἀντιπαρήκει δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πολυμερέστατος [δὲ] ὢν Πόντος, οὗ τὸ μὲν μυχαίτατον Μαιῶτις καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἔξω πρὸς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον συνεστόμωται τῇ καλουμένῃ Προποντίδι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

17 · Ocean and the inner sea

I.40.1.17

The sea outside the inhabited world is called both Atlantic and Ocean, and flows around us. In the west it opens inward through a narrow mouth, the so-called Pillars of Heracles, and enters the inner sea as though entering a harbor. Gradually widening, it spreads out and embraces great gulfs connected with one another.[1003]

18 · The Mediterranean basins

I.40.1.18

First, on the right as one sails in through the Pillars of Heracles, it is said to form two gulfs called the Syrtes, one named the Great and the other the Small. On the other side, where the gulfs are shaped differently, it forms three seas: the Sardinian, the so-called Gallic, and the Adriatic. Next, lying across these, is the Sicilian sea; after it, the Cretan. <And> adjoining that sea are the Egyptian, Pamphylian, and Syrian on one side, and the Aegean and Myrtoan on the other.[1004]

19 · Pontus and Maeotis

I.40.1.19

Opposite the seas just named extends Pontus, [but] divided into very many parts. Its innermost part is called Maeotis, while its outer part toward the Hellespont connects at its mouth with the sea called Propontis.[1005]

1003. The Pillars of Heracles mark the western entrance to the Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar. The passage describes the inner sea as an inlet of the encompassing Ocean.

1004. The names follow the ancient coastal divisions of the sea. “On the right” is the southern side for a traveler entering from the west. The two Syrtes are the large North African gulfs; the catalogue proceeds by adjacent basins rather than by modern national boundaries.

1005. Pontus is the Black Sea, Maeotis the Sea of Azov, and Propontis the Sea of Marmara. The second de, “but,” is rejected as superfluous. The sequence is the author’s compressed description of the connected waters.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

20 I.40.1.20

Πρός γε μὴν ταῖς ἀνασχέσεσι τοῦ ἡλίου πάλιν εἰσρέων ὁ Ὠκεανός, τὸν Ἰνδικόν τε καὶ Περσικὸν διανοίξας κόλπον, ἀναφαίνει τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν θάλασσαν διειληφώς. Ἐπὶ θάτερον δὲ κέρας καταστενοῦται καὶ ἐπιμήκη διιὼν εἰς αὐχένα πάλιν ἀνευρύνεται, τὴν Ὑρκανίαν τε καὶ Κασπίαν ὁρίζων· τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ ταύτην βαθὺν ἔχει τὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν Μαιῶτιν λίμνην τόπον.

21 I.40.1.21

Εἶτα κατ᾽ ὀλίγον τι ὑπὲρ τοὺς Σκύθας τε καὶ Κελτικὴν σφίγγει τὴν οἰκουμένην, πρός τε τὸν Γαλατικὸν καλούμενον κόλπον καὶ τὰς προειρημένας στήλας Ἡρακλείους, ὧν ἔξω περιρρεῖ τὴν γῆν ὁ Ὠκεανός.

22 I.40.1.22

Ἐν τούτῳ γε μὴν νῆσοι μεγάλαι τυγχάνουσιν, αἱ [τε] δύο Βρετανικαὶ λεγόμεναι [καὶ] Ἄλβιον καὶ Ἰέρνη, τῶν προϊστορουμένων μείζους, ὑπὲρ Κελτοὺς κείμεναι· τούτων δὲ ἐλάττους ἥ τε Ταπροβάνη πέραν Ἰνδῶν, λοξὴ πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ ἡ Φοβέα [Εὔβοια] καλουμένη, κατὰ τὸν Ἀράβιον κειμένη κόλπον. Οὐκ ὀλίγαι τε ἄλλαι μικραὶ περὶ τὰς Βρετανικὰς καὶ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν κύκλῳ περιστεφανοῦσι τὴν οἰκουμένην ταύτην, ἣν δὴ νῆσον εἰρήκαμεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 260-261

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

20 · Eastern inlets of Ocean I.40.1.20

Again, toward the rising of the sun, Ocean flows inward, opening the Indian and Persian gulfs and enclosing the expanse known as the Erythraean Sea. At another arm it narrows, passes into a long neck, and widens again, marking out the Hyrcanian and Caspian Sea. The region beyond this extends far inland, beyond Lake Maeotis.[1006]

21 · Ocean around the north and west I.40.1.21

Then, little by little, beyond the Scythians and the Celtic country, it closes around the inhabited world toward the gulf called Gallic and the Pillars of Heracles already mentioned, outside which Ocean flows around the land.

22 · Islands beyond the continents I.40.1.22

In Ocean there are great islands: [and] the two called British, [and] Albion and Ierne, larger than those previously described and lying beyond the Celts. Smaller than these are Taprobane, beyond the Indians and at an angle to the inhabited world, and the island called Phobea [Euboea], situated by the Arabian Gulf.[1007] Many other small islands around the British islands and Iberia form a circular crown about this inhabited world, which we have called an island.

1006. This ancient geographical picture treats the Hyrcanian or Caspian Sea as an inlet of Ocean. Erythraean, literally “red,” is used here for a broad eastern expanse associated with the Indian and Persian gulfs. These names and connections should not be read as the boundaries of the modern Red Sea.

1007. Albion is Britain, Ierne Ireland, and Taprobane Sri Lanka. The printed text says Taprobane and Phobea are smaller; versions of De mundo that insert “not” give a different comparison. Wachsmuth rejects Euboea as a divergent form of the damaged name Phobea; he does not replace the latter with the parallel’s Phebol. The two bracketed conjunctions are also rejected. The English preserves these decisions; Phobea’s identification is left open.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

23 I.40.1.23

ἧς πλάτος μὲν κατὰ τὸ βαθύτατον τῆς ἠπείρου βραχὺ ἀποδέον τετρακισμυρίων σταδίων φασὶν οἱ εὖ γεωγραφήσαντες, μῆκος δὲ περὶ ἑπτακισμυρίους μάλιστα. διαιρεῖται δὲ εἵς τε Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν καὶ Λιβύην.

24 I.40.1.24

Εὐρώπη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἧς ὅρος κύκλῳ στῆλαί τε Ἡρακλέους καὶ μυχοὶ Πόντου, θάλαττά τε [καὶ] Ὑρκανία, καθ᾽ ἣν στενώτατος ἰσθμὸς εἰς τὸν Πόντον διήκει· τινὲς δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ Τάναϊν ποταμὸν εἰρήκασιν. Ἀσία δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἰσθμοῦ τοῦ τε Πόντου καὶ τῆς Ὑρκανίας θαλάττης μέχρι θατέρου ἰσθμοῦ, ὃς μεταξὺ κεῖται τοῦ τε Ἀραβικοῦ κόλπου καὶ τῆς ἔσω θαλάττης, περιεσχημένος ὑπό τε ταύτης καὶ τοῦ πέριξ ὠκεανοῦ· τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ Τανάϊδος μέχρι Νείλου τίθενται ὅρον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 261

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

23 · Dimensions and divisions

I.40.1.23

Writers skilled in geography say that its breadth, where the mainland extends deepest, is a little short of forty thousand stades, and its length approximately seventy thousand. It is divided into Europe, Asia, and Libya.[1008]

24 · Europe and Asia

I.40.1.24

Europe is the region bounded round by the Pillars of Heracles, the recesses of Pontus, and the [and] Hyrcanian Sea, from which a very narrow isthmus extends to Pontus. Some give the river Tanais instead of the isthmus. Asia is the region from the isthmus just mentioned, between Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, to the other isthmus lying between the Arabian Gulf and the inner sea, enclosed by that sea and the surrounding Ocean. Some set its boundary from the Tanais to the Nile.[1009]

1008. These are dimensions of the inhabited world in the account, not measurements of the entire globe. The stade was an ancient unit whose length varied; the original figures are retained without a falsely precise conversion. Libya here names the African division of the inhabited world.

1009. Tanais is the river Don. The account records competing conventions for dividing continents, using either rivers or isthmuses. The second “and” before Hyrcanian is rejected in the source. The Arabian isthmus is the land between the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

25 I.40.1.25

Λιβύη δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀραβικοῦ ἰσθμοῦ ἕως Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Νείλου φασὶν ἕως ἐκείνων. Τὴν δὲ Αἴγυπτον ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Νείλου στομάτων περιεχομένην οἱ μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, οἱ δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ προσάπτουσι· καὶ τὰς νήσους οἱ μὲν ἐξαιρέτους ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ [ἀεὶ] προσνέμουσιν ἀεὶ ταῖς γείτοσι μοίραις. Γῆς μὲν δὴ καὶ θαλάττης φύσιν καὶ θέσιν, ἣν καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν οἰκουμένην, τοιάνδε πῃ ἱστορήκαμεν.

26 I.40.1.26

[κεφ. 4] Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀξιολογωτάτων ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς παθῶν νῦν λέγωμεν, αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀνακεφαλαιούμενοι. Δύο γὰρ δή τινες ἀναθυμιάσεις ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀναφέρονται συνεχῶς εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀέρα λεπτομερεῖς καὶ ἀόρατοι παντάπασιν, ἔκ τε τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἠόνας τόπων ἔκ τε ποταμῶν τε καὶ ναμάτων ἀναφερόμεναι θεωροῦνται. Τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μέν ἐστι ξηρὰ καὶ καπνώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπορρέουσα· ἡ δὲ νοτερὰ καὶ ἀτμιδώδης, [καὶ] ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιωμένη φύσεως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 261-262

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

25 · Libya and Egypt

I.40.1.25

Libya is the region from the Arabian isthmus to the Pillars of Heracles; others say from the Nile to those pillars. Egypt, enclosed by the mouths of the Nile, is assigned by some to Asia and by others to Libya. Some place the islands in a separate category, while others [always] assign them in each case to the neighboring divisions.[1010] Such, approximately, is our account of the nature and position of land and sea which we customarily call the inhabited world.

26 · Two exhalations

I.40.1.26

[Chapter 4] Let us now discuss the most noteworthy occurrences within and above it, summarizing only the essentials. Two exhalations continually rise from it into the air above us, composed of fine particles and entirely invisible; they are observed rising from places along the shores, from rivers, and from streams.[1011] One is dry and smoky, flowing from the earth; the other is moist and vaporous, [and] exhaled from the liquid element.

1010. The Egypt described by reference to the mouths of the Nile is the delta region. The first aei, “always,” is bracketed as redundant; the second is rendered “in each case.” The final qualifying phrase, “approximately,” preserves the summary’s modest scope.

1011. “Entirely invisible” and “are observed” stand together awkwardly in the printed text; the apparatus records proposed repairs. The translation preserves the tension. The dry and moist exhalations provide the organizing explanation for the phenomena that follow. The bracketed conjunction is rejected by Heeren.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

27 I.40.1.27

Γίνονται δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης ὁμίχλαι καὶ δρόσοι καὶ πάγων ἰδέαι, νέφη τε καὶ ὄμβροι καὶ χιόνες καὶ χάλαζαι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ἄνεμοί τε καὶ πνεύματα διάφορα, βρονταί τε καὶ ἀστραπαὶ καὶ πρηστῆρες καὶ κεραυνοὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ δὴ τούτοις ἐστὶ συμφυΐα.

28 I.40.1.28

Ἔστι δὲ ὁμίχλη μὲν ἀτμιδώδης ἀναθυμίασις ἄγονος ὕδατος, ἀέρος μὲν παχυτέρα, νέφους δὲ ἀραιοτέρα· γίνεται δὲ ἤτοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς νέφους ἢ ἐξ ὑπολείμματος. Ἀντίπαλος δὲ αὐτῇ λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν αἰθρία, οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὖσα πλὴν ἀὴρ ἀνεφελός τε καὶ ἀνόμιχλος.

29 I.40.1.29

Δρόσος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑγρὸν ἐξ αἰθρίας κατὰ σύστασιν λεπτὴν φερόμενον, κρύσταλλος δὲ ἀθρόον ὕδωρ ἐξ αἰθρίας πεπηγός, πάχνη δ᾽ ἐστὶν … ἡμιπαγὴς δρόσος·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

27 · What each exhalation produces

I.40.1.27

From the moist exhalation arise mists, dews, forms of frost, clouds, rains, snows, and hail; from the dry one arise winds and differing blasts, thunder, lightning, fiery storm blasts, thunderbolts, and the other phenomena naturally akin to these.[1012]

28 · Mist and clear air

I.40.1.28

Mist is a vaporous exhalation that produces no water, thicker than air but thinner than cloud. It arises either from a cloud's first formation or from its remnant. What is called clear weather is its opposite, and truly is so: it is nothing other than air free from cloud and mist.[1013]

29 · Dew, ice, and frost

I.40.1.29

Dew is moisture descending from a clear sky in a fine condensation; ice is a mass of water frozen under a clear sky; frost is … half-frozen dew.[1014]

1012. Prēstēres, here "fiery storm blasts," are violent winds associated with burning; the text later gives a more specific account of them. Pneumata means moving air or blasts in this physical classification.

1013. "Produces no water" renders agonos hydatos: the mist does not yield the falling water of rain. The contrast with cloud concerns the degree of thickening in this ancient account.

1014. The gap before "half-frozen dew" is printed in Wachsmuth. The separate text of De mundo distinguishes frozen dew from partially frozen dew, but that fuller wording has not been inserted into the facing text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

30 I.40.1.30

νέφος δ᾽ ἐστὶν <πάχος> ἀτμῶδες συνεστραμμένον γόνιμον ὕδατος· ὄμβρος δὲ γίνεται μὲν κατ᾽ ἐκπιασμὸν νέφους εὖ μάλα πεπαχυμμένου· διαφορὰς δὲ ἴσχει ὅσας καὶ ἡ τοῦ νέφους ἀπόθλιψις· ἠπία μὲν γὰρ οὖσα μαλακὰς ψεκάδας διασπείρει, σφοδρὰ δὲ ἀδροτέρας· καὶ τοῦτο καλοῦμεν ὄμβρον ὑετοῦ μείζονα καὶ συνεχῆ συστρέμματα ἐπὶ γῆς φερόμενα.

31 I.40.1.31

Χιὼν δὲ γίνεται κατὰ νεφῶν πεπυκνωμένων ἀπόθραυσιν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ὕδωρ μεταβολῆς ἀνακοπέντων· ἐργάζεται δὲ ἡ μὲν κοπὴ τὸ ἀφρῶδές τε καὶ ἔκλευκον, ἡ δὲ σύμπηξις τοῦ ἐνόντος ὑγροῦ τὴν ψυχρότητα οὔπω χυθέντος οὐδὲ ἠραιωμένου. Σφοδρὰ δ᾽ αὕτη καὶ ἀθρόα καταφερομένη νιφετὸς ὠνόμασται.

32 I.40.1.32

Χάλαζα δὲ γίνεται νιφετοῦ συστραφέντος καὶ βρῖθος ἐκ πιλήματος εἰς καταφορὰν ταχυτέραν λαβόντος· παρὰ δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀπορρηγνυμένων θραυσμάτων οἵ τε ὄγκοι μείζους αἵ τε φοραὶ γίνονται βιαιότεραι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως πέφυκε συμπίπτειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

30 · Cloud and rain

I.40.1.30

cloud is a gathered vaporous <mass> capable of producing water. Rain arises when a thoroughly thickened cloud is squeezed out, and varies with the compression of the cloud. Gentle compression scatters fine drops; violent compression scatters larger ones. What we call a downpour consists of larger, continuous masses of rain descending to earth.[1015]

31 · Snow

I.40.1.31

Snow arises from the breaking up of condensed clouds, checked before their change into water. The breaking produces its frothy texture and whiteness; the freezing of the moisture within it, which has not yet flowed out or become diffuse, produces its coldness. When it falls violently and in a mass, it is called a snowstorm.

32 · Hail

I.40.1.32

Hail arises when snow is compacted and gains weight from its compression, causing a faster descent. According to the size of the fragments that break off, the masses are larger and their movements more violent. These phenomena, then, naturally arise from the moist exhalation.[1016]

1015. The supplied pachos means thickness or a thick mass. The explanation is mechanical: the degree of compression determines the character of the rain. The distinction between ombros and hyetos in the closing phrase is rendered as downpour and rain.

1016. This is the author's sequence from condensed cloud to snow and compressed hail. The English preserves that physical account rather than substituting a modern explanation of hail formation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

33 I.40.1.33

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ὑπὸ ψύχους μὲν ὠσθείσης ὥστε ῥεῖν ἄνεμος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὗτος πλὴν ἀὴρ ῥέων πολὺς καὶ ἀθρόος, ὅστις ἅμα καὶ πνεῦμα λέγεται. Καλεῖται δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ ἑτέρως ἥ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.

34 I.40.1.34

Τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀέρι πνέοντα πνεύματα καλοῦμεν ἀνέμους, αὔρας δὲ τὰς ἐξ ὑγροῦ φερομένας ἐκπνοάς. Τῶν δὲ ἀνέμων οἱ μὲν ἐκ νενοτισμένης γῆς ῥέοντες ἀπόγειοι λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ κόλπων διεξᾴττοντες ἐγκολπίαι· τούτοις δὲ ἀνάλογόν τι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐκ ποταμῶν τε καὶ λιμνῶν. Οἱ δὲ κατὰ ῥῆξιν γιγνόμενοι καὶ ἀνάλυσιν τοῦ πάχους εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ποιούμενοι ἐκνεφίαι· μεθ᾽ ὕδατος δὲ ἀθρόου ῥαγέντος ἐξυδρίαι λέγονται.

35 I.40.1.35

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς συνεχεῖς εὖροι κέκληνται, βόρεαι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ ἄρκτου· ζέφυροι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ δυσμῶν· νότοι δὲ <οἱ> ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

33 · Wind and living breath I.40.1.33

Wind arises from the dry exhalation when cold drives it into a flow. It is nothing other than a great mass of flowing air, which is also called pneuma. In another sense, pneuma also names the animate and generative substance in plants and animals that pervades all things; we need not discuss that now.[1017]

34 · Local winds and squalls I.40.1.34

We call the blasts moving in the air winds, and the breaths coming from water breezes. Winds flowing from moist earth are called land winds; those rushing out of gulfs, gulf winds. Those from rivers and lakes are analogous to these. Winds arising from a rupture and dissolving the dense mass into themselves are called cloud squalls; when accompanied by a mass of water bursting forth, they are called rain squalls.[1018]

35 · Four principal directions I.40.1.35

The continuous winds from the east are called east winds, those from the north north winds, those from the west west winds, and <those> from the south south winds.[1019]

1017. Pneuma can mean wind, breath, or a vital substance. The author explicitly separates the physical wind under discussion from the life-bearing sense of the word; retaining the Greek term here makes that distinction visible.

1018. Eknephiai and exydriai distinguish violent outbursts associated with cloud and water. In “the dense mass,” cloud is understood from the context; the parallel De mundo explicitly supplies it after “rupture.”

1019. The Greek collective names are euroi, boreai, zephyroi, and notoi. The following catalogue uses related names more specifically for individual directions. “Continuous” follows the printed synecheis, which Heeren proposed omitting.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

36 I.40.1.36

Τῶν γε μὴν εὔρων Ἀπαρκτίας μὲν λέγεται <ὁ> ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς θερινὰς ἀνατολὰς τόπου ῥέων ἄνεμος, Ἀπηλιώτης δὲ <ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς ἰσημερινάς, Εὖρος δὲ ὁ> ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς χειμερινάς. Καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ζεφύρων Ἀργέστης μὲν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς θερινῆς δύσεως, ὅντινα καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν Ὀλυμπίαν, οἱ δὲ Ἰάπυγα, Ζέφυρος δὲ <ὁ> ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσημερινῆς, <Λὶψ δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς χειμερινῆς>.

37 I.40.1.37

Καὶ τῶν βορείων ἰδίως ὁ μὲν [τῶν] ἐξῆς τῷ Καικίᾳ καλεῖται Βορέας, [δὲ καὶ] Ἀπαρκτίας δὲ ὁ ἐφεξῆς [αὐτῶν καθεξῆς] ἀπὸ τοῦ πόλου κατὰ τὸ μεσημβρινόν, Θρακίας δὲ ὁ ἐξῆς τῷ Ἀργέστῃ, ὃν ἔνιοι Καικίαν καλοῦσι. Καὶ τῶν [μὲν] νότων ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς πόλου φερόμενος, ἀντίπαλος τῷ Ἀπαρκτίᾳ, καλεῖται Νότος· Εὐρόνοτος δὲ ὁ μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ Εὔρου. Τὸν δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα μεταξὺ Λιβός τε καὶ Νότου οἱ μὲν Λιβόνοτον, οἱ δὲ Λιβοφοίνικα καλοῦσι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

36 · Eastern and western winds

I.40.1.36

Among the east winds, Aparctias is the name of <the> wind flowing from the place of the summer sunrise; Apeliotes, <of the one from the equinoctial sunrise; and Eurus, of the one> from the winter sunrise. Of the opposite west winds, Argestes comes from the summer sunset, called Olympias by some and Iapyx by others; Zephyrus is <the one> from the equinoctial sunset, <and Lips the one from the winter sunset>.[1020]

37 · Northern and southern winds

I.40.1.37

Among the northern winds in particular, the one [of those] next to Caecias is called Boreas; [and also] the next [of them in order], coming from the pole along the meridian, is Aparctias. The one next to Argestes is Thrascias, which some call Caecias.[1021] Among the south winds [on the one hand], the one coming from the unseen pole, opposite Aparctias, is called Notus; the one between it and Eurus is Euronotus. The one on the other side, between Lips and Notus, some call Libonotus and others Libophoenix.

1020. The directions are defined by the changing sunrise and sunset positions, rather than by evenly spaced compass points. “Aparctias” is the reading of the Stobaeus witnesses here, though the parallel has Caecias; Aparctias occurs again below as the polar north wind. The inconsistency is preserved. The bracketed restorations come from De mundo.

1021. The square brackets retain redundant or intrusive wording rejected by Wachsmuth. This catalogue also gives Caecias as an alternative name for Thrascias, despite the earlier use of Caecias on the other side of north. Names have not been silently redistributed into a corrected wind rose. The unseen pole is the southern one in the observer’s scheme.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

38 I.40.1.38

Τῶν δὲ ἀνέμων οἱ μέν εἰσιν εὐθύπνοοι, ὁπόσοι διεκθέουσι πρόσω κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν· οἱ δέ εἰσιν ἀνακαμψίπνοοι, καθάπερ ὁ Καικίας λεγόμενος. Καὶ οἱ μὲν χειμῶνος, καθάπερ οἱ νότοι, δυναστεύοντες, οἱ δὲ θέρους, ὡς οἱ ἐτησίαι λεγόμενοι, μῖξιν ἔχοντες τῶν τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρκτου φερομένων καὶ ζεφύρων. οἱ δὲ Ὀρνιθίαι καλούμενοι, ἐαρινοὶ πνέοντες ἄνεμοι, βόρειοί εἰσι τῷ γένει.

39 I.40.1.39

Τῶν γε μὴν βιαίων πνευμάτων καταιγίς μέν ἐστι πνεῦμα … βίᾳ καὶ ἄφνω προσαλλόμενον· λαῖλαψ δὲ καὶ στρόβιλος πνεῦμα εἰλούμενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω· ἀναφύσημα δὲ πνεῦμα γῆς ἄνω φερόμενον κατὰ τὴν ἐκ βυθοῦ τινος ἢ ῥήγματος ἀνάδοσιν· ὅταν δὲ πολὺ φέρηται εἰλούμενον, πρηστὴρ χθόνιός ἐστιν.

40 I.40.1.40

Εἰληθὲν δὲ πνεῦμα ἐν νέφει παχεῖ τε <καὶ> νοτίῳ καὶ ἐξωσθὲν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ βιαίως <ῥηγνύον> τὸ πίλημα τοῦ νέφους βρόμον καὶ πάταγον μέγαν ἀπειργάσατο, βροντὴν λεγόμενον, ὥσπερ ἐν ὕδατι πνεῦμα σφοδρῶς ἐλαυνόμενον. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ νέφους ἔκρηξιν πυρωθὲν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ λάμψαν ἀστραπὴ λέγεται·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

38 · Wind courses and seasons

I.40.1.38

Some winds blow straight, running forward in a straight course; others bend back in their blowing, such as the one called Caecias. Some prevail in winter, like the south winds; others in summer, like the so-called Etesians, which combine winds from the north with west winds. The winds called Ornithian blow in spring and belong to the northern class.[1022]

39 · Violent blasts

I.40.1.39

Among violent blasts, a squall is a wind … that strikes forcibly and suddenly. A tempest or whirlwind is wind twisting up and down. An upward blast is wind from the earth carried aloft as it rises from some depth or fissure; when a great quantity is borne along in a whirl, it is a terrestrial storm blast.[1023]

40 · Thunder and lightning

I.40.1.40

Wind trapped in a thick <and> moist cloud and forced violently through it, <rupturing> the cloud's compressed mass, produces a great roar and crash called thunder, like air driven violently through water. When the cloud bursts, the wind that has caught fire and flashed is called lightning;[1024]

1022. Etesian means recurring yearly; Ornithian means associated with birds. The descriptions distinguish the season and course of a wind from its direction of origin.

1023. A gap is printed after "wind" in the definition of the squall. The parallel text contains a fuller distinction between a squall and another storm wind; none is reconstructed here. The final term is prēstēr chthonios, a prēstēr arising from the earth.

1024. The explanation treats thunder as the sound of escaping wind and lightning as that wind ignited. "And" and "rupturing" are supplied from De mundo. This account continues the dry-exhalation theory rather than a theory of electrical discharge.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

41 I.40.1.41

ὃ δὴ πρότερον τῆς βροντῆς προσέπεσεν ὕστερον γενόμενον, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ πέφυκε φθάνεσθαι· τοῦ μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν δηλουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἐπειδὰν ἐμπελάσῃ τῇ ἀκοῇ· καὶ ὅταν τὸ μὲν τάχιστον ᾖ τῶν ὄντων, λέγω δὲ τὸ πυρῶδες, τὸ δὲ ἧττον ταχύ, τὸ ἀερῶδες, ἐν τῇ πλήξει πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἀφικνούμενον.

42 I.40.1.42

Τὸ δὲ ἀστράψαν, ἀναπυρωθὲν βιαίως καὶ ἄχρι τῆς γῆς διελθόν, κεραυνὸς καλεῖται· ἐὰν δὲ ἡμίπυρον ᾖ, σφοδρὸν ἄλλως καὶ ἀθρόον, πρηστήρ· ἐὰν δὲ ἄπυρον παντελῶς, τυφών. Ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων κάτω σκῆψαν εἰς γῆν σκηπτὸς ὀνομάζεται.

43 I.40.1.43

Τῶν δὲ κεραυνῶν οἱ μὲν αἰθαλώδεις ψολόεντες λέγονται· οἱ δὲ ταχέως διᾴττοντες ἀργῆτες· ἑλικίαι δὲ οἱ γραμμοειδῶς φερόμενοι· σκηπτοὶ δὲ ὅσοι κατασκήπτουσιν εἴς τι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

41 · Why the flash appears first I.40.1.41

it reaches us before the thunder although it comes into being later, because what is audible naturally arrives after what is visible. The latter is apparent even from far away, the former only when it comes close to the hearing; and this is so when the one, I mean the fiery element, is the swiftest of things, while the other, the airy element, is less swift, reaching the hearing in the impact.[1025]

42 · Thunderbolt, fiery blast, and whirlwind I.40.1.42

What flashes, is violently kindled, and passes all the way to the earth is called a thunderbolt. If it is only partly fiery, but otherwise violent and concentrated, it is a fiery storm blast; if entirely without fire, a whirlwind. Each of these, when it strikes down upon the earth, is called a striking bolt.[1026]

43 · Kinds of thunderbolt I.40.1.43

Of thunderbolts, the smoky ones are called smoldering, those that dart swiftly bright, those that travel in a streak winding, and those that strike something striking bolts.[1027]

1025. The author distinguishes the order of production from the order of perception. The clause beginning “when” is marked as corrupt in the apparatus, though no dagger is printed in the body; its apparent contrast between the speed of fire and of air is translated without claiming that the syntax is secure.

1026. The Greek terms are keraunos, prēstēr, typhōn, and skēptos. Skēptos is explained through skēptein, to strike or fall upon. The classification depends on the presence and degree of fire in the moving air.

1027. The names are psoloeis, argēs, helikias, and skēptos. The description grammoeidōs is literally “in the form of a line,” while helikias suggests winding or spiral movement. The juxtaposition belongs to the printed classification and is retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

44 I.40.1.44

Συλλήβδην δὲ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι φαντασμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι κατ᾽ ἔμφασιν, <τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν. Κατ᾽ ἔμφασιν μὲν> ἴριδες καὶ ῥάβδοι καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν δὲ σέλα τε διάττοντα καὶ κομῆται καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια.

45 I.40.1.45

Ἶρις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἔμφασις ἡλίου τμήματος ἢ σελήνης, ἐν νέφει νοτερῷ καὶ κοίλῳ καὶ συνεχεῖ πρὸς φαντασίαν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρουμένη κατὰ κύκλου περιφάνειαν. Ῥάβδος δὲ ἴριδος ἔμφασις εὐθεῖα· ἅλως δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔμφασις λαμπρότητος ἄστρου περίαυγος, διαφέρουσα τῇ ἰδιότητι, <ὅτι> ἡ μὲν Ἶρις ἐξ ἐναντίας φαίνεται ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης, ἡ δ᾽ ἅλως κύκλῳ παντὸς ἄστρου.

46 I.40.1.46

Σέλας δ᾽ ἐστὶ πυρὸς ἀθρόου ἔξαψις ἐν ἀέρι. Τῶν δὲ σελῶν τὰ μὲν ἀκοντίζεται, τὰ δὲ στηρίζεται. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐξακοντισμός ἐστι πυρὸς γένεσις ἐκ παρατρίψεως ἐν ἀέρι φερομένου ταχέως καὶ φαντασίαν μήκους ἐμφαίνοντος διὰ τὸ τάχος· ὁ δὲ στηριγμὸς χωρὶς φορᾶς προμήκης ἔκτασις καὶ οἱονεὶ ἄστρου ῥύσις· πλατυνομένη δὲ κατὰ θάτερον κομήτης καλεῖται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

44 · Appearances and physical formations I.40.1.44

To sum up, some apparitions in the air occur as an appearance, <others as an actual formation. As an appearance occur> rainbows, rods, and things of that kind generally; as actual formations, shooting lights, comets, and similar things.[1028]

45 · Rainbow, rod, and halo I.40.1.45

A rainbow is an appearance of a segment of the sun or moon, seen along the circumference of a circle in a moist, hollow, continuous cloud that presents the image as in a mirror. A rod is a straight appearance of a rainbow. A halo is a surrounding appearance of a heavenly body's brightness, differing in this characteristic: <that> a rainbow appears opposite the sun or moon, whereas a halo appears around any heavenly body.[1029]

46 · Shooting and stationary lights I.40.1.46

A luminous flare is the kindling of a mass of fire in the air. Some flares shoot out, while others remain in place. A shooting flare is fire generated by friction, moving rapidly through the air and presenting an appearance of length because of its speed. A stationary flare is an elongated extension without movement, like a stream from a star; when it broadens at one end, it is called a comet.[1030]

1028. Emphasis is an appearance produced through reflected light in the explanation that follows; hypostasis is something physically constituted. This distinguishes optical appearances from bodies or fires thought actually to form in the air. The restored contrast is supplied from De mundo.

1029. The explanation treats the cloud as a reflecting surface. "Rod" translates rhabdos, a straight luminous band. The source's distinction is the position of the appearance relative to the luminous body; the supplied "that" introduces it.

1030. Selas is a luminous blaze or flare. The author accounts for the apparent streak of a moving light by its speed, but places comets among stationary extensions of fire in the air. These are the text's categories, not identifications with a modern class of objects.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

47

I.40.1.47

Πολλάκις δὲ τῶν σελῶν τὰ μὲν ἐπιμένει πλείονα χρόνον, τὰ δὲ παραχρῆμα σβέννυται. Πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι φασμάτων ἰδέαι θεωροῦνται, λαμπάδες τε καλούμεναι καὶ δοκίδες καὶ πωγωνίαι καὶ βόθυνοι, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιότητα ὧδε προσαγορευθεῖσαι. Καὶ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἑσπέρια, τὰ δὲ ἑῷα, τὰ δὲ ἀμφιφανῆ θεωρεῖται· σπανίως δὲ καὶ βόρεια καὶ νότια. Πάντα δὲ ἀβέβαια· οὐδὲ γάρ ποτέ τι τούτων ἀεὶ φανερὸν ἱστόρηται κατεστηριγμένον.

48

I.40.1.48

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἀέρια τοιαῦτα. Ἐμπεριέχει δὲ καὶ ἡ γῆ πολλὰς ἐν ἑαυτῇ καθάπερ ὕδατος, οὕτως δὲ καὶ πνεύματος καὶ πυρὸς πηγάς· τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ γῆν εἰσιν ἀόρατοι, πολλαὶ δὲ ἀναπνοὰς ἔχουσι καὶ ἀναφυσήσεις, ὥσπερ Λιπαρά τε καὶ Αἴτνη καὶ Αἰόλου νῆσος· αἱ δ᾽ ἐκρέουσι πολλάκις ποταμοῦ δίκην καὶ μύδρους ἀναρριπτοῦσι διαπύρους. Ἔνιαι δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν οὖσαι πλησίον πηγαίων ὑδάτων θερμαίνουσι ταῦτα· καὶ τὰ μὲν χλιαρὰ τῶν ναμάτων ἀνιᾶσι, τὰ δὲ ὑπέρζεστα, τὰ δὲ εὖ ἔχοντα κράσεως.

49

I.40.1.49

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πολλὰ πολλαχοῦ γῆς στόμια ἀνέῳκται. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνθουσιᾶν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἐμπελάζοντας, … τὰ δὲ χρησμῳδεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ, τὰ δὲ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖ, καθάπερ τὰ ἐν Φρυγίᾳ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

47 · Other fiery appearances I.40.1.47

Often some flares persist for a longer time, while others are extinguished at once. Many other forms of apparition are also seen, called torches, beams, beards, and pits because of their resemblance to these things. Some appear in the west, some in the east, and some in both; rarely they appear in the north or south as well. All are transient: none has ever been recorded as remaining fixed and perpetually visible.[1031]

48 · Underground fire and warm springs I.40.1.48

Such are the phenomena of the air. The earth also contains many sources within itself, of wind and fire just as of water. Some are invisible beneath the earth; many have vents and upward blasts, as at Lipara, Etna, and the island of Aeolus. Others often flow out like a river and throw up masses of glowing rock. Some underground sources, lying near spring waters, heat them, sending up streams that are lukewarm, exceedingly hot, or well tempered.[1032]

49 · Vents and oracles I.40.1.49

Likewise, many openings for winds stand open in many parts of the earth. Some cause those who approach to enter inspired frenzy, … others to utter oracles, as at Delphi and Lebadea, while others kill them outright, as in Phrygia.[1033]

1031. The names describe visual shapes. “In the west” and “in the east” render words that can also mean evening and morning; the continuation with north and south favors directions here. Amphiphanē is understood as appearing on both sides.

1032. The text explains volcanic flows, expelled glowing masses, and hot springs through sources of fire beneath the earth. It names the island of Aeolus in the singular; the apparatus records a plural in the parallel text.

1033. Enthousian is to be divinely inspired or possessed. This is the text’s explanation of the effects of subterranean emissions, including oracular inspiration. A gap after the first effect is printed in the source and left open here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

50 I.40.1.50

Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ συγγενές τι πνεῦμα εὔκρατον ἐν γῇ, παρεξωσθὲν εἰς μυχίους σήραγγας αὐτῆς, ἔξεδρον γενόμενον ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων τόπων, πολλὰ μέρη συνεκράδανε· πολλάκις δὲ πολὺ γενόμενον ἐξωσθὲν ἐν τοῖς ταύτης κοιλώμασι καὶ ἀποκλεισθὲν ἐξόδου μετὰ βίας αὐτὴν συνετίναξε, ζητοῦν ἔξοδον αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπειργάσατο τὸ πάθος τοῦτο, ὃ καλεῖν σεισμοὺς εἰώθαμεν.

51 I.40.1.51

Τῶν δὲ σεισμῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ πλάγια σείοντες κατ᾽ ὀξείας γωνίας ἐπικλίνται καλοῦνται· οἱ δὲ ἄνω ῥιπτοῦντες καὶ κάτω κατ᾽ ὀρθὰς γωνίας βράσται· οἱ δὲ συνιζήσεις ποιοῦντες καὶ τὰ κοῖλα χασματίαι· οἱ δὲ χάσματα ποιοῦντες καὶ γῆν ἀναρρηγνύντες ῥῆκται. Τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ πνεῦμα προσαναβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ πέτρας, οἱ δὲ πηλόν, οἱ δὲ πηγὰς φαίνουσι τὰς πρότερον οὐκ οὔσας.

52 I.40.1.52

Τινὲς δὲ ἀποτρέπονται κατὰ μίαν πρόωσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν <ὥστας· οἱ δὲ ἀναπάλλοντες καὶ ταῖς εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐγκλίσεσι> καὶ ἀποπάλσεσι διορθοῦντες ἀεὶ τὸ σειόμενον παλματίαι λέγονται, τρόμῳ πάθος ὅμοιον ἀπεργαζόμενοι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

50 · The cause of earthquakes

I.40.1.50

Often a naturally present, well-tempered wind within the earth, driven aside into its deep passages and displaced from its proper regions, shakes many parts together. Often, too, when it accumulates in great quantity, is driven into the earth's hollows, and is barred from an outlet, it shakes the earth violently in seeking a way out for itself, producing the disturbance we customarily call earthquakes.[1034]

51 · Kinds of earthquake

I.40.1.51

Of earthquakes, those that shake sideways at acute angles are called tilting; those that toss up and down at right angles, heaving; those that cause subsidence and hollows, gaping; and those that make clefts and split the earth, rending. Some of these also throw up wind, others rocks, others mud, while others reveal springs that did not exist before.[1035]

52 · Thrusts and tremors

I.40.1.52

Some turn aside in a single thrust and are called <thrusting; those that toss up and, through inclinations to either side> and rebounds, repeatedly set the shaken object upright are called trembling, producing an effect like a shudder.[1036]

1034. The proposed cause is trapped subterranean wind. The printed exōsthen, "driven," differs from the parallel's wording about wind being confined from outside. The English follows the Stobaeus text.

1035. The names epiklintai, brastai, chasmatiai, and rhēktai classify the movement or visible effect. "Subsidence and hollows" follows the printed kai ta koila; the parallel instead describes subsidence into hollows.

1036. The long supplement was restored by Heeren from De mundo. The opening apotrepontai, "turn aside," is what Wachsmuth prints; the parallel has an active participle meaning overturning. The English retains the printed construction rather than silently adopting that reading.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 267-268

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

53

I.40.1.53

Γίγνονται δὲ καὶ μυκητίαι σεισμοί, σείοντες τὴν γῆν μετὰ βρόμου. Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ χωρὶς σεισμοῦ γίνεται μύκημα γῆς, ὅταν τὸ πνεῦμα σείειν μὲν μὴ αὔταρκες ᾖ, εἰλούμενον δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ κόπτηται μετὰ ῥοθίου βίας. Συσσωματοποιεῖται δὲ τὰ σείοντα πνεύματα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὑγρῶν κεκραμένων.

54

I.40.1.54

Τὰ δὲ ἀνάλογον συμπίπτει τούτοις καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ. Χάσματα <γὰρ> γίγνονται θαλάττης καὶ ἀναχωρήματα πολλάκις καὶ κυμάτων ἐπιδρομαί, ποτὲ μὲν ἀντανακοπὴν ἔχουσαι, ποτὲ δὲ πρόωσιν μόνον· ὥσπερ ἱστορεῖται περὶ Ἑλίκην τε καὶ Βοῦραν. Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀναφυσήματα γίγνεται πυρὸς ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ πηγῶν ἀναβλύσεις καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολαὶ καὶ δένδρων ἐκφύσεις, ῥοαί τε καὶ δῖναι <ταῖς> τῶν πνευμάτων ἀνάλογον, αἱ μὲν ἐν μέσοις πελάγεσιν, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς εὐρίπους τε καὶ πορθμούς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

53 · Underground rumbling I.40.1.53

There are also bellowing earthquakes, which shake the earth with a roar. Often the earth bellows without an earthquake, when the wind is insufficient to shake it but, confined within it, is battered with a violent rushing noise. The winds that cause the shaking are also formed into compact masses by the mingled liquids within the earth.[1037]

54 · Disturbances of the sea I.40.1.54

Analogous disturbances occur in the sea as well. <For> the sea often opens into gaps or withdraws, and waves rush in, sometimes with a returning recoil and sometimes only with a forward thrust, as is reported of Helice and Bura. Often there are also eruptions of fire in the sea, upwellings of springs, outlets of rivers, growths of trees, and currents and eddies analogous to <those> of winds, some in the open seas and others in narrow channels and straits.[1038]

1037. The distinction is between audible rumbling with and without perceptible shaking. “Mingled” translates the printed kekramenōn; the parallel reads a word meaning hidden. The closing claim about compacted wind belongs to the account’s physical mechanism.

1038. The comparison extends the preceding terrestrial phenomena into the sea. The reference to Helice and Bura illustrates an overwhelming incursion of water. “Growths of trees” follows dendrōn ekphyseis without specifying what organisms or appearances the author intended.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 268-269

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

55

I.40.1.55

Πολλαί τε ἀμπώτεις λέγονται καὶ κυμάτων ἄρσεις συμπεριοδεύειν ἀεὶ τῇ σελήνῃ κατά τινας ὡρισμένους καιρούς. Ὡς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων κεκραμένων ἀλλήλοις ἐν ἀέρι τε καὶ γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς αἱ τῶν παθῶν ὁμοιότητες συνίστανται, τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους φθορὰς καὶ γενέσεις φέρουσαι, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον φυλάττουσαι.

56

I.40.1.56

<κεφ. 5> Καίτοι γέ τις ἐθαύμαζε, πῶς ποτε ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν συνεστηκὼς ὁ κόσμος, λέγω δὲ ξηρῶν τε καὶ ὑγρῶν, ψυχρῶν τε καὶ θερμῶν, οὐ πάλαι διέφθαρται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν· ὡς κἂν εἰ πόλιν τινὲς θαυμάζοιεν, ὅπως διαμένει συνεστηκυῖα ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐθνῶν, πενήτων λέγω καὶ πλουσίων, νέων γερόντων, ἀσθενῶν ἰσχυρῶν, πονηρῶν χρηστῶν. Ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ πολιτικῆς ὁμονοίας τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίαν ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἀποτελεῖν διάθεσιν, ὑποδεχομένην πᾶσαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ τύχην.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

55 · Tides and the enduring whole

I.40.1.55

Many ebbings and risings of the waves are said continually to follow the moon’s circuit at certain fixed times. To state the matter generally, because the elements are mingled with one another in air, earth, and sea, similar disturbances naturally occur, bringing destruction and generation to particular things while preserving the whole as ungenerated and indestructible.[1039]

56 · The city as a comparison

I.40.1.56

<Chapter 5> Yet someone might wonder how the cosmos, composed of contrary principles, dry and moist, cold and hot, has not long since been destroyed and perished. It would be as if people wondered how a city endures when composed of the most opposed groups: poor and rich, young and old, weak and strong, bad and good. They fail to understand that this is the most remarkable feature of civic concord: it produces one disposition from many, and a common disposition from unlike ones, embracing every nature and condition of fortune.[1040]

1039. This closes the physical catalogue and introduces the argument of the next section. Change and destruction affect the parts; the cosmos as a whole is said neither to come into being nor to perish. The lunar relation of tides is stated without a detailed mechanism.

1040. Ethnē here means groups or classes within a city, not separate nations. Homonoia, concord, names a unity that accommodates differences; it becomes the governing comparison for the coexistence of contrary elements.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

57 I.40.1.57

Ἴσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίχεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ οὐχ ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συνῆψεν, οὐ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων.

58 I.40.1.58

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμουμένη τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν· ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ μελανῶν, ὠχρῶν τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν χρωμάτων ἐγκερασαμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνως· μουσικὴ δὲ ὀξεῖς ἅμα δὲ καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρούς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους μίξασα ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἁρμονίαν· γραμματικὴ δὲ φωνηέντων τε καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κρᾶσιν ποιησαμένη τὴν ὅλην τέχνην ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο.

59 I.40.1.59

Αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ λεγόμενον· “Συνάψειας οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον <καὶ> διᾷδον, ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 269-270

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

57 · Nature's joining of opposites

I.40.1.57

Perhaps nature seeks opposites and produces concord from them, rather than from things alike. Thus, for example, it has brought male together with female, not each with its own sex, and joined the first concord through opposites rather than through likenesses.[1041]

58 · Painting, music, and letters

I.40.1.58

Art, too, seems to imitate nature in doing the same. Painting mixes the qualities of white and black, yellow and red colors, and produces images in agreement with their originals. Music mixes high and low, long and short notes in different sounds and produces a single harmony. The art of letters combines vowels and consonants and constructs its entire craft from them.[1042]

59 · Heraclitus on combination

I.40.1.59

This very thing was said by Heraclitus the obscure: "You could join wholes and not-wholes, what converges and what diverges, what sings together <and> what sings apart; from all things one, and from one all things."[1043]

1041. The example concerns the joining of sexes in generation as an analogy for natural composition. "Perhaps" retains the author's qualification as he moves from civic concord to nature.

1042. The examples distinguish contrasts in color, pitch, duration, and speech sounds. "Originals" interprets proēgoumenois as the models represented. Aphōna, literally voiceless letters, is rendered "consonants" in contrast with vowels.

1043. The translation follows the printed synapseias, "you could join," rather than the noun synapsies, "connections," found in another reading noted in the apparatus. The supplied "and" restores the parallel pair. Wachsmuth identifies the quotation as fragment 59 in Bywater and 37 in Schleiermacher; their numbers belong to those editions. The musical verbs preserve the contrast underlying concord and discord.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 269-270

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

60 I.40.1.60

Οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν, οὐρανοῦ λέγω καὶ γῆς τοῦ τε σύμπαντος κόσμου, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων κράσεως ἀρχῶν μία διεκόσμησεν ἁρμονία· ξηρὸν γὰρ ὑγρῷ ψυχρόν τε θερμῷ μιγέν, βαρεῖ τε κοῦφον καὶ ὀρθὸν περιφερεῖ, γῆν τε πᾶσαν … καὶ αἰθέρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἐκόσμησε μία δὴ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις,

61 I.40.1.61

ἐκ τῶν ἀμίκτων καὶ ἑτεροίων, ἀέρος τε καὶ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος, τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα καὶ μιᾷ περιλαβοῦσα σφαίρας ἐπιφανείᾳ, τάς τε ἐναντιωτάτας ἐν αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκάσασα ὁμολογῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τούτων μηχανησαμένη τῷ παντὶ σωτηρίαν.

62 I.40.1.62

Αἰτία δὲ ταύτης <μὲν> ἡ <τῶν στοιχείων ὁμολογία>, τῆς <δὲ> ὁμολογίας ἰσομοιρία καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐτῶν πλέον <ἕτερον> ἑτέρου δύνασθαι· τὴν γὰρ ἴσην ἀντίτασιν ἔχει τά τε βαρέα πρὸς τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ θάτερα, τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τῶν μειζόνων διδασκούσης, ὅτι τὸ ἴσον σωστικόν πώς ἐστιν ὁμονοίας, ἡ δὲ ὁμόνοια τοῦ πάντων γεννήτορός τε καὶ περικαλλεστάτου κόσμου.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 270-271

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

60 · One harmony of the whole

I.40.1.60

In this way a single harmony has ordered the constitution of all things, heaven and earth and the entire cosmos, through the blending of the most contrary principles. Dry is mixed with moist, cold with hot, light with heavy, and straight with curved. The whole earth … and aether, sun, moon, and all heaven have been ordered by one power extending through everything,[1044]

61 · Agreement and preservation

I.40.1.61

fashioning the entire cosmos from unmixing and unlike things, air, earth, fire, and water, enclosing it within a single spherical surface, compelling the most contrary natures within it to agree with one another, and through them securing the preservation of the whole.[1045]

62 · Equal powers

I.40.1.62

The cause of this preservation <on the one hand> is the <agreement of the elements>; the cause of agreement <in turn> is their equal share and the fact that no <one> of them has greater power than another. Heavy things offer an equal counter-tension to light things, and hot things to their opposites. Nature thus teaches in the greater things that equality in some way preserves concord, and concord preserves the cosmos, begetter of all things and supremely beautiful.[1046]

1044. A gap is printed after “the whole earth.” The parallel includes the sea, but the missing words are not supplied here. The English divides the long construction to make its contrasts readable while continuing the sentence into the following unit.

1045. The apparent paradox is deliberate: what is naturally unlike or resistant to mixture contributes to a single ordered whole through the power that joins it. “Preservation” renders sōtēria in its cosmological sense.

1046. Several missing words are restored from De mundo. Isomoiria means an equal share or apportionment; the following clause explains it through the balance of powers. The argument concerns opposed forces preserving one another, not identical properties or an absence of change.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

63 I.40.1.63

Τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴη φύσις τοῦδε κρείττων; Ἥν γὰρ ἂν εἴπῃ τις μέρος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, τό τε καλὸν πᾶν ἐπώνυμόν ἐστι τούτου καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου λεγόμενον κεκοσμῆσθαι.

64 I.40.1.64

Τί δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους δύναιτο ἂν ἐξισωθῆναι τῇ κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν τάξει καὶ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρων ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης κινουμένων <ἐν> ἀκριβεστάτοις μέτροις ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα; Τίς δὲ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀψεύδεια τοιάδε, ἥν<τινα> φυλάττουσιν αἱ καλαὶ καὶ γόνιμοι τῶν ὅλων ὧραι, θέρη τε καὶ χειμῶνας ἐπάγουσαι τεταγμένως, ἡμέρας <τε> καὶ νύκτας εἰς μηνὸς ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ;

65 I.40.1.65

Καὶ μὴν μεγέθει μὲν οὗτος ἀνυπέρθετος, κινήσει δ᾽ ὀξύτατος, λαμπρότητι δὲ τηλαυγέστατος, δυνάμει δὲ ἀγήρως καὶ ἄφθαρτος. Οὗτος ἐναλίων ζῴων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἀερίων φύσεις ἐχώρισε καὶ βίους ἐμέτρησε ταῖς αὐτοῦ κινήσεσιν. Ἐκ τούτου πάντα ἐμπνεῖται καὶ ψυχὴν ἴσχει τὰ ζῷα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 271-272

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

63 · Order and beauty

I.40.1.63

For what nature could be better than this? Whatever anyone might name is a part of it. Everything beautiful and orderly bears its name, being called "ordered" from the word "cosmos."[1047]

64 · Celestial measure and the seasons

I.40.1.64

What particular thing could equal the order in heaven and the motion of the stars, sun, and moon, moving <in> the most exact measures from age to age? What reliability could match that which the beautiful and fruitful seasons of the universe maintain, bringing summers and winters in due order, <both> days and nights to complete month and year?[1048]

65 · The cosmos and living things

I.40.1.65

The cosmos is unsurpassed in magnitude, swiftest in motion, most far-shining in brightness, and ageless and imperishable in power. It has distinguished the natures of creatures of sea, land, and air, and measured their lives by its own motions. From it all living creatures receive breath and possess life.[1049]

1047. The argument turns again on kosmos, order, adornment, or the universe, and the related verb kosmein, to order or adorn. English cannot reproduce the common root without retaining the Greek name.

1048. The source supplements en, the ending tina of hēntina, and te. The first and third can be shown separately in English; the supplemented relative pronoun is rendered as a whole by "that which." Apseudeia, literally freedom from falsehood, is the unfailing reliability of the cycles.

1049. The subject throughout is the cosmos. Its motions measure living beings' lives through the temporal cycles just praised. Psychē can mean soul or life; "possess life" fits the pairing with receiving breath here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

66

I.40.1.66

Ἐκ τούτου καὶ αἱ παράδοξοι νεοχμώσεις τεταγμένως ἀποτελοῦνται, συναραττόντων μὲν ἀνέμων παντοίων, πιπτόντων δὲ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κεραυνῶν, ῥηγνυμένων τε χειμώνων ἐξαισίων. Διά τε τούτων τὸ νοτερὸν ἐκπιεζόμενον τό τε πυρῶδες διαπνεόμενον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἄγει τὸ πᾶν καὶ καθίστησιν.

67

I.40.1.67

Ἥ τε γῆ φυτοῖς κομῶσα [κοσμηθεῖσα] παντοδαποῖς, νάμασί τε περιβρύουσα καὶ περιοχουμένη ζῴοις, κατὰ καιρὸν ἐκφύουσά τε πάντα καὶ τρέφουσα καὶ δεχομένη, μυρίας φέρουσα ἰδέας καὶ πόας, τὴν ἀγήρω φύσιν ὁμοίως τηρεῖ, καίτοι [γῆ] καὶ σεισμοῖς τινασσομένη καὶ πλημμύραις ἐπικλυζομένη πυρκαϊαῖς τε κατὰ μέρος φλογιζομένη. Πάντα δὲ ἔοικεν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ γινόμενα τὴν δι᾽ αἰῶνος σωτηρίαν παρέχειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

66 · Extraordinary events within order

I.40.1.66

From it, too, extraordinary changes are accomplished in an orderly way, as winds of every kind collide, thunderbolts fall from heaven, and exceptional storms break out. Through these processes moisture is squeezed out and the fiery element is vented, bringing the whole into concord and establishing it there.[1050]

67 · The enduring earth

I.40.1.67

The earth, luxuriant with plants [adorned] of every kind, abounding in streams and borne about by animals,[1051] bringing forth, nourishing, and receiving everything in season, bearing countless forms and grasses, likewise preserves its ageless nature, although [earth] is shaken by earthquakes, inundated by floods, and burned by fires in particular places. All these events seem to work to its good and secure its preservation through all time.[1052]

1050. The argument now includes violent events within cosmic order. The same storms described earlier as physical disturbances are presented as processes that restore a balance of moisture and fire.

1051. “Borne about by animals” renders the problematic printed periochoumenē zōiois. Wachsmuth asks whether the text once read perioikoumenē, “inhabited,” but does not adopt that change. The strange wording is therefore retained and identified as a textual difficulty, not explained as a doctrine that animals carry the earth.

1052. The bracketed “adorned” and repeated “earth” are rejected in the base edition. “Grasses” follows its poas, where the parallel De mundo has pathē, affections or experiences. “Receiving” balances producing and nourishing, as things return to the earth.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 40

68 I.40.1.68

Σειομένης τε γὰρ διεξάττουσιν αἱ τῶν πνευμάτων παρεμπτώσεις κατὰ <τὰ> ῥήγματα τὰς ἀναπνοὰς ἴσχουσαι, καθὼς ἄνω λέλεκται, καθαιρομένη τε ὄμβροις ἀποκλύζεται πάντα τὰ νοσώδη, περιπνεομένη δὲ αὔραις τά τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖται. Καὶ μὴν αἱ φλόγες μὲν τὸ παγετῶδες ἰαίνουσιν, οἱ πάγοι δὲ τὰς φλόγας ἀνιᾶσι.

69 I.40.1.69

Καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκμάζει, τὰ δὲ φθείρεται· καὶ αἱ μὲν γενέσεις ἀνασηκοῦσι τὰς φθοράς, αἱ φθοραὶ δὲ κουφίζουσι τὰς γενέσεις. Μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων περαινομένη σωτηρία [δὲ] διὰ τέλους ἀντιπαρισταμένων ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὸ μὲν περικρατούντων τὸ δὲ περικρατουμένων φυλάττει τὸ σύμπαν ἄφθαρτον δι᾽ αἰῶνος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 40

68 · Purification and mutual restraint I.40.1.68

For when the earth is shaken, the intrusions of wind rush out, finding vents through <the> fissures, as was said above. Cleansed by rains, it washes away everything unhealthy; swept by breezes, it is purified both below and above its surface. Flames warm what is frozen, and frosts abate the flames.[1053]

69 · Generation and destruction in balance I.40.1.69

Of particular things, some come into being, some reach their prime, and some perish. Generations counterbalance destructions, while destructions lighten the burden of generations. A single preservation achieved through them all [but], as they continually oppose one another and now prevail, now are prevailed over, keeps the whole imperishable through all time.[1054]

1053. The account presents shaking, rain, wind, heat, and cold as reciprocal remedies within nature. “Warm” follows Usener’s correction iainousin as printed; the apparatus records a different transmitted verb.

1054. The balance metaphor joins anasēkoun, counterweighing or compensating, with kouphizein, lightening. The final repeated de is rejected. The unusual to men ... to de is taken temporally, “now ... now,” in the reciprocal sequence of prevailing and yielding; the parallel explicitly has tote, “at one time.” The excerpt ends here, at the end of De mundo chapter 5.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

Κεφάλαιον ΜΑ′ I.41.heading

Περὶ φύσεως καὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐξ αὐτῆς αἰτιῶν.

1.1 I.41.1.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Τάτ.

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἐγώ, ὦ τέκνον, καὶ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβείας πρῶτον τόδε συγγράφω. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἂν λέγοιτο δικαιότερον εὐσέβεια [ἢ] τοῦ νοῆσαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ χάριν τῷ ποιήσαντι ὑπὲρ τούτων ὁμολογῆσαι, ὅπερ διατελῶν οὐ παύσομαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

Chapter 41: On nature and the causes arising from it

I.41.heading

On nature and the causes arising from it.[1055]

1.1 · Hermes: piety and understanding

I.41.1.1

From Hermes, from the work To Tat.[1056]

<HERMES> My child, I write this first both out of love for humanity and out of reverence for God. Nothing could more rightly be called piety [than] understanding the things that exist and acknowledging gratitude for them to their maker. I shall never cease to do this.[1057]

1055. Wachsmuth's apparatus reports that the chapter heading is absent from the two principal manuscripts. The title is retained as printed. Numbers after each excerpt number divide the text for facing-page comparison; they are not ancient subdivisions.

1056. The teacher is Hermes and the pupil Tat. The manuscript excerpt lacks speaker labels; Wachsmuth supplies them, and the angle brackets are retained in both languages. The attribution belongs to the Hermetic literary tradition, not to an identifiable historical author named Hermes.

1057. Eusebeia means piety or reverence; here it is expressed through understanding and gratitude. Wachsmuth rejects the comparative particle ē, "than," because the following genitive already conveys the comparison. The English bracket makes that editorial deletion visible while retaining the comparison's sense.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.2 I.41.1.2

<TAT> Τί οὖν ἄν τις πράττων, ὦ πάτερ, εἰ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἐνθάδε, καλῶς διαγάγοι τὸν βίον;

<EPM.> Εὐσέβει, ὦ τέκνον. Ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως φιλοσοφήσει· χωρὶς γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἄκρως εὐσεβῆσαι ἀδύνατον· ὁ δὲ μαθὼν οἷά ἐστι καὶ πῶς διατέτακται καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος καὶ ἕνεκεν τίνος, χάριν εἴσεται ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ δημιουργῷ ὡς πατρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τροφεῖ χρηστῷ καὶ ἐπιτρόπῳ πιστῷ· ὁ δὲ χάριν ὁμολογῶν εὐσεβήσει· ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν εἴσεται καὶ ποῦ ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ τίς ἐστιν ἐκείνη, καὶ μαθὼν ἔτι μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερος ἔσται.

1.3 I.41.1.3

Οὐδέποτε γάρ, ὦ τέκνον, ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι οὖσα καὶ κουφίσασα ἑαυτὴν ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὀλισθῆσαι δύναται ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον· δεινὸν γὰρ ἔρωτα ἴσχει καὶ λήθην πάντων τῶν κακῶν ψυχὴ μαθοῦσα ἑαυτῆς τὸν προπάτορα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἀποστῆναι δύναται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.2 · Philosophy and gratitude I.41.1.2

<TAT> What, then, should one do, father, to live well, if nothing here is true?

<HERMES> Practice piety, my child. Whoever practices piety will pursue philosophy to the fullest; for without philosophy it is impossible to be fully pious. One who has learned what things are, how they are ordered, by whom, and for what purpose will feel gratitude for everything to the maker, as to a good father, a kindly nurturer, and a faithful guardian. Whoever acknowledges gratitude will be pious; whoever is pious will know where truth is and what it is, and through that knowledge will become still more pious.[1058]

1.3 · The soul's love of the good I.41.1.3

For a soul that is in a body, my child, and has lifted itself toward the apprehension of what is truly good and true can never slip toward the opposite. A soul that has come to know its own forefather is seized by a powerful love and forgets every evil; it can no longer depart from the good.[1059]

1058. Dēmiourgos is the maker or craftsman. The questions concern things' character, arrangement, agent, and purpose. The sequence joins philosophical inquiry to gratitude and reverence, rather than treating them as separate pursuits.

1059. The verb kouphizein suggests making light or lifting up. Propatōr, "forefather," names the soul's originating source in the teacher's argument. Love and forgetfulness describe the resulting reorientation of the soul.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.4 I.41.1.4

Τοῦτ᾽, ὦ τέκνον, τοῦτο εὐσεβείας ἔστω τέλος, ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀφικνούμενος καὶ καλῶς βιώσῃ καὶ εὐδαιμόνως τεθνήξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς σου μὴ ἀγνοούσης ποῦ αὐτὴν δεῖ ἀναπτῆναι. Αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστίν, ὦ τέκνον, ἡ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὁδός, ἣν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι ὥδευσαν καὶ ὁδεύσαντες ἔτυχον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Σεμνὴ αὕτη ὁδὸς καὶ λεία, χαλεπὴ δὲ ψυχῇ ὁδεῦσαι ἐν σώματι οὔσῃ.

1.5 I.41.1.5

Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ πολεμῆσαι δεῖ καὶ διάστασιν μεγάλην ποιῆσαι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς μέρους πλεονεκτηθῆναι. Ἑνὸς γὰρ γίγνεται πρὸς δύο ἡ σύστασις, τοῦ μὲν φεύγοντος, τῶν δὲ καθελκόντων κάτω, καὶ ἔρις καὶ μάχη πολλὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων γίγνεται τοῦ μὲν φυγεῖν βουλομένου, τῶν δὲ κατασχεῖν σπευδόντων. Ἡ δὲ νίκη ἀμφοτέρων οὐχ ὁμοία· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδει, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ κακὰ κατοικεῖ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐλευθερωθῆναι ποθεῖ, τὰ δὲ τὴν δουλείαν ἀγαπᾷ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.4 · The road to truth

I.41.1.4

Let this, my child, be the goal of piety. By reaching it you will both live well and die blessed, since your soul will know where it must fly upward. For this alone, my child, is the road to truth, which our ancestors also traveled, and by traveling it attained the good. This road is venerable and smooth, yet difficult for a soul to travel while it is in a body.[1060]

1.5 · The inward struggle

I.41.1.5

First the soul must wage war against itself, bring about a great division, and be overcome by its one part. For one is arrayed against two: the one flees, while the others pull it downward. Great strife and conflict arise between them, the one wishing to escape, the others eager to hold it fast. Victory does not mean the same thing for both sides: the one hastens toward the good, while the others dwell amid evils; the one longs to be set free, while the others cherish slavery.[1061]

1060. Telos is the end or goal. The road can be smooth in itself yet difficult for an embodied traveler. The upward flight continues the preceding image of the soul's elevation.

1061. The passage assumes three parts within the soul but does not name them here. The single aspiring part and the two that drag it downward are therefore left unnamed. Systasis, literally a placing together or array, is used in the context of their conflict.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 273-274

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.6 I.41.1.6

Κἂν μὲν νικηθῇ τὰ δύο μέρη, μεμένηκεν ἑαυτῶν ἔρημα καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος· ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἓν ἡττηθῇ, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο ἄγεται καὶ φέρεται τιμωρούμενον τῇ ἐνθάδε διαίτῃ. Οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ τέκνον, ὁ τῆς ἐκεῖσε ὁδοῦ ἀγών· δεῖ γάρ σε, ὦ τέκνον, πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους ἐγκαταλεῖψαι καὶ νικῆσαι τὸν ἐναγώνιον βίον καὶ νικήσαντα οὕτως ἀνελθεῖν.

1.7 I.41.1.7

Νῦν δέ, ὦ τέκνον, <ἐν> κεφαλαίοις τὰ ὄντα διεξελεύσομαι· νοήσεις γὰρ τὰ λεγόμενα μεμνημένος ὧν ἤκουσας.

Πάντα τὰ ὄντα κινεῖται· μόνον τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀκίνητον.

Πᾶν σῶμα μεταβλητόν, οὐ πᾶν σῶμα διαλυτόν· [ἔνια τῶν σωμάτων διαλυτά].

Οὐ πᾶν ζῷον θνητόν, οὐ πᾶν ζῷον ἀθάνατον.

Τὸ διαλυτὸν φθαρτόν, τὸ μένον ἀμετάβλητον, <τὸ ἀμετάβλητον> ἀίδιον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.6 · Victory and ascent I.41.1.6

If the two parts are defeated, they remain bereft of themselves and of their ruler; but if the one is defeated, it is swept along by the two, punished by its life here.[1062] This, my child, is the contest on the road that leads there. For you must first leave the body behind before the end, my child, and prevail over the life of struggle; having prevailed, then ascend.[1063]

1.7 · Summaries: motion and dissolution I.41.1.7

Now, my child, I shall go through the things that exist <in> summary statements. You will understand what is said by remembering what you have heard.

Everything that exists moves; only what does not exist is motionless.

Every body can change; not every body can dissolve. [Some bodies can dissolve.]

Not every living being is mortal; not every living being is immortal.

What can dissolve can perish; what remains is unchanging; <what is unchanging> is everlasting.[1064]

1062. “Bereft of themselves and of their ruler” follows the difficult printed wording. The apparatus records conjectures involving remaining still or being at peace; these have not been substituted for the base text.

1063. “Before the end” distinguishes the soul’s release while still living from the death already mentioned. In this argument, leaving the body behind is the inward struggle for freedom from its domination.

1064. The summary form is preserved as a sequence of separate sayings. Dissolution, perishability, and change are distinct terms here. Wachsmuth rejects the redundant sentence about some bodies and prints the supplied repeated subject in the last saying.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.8 I.41.1.8

Τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ φθείρεται, τὸ δὲ ἅπαξ γινόμενον οὐδέποτε φθείρεται οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι γίνεται.

Πρῶτον ὁ θεός, δεύτερον ὁ κόσμος, τρίτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸν θεόν.

1.9 I.41.1.9

Ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν θνητόν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἀθάνατον.

Πᾶσα οὐσία ἀθάνατος, πᾶσα οὐσία μεταβλητή.

Πᾶν τὸ ὂν διττόν, οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἕστηκεν.

Οὐ πάντα ψυχῇ κινεῖται, πᾶν δὲ ὂν ψυχὴ κινεῖ.

1.10 I.41.1.10

Πᾶν τὸ πάσχον αἴσθεται, <οὐ> πᾶν τὸ αἰσθόμενον πάσχει.

Πᾶν τὸ λυπούμενον καὶ ἥδεται [ζῷον θνητόν], οὐ πᾶν τὸ ἡδόμενον λυπεῖται [ζῷον ἀίδιον].

Οὐ πᾶν σῶμα νοσεῖ· πᾶν σῶμα νοσοῦν διαλυτόν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.8 · Generation and the threefold order I.41.1.8

What is always coming into being is also always perishing; what comes into being once never perishes or becomes anything else.

First is God, second the cosmos, third the human being.

The cosmos is for the human being, and the human being for God.[1065]

1.9 · Soul, substance, and motion I.41.1.9

The perceptive part of the soul is mortal, the rational part immortal.

Every substance is immortal; every substance can change.

Everything that exists is twofold; none of the things that exist stands still.

Not everything is moved by soul, yet soul moves everything that exists.[1066]

1.10 · Perception, pain, and pleasure I.41.1.10

Everything that is affected perceives; <not> everything that perceives is affected.

Everything that feels pain also feels pleasure [a mortal living being]; not everything that feels pleasure feels pain [an everlasting living being].

Not every body is subject to disease; every diseased body can dissolve.[1067]

1065. The contrast is between recurrent generation and a single coming-to-be. Dia with the accusative in the final saying is understood as “for the sake of.” The order printed here is retained.

1066. These compressed sayings contain unresolved tensions. Wachsmuth records proposed changes to the second statement about substance, says he does not understand “twofold,” and prints the final contrast as given here. The translation preserves the affirmative and negative claims without repairing them into a single consistent doctrine.

1067. Paschein can mean being affected or undergoing something, and does not always mean suffering pain. The following saying uses a distinct word for pain. Wachsmuth supplies “not” in the first contrast and rejects the two explanatory labels in the second.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.11 I.41.1.11

Ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὁ λογισμὸς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

Ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ νοΐ, ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής.

Οὐδὲν ἐν σώματι ἀληθές, ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ πᾶν ἀψευδές.

Πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον μεταβλητόν, οὐ πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον φθαρτόν.

1.12 I.41.1.12

Οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ.

Ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακός.

Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκούσιον, τὸ κακὸν ἀκούσιον.

Οἱ θεοὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αἱροῦνται ὡς ἀγαθὰ …

1.13 I.41.1.13

Ἡ εὐνομία μετὰ θεοῦ ὁμόνοια· ἡ εὐνομία ὁ νόμος.

Θεῖος χρόνος, νόμος ἀνθρώπινος.

Κακία κόσμου τροφή, χρόνος ἀνθρώπου φθορά.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.11 · Mind and truth I.41.1.11

Intellect is in God; reasoning is in the human being.

Reason is in intellect; intellect is unaffected.

Nothing in a body is true; in what is incorporeal, everything is free from falsehood.

Everything that has come into being can change; not everything that has come into being can perish.[1068]

1.12 · Goodness and choice I.41.1.12

Nothing on earth is good; nothing in heaven is evil.

God is good; the human being is evil.

The good is voluntary; evil is involuntary.

The gods choose good things as good …[1069]

1.13 · Law, time, and nourishment I.41.1.13

Good order is concord with God; good order is law.

Time is divine; law is human.

Evil is the cosmos's nourishment; time is the human being's destruction.[1070]

1068. Nous, logismos, and logos are rendered "intellect," "reasoning," and "reason" to preserve their distinction in these sayings. "Unaffected" translates apathēs, the absence of undergoing an affection.

1069. The printed gap after the last saying is retained. Meineke proposed supplying a contrast about humans choosing evils as goods; Wachsmuth mentions it in the apparatus but does not put it in the text. The plural "gods" is preserved alongside the preceding singular "God."

1070. These are the printed readings. The apparatus records proposed "lawlessness" in place of the second "good order," and questions the contrast between time and law. Trophē, "nourishment," is Canter's correction of tryphē, "luxury." No further repairs have been adopted.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.14 I.41.1.14

Πᾶν <τὸ> ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάθετον, πᾶν τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς μεταθετόν.

Οὐδὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον, οὐδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐλεύθερον.

Οὐδὲν ἄγνωστον ἐν οὐρανῷ, οὐδὲν γνώριμον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.

1.15 I.41.1.15

Οὐ κοινωνεῖ <τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς, κοινωνεῖ> τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ.

Πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄμωμα, πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐπίμωμα.

Τὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ θνητόν, τὸ θνητὸν οὐχ ἀθάνατον.

Τὸ σπαρὲν οὐ πάντως γενητόν, τὸ δὲ γενητὸν πάντως καὶ σπαρέν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.14 · Heaven and earth I.41.1.14

Everything <that is> in heaven is unalterable; everything on earth is alterable.

Nothing in heaven is enslaved; nothing on earth is free.

Nothing in heaven is unknown; nothing on earth is known.[1071]

1.15 · Participation and generation I.41.1.15

<Things in heaven> do not participate <in earthly things;> earthly things <participate> in things in heaven.

Everything in heaven is blameless; everything on earth is blameworthy.

The immortal is not mortal; the mortal is not immortal.

What has been sown does not necessarily come to birth; what comes to birth has necessarily also been sown.[1072]

1071. The supplied article is represented by “that is.” These sweeping antitheses belong to the excerpt’s distinction between the heavenly and earthly orders; “known” renders gnōrimon without silently weakening the claim to “fully known.”

1072. Wachsmuth restores the first contrast by comparison with the statement about mortal and immortal below. The English separates the one Greek supplement into corresponding parts to preserve ordinary word order. “Sown” introduces the account of conception and birth that follows.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.16 I.41.1.16

Διαλυτοῦ σώματος δύο χρόνοι· ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σπορᾶς μέχρι τῆς γενέσεως καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου· τοῦ ἀιδίου σώματος χρόνος ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως μόνος.

Τὰ διαλυτὰ σώματα αὔξεται καὶ μειοῦται.

Ἡ διαλυτὴ ὕλη εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἐναλλοιοῦται [φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν]· ἡ δὲ ἀίδιος ἢ εἰς αὐτὴν ἢ εἰς τὰ ὅμοια.

1.17 I.41.1.17

Γένεσις ἀνθρώπου φθορᾶς, φθορὰ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως ἀρχή.

Τὸ ἀπογιγνόμενον <καὶ ἐπιγίγνεται, τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον> καὶ ἀπογίγνεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.16 · The periods and changes of bodies I.41.1.16

A body that can dissolve has two periods: from sowing to birth, and from birth to death. An everlasting body has only the period beginning from its coming-to-be.

Bodies that can dissolve grow and diminish.

Matter that can dissolve changes into its opposites [destruction and generation]; everlasting matter changes either into itself or into similar things.[1073]

1.17 · Generation and disappearance I.41.1.17

Human generation is the beginning of destruction; human destruction is the beginning of generation.

What passes away <also comes into being; what comes into being> also passes away.[1074]

1073. The everlasting body has a beginning here but no stated terminal point. The distinction therefore concerns duration after coming-to-be, not absence of all generation. Wachsmuth rejects “destruction and generation” as an intrusive explanation.

1074. Archē, “beginning,” serves both halves of the first saying. The second keeps Heeren’s supplied reciprocal clause. The verbs oppose passing away and arising anew.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.18 I.41.1.18

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐν σώμασίν εἰσι, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἰδέαις, τὰ δὲ <ἐν> ἐνεργείαις· σῶμα δὲ ἐν ἰδέαις, ἰδέα δὲ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐν σώματί ἐστι.

Τὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ μετέχει τοῦ θνητοῦ, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν τοῦ ἀθανάτου μετέχει.

Τὸ μὲν θνητὸν εἰς ἀθάνατον σῶμα οὐκ ἔρχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον εἰς θνητὸν παραγίνεται.

1.19 I.41.1.19

Αἱ ἐνέργειαι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνωφερεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατωφερεῖς.

Οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, πάντα ὠφελεῖ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς.

Ὁ οὐρανὸς σωμάτων ἀιδίων δεκτικός, ἡ γῆ σωμάτων φθαρτικῶν δεκτική.

Ἡ γῆ ἄλογος, ὁ οὐρανὸς λογικός.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.18 · Bodies, forms, and activities I.41.1.18

Of things that exist, some are in bodies, some in forms, and some <in> activities. Body is in forms, while form and activity are in body.

The immortal does not share in the mortal, but the mortal shares in the immortal.

The mortal does not enter an immortal body, but the immortal comes into a mortal one.[1075]

1.19 · The direction of influence I.41.1.19

Activities are not directed upward, but downward.

Earthly things bring no benefit to heavenly things; heavenly things bring every benefit to earthly things.

Heaven receives everlasting bodies; earth receives bodies subject to decay.

Earth is irrational; heaven is rational.[1076]

1075. Idea is rendered “form,” and energeia “activity.” Both terms recur in later excerpts in this chapter. The reciprocal relation of form and body is translated as printed, without replacing “in forms” with “has forms.”

1076. The second saying follows Wachsmuth’s reversal of the transmitted order of the two groups in its affirmative half. The first saying’s downward direction reappears in the later discussion of activities. Phthartikōn is rendered in the sense suggested by its opposition to everlasting bodies; one witness instead has the ordinary word for perishable.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.20 I.41.1.20

Τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ὑπόκειται, τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τῇ γῇ ἐπίκειται.

Ὁ οὐρανὸς πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, ἡ γῆ ὕστατον στοιχεῖον.

Πρόνοια θεία τάξις, ἀνάγκη προνοίᾳ ὑπηρέτις.

Τύχη φορὰ ἄτακτος, ἐνεργείας εἴδωλον, δόξα ψευδής.

Τί θεός; ἄτρεπτον ἀγαθόν· τί ἄνθρωπος; τρεπτὸν κακόν.

1.21 I.41.1.21

Τούτων τῶν κεφαλαίων μεμνημένος καὶ ὧν σοι διὰ πλειόνων λόγων διεξῆλθον εὐκόλως ἀναμνησθήσῃ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνων εἰσὶ περιοχαί. Τὰς μέντοι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὁμιλίας παραιτοῦ· φθονεῖν μὲν γάρ σε οὐ βούλομαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅτι πολλοῖς δόξεις καταγέλαστος εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον παραλαμβάνεται, ἀνόμοιος δὲ ἀνομοίῳ οὐδέποτε φίλος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.20 · Subordination, providence, and chance I.41.1.20

Things in heaven are subordinate; things on earth rest upon the earth.[1077]

Heaven is the first element; earth is the last element.

Providence is divine order; necessity is the servant of providence.

Chance is disorderly motion, an image of activity, a false opinion.

What is God? Unchanging good. What is the human being? Changing evil.[1078]

1.21 · Remembering and withholding I.41.1.21

If you remember these summary statements, you will easily recall what I explained to you at greater length, for these are summaries of those teachings. Yet decline discussions with the multitude. I do not want you to be grudging; the reason is rather that you will seem ridiculous to many.[1079] Like is taken to like, while unlike is never a friend to unlike.

1077. The first saying is defective or obscure: the printed text does not say to what heavenly things are subordinate. Several conjectures are recorded in the apparatus, none adopted here.

1078. The printed dative pronoiāi makes necessity the servant of providence. The apparatus records a nominative variant in one manuscript; the printed reading is followed. In the final contrast, Wachsmuth adopts Usener's "changing" for the human being.

1079. "Grudging" renders phthonein in the context of withholding knowledge. The transition "rather because" is syntactically incomplete in the Greek; the English supplies its evident argumentative connection without adding a reconstructed clause to the facing text.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 277

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.22 I.41.1.22

Οὗτοι δὲ οἱ λόγοι ὀλίγους παντελῶς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἔχουσιν ἢ τάχα οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀλίγους ἕξουσιν. Ἔχουσι δέ τι καὶ ἴδιον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς· τοὺς κακοὺς μᾶλλον παροξύνουσι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν· διὸ χρὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς φυλάττεσθαι μὴ νοοῦντας τῶν λεγομένων τὴν ἀρετήν.

1.23 I.41.1.23

<TAT> Πῶς εἶπας, ὦ πάτερ;

<EPM.> Οὕτως, ὦ τέκνον. Πᾶν τὸ ζῷον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἐπιρρεπέστερόν ἐστιν εἰς τὴν κακίαν καὶ ταύτῃ σύντροφον γίγνεται, διὸ καὶ ἥδεται αὐτῇ. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐὰν μάθῃ ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ πάντα κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ ἀνάγκην γίνεται, εἱμαρμένης πάντων ἀρχούσης, οὕτω πολλῷ ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρον ἔσται, καταφρονῆσαν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ὡς γενητοῦ, τὰς δὲ αἰτίας τοῦ κακοῦ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ ἀναφέρον, οὐδ᾽ ἀφέξεταί ποτε παντὸς ἔργου κακοῦ. Διὸ φυλακτέον αὐτούς, ὅπως ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ὄντες ἔλαττον ὦσι κακοὶ φόβῳ τοῦ ἀδήλου.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

1.22 · Few receptive hearers

I.41.1.22

These teachings have very few hearers indeed, and perhaps they will not even have those few. They also have a peculiar feature: they provoke the wicked still further toward wickedness. One must therefore be on guard against the multitude, who do not understand the excellence of what is being said.[1080]

1.23 · The misuse of fate

I.41.1.23

<TAT> What do you mean, father?

<HERMES> This, my child. The human creature as a whole inclines more readily toward wickedness and grows up in its company, which is why it takes pleasure in it. If this creature learns that the cosmos came into being and that everything happens according to providence and necessity, with fate ruling all things, it will become far worse than before: it will despise the whole as something generated, attribute the causes of evil to fate, and never refrain from any evil deed. We must therefore guard against them, so that, remaining ignorant, they may be less wicked through fear of what is hidden.[1081]

1080. The teacher's warning concerns the effect of teachings on an unprepared audience. The following exchange specifies the feared misunderstanding: using necessity and fate as an excuse for wrongdoing.

1081. This is the teacher's stated reason for restricting disclosure. "Generated" does not here mean unreal: the danger is that the hearer will infer contempt for the cosmos and immunity from responsibility. The translation preserves that warning without turning it into a general denial of providence.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 277-278

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.1 I.41.2.1

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρχύτου Περὶ ἀρχᾶν.

Ἀνάγκα [καὶ] δύο ἀρχὰς εἶμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὁριστῶν, ἐτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀορίστων. Καὶ τὰν μὲν ῥητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν καὶ τὰ ἐόντα ὁμοίως συνέχεν καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐόντα ὁρίζεν καὶ συντάσσεν (πλατιάζοισαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς γινομένοις εὐλόγως καὶ εὐρύθμως ἀνάγεν πάντα καὶ τὸ καθόλω οὐσίας τε καὶ ἰδέας μεταδιδόμεν)· τὰν δ᾽ ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐς γένεσίν τε καὶ ὠσίαν παραγενόμενα διαλύεν (πλατιάζοισαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξομοιοῦν αὐτᾷ ταῦτα).

2.2 I.41.2.2

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαιρεόμεναι τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνοντι τῷ τὰν μὲν εἶμεν ἀγαθοποιόν, τὰν δ᾽ εἶμεν κακοποιόν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγως εἶμεν, τὸν μὲν ἕνα τᾶς ἀγαθοποιῶ φύσιος, τὸν δ᾽ ἕνα τᾶς κακοποιῶ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ τέχνᾳ καὶ τὰ φύσι γινόμενα δύο τούτων πράτων μετείληφε, τᾶς τε μορφῶς καὶ τᾶς ὠσίας. Καὶ ἁ μὲν μορφὼ ἐντὶ ἁ αἰτία τῶ τόδε τι εἶμεν· ἁ δὲ ὠσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, παραδεχόμενον τὰν μορφώ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 278-279

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.1 · Archytas: two opposed principles I.41.2.1

From Archytas, On Principles.[1082]

There must [also] be two principles of existing things: one comprising the series of ordered and determinate things, the other the series of disordered and indeterminate things. The first is expressible and rational; it holds existing things together alike, and determines and orders things that do not exist. For, continually extending its reach among things that come to be, it guides everything rationally and rhythmically and, in general, imparts substance and form. The other is irrational and inexpressible; it damages what has been ordered and dissolves what has attained generation and being. For, continually extending its reach among things, it makes them like itself.[1083]

2.2 · Form and the underlying material I.41.2.2

But since there are two principles dividing things into opposed kinds, one productive of good and the other productive of evil, there must also be two accounts: one of the nature that produces good, the other of the nature that produces evil. For this reason, both things made by art and things produced by nature partake of these two primary factors, form and underlying being. Form is the cause of a thing's being this particular thing; underlying being is the substrate that receives form.[1084]

1082. The title attributes this and excerpt 5 to Archytas' On Principles. Modern scholarship commonly treats the work as Pseudo-Archytas, a later work under his name. The printed Doric dialect is retained; English does not imitate it with an invented dialect.

1083. Systoichia is a corresponding series or column. The two columns oppose order and limit to disorder and indefiniteness. "Things that do not exist" renders the printed negative without replacing it with "things not yet existing." Square brackets preserve Wachsmuth's deletion of kai, "also."

1084. The Doric ōsia corresponds to ousia, but here it is explicitly the receptive substrate. "Underlying being" marks that usage; in the next passage estō similarly denotes the underlying stuff, subsequently identified with matter. Logos can mean account, reason, or ratio according to context.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.3 I.41.2.3

Οὔτε δὲ τᾷ ὠσίᾳ οἷόν τέ ἐντι μορφῶς μετεῖμεν αὐτᾷ ἐξ αὐτᾶς, οὔτε μὰν τὰν μορφὼ γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὠσίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκα ἀτέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν τὰν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφώ· ταύταν δὲ τὰν πράταν τᾷ δυνάμι καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν τᾶν ἀλλᾶν· ὀνομάζεσθαι δ᾽ αὐτὰν ποθάκει θεόν· ὥστε τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἶμεν ἤδη, τόν τε θεὸν καὶ τὰν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφώ. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν <τὸν> τεχνίταν καὶ τὸν κινέοντα, τὰν δ᾽ ἐστὼ τὰν ὕλαν καὶ τὸ κινεόμενον, τὰν δὲ μορφὼ τὰν τέχναν καὶ ποθ᾽ ἃν κινέεται ὑπὸ τῶ κινέοντος ἀ ἐστώ.

2.4 I.41.2.4

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ τὸ κινεόμενον ἐναντίας ἑαυτῷ δυνάμιας ἴσχει τὰς τῶν ἁπλόων σωμάτων, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία συναρμογᾶς τινος δεῖται καὶ ἑνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμῶν δυνάμιας καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γαμετρικοῖς δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνεν, ἃ καὶ συναρμόξαι καὶ ἑνῶσαι τὰν ἐναντιότατα δυνασεῖται ἐν τᾷ ἐστοῖ τῶν πραγμάτων ποττὰν μορφώ. Καθ᾽ αὐτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἀ ἐστὼ ἄμορφός ἐντι, κιναθεῖσα δὲ ποττὰν μορφὼ ἔμμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἔχοισα τὸν τᾶς συντάξιος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 279-280

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.3 · The third cause: God

I.41.2.3

Underlying being cannot partake of form by itself, nor can form on its own come to be in the underlying being. There must instead be some other cause that will move the stuff of things toward form. This cause must be first in power and supreme over the others; it is fitting to call it God. There are therefore now three principles: God, the stuff of things, and form. God is <the> craftsman and mover; the underlying stuff is the matter and what is moved; form is the art and that toward which the mover moves the underlying stuff.[1085]

2.4 · Proportion unites opposites

I.41.2.4

But since what is moved contains mutually opposed powers, those of the simple bodies, and opposites require some fitting together and unification, we must bring in the powers of numbers, proportions, and the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry. These will be able to fit together and unite the opposition in the stuff of things in accordance with form. For the underlying stuff, when left to itself, is formless; but when moved toward form, it becomes formed and possesses the rational structure of its arrangement.[1086]

1085. The argument adds an active cause to form and receptive matter. “Art” here means the ordering craft or design, not fine art. The supplied article before “craftsman” is marked in both languages.

1086. The simple bodies are the elemental constituents. The text invokes mathematical relations to explain how their opposed powers can be joined into an ordered whole; it does not specify particular ratios here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.5 I.41.2.5

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δι᾽ ὃ κινέεται τὸ κινεόμενον ἐντὶ τὸ πράτως κινέον· ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκα τρεῖς εἶμεν τὰς ἀρχάς, τάν τε ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφὼ καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶ κινατικὸν καὶ πρᾶτον τᾷ δυνάμι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω τι κρέσσον· νόω δὲ κρέσσον ἐντί, ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεόν, φανερόν.

2.6 I.41.2.6

Ὁ μὲν τῶ ἴσω λόγος περὶ τὰν ῥητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν φύσιν ἐντί· ὁ δὲ τῶ ἀνίσω περὶ τὰν ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον· αὔτα δ᾽ ἐντὶ ἃ ἐστώ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γίνεται περὶ ταύταν καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτας.

3.1 I.41.3.1

Ἐκ τῶν Πορφυρίου πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμῶν.

Τὰ κατηγορούμενα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐνύλου ἀληθῶς ἐστὶ ταῦτα, τὸ πάντῃ εἶναι διαπεφορημένον, τὸ μεταβλητὸν εἶναι, τὸ ὑφεστάναι ἐν ἑτερότητι, τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι, τὸ <μὴ> καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, τὸ ἐν ὄγκῳ θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

2.5 · Beyond intellect I.41.2.5

Likewise, the cause of a moved thing's motion is also its primary mover. There must therefore be three principles: the stuff of things, form, and that which initiates motion from itself and is first in power. Such a principle must be not merely intellect, but something greater than intellect. And that which we call God is plainly greater than intellect.[1087]

2.6 · Equality and inequality I.41.2.6

The account of the equal concerns expressible and rational nature; that of the unequal concerns irrational and inexpressible nature. The latter is the underlying stuff; that is why coming-to-be and passing-away occur in it, and cannot occur without it.[1088]

3.1 · Porphyry: the sensible and material I.41.3.1

From Porphyry's Starting Points toward the Intelligible.

These are the things truly predicated of the sensible and material: being dispersed in every direction; being changeable; subsisting in otherness; being composite; <not> existing of itself in its own right; being in a place; being observed in extended mass; and all similar characteristics.[1089]

1087. The passage identifies the cause of motion with the primary mover, then ranks that cause above intellect. "From itself" describes its initiating power. This is the excerpt's own hierarchy, not a definition imposed on the neighboring Hermetic texts.

1088. The printed text marks a break before this closing statement. Its equal/unequal opposition recalls the two columns at the beginning. Logos is retained as "account"; the mathematical context also allows the resonance of ratio.

1089. "Sensible" means accessible to sense-perception; "intelligible" means accessible to intellect. The supplied negative is essential to the contrast with what subsists in its own right in the next paragraph. Otherness is opposed there to identity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

3.2 I.41.3.2

Τοῦ δὲ ὄντως ὄντος καὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ὑφεστηκότος αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἱδρυμένον, τὸ ὡσαύτως <καὶ> κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, τὸ ἐν ταὐτότητι οὐσιῶσθαι, τὸ ἀμετάβλητον εἶναι κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, τὸ ἀσύνθετον, τὸ μήτε λυτὸν μήτε ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι μήτε εἰς ὄγκον διαπεφορήσθαι, τὸ μήτε γιγνόμενον μήτε ἀπολλύμενον εἶναι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὧν ἐχομένους δεῖ μηδὲν ἐπαλλάττοντας περὶ τῆς διαφόρου αὐτῶν φύσεως καὶ αὐτοὺς λέγειν καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων ὑπακούειν.

4.1 I.41.4.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἄμμωνα.

Ἡ ψυχὴ τοίνυν οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀσώματος, καὶ ἐν σώματι δὲ οὖσα οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας οὐσιότητος. Τυγχάνει γὰρ οὖσα ἀεικίνητος κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, κατὰ νόησιν αὐτοκίνητος, οὐκ ἔν τινι κινουμένη, οὐ πρός τι, οὐχ ἕνεκεν τινος· προτερεῖ γὰρ τῇ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ πρότερον οὐ δεῖται τῶν ὑστέρων. Τὸ ἔν τινι τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος καὶ χρόνος καὶ φύσις, τὸ δὲ πρός τι ἐστὶν ἁρμονία καὶ εἶδος καὶ σχῆμα, τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ σῶμα· ἕνεκα γὰρ σώματος καὶ χρόνος καὶ τόπος καὶ φύσις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

3.2 · What truly is

I.41.3.2

Of that which truly is and itself subsists in its own right, these are the predicates: being always established in itself; remaining in the same manner <and> condition; having its being in identity; being unchangeable in essence; being uncompounded; being neither dissoluble nor in a place nor dispersed into extended mass; neither coming to be nor passing away; and all such characteristics. We must hold to these distinctions, interchanging none of them, both when we ourselves speak of their different natures and when we listen to others speak.[1090]

4.1 · Hermes: the soul's own being

I.41.4.1

From Hermes, from the writings To Ammon.

The soul, then, is an incorporeal substance; even when it is in a body, it does not depart from its own essential being. For it is ever-moving in its essence and self-moving in thought, without moving in something, in relation to something, or for the sake of something. It is prior in power, and what is prior has no need of what comes after. "In something," then, means place, time, and nature; "in relation to something" means harmony, form, and shape; and "for the sake of something" means body. For time, place, and nature exist for the sake of body.[1091]

1090. The injunction concerns the two contrasting orders just described. The translation keeps the instruction not to transfer their respective predicates from one to the other.

1091. The soul's motion is denied the conditions that govern bodily motion. The Greek's "in," "in relation to," and "for the sake of" organize the distinctions that follow; the English retains their somewhat unusual application to nature and harmony.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

4.2 I.41.4.2

Ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα κοινωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπεί τοι γε τὸ σῶμα ἐδεῖτο τόπου (ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν συστῆναι σῶμα ἄνευ τόπου) καὶ μεταβάλλεται φυσικῶς, ἀδύνατον δὲ μεταβολὴν εἶναι ἄνευ χρόνου καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως, οὐδὲ σώματος οἷόν τε σύστασιν εἶναι ἄνευ ἁρμονίας. Ἕνεκα τοίνυν τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος· παραδεχόμενος γὰρ τὰς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολὰς οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ μεταβαλλόμενον·

4.3 I.41.4.3

Μεταβαλλόμενον δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου εἰς ἕτερον μεταπίπτει καὶ τῆς μὲν ἕξεως στερίσκεται, τοῦ δὲ εἶναι σῶμα συστατὸν οὐχί· μεταβληθὲν δὲ εἰς ἕτερον τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἕξιν ἔχει. Τὸ γὰρ σῶμα, ᾗ σῶμα, μένει σῶμα· ἡ δὲ ποιὰ διάθεσις οὐ μένει· τὸ σῶμα τοίνυν κατὰ διάθεσιν μεταβάλλεται.

4.4 I.41.4.4

Ἀσώματος τοίνυν ὁ τόπος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ κίνησις. Τυγχάνει δὲ ἕκαστον τούτων τῆς ἰδίας ἰδιότητος. Ἰδιότης δὲ τοῦ τόπου περιοχή, χρόνου δὲ διάστημα καὶ ἀριθμός, φύσεως δὲ κίνησις, ἁρμονίας δὲ φιλία, σώματος δὲ μεταβολή· ἰδιότης δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν νόησις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

4.2 · The conditions of bodily existence I.41.4.2

These share in one another through a kinship of nature, since body needed a place - for a body could not be constituted without place - and changes naturally. Yet change is impossible without time and movement according to nature, and a body cannot be constituted without harmony. Place therefore exists for the sake of body: by receiving the body's changes, it prevents what changes from being destroyed.[1092]

4.3 · Change of condition I.41.4.3

As it changes, it passes from one thing into another and loses its condition, but not its existence as a constituted body. When it has changed into something else, it has that other thing's condition. For body, insofar as it is body, remains body; its particular disposition does not remain. Body therefore changes in disposition.[1093]

4.4 · The distinctive properties I.41.4.4

Place, time, and natural motion are therefore incorporeal. Each has its own distinctive property. The property of place is enclosure; of time, interval and number; of nature, motion; of harmony, friendship; of body, change. The property of soul is thinking in accordance with its essence.[1094]

1092. Harmony here is the fitting together required for bodily constitution. The claim about destruction is explained in the next paragraph: a particular condition is lost, while body as body persists.

1093. Hexis, "condition," and diathesis, "disposition," name the state that changes. The wording "constituted body" follows Wachsmuth's rearrangement of the transmitted words; the apparatus records a simpler reading that omits "constituted."

1094. The list distinguishes incorporeal conditions from body. "Enclosure" follows the conjecture periochē adopted in the printed text; "friendship" preserves the personifying language used of harmony.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

5.1 I.41.5.1

Ἀρχύτου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ἀρχᾶν.

Ἀρχὰ τᾶς τῶν ἐόντων γνώσιος τὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα. Τῶν δ᾽ αὐτόθεν φαινομένων τὰ μὲν ἐντὶ νοατά, τὰ δ᾽ αἰσθατά· νοατὰ μὲν τὰ ἀκίνητα, αἰσθατὰ δὲ τὰ κινεόμενα. Κριτήριον δὲ τῶν μὲν νοατῶν ὁ νόος, τῶν δ᾽ αἰσθατῶν ἁ αἴσθασις. Τῶν δὲ μὴ αὐτόθεν φαινομένων τὰ μὲν ἐντὶ ἐπιστατά, τὰ δὲ δοξαστά· ἐπιστατὰ μὲν τὰ ἀκίνητα, δοξαστὰ δὲ τὰ κινεόμενα.

5.2 I.41.5.2

Δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τρία νοᾶσαι, τό τε κρῖνον καὶ τὸ κρινόμενον καὶ ποθ᾽ ὅπερ κρίνεται. Καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον εἶμεν τὸν νόον καὶ τὰν αἴσθασιν, τὸ δὲ κρινόμενον τὸν λόγον· ποθ᾽ ὅπερ δὲ κρίνεται τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον· τούτω δὲ τὸ μὲν νοατόν, τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθατόν. Ἐπικρίνει δὲ ὁ νόος τὸν λόγον, ὁκὰ μὲν ποτὶ τὸ νοατὸν ποτιβάλλων, ὁκὰ δὲ ποτὶ τὸ αἰσθατόν. Ὅκκα μὲν γὰρ περὶ νοατῶν μαστεύηται ὁ λόγος, ποτὶ τὸ νοατὸν ποτιβάλλει, ὅκκα δὲ περὶ αἰσθατῶν, ποτὶ τὸ αἰσθατόν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

5.1 · Archytas: what is immediately evident I.41.5.1

From Archytas, On Principles.

The starting point of knowledge of things that exist is what is immediately evident. Of things immediately evident, some are intelligible and others perceptible: the intelligible are unmoving, the perceptible moving. The criterion of the intelligible is intellect, and that of the perceptible is sense-perception. Of things not immediately evident, some are objects of knowledge and others of opinion: the unmoving are objects of knowledge, the moving of opinion.[1095]

5.2 · Judge, account, and standard I.41.5.2

We must understand these three: what judges, what is judged, and the standard against which it is judged. What judges is intellect and sense-perception; what is judged is the account; the standard against which it is judged is what is immediately evident, either intelligible or perceptible. Intellect judges the account by comparing it now with the intelligible, now with the perceptible. For when the account investigates intelligible things, it makes the comparison with the intelligible; when perceptible things, with the perceptible.[1096]

1095. The attribution and Doric dialect continue those of excerpt 2. “Immediately evident” renders autothen phainomena, things evident directly or of themselves. For the criterion of intelligibles, Wachsmuth prints Jacobs’ correction “intellect” in place of the manuscripts’ “cosmos.”

1096. Logos here is an account or argument submitted to judgment. The passage assigns a role to both intellect and perception, then describes intellect as the agent that compares the account with the appropriate evidence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

5.3 I.41.5.3

Καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ψευδογραφίαι ἐν γαμετρίᾳ κατὰ σχήματα καὶ ἀριθμὼς ἐμφαίνονται, αἰτιολογίαι δὲ καὶ εἰκοτολογίαι ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ πολιτικῇ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ πράξιας. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ἐν διπλόῳ λόγῳ ἁρμονία τυγχάνει, ποτὶ τὸ νοατὸν [λόγον] ποτιβάλλων ὁ λόγος γινώσκει· τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι συμφωνεῖ ὁ διπλόος λόγος, διὰ τᾶς αἰσθάσιος ἐπιμαρτυρεῖται.

5.4 I.41.5.4

Καὶ τῶν μαχανικῶν δὲ τοὶ λόγοι ποττὰ νοατὰ ποτιβάλλοντι σχήματα καὶ ἀριθμὼς καὶ ἀναλογίας, τὰ δὲ ἀποτελέσματα ποτὶ τὰ αἰσθητά· μεθ᾽ ὕλας γὰρ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται καὶ κινάσιος. Καθόλω δὲ ἀμάχανον γνώμεν τὸ διὰ τί ἐν ἑκάστῳ μὴ προειδότας τὸ τί ἐντι ἕκαστον. Κρίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν τί ἐντι ἕκαστον <τῶν> ἐόντων τῷ νόῳ· τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι ἐντὶ ἢ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, λόγῳ καὶ αἰσθάσι· λόγῳ μέν, ὅκκα δεῖξίν τινος σαμάνωμεν διὰ συλλογισμῶ, ὑπάρχοντος ἐξ ἀνάγκας· αἰσθάσι δ᾽, ὅκκα ἐπιμαρτυρώμεθα τὸν λόγον διὰ τᾶς αἰσθάσιος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

5.3 · Mathematical and audible harmony I.41.5.3

For this reason, false constructions in geometry become apparent through figures and numbers, while causal and probable accounts in natural and political inquiry become apparent through generation and actions. Reason knows that the octave is in a double ratio by comparing it with the intelligible [ratio]; that the double ratio sounds concordant is confirmed by sense-perception.[1097]

5.4 · Mechanics and demonstration I.41.5.4

The accounts used by practitioners of mechanics likewise compare figures, numbers, and proportions with intelligible things, but their results with perceptible things; for these results are considered together with matter and motion. In general, it is impossible to know the reason why in each case without first knowing what the thing is. What each <of> the existing things is is judged by intellect; that it exists, or that it is so, by argument and sense-perception: by argument when we indicate a demonstration of something through an inference, the fact obtaining necessarily; by perception when we confirm the argument through sense-perception.[1098]

1097. Pseudographiai are erroneous geometrical constructions or proofs. The printed transition is compressed; “become apparent” is carried across the contrasted clauses. Harmonia in the numerical example denotes the octave and its 2:1 ratio. The bracketed logos is rejected by Wachsmuth following Usener; it is represented as “ratio” here to show the deletion without concealing the resulting construction.

1098. The final distinction separates what a thing is, why it is so, and the fact that it exists or is so. The difficult participle “obtaining” is retained rather than silently adopting the infinitive suggested in the apparatus. “Inference” renders syllogismos without assuming that every such argument has a particular formal arrangement.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 283-284

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.1 I.41.6.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ.

<TAT> Ὀρθῶς ταῦτα ἀπέδειξας, ὦ πάτερ· ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἔτι με δίδαξον. Ἔφης γάρ που τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τοῦ λογικοῦ· νῦν δὲ φῂς τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα στερήσει τοῦ λογικοῦ ἄλογα εἶναι καὶ κεκλῆσθαι· δῆλον <δ'> ὅτι ἀνάγκη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα μὴ μετέχειν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲ τέχνης διὰ τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι τοῦ λογικοῦ.

<ERM.> Ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὦ τέκνον.

<TAT> Πῶς οὖν ὁρῶμεν, ὦ πάτερ, τινὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ χρώμενα, οἷον τοὺς μύρμηκας τὰς τροφὰς ἀποθησαυριζομένους τοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ τὰ ἀέρια ζῷα ὁμοίως καλιὰς ἑαυτοῖς συντιθέντα, τὰ δὲ τετράποδα γνωρίζοντα τοὺς φωλεοὺς τοὺς ἰδίους;

6.2 I.41.6.2

<ERM.> Ταῦτα, ὦ τέκνον, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐδὲ τέχνῃ ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ φύσει. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ τέχνη διδακτά εἰσι· τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν διδάσκεται. Τὰ δὲ φύσει γιγνόμενα ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γίνεται καθολικῇ· τὰ δὲ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ εἰδικῶς παραγίγνεται, οὐ πᾶσι· <τὰ δὲ πᾶσι> γινόμενα ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐνεργεῖται. Οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι <πάντες> ἄνω βλέπουσιν, οὐ πάντες δὲ ἄνθρωποι μουσικοὶ οὐδὲ πάντες τοξόται ἢ κυνηγοὶ οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα· ἀλλά τινὲς αὐτῶν τι ἔμαθον ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης ἐνεργούσης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.1 · Hermes and Tat: animals and skill

I.41.6.1

From Hermes, from the writings To Tat.

<TAT> You have demonstrated this correctly, father; but teach me this further point. You said, I believe, that knowledge and skill are an activity of the rational faculty. Yet now you say that irrational animals are and are called irrational because they lack that faculty. <And> it is clear that, on this account, irrational animals necessarily have no share in knowledge or skill, since they lack the rational faculty.

<HERMES> Necessarily, my child.

<TAT> Why, then, father, do we see some irrational animals employing knowledge and skill, such as ants storing their winter food, flying creatures likewise building nests for themselves, and quadrupeds recognizing their own dens?[1099]

6.2 · Nature and what is learned

I.41.6.2

<HERMES> They do these things, my child, by nature, not by knowledge or skill. Knowledge and skill can be taught; none of these irrational creatures is taught anything. Things that occur by nature arise through a general activity, while those that arise through knowledge and skill come to particular individuals, not to all. <What occurs in all> is brought about by nature. For example, <all> human beings look upward, but not all are musicians, archers, or hunters, or practice every other pursuit. Some of them have learned something through the activity of knowledge and skill.[1100]

1099. Speaker labels are supplied throughout this dialogue. Technē means an acquired skill or craft. The genitive “of winter” is awkward in the ants’ example; “winter food” conveys one possible connection without importing the proposed supplement “before winter.”

1100. This is the dialogue’s ancient account of animal behavior, not a statement of modern biology. Its distinction is between a capacity common by nature and a skill acquired by particular individuals. “All” and the contrasted clause are editorial supplements.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.3 I.41.6.3

Τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ μὲν τινὲς τῶν μυρμήκων τοῦτο ἔπραττον, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ, καλῶς ἂν ἔλεγες ἐπιστήμῃ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ τέχνῃ συνάγειν τὰς τροφάς· εἰ δὲ πάντες ὁμοίως ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐδὲ τέχνῃ τοῦτο πράττουσιν.

6.4 I.41.6.4

Ἐνέργειαι γάρ, ὦ Τάτ, ἀσώματοι αὐταὶ οὖσαι, ἐν σώμασίν εἰσιν καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργοῦσι. Διόπερ, ὦ Τάτ, καθότι ἀσώματοί εἰσι, καὶ ἀθανάτους αὐτάς φημι εἶναι· καθότι δὲ χωρὶς σωμάτων ἐνεργεῖν οὐ δύνανται, φημὶ αὐτὰς εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι. Τὰ γὰρ πρός τι ἢ ἕνεκά τινος γενόμενα προνοίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ὑποπεπτωκότα ἀδύνατον ἀργά ποτε μεῖναι τῆς ἰδίας ἐνεργείας.

6.5 I.41.6.5

Τὸ γὰρ ὂν ἀεὶ ἔσται, ταὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ σῶμα καὶ ζωή ἐστι. Τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἕπεται τὸ καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ σώματα εἶναι. Διὸ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν σωμάτωσίν φημι ἀιδίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ σώματα ἐπίγεια διαλυτά, σώματα δὲ δεῖ εἶναι, τόπους καὶ ὄργανα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ταῦτα, αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἀθάνατοι, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἀεί ἐστιν, ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ σωματοποίησις, εἴγε ἀεί ἐστι.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 284-285

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.3 · The example of ants

I.41.6.3

In the same way, if some ants did this and others did not, you would rightly say that they did it by knowledge and gathered their food by skill. But if all alike are led to it by nature, even without willing it, clearly they do not do it by knowledge or skill.[1101]

6.4 · Incorporeal activities in bodies

I.41.6.4

For activities, Tat, although themselves incorporeal, are in bodies and act through bodies. Accordingly, insofar as they are incorporeal, I say that they are immortal; insofar as they cannot act without bodies, I say that they are always in a body. Things that have come to be in relation to something or for some purpose, subject to providence and necessity, can never remain idle in respect of their own activity.[1102]

6.5 · The continual formation of bodies

I.41.6.5

For what is will always be: its body and life are the same. It follows from this argument that bodies, too, always exist. That is why I say that embodiment itself is an everlasting activity. For if earthly bodies are dissoluble, yet bodies must exist as places and instruments of activities, while activities are immortal and the immortal always exists, the formation of bodies is itself an activity, since it always exists.[1103]

1101. The example applies the preceding general/particular distinction. Akontes, “without willing it,” presents the behavior as involuntary rather than learned.

1102. Energeiai, consistently “activities,” are treated here as operative powers that act in bodies. The vocabulary should not be understood as referring to energy in the modern physical sense.

1103. The first sentence follows Wachsmuth’s correction tauton, “the same,” for the transmitted “this.” The argument requires a continuing supply of bodies, not the immortality of each earthly body. Sōmatōsis and sōmatopoiēsis are rendered “embodiment” and “formation of bodies.”

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 284-285

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.6 I.41.6.6

Παρέπονται δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ οὐκ ἀθρόως παραγιγνόμεναι, ἀλλά τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἅμα τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνεργοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον οὖσαι, αἱ δὲ καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν τῆς ἡλικίας τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς συνεργοῦσαι. Αὗται δὲ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῶν σωμάτων εἰσὶν ἠρτημέναι. Καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἔρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητὰ αὗται [αἱ] σωματοποιοῦσαι, ἑκάστη δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖ ἢ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἢ τὴν ψυχήν.

6.7 I.41.6.7

Καὶ αὐτῇ μέντοι τῇ ψυχῇ συγγίγνονται χωρὶς σώματος· ἀεὶ δὲ ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι θνητῷ ἐστι· δύναται γὰρ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι χωρὶς τῶν σωμάτων οὐ δύνανται εἶναι. Ἱερὸς λόγος ἐστίν, ὦ τέκνον, οὗτος. Συνεστάναι μὲν σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς οὐ δύναται, τὸ δὲ εἶναι δύναται.

<TAT> Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ πάτερ;

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.6 · Activities and the growing soul I.41.6.6

They accompany the soul, but do not arrive all at once. Some act as soon as a human being comes to be, being present with the soul in its irrational part; the purer activities cooperate with the soul's rational part as age advances. These activities are attached to bodies. From divine bodies they come into mortal ones, [the] activities forming bodies, and each acts upon either the body or the soul.[1104]

6.7 · Soul and body can part I.41.6.7

Yet they also associate with the soul itself apart from body. Activities always exist, but the soul is not always in a mortal body: it can exist apart from the body, whereas activities cannot exist apart from bodies. This is a sacred teaching, my child. A body cannot be constituted without soul, but it can exist without it.

<TAT> What do you mean by that, father?[1105]

1104. The participle "cooperating" lacks an expressed main verb in its clause; the English supplies the parallel sense. The attachment to bodies is retained as printed, without adding the preposition proposed in the apparatus. The rejected article before "forming bodies" is represented by "[the]" in the explanatory English phrase.

1105. The opening statement about association with soul apart from body sits uneasily beside the repeated requirement that activities be in bodies. The translation preserves both statements. The following distinction concerns a body's initial constitution and its continued existence after the soul departs.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.8 I.41.6.8

<ΕΡΜ.> Οὕτω νόησον, ὦ Τάτ· τῆς ψυχῆς χωρισθείσης τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμένει αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σῶμα παρὰ τὸν τῆς ἐπιμονῆς χρόνον ἐνεργεῖται διαλυόμενον καὶ ἀειδὲς γιγνόμενον· ταῦτα δὲ οὐ δύναται πάσχειν τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ἐνεργείας. Ἐπιμένει οὖν τῷ σώματι ἡ ἐνέργεια αὕτη ψυχῆς χωρισθείσης. Αὕτη οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ ἀθανάτου σώματος καὶ θνητοῦ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀθάνατον ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὔ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κρατεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργούμενον κρατεῖται) καὶ τὸ μὲν κρατοῦν ἐπιτακτικὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον <ὂν> ἄγει, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον φέρεται.

6.9 I.41.6.9

Αἱ μὲν <οὖν> ἐνέργειαι οὐ μόνον τὰ ἔμψυχα ἐνεργοῦσι σώματα, <ἀλλὰ> καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, ξύλα καὶ [τοὺς] λίθους καὶ τὰ ἄλλ᾽ ὁμοίως, αὔξουσαί τε καὶ καρποφυοῦσαι καὶ πεπαίνουσαι καὶ φθείρουσαι καὶ τήκουσαι καὶ σήπουσαι καὶ θρύπτουσαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐνεργοῦσαι, ὅσα δύναται σώματα ἄψυχα πάσχειν. Ἐνέργεια γὰρ κέκληται, ὦ τέκνον, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τὸ γιγνόμενον·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 286

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.8 · Activity after the soul's departure

I.41.6.8

<HERMES> Understand it this way, Tat. When the soul has separated from the body, the body itself remains. For as long as it remains, it is acted upon, dissolving and becoming formless; and the body cannot undergo these things without activity. This activity therefore remains with the body after the soul's separation. Here, then, is the difference between an immortal body and a mortal one: the immortal is constituted from a single matter, the mortal is not; the one acts, the other is acted upon. For everything active rules, while what is acted upon is ruled. What rules, <being> commanding and free, leads; what is enslaved is carried along.[1106]

6.9 · Activity in lifeless things

I.41.6.9

Activities, <then>, act not only upon ensouled bodies, <but> also upon lifeless ones - wood, [the] stones, and other things alike - causing growth, the production of fruit, ripening, destruction, melting, rotting, crumbling, and all similar effects that lifeless bodies can undergo. For "activity," my child, is the name given to precisely this: whatever it is that happens.[1107]

1106. The text counts dissolution itself as an effect of activity. Its active/passive contrast is then expressed through the political language of ruler and slave. "A single matter" is retained without specifying a heavenly element that this passage does not name.

1107. The list moves between growth and disintegration and is broader than the examples wood and stone alone. Wachsmuth's "producing fruit" is a correction of the transmitted "bearing fruit." The redundant article before stones is bracketed as in the edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.10 I.41.6.10

Ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ πολλά, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα· οὐδέποτε γὰρ χηρεύει τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ὁ κόσμος, ἀεὶ δὲ φερόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ κυΐσκει τὰ ὄντα, οὐδέποτε ἀπολειφθησόμενα αὐτὰ τῆς φθορᾶς. Πᾶσα οὖν ἐνέργεια νοείσθω, ὡς ἀεὶ ἀθάνατος οὖσα, ἥτις ἂν ᾖ ἐν οἱῳδήποτε σώματι.

6.11 I.41.6.11

Τῶν δὲ ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν θείων σωμάτων, αἱ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν, καὶ αἱ μὲν καθολικαί, αἱ δὲ εἰδικαί, καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν γενῶν, αἱ δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου. Θεῖαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ εἰς τὰ ἀίδια σώματα ἐνεργοῦσαι· αὖται δὲ καὶ τέλειαί εἰσιν, ὡς εἰς τέλεια σώματα· μερικαὶ δὲ αἱ δι᾽ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου γένους τῶν ζῴων· εἰδικαὶ δὲ αἱ εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων τι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.10 · A cosmos always bringing forth

I.41.6.10

And many things must always come to be - indeed, all things. For the cosmos is never bereft of any of the things that exist; always moving, it conceives existing things within itself, while they themselves will never be exempt from decay. Let every activity therefore be understood as always immortal, whatever it may be and in whatever body.[1108]

6.11 · Kinds of activity

I.41.6.11

Of activities, some belong to divine bodies, others to perishable ones; some are general, others specific; some belong to genera, others to the parts of each individual. Divine activities are those acting upon everlasting bodies; these are also perfect, since they act upon perfect bodies. Partial activities operate through each genus of living creatures; specific activities act upon each particular existing thing.[1109]

1108. The cosmos is described through pregnancy or conception. The difficult closing clause follows Wachsmuth's auta, "they themselves," and phthora, "decay," without adopting an alternative reference to motion. The contrast is between perishing products and enduring activities.

1109. The classification is not fully consistent as transmitted. The apparatus records proposed additions meant to align its divisions, but Wachsmuth notes that even these do not make them agree. "General," "partial," and "specific" preserve the printed terms without reconstructing a tidier taxonomy.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 286-287

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.12 I.41.6.12

Οὗτος οὖν ὁ λόγος, ὦ τέκνον, συνάγει πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι ἐνεργειῶν. Εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι, πολλὰ δὲ σώματα ἐν κόσμῳ, πλείους φημὶ εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν σωμάτων. Ἐν ἑνὶ γὰρ πολλάκις σώματί ἐστι μία καὶ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτη χωρὶς τῶν παρεπομένων καθολικῶν· καθολικὰς γὰρ ἐνεργείας φημὶ τὰς ὄντως σωματικάς, διὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν κινήσεων γινομένας· χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὸ σῶμα συστῆναι οὐ δυνατόν.

6.13 I.41.6.13

Ἕτεραι δέ εἰσιν εἰδικαὶ ἐνέργειαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων. Παρέπονται γὰρ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ αἰσθήσεις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν <αἱ> αἰσθήσεις εἰσί. Νόησον οὖν, ὦ τέκνον, διαφορὰν ἐνεργείας <καὶ αἰσθήσεως· ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια> ἄνωθεν πέμπεται· ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ σώματι οὖσα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσα, δεξαμένη τὴν ἐνέργειαν φανερὰν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ αὐτὴν σωματοποιήσασα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.12 · More activities than bodies I.41.6.12

This argument, then, my child, concludes that everything is full of activities. For if activities must be in bodies, and there are many bodies in the cosmos, I say that activities are more numerous than bodies. Often in one body there is one activity, a second, and a third, apart from the general activities that accompany it. By general activities I mean those that are bodily in the proper sense and occur through perceptions and movements; for without these activities a body cannot be constituted.[1110]

6.13 · Activity made perceptible I.41.6.13

There are other, specific activities in human souls through skills, knowledge, pursuits, and actions. Perceptions follow activities; or rather, <the> perceptions are the results of activities. Understand, then, my child, the difference between activity <and perception. Activity> is sent from above; perception, being in the body and deriving its being from it, receives the activity and makes it manifest, as though giving it a body.[1111]

1110. “Bodily” describes where these activities operate. The text earlier calls activities themselves incorporeal. The apparatus proposes “body-forming” in place of “bodily,” but that conjecture is not adopted in the base text.

1111. The longer supplement restores the two sides of the comparison. The image of giving activity a body explains how an otherwise incorporeal operation becomes perceptible.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.14 I.41.6.14

Διόπερ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ σωματικὰς καὶ θνητάς φημι εἶναι, τοσοῦτον συνεστώσας, ὅσον καὶ τὸ σῶμα. Καὶ γὰρ συγγεννῶνται τῷ σώματι αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ συναποθνῄσκουσι· τὰ δὲ ἀθάνατα σώματα αὐτὰ μὲν [ἀθάνατον] αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἔχει, ὡς ἐξ οὐσίας τοιαύτης συνεστῶτα· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ἄλλου ἐστὶ [σωματικὴ] ἢ τοῦ προσγενομένου τῷ σώματι κακοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ πάλιν αὖ ἀπογενομένου. Τοῖς δὲ ἀιδίοις σώμασιν οὔτε προσγίνεταί <τι> οὔτε ἀπογίνεται· διὸ αἴσθησις ἐν ἐκείνοις οὐ γίνεται.

6.15 I.41.6.15

<TAT> Ἐν παντὶ οὖν σώματι αἴσθησις αἰσθάνεται;

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἐν παντί, ὦ τέκνον, καὶ ἐνέργειαι <ἐν> πᾶσιν ἐνεργοῦσι.

<TAT> Καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις, ὦ πάτερ;

<ΕΡΜ.> Καὶ <τοῖς> ἀψύχοις, ὦ τέκνον. Διαφοραὶ δὲ εἰσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων· αἱ μὲν τῶν λογικῶν μετὰ λόγου γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων σωματικαί εἰσι μόνον, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων αἰσθήσεις μέν εἰσι, παθητικαὶ δὲ κατὰ αὔξησιν μόνον καὶ κατὰ μείωσιν γιγνόμεναι. Τὸ δὲ πάθος καὶ <ἡ> αἴσθησις ἀπὸ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἤρτηνται, εἰς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ συνάγονται, ὑπὸ δὴ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.14 · Perception and change

I.41.6.14

That is why I say that perceptions are both bodily and mortal, lasting only as long as the body. Perceptions are born together with the body and die with it. Immortal bodies themselves have no [immortal] perception, being constituted from a substance of that kind. For [bodily] perception is of nothing at all other than an evil or a good that has come to the body, or something that has departed from it again. But there is not <anything> that comes to everlasting bodies or departs from them; hence perception does not arise in them.[1112]

6.15 · Perception in different beings

I.41.6.15

<TAT> Does perception, then, perceive in every body?

<HERMES> In every body, my child; activities also act <in> all.

<TAT> Even in lifeless things, father?

<HERMES> Even in <the> lifeless things, my child. But perceptions differ. Those of rational beings occur with reason; those of irrational beings are bodily only; those of lifeless things are indeed perceptions, but passive ones, occurring only through increase and diminution. Affection and <the> perception depend upon a single summit and are brought to the same point by the activities themselves.[1113]

1112. The two bracketed adjectives are rejected in the printed edition. The claim is that unchanging immortal bodies lack perception understood as awareness of an addition or loss. The following exchange's general language about "every body" is retained, despite the qualification made here.

1113. Pathos, "affection," is something undergone. The passage extends aisthēsis, "perception," to passive bodily response in lifeless things; this is broader than ordinary conscious sensation. The "single summit" is left unspecified in the excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.16

I.41.6.16

Τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων ζῴων εἰσὶ δύο ἄλλαι ἐνέργειαι, αἳ παρέπονται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι, λύπη καὶ χαρά· χωρὶς τούτων ζῷον ἔμψυχον καὶ μάλιστα λογικὸν αἰσθέσθαι ἀδύνατον· διὸ καὶ ἰδέας ταύτας εἶναί φημι [τῶν παθῶν ἰδέας] τῶν λογικῶν μᾶλλον ζῴων ἐπικρατούσας. [Αἱ μὲν ἐνέργειαι ἐνεργοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀναφαίνουσιν.] Αὗται δὲ οὖσαι σωματικαὶ ἀνακινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλόγων μερῶν, διὸ καὶ ἀμφοτέρας φημὶ κακωτικὰς εἶναι.

6.17

I.41.6.17

Τό τε γὰρ χαίρειν μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν παρέχον πολλῶν κακῶν εὐθέως αἴτιον συμβαίνει τῷ παθόντι, ἥ τε λύπη ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ὀδύνας ἰσχυροτέρας παρέχεται· διόπερ εἰκότως ἀμφότεραι κακωτικαὶ ἂν εἴησαν.

<ΤΑΤ> Ἡ αὐτὴ <δ᾽> ἂν εἴη αἴσθησις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὦ πάτερ;

<ΕΡΜ.> Πῶς νοεῖς, ὦ παῖ, ψυχῆς αἴσθησιν;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.16 · Pain and joy

I.41.6.16

In ensouled living creatures there are two further activities that accompany perceptions and affections: pain and joy. Without them an ensouled creature, especially a rational one, cannot perceive. That is why I call these forms [forms of the affections] that prevail especially over rational creatures. [Activities act, while perceptions reveal the activities.] These, being bodily, are stirred by the irrational parts of the soul; that is why I say that both are harmful.[1114]

6.17 · Pleasure and suffering

I.41.6.17

For rejoicing, which provides perception with pleasure, immediately proves a cause of many evils for the one who experiences it; pain supplies sharper pangs and sufferings. Both may therefore reasonably be called harmful.

<TAT> <But> would the perception of soul and body be the same, father?

<HERMES> What do you understand by perception of the soul, my child?[1115]

1114. The rejected sentence interrupts the discussion of pain and joy. With it set aside, “these” and “both” refer back to that pair. The translation displays both the rejected repetition and the rejected sentence, as does the Greek edition.

1115. The teacher evaluates joy and pain through their effects on the embodied subject. Tat’s next question shifts the issue from their value to the ontological status of perception itself.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.18 I.41.6.18

<TAT> Οὐχ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἀσώματος, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ὦ πάτερ, <εἰ> ἡ αἴσθησις [ἡ] ἐν σώματι οὖσα τυγχάνει;

<ΕΡΜ.> Ἐὰν ἐν σώματι αὐτὴν θῶμεν, ὦ τέκνον, ὁμοίαν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν ἀποφανοῦμεν ἢ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσώματα ὄντα φαμὲν ἐν σώμασιν. Ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις οὔτε ἐνέργειά ἐστιν οὔτε ψυχὴ οὔτε ἀσώματόν τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ προειρημένα, οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἀσώματον· εἰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματον, σῶμα ἂν εἴη· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων δεῖ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα.

7.1 I.41.7.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἄμμωνα.

Κινεῖται δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τῆς κινήσεως τῆς κινούσης τὸ πᾶν. Ἡ γὰρ φύσις τοῦ παντὸς τῷ παντὶ παρέχει κινήσεις, μίαν μὲν τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτῆς, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν· καὶ ἡ μὲν διήκει διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου καὶ ἐντὸς συνέχει· ἡ δὲ παρήκει καὶ ἐκτὸς περιέχει· καὶ διὰ πάντων πεφοιτήκασι κοινῇ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

6.18 · Is perception a body? I.41.6.18

<TAT> Is not the soul incorporeal, while perception would be a body, father, <if> perception happens to be in a body?[1116]

<HERMES> If we place it in a body, my child, we shall declare it similar to the soul or to activities; for we say that these are in bodies although incorporeal. But perception is neither activity nor soul nor any other incorporeal thing besides those already mentioned. It would therefore not be incorporeal; and if it is not incorporeal, it would be a body. For of existing things, some must be bodies and others incorporeal.[1117]

7.1 · Hermes: nature and motion I.41.7.1

From Hermes, from the writings To Ammon.

What is moved moves through the activity of the motion that moves the whole. For the nature of the whole provides the whole with movements: one according to its power, the other according to activity. The former passes through the entire cosmos and holds it together from within; the latter extends around it and encloses it from outside. Together they have permeated all things.[1118]

1116. The repeated Greek article hē, rejected by the editor, has no separate natural English equivalent; its deletion remains visible in the facing Greek. The conditional “if” is an editorial supplement.

1117. The teacher distinguishes being in a body from being a body, then nevertheless concludes that perception is corporeal by excluding it from the incorporeal kinds he has named. The reasoning is retained as printed.

1118. The two movements are distinguished by dynamis, “power,” and energeia, “activity.” Wachsmuth explicitly finds the pronoun autēs, “its,” obscure; the translation refers it provisionally to nature, without emending the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

7.2 I.41.7.2

Καὶ ἡ φύσις πάντων, φύουσα τὰ γιγνόμενα, φυὴν παρέχει τοῖς φυομένοις, σπείρουσα μὲν τὰ ἑαυτῆς σπέρματα, γενέσεις <δ'> ἔχουσα διʼ ὕλην κινητήν. Κινουμένη δὲ θερμαίνεται καὶ γίνεται <ἡ> ὕλη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, τὸ μὲν σθεναρὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν, τὸ δὲ πάσχον. Τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ ὕδατι ἐξήρανε τοῦ ὕδατος, καὶ ἐγένετο <ἡ γῆ> ὀχουμένη ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕδατος. Περιξηραινομένου δὲ ἀτμὸς ἐγένετο ἐκ τῶν τριῶν, τοῦ τε ὕδατος <καὶ> τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ πυρός, καὶ ἐγένετο ἀήρ.

7.3 I.41.7.3

Ταῦτα συνῆλθε κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἁρμονίας λόγον, θερμὸν ψυχρῷ, ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, καὶ ἐκ τῆς συμπνοίας τούτων ἐγένετο πνεῦμα καὶ σπέρμα ἀνάλογον τῷ περιέχοντι πνεύματι. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐς τὴν μήτραν ἐμπεσὸν οὐκ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι, οὐκ ἠρεμοῦν δὲ μεταβάλλει τὸ σπέρμα, μεταβαλλόμενον δὲ αὔξην ἴσχει καὶ μέγεθος. Ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει δὲ εἴδωλον ἐπισπᾶται σχήματος καὶ σχηματίζεται· ὀχεῖται δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ σχήματι τὸ εἶδος, διʼ οὗ καὶ εἰδωλοποιεῖται τὸ εἰδωλοποιούμενον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

7.2 · The formation of the elements I.41.7.2

The nature of all things brings forth what comes to be and gives growth to what grows, sowing its own seeds <and> producing generations through movable matter. As it moves, <the> matter grows warm and becomes fire and water, the one vigorous and strong, the other passive. Fire, opposing water, dried out some of the water, and <earth> came to be, borne upon the water. As the drying continued, vapor arose from the three - water <and> earth and fire - and air came to be.[1119]

7.3 · Seed, growth, and shape I.41.7.3

These came together according to the ratio of harmony, hot with cold and dry with wet. From their breathing together arose breath and seed corresponding to the surrounding breath. When this breath enters the womb, it does not rest within the seed; through its unrest it changes the seed, and as the seed changes it acquires growth and size. With its increase in size it draws to itself an image of a shape and takes shape. Form is borne upon the shape, and through it what is being fashioned into an image receives its image.[1120]

1119. The repeated root phy- links nature, bringing forth, and growth. The partitive “some of the water” represents the Greek genitive after “dried.” The passage offers an ancient account of elemental generation, with earth and air emerging after fire and water.

1120. Pneuma is rendered “breath,” retaining its connection with sympnoia, “breathing together.” The last sentence distinguishes schēma, shape, from eidos, form, and keeps the printed repetition of eidōlopoiein, “fashion into an image,” rather than the simpler verb proposed in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

7.4 I.41.7.4

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν τῇ νηδύι τὴν ζωτικὴν κίνησιν, τὴν δὲ βλαστικήν, καὶ ταύτην ἥρμοσεν ἁρμονία, ὑποδοχὴν οὖσαν τῆς διανοητικῆς ζωῆς. Ἔστι δὲ αὕτη ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀμετάβλητος, οὐδέποτε ἐξισταμένη τῆς ἀμεταβλησίας. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νηδύι ἀριθμοῖς λοχεύει καὶ μαιοῦται καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔξω ἀέρα ἄγει·

7.5 I.41.7.5

Καὶ ἐγγυτάτω ψυχὴ οὖσα οἰκειοῦται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν συγγενικὴν ἰδιότητα ἀλλὰ τὴν καθειμαρμένην· οὐ γὰρ ἔρως ἐστὶν αὐτῇ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. Διὰ τοῦτο καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην παρέχει τῷ γιγνομένῳ διανοητικὴν κίνησιν καὶ νοερὰν ζωῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίαν· παρεισέρπει γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι καὶ κινεῖ ζωτικῶς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

7.4 · Growth prepared for thought I.41.7.4

Since, then, the breath in the womb did not possess the movement of animal life but the movement of growth, harmony fitted this movement together as a receptacle for the life of thought. This is without parts and unchangeable, never departing from its unchangeability. Through numbers it brings to birth and midwives what is in the womb, leading it into the outer air.[1121]

7.5 · The soul's fated association I.41.7.5

And the soul, being very near, becomes associated with it, not through a characteristic of natural kinship but through one assigned by fate; for it has no desire to be with a body. For this reason it gives the creature coming to be, according to fate, the movement of thought and the intellectual substance of life itself. For it slips into the breath and sets it in living motion.[1122]

1121. The shift from growth to life capable of thought is clear, but the syntax and pronoun references are not. "This" may refer to the life of thought or to harmony; the subject of the next sentence is likewise unstated. The English preserves that uncertainty. "Movement of growth" follows the editor's blastikēn in place of the transmitted brastikēn.

1122. Here psychē, "soul," is explicitly nominative in the printed text. Its association with the emerging creature is attributed to fate rather than desire. The contrast with the preceding growth process explains "living motion" as the higher life supplied by soul.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.1 I.41.8.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἄμμωνα πρὸς Τάτ.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν κύριος καὶ πάντων δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀιδίων σωμάτων, ὦ Τάτ, ἅπαξ ποιήσας οὐκέτι ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς παραδοὺς καὶ ἑνώσας ἀλλήλοις ἀφῆκε φέρεσθαι, μηδὲν ἐνδέοντα, ὡς ἀίδια. Εἰ δὲ δέονταί τινων, ἀλλήλων δεήσονται, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἐπιφορᾶς, ὡς ἀθάνατα. Ἔδει γὰρ τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου σώματα γενόμενα τοιαύτην ἔχειν καὶ τὴν φύσιν.

8.2 I.41.8.2

Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργὸς ἐν σώματι ὧν ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς καὶ ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ποιήσει σώματα διαλυτὰ καὶ θνητά. Οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἦν αὐτῷ μιμεῖσθαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀδύνατον <ὄν>. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐποίησεν οὔσης ἀσωμάτου, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς γειναμένης σωματώσεως ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς. Εἰκότως οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὰ σώματα, ὡς ἐξ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας γεγεννημένα, ἀθάνατά ἐστι· τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα διαλυτὰ καὶ θνητά, ὡς τῆς ὕλης ἡμῶν ἐκ σωμάτων συνεστώσης, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενῆ εἶναι καὶ πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας δεόμενα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.1 · Hermes: everlasting bodies I.41.8.1

From Hermes, from the writings To Ammon, to Tat.[1123]

The lord and maker of all everlasting bodies, Tat, having made them once, made them no more and does not make them now. For he entrusted them to themselves, united them with one another, and let them move, lacking nothing, since they are everlasting. If they need anything, they will need one another, but no supply from outside, since they are immortal. For bodies that came to be through him had to possess a corresponding nature.

8.2 · The maker of mortal bodies I.41.8.2

Our maker, however, being in a body, made us, continually makes us, and will make us as bodies that can dissolve and die. For it was not lawful for him to imitate his own maker, besides its <being> impossible. The one made things from the first substance, which is incorporeal; the other made us from the embodiment that gave birth. Thus, according to sound reason, those bodies are immortal, having been born from incorporeal substance; ours are dissoluble and mortal, since our matter is constituted from bodies, and they are weak and need much assistance.[1124]

1123. The source heading contains both “To Ammon” and “to Tat.” The latter agrees with the address in the text, but the double heading is retained without deciding how the excerpt acquired it.

1124. The excerpt distinguishes two makers without naming the embodied one here. The unusual expression “the embodiment that gave birth” translates the printed geinamenēs sōmatōseōs; it is not silently changed into “generated matter.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.3 I.41.8.3

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ τυχὸν ἀντέσχεν ὁ σύνδεσμος ἡμῶν τῶν σωμάτων, εἰ μή τινα εἶχεν ἐπεισερχομένην τροφὴν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων καὶ ὑπεσωμάτου ἡμᾶς καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν; Καὶ γὰρ γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος ἐπιρροὴ ἡμῖν γίγνεται, ἥ τις τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν νεοποιοῦσα συνέχει τὸ σκῆνος· ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὰς κινήσεις ἐσμὲν ἀσθενέστεροι, φέροντες κινήσεις μηδὲ ἡμέρας μιᾶς.

8.4 I.41.8.4

Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὦ τέκνον, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐν ταῖς νυξὶν ἡμῶν ἀνεπαύετο τὰ σώματα, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς μίαν ἡμέραν ἀντέσχομεν. Ὅθεν ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ δημιουργὸς πάντα προεπιστάμενος, εἰς διαμονὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἐποίησε τὸν ὕπνον, [ὃν] μέγιστον τοῦ καμάτου τῆς κινήσεως, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἰσότητος ἔταξεν ἑκατέρῳ χρόνον, μᾶλλον δὲ τῇ ἀναπαύλῃ πλείονα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.3 · Food renews the body I.41.8.3

How could the binding of our bodies endure even for a little while, unless it received incoming nourishment from like elements and replenished our bodies each day? For an influx of earth, water, fire, and air comes to us, renewing our bodies and holding together their dwelling. Thus we are also weak in relation to movement, unable to endure even a single day's movements.[1125]

8.4 · Sleep and rest I.41.8.4

Know well, my child, that if our bodies did not rest at night, we could not hold out for a single day. Hence the maker, being good and knowing all things beforehand, made sleep for the creature's preservation, [which] greatest ... for the weariness of movement, and assigned equal time to each - or rather, more to rest.[1126]

1125. Skēnos, literally a tent or dwelling, is an image for the body. The transition "thus" is difficult after the account of nourishment; the apparatus considers a different connective or a loss of text. The printed connection is retained.

1126. The phrase containing megiston, "greatest," is corrupt, as Wachsmuth notes. Suggested repairs supply a soothing remedy or replace the word with "relief," but the edition adopts none. The ellipsis in the English marks the broken sense, not an additional gap printed in the Greek. "Each" refers to movement and rest.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.5 I.41.8.5

Μεγίστην δὲ νόει, τέκνον, τοῦ ὕπνου τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐναντίαν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐλάττω <δ᾽> ἐκείνης. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ σώματα ζῆν οὐ δύναται χωρὶς τοῦ ὕπνου. Ἄνεσις γὰρ καὶ ἄφεσίς ἐστι τῶν συνδέτων μελῶν καὶ ἔσωθεν ἐνεργεῖ σωματοποιῶν τὴν ἐπεισελθοῦσαν ὕλην, ἑκάστῳ τὸ οἰκεῖον διαστέλλων· τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τῷ αἵματι, τὴν δὲ γῆν <τοῖς> ὀστέοις καὶ μυελοῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα τοῖς νεύροις καὶ φλεψί, τὸ δὲ πῦρ τῇ ὁράσει. Διόπερ καὶ ἥδεται ἄκρως τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ὕπνου ταύτην ἐνεργοῦντος τὴν ἡδονήν.

9.1 I.41.9.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κρατύλου.

Τὸ σῶμα λέγεις; Πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ· καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

8.5 · Sleep as an activity I.41.8.5

Understand, my child, that the activity of sleep is very great, opposed to the soul's activity <but> no less than it. For just as the soul is an activity of motion, so bodies cannot live without sleep. Sleep is a relaxation and release of the joined limbs; it acts from within, turning incoming matter into body and allocating to each part what belongs to it: water to blood, earth to <the> bones and marrow, air to sinews and veins, and fire to sight. That is why the body takes such great pleasure when sleep produces this pleasure.[1127]

9.1 · Plato: body as tomb and sign I.41.9.1

From Plato's Cratylus.

Do you mean "body"? It seems to me that this can be explained in many ways; with even a small alteration, very readily indeed. Some say that it is the soul's "tomb," as though the soul were buried in its present condition. Again, because the soul uses it to signify whatever it signifies, on this account too it is rightly called a "sign."[1128]

1127. The distribution of elements is the physiology of this excerpt. Neura is translated "sinews," avoiding an assumption that the term has the precise scope of modern nerves. The final repetition of pleasure is retained as printed.

1128. Cratylus 400b-c. The speaker is Socrates. The passage plays on sōma, "body," and sēma, which can mean both tomb and sign; sēmainein means to signify. These wordplays are explanations offered within the dialogue, not modern historical etymologies.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

9.2 I.41.9.2

Δοκοῦσι μέντοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσι· τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτό, ὥσπερ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, <τὸ> σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδὲν γράμμα.

10.1 I.41.10.1

<Πλουτάρχου.>

Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐδήλωσε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ζώντων ἀεὶ δέμας προσαγορεύει, ὡς ἐν τούτοις·

ἐπεὶ οὔ ἐθέν ἐστι χερείων

οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν.

Τὸ δὲ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα καλεῖ·

Σῶμα δὲ οἴκαδ᾽ ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν, ὄφρα πυρός με

Τρῶες καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι λελάχωσι θανόντα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

9.2 · The body as a place of keeping I.41.9.2

But it seems especially to have been the followers of Orpheus who gave it this name: the soul is paying a penalty for whatever it is paying a penalty for, and has this enclosure, like a prison, so that it may be kept safe. Thus this is, as its name says, <the> "keeping-place" of the soul until it has paid what it owes; and there is no need to alter a single letter.[1129]

10.1 · Attributed to Plutarch: Homer's words for body I.41.10.1

<From Plutarch.>[1130]

Homer too indicated this in the same way. He always calls the body of the living demas, as in these lines:

"For she is no worse than her

in build or stature."

But what has lost its soul he calls sōma:

"Give my body back to my home, so that the Trojans

and the Trojans' wives may grant me fire when I am dead."[1131]

1129. The last explanation connects sōma with sōzesthai, "to be kept safe" or "preserved." "Keeping-place" conveys the pun but is not the ordinary meaning of sōma. The combination of protection and confinement is present in the Greek.

1130. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution to the work transmitted under Plutarch's name, comparing On Homer 124; it is not a manuscript heading here. The brackets preserve that editorial status.

1131. The quotations are Iliad 1.114-115 and 7.79-80. Wachsmuth's first reference is misnumbered 1.115-116. Demas is bodily build or frame; sōma in the second quotation is the dead body. The ensuing argument turns these usages into a philosophical wordplay.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 41

10.2 I.41.10.2

Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ δέμας κρατουμένης, σῶμα δὲ ἀπολείπεται, τουτέστι σῆμα καὶ ἴχνος, ἀπελθούσης.

11.1 I.41.11.1

Ἑρμοῦ.

Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ προὸν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων. Προὸν [ὂν] γάρ ἐστι, δι᾽ οὗ ἡ οὐσιότης ἡ καθόλου λεγομένη κοινὴ νοεῖται τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὄντων τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ νοουμένων. Τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτοις κατά τι ἕτερον πάλιν αὐτὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτά ἐστι φύσις, οὐσία αἰσθητή, ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ αἰσθητὰ πάντα.

11.2 I.41.11.2

Μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων νοηματικοὶ καὶ αἰσθητοὶ θεοί· … τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα τῶν νοητῶν, τὰ δὲ δοξαστά, τὰ κοινωνοῦντα τῶν νοηματικῶν θεῶν. Αὗται δὲ εἰκόνες εἰσὶ νοημάτων, οἷον ἥλιος εἰκών ἐστι τοῦ ἐπουρανίου δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸ ὅλον ἐδημιούργησε, καὶ ὁ ἥλιος δημιουργεῖ τὰ ζῷα καὶ γεννᾷ <τὰ> φυτὰ καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πρυτανεύει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 41

10.2 · Bond, body, and trace I.41.10.2

For the same thing was the soul's bond and bodily frame while it was held fast; when it has departed, a body remains - that is, a sign and trace.[1132]

11.1 · Hermes: prior being and sensible nature I.41.11.1

From Hermes.

Prior being, then, stands over all existing things and all things that truly are. For it is prior being [being] through which what is called essential being in general is understood as common to things that truly are and to existing things conceived in themselves. What is opposed to these in another respect, again taken in itself, is nature: sensible substance, containing in itself all sensible things.[1133]

11.2 · The sun as an image I.41.11.2

Between these are gods of thought and perceptible gods: ... some things sharing in the intelligibles, others objects of opinion, those sharing in the gods of thought. These are images of objects of thought; for example, the sun is an image of the heavenly creator God. Just as he fashioned the whole, so the sun fashions living creatures, brings forth <the> plants, and governs the breaths.[1134]

1132. The wordplay joins desmos, "bond," with demas, "frame," and sōma, "body," with sēma, "sign." It describes the corpse as the trace left by the departed soul.

1133. This fragment is difficult and textually damaged. Proon, "prior being," and ousiotēs, "essential being," are kept distinct. Wachsmuth prints the correction "is understood" and rejects the redundant on, "being." The awkward distinction between "existing things" and "things that truly are" is preserved rather than resolved into an unstated system.

1134. The ellipsis represents the gap marked in the edition. No lost connective or missing subject has been reconstructed. "Gods of thought" renders noēmatikoi theoi; the feminine "these" has no secure antecedent in the surviving wording. Pneumata, "breaths," can also carry the senses winds or spirits. Wachsmuth notes that the manuscripts insert material from chapter 45 after this excerpt; his printed arrangement is followed.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

Κεφάλαιον ΜΒ′ I.42.heading

Περὶ τῆς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεως.

1.1 · Πλάτωνος I.42.1.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πάντα ἦν τὰ τοῦ θνητοῦ ζῴου συμπεφυκότα μέρη καὶ μέλη, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν ἐν πυρὶ καὶ πνεύματι συνέβαινεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχειν αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τούτων τηκόμενον, κενούμενον ἔφθινε, βοήθειαν αὐτῷ θεοὶ μηχανῶνται.

1.2 I.42.1.2

Τῆς γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνης ξυγγενῆ φύσεως φύσιν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις καὶ αἰσθήσεσι κεραννύντες, ὥσθ᾽ ἕτερον ζῷον εἶναι, φυτεύουσιν· ἃ δὴ νῦν ἥμερα δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα παιδευθέντα ὑπὸ γεωργίας τιθασῶς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσχε· πρὶν δ᾽ ἦν μόνα τὰ τῶν ἀγρίων γένη, πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἡμέρων ὄντα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

Chapter 42: On the generation of living creatures I.42.heading

On the generation of living creatures.[1135]

1.1 · Plato: a remedy for bodily depletion I.42.1.1

From Plato, from the Timaeus.

Now that all the parts and limbs of the mortal creature had grown together, and its life necessarily depended on fire and breath, it was being melted and emptied by these and was wasting away. The gods therefore devise a means of helping it.[1136]

1.2 · Cultivation and another kind of life I.42.1.2

For they blend a nature akin to human nature with other forms and perceptions, so that it constitutes a different living creature, and plant it. These are the cultivated trees, plants, and seeds of today: schooled by agriculture, they have become tame toward us. Previously there were only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated ones.[1137]

1135. Much of this chapter is lost. Wachsmuth restores its topic headings from the index of the Laurentian florilegium, Γ.10; the general heading is absent from manuscripts F and P. The numbers 1-13 mark the printed sequence of topics. Only three excerpts survive, under topics 1, 7, and 13; the latter two also bear the excerpt numbers (2) and (3). Further subdivisions here serve facing-page comparison.

1136. Timaeus 76e-77c. The passage continues an account of the formation of the human body. The gods' remedy is the plant life described next, which supplies what the mortal body loses. Pneuma is rendered "breath" here; fire and breath belong to the dialogue's account of bodily life.

1137. The language of schooling and taming treats cultivation as an education of plants. Zōion, "living creature," includes plant life in this argument; translating it simply as "animal" would obscure the claim. "Cultivated" renders hēmeros, whose range also includes "tame."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

1.3 I.42.1.3

Πᾶν γὰρ οὖν ὅ τι περ ἂν μετάσχῃ τοῦ ζῆν, ζῷον μὲν ἂν ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτο ὀρθότατον· μετέχει γε μὴν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν λέγομεν, τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἴδους, ὃ μεταξὺ φρενῶν ὀμφαλοῦ τε ἱδρῦσθαι λόγος, ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ μηδέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδείας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν.

1.4 I.42.1.4

Πάσχον γὰρ διατελεῖ πάντα· στραφέντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἑαυτό, τὴν μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀπωσαμένῳ κίνησιν, τῇ δὲ οἰκείᾳ χρησαμένῳ, τῶν αὐτοῦ τι λογίσασθαι κατιδόντι φύσιν οὐ παρέδωκεν ἡ γένεσις· διὸ δὴ ζῇ μὲν ἐστί τε οὐχ ἕτερον ζῴου, μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατερριζωμένον πέπηγε διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἐστερῆσθαι.

2 I.42.2.heading

<Περὶ συλλήψεως.>

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 42

1.3 · The third kind of soul I.42.1.3

For anything whatever that shares in life may justly and most properly be called a living creature. Yet this creature of which we are now speaking shares in the third kind of soul, which is said to be situated between the diaphragm and the navel. This kind has no part in opinion, reasoning, or intellect, but does share in pleasant and painful perception accompanied by desires.[1138]

1.4 · Rooted life and inward reflection I.42.1.4

For it continually undergoes everything that happens to it. Its origin has not given it the capacity to turn within itself about itself, to push aside movement from outside and use its own, and thus to reason about any of its own conditions by discerning their nature. It therefore lives and is nothing other than a living creature; but it stands fixed and rooted, because it has been deprived of movement originating from itself.[1139]

2 · Restored topic heading I.42.2.heading

<On conception.>

Text missing.[1140]

1138. The plant is assigned the kind of soul associated with the lower region of the human body. The argument grants it perception and desire while withholding opinion, reasoning, and intellect. The printed phrēn, in the plural phrenes, names the diaphragm here.

1139. The passage contrasts being affected with the inward movement of reflection. Its concluding denial of self-originating motion accompanies the image of a rooted plant. It does not retract the preceding assertion that plants live and perceive. Wachsmuth prints physin, “nature,” where manuscripts F and P have physei, “by nature.” “By discerning their nature” connects physin with “discerning” and the preceding “own conditions”; this construal is tentative.

1140. The angle brackets mark a restored heading. The Latin deest, “is missing,” is Wachsmuth’s notice of the missing text; it is not part of the ancient Greek. The same presentation is used for the lost topics that follow.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

3 I.42.3.heading

<Ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ διαρθροῦται τὸ ἔμβρυον.>

deest.

4 I.42.4.heading

<Ἀπὸ ποίου ἄρχεται μορίου μορφοῦσθαι τὸ ἔμβρυον.>

deest.

5 I.42.5.heading

<Πῶς ἄρρενα γεννᾶται καὶ θήλεα.>

deest.

6 I.42.6.heading

<Πῶς τέρατα γίνεται.>

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 42

3 · Restored topic heading

I.42.3.heading

<In how much time the embryo develops distinct parts.>

Text missing.[1141]

4 · Restored topic heading

I.42.4.heading

<From which part the embryo begins to take shape.>

Text missing.

5 · Restored topic heading

I.42.5.heading

<How males and females are generated.>

Text missing.

6 · Restored topic heading

I.42.6.heading

<How anomalous births occur.>

Text missing.[1142]

1141. Diarthrousthai means to acquire distinct joints or an articulated structure. The heading concerns the development of bodily parts, not the total duration of pregnancy.

1142. Terata can denote marvels, portents, or anomalous offspring. In this sequence of topics about generation, it concerns unusual bodily formation. The lost text leaves the particular cases and explanations unknown.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

7

I.42.7.heading

<Πόθεν γίνονται τῶν γονέων αἱ ὁμοιώσεις ἢ τῶν προγόνων.>

7.1 · (2) Ἑρμοῦ

I.42.7.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης.

Παρὰ τί δὲ τὰ βρέφη ὅμοια τοῖς γονεῦσι γίνεται ἢ συγγενείαις ἀποδίδοται; Ἐκθήσω λόγον. Ὅταν νοστίμου αἵματος ἐξαφρουμένου ἡ γέννησις ἀποθησαυρίζῃ γόνον, συμβαίνει πως ἐκπνεῖν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου μελῶν οὐσίαν τινὰ κατὰ θείαν ἐνέργειαν, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπου γινομένου, τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικὸς εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

7 · Restored topic heading

I.42.7.heading

<How resemblances to parents or ancestors arise.>[1143]

7.1 · (2) Hermes: the source of resemblance

I.42.7.1

From Hermes, from Aphrodite.[1144]

Why do infants resemble their parents or show the family to which they belong? I shall set out an explanation. When nourishing blood foams up and the generative process stores away seed, some substance of the limbs somehow issues like a breath from the entire body through divine activity, as though the same human being were coming into existence. It is likely that the same thing also occurs in the woman.[1145]

1143. The restored heading introduces the chapter's second surviving excerpt. Parents are distinguished from earlier ancestors, anticipating the final sentence of the passage.

1144. Aphrodite is the title of the work attributed to Hermes, not the name of the speaker in this excerpt. The explanation derives reproductive seed from the whole body and applies the process to both parents. Gennēsis, literally "generation" or "procreation," is rendered "generative process"; the printed word does not itself name an anatomical organ.

1145. The apparatus credits Usener with "foams up," exaphroumenou, and Meineke with "generation" and the corrected form ekpnein. Wachsmuth retains "as though the same human being were coming into existence," although Meineke would delete it as a gloss. "Nourishing" follows the nutritious sense of nostimos (LSJ, s.v.).

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

7.2 I.42.7.2

Ὅταν <οὖν> καθυπερτερήσῃ τὸ ῥυὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἄθικτον γένηται, τῷ πατρὶ ὁμοιούμενον τὸ βρέφος ἀποδειχθήσεται, ὡς τὸ ἀνάπαλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῇ μητρί· ἐὰν <δὲ> τινος μέρους καθυπερτέρησις γένηται, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος ἀφομοιοῦται.

7.3 I.42.7.3

Ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε δὲ καὶ εἰς μακρὰς γενεὰς παραβάλλει τὸ βρέφος τῇ μορφῇ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἐκείνου δεκανοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος πρὸς τὴν ὥραν, ἐν ᾗ ἡ γυνὴ ἐπαιδοποίει.

8 I.42.8.heading

<Πῶς ἄλλοις ὅμοιοι γίνονται οἱ γεννώμενοι καὶ οὐ τοῖς γονεῦσι.>

deest.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

7.2 · The predominance of one parent's contribution I.42.7.2

<Thus,> when what has flowed from the man predominates and remains untouched, the infant will prove to resemble its father; when the reverse occurs, it will in the same way resemble its mother. <But> if the contribution from a particular part predominates, the resemblance is to that part.[1146]

7.3 · Ancestral likeness and the decan I.42.7.3

Sometimes, even across many generations, the infant matches the form of an ancestor,[1147] when the decan associated with that person bears a relation to the hour at which the woman was conceiving.[1148]

8 · Restored topic heading I.42.8.heading

<How those who are born resemble others rather than their parents.>

Text missing.[1149]

1146. "Untouched" retains the printed athikton; alternative readings in the apparatus are not substituted. The supplements oun and de are attributed to Heeren and Wachsmuth respectively. The account allows a particular bodily feature, as well as an entire parental likeness, to predominate.

1147. "Ancestor" interprets "the one who begot" in light of "many generations" and the topic heading. The Greek can be construed as making that person's decan the subject, but can also suggest that the ancestor himself has a decan's role. The translation adopts the former construal. "Was conceiving" takes the general expression "was producing a child" in the reproductive context of this excerpt; the precise moment is not further defined.

1148. Decans are astral powers discussed earlier in I.21.9. They are associated with thirty-six divisions of the zodiac; compare Brian P. Copenhaver, Hermetica (1992), Introduction, on the Liber Hermetis. Here an astrological relationship is added to the preceding bodily explanation. Logos is kept as the broad "relation," without specifying an unexpressed mechanism.

1149. This is a separate restored topic. The text that once distinguished its question from resemblance to ancestors in the preceding passage has not survived.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

9 I.42.9.heading

<Διατί αἱ ἡμίονοι στεῖραι.>

deest.

10 I.42.10.heading

<Πῶς δίδυμα γίνεται καὶ τρίδυμα.>

deest.

11 I.42.11.heading

<Εἰ τὸ ἔμβρυον ζῷον.>

deest.

12 I.42.12.heading

<Πῶς τρέφεται τὰ ἔμβρυα.>

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 42

9 · Restored topic heading

I.42.9.heading

<Why female mules are sterile.>

Text missing.[1150]

10 · Restored topic heading

I.42.10.heading

<How twins and triplets arise.>

Text missing.

11 · Restored topic heading

I.42.11.heading

<Whether the embryo is a living creature.>

Text missing.[1151]

12 · Restored topic heading

I.42.12.heading

<How embryos are nourished.>

Text missing.

1150. The feminine article and adjective identify female mules. The heading preserves the ancient question; no explanation survives under it.

1151. The same term zōion appears in the opening discussion of plants. The heading preserves a question about the embryo's status as a living creature; the lost passage supplies no surviving answer.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 42

13 I.42.13.heading

<Διατί τὰ ἑπταμηνιαῖα γόνιμα.>

13 · (3) <Ἀετίου> I.42.13.1

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἱπποκράτην φασίν, ἐὰν μὲν ἐκπληρωθῇ ἡ μήτρα ἐν τοῖς ἑπτὰ μησί, τότε προκύπτειν καὶ γεννᾶσθαι γόνιμα· ἐὰν δὲ προκύψῃ μέν, μὴ τρέφηται δέ, ἀσθενήσαντος [δὲ] τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ διὰ τὸ ἐπίπονον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ ἔμβρυον, ἄτροφον εἶναι. Ἐὰν δὲ μείνῃ τοὺς ἐννέα μῆνας ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ, προκύψαν τότε ὁλόκληρόν ἐστι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 42

13 · Restored topic heading

I.42.13.heading

<Why infants born at seven months are viable.>[1152]

13 · (3) <Aëtius>: seven and nine months

I.42.13.1

Those associated with Aristotle and Hippocrates say that, if the womb is filled in the seven months, the offspring then emerges and is born viable.[1153] But if it emerges without being nourished, the umbilical cord having [also] grown weak because the embryo has become a strain upon it, it lacks nourishment.[1154] If, however, it remains in the womb for the nine months, it is complete when it then emerges.[1155]

1152. Gonima here concerns the capacity of the offspring to live or develop, rather than its later fertility. The following passage is the third surviving excerpt of the chapter.

1153. Wachsmuth supplies the source attribution Aëtius V.18.4 (Diels, p. 428); the bracketed Latin source-heading is translated into Greek and English. “Those associated with” renders hoi peri: this is a reported position, not a quotation directly identified with a work by either named author. The printed “womb” is Canter’s correction from the parallel Placita text for the manuscripts’ “day.”

1154. Omphalos, literally “navel,” here denotes the umbilical connection that nourishes the embryo. “Lacks nourishment” follows atrophon and retains the repetition of “without being nourished.” The account’s sequence of emergence and failed nourishment is compressed. Wachsmuth records expansions proposed from the parallel text but does not print them; none is silently introduced here. The bracketed “also” represents the rejected particle de.

1155. “Complete” translates holoklēron, contrasting the final condition with deficient nourishment. The seven- and nine-month claims belong to this ancient physiological account. Wachsmuth does not add the separate excerpt headed “Euryphon the physician” that Diels proposed inserting here; the present translation follows the printed chapter’s ending.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 43

Κεφάλαιον ΜΓ′ I.43.heading

Πόσα γένη ζῴων καὶ εἰ πάντα λογικὰ καὶ αἰσθητά.

<Ἀετίου> I.43.1

Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τέτταρα γένη ζῴων· χερσαῖα, ἔνυδρα, πτηνά, οὐράνια. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄστρα ζῷα λέγεσθαι, τὸν κόσμον † καὶ τὸν ἔνθεον ζῷον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 43

Chapter 43: The kinds of living creatures I.43.heading

How many kinds of living creatures there are, and whether all are rational and perceptible.[1156]

<Aëtius>: four kinds I.43.1

Plato and Aristotle recognize four kinds of living creatures: terrestrial, aquatic, winged, and heavenly.[1157] For the stars too are said to be living creatures, and the cosmos † and the divinely inspired one, a rational, immortal living creature.[1158]

1156. The printed aisthēta means “perceptible,” as distinct from aisthētika, “capable of perception,” which appears in I.45.2. The heading is retained without silently substituting the latter. Wachsmuth records a longer sequence of subordinate topics in the Laurentian index, but does not print their lost contents here.

1157. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution Aëtius V.20.1 (Diels, p. 432). The names introduce a reported position; this is not a direct quotation identified with a particular work by either philosopher.

1158. The dagger marks a corrupt clause. The English deliberately leaves its disrupted syntax visible. Diels’s proposed repair, recorded in the apparatus but not adopted in the printed text, would make the cosmos itself a living creature with divinity within it. Entheos suggests the presence of a god within; the precise construction here remains uncertain.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 44

Κεφάλαιον ΜΔ′ I.44.heading

Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ θανάτου.

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 44

Chapter 44: On sleep and death

I.44.heading

On sleep and death.

Text missing.[1159]

1159. The Latin deest is Wachsmuth's notice that the chapter's text is missing. Its heading is absent from manuscripts F and P. No replacement text is supplied in this edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 45

Κεφάλαιον ΜΕ′ I.45.heading

Πῶς ηὐξήθη τὰ φυτὰ καὶ εἰ ζῷα.

1 · Πλάτων Θαλῆς I.45.1

Πλάτων Θαλῆς καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἔμψυχα ζῷα. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σαλεύεσθαι καὶ ἐντεταμένους ἔχειν τοὺς κλάδους καὶ ταῖς ἐπαγωγαῖς εἴκειν καὶ πάλιν σφοδρῶς ἀναχαλᾶσθαι, ὥστε καὶ συνανέλκειν βάρη.

2 · Ἀριστοτέλης I.45.2

Ἀριστοτέλης ἔμψυχα μέν, οὐ μὴν ζῷα. Τὰ γὰρ ζῷα ὁρμητικὰ εἶναι καὶ αἰσθητικά, ἔνια δὲ καὶ λογικά.

BOOK I CHAPTER 45

Chapter 45: Plants and living creatures I.45.heading

How plants grew, and whether they are living creatures.[1160]

1 · Plato and Thales: plants as ensouled creatures I.45.1

Plato and Thales hold that plants too are ensouled living creatures. This is evident also from their swaying, from their holding their branches under tension, and from their yielding to applied loads and then springing back so forcefully that they lift weights along with them.[1161]

2 · Aristotle: soul without animal life I.45.2

Aristotle holds that they are ensouled, but are not animals. For animals possess impulse and perception, and some also possess reason.[1162]

1160. Wachsmuth supplies the source attribution Aëtius V.26.1-2 (Diels, p. 438). Related material is also transmitted after chapter 41; the present edition follows his printed arrangement. The two reports below use different criteria for what counts as a zōion.

1161. The movements of branches supply the evidence adduced for life and soul. “Applied loads” renders epagōgai in light of the concluding reference to weights. The report treats elastic movement as a sign of animation; it does not distinguish the mechanisms in modern botanical terms.

1162. Here zōia has the narrower force “animals,” contrasted with plants. Having soul does not by itself satisfy the additional criteria of impulse and perception. The printed aisthētika, “capable of perception,” is corrected from aisthēta in F and P with the aid of the parallel Placita passage. Compare I.42.1 and the heading of chapter 43.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 46

Κεφάλαιον ΜΣ′ I.46.heading

Περὶ τροφῆς καὶ ὀρέξεως τῶν ζῴων.

deest.

BOOK I CHAPTER 46

Chapter 46: Nutrition and appetite

I.46.heading

On nutrition and appetite in living creatures.

Text missing.[1163]

1163. This chapter too is represented by its heading and Wachsmuth's missing-text notice. The heading is absent from manuscripts F and P. Orexis denotes appetite or desire directed toward an object.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

Κεφάλαιον ΜΖ′ I.47.heading

Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπων.

1.1 · Πλάτωνος I.47.1.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγγελθέντα διεξελθεῖν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς μέχρι γενέσεως ἀνθρωπινῆς σχεδὸν ἔοικε τέλος ἔχειν. Τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα ᾗ γέγονεν αὖ διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστέον, ὃ μή τις ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμετρότερός τις αὐτῷ ἂν δόξειε περὶ τοὺς τοιούτων λόγους εἶναι. Τῇδ᾽ οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστω λεγόμενον.

1.2 I.47.1.2

Τῶν γενομένων ἀνδρῶν ὅσοι δειλοὶ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀδίκως διῆλθον, κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα γυναῖκες μετεφύοντο ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει. Καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον δὴ τὸν χρόνον διὰ ταῦτα θεοὶ τὸν τῆς ξυνουσίας ἔρωτα ἐτεκτήναντο, ζῷον τὸ μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ συστήσαντες ἔμψυχον, τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ποιήσαντες ἑκάτερον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

Chapter 47: On human nature

I.47.heading

On human nature.[1164]

1.1 · Plato: completing the account of the world

I.47.1.1

From Plato, from the Timaeus.

The account we were charged at the outset to give, concerning the universe down to the generation of human beings, now seems almost complete. We must briefly mention in turn how the other living creatures came into being, without unnecessarily prolonging the subject; for one would then seem to oneself more measured in discussions of this kind. Let the account, then, proceed as follows.[1165]

1.2 · Sexual difference and a second birth

I.47.1.2

Of the men who had come into being, those who were cowardly and lived unjust lives were, according to the likely account, transformed into women at their second birth. At that time, for these reasons, the gods devised the desire for sexual intercourse, forming an ensouled creature in us and another in women, and making each in the following way.[1166]

1164. The chapter contains fifteen excerpts. Its general heading is absent from F and P but is printed by Wachsmuth. Decimal subdivisions of longer excerpts are added here solely to facilitate comparison of the facing languages.

1165. Timaeus 90e-92c, the closing section of the dialogue. The speaker is Timaeus. The reference to a measured account introduces a brief narrative of the origins of sexual difference and the several kinds of animals.

1166. The passage presents sexual difference through a hierarchical myth of rebirth: “us” identifies the male speaker’s standpoint. “According to the likely account” qualifies the narrative. Its moral ranking of the sexes belongs to that narrative; it is retained as part of the text, not adopted as an explanation of human biology.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.3 I.47.1.3

Τὴν τοῦ ποτοῦ διέξοδον, ᾗ διὰ τοῦ πνεύμονος τὸ πῶμα ὑπὸ τοὺς νεφροὺς εἰς τὴν κύστιν ἐλθὸν καὶ τῷ πνεύματι θλιφθὲν συνεκπέμπει δεχομένη συνέτρησαν εἰς τὸν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς κατὰ τὸν αὐχένα καὶ διὰ τῆς ῥάχεως μυελὸν ξυμπεπηγότα, ὃν δὴ σπέρμα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις εἴπομεν. Ὁ δέ, ἅτε ἔμψυχος ὢν καὶ λαβὼν ἀναπνοὴν τοῦθ᾽ ᾗπερ ἀνέπνευσε, τῆς ἐκροῆς ζωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐμποιήσας αὐτῷ, τοῦ γεννᾶν ἔρωτα ἀπετέλεσε.

1.4 I.47.1.4

Διὸ δὴ τῶν μὲν ἀνδρῶν τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰδοίων φύσιν ἀπειθές τε καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς γεγονός, οἷον ζῷον ἀνυπήκοον τοῦ λόγου, πάντων δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας οἰστρώδεις ἐπιχειρεῖ κρατεῖν· αἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ μῆτραί τε καὶ ὑστέραι λεγόμεναι διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ζῷον ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐνὸν τῆς παιδοποιίας, ὅταν ἄκαρπον παρὰ τὴν ὥραν χρόνον πολὺν γίγνηται, χαλεπῶς ἀγανακτοῦν φέρει καὶ πλανώμενον πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, τὰς τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους ἀποφράττον, ἀναπνεῖν οὐκ ἐῶν, εἰς ἀπορίας τὰς ἐσχάτας ἐμβάλλει καὶ νόσους παντοδαπὰς ἄλλας παρέχει,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.3 · The passage of seed

I.47.1.3

They pierced a connection from the outlet for drink to the marrow that extends continuously from the head down the neck and through the spine, which we called seed in our earlier account. This outlet receives and discharges the drink after it has passed through the lung, beneath the kidneys, into the bladder, and has been compressed by the breath.[1167] The marrow, being ensouled and having acquired a breathing passage, instilled in the outlet through which it breathed a vital desire to flow out, and so produced the desire to procreate.[1168]

1.4 · The male organ and the womb

I.47.1.4

Hence the male sexual organ has become disobedient and self-willed, like a creature that will not listen to reason, and through frenzied desires attempts to dominate everything. For the same reasons, what are called the womb and uterus in women contain a creature desirous of childbearing. When it remains fruitless for a long time beyond the proper season, it bears this with angry resentment; wandering everywhere through the body, obstructing the passages of breath and preventing breathing, it produces extreme distress and all manner of other diseases,[1169]

1167. The passage identifies reproductive seed with marrow and describes drink as passing through the lung. These are features of the dialogue's ancient physiology. The English rearranges the first sentence's clauses to make the two connected passages intelligible.

1168. The syntax of "having acquired a breathing passage, this through which it breathed" is difficult. The translation takes the demonstrative to refer to the outlet and understands desire as imparted to it. Archer-Hind, Timaeus (1888), note on 91b, also flags a possible textual defect. No conjectural Greek is substituted.

1169. The sentence continues in the next unit. Mētra and hystera are two names for the womb, not two separate organs. Its movement through the body belongs to the ancient "wandering womb" account. Both male and female reproductive impulses are portrayed as creatures capable of resisting rational control.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.5 I.47.1.5

μέχρι περ ἂν ἑκατέρων ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ ἔρως ξυναγαγόντες, οἷον ἀπὸ δένδρων καρπὸν ἀποδρέψαντες, ὡς εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἀόρατα ὑπὸ σμικρότητος καὶ ἀδιάπλαστα ζῷα κατασπείραντες καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες, μεγάλα ἐντὸς ἐκθρέψωνται καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς φῶς ἀγαγόντες ζῴων ἀποτελέσωσι γένεσιν. Γυναῖκες μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ πᾶν οὕτω γέγονε·

1.6 I.47.1.6

τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων φῦλον μετερρυθμίζετο, ἀντὶ τριχῶν πτερὰ φῦον, ἐκ τῶν ἀκάκων ἀνδρῶν, κούφων δέ, καὶ μετεωρολογικῶν μέν, ἡγουμένων δὲ διὰ ὄψεως τὰς περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις βεβαιοτάτας εἶναι δι᾽ εὐήθειαν. Τὸ δ᾽ αὖ πεζὸν καὶ θηριῶδες γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν μηδὲν προσχρωμένων φιλοσοφίᾳ μηδὲ ἀθρούντων τῆς περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν φύσεως πέρι μηδέν, διὰ τὸ μηκέτι ταῖς ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ χρῆσθαι περιόδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὰ στήθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόσιν ἔπεσθαι μέρεσιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.5 · Conception and birth I.47.1.5

until the desire and love of both bring them together and, plucking fruit as though from trees, sow in the womb as in a field living creatures invisible through their smallness and as yet unformed. They then differentiate these and nourish them within until they are large; afterward they bring them into the light and complete the birth of living creatures. Women, then, and the whole female sex came into being in this way.[1170]

1.6 · Birds and earthbound creatures I.47.1.6

The tribe of birds was refashioned, growing feathers instead of hair, from harmless but light-minded men. They studied the heavens, yet in their simplicity supposed that proofs obtained through sight were the most reliable proofs about them. Land animals and beasts, in turn, arose from those who made no use of philosophy and gave no consideration at all to the nature of the heavens. They no longer used the revolutions within the head, but followed the parts of the soul around the breast as their rulers.[1171]

1170. The agricultural image joins seed, field, nourishment, and birth. “Differentiate” renders diakrinantes: the initially unformed creatures acquire distinct structures. The text keeps desire and love as the grammatical agents throughout the sequence.

1171. The “revolutions” are the circular movements associated with rational thought in the Timaeus. The myth connects bodily form with a previous way of using, or failing to use, reason. Meteorologikoi here denotes students of things aloft, especially the heavens, rather than of weather alone.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.7 I.47.1.7

Ἐκ τούτων οὖν τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τά τ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν κῶλα καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς εἰς γῆν ἑλκόμενα ὑπὸ συγγενείας ἤρεισαν, προμήκεις τε καὶ παντοίας ἔσχον τὰς κορυφάς, ὅπῃ συνεθλίφθησαν ὑπὸ ἀργίας ἑκάστων αἱ περιφοραί. Τετράπουν τε τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἐκ ταύτης ἐφύετο καὶ πολύπουν τῆς προφάσεως, θεοῦ βάσεις ὑποτιθέντος πλείους τοῖς μᾶλλον ἄφροσιν, ὡς μᾶλλον ἐπὶ γῆν ἕλκοιντο. Τοῖς δ᾽ ἀφρονεστάτοις αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ παντάπασι πρὸς γῆν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα κατατεινομένοις, ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι ποδῶν χρείας οὔσης, ἄποδα αὐτὰ καὶ ἰλυσπώμενα ἐπὶ γῆς ἐγέννησαν.

1.8 I.47.1.8

Τὸ δὲ τέταρτον γένος ἔνυδρον γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἀνοητοτάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων, οὓς οὐδὲ ἀναπνοῆς καθαρᾶς ἔτι ἠξίωσαν οἱ μεταπλάττοντες, ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ πλημμελείας πάσης ἀκαθάρτως ἐχόντων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ λεπτῆς καὶ καθαρᾶς ἀναπνοῆς ἀέρος εἰς ὕδατος θολερὰν καὶ βαθεῖαν ἔωσαν ἀνάπνευσιν· ὅθεν ἰχθύων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀστρέων ξυναπάντων τε ὅσα ἔνυδρα γέγονε, δίκην ἀμαθίας ἐσχάτης ἐσχάτας οἰκήσεις εἰληχότων. Καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε καὶ νῦν διαμείβεται τὰ ζῷα εἰς ἄλληλα, νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀποβολῇ καὶ κτήσει μεταβαλλόμενα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.7 · The multiplication and loss of feet I.47.1.7

Because of these habits, they planted their forelimbs and heads upon the earth, drawn toward it by kinship. Their heads became elongated and assumed all manner of shapes, according to how each creature's revolutions had been compressed through disuse. For this reason their kind grew four-footed or many-footed: the god placed more supports beneath the more foolish, so that they might be drawn still closer to the earth. As for the most foolish of these, whose whole bodies were stretched completely toward the ground, the gods made them without feet, crawling on the earth, since they had no further need of feet.[1172]

1.8 · Aquatic life and changes of embodiment I.47.1.8

The fourth kind, aquatic life, arose from the very most senseless and ignorant. Their refashioners no longer judged them worthy even of pure breathing, since every sort of wrongdoing had defiled their souls. Instead of the fine, pure breathing of air, they thrust them into the murky, deep breathing of water. Thus arose the race of fish, shellfish, and all aquatic creatures, allotted the lowest dwellings as punishment for the lowest ignorance. In accordance with all this, then as now, living creatures change into one another, undergoing transformation through the loss and acquisition of intellect and folly.[1173]

1172. The number of limbs is explained through the soul's earthward inclination. The Greek moves from "the god" to an unnamed plural subject, rendered "the gods," recalling the makers in the preceding narrative. "Kinship" gives the reason for the earthward attraction within the myth.

1173. The account ends with continuing exchanges between forms of life, governed by intellectual and moral condition. "Lowest" retains the repeated eschatos, which links the extremity of ignorance with the remoteness or depth of the allotted dwelling.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.9 I.47.1.9

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ἤδη τὸν λόγον φῶμεν ἔχειν· θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῷα λαβὼν καὶ συμπληρωθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, οὕτω ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν, εἷς οὐρανὸς ὅδε, μονογενὴς ὤν.

2 · Πλάτωνος I.47.2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἴη πᾶσιν ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων σύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι· δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον ἔρωτα· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φόβον τε καὶ θυμόν, ὅσα τε ἐπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα.

3 · Πλάτωνος I.47.3

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κρατύλου.

Ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

1.9 · The visible cosmos I.47.1.9

Let us now say that the account of the universe has reached its end. For this cosmos, having received mortal and immortal living creatures and been filled with them, has thus become a visible living creature encompassing visible things, an image of its maker, a perceptible god, greatest and best, most beautiful and most complete: this one heaven, unique in its kind.[1174]

2 · Plato: perception and the passions I.47.2

From Plato, from the Timaeus.

First, then, perception would necessarily arise in all as an innate accompaniment of violent affections; second, love mingled with pleasure and pain; and in addition to these, fear and anger, everything that follows them, and everything naturally opposed to them.[1175]

3 · Plato: the name “human being” I.47.3

From Plato, from the Cratylus.

The human being was rightly named anthrōpos, because he examines what he has seen.[1176]

1174. The translation follows Wachsmuth’s printed poiētou, “maker,” and the nominative theos, “god.” His apparatus also records noētou, “intelligible,” and the genitive theou, “of a god,” familiar from a different reading of this sentence. Those alternatives are not silently substituted. Monogenēs emphasizes the cosmos’s uniqueness.

1175. Timaeus 42a. Pathēmata are things undergone or affections, here the forcible disturbances accompanying embodiment. “Innate accompaniment” conveys symphyton, something that grows together with a being; the passage then enumerates its emotional endowments.

1176. Cratylus 399c. The proposed explanation plays on anthrōpos and anathrōn ha opōpe, “examining what he has seen.” It is a philosophical wordplay within the dialogue, not an established historical derivation of the Greek noun.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

4 · Πλάτωνος I.47.4

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

5 · Πλάτωνος I.47.5

Πλάτωνος Νόμων ε′.

Καὶ γάρ, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, μηδὲ τοῦθ᾽ ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσί τινες ἄλλοι διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον. Οἱ μέν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα παντοῖα καὶ δι᾽ εἰλήσεις ἀλλόκοτοί τέ εἰσι καὶ ἐναίσιοι αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ δι᾽ ὕδατα, οἱ δὲ δι᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφὴν ἀναδιδοῦσαν, οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω, ταῖς ψυχαῖς δὲ οὐκ ἧττον δυναμένην πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμποιεῖν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

4 · Plato: most people lie between the extremes I.47.4

From Plato, from the Phaedo.

Good people and bad people are very few in each class; those between them are the most numerous.[1177]

5 · Plato: place and human character I.47.5

From Plato, Laws, Book V.

For, Megillus and Clinias, let us not overlook this matter concerning places, as though some places did not differ from others in producing better and worse human beings. We must not legislate in opposition to these differences.[1178] Some places are unfavorable or favorable because of their various winds and exposures to the sun, others because of their waters, and others because of the very nourishment supplied by the earth. This produces better and worse effects upon bodies and is no less capable of bringing about all such effects in souls.[1179]

1177. Phaedo 90a. The excerpt preserves an infinitive construction detached from its introductory clause; the English gives it as a statement. Sphodra, “very,” stands with “few” in the printed wording.

1178. Laws 747d-e. Wachsmuth retains ouk, “not,” in the first subordinate clause, although Ficino deleted it. “As though ... did not” interprets that difficult negative construction in light of the differences asserted immediately afterward; the Greek negative remains visible.

1179. The printed enaisioi is “favorable” or “auspicious,” paired with allokotoi, literally “strange” or “uncongenial.” The apparatus records exaisioi as an alternative, but that is not the text printed here. The argument extends the influence of environment and food from bodily condition to character.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

6.1 · Ἀριστοτέλους I.47.6.1

Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Φυσιογνωμονικῶν.

Ὅτι αἱ διάνοιαι ἕπονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ καθ᾽ αὑτάς, ἀπαθεῖς μένουσαι τῶν τοῦ σώματος κινήσεων, τοῦτο δῆλον γίνεται ἐν ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἀρρωστίαις· πολὺ γὰρ ἐξαλλάττουσαι φαίνονται αἱ διάνοιαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων. Καὶ τοὐναντίον δὴ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς παθήμασι τὸ σῶμα συμπάσχον φανερόν ἐστι περὶ τε τοὺς ἔρωτας καὶ τοὺς φόβους καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ τὰς ἡδονάς.

6.2 I.47.6.2

Ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις μᾶλλον ἄν τις συνίδοι, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα σῶμά τε καὶ ψυχὴ συμφυῆ, ὥστε τῶν πλείστων ἀλλήλοις αἴτια γίγνεσθαι παθημάτων. Οὐδὲν γάρ που ζῷον γεγένηται τοιοῦτον, ὃ τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἔσχηκέ τι ἑτέρου ζῴου, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἄλλου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τό τε σῶμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἕπεσθαι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι τοιάνδε διάνοιαν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οἱ περὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιστήμονες ἐκ τῆς ἰδέας δύνανται θεωρεῖν ἱππικοί τε ἵππους καὶ κυνηγετικοὶ κύνας. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ἀληθὴς ἂν εἴη ἡ φυσιογνωμονία.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

6.1 · Aristotle: mind and bodily condition I.47.6.1

From Aristotle's Physiognomics.

That mental states follow human beings and do not exist independently, remaining unaffected by the body's movements, becomes evident in drunkenness and illness: mental states visibly alter greatly under the body's affections.[1180] Conversely, the body manifestly shares in the soul's affections, in cases of love, fear, grief, and pleasure.[1181]

6.2 · Natural correspondence and physiognomy I.47.6.2

One might see still more clearly in things that develop naturally that body and soul are so related, growing together, that each causes most of the other's affections. No creature has come into being with the outward form of one animal and the mental disposition of another. Body and soul always belong to the same creature, so that a certain kind of mental disposition necessarily follows a certain kind of body. Moreover, those knowledgeable about each of the other animals can judge it from its appearance: horsemen judge horses, and hunters dogs. If these things are true, physiognomy would be true.[1182]

1180. Physiognomics 805a1-18, under the traditional attribution to Aristotle. The unexpected "follow human beings" translates the printed tois anthrōpois. Wachsmuth's apparatus notes that the direct tradition of the treatise has tois sōmasi, "follow bodies," and calls it correct, but he does not place it in his text.

1181. The opening argument posits reciprocal effects between soul and body. Dianoiai here refers to mental conditions or dispositions, not just individual thoughts. The proposed art of judging character from bodily appearance is named at the excerpt's close.

1182. Physiognomy is the proposed inference from bodily signs to inner disposition. The passage argues for its possibility from the association of body and soul and from practical judgments about animals; the translation retains the conditional conclusion. Symphyē is the printed dual adjective, referring jointly to body and soul.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

7.1 · Πλάτωνος I.47.7.1

Πλάτωνος Νόμων ζ'.

Μεταβολὴν γὰρ δὴ πάντων πλὴν κακῶν πολὺ σφαλερώτατον εὑρήσομεν, ἐν ὥραις πάσαις, ἐν πνεύμασι καὶ διαίταις σωμάτων, ἐν τρόποις ψυχῶν, ἐν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' οὔ, πλὴν ὅπερ εἶπον νῦν δὴ κακοῖς·

7.2 I.47.7.2

ὥστε εἴ τις ἀποβλέψειε πρὸς σώματα, ὡς πᾶσι μὲν σιτίοις πᾶσι δὲ ποτοῖς καὶ πόνοις ξυνήθη γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ταραχθέντα ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἔπειτα ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων ὑπὸ χρόνου σάρκας φύσαντα οἰκείας τούτοις, φίλα τε καὶ ξυνήθη καὶ γνώριμα γενόμενα πάσῃ ταύτῃ τῇ διαίτῃ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ὑγείαν ἄριστα διάγει· καὶ ἐάν ποτ' ἄρα ἀναγκασθῇ μεταβάλλειν αὖθις ἠντινοῦν τῶν εὐδοκίμων διαίτων, τότε κατ' ἀρχὰς συνταραχθεὶς ὑπὸ νόσων μόγις ποτὲ κατέστη τὴν συνήθειαν τῇ τροφῇ πάλιν ἀπολαβών·

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

7.1 · Plato: the hazards of change

I.47.7.1

From Plato, Laws, Book VII.

We shall find that change is by far the most hazardous thing in every matter except bad things: in all the seasons, in winds and bodily regimens, and in the dispositions of souls. This applies, so to speak, not in some cases and not others, but in all, apart from the bad things I have just mentioned.[1183]

7.2 · Bodily habituation

I.47.7.2

Thus, if one considers bodies, they become accustomed to every kind of food, drink, and exertion. At first disturbed by them, they subsequently grow from these very things, over time, flesh adapted to them. Once friendly with, accustomed to, and familiar with this entire regimen, they fare best in pleasure and health. If a person is ever compelled to change again any of these approved regimens, he is at first thrown into confusion by illnesses; only with difficulty does he eventually settle down, after regaining familiarity with his nourishment.[1184]

1183. Laws 797d-798b. The exception is stated twice: changing bad conditions is excluded from the claim. The following comparison moves from habituation of the body to attachment to long-established laws.

1184. The Greek shifts from plural “bodies” to singular verbs and then to a masculine participant. The English makes that shift explicit with “a person.” Diaita includes the whole manner of bodily living, including exertion, rather than food alone.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

7.3 I.47.7.3

ταὐτὸν δὴ δεῖ νομίζειν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. Οἷς γὰρ ἂν ἐντραφῶσι νόμοις καὶ κατά τινα θείαν εὐτυχίαν ἀκίνητοι γένωνται μακρῶν καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, ὡς μηδένα ἔχειν μνείαν μηδὲ ἀκοὴν τοῦ ποτὲ ἄλλως αὐτὰ σχεῖν ἢ καθάπερ νῦν ἔχει, σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τό τι κινεῖν τῶν τότε καθεστώτων.

8.1 · Ἑρμοῦ I.47.8.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ.

<ΕΡΜ.> Κοινωνία δέ ἐστι ψυχῶν, καὶ κοινωνοῦσι μὲν αἱ τῶν θεῶν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῖς τῶν ἀλόγων. Ἐπιμελοῦνται δὲ οἱ κρείττονες τῶν ἐλαττόνων, θεοὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπων, ἄνθρωποι δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων [ζῴων], ὁ δὲ θεὸς πάντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ὑπόκειται τῷ θεῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τῷ κόσμῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ περὶ πάντα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

7.3 · Reverence for established laws I.47.7.3

We must suppose that the same thing happens with people's mental dispositions and the natures of their souls. When the laws in which they have been brought up remain unmoved through some divine good fortune for a long succession of years, so that no one remembers or has even heard of things ever being otherwise than they are now, the whole soul feels reverence and fears to disturb anything then established.[1185]

8.1 · Hermes: the community of souls I.47.8.1

From Hermes, from the discourses To Tat.

<HERMES> There is a community of souls: those of the gods share with those of human beings, and human souls with those of irrational beings. The greater care for the lesser: gods for human beings, human beings for irrational [creatures], and God for all.[1186] The cosmos is therefore subject to God, the human being to the cosmos, and irrational beings to the human being; God is above all and encompasses all.[1187]

1185. The comparison describes the strength of attachment produced by long habituation. "Unmoved" and "disturb" retain the shared language of motion linking a change in regimen with a change in law.

1186. Wachsmuth identifies the Hermetic parallel at Parthey, p. 82. Speaker names, absent from F and P, are supplied from that parallel and remain in angle brackets. Square brackets mark rejected wording, here zōiōn, "creatures."

1187. The passage distinguishes the singular God from the plural gods and arranges living beings in a hierarchy of care. Koinōnia and koinōnousi express participation or fellowship between souls, not their simple identity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.2 I.47.8.2

Καὶ τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ καθάπερ [αἱ] ἀκτῖνες αἱ ἐνέργειαι· τοῦ δὲ κόσμου [αἱ ἀκτῖνες] αἱ φύσεις· τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. Καὶ αἱ μὲν ἐνέργειαι διὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐνεργοῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τῶν τοῦ κόσμου φυσικῶν αἰτίων, αἱ δὲ φύσεις διὰ τῶν στοιχείων, οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.

8.3 I.47.8.3

Καὶ αὕτη ἡ τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησις ἠρτημένη ἐκ τῆς <τοῦ> ἑνὸς φύσεως καὶ διήκουσα δι᾽ ἑνὸς τοῦ νοῦ, οὗ οὐδέν ἐστι θειότερον καὶ ἐνεργέστερον καὶ ἑνωτικώτερον ἀνθρώπων μὲν πρὸς θεούς, θεῶν δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθὸς δαίμων· ὅθεν μακαρία ψυχὴ ἡ τούτου πληρεστάτη, κακοδαίμων δὲ ψυχὴ ἡ τούτου κενωτάτη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.2 · Divine activities, natures, and arts

I.47.8.2

God's activities are like [the] rays; the cosmos has its natures [as its rays]; the human being has arts and sciences.[1188] The activities operate through the cosmos and reach the human being through the cosmos's natural causes; the natures act through the elements, and human beings through arts and sciences.[1189]

8.3 · Intellect as the good daemon

I.47.8.3

This governance of the universe depends upon the nature of <the> One and extends through the one intellect. Nothing is more divine, more active, or more capable of uniting human beings with gods and gods with human beings. This is the good daemon. Hence the soul fullest of it is blessed, while the soul most empty of it is ill-fated.[1190]

1188. The comparison with rays extends through a compressed three-part sentence. The square brackets preserve the rejected article before "rays" and the repeated phrase "the rays" after "cosmos," adapting the latter's placement to English syntax.

1189. "Natural causes" follows aitiōn, Usener's correction printed by Wachsmuth, rather than aktinōn, "rays," in F and P. Energeiai are operative activities or powers; "natures" preserves physeis as the corresponding level within the cosmos.

1190. Nous, "intellect," is here a divine unifying agency and is called the agathos daimōn, "good daemon." Kakodaimōn, translated "ill-fated," echoes the word daimōn and can suggest being attended by a bad daemon. The supplement is the article in "of the One"; its English position is adapted to the construction.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.4 I.47.8.4

<ΤΑΤ> Πῶς τοῦτο πάλιν λέγεις, ὦ πάτερ;

<ΕΡΜ.> Οἴει οὖν, ὦ τέκνον, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ νοῦν ἔχει τὸν ἀγαθόν; περὶ γὰρ τούτου ὁ νῦν λόγος, οὐ τοῦ ὑπηρετικοῦ, περὶ οὗ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρήκαμεν, τοῦ καταπεμπομένου ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης. Ψυχὴ γὰρ χωρὶς <τοῦ> νοῦ “οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν οὔτ᾽ ἔρξαι δύναται”. Πολλάκις γὰρ ἐξίσταται ὁ νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ οὔτε βλέπει ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτε ἀκούει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλόγῳ ζῴῳ ἔοικε.

8.5 I.47.8.5

Τηλικαύτη δύναμίς ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ νωθρᾶς ψυχῆς ἀνέχεται, ἀλλὰ καταλείπει τὴν [ἐν] τῷ σώματι προσκειμένην καὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀγχομένην κάτω· ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ ψυχή, ὦ τέκνον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχει. Ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ἄνθρωπον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον· ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος θεῖον ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις συγκρινόμενον τῶν ἐπιγείων τισίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄνω ἐν οὐρανῷ λεγομένοις θεοῖς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.4 · The good intellect and the soul I.47.8.4

<TAT> What do you mean by that, father?

<HERMES> Do you suppose, child, that every soul possesses the good intellect? It is this that we are discussing now, not the ministering intellect of which we spoke earlier, which is sent down by Justice.[1191] For without <the> intellect the soul "can neither say anything nor do anything."[1192] Intellect often withdraws from the soul, and at that time the soul neither sees nor hears, but resembles an irrational animal.

8.5 · Attachment to the body I.47.8.5

Such is the power of intellect. It does not even tolerate a sluggish soul, but abandons the soul attached to the body and stifled below by it. Such a soul, child, has no intellect.[1193] Hence one should not even regard such a person as human. For the human being is a divine creature, to be compared with none of the other earthly creatures, but with those above in heaven who are called gods.[1194]

1191. The good intellect is distinguished from an intellect serving Justice. The reference to an earlier discussion belongs to the underlying Hermetic discourse; Stobaeus's excerpt does not reproduce that entire context.

1192. Wachsmuth identifies the quoted phrase with Theognis 177-178. It is retained here as a brief quotation inside the prose. The supplied article before nous remains marked. The account links effective perception with the presence of intellect, even though it compares the deprived soul to an animal.

1193. Wachsmuth deletes en, "in," before "the body," retaining the construction "attached to the body." The deletion is shown on the Greek page; adding a separate "in" to the English would destroy that construction. Anchomenēn means being choked or strangled, here rendered "stifled."

1194. The distinction is between ordinary human embodiment and the text's ideal of fully realized humanity. Its denial of the name "human" to the soul without intellect is part of this spiritual hierarchy.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.6 I.47.8.6

Μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ χρὴ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπὲρ ἐκείνους ἐστὶν ὁ ὄντως ἄνθρωπος, ἢ πάντως ἰσοδυναμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδεὶς μὲν γὰρ τῶν οὐρανίων <θεῶν> ἐπὶ γῆς κατελεύσεται, οὐρανοῦ τὸν ὅρον καταλιπών· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβαίνει καὶ μετρεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ πάντων μεῖζον οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν καταλιπὼν ἄνω γίγνεται· τοσοῦτον τὸ μέγεθός ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐκτάσεως.

8.7 I.47.8.7

Διὸ τολμητέον εἰπεῖν, τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον <τὸν> ἐπίγειον εἶναι θνητὸν θεόν, τὸν δὲ οὐράνιον θεὸν ἀθάνατον ἄνθρωπον. Διόπερ διὰ τούτων τὰ πάντα <διοικεῖται> τῶν δύο, κόσμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς πάντα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

8.6 · The reach of the human being I.47.8.6

Rather, if we must dare to tell the truth, the truly human being is above those gods; or at any rate they are equal in power. None of the heavenly <gods> will descend to earth, leaving heaven's boundary. Yet the human being ascends even to heaven and measures it; and, greatest of all, he reaches the heights without even leaving the earth. So great is the extent of his reach.[1195]

8.7 · Mortal god and immortal human I.47.8.7

Therefore we must dare to say that the human being <who is> earthly is a mortal god, and the heavenly god an immortal human being. Hence all things <are governed> through these two, cosmos and human being; but all are under the One.[1196]

1195. The movement is an ascent of understanding that does not require departure from the earth. "Reach" translates ektasis, "extension," the reading printed from the Hermetic parallel. F and P instead have ekstasis, "standing outside oneself"; the translation does not import "ecstasy" into Wachsmuth's text.

1196. The supplied Greek article restricts the first description to the earthly human being and is represented by "who is." Wachsmuth also restores the verb "are governed" from the Hermetic parallel. The final clause makes the One supreme over the two mediating terms.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

9.1 · Ἑρμοῦ I.47.9.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ.

Ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος τὸ δεύτερον ζῷον μετὰ τὸν κόσμον, πρῶτον δὲ τῶν θνητῶν.

Ψυχὴ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὀχεῖται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ [δὲ] ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, τὸ πνεῦμα <ἐν τῷ σώματι. Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα> διῆκον διὰ φλεβῶν καὶ ἀρτηριῶν καὶ αἵματος κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ὥσπερ τρόπον τινὰ βαστάζει.

9.2 I.47.9.2

Διὸ καί τινες τὴν ψυχὴν αἷμα νομίζουσιν εἶναι, σφαλλόμενοι τὴν φύσιν, οὐκ εἰδότες, ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναχωρήσαντος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αἷμα παγῆναι καὶ τὰς φλέβας καὶ τὰς ἀρτηρίας κενωθῆναι, <καὶ τότε> τὸ ζῷον ἐκλείπειν· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ σώματος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

9.1 · Hermes: the vehicles of the soul I.47.9.1

From Hermes, from the discourses To Tat.

The human being is the second living creature after the cosmos, but the first among mortals.

The human soul is carried in this way: intellect in reason, reason in soul, [and] soul in spirit, spirit <in body. Spirit>, passing through veins, arteries, and blood, moves the living creature and, as it were, in a certain way sustains it.[1197]

9.2 · Blood, spirit, and bodily death I.47.9.2

That is why some suppose the soul to be blood, mistaking its nature. They do not know that, once spirit has withdrawn into the soul, the blood must first coagulate and the veins and arteries be emptied, <and only then> must the living creature cease to live. This is the death of the body.[1198]

1197. Wachsmuth cites Parthey, p. 75, and separates the opening statement from the following passage. Ocheitai suggests being carried as in a vehicle. Logos is “reason”; pneuma, “spirit,” is the bodily medium described as passing through the vessels. The supplement and rejected de remain marked. The redundant “as it were, in a certain way” follows the printed hōsper tropon tina; conjectures recorded in the apparatus are not adopted.

1198. The account distinguishes soul from blood by placing the withdrawal of spirit before bodily death. “Into the soul” follows the printed direction of withdrawal. The restored words “and then” make the claimed sequence explicit. This is the passage’s ancient physiological explanation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

10 · Πλάτωνος I.47.10

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας δ′.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἴδη τε καὶ ἤθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκεῖσε ἀφῖκται. Γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον· ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ <περὶ> τὸν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον· ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ὃ περὶ τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατ᾽ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα.

11.1 · Πλάτωνος I.47.11.1

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας δ′.

Ἴθι δή, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνου. Ἆρα οὕτως ἔλεγες, τὸν μὲν εὐφυῆ πρός τι εἶναι, τὸν δ᾽ ἀφυῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥᾳδίως τι μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὑρετικὸς εἴη οὗ ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μηδὲ ἃ ἔμαθε σῴζοιτο;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

10 · Plato: character in persons and cities I.47.10

From Plato, Republic, Book IV.

“Must we not,” I said, “certainly agree that the same forms and traits of character exist in each of us as in the city? They surely did not arrive there from anywhere else. It would be ridiculous to suppose that spiritedness did not enter cities from the individuals who are reputed to possess it, such as the inhabitants of Thrace and Scythia and, broadly speaking, the northern region; or love of learning, which one might chiefly associate <with> our own region; or love of money, which one might say is especially found among the Phoenicians and the people of Egypt.”[1199]

11.1 · Plato: natural aptitude I.47.11.1

From Plato, Republic, Book IV.

“Come now,” we shall say to him, “answer us. Did you mean that one person has a natural aptitude for something and another lacks it when one learns it easily and the other with difficulty; and when one, after a little instruction, can discover much more concerning what he has learned, while the other, despite much instruction and practice, cannot even retain what he has learned?[1200]

1199. Republic 435e-436a. The city’s characteristics are traced to its inhabitants, preparing the comparison between civic and individual psychology. The regional claims are the speaker’s ancient ethnic generalizations. “Spiritedness” renders thymoeides, the term for the soul’s assertive or passionate element. Wachsmuth supplies peri from Plato’s direct tradition.

1200. The transmitted source-heading says Book IV, which is retained on both pages. Wachsmuth’s reference correctly places the passage in Republic V, 455b-c. The questions define aptitude by learning, independent discovery, retention, and, next, the body’s assistance to thought. The quotation continues in the next unit.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

11.2 I.47.11.2

καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοίη τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δ᾽ ἐναντιοῖτο; Ἆρ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυῆ πρὸς ἕκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὡρίζου;

Οὐδείς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει.

12.1 · Πλάτωνος I.47.12.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Μέγιστον δὲ καὶ λοιπὸν τῶν κοινῶν περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα παθημάτων, τὸ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν αἴτιον, ἐν οἷς διεληλύθαμεν, καὶ ὅσα διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων αἰσθήσεις κεκτημένα καὶ λύπας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡδονάς τε ἑπομένας ἔχει. Ὧδ᾽ οὖν κατὰ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἀναισθήτου παθήματος <τὰς> αἰτίας λαμβάνωμεν, ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι τὸ τῆς εὐκινήτου τε καὶ δυσκινήτου φύσεως ὅ τι διειλόμεθα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν· ταύτῃ γὰρ μεταδιωκτέον πάντα ὅσα ἐπινοοῦμεν ἐλεῖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

11.2 · The body's assistance to thought I.47.11.2

"And when in one person the bodily faculties adequately serve thought, while in another they oppose it? Was it by anything other than these criteria that you distinguished the person naturally fitted for each activity from the person who is not?"

"No one," he said, "will name any others."[1201]

12.1 · Plato: the causes of sensation I.47.12.1

From Plato, from the Timaeus.

The greatest subject still remaining among the affections common to the whole body is the cause of pleasant and painful experiences among those we have discussed, and of all the experiences that acquire sensations through the bodily parts and have pains and consequent pleasures within them. Let us therefore grasp <the> causes of every perceived and unperceived affection in this way, recalling the distinction we made earlier between a nature easily moved and one difficult to move. By this route we must pursue everything we intend to grasp.[1202]

1201. The wording refers broadly to "the things of the body," translated "bodily faculties." The short reply returns from the imagined questioning of an opponent to the dialogue's actual respondent.

1202. Timaeus 64a-d. Pathos is an affection or alteration, which may occur without being perceived. The opening sentence is compressed and lacks an explicit main verb; the English supplies "is." The distinction between ease and difficulty of movement supplies the mechanism of transmission in the next unit.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

12.2 I.47.12.2

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον, ὅταν καὶ βραχὺ πάθος εἰς αὐτὸ ἐμπίπτῃ, διαδίδωσι κύκλῳ μόρια ἕτερα ἑτέροις, ταὐτὸν ἀπεργαζόμενα, μέχρι περ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον ἐλθόντα ἐξαγγείλῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν δύναμιν. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον, ἑδραῖον <ὂν>, κατ᾽ οὐδένα τε κύκλον ἰόν, πάσχει μόνον, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐ κινεῖ τῶν πλησίον· ὥστε οὐ διαδιδόντων μορίων μορίοις ἄλλων ἄλλοις τὸ πρῶτον πάθος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀκίνητον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ζῷον γενόμενον ἀναίσθητον παρέσχε τὸ παθόν.

12.3 I.47.12.3

Ταῦτα δὲ περί τε ὀστᾶ καὶ τρίχας ἐστὶ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα γήινα τὸ πλεῖστον ἔχομεν ἐν ἡμῖν μόρια· τὰ δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν περὶ τὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς μάλιστα διὰ τὸ πυρὸς ἀέρος τε ἐν αὐτοῖς δύναμιν ἐνεῖναι μεγίστην. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὧδε διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ. Τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν· τὸ δ᾽ εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ· τὸ δὲ ἠρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον· τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

12.2 · Transmission to the thinking faculty I.47.12.2

For that which is naturally easy to move transmits even a slight affection that strikes it: its parts pass it around from one to another, producing the same effect, until they reach the thinking faculty and announce the power of what caused it. The opposite, <being> stationary and passing around no circuit, is affected alone and moves none of its neighbors. Thus, because the parts do not transmit the first affection to one another, it remains within them without moving into the whole creature and leaves the affected part unperceived.[1203]

12.3 · Earthy parts and the organs of sense I.47.12.3

This occurs with bones, hair, and all the other predominantly earthy parts within us. The former condition occurs especially with the organs of sight and hearing, because the power of fire and air is greatest in them.[1204] Pleasure and pain must be understood as follows. An affection that occurs violently and all at once, contrary to nature, is painful; a return to nature that likewise occurs all at once is pleasant. What happens gently and little by little is imperceptible; what is opposite to these behaves oppositely.[1205]

1203. The account makes perception depend upon an alteration's reaching to phronimon, "the thinking faculty." An isolated bodily alteration remains below awareness. The supplied participle on, "being," restores the description of what stays fixed.

1204. "The former condition" is ready transmission, contrasted with the fixed condition of the earthy parts. Fire and air are the mobile elemental constituents invoked to explain the special responsiveness of sight and hearing.

1205. The opposition is between disruption and restoration of the natural condition. Abruptness determines whether the change is felt; the final compressed clause reverses the gentle, gradual case without specifying a new mechanism.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

12.4 I.47.12.4

Τὸ δὲ μετ᾽ εὐπετείας γιγνόμενον ἅπαν αἰσθητὸν μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα, ἡδονῆς <δὲ> καὶ λύπης οὐ μετέχον· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν παθήματα, ἢ δὴ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ξυμφυὲς ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι.

13.1 · Πλάτωνος I.47.13.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φιλήβου.

Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.

Πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι᾽ ὀλίγων ὅτι τάχιστα περὶ μεγίστων ῥηθῆναι.

Οἶμαι μέν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον δὲ ἔτι <ταὐτὰ> ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

12.4 · Perception without pleasure or pain I.47.12.4

Everything that happens with ease is most readily perceived, <but> has no share in pleasure or pain. Such are the affections of sight itself, which, as was said earlier, becomes by day a body continuous with our own.[1206]

13.1 · Plato: harmony, pain, and pleasure I.47.13.1

From Plato, from the Philebus.

“I say, then, that when harmony is dissolved in us living creatures, our natural constitution is dissolved and pains arise at that very time.”

“What you say is quite likely.”

“When harmony is restored and returns to its own natural condition, we must say that pleasure arises, if we are to speak as briefly and quickly as possible about matters of the greatest importance.”

“I think you are right, Socrates, but let us try to state these <same> things still more clearly.”[1207]

1206. The ease of transmission is distinct from a violent disruption or a sudden restorative change. The final sentence recalls the Timaeus’s account of vision, in which visual fire joins with daylight to form a continuous body. This is the dialogue’s theory, not a description in modern optics.

1207. Philebus 31d-32c. Socrates and his respondent, Protarchus, alternate without explicit speaker labels in the excerpt. “Harmony” denotes the organized fitting together of the living being; its dissolution and restoration are proposed as the causes of pain and pleasure.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

13.2 I.47.13.2

Οὐκοῦν δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾷστον συννοεῖν;

Ποῖα;

Πείνη μέν που <λύπη> καὶ λύσις.

Ναί.

Ἐδωδὴ δὲ πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν ἡδονή.

Ναί.

Δίψος δ᾽ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη καὶ λύσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή· διάκρισις δὲ τ᾽ αὖ καὶ διάλυσις παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη· κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

13.2 · Hunger, thirst, and heat I.47.13.2

“Surely common and obvious examples are easiest to understand?”

“Which ones?”

“Hunger is, I take it, <pain> and dissolution.”

“Yes.”

“Eating, by replenishing us, is in turn pleasure.”

“Yes.”

“Thirst, again, is damage, pain, and dissolution; the power of moisture to refill what has dried out is pleasure. Unnatural separation and dissolution, the effects of stifling heat, are pain; restoration to nature and cooling are pleasure.”

“Certainly.”[1208]

1208. Wachsmuth supplies “pain” in the hunger example and restores the division before the answer “Yes.” He retains “and dissolution” after thirst, although the apparatus records its deletion by Stallbaum. The sequence illustrates loss, replenishment, overheating, and cooling.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

13.3 I.47.13.3

Καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις [καὶ] λύπη· πάλιν δ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. Καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος <ὁ> λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῇ, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.

13.4 I.47.13.4

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;

Κείσθω.

Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα, τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον <ἡδὺ> καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπ<ηρ>ῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ᾽ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

13.3 · Cold and return to the natural condition I.47.13.3

“Likewise, the unnatural congealing of a creature’s moisture through cold is [also] pain; when its constituents return to the same condition and separate again, their natural course is pleasure. In a word, consider whether <the> following account seems adequate to you. When the form that has naturally become ensouled from the unlimited and limit, as I said earlier, is damaged, that damage is pain; the journey back to the constituents’ own being, this return of them all, is pleasure.”

“Let it stand; it seems to me to provide at least an outline.”[1209]

13.4 · Pleasure and pain in expectation I.47.13.4

“Shall we therefore set this down as one kind of pain and of pleasure in these respective affections?”

“Let it be set down.”

“Then set down what belongs to the soul itself in anticipation of these affections: what is hoped for before pleasant experiences is <pleasant> and encouraging, while what precedes painful experiences is fearful and distressing.”

“For this is indeed another kind of pleasure and pain: what arises in the soul itself, apart from the body, through expectation.”[1210]

1209. The brackets retain a rejected kai and the supplied article before “account.” The unlimited and limit are the principles invoked in the underlying discussion to explain an ordered mixture. The English makes “constituents” explicit when the Greek shifts from a singular living form to plural possessives and “all.”

1210. Wachsmuth restores hēdy, “pleasant,” and two letters within lypērōn, “painful.” The latter restoration is shown within the Greek word; English has no corresponding detachable syllable. The argument distinguishes present bodily conditions from the soul’s anticipatory responses.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

14.1 · <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.47.14.1

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ.>

Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι ἔφαμεν, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός.

Πῶς;

Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστί, πρότερον ἀναληπτέον· καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι.

Πῶς φῄς;

14.2 I.47.14.2

Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.

Κείσθω.

Τὰ μὲν μὴ δι᾽ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν <φῶμεν> λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρ᾽ ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

14.1 · <In the same work>: memory and sensation I.47.14.1

<In the same work.>

“Moreover, the other kind of pleasure, which we said belongs to the soul itself, has all come about through memory.”

“How?”

“We must first take up what memory actually is, it seems; and probably sensation must be taken up even before memory, if these matters are to become suitably clear to us in some way.”

“What do you mean?”[1211]

14.2 · Affections that do and do not reach the soul I.47.14.2

“Suppose that, among the affections that occur in our body, some die out within the body before passing through to the soul and leave it unaffected; others pass through both and produce something like a shaking, at once peculiar to each and shared by both.”

“Let that be supposed.”

“If we <say> that the affections not passing through both escape our soul’s notice, while those passing through both do not, shall we be speaking quite correctly?”

“Of course.”[1212]

1211. Philebus 33c-34a. The source-heading is supplied by Gaisford: F and P mark a new excerpt without giving this title. The dialogue moves backward from pleasure to memory, then from memory to the prior condition of sensation.

1212. Compare the transmission account in I.47.12. The distinction here is whether an affection reaches both body and soul. “Peculiar to each and shared by both” retains the two aspects of the resulting movement instead of reducing them to one.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

14.3 I.47.14.3

Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς, ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν. Ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. Ἦ γάρ;

Τί μήν;

Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

Πῶς;

Ἀντὶ τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς, ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

Ἔμαθον.

14.4 I.47.14.4

Τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δὴ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγου ἄν.

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν;

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

14.3 · Being unnoticed is not forgetting I.47.14.3

“But do not take my saying ‘to have escaped notice’ as though I were speaking of the occurrence of forgetting. Forgetting is the departure of memory, whereas in the case now under discussion memory has not yet arisen. It is absurd to speak of losing something that neither exists nor has yet come into existence. Is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then change only the terms.”

“How?”

“Instead of saying that something has escaped the soul’s notice when the soul is unaffected by the body’s shakings, call what you now name ‘forgetting’ ‘absence of sensation.’”

“I understand.”[1213]

14.4 · A shared movement I.47.14.4

“When soul and body are jointly involved in a single affection and are jointly moved, you would speak appropriately by calling this movement sensation.”

“What you say is entirely true.”

“Do we now understand, then, what we mean to call sensation?”[1214]

1213. The clarification turns on related Greek words: lanthanein, “escape notice,” and lēthē, “forgetting.” An unperceived affection has produced no memory to lose. Anaisthēsia here means lack of sensation or awareness, not medically induced anesthesia.

1214. The definition concerns a movement shared by body and soul. The excerpt stops here, before the further account of memory in the dialogue.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 47

15 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.47.15

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 47

15 · In the same work: pleasure mingled with pain I.47.15

In the same work.

Body without soul, soul without body, and both together in their affections are full of pleasure mingled with pains.[1215]

1215. Philebus 50d. “Without” distinguishes the respective fields of affection within the argument; it need not imply a claim that the living body exists independently of soul. This brief excerpt closes chapter 47. Chapter 48, “On Intellect,” begins on the same printed page.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

Κεφάλαιον ΜΗ′ I.48.heading

Περὶ νοῦ.

1 · Πλάτωνος I.48.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φιλήβου.

Ἔγωγε ἡγεῖσθαι οἶμαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν.

2 · Πλάτωνος I.48.2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Φέρε δή, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; Καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

Chapter 48: On intellect

I.48.heading

On intellect.[1216]

1 · Plato: the truest knowledge

I.48.1

From Plato, from the Philebus.

For my part, I think that everyone endowed with even a little intellect considers it by far the truest knowledge.[1217]

2 · Plato: intellect and excellence in the soul

I.48.2

From Plato, from the Phaedo.

Come now, by Zeus: is one soul said to possess intellect and excellence and to be good, while another possesses folly and wickedness and is bad? And are these things truly said?[1218]

1216. Nous is rendered “intellect” throughout this chapter; logos is normally “reason.” The eight excerpts address different questions about its nature, objects, and relation to soul and body. Decimal subdivisions of longer excerpts are editorial aids for comparing the facing languages. Wachsmuth records that the chapter heading is absent from manuscripts F and P.

1217. Philebus 58a. The excerpt omits the earlier words specifying knowledge of being, reality, and what always remains the same. “It” preserves that dependence on an absent antecedent; the English does not insert the omitted subject into Stobaeus’s Greek. The claim concerns a kind of knowledge, rather than identifying intellect itself as that knowledge.

1218. Phaedo 93b. Socrates is questioning the proposal that soul is a harmony. The contrast between a good and a bad soul forms part of that argument; this excerpt preserves the questions without the answer. Aretē, “excellence,” here has an ethical force alongside goodness and its opposite, wickedness.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

3.1 · Ἑρμοῦ I.48.3.1

Ἑρμοῦ.

<TAT> Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ πάτερ; ὁ νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς χωρίζεται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ πνεύματος, σοῦ εἰπόντος ἔνδυμα εἶναι τοῦ μὲν νοῦ τὴν ψυχήν, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ πνεῦμα;

<ΕΡΜ.> Συννοεῖν δεῖ, <ὦ> τέκνον, τὸν ἀκούοντα τῷ λέγοντι καὶ συμπνεῖν καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἀκοὴν τῆς τοῦ λέγοντος φωνῆς.

3.2 I.48.3.2

Ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν ἐνδυμάτων τούτων ἐν σώματι γηΐνῳ γίνεται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν νοῦν ἐν γηΐνῳ σώματι γυμνὸν αὐτὸν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἑδράσαι. Οὔτε γὰρ τὸ γήϊνον σῶμα δυνατὸν ἐστι τὴν τηλικαύτην ἀθανασίαν ἐνεγκεῖν οὔτε τὴν τοσαύτην ἀρετὴν ἀνασχέσθαι συγχρωτιζόμενον αὐτῇ παθητὸν σῶμα. Ἔλαβεν <οὖν> ὥσπερ περιβόλαιον τὴν ψυχήν· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτή τις θεία οὖσα καθάπερ ὑπηρέτῃ τῷ πνεύματι χρῆται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ ζῷον διοικεῖ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

3.1 · Hermes: the question about separation I.48.3.1

From Hermes.

<TAT> What do you mean by this, father? Intellect separates from soul, and soul from spirit, although you said that soul is the garment of intellect, and spirit the garment of soul?

<HERMES> The hearer must think together with the speaker, <my> child, breathe in accord with him, and have a hearing keener than the speaker's voice.[1219]

3.2 · The garments of embodied intellect I.48.3.2

These garments are combined in an earthen body; for intellect cannot establish itself naked and alone in an earthen body. The earthen body cannot bear so great an immortality, nor can so great an excellence endure a body subject to suffering coming into close contact with it. Intellect <therefore> took soul as a kind of covering. Soul, itself something divine, uses spirit as a servant, and spirit governs the living creature.[1220]

1219. The passage corresponds to Corpus Hermeticum X.16-18. Wachsmuth supplies the speaker labels from the parallel Hermetic text, which also supports endyma, "garment," against dynamis, "power," in F and P. Pneuma, "spirit," retains its association with breath, made audible in sympnein, "breathe in accord." The added Greek vocative particle ō is represented by the marked address in English.

1220. The garments mediate between immortal intellect and a body liable to affection and suffering (pathēton). Aretē here denotes intellect's excellence, not simply moral virtue. The imagery continues in the fiery tunic below; it distinguishes soul, spirit, and body without making the coverings interchangeable. Wachsmuth restores oun and corrects the pronoun to autēi, referring to the excellence just mentioned.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

3.3 I.48.3.3

Ὅταν <οὖν> ὁ νοῦς ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ γηΐνου σώματος, τὸν ἴδιον εὐθὺς ἐνεδύσατο χιτῶνα τὸν πύρινον, ὃν οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἔχων εἰς τὸ γήϊνον σῶμα κατοικῆσαι. Γῆ γὰρ πῦρ οὐ βαστάζει· πᾶσα γὰρ γῆ φλέγεται καὶ ὑπὸ ὀλίγου σπινθῆρος. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ περιέχυνται τῇ γῇ, ὥσπερ ἔρυμα καὶ τεῖχος ἀντέχον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς φλόγα·

3.4 I.48.3.4

νοῦς δὲ ὀξύτατος <ὢν> πάντων τῶν θείων νοημάτων καὶ τὸ ὀξύτατον πάντων τῶν στοιχείων ἔχει τὸ πῦρ σῶμα. Δημιουργὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ νοῦς τῶν πάντων ὀργάνῳ τῷ πυρὶ πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν χρῆται. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοῦ παντὸς τῶν πάντων, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς μόνον. Γυμνὸς γὰρ ὢν τοῦ πυρὸς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ νοῦς ἀδυνατεῖ τὰ θεῖα δημιουργεῖν, ἀνθρώπινος ὢν τῇ οἰκήσει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

3.3 · The tunic of fire

I.48.3.3

When, <then>, intellect is released from the earthen body, it immediately puts on its own tunic of fire, which it could not wear while dwelling in the earthen body. For earth cannot sustain fire: all earth burns even from a small spark. For this reason water too has been poured around the earth, resisting the flame of fire like a defensive barrier and a wall.[1221]

3.4 · Cosmic and human craftsmanship

I.48.3.4

Intellect, <being> the keenest of all divine thoughts, also has as its body fire, the keenest of all the elements. For intellect, being the craftsman of all things, uses fire as an instrument of its craftsmanship. The intellect of the universe fashions all things, but human intellect only things upon the earth. For the intellect in a human being, stripped of fire, cannot fashion divine things, since it is human by virtue of its dwelling.[1222]

1221. The tunic is intellect's own garment after release, unlike the soul and spirit that clothe it during embodiment. The English uses a present tense for the general occurrence; the printed Greek has enedysato, an aorist, after hotan. The claim about earth, fire, and surrounding water belongs to this ancient elemental account. For discussion of the garment imagery, see M. David Litwa, "Corpus Hermeticum 10 cont'd" (2024), on X.16-18.

1222. Oxytatos, "keenest," links intellect's penetrative quality with fire's. The final sentence limits embodied human craftsmanship; it does not deny the preceding distinction between intellect and its earthly dwelling. The translation follows the printed oikēsei, "dwelling," rather than the parallel Hermetic dioikēsei, "administration," recorded in the apparatus.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 311-312

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

4.1 · Πορφυρίου I.48.4.1

Πορφυρίου ἐκ τῶν Πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμῶν.

Πᾶν γενητὸν ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς γενέσεως ἔχει, εἴ γε μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεται. Ἀλλὰ τῶν γε γενητῶν ὅσα μὲν διὰ συνθέσεως κέκτηται τὸ εἶναι, λυτὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθαρτά· ὅσα δὲ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀσύνθετα ὄντα ἐν τῷ ἁπλῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως κέκτηται τὸ εἶναι, ἄλυτα ὄντα, ἔστι μὲν ἄφθαρτα, γενητὰ δὲ λέγεται, οὐ τῷ σύνθετα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνηρτῆσθαι.

4.2 I.48.4.2

Τὰ μὲν οὖν σώματα διχῶς γενητὰ καὶ ὡς ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας ἠρτημένα τῆς παραγούσης καὶ ὡς σύνθετα· ψυχὴ δὲ καὶ νοῦς γενητά, ὡς ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας ἠρτημένα μόνον, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὡς σύνθετα. Τὰ μὲν ἄρα σώματα γενητὰ καὶ λυτὰ καὶ φθαρτά· τὰ δὲ ἀγένητα μὲν ὡς ἀσύνθετα καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ ἄλυτα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, γενητὰ δὲ ὡς <ἀπ᾽> αἰτίου ἠρτημένα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 312

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

4.1 · Porphyry: two senses of being generated I.48.4.1

From Porphyry, from Starting Points toward the Intelligibles.

Everything generated has the cause of its generation in something else, if indeed nothing comes into being without a cause. But among generated things, those that possess their being through composition would be dissoluble and for that reason perishable. Those, however, that are simple and uncompounded and possess their being in the simplicity of their subsistence are indissoluble and therefore imperishable. They are nevertheless called generated, because they depend upon some cause, not because they are compounded.[1223]

4.2 · Bodies, soul, and intellect I.48.4.2

Bodies, then, are generated in two respects: they depend on the cause that brings them forth, and they are compounded. Soul and intellect are generated only in that they depend on a cause, and not also in that they are compounded. Bodies, therefore, are generated, dissoluble, and perishable. The others are ungenerated in being uncompounded, and in this respect also indissoluble and imperishable; yet they are generated in depending <upon> a cause.[1224]

1223. The title is also known as the Sententiae or Aphormai. Genēton, “generated,” is being distinguished into composition from parts and dependence upon a cause. Hypostasis here denotes subsistence, the way a thing has its being. The argument therefore allows something to depend on a cause without being subject to dissolution.

1224. “The others” refers to soul and intellect. Wachsmuth explicitly rejects adding noēta, “intelligibles,” here, since those are not the pair named in the preceding sentence. The apparently opposed predicates “generated” and “ungenerated” apply in the two different respects just defined. The supplied preposition ap’ remains marked.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 312

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.1 · Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.48.5.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ πάντων· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς, πρὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἕν. Ὅτι δὲ πολλὰ ὁ νοῦς δῆλον· νοεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ νοήματα, οὐχ ἓν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα ὄντα παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον. Εἰ οὖν ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά, πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ νοῦς.

5.2 I.48.5.2

Ὅτι δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τοῖς νοητοῖς, οὕτως δείκνυται. Εἰ γάρ τί ἐστιν ὃ θεωρεῖ, ἤτοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχων τοῦτο θεωρήσει, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ κείμενον. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεωρεῖ δῆλον· σὺν γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν εἴη ἂν ὁ νοῦς, ἀφαιρεθεὶς δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν ἀφῄρηται τῆς οὐσίας. Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐπιστήσαντας τοῖς πάθεσιν ἃ συμβαίνει περὶ τὰς γνώσεις ἀνιχνεῦσαι τὴν ἐκείνου θεωρίαν. Γνωστικαὶ δὲ δυνάμεις ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθρόον αἴσθησις, φαντασία, νοῦς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.1 · Porphyry: the One before intellect I.48.5.1

By the same author.

Intellect is not the principle of all things, for intellect is many, and before the many there must be the One. That intellect is many is clear: it always thinks its objects of thought, which are many, not one, and are not other than itself. If, then, it is identical with them, and they are many, intellect too would be many.[1225]

5.2 · Investigating intellectual contemplation I.48.5.2

That it is identical with the intelligibles is shown as follows. If there is something that it contemplates, it will contemplate it either as something it has within itself or as something situated elsewhere. That it does contemplate is clear: intellect would exist together with thinking, and deprived of thinking it is deprived of its being. We must therefore attend to the conditions that occur in acts of cognition and trace out its contemplation. Taken together, the cognitive powers in us are perception, imagination, and intellect.[1226]

1225. Archē means an originating principle. The One's priority is an order of dependence, rather than a claim that it existed earlier in time. Noēmata is rendered "objects of thought"; Wachsmuth retains that word rather than adopting Meineke's noēta, "intelligibles." The following argument explains why intellect and its objects are identical.

1226. Theōria, "contemplation," here means an act of cognitive consideration. The argument treats thinking as constitutive of intellect, rather than an activity it can lose while remaining what it is. Phantasia is the power of forming or receiving appearances and images; "imagination" need not imply deliberate invention.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 312-313

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.3 I.48.5.3

Πάντῃ δὲ τὸ αἰσθήσει προσχρώμενον τοῖς ἔξω ἐπιβάλλον θεωρεῖ, οὐχ ἑνούμενον ἐκείνοις ἃ θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τύπον αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὰ προσβολῆς λαμβάνον. Ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον, ἀμήχανον ἐν ταυτότητι γενέσθαι τοῦ ὁρωμένου· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἴδοι, εἰ μὴ ἐν διαστάσει γένοιτο, ὡσαύτως δὲ κἂν τὸ ἁπτόμενον, ἐν ταυτότητι γενόμενον, φθαρείη. Ἐξ ὧν δῆλον, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθήσει προσχρώμενον εἰς τὸ ἔξω φέρεται, εἰ μέλλει τὸ αἰσθητὸν καταλήψεσθαι.

5.4 I.48.5.4

Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ φαντασία ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω φέρεται καὶ τῇ τάσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἰκόνισμα παρυφίσταται . . . . ., ἤτοι καὶ παρασκευάζον ἔξωθεν ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω τάσει τὴν ὡς ἔξω ὄντος εἰκονίσματος ἐνδεικνύμενον. Καὶ τούτων μὲν κατάληψις τοιαύτη, ὧν οὐδεμία εἰς ἑαυτὴν συννεύουσα καὶ συναγομένη ἐντύχοι ἂν ἢ τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναισθήτῳ εἴδει·

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.3 · Perception requires an external object I.48.5.3

In every case, what employs perception contemplates by reaching toward external things. It does not become one with what it contemplates, but receives only their imprint through its encounter with them. Thus, when an eye sees the visible object, it cannot become identical with that object: it could not see unless there were a separation. Likewise, even what touches would be destroyed if it became identical with its object. It is clear from this that perception, and what employs perception, always moves outward if it is to apprehend the perceptible object.[1227]

5.4 · Imagination and the outward image I.48.5.4

Likewise, imagination too always moves outward, and through its extension the image comes into existence alongside it . . . . . , either also producing from outside, or by the very outward extension indicating the imagination of an image as though it were outside.[1228] Such is the apprehension of these powers: neither, by turning and gathering into itself, could encounter either a perceptible or an imperceptible form.[1229]

1227. The contrast is between contact with an object and identity with it. “What touches” takes the middle participle haptomenon as the perceiving subject; it can also be understood passively as the thing touched. In either construal, the sentence argues that eliminating the distinction between the two destroys the conditions of touch.

1228. A gap is printed after paryphistatai. The following participles lack a secure subject in the surviving wording; their awkwardness is retained. Wachsmuth explains tēn by mentally supplying phantasian, represented here by “the imagination.” Usener suggested a missing clause about what uses imagination moving outward, but that conjectural replacement is not inserted. The exact wording and connection remain uncertain.

1229. The two powers are perception and imagination. The point is that their objects are presented as external, even when an image is not a presently perceived thing. The Greek uses oudemia, “none,” where “neither” is expected for the pair, a usage noted by Wachsmuth.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 313

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.5 I.48.5.5

ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ οὐ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡ κατάληψις, ἀλλὰ συννεύοντος εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸν θεωροῦντος. Παρεξελθὼν γὰρ τοῦ θεάσασθαι τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ ὅμμα εἶναι τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργειῶν <ἐνεργ>ουσῶν τὸ ὅραμα, οὐδὲν ἂν νοήσειεν. Ὡς μὲν οὖν ἦν [ἡ] αἴσθησίς τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐστὶ νοῦς τε καὶ τὸ νοητόν.

5.6 I.48.5.6

Θεωρεῖ δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐκτεινομένη εἰς τὸ ἔξω, εὑρίσκουσα τὸ αἰσθητὸν <ἐν> τῇ ὕλῃ κείμενον· ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἰς αὐτὸν συναγόμενος, οὐδαμῇ ἔξω ἐκτεινόμενος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐδόκει τισὶν <οὐδ'> ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει καὶ <τῇ> τῆς φαντασίας. Ἡ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζῴῳ φαντασία ἐδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις· ἀλλ᾽ [εἰ] ἐκείνοις μὲν πάντα ἀπαρτήσασιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς σωματικῆς φύσεως ἀκόλουθον ἦν καὶ τὸν νοῦν τούτων ἀπαρτᾶν·

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.5 · Intellect turns toward itself I.48.5.5

With intellect, however, apprehension does not occur in this way, but through its turning into itself and contemplating itself. For if it ceased to behold its own activities and to be the eye of its own activities <producing> the sight, it would think nothing. As there were perception and the perceptible, then, so there are intellect and the intelligible.[1230]

5.6 · Intellect and imagination distinguished I.48.5.6

Perception contemplates by extending outward and finding the perceptible situated <in> matter; intellect does so by gathering into itself, without extending outward at all. Some also took it in this way, <not even> making a distinction of name between the subsistence of intellect and <that> of imagination.[1231] For they had judged imagination in a rational living creature to be thinking. But [if], for those who made everything depend on matter and corporeal nature, it was consistent to make intellect depend on these too.[1232]

1230. Intellect's activities themselves produce what it sees. Wachsmuth's intraword restoration energ- changes ousōn, "being," into energousōn, "producing" or "enacting"; the English marks the whole participle because its word structure cannot reproduce the Greek supplement. The rejected article [hē] has no separate English equivalent. The analogy pairs each power with its object without erasing the different relations just described.

1231. The transition beginning "Some also took it in this way" is strained: what "it" refers to is not secure. The next sentence clearly describes thinkers who identify imagination in a rational creature with thinking. The English retains this uncertain connection instead of silently reversing the preceding denial of outward extension. The marked "not even" follows Wachsmuth's supplement oud'.

1232. "If" is bracketed for deletion in the Greek; the remaining sentence explains the consistency of a materialist account on its own assumptions. Apartan means to make dependent or suspend from, continuing the vocabulary of causal dependence in excerpt 4.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 313-314

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.7 I.48.5.7

ὁ δ᾽ ἡμέτερος <νοῦς> ἀσωμάτων καὶ ἑτέρων θεωρὸς οὐσιῶν ποῦ τοίνυν κειμένας καταλήψεται αὐτάς; Ἔξω δὲ ὄντων ὕλης οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα. Δῆλον <οὖν> ὡς νοερὰ καὶ νοήσει συναχθήσεται. [Καὶ] τοίνυν εἰ νοερὰ <χωρεῖ> εἰς τὸν νοῦν, [καὶ τὸ νοητὸν] καὶ ἑαυτὸν θεωρήσει νοῶν τὰ νοητά· καὶ χωρῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν, νοεῖ διὰ τὸ εἰς ἐκεῖνα χωρεῖν.

5.8 I.48.5.8

Εἰ δὲ πολλὰ [καὶ] τὰ νοητά, (πολλὰ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ οὐχ ἕν), πολλὰ ἂν εἴη [καὶ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτός. Κεῖται δὲ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν τὸ ἕν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἕν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

5.7 · Intelligibles have no external place I.48.5.7

But our <intellect> contemplates incorporeal and different substances: where, then, will it find them situated when it apprehends them? Since they are outside matter, these things would be nowhere. It is clear, <then>, that as intellectual things they will be gathered together by thinking. [And] accordingly, if intellectual things <enter> intellect, [and the intelligible,] it will also contemplate itself when it thinks the intelligibles; and in entering itself it thinks because it enters them.[1233]

5.8 · The conclusion: unity precedes multiplicity I.48.5.8

If the intelligibles [too] are many (for intellect thinks many things, and not one), intellect itself too must necessarily be many [also]. But the One is prior to the many; hence the One must be prior to intellect.[1234]

1233. “Our intellect” means intellect as understood in the account being defended. Wachsmuth prints “incorporeal,” corrected by Usener from “bodies,” and retains “different” rather than Usener’s proposed “more divine.” The restored verb chōrei allows the intellectual things to “enter”; the subject then shifts to intellect. The disconnected words [kai to noēton] remain visibly rejected. “Nowhere” denies a material location, not the objects’ existence.

1234. The conclusion returns to the opening claim of excerpt 5 after arguing for intellect’s identity with its objects. The two bracketed kai are rejected in the printed Greek; their English equivalents remain bracketed, with the second moved to the end of its clause for readability. The following unbracketed kai is retained as “too.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.1 · Ἀρχύτου I.48.6.1

Ἀρχύτου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ νόω καὶ αἰσθάσιος.

Αἴσθασις μὲν ἐν σώματι γίνεται, νόος δ᾽ ἐν ψυχᾷ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰ τῶν αἰσθατῶν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ τῶν νοατῶν. Πλάθεος μὲν γὰρ μέτρον ἀριθμός, μάκεος δὲ πούς, ῥοπᾶς δὲ καὶ σταθμῶ ζυγόν, ὀρθότατος δὲ καὶ εὐθύτατος κανὼν καὶ στάθμα ὀρθὰ γωνία· οὕτως δὲ καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰσθατῶν αἴσθασις [μέτρον], τῶν δὲ νοατῶν νόος ἀρχὰ καὶ μέτρον ἐντί.

6.2 I.48.6.2

Καὶ ὁ μὲν νόος ἀρχὰ νοατῶν τε <καὶ> φύσι πράτων· ἁ δὲ αἴσθασις <δευτέρων τε φύσι καὶ τῶν παρ᾽> ἀμῖν· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐντι ἀρχὰ τᾷ ψυχᾷ, ἁ δὲ τῷ σώματι. Καὶ ὁ μὲν νόος τῶν τιμιαιτάτων ἐντὶ κριτάς, ἁ δ᾽ αἴσθασις τῶν χρησιμωτάτων. Ἃ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθασις τῶ σώματος ἕνεκε συνέστακε καὶ τᾶς εἰς τοῦτο λειτουργίας· ὁ δὲ νόος <τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἕνεκε> καὶ τᾶς εἰς ταύταν πολυφραδμοσύνας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 315

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.1 · Archytas: the measures of things I.48.6.1

From Archytas, from On Intellect and Perception.

Perception occurs in body, intellect in soul. The former is a principle for perceptible things, the latter for intelligibles. For number is the measure of multitude, a foot of length, a balance of downward inclination and weight, and a rule, a plumb line, and a right angle of uprightness and straightness. So too perception is the principle and measure of perceptibles [measure], and intellect of intelligibles.[1235]

6.2 · The purposes of perception and intellect I.48.6.2

Intellect is a principle for things intelligible <and> primary by nature; perception for things <secondary by nature and those in relation to> us. For the former is a principle for soul, the latter for body. Intellect judges the most worthy things, perception the most useful. Perception is constituted for the sake of the body and the service directed to it; intellect <for the sake of soul> and the resourceful understanding directed to it.[1236]

1235. This Doric work is transmitted under Archytas's name but belongs to the Pseudo-Archytan writings; see De Cesaris and Horky, "Hellenistic Pythagorean Epistemology" (2018). The Greek retains its dialect. The compressed list of measuring tools follows Wachsmuth, including words Meineke proposed deleting. "Principle and measure" governs both faculties in the English; the earlier redundant metron, rejected by Wachsmuth, remains bracketed.

1236. The substantial supplement after "perception" is Usener's, printed by Wachsmuth; it restores the contrast between what is primary in nature and what is accessible to us. The soul's purpose-clause is also supplied. Polyphradmosynē denotes breadth or resourcefulness of understanding. The contrast concerns the objects and purposes of the faculties, not an assertion that sensory service is worthless.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 315

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.3 I.48.6.3

Καὶ ὁ μὲν νόος ἐντὶ ἀρχὰ τᾶς ἐπιστάμας, ἁ δ᾽ αἴσθασις τᾶς δόξας· ἁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὰν ἐκ τῶν αἰσθατῶν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ τὰν ἐκ τῶν νοατῶν. Τυγχάνοντι δὲ τὰ μὲν αἰσθατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων κινάσιος μεταβλάσιός τε κοινανέοντα, τὰ δὲ νοατὰ στάσιος καὶ αἰδιότατος.

6.4 I.48.6.4

Παραπλασίως δὲ καὶ ἁ αἴσθασις καὶ ὁ νόος ἔχοντι· ἁ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθασις τῶ αἰσθατῶ, τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθατὸν καὶ κινέεται καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ οὐδέποκα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἀτρεμέει· διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ βέλτιον καὶ χεῖρον γίνεται ὁρῆν <τὸ αἰσθατόν>· ὁ δὲ νόος τῶ νοατῶ, τὸ δὲ νοατὸν ἀκίνατον ἐξ ὠσίας· διὸ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον ἐντὶ νοὲν τὸ νοατόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.3 · Knowledge, opinion, and their objects I.48.6.3

Intellect is the principle of knowledge, and perception of opinion; for the latter has its activity from perceptibles, the former from intelligibles. Among things, the perceptibles share in motion and change, while intelligibles share in rest and eternity.[1237]

6.4 · Variable seeing and unvarying understanding I.48.6.4

Perception and intellect stand in corresponding relations: perception to the perceptible, which moves and changes and never remains still in the same condition. Hence it is possible to see <the perceptible> more or less, better or worse. Intellect stands in relation to the intelligible, which is unmoving in its very being; hence one cannot understand the intelligible more or less, better or worse.[1238]

1237. The masculine ho de points back to intellect, paired with the feminine perception. The English therefore takes “the latter” and “the former” as those faculties, though the preceding knowledge/opinion pair also makes a conceptual contrast. Epistama (Attic epistēmē) is knowledge; doxa is opinion. The opposition between changing and unchanging objects will ground the comparison that follows.

1238. The elliptical Greek gives “perception of the perceptible” and “intellect of the intelligible,” with Doric genitives; the English makes these relations explicit. The perceptible object is a printed supplement. The wording about degrees of seeing is compressed, and admits a stronger emphasis on the object’s changing visibility. The translation takes ginetai horēn as “it is possible to see”; the contrast remains with intellect’s unvarying object. Wachsmuth records a suspected gap after “being” but prints no gap there.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 315-316

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.5 I.48.6.5

<Καὶ> καθάπερ <ὁ> νόος τὸ πρᾶτον βλέπει καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, οὕτως ἁ αἴσθασις τὰν εἰκόνα καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νόος οὐρανὸν ἁπλῶς <ἢ τέχναν>, ἁ δ᾽ αἴσθασις ἁπλῶς τὰν τῶ ἁλίω σφαῖραν ἢ τὰς χειροτεχνατῶν.

6.6 I.48.6.6

Ἔτι <ὁ> μὲν νόος ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, καθάπερ μονὰς καὶ στιγμά, παραπλασίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νοατόν (τὸ γὰρ εἶδος οὔτε πέρας σώματός ἐντι οὔτε ὅρος, ἀλλὰ μόνον τύπωσις τῶ ἐόντος, ᾧ ἐόν ἐντι), ἁ δ᾽ αἴσθασις μεριστὰ καὶ διαιρετά.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 316

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.5 · Paradigm and image

I.48.6.5

<And> just as intellect beholds what is primary and the paradigm, so perception beholds the image and what is secondary. For intellect beholds heaven without qualification <or art>, while perception simply beholds the sun's sphere or those of craftsmen.[1239]

6.6 · The indivisibility of intellect and form

I.48.6.6

Further, intellect is without parts and indivisible, like a unit and a point, and likewise the intelligible. For form is neither a body's limit nor its boundary, but solely an impress of what is, insofar as it is. Perception, however, has parts and is divisible.[1240]

1239. The printed ouranon, "heaven," is Wachsmuth's correction of corrupt wording; he also supplies "or art." The final phrase, literally "the [feminine plural] of craftsmen," lacks its noun. "Those" leaves that ellipsis visible: spheres or crafted works may be intended, but the text does not securely decide. De Cesaris and Horky (2018), pp. 248-249, discuss the uncertainty. The restored Greek article ho before "intellect" has no separate English equivalent.

1240. Monas is a unit, and stigma a geometrical point. Typōsis, "impress," is a difficult description of form: the text contrasts it with a bodily outline or boundary rather than defining it as a physical imprint. The supplied Greek article is retained on the facing page. Meineke proposed adding an analogy between perception and a dyad and line; Wachsmuth does not print that addition, and it is not inserted here.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.7

I.48.6.7

Τῶν γὰρ ἐόντων ἐντὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσθατά, τὰ δὲ δοξαστά, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιστατά, τὰ δὲ νοατά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα, ὧν ἐντί τις ἀντιτυπία, αἰσθατά· δοξαστὰ δὲ τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδέων ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος τῶ ἀνθρώπω καὶ τὸ <τι> τρίγωνον τῶ τριγώνω· ἐπιστατὰ δὲ τὰ τοῖς εἴδεσι συμβεβακότα ἐξ ἀνάγκας, ὡς ἐν γαμετρίᾳ τὰ τοῖς σχήμασι· νοατὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδεα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐπιστατῶν οἷον αὐτὸ κύκλος καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ σφαῖρα.

6.8

I.48.6.8

Τυγχάνοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἁμῖν αὐτοῖς κατὰ ψυχὰν γνώσιες τέτταρες· νόος, ἐπιστάμα, δόξα, αἴσθασις· ὧν αἱ μὲν δύο τῶ λόγω ἀρχαί ἐντι, οἷον νόος καὶ αἴσθασις, τὰ δὲ δύο τέλεα, οἷον ἐπιστάμα καὶ δόξα. Τὸ δ᾽ ὅμοιον ἀεὶ τῶ ὁμοίω γνωστικόν. Φανερὸν <ὧν> ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόος ἐν ἁμῖν τῶν νοατῶν γνωστικός, ἁ δὲ ἐπιστάμα τῶν ἐπιστατῶν, <ἁ δὲ δόξα τῶν δοξαστῶν,> ἁ δὲ αἴσθασις τῶν αἰσθατῶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

6.7 · Four classes of objects I.48.6.7

For among things that are, some are perceptible, some objects of opinion, some objects of knowledge, and some intelligible. Bodies, which have a certain resistance, are perceptible. Objects of opinion are things that participate in forms as images do, as a particular human being participates in human being, and a <particular> triangle in triangle. Objects of knowledge are the properties that necessarily belong to forms, as in geometry those that belong to figures. Intelligibles are the forms themselves and the principles of the objects of knowledge, such as circle itself, triangle, and sphere.[1241]

6.8 · Four kinds of cognition I.48.6.8

In our own souls too there are four kinds of cognition: intellect, knowledge, opinion, and perception. Two are starting points of reason, namely intellect and perception; the other two are its completions, namely knowledge and opinion. Like always has the capacity to know like. It is clear, <then>, that intellect in us knows intelligibles, knowledge knows objects of knowledge, <opinion knows objects of opinion,> and perception knows perceptibles.[1242]

1241. Antitypia is resistance or impenetrability, a characteristic of bodies. The distinction between a particular triangle, its necessary properties, and triangle itself illustrates the successive kinds of object. “Participates” is carried forward from the opening participle to clarify the compressed examples. The printed neuter auto before “circle” is retained in Greek and rendered “itself”; it is not silently changed to an agreeing masculine form.

1242. The four kinds of cognition correspond to the preceding four kinds of object. Archai and telea distinguish starting points from completed results of logos, “reason.” The clause about opinion and its objects is supplied by the editor from Canter’s restoration; it completes the parallel structure. The dialectal connective ōn corresponds to oun, “then.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 48

7 · <Ἀετίου> I.48.7

Πυθαγόρας, Ἀναξαγόρας, Πλάτων, Ξενοκράτης, Κλεάνθης θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν.

Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος ταὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ ψυχήν, καθ᾽ οὓς οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ζῷον ἄλογον κυρίως.

8.1 · Ἰαμβλίχου I.48.8.1

Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς.

Πάλιν τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττόνων δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ λέγουσι μὴ εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη. Οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος καὶ Πυθαγόρου παρεῖναι μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιγενέσι τὸν λόγον φασίν, ἐπισκοτεῖσθαί γε μὴν [ἐν] τοῖς ἔξωθεν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχάζειν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

7 · <Aëtius>: intellect and soul I.48.7

Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, Xenocrates, and Cleanthes hold that intellect enters from outside.

Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus hold that intellect and soul are the same; on their account, no living creature would be irrational in the strict sense.[1243]

8.1 · Iamblichus: the development of reason I.48.8.1

From Iamblichus, from On the Soul.

Again, then, concerning intellect and all the soul's higher powers, the Stoics say that reason is not implanted at once, but is assembled later from perceptions and impressions, at about fourteen years of age. The followers of Plato and Pythagoras, however, say that reason is present even in the newborn, though it is obscured by external things and does not exercise its proper activity, but lies quiet.[1244]

1243. Wachsmuth supplies the attribution Aëtius IV.5.11-12 (Diels, p. 392). These are reports grouped under names, not identified verbatim quotations from the philosophers. "From outside" translates thyrathen, literally "from beyond the door." The conclusion about irrational creatures follows from the reported identification of intellect and soul; it is qualified by kyriōs, "in the strict sense."

1244. The contrast is between the development of reason out of perceptual experience and a reason already present but inactive. Phantasiai in the Stoic report are "impressions"; the same word-family supplied "imagination" in Porphyry's different account. The bracketed en is rejected in the Greek, so the English renders the remaining instrumental dative as "by external things." The age is part of Iamblichus's report, not a modern developmental claim.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

8.2 I.48.8.2

Ἤδη τοίνυν [περὶ τοῦ νοῦ] πολλοὶ μὲν Περιπατητικοὶ τὸν ἐκ σπέρματος καὶ [τὸν] ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλλον νοῦν ὑποθέμενοι, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀποβλαστάνοντα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως, καὶ χωριστὸν καὶ θύραθεν ἐπικαλούμενον ἕτερον παραγίγνεσθαι λέγουσιν ὀψιαίτατα, ἐπειδὰν τελειωθῇ μὲν ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν νοῦς, ἐπιτηδείως δὲ μετέχῃ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν νοήσεως.

8.3 I.48.8.3

Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῇ ψυχῇ ἅμα τῇ πρώτῃ εἰσόδῳ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ σῶμα συνεισάγουσιν, οὐδὲ εἶναι ὅλως ἑτέραν μὲν αὐτήν, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῆς τὸν νοῦν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 48

8.2 · Two intellects in Peripatetic accounts I.48.8.2

Now, then, [concerning intellect,] many Peripatetics posit one intellect arising from seed and from nature, as sprouting immediately from the first generation. They say that another, separable and summoned from outside, arrives very late, when the potential intellect has reached completion and is suitably disposed to participate in actual thinking.[1245]

8.3 · Intellect entering with the soul I.48.8.3

Many of the Platonists themselves also bring intellect in together with soul at its first entrance into the body, and hold that soul and intellect are not distinct from one another at all.[1246]

1245. The text distinguishes a naturally developing intellect from a separable one. The printed epikaloumenon, “summoned,” is marked as doubtful in the apparatus; Usener proposed epeisagomenon, “brought in afterward,” but Wachsmuth does not adopt it. The brackets preserve the rejected topic phrase and, in Greek, the redundant article ton. “Potential” and “actual” render the contrast between dynamis and energeia.

1246. The account distinguishes views within the Platonic tradition rather than attributing one position to every Platonist. The final infinitive construction is rendered with “hold” supplied in English. This closes chapter 48; chapter 49, “On the Soul,” begins on the same printed page.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

Κεφάλαιον ΜΘ′ I.49.heading

Περὶ ψυχῆς.

1a.1 · <Ἀετίου> I.49.1a.1

Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον.

Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν κινοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαμβάνει.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτης.

Ἀλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ ἀίδιον κίνησιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμφερῆ τοῖς θείοις ὑπολαμβάνει.

1a.2 I.49.1a.2

Δικαίαρχος ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων.

Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρὸς συγγυμνασίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

Chapter 49: On the soul

I.49.heading

On the soul.[1247]

1a.1 · <Aëtius>: soul and self-movement

I.49.1a.1

Thales was the first to declare the soul to be always in motion, or self-moving.

Pythagoras calls it a number that moves itself, taking number to stand for intellect.

Xenocrates holds the same view.

Alcmaeon considers it a nature that moves itself in eternal motion, and for this reason regards it as immortal and akin to divine things.[1248]

1a.2 · Harmony and the senses

I.49.1a.2

Dicaearchus calls it a harmony of the four elements.

Asclepiades the physician calls it the joint exercise of the senses.[1249]

1247. Psychē, "soul," names the principle of life as well as the subject of thought and desire in these excerpts. The opening reports give competing definitions; they are not a single doctrine of Stobaeus. Letters follow Wachsmuth's numbering, while decimal subdivisions are modern aids to comparison. His apparatus records that the heading is absent from F and P.

1248. Wachsmuth identifies this group editorially with Aëtius IV.2.1, 3, 4, 2, 7, 8, 6 (Diels, p. 386). The translated Latin attribution is marked by angle brackets. "First" is the report's claim, not an independently established chronology. Thales' alternatives distinguish continual motion from motion originating in the soul itself; Alcmaeon explicitly connects everlasting motion with immortality.

1249. The four elements are earth, water, air, and fire. Harmonia suggests their ordered combination. The unusual syngymnasia, rendered "joint exercise," is retained; the report gives no further explanation of how the senses together constitute soul. A long list of topics found here in the manuscripts is excluded by Wachsmuth as a reader's marginal summary; it is not part of his printed main text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1a.3 I.49.1a.3

Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνδελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος· τὴν δ᾽ ἐντελέχειαν ἀκουστέον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας.

1b.1 · <Ἀετίου> I.49.1b.1

Ἀναξιμένης, Ἀναξαγόρας, Ἀρχέλαος [Διογένης] ἀερώδη.

Οἱ Στωικοὶ πνεῦμα νοερόν, θερμόν.

Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Ἵππασος πυρώδη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1a.3 · Aristotle: first actuality

I.49.1a.3

Aristotle calls it the first actuality of a natural body equipped with organs and possessing life potentially. “Actuality” is to be understood as form and activity.[1250]

1b.1 · <Aëtius>: air, breath, and fire

I.49.1b.1

Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, [Diogenes] call it air-like.

The Stoics call it intelligent, warm breath.

Parmenides and Hippasus call it fiery.[1251]

1250. The Greek first prints endelecheian, with delta, then entelecheian, with tau; both are rendered according to the technical definition given here. The spelling difference remains visible on the facing page. “First actuality” identifies the body’s being constituted as living, distinguished from its potential for life. The gloss associates this actuality with eidos, form, and energeia, activity.

1251. The editorial attribution refers to Aëtius IV.3.2-11 (Diels, p. 387). Wachsmuth brackets Diogenes as an intrusive name here; a distinct notice of Diogenes of Apollonia follows. Pneuma is rendered “breath” in this physical definition. This should not be taken to mean an immaterial spirit; the wording expressly attributes warmth to it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1b.2 I.49.1b.2

Δημόκριτος πυρῶδες σύγκριμα ἐκ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν, σφαιρικὰς μὲν ἐχόντων τὰς ἰδέας, πυρίνην δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπερ σῶμα εἶναι.

Ἡράκλειτος φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡρίσατο.

Λεύκιππος ἐκ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν.

Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἐξ ἀέρος τὴν ψυχήν.

Ἵππων ἐξ ὕδατος τὴν ψυχήν.

1b.3 I.49.1b.3

Ξέναρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς καὶ τινες ἕτεροι τῆς αὐτῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἅμα καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος συντεταγμένην.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1b.2 · Democritus and further elemental accounts I.49.1b.2

Democritus calls it a fiery compound of things discernible by reason, spherical in their shapes and fiery in their power; this compound is a body.[1252]

Heraclitus defined the soul as like light.

Leucippus holds that the soul is made of fire.

Diogenes of Apollonia holds that the soul is made of air.

Hippon holds that the soul is made of water.[1253]

1b.3 · Xenarchus: form and the body I.49.1b.3

Xenarchus the Peripatetic and certain others of the same school call it perfection and actuality in respect of form, existing in its own right and at the same time ordered together with the body.[1254]

1252. The things discernible by reason are the constituents of the compound; the report describes their shapes and power without printing the word “atoms.” Logōi theōrētōn does not here make them incorporeal. Wachsmuth retains hoper, “which,” referring to the compound, rather than Usener’s proposed dioper, “therefore.”

1253. The wording distinguishes “like light” from “made of fire.” These are brief reports under the philosophers’ names, not necessarily quotations of their own words. The English supplies “holds” where Greek gives only the name and a compressed predicate.

1254. The report joins two claims: soul has its own standing, yet is coordinated with body. “In its own right” renders kath’ heautēn without deciding the stronger question of separate existence. Hairesis here is a philosophical school; “Peripatetic” identifies the Aristotelian tradition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1b.4 I.49.1b.4

Ἐπίκουρος κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκατονόμαστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἴσθησιν.

1c · Ἑρμοῦ I.49.1c

Ἑρμοῦ.

Ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀίδιος νοητική, νόημα ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον.

2 · Πλάτωνος I.49.2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου.

Ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως <οὖσα> ψυχῆς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

1b.4 · Epicurus: a fourfold mixture

I.49.1b.4

Epicurus calls it a mixture of four constituents: something fiery, something airy, something breath-like, and a fourth, unnamed constituent. This last was, for him, the element responsible for perception. Of these constituents, breath produces motion; air, rest; the warm constituent, the manifest warmth of the body; and the unnamed constituent, perception within us. For perception is present in none of the elements that have names.[1255]

1c · Hermes: soul as thinking substance

I.49.1c

From Hermes.

Soul, then, is an eternal substance capable of thought, having its own reason as its object of thought.[1256]

2 · Plato: a shortened quotation

I.49.2

From Plato, from the Phaedrus.

For the colorless, shapeless, intangible substance of soul, truly <existing>.[1257]

1255. This fourfold mixture is not the familiar set of earth, water, air, and fire. The report distinguishes air from breath, and reserves the power of perception for a fourth constituent whose name it does not give. “Produces” carries the concluding empoiein back through the parallel clauses.

1256. The statement recurs at the beginning of excerpt 6 with a different word order. Wachsmuth retains both occurrences, although Heeren omitted this one. Logos is rendered “reason,” and noēma “object of thought”; the clause is compressed, and can also suggest that soul’s own reason constitutes its thought. The heading attributes the passage to Hermes.

1257. Phaedrus 247c. As printed here, the quotation is only a noun phrase. In Plato’s fuller sentence, psychēs, “of soul,” belongs with the following “pilot,” intellect, which sees true being; it does not define true being as the soul’s substance. This excerpt stops before those words. The English exposes the resulting compression rather than importing the omitted continuation. Wachsmuth supplies ousa from Plato. Compare the Greek text of Phaedrus 247c reproduced by Luke Dysinger at ldysinger.com/@texts/0-03_plato/04_phaedrus.htm.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

3.1 · Ἑρμοῦ I.49.3.1

Ἑρμοῦ.

Ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσώματος οὐσία· εἰ γὰρ ἔχει σῶμα, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἑαυτῆς σωστική. Πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα δεῖται τοῦ εἶναι, δεῖται καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἐν τάξει κειμένης. Παντὶ γὰρ τῷ γένεσιν ἔχοντι καὶ μεταβολὴν δεῖ ἐπακολουθεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον γίνεται ἐν μεγέθει, γινόμενον <γὰρ> αὔξην ἔχει· παντὶ δὲ τῷ αὐξανομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖ μείωσις, μειώσει φθορά. Μετειληφὸς δὲ εἴδους ζωῆς ζῇ καὶ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ εἶναι <διὰ> τὴν ψυχήν.

3.2 I.49.3.2

Ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὴ προτοῦ ὄν ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ εἶναι νῦν λέγω τὸ ἐν λόγῳ γενέσθαι καὶ μετέχειν ζωῆς νοερᾶς· παρέχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴν νοεράν. Καλεῖται δὲ ζῷον μὲν διὰ τὴν ζωήν, λογικὸν δὲ διὰ τὸ νοερόν, θνητὸν δὲ διὰ τὸ σῶμα. Ψυχὴ ἄρα <οὐσία> ἀσώματος, ἀμετάπτωτον ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν. Πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τέ ἐστι λέγειν ζῷον [νοερόν], μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας τῆς καὶ παρεχούσης ζωήν; ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ λογικὸν οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, μὴ οὔσης τῆς διανοητικῆς οὐσίας τῆς καὶ παρεχούσης νοερὰν ζωήν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

3.1 · Hermes: body depends upon soul I.49.3.1

From Hermes.

Soul, then, is an incorporeal substance. For if it has a body, it will no longer be able to preserve itself. Every body needs being; it also needs life established in an orderly arrangement. Everything that comes into being must also undergo change. What comes into being does so with magnitude; <for> in coming into being it grows. Everything that grows is followed by diminution, and diminution by destruction. But through receiving a form of life it lives and shares in being <through> soul.[1258]

3.2 · The source of rational life I.49.3.2

What causes another thing to be is itself already a being. By "being" here I mean coming to exist in reason and sharing in intelligent life; it is soul that supplies intelligent life. It is called a living creature because of life, rational because of intelligence, and mortal because of the body. Soul, therefore, is an incorporeal <substance> whose power does not change. How can one speak of an [intelligent] living creature unless there is a substance that also supplies life? Nor can one call it rational unless there is a thinking substance that also supplies intelligent life.[1259]

1258. The subject of the final sentence is the body. The argument makes soul the source of its life. The awkward first "needs," deitai, remains in Wachsmuth's text, although he proposes deleting it in the apparatus. The English retains both occurrences; it does not silently replace the sentence with a smoother conjecture. The supplied gar and dia are marked.

1259. The printed pro tou, written protou, is Wachsmuth's correction and gives priority to the cause; the neuter on is rendered "a being." The creature is the understood subject of "is called." Wachsmuth supplies ousia and rejects noeron in the first question, preserving a distinction between life as such and intelligent life. These signs are retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

3.3 I.49.3.3

Ἐν πᾶσι δὲ οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται τὸ νοερὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν. Ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπερέχῃ ἐν τῇ συστάσει τὸ θερμόν, κοῦφος καὶ ἔνθερμος <ἄνθρωπος> γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν, βαρὺς καὶ νωχελὴς γίνεται· φύσις γὰρ ἁρμόζει τὴν τοῦ σώματος σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν. Εἴδη δὲ τῆς ἁρμονίας τρία· τὸ κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ <τὸ> ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ μέσον.

3.4 I.49.3.4

Ἁρμόζει δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐπικρατήσαντα ἀστέρα τῆς συγκράσεως τῶν ἀστέρων. Παραλαβοῦσα δὲ ψυχὴ <σῶμα> καθὼς εἵμαρται, τούτῳ παρέχει ζωὴν τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἔργῳ. Ἡ φύσις τοίνυν ὁμοιοῖ τὴν ἁρμονίαν τοῦ σώματος τῇ τῶν ἀστέρων συγκράσει καὶ ἑνοῖ τὰ πολυμιγῆ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων ἁρμονίαν, ὥστε ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπάθειαν. Τέλος γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων ἁρμονίας τὸ γεννᾶν συμπάθειαν καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην αὐτῶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

3.3 · Bodily constitution and intelligence I.49.3.3

Intelligence does not reach everyone, because of the body's constitution in relation to its harmony. If warmth predominates in the constitution, the <person> becomes light and ardent; if cold predominates, heavy and sluggish. For nature adjusts the constitution of the body to its harmony. There are three forms of harmony: that according to warmth, that according to cold, and that according to the intermediate condition.[1260]

3.4 · The harmony of the stars I.49.3.4

Nature adjusts it according to the star that has prevailed in the blending of the stars. Soul receives a <body> as fate has ordained and gives life to this work of nature. Nature therefore makes the body's harmony resemble the blending of the stars and unifies its many mixed constituents in accordance with the stars' harmony, so that they have sympathy with one another. For the purpose of the stars' harmony is to engender sympathy according to their fate.[1261]

1260. The negative is understood as "not everyone," rather than "no one," in view of the differences that follow. Harmonia is the body's ordered balance or attunement. The account links temperament to a warm, cold, or intermediate constitution. The supplied Greek article before "cold" has no separate English equivalent; the supplied anthrōpos is marked as "person."

1261. Sympatheia means a correspondence or mutual responsiveness, not simply shared emotion. The excerpt explains the body through stellar influences and fate. Wachsmuth questions whether "star" should be deleted, but retains it; the English does likewise. "Nature" supplies the continuing subject of the opening verb. The final "their" is left attached to the stars as in the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

4.1 · Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.49.4.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὦ Ἄμμων, οὐσία αὐτοτελής, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλομένη βίον τὸν καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἐπεσπάσατο ἑαυτῇ λόγον ὅμοιον τῇ ὕλῃ ἔχοντα θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Καὶ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ὑπερέχει ὕλην· οὗτος, ἐὰν ἕξιν ποιήσῃ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόημα, γίνεται ἀνδρεία καὶ οὐ παράγεται ὑπὸ δειλίας. Ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία ὑπερέχεται· αὕτη ἐὰν ἕξιν ποιήσῃ πρὸς τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμόν, γίνεται σωφροσύνη καὶ οὐ κινεῖται ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς· ἀναπληροῖ γὰρ ὁ λογισμὸς τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

4.2 I.49.4.2

Ὅταν δὲ ἀμφότερα ὁμονοήσῃ καὶ ἴσην ἕξιν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἔχηται ἀμφότερα τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ, γίνεται δικαιοσύνη· ἡ γὰρ ἴση ἕξις αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖ μὲν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ, ἐπανισοῖ δὲ τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. Ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων ἡ διανοητικὴ οὐσία, καθ᾽ αὐτὴν αὐτὴ οὖσα, ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς περινοητικῷ λόγῳ κράτος ἔχουσα [τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον]. Ἄρχει δὲ καὶ ἡγεμονεύει ἡ οὐσία ὥσπερ ἄρχων· ὁ δὲ λόγος αὐτῆς ὥσπερ σύμβουλος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

4.1 · Hermes: soul, spirit, and desire

I.49.4.1

By the same author.

Soul, then, Ammon, is a substance complete in itself. At the beginning it chose a life in accordance with fate and drew to itself a reason resembling matter, possessing spirit and desire.[1262] Spirit prevails over matter: if it forms a settled relation to the soul's thought, it becomes courage and is not led astray by cowardice. Desire, however, is prevailed over. If it forms a settled relation to the soul's reasoning, it becomes self-control and is not moved by pleasure; for reasoning supplies what desire lacks.[1263]

4.2 · Justice as a balanced disposition

I.49.4.2

When both come into agreement, establish an equal disposition, and both adhere to the soul's reasoning, justice arises. Their equal disposition removes the excess of spirit and makes good the deficiency of desire. Their principle is the thinking substance, itself existing in its own right, possessing power in its encompassing reason [its own reason]. The substance rules and leads like a ruler, while its reason acts like a counselor.[1264]

1262. Thymos, here "spirit," is the assertive or angry impulse paired with desire, not pneuma, the breath or spirit of other passages. The wording combines the soul's choice with fate, without explaining their reconciliation. The "reason resembling matter" is a lower logos associated with these impulses.

1263. The active hyperechei, "prevails over," and passive hyperechetai, "is prevailed over," are corrections adopted from Usener. The passive leaves its agent unstated. Hexis is a settled state or disposition; here the English emphasizes its relation to thought. The virtues arise when the impulses are brought into such a relation.

1264. The "both" are spirit and desire. Perinoētikos, rendered "encompassing," suggests thought that comprehends or considers its object. The repeated "its own reason" is printed in square brackets by Wachsmuth as rejected wording; it remains deliberately awkward here. The ruler and counselor image distinguishes the soul's substance from its logos.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

4.3 I.49.4.3

Ὁ περινοητικὸς λόγος τοίνυν τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ γνῶσις τῶν λογισμῶν τῶν παρεχόντων εἰκασμὸν λογισμοῦ τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ἀμυδρὸν μὲν ὡς πρὸς λόγον, λογισμὸν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον, καθάπερ ἠχὼ πρὸς φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τῆς σελήνης λαμπρὸν πρὸς ἥλιον. Ὅρμοσται δὲ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πρὸς τινα λογισμὸν καὶ ἀνθέλκει ἄλληλα καὶ ἐπισπᾶται <τὴν> ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὑλικὴν διάνοιαν.

5.1 · Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.49.5.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀεικίνητος. Ἔφημεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γενικοῖς κινήσεις τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων. Φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ οὐσίας τινὸς οὐχ ὕλης γεγενῆσθαι, ἀσώματον οὖσαν καὶ αὐτῆς ἀσωμάτου οὔσης. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον ἀνάγκη ἔκ τινος γεγενῆσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

4.3 · Reason and its echo

I.49.4.3

The substance's encompassing reason is therefore knowledge of the reasonings that supply the irrational with a likeness of reasoning. This is dim in comparison with reason, yet counts as reasoning in comparison with the irrational, as an echo stands to a voice and the moon's brightness to the sun.[1265] Spirit and desire are attuned to a certain reasoning; they pull against one another and draw to themselves the material understanding within them.[1266]

5.1 · Hermes: soul and its origin

I.49.5.1

By the same author.

Every soul is immortal and always in motion. For in the general discussions we said that some motions come from activities, others from bodies. We say that soul has arisen from a certain substance, not from matter, being itself incorporeal and that substance also incorporeal. For everything that has come into being must have arisen from something.[1267]

1265. Wachsmuth calls logismōn, "reasonings," corrupt and suspects that more of the sentence may be damaged. The translation follows the printed words provisionally; it should not be read as a secure definition. The comparisons nevertheless distinguish a source from its weaker echo or reflected light.

1266. The singular Greek verbs govern the paired spirit and desire. The English takes the second verb as their drawing to themselves the understanding associated with matter. Wachsmuth corrects this verb and supplies its article, which has no distinct English equivalent. "Material understanding" preserves the tension with the higher thinking substance.

1267. "The general discussions" renders en tois genikois, an internal reference whose full title is not supplied here. Energeiai are activities or active operations. The excerpt distinguishes soul's derivation from an incorporeal substance from a body's material origin; being generated is not treated as sufficient to make soul perishable.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

5.2 I.49.5.2

Ὅσων μὲν οὖν τῇ γενέσει φθορὰ ἐπακολουθεῖ, τούτοις δύο κινήσεις παρακολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη, τήν τε <τῆς> ψυχῆς ὑφ᾽ ἧς κινεῖται καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑφ᾽ ἧς αὔξεται καὶ φθίνει, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀναλυθέντος ἀναλύεται. Ταύτην ὁρίζομαι τὴν κίνησιν τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητος, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἐν αὐτῇ κινεῖται καὶ ἄλλοις κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖ. Κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ἐστὶ ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀεικίνητος, ἔχουσα κίνησιν τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν.

5.3 I.49.5.3

Ἰδέαι δὲ ψυχῶν· θεία, ἀνθρωπίνη, ἄλογος. Ἡ μὲν οὖν θεία τοῦ θείου σώματος <δι᾽> αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ κινεῖται καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖ. Ἐπὰν γὰρ θνητῶν ζῴων ἀπαλλαγῇ, χωρισθεῖσα τῶν ἀλόγων ἑαυτῆς μερῶν, ἐξελθοῦσα εἰς τὸ θεῖον σῶμα ὡς ἀεικίνητος ἐν ἑαυτῇ κινεῖται, συμπεριφερομένη τῷ παντί.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

5.2 · Two motions in mortal creatures I.49.5.2

In things whose coming into being is followed by destruction, two motions must accompany them: that <of> soul, by which each is moved, and that of body, by which it grows and declines; moreover, when the body is dissolved, it too is dissolved. This I define as the motion of perishable bodies.[1268] Soul, however, is always in motion, because it always moves within itself and brings about motion in other things. On this account every soul is immortal and always in motion, having its own activity as its motion.[1269]

5.3 · The divine soul I.49.5.3

The forms of soul are divine, human, and irrational. The divine soul, then, is the activity of the divine body, acting <through> itself. For it moves within itself and moves that body. When it is freed from mortal living creatures, separated from its own irrational parts, and has gone out into the divine body, it moves within itself as something always in motion, revolving together with the universe.[1270]

1268. The Greek moves from plural “things” to singular verbs and leaves the subject of “is dissolved” implicit. The English takes it as the mortal living thing, with “the body” supplied as the subject of the preceding participle. The reference is compressed; it is not rendered as the destruction of soul, which the next sentences expressly deny.

1269. The supplied Greek article tēs marks the soul’s possession of its motion; English requires “of.” Soul’s activity is treated as intrinsic, in contrast to the bodily process of growth and decline. “Within itself” follows the printed en autēi, Wachsmuth’s correction.

1270. The supplemented di’ makes the activity operate “through itself”; the clause remains highly compressed. The “divine body” is associated here with cosmic revolution, but the excerpt does not give a fuller identification. The pronouns distinguish the soul moving within itself from the body it moves.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

5.4 I.49.5.4

Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ἔχει μὲν καί τι τοῦ θείου, συνῆπται δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός. Καὶ αὗται μὲν ἀθάνατοι, καθότι καὶ αὗται ἐνέργειαι τυγχάνουσιν, [αἱ] ἐνέργειαι δὲ θνητῶν σωμάτων. Διὸ τοῦ μὲν θείου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, οὔσης ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι, πόρρω τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ εἰσέλθῃ τοῦτο εἰς θνητὸν σῶμα, κἀκεῖνα ἐπιφοιτᾷ καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῶν γίνεται ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἀνθρωπίνη. Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων συνέστηκεν ἐκ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Διόπερ καὶ ἄλογα ἐκλήθη τὰ ζῷα ταῦτα, στερήσει τοῦ λόγου τῆς ψυχῆς.

5.5 I.49.5.5

Τετάρτην δὲ νόει τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων, ἥτις ἔξωθεν οὖσα τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργεῖ κινοῦσα. Αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινουμένη καὶ ὥσπερ κατὰ πάροδον ταῦτα κινοῦσα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

5.4 · Human and irrational souls I.49.5.4

The human soul has something of the divine, but the irrational elements, desire and spirit, are also attached to it. These too are immortal, insofar as they too are activities, yet activities of mortal bodies. They are therefore far from the divine part of the soul while the soul is in the divine body. But whenever that part enters a mortal body, those elements also arrive, and through their presence it always becomes a human soul. The soul of irrational creatures consists of spirit and desire. These creatures are accordingly called irrational because they lack the soul's reason.[1271]

5.5 · Motion in things without soul I.49.5.5

Understand a fourth kind, that belonging to things without soul: it is outside the bodies and acts by moving them. This would be moving within the divine body and moving these things, as it were, in passing.[1272]

1271. The feminine "these" refers to desire and spirit considered as activities, despite the masculine noun thymos. Their immortality as activities is distinguished from the mortality of the bodies in which they operate. The rejected Greek article hai is retained in brackets on the facing page; it has no natural separate equivalent in this English predicate.

1272. The fourth kind is added after the initial threefold list. The apparent paradox of a soul "of things without soul" is explained by locating its activity outside the bodies it moves. The Greek leaves "kind" implicit and uses the tentative eiē, "would be." The translation preserves both the external action and the qualification "as it were."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

6.1 · Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.49.6.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἀίδιος νοητικὴ οὐσία, νόημα ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον, συννοοῦσα δὲ διάνοιαν τῆς ἁρμονίας ἐπισπᾶται. Ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος, αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν μένει, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς οὖσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ. Ἄρχει δὲ τοῦ ἑαυτῆς λόγου, φέρουσα ὁμοίαν κίνησιν [ἐν] τῷ ἑαυτῆς νοήματι ὀνόματι ζωὴν τῷ εἰς ζωὴν ἐρχομένῳ. Τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ψυχῆς, τὸ παρέχειν ἑτέροις ὅμοιον τῇ ἰδιότητι αὐτῆς.

6.2 I.49.6.2

Δύο τοίνυν εἰσὶ ζωαὶ καὶ δύο κινήσεις. Μία μὲν ἡ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν σώματος. Καὶ ἡ μὲν γενικωτέρα, <ἡ δὲ μερικωτέρα>. Καὶ ἡ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἐστὶν αὐτεξούσιος· ἡ δὲ ἀναγκαστική· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον τῇ τοῦ κινοῦντος ἀνάγκῃ ὑποτέτακται. Ἡ δὲ κινοῦσα κίνησις τῷ τῆς νοητικῆς οὐσίας ἔρωτι ᾠκείωται. Εἴη γὰρ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀσώματος ἀμέτοχος οὖσα τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

6.1 · Hermes: the soul's own reason I.49.6.1

By the same author.

Soul, then, is an eternal substance capable of thought, having its own reason as its object of thought; in thinking together with it, soul draws to itself an understanding of harmony. Released from the natural body, it remains on its own, belonging to itself in the intelligible world.[1273] It rules its own reason, bringing a motion like [in] its own thought, life in name, to what comes to life. For this is peculiar to soul: to supply other things with something like its own distinctive character.[1274]

6.2 · Two lives and two motions I.49.6.2

There are therefore two lives and two motions. One accords with substance, the other with the nature of body. The one is more general, <the other more particular>. That which accords with substance is self-governing; the other is governed by necessity, for everything moved is subject to the necessity imposed by what moves it. The motion that imparts movement is bound to the love of the thinking substance. For soul would be incorporeal, having no share in the natural body.[1275]

1273. The opening repeats 1c and continues it. "With it" is supplied to express the joint thinking suggested by synnoousa; its precise relation to the following "understanding of harmony" is uncertain. The phrase can also emphasize the soul's act of considering. The intelligible world is the realm apprehended by thought.

1274. This sentence is textually strained. Wachsmuth rejects en, "in," before "its own thought," but leaves onomati zōēn, "life in name," in the text while proposing its removal in the apparatus. The English follows the comparison expressed by homoian with the dative and preserves the extra phrase. The rejected en would instead make thought the sphere of motion, "in its own thought." Its awkward position remains visible in English brackets. No conjectural repair is adopted.

1275. The feminine pronouns can apply to both life and motion; the English leaves that shared application open. Autexousios means having authority over oneself. "Love" translates erōs, which relates the imparting of motion to thinking substance. Wachsmuth retains asōmatos, "incorporeal," while proposing its deletion in the apparatus; the translation retains it too.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

6.3 I.49.6.3

Εἰ γὰρ ἔχει σῶμα, οὔτε λόγον ἔχει οὔτε νόησιν. Πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἀνόητον· μεταλαβὸν δὲ οὐσίας τὸ εἶναι ζῷον ἔμπνουν ἔσχε. Καὶ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος, ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ καλοῦ θεωρητικός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα τῶν φαινομένων κριτικόν ἐστι. Διῄρηται δὲ εἰς τὰς ὀργανικὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἔστι τι μέρος αὐτοῦ πνευματικὴ ὅρασις καὶ πνεῦμα ἀκουστικὸν καὶ ὀσφρητικὸν καὶ γευστικὸν καὶ ἁπτικόν. Τοῦτο τὸ πνεῦμα ἀνάλογον γενόμενον διανοίας κρίνει τὸ αἰσθητικόν, εἰ δὲ μή, φαντάζεται μόνον. Τοῦ γὰρ σώματός ἐστι καὶ δεκτικὸν πάντων. Ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ τὸ φρονοῦν.

6.4 I.49.6.4

Συνυπάρχει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἡ τῶν τιμίων γνῶσις, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι ἡ δόξα. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος κόσμου τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

6.3 · Breath, perception, and thought

I.49.6.3

For if it has a body, it has neither reason nor thought. Every body is without thought; but by sharing in substance it has acquired existence as a breathing living creature. Breath belongs to the body, while the reason of the substance contemplates the beautiful. Perceptive breath judges appearances. It is divided among the senses that operate through organs: one part of it is vision through breath, and there is breath for hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. When this breath comes into correspondence with understanding, it judges what is perceived; otherwise it merely receives appearances. For it belongs to the body and is receptive to everything. But the reason of the substance is that which thinks.[1276]

6.4 · Knowledge and opinion

I.49.6.4

Knowledge of things worthy of honor accompanies reason, while opinion accompanies breath. For the one has its activity from the surrounding cosmos, the other from itself.[1277]

1276. Pneuma is the breath-like medium of the bodily senses, distinguished from the soul's logos. "What is perceived" renders to aisthētikon according to its place as the object of judgment; the expression can also denote the perceptive faculty. Phantazetai is rendered "receives appearances," in contrast to judging them. The printed kalou, "beautiful," is retained rather than the manuscript's earlier katholou, "universal," recorded in the apparatus.

1277. The final contrast is compressed. The neuter "the one" points to pneuma, breath; the feminine "the other" is most naturally taken here as gnōsis, knowledge, though doxa, opinion, is also feminine. The English leaves the pronouns visible. This reading contrasts breath's dependence on the surrounding world with knowledge's inner activity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

<Περὶ μερῶν> I.49.7a.heading

<Περὶ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς.>

7a · <Ἀετίου> I.49.7a

. . . . .

Ἀπολλοφάνης <ἐξ ἐννέα μερῶν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι>.

Περὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀφθαρσίας I.49.7b.heading

Περὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς.

7b · <Ἀετίου> I.49.7b

Ἀριστοτέλης ἀκίνητον τὴν ψυχήν, πάσης κινήσεως προηγουμένην, τῆς δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχειν, καθάπερ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ καθάπαξ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς σώμασιν εἴδη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

<On the parts of the soul> I.49.7a.heading

<On the parts of the soul.>[1278]

7a · <Aëtius>: Apollophanes I.49.7a

. . . . .

Apollophanes <says that the soul consists of nine parts>.[1279]

On motion and indestructibility I.49.7b.heading

On the motion and indestructibility of the soul.[1280]

7b · <Aëtius>: Aristotle on motion I.49.7b

Aristotle holds that the soul is unmoved and precedes every motion, but participates in motion incidentally, as do shapes, boundaries, and, in general, the forms belonging to bodies.[1281]

1278. This topic heading is restored by Wachsmuth. His apparatus, following Elter, uses Photius's list of philosophers and the parallel account in Tertullian, On the Soul 14, as evidence that material on the soul's parts has been lost here. The following dots and supplement belong to that reconstruction; they do not represent a cut made in this translation.

1279. Wachsmuth's editorial attribution is to Aëtius IV.4 (Diels, pp. 389ff.). The name stands outside the angle brackets, but the doctrinal statement is supplied. The nine parts are not named here. Other lost material is inferred in the apparatus, but no further reconstruction is printed or inserted into this translation.

1280. Unlike the preceding topic heading, this one is printed without angle brackets. Aphtharsia means immunity from destruction or decay; athanasia, "immortality," is the related but distinct term used in some of the following passages.

1281. The editorial source label reads Aëtius IV.3.2, Diels p. 392. "Incidentally" translates kata symbebēkos: a shape can move because the body whose shape it is moves. The report distinguishes this from movement belonging to the soul itself. "Precedes" preserves proēgoumenēn without making it a claim of temporal priority.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

7c.1 · <Ἀετίου καὶ Πλάτωνος> I.49.7c.1

Πλάτων ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀεικίνητον.

Λέγει γοῦν ἐν Φαίδωνι·

Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· Ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καλῶς, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι <ᾖ>, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται, ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ.

7c.2 I.49.7c.2

Ἐπεὶ εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν <ὧν> νῦν σὺ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἐστί τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

7c.1 · <Aëtius and Plato>: Cebes' doubt I.49.7c.1

Plato holds that it is indestructible and always in motion.

He says, at any rate, in the Phaedo:

When Socrates had said this, Cebes took up the discussion. "Socrates," he said, "the other things seem to me well said. But what concerns the soul causes people much disbelief. They fear that, once released from the body, it may no longer <exist> anywhere, but may be destroyed and perish on the very day the person dies; that immediately on leaving the body and departing from it, scattered like breath or smoke, it may fly away and no longer be anything anywhere."[1282]

7c.2 · Survival must include understanding I.49.7c.2

"For if it existed somewhere on its own, gathered together and released from those evils <which> you have just described, Socrates, there would be great and noble hope that what you say is true. But perhaps no little reassurance and convincing evidence are needed for this: that the soul exists after the person has died and possesses some power and understanding."[1283]

1282. The opening report is editorially assigned to Aëtius (printed IV.3.1, Diels p. 392), followed by Phaedo 69e-70b. Cebes raises an objection to survival, rather than denying it outright. The supplied ēi restores the verb "exist." The fear construction continues through the image of dispersion. Modern quotation marks and paragraphing clarify the dialogue; they do not add speaker labels to the Greek.

1283. Cebes asks for more than a surviving remnant: soul must retain power and phronēsis, understanding. Its being "gathered together" answers the preceding fear of dispersal like smoke. Paramythia combines reassurance with persuasive explanation; pistis is the assurance or grounds of conviction that the argument is to provide. The restored relative pronoun remains marked.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

7c.3 I.49.7c.3

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; - Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμ᾽ ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.

8.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.8.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις λόγος οὗτος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκεῖ; Οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι· καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γένοιτο, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

7c.3 · Socrates proposes an inquiry I.49.7c.3

“What you say is true, Cebes,” said Socrates. “But what shall we do? Would you like us to discuss these very matters, whether they are likely to be so or not?”

“I, at any rate,” said Cebes, “would gladly hear what opinion you hold about them.”[1284]

8.1 · Plato: an old account of return I.49.8.1

In the same work.

“Now there is this old account that we remember: souls exist there after arriving from here, and return here again and come into being from the dead. If this is so, if the living come into being again from those who have died, must not our souls exist there? For they could hardly come into being again if they did not exist. This would be sufficient evidence that these things are so, if it actually became clear that the living come into being from no other source than the dead. If that is not the case, some other argument would be needed.”

“Certainly,” said Cebes.[1285]

1284. Socrates accepts the need for an argument. Diamythologein here introduces a discussion or account; the question remains whether the proposed state of affairs is likely. The next excerpt supplies the argument from the generation of opposites.

1285. Phaedo 70c-71a and 71c-72a are joined in this excerpt. The opening feminine participle leaves “souls” understood, which the English supplies. “There” refers to the realm of the dead, and “here” to the living world. The old account is a starting point whose crucial premise is still to be examined.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.2 I.49.8.2

Μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἆρα οὐτωσὶ γίγνεται ἅπαντα οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου.

8.3 I.49.8.3

Οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; - Ναί. - Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; - Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτω. - Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον; - Πάνυ γε. - Τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἐὰν δικαιότερον, οὐκ ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; - Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; - Ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; - Πάνυ γε. - . . . . .

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.2 · The generation of opposites I.49.8.2

"Then do not consider this only in human beings," he said, "if you want to understand it more easily. Let us examine all animals and plants, and, in a word, everything that comes into being: does everything arise in this way, opposite from opposite and from no other source, wherever there is such an opposition? For example, the beautiful is surely opposite to the ugly, the just to the unjust, and countless other things stand in this relation. Let us therefore consider whether, for everything that has an opposite, it must come into being from no other source than its own opposite."[1286]

8.3 · Greater and smaller, better and worse I.49.8.3

"For example, when something becomes larger, must it not have been smaller before and then become larger?" "Yes."

"And if it becomes smaller, will it not have been larger before and afterward become smaller?" "That is so," he said.

"And the weaker comes from the stronger, the faster from the slower?" "Certainly."

"What about this: if something becomes worse, does it not come from being better, and if more just, from being more unjust?" "Of course."

"Have we then sufficiently established," he said, "that all things arise in this way, opposite things from their opposites?" "Certainly."

. . . . .[1287]

1286. The inquiry concerns things that have opposites; the qualification must not disappear into an unrestricted claim that everything has an opposite. Kalon and aischron can carry ethical as well as aesthetic meanings. "Beautiful" and "ugly" retain the broad contrast, followed by the explicitly ethical pair just and unjust.

1287. The examples concern transitions between contrary conditions. The dots are printed in Wachsmuth and mark the discontinuity between Phaedo 71a and 71c. The intervening discussion is not supplied here. The next passage applies the pattern to living and being dead.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.4 I.49.8.4

Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. - Τί; - Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. - Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων; - Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

8.5 I.49.8.5

Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. Λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἱκανῶς σοι ἔφην ἢ οὔ; - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.4 · Living and being dead I.49.8.4

"What then?" he said. "Does living have an opposite, as sleeping is opposite to being awake?"

"Certainly," he said.

"What is it?"

"Being dead," he said.

"Then these arise from one another, if they are opposites, and there are two processes of becoming between them, since they are two?"

"Of course."[1288]

8.5 · The comparison with sleep and waking I.49.8.5

"I will describe one of the two pairs I was just speaking of," said Socrates, "both the pair itself and the processes of becoming; you describe the other to me. I mean sleeping and being awake: being awake arises from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake. Of their processes of becoming, one is falling asleep and the other waking up. Have I explained it sufficiently to you, or not?"

"Certainly."[1289]

1288. The opposition is between living and being dead, while the processes connecting them are dying and coming back to life. Keeping state and transition distinct is essential to the next steps. The comparison with sleeping and waking gives a familiar example of movement in both directions.

1289. The printed ephēn, "I said," makes the last question first-person; the translation retains it rather than the alternative ephē, "he said," recorded from Plato. Syzygia is a pair joined in a relation. The distinction between a state and the process of entering it continues from the preceding unit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.6 I.49.8.6

Λέγε δὴ καὶ σύ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. Οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; - Ἔγωγε. - Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; - Ναί. - Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; - Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. - <Τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; - Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν,> ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. - Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; - Φαίνεται, ἔφη. - Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου. - Ἔοικεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.6 · From the living to the dead and back

I.49.8.6

"Now you tell me in the same way," he said, "about life and death. Do you not say that being dead is opposite to living?" "I do."

"And that they arise from one another?" "Yes."

"Then what arises from what is living?" "What is dead," he said.

<"And what," he said, "arises from what is dead?" "One must admit," he said,> "that it is what is living."

"Then living things and living people arise from the dead, Cebes?" "It appears so," he said.

"Then our souls exist in Hades," he said. "So it seems."[1290]

1290. The restored question and the first part of its answer are absent from F and P and supplied from Plato. Their brackets are retained across the change of speaker. The Greek distinguishes living things (neuter) and living people (masculine); both are represented. Hades here names the realm of the dead.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.7

I.49.8.7

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἤ γ᾽ ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὔ; - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. - Πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ποιήσομεν; <οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν> τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν; - Πάντως που, ἔφη. - Τίνα ταύτην; - Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.

8.8

I.49.8.8

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων <ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; - Πάνυ γε. - Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων> γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· τούτου δὲ ὄντος, ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι, ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. - Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

8.7 · The opposite process

I.49.8.7

“And of the two processes of becoming involved here, is not one at least clear? Dying is surely clear, is it not?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“What then shall we do?” he said. “<Shall we not assign in return> the opposite process of becoming? Will nature be lame in this respect? Or must we assign to dying an opposite process?”

“Surely we must,” he said.

“What is it?”

“Coming back to life.”[1291]

8.8 · The conclusion from the cycle

I.49.8.8

“Then,” he said, “if coming back to life exists, <would this be a process of becoming that leads> from the dead <to the living, namely coming back to life?” “Certainly.” “We agree, then, on this ground also, that the living> have come into being <from the dead> no less than the dead from the living. And if this is so, it seemed sufficient evidence that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere, from which they come into being again.”

“From what we have agreed,” he said, “it seems to me necessary that this should be so, Socrates.”[1292]

1291. The supplemented words restore the question from Plato. Nature’s being “lame” pictures an incomplete pair of contrary processes. Anabiōskesthai means returning to life; in this argument it is the process required to balance dying, rather than a detailed description of how rebirth occurs.

1292. The long supplement restores an exchange and part of the concluding statement from Plato. English word order requires its brackets to be distributed, while the continuous Greek supplement remains visible opposite. The conclusion depends on the agreed two-way process; the translation preserves the qualifications “if” and “from what we have agreed.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.9.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν τῷ συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ᾗπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ; - Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. - Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ <ταὐτά>, ταῦτα <δὲ> σύνθετα; - Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. . . . . .

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.1 · Plato: what can be dissolved? I.49.9.1

In the same work.

“Is it not naturally fitting for what has been put together and is composite to undergo this: to be divided in the way in which it was put together? If something is uncompounded, does it not belong to that alone, if to anything, to escape these changes?”

“That seems to me to be so,” said Cebes.

“Then the things that always remain the same and in the same condition are most likely to be uncompounded; <but> those that vary from one time to another and never remain <the same> are composite?”

“That is how it seems to me.”

. . . . . [1293]

1293. The excerpt joins Phaedo 78c with 79a-80e; Wachsmuth’s heading gives 78b-c and 79a-80d. Its dots mark the printed discontinuity. The supplied tauta and de are represented in English, with “but” moved to its natural position. The argument proceeds from composition and change to the distinction between visible and unseen things. “Most likely” retains eikos; it is not a categorical identification.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.2 I.49.9.2

Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές; - Θῶμεν, ἔφη. - Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; - Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. - Φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; - Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.

9.3 I.49.9.3

Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; - Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. - Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀειδές; - Οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. - Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴῃ; - Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.2 · Visible and unseen kinds of being I.49.9.2

“Shall we then posit,” he said, “two kinds of things that are, one visible and the other unseen?”

“Let us do so,” he said.

“And that the unseen remains the same, while the visible never remains the same?”

“Let us posit that too,” he said.

“Come then,” he said, “are we ourselves anything other than body on the one hand and soul on the other?”

“Nothing else,” he said.[1294]

9.3 · The body belongs with the visible I.49.9.3

“To which kind, then, would we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?”

“It is clear to everyone,” he said, “that it is the visible.”

“And the soul: visible or unseen?”

“Not visible to human beings, at any rate, Socrates,” he said.

“But we were speaking of what is visible or not to human nature. Or do you think we meant some other nature?”

“Human nature.”[1295]

1294. Eidē here means kinds or classes; the statement divides things that are into visible and unseen. Aeides, “unseen,” will later be linked by wordplay with Hades. The English question about our composition renders the compressed allo ti ... ē construction as a request for agreement.

1295. The qualification concerns visibility to human observers. The Greek answer “not by human beings” leaves the verb of seeing implicit; the English makes that implication explicit. Kinship with a kind is the argument’s claim at this stage, rather than identity with it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.4 I.49.9.4

Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; - Οὐχ ὁρατόν. - Ἀειδὲς ἄρα; - Ναί. - Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ; - Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

9.5 I.49.9.5

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι), τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; - Πάνυ γε.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.4 · The soul's affinity with the unseen I.49.9.4

"Then what do we say about the soul: is it visible or invisible?"

"Not visible."

"Unseen, then?"

"Yes."

"Then soul is more like the unseen than body is, and body more like the visible?"

"It must be so, Socrates."[1296]

9.5 · The soul drawn into bodily perception I.49.9.5

"And did we not say some time ago that when soul uses the body to examine something, through sight or hearing or any other sense (for examining something through a sense is what 'through the body' means), it is drawn by the body toward things that never remain the same? The soul itself then wanders, is disturbed, and grows dizzy as though drunk, because it is in contact with such things."

"Certainly."[1297]

1296. Both aoraton and aeides express the absence of visibility. The genitive sōmatos makes the comparison "more like the unseen than body is"; the second clause supplies body as the contrasting subject. This conclusion concerns resemblance, which the next passages develop through the soul's activity.

1297. The bodily senses direct soul toward changing objects, and the soul's condition is described as reflecting their instability. The imagery of wandering and drunkenness is part of the comparison; "in contact with" translates ephaptomenē without making this an assertion of physical contact between soul and object.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.6 I.49.9.6

Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ συγγενὴς αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἀεὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; - Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

9.7 I.49.9.7

Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον; - Πᾶς ἂν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, συγχωρήσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. - Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; - Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.6 · Thought in contact with the unchanging I.49.9.6

"But when it examines things by itself, it goes toward what is pure, everlasting, immortal, and unchanging. Being akin to that, it is always in its company whenever it comes to be on its own and is able to do so. It has ceased its wandering and, in relation to those things, always remains in the same condition, because it is in contact with things of that kind. And is this condition of the soul called understanding?"

"What you say is entirely right and true, Socrates," he said.[1298]

9.7 · Which kind is closer to soul? I.49.9.7

"Then, from both the earlier discussion and what has now been said, to which kind does soul seem to you more similar and more closely akin?"

"From this line of inquiry, Socrates," he said, "I think everyone, even the slowest learner, would agree that soul is altogether more like what always remains the same than what does not."

"And the body?"

"The other kind."[1299]

1298. Phronēsis is rendered "understanding," as in Cebes' request above. The soul's steadiness is connected with the character of what it apprehends. Pathēma here denotes its state or condition, not necessarily suffering. The qualifications "whenever" and "is able" remain part of the claim.

1299. Methodos is the course of inquiry or argument just followed. The emphatic holōi kai panti, "altogether," strengthens the comparison; it does not erase its comparative form. The body is assigned the contrary affinity.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.8 I.49.9.8

Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῇδε· ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὖ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι, ἢ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; - Ἔοικε. - Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικε; - Δῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.8 · Ruling and being ruled

I.49.9.8

“Consider it in this way too. When soul and body are together, nature commands the one to serve and be ruled, the other to rule and exercise mastery. In these respects, which seems to you like the divine and which like the mortal? Does the divine not seem to you naturally fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to be ruled and serve?”

“So it seems.”

“Then which does soul resemble?”

“Plainly, Socrates, soul resembles the divine, and body the mortal.”[1300]

1300. The grammatical genders identify body as what serves and soul as what rules. The account uses the language of command and mastery to establish a further resemblance between soul and the divine. This is an analogy within Socrates’ argument, not a separate statement that every actual human action is governed by reason.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.9 I.49.9.9

Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ, ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότερον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. Ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἄλλο, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ὡς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; - Οὐκ ἔχομεν. - Τί οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων τούτων ἆρ᾽ οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; - Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.9 · The combined comparison I.49.9.9

“Consider, Cebes,” he said, “whether all that has been said yields this result for us: soul is most like what is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, and indissoluble, always remaining the same as itself in the same condition; body, in turn, is more like what is human, mortal, unintelligible, multiform, dissoluble, and never remaining the same as itself. Can we say anything against this, dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?”

“We cannot.”

“If that is how matters stand, is it not fitting for body to be dissolved quickly, and for soul to be altogether indissoluble, or something close to that?”

“Of course.”[1301]

1301. “Or something close to that” is a significant qualification and is retained. Mono-eides and poly-eides contrast uniformity with multiplicity of form. Anoēton stands opposite noēton, intelligible, so here it is rendered “unintelligible,” not “unthinking.” Wachsmuth reports that manuscript P omits the text from “and indissoluble” onward through a later passage on p. 335; his printed text continues from other evidence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.10 I.49.9.10

Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ σῶμα καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ὃ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον· ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. Συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον· ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐὰν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ὁμοίως, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὔ; - Ναί.

9.11 I.49.9.11

Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς [τὸ] τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης καὶ Σιμμία.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

9.10 · The persistence of the body

I.49.9.10

“Do you observe, then,” he said, “that when a person dies, the visible body, lying in the visible world, which we call a corpse and which is liable to dissolve, fall apart, and disperse into the air, undergoes none of these things immediately? It remains for a fairly long time, and for a very long time indeed if the person dies with the body in good condition and at a suitable season. For when the body shrivels and is embalmed, like those embalmed in Egypt, it remains almost whole for an extraordinarily long time. And even if it decays, some parts of the body, bones and sinews and all such things alike, are, so to speak, immortal. Are they not?”

“Yes.”[1302]

9.11 · The soul’s departure to the unseen

I.49.9.11

“And soul, then, the unseen, which departs to another place of the same kind, noble and pure and unseen, to Hades in the truest sense, to the good and wise god, where, if the god wills, my own soul must soon go: will a soul of this kind and with this nature, on being released from the body, immediately have been blown away and destroyed, as most people say? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias.”[1303]

1302. The body’s persistence prepares a comparison with the soul; “so to speak” explicitly qualifies the description of bones and sinews as immortal. “Shrivels” renders sympeson, literally collapsing or drawing together, in the context of preservation. The printed homoiōs, “alike,” is retained rather than the alternative homōs, “nevertheless,” noted in the apparatus.

1303. The verbal association between aeides, “unseen,” and Hades is part of the passage’s wordplay, not an etymology asserted by this edition. Socrates speaks of his own approaching death. The extra Greek article to after “to” is rejected by Wachsmuth and remains bracketed opposite; it has no natural separate English equivalent. The conditional “if the god wills” is retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

10 · Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κρατύλου I.49.10

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Κρατύλου.

Οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν τι νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο ἄρα, ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυται καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν ψυχὴν αὐτὸ καλέσαι.

11.1 · Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου I.49.11.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδρου.

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. Τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλου κινούμενον παῦλαν ἔχον ζωῆς παῦλαν ἔχει κινήσεως. Μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται, τοῦτο γὰρ πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

10 · Plato, Cratylus: the name of soul I.49.10

Plato, from the Cratylus.

I think those who gave soul its name had something like this in mind: when it is present in the body, it is the cause of the body's living, providing the power to breathe and refreshing it; but as soon as what refreshes it fails, the body perishes and dies. That, I think, is why they called it psychē, soul.[1304]

11.1 · Plato, Phaedrus: self-motion I.49.11.1

Plato, from the Phaedrus.

Every soul is immortal. For what is always in motion is immortal; but what moves something else and is moved by something else ceases to move when its life ceases. Only what moves itself, since it does not abandon itself, never stops moving; for it is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things that move.[1305]

1304. Cratylus 399d-e. The proposed explanation connects psychē, "soul," with anapsychon, "refreshing" or "cooling," alongside breathing. Keeping psychē in the English makes the wordplay visible. This is the explanation offered in the quoted dialogue, not an established historical derivation of the word.

1305. Phaedrus 245c-246a. Wachsmuth prints "when its life ceases, its motion ceases"; his apparatus records the reversed order in Plato, "when its motion ceases, its life ceases." The English follows the printed Stobaeus. The argument distinguishes motion received from something else from motion whose source is the moving thing itself.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

11.2 I.49.11.2

Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἑνός. Εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄφθορον αὐτὸ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. Ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι.

11.3 I.49.11.3

Οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὖν οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

11.2 · A beginning cannot come into being

I.49.11.2

A beginning does not come into being. For everything that comes into being must come from a beginning, while the beginning itself comes from nothing. For if a beginning came from something, it would not come from a beginning. Since it does not come into being, it must also be indestructible. For if a beginning were destroyed, neither would it ever come into being from anything nor would anything else come from it, if everything must come into being from a beginning.[1306]

11.3 · The source of all motion

I.49.11.3

Thus the beginning of motion is what itself moves itself. This can neither perish nor come into being; otherwise the whole heaven and the whole process of becoming would collapse and stand still, and would never again have a source from which they could be set in motion and come into being.[1307]

1306. Archē means a beginning or originating principle. “It would not come from a beginning” follows the difficult printed ex archēs; the apparatus records the alternative archē, which gives the more familiar “it would no longer be a beginning.” The translation preserves the base text rather than repairing its reasoning. “Comes from nothing” means it has no source from which it originates, not that it is created out of nothing.

1307. The argument now connects the persistence of self-motion with the possibility of motion throughout the cosmos. Genesis, “becoming,” includes the coming into being of things, not merely human birth. The alternative introduced by “otherwise” is the consequence the argument treats as unacceptable.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

11.4 I.49.11.4

Ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. Πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον· ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς. Εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο οὕτως, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη.

11.5 I.49.11.5

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον· οἷον μὲν ἐστί, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. Ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. Ἐοικέτω δὴ ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

11.4 · Self-motion as the nature of soul

I.49.11.4

Since what moves itself has been shown to be immortal, one need feel no shame in saying that this very thing is the essence and account of soul. For every body whose motion comes from outside is soulless, while a body whose motion itself comes from within, from itself, is ensouled, since this is the nature of soul. If this is so, if what itself moves itself is nothing other than soul, then soul must necessarily be both ungenerated and immortal.[1308]

11.5 · The winged team and charioteer

I.49.11.5

Enough, then, about its immortality. Concerning its form, we must speak in this way: to describe what it is would require an account wholly divine and lengthy; to say what it resembles requires a human and shorter one. Let us therefore speak in the latter way. Let it resemble the combined power of a winged team and a charioteer, grown together as one.[1309]

1308. Ousia and logos identify what soul is and the account defining it. Apsychon and empsychon are rendered “soulless” and “ensouled” to retain the explicit reference to psychē. The printed auto in the clause about inward motion is retained and understood with motion. The passage states a philosophical criterion of life; its conclusion depends on identifying soul with self-motion.

1309. The passage explicitly distinguishes an account of what soul is from an image of what it resembles. The team is a pair of horses, governed by a charioteer; the excerpt ends before the image is developed. Symphytos, “grown together,” describes their united power. Idea is rendered “form” here without treating it automatically as a separately existing Platonic Form.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

12 · Ἡροδότου ἱστορία β′ I.49.12

Ἡροδότου ἱστορία β′.

Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατόν ἐστι· τοῦ δὲ σώματος καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γενόμενον ἐσδύνειν· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. Τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο οἳ μὲν πρότερον, οἳ δὲ ὕστερον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

12 · Herodotus: the soul's circuit

I.49.12

Herodotus, Histories, Book II.

The Egyptians were also the first to state this account: that the human soul is immortal, and when the body perishes it enters another living creature as each comes into being; and when it has passed through all the creatures of land, sea, and air, it enters again a human body that has come into being. The soul completes this circuit in three thousand years. Certain Greeks adopted this account, some earlier and others later.[1310]

1310. Histories II.123. The claim of Egyptian priority and the three-thousand-year circuit belong to Herodotus's report; they are not presented as independently verified history. The excerpt names none of the Greeks who adopted the account. The Greek retains Ionic forms and the printed shift from a finite verb ("enters") to an infinitive in reported speech; the English keeps that report continuous.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.1 · Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος I.49.13.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ; - Τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ. - Τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλο τι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐντεθῆναι; - Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ἐπείσθην ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. - Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ γε ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτέ ἔτι δόξειεν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.1 · Plato: recollection reconsidered

I.49.13.1

Plato, from the Phaedo.

“Then,” he said, “do you reject all the preceding arguments, or accept some and reject others?”

“Some we accept,” they both said, “and others we reject.”

“What, then,” he said, “do you say about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection, and that, if this is so, our soul must surely have existed earlier, before being placed in the body?”

“For my part,” said Cebes, “I was wonderfully persuaded by it then, and now I stand by it as by no other argument.”

“I feel the same myself,” said Simmias, “and I would be very surprised if I ever came to think differently about this.”[1311]

1311. Phaedo 91e-95a. The dual ephatēn identifies the answer as shared by Cebes and Simmias. The question recalls a prior argument, rather than reproducing its proof. Wachsmuth prints the separate words allo ti, rendered “surely,” where his apparatus records allothi, “elsewhere,” in Plato. Entethēnai means being placed in the body; the alternative endethēnai, being bound in it, is not substituted.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.2 I.49.13.2

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλο δόξαι, ἄνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι. Οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία ξυγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξῃ; - Οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

13.3 I.49.13.3

Αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δ᾽ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις· ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. Οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ τῷ λόγῳ πῶς ξυναινέσεται; - Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.2 · Harmony requires its constituents I.49.13.2

And Socrates said: “But, my Theban friend, you must think differently if this opinion remains: that harmony is a composite thing, and soul is a kind of harmony composed of the things held in tension throughout the body. Surely you will not accept your own assertion that a harmony was already composed before there existed that from which it had to be composed. Or will you?”

“By no means, Socrates,” he said.[1312]

13.3 · The lyre comes before its harmony I.49.13.3

“Do you realize, then,” he said, “that you are saying just this when you say that soul exists before even arriving in human form and body, yet is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not like the thing to which you compare it. The lyre, the strings, and the notes, still unattuned, come into being first; harmony is formed last of all and perishes first. How, then, will this argument of yours agree with the other?”

“In no way,” said Simmias.[1313]

1312. Harmonia is the fitting together or attunement of constituents, illustrated below by a lyre and its strings. The proposal under examination makes soul dependent on the bodily elements whose tension produces it. The unusual singular ekeino before the plural “from which” is retained in Greek and represented by the collective “that” in English.

1313. The contradiction is between pre-existence and dependence on a later bodily composition. The temporal order of lyre, strings, notes, and harmony is essential: harmony cannot precede its constituents. Xynainesetai, the printed verb, asks whether the two accounts will agree; musical language becomes more explicit in the next exchange.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.4 I.49.13.4

Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πρέπει γε, εἴπερ τῳ̣ ἄλλῳ̣ λόγῳ̣ ξυνῳ̣δῷ̣ εἶναι καὶ τῷ̣ περὶ ἁρμονίας. - Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. - Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοι οὐ ξυνῳ̣δός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα· πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν; - Πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας· ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσι, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ̣ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.

13.5 I.49.13.5

Ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν ἢ εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν. Ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδειγμαι. Ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ὡς ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ὡς ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.4 · An argument that must be in tune

I.49.13.4

"Yet surely," he said, "if any argument ought to be in tune, the argument about harmony ought to be so too."

"It certainly ought," said Simmias.

"But this argument of yours is out of tune," he said. "Consider which account you choose: that learning is recollection, or that soul is a harmony."

"By far the former, Socrates," he said. "The latter came to me without demonstration, with a certain plausibility and attractive appearance; that is also why most people accept it. But I know that arguments which base their demonstrations on probabilities are impostors. Unless one is on guard against them, they deceive one thoroughly, in geometry and in everything else."[1314]

13.5 · Recollection and what is

I.49.13.5

"But the argument about recollection and learning was stated on the basis of a premise worthy of acceptance. For our soul was said to exist even before entering a body, just as its reality exists, the reality bearing the designation 'what it is.' And I have, as I convince myself, established this adequately and correctly. For these reasons, then, it seems I must accept neither my own assertion nor anyone else's that soul is a harmony."[1315]

1314. Xynōidos, "in tune," plays on the doctrine being discussed. Simmias contrasts a demonstrative argument with an account accepted because it looks persuasive. Eikos can mean likelihood or plausibility; "probabilities" here does not imply a numerical calculation. The assessment is Simmias's reason for withdrawing his proposal.

1315. This compressed sentence connects the soul's prior existence with ousia, reality, designated "what it is." The printed autēs is genitive, "its"; the apparatus proposes hautē, "this," instead. The English retains the genitive. Wachsmuth also prints apodedeigmai, here "I have established," where he records Plato's apodedegmai, "I have accepted." These difficult readings are not silently replaced.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.6 I.49.13.6

Τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν, ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται; - Οὐδαμῶς. - Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ᾽ ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ. - Συνέφη. - Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλὰ ἕπεσθαι. - Συνεδόκει. - Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσι. - Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.6 · Harmony must follow its parts I.49.13.6

“What about this way of looking at it, Simmias?” he said. “Do you think a harmony, or any other composition, can be in a condition different from that of the things of which it is composed?”

“Not at all.”

“Nor, I suppose, can it do or undergo anything other than what those things do or undergo.” He agreed.

“Then harmony cannot lead the things of which it is composed; it must follow them.” He agreed.

“Then a harmony is very far from being able to move or sound contrary to its own parts, or oppose them in any other way.”

“Very far indeed,” he said.[1316]

1316. The conclusion concerns the dependence of a composition on its components: harmony follows their condition and cannot act against them. “Do or undergo” preserves the paired active and passive verbs poiein and paschein. This prepares the later contrast with soul’s resistance to bodily desires.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.7 I.49.13.7

Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη ἁρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ; - Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. - Ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐὰν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων· εἰ δ᾽ ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἔλαττον, ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; - Πάνυ γε. - Ἦ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι, ψυχήν; - Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.7 · Degrees of harmony and of soul I.49.13.7

“What, then? Is not each harmony naturally a harmony according to the way it is attuned?”

“I do not understand,” he said.

“If it is attuned more fully and to a greater degree,” he said, “assuming this can happen, would it not be more of a harmony and a greater one; and if less fully and to a smaller degree, less of a harmony and a smaller one?”

“Certainly.”

“Does this also apply to soul: can one soul be, even in the slightest degree, more or less than another in this very respect, being a soul?”

“Not in any way,” he said.[1317]

1317. The qualification “assuming this can happen” is retained: degrees of attunement are proposed conditionally. Simmias denies degrees of being a soul, which is distinct from the possibility that souls differ in goodness or understanding. Those differences become the next test of his account.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.8 I.49.13.8

Φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; - Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. - Τῶν οὖν τιθεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; Πότερα ἁρμονίαν αὖ τιν᾽ ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὖσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην; - Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε, φησὶν ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.8 · Virtue as a second harmony? I.49.13.8

“Come now, by Zeus,” he said. “Is one soul said to possess understanding and virtue and to be good, while another possesses folly and wickedness and is bad? And is this said truly?”

“Certainly it is true.”

“Then what will someone who maintains that soul is harmony say these things in souls are, virtue and vice? Another harmony and a lack of attunement? Will the good soul be attuned and, itself being a harmony, contain another harmony within itself, while the other is itself unattuned and has no further harmony within it?”

“I cannot say,” says Simmias, “but clearly someone who made that assumption would say something of the kind.”[1318]

1318. The proposed distinction introduces harmony within something already defined as harmony. Anarmostia is lack of attunement, contrasted with aretē, virtue, under the hypothesis. Simmias’s answer remains tentative: he reports what the theory’s defender would have to say, rather than endorsing the added account. The Greek present phēsin is retained as “says.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.9 I.49.13.9

Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ᾽ ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι. Τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον μηδὲ ἧττον, μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι; ἦ γάρ; - Πάνυ γε. - Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; - Ἔστιν. - Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἐστὶν ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; - Τὸ ἴσον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.9 · Equal participation in harmony I.49.13.9

“But it has already been agreed,” he said, “that one soul is neither more nor less a soul than another. Does that agreement mean that one harmony is neither more nor greater, neither less nor smaller, as a harmony, than another? Is that right?”

“Certainly.”

“And what is neither more nor less a harmony is neither more nor less attuned. Is that so?”

“It is.”

“And does what is neither more nor less attuned participate in harmony to any greater or smaller degree, or equally?”

“Equally.”[1319]

1319. The inference continues to assume that soul is harmony. Equality in being a soul is transferred to equality in harmony and attunement. The repeated comparatives are preserved because they form successive steps, rather than redundant descriptions to be removed.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.10

I.49.13.10

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται; - Οὕτω. - Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας <μετέχοι> ἄν. - Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. - Τοῦτο δ᾽ αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ᾽ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη; - Οὐδὲν πλέον. - Μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν· ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ᾽ ἂν μετάσχοι. - Οὐ μέντοι. - Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. - Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.10 · Could a soul contain vice? I.49.13.10

“Then, since one soul is neither more nor less a soul than another, neither is it more nor less attuned?”

“That is so.”

“And in that condition it would <participate> no more in lack of attunement or in harmony.”

“Certainly not.”

“And in that condition could one soul participate in vice or virtue more than another, if vice were lack of attunement and virtue harmony?”

“No more.”

“Rather, Simmias, following the argument strictly, no soul will participate in vice at all, if it is a harmony. For a harmony, being wholly just what it is, a harmony, could never participate in lack of attunement.”

“Certainly not.”

“Nor, surely, could a soul, being wholly a soul, participate in vice.”

“How could it, given what has been said?”[1320]

1320. The supplied metechoi, “participate,” is absent from F and P and restored from Plato. The conclusion that no soul could contain vice is a consequence used against the harmony hypothesis, not Socrates’ positive doctrine. “Following the argument strictly” renders kata ton orthon logon in the course of that test.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.11 I.49.13.11

Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχαί. - Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. - Ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. - Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

13.12 I.49.13.12

Τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ᾽ ὅ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; - Οὐκ ἔγωγε. - Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα παθήμασιν, ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία ἐροῦμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ; - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.11 · An unacceptable consequence I.49.13.11

“Then according to this argument all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if souls are equally constituted to be just this, souls.”

“So it seems to me, Socrates,” he said.

“And does it seem right for the account to be stated this way,” he said, “and would the argument have these consequences if the premise that soul is harmony were correct?”

“Not in any way,” he said.[1321]

13.12 · Soul resists bodily desires I.49.13.12

“What, then?” he said. “Of everything in a human being, do you say that anything governs except soul, especially a wise soul?”

“I do not.”

“Does it yield to the body’s conditions, or does it also oppose them? I mean this sort of thing: when heat and thirst are present, it pulls in the opposite direction, toward not drinking; when hunger is present, toward not eating. And we shall describe countless other cases in which soul opposes what concerns the body, shall we not?”

“Certainly.”[1322]

1321. “All living creatures” preserves the scope of zōiōn. The conclusion conflicts with the accepted difference between good and bad souls. The question challenges the premise by its consequences; it is not a claim that every living creature is in fact equally good. Wachsmuth’s sentence ends with a full stop, although its force is interrogative.

1322. The argument returns to governing and following. The examples concern soul’s capacity to resist a bodily impulse, not a general recommendation to refuse food or drink. “We shall describe” follows the printed eroumen, rather than horōmen, “we see,” recorded from Plato in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.13 I.49.13.13

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτε ταύτην, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἀλλ᾽ ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; - Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

13.14 I.49.13.14

Τί οὖν νῦν; οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον φαίνεται ἡμῖν ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων, ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ᾽ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷον που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα·

13.15 · Ὁμήρου I.49.13.15

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη, καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ᾽ ἔτλης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.13 · A harmony cannot sing against its parts I.49.13.13

"Yet did we not agree earlier that, if it were a harmony, it could never sing contrary to the tension, relaxation, plucking, or any other condition of the things of which it consists, but must follow them and could never lead?"

"We agreed," he said. "Of course we did."[1323]

13.14 · Command, correction, and persuasion I.49.13.14

"What, then, do we find now? Does it not appear to do the very opposite, leading all those things of which someone says it consists, opposing them in almost everything throughout life, and exercising mastery in every way? Some it disciplines more harshly and painfully, as in physical training and medicine; others more gently. Sometimes it threatens, sometimes admonishes, addressing desires, anger, and fears as one thing speaking to another. Homer too has represented something like this in the Odyssey, where he says of Odysseus:"[1324]

13.15 · Homer: Odysseus addresses his heart I.49.13.15

He struck his breast and rebuked his heart with words:
"Endure, my heart: once you endured something still more dreadful."[1325]

1323. The verbs return to the strings of the lyre. Psalloito refers to plucking, the reading printed here; the apparatus records palloito, vibration or shaking, in Plato. The image supplies the contrast with the soul's resistance and command described in the next passage.

1324. The repeated contrast between one thing and another gives the dialogue within a person its argumentative role. The soul appears to command and address the very bodily constituents from which the harmony theory would derive it. Gymnastikē denotes physical training; the comparison also includes the painful treatment of medicine.

1325. Odyssey XX.17-18, as quoted here. Kynteron, literally "more dog-like," is an emphatic word for something more shameless or dreadful. "Dreadful" suits the remembered ordeal without inserting the wider narrative. The two lines remain verse; Socrates uses the act of self-address as evidence for the soul's ruling activity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.16

I.49.13.16

Ἆρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς ἢ καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν; - Νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. - Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. - Ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

13.17

I.49.13.17

Εἶεν δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἴλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; - Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

13.16 · Agreement with Homer and ourselves

I.49.13.16

"Do you think he composed these lines with the thought that soul is a harmony, liable to be led by bodily conditions, rather than fitted to lead and master them, and itself something far more divine than a harmony?"

"Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is how it seems to me."

"Then, my good friend, it is in no way right for us to say that soul is a kind of harmony. For, it seems, we would agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That is so," he said.[1326]

13.17 · From Harmonia to Cadmus

I.49.13.17

"Very well," said Socrates. "It seems we have managed to make Theban Harmonia reasonably gracious toward us. But what of Cadmus, Cebes?" he said. "How shall we appease him, and with what argument?"

"I think you will find one," said Cebes.[1327]

1326. Simmias's affirmative reply follows a question whose alternatives are compressed. The argument requires agreement with the latter description, soul as ruler, as Socrates' conclusion confirms; the English retains the question and reply rather than replacing the reply with a negative. "Far more divine" remains a comparison, not an identification of soul with a particular god.

1327. Harmonia is both the name of the mythical wife of Cadmus and the word for harmony; their marriage is related in Apollodorus, Library III.4.2 (Theoi Classical Texts Library, https://www.theoi.com/Text/Apollodorus3.html). Socrates turns the pair into a playful transition from Simmias's harmony objection to Cebes' remaining difficulty. The language of appeasement continues the personification.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

14.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.14.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. Ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἂν βούλῃ, τά γ᾽ ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἐάν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσῃ. - Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. - Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος.

14.2 I.49.14.2

Ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανον γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε· ἆρ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συστρέφεται·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

14.1 · Plato: a question about causes I.49.14.1

In the same work.

Socrates paused for a considerable time and considered something within himself. “What you are asking is no small matter, Cebes,” he said. “We must examine comprehensively the cause of coming into being and passing away. So, if you wish, I will recount my own experiences concerning these things. Then, if anything I say seems useful to you, you can use it to reach conviction about the matters you are discussing.”

“I certainly wish it,” said Cebes.

“Listen, then: I will tell you.”[1328]

14.2 · The attraction of inquiry into nature I.49.14.2

“When I was young, Cebes,” he said, “I had an extraordinary desire for that wisdom which they call inquiry into nature. It seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the causes of each thing: why it comes into being, why it perishes, and why it exists. I often shifted this way and that, first examining questions like these: is it when the hot and the cold undergo some kind of putrefaction, as certain people said, that living creatures take shape?”[1329]

1328. Phaedo 95e-96c. Genesis and phthora are coming into being and passing away, the general processes whose explanation bears on the soul’s survival. “My own experiences” introduces Socrates’ account of his intellectual inquiry as Plato presents it in the dialogue; it is not an independent autobiographical document.

1329. Historia here means inquiry or investigation. The printed hyperēphanon characterizes knowing causes as something magnificent; it does not say that Socrates personally became proud. The account of organisms arising through putrefaction is one of the theories he explored, expressly attributed to unnamed others.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

14.3 I.49.14.3

καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.

15.1 · Πλάτωνος I.49.15.1

Πλάτωνος.

Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

14.3 · Perception, memory, and knowledge I.49.14.3

"And is blood that by which we think, or air, or fire? Or is it none of these, but the brain that provides the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and smelling, from which memory and opinion might arise, and from memory and opinion, once it has become stable in these respects, knowledge comes into being? Examining in turn the destruction of these things, and what happens concerning heaven and earth, I finally thought myself utterly without aptitude for this inquiry."[1330]

15.1 · Plato: a cause and its conditions I.49.15.1

Plato.

For to be unable to distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that without which the cause could never be a cause is another! Most people seem to me to grope at this latter thing as though in darkness and, applying a name that does not belong to it, call it the cause.[1331]

1330. The alternatives are questions under investigation, not doctrines all endorsed at once. Doxa is opinion and epistēmē knowledge. The printed κατὰ ταῦτα, "in these respects," is retained; Wachsmuth's apparatus records Heindorf's κατὰ ταὐτά, "in the same way." The feminine participle "having become stable" agrees directly with opinion.

1331. Phaedo 99b-100a. The opening is a detached noun phrase in the excerpt; the English leaves it exclamatory instead of supplying an unprinted main clause. The distinction is between the genuine explanation and a necessary condition of its operation. The wording does not yet specify what that explanation must be.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

15.2 I.49.15.2

Διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡγοῦνται τούτου ἄν ποτε Ἄτλαντα ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνιδεῖν καὶ συνδέειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.

15.3 I.49.15.3

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητὴς ὀτουοῦν ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ᾽ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσομαι, ὦ Κέβης; - Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

15.2 · What holds the earth in place? I.49.15.2

That is why one person surrounds the earth with a vortex and so makes it remain beneath the heaven, while another props air beneath it as a support, as though beneath a broad kneading trough. But the power by which things have been placed as well as possible and now lie as they do: this they neither seek nor suppose to possess any divine strength. Instead, they think they may one day discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, holding everything together more fully; they do not believe that what is good and necessary truly comprehends and binds anything.[1332]

15.3 · A second voyage in search of causes I.49.15.3

“I would most gladly become anyone’s pupil in the matter of a cause of that kind, whatever its true character may be. But since I was deprived of it and could neither discover it myself nor learn it from someone else, would you like me to show you, Cebes,” he said, “how I have pursued a second voyage in the search for the cause?”

“Very much indeed,” he said.[1333]

1332. The compressed clause about the best arrangement is interpreted as the power responsible for the present disposition of things. Atlas supplies an image for what supports the whole. The final printed synidein means discerning or comprehending together, and syndeein binding together. The apparatus records Plato’s different pair, “bind together and hold together”; that smoother wording is not substituted.

1333. The “second voyage” names a further route after the desired explanation could not be found. Socrates does not claim here to have achieved the first inquiry’s aim. The next passages describe the change in procedure: examining accounts and using a proposed account to test agreement.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

15.4 I.49.15.4

Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσι· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. Τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

15.5 I.49.15.5

Ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἰκάζω, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. - Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

15.4 · The image of an eclipse I.49.15.4

"After this," he said, "since I had grown weary of examining things that are, I thought I must take care not to suffer what people suffer when they watch and examine the sun in eclipse. For some damage their eyes unless they examine its image in water or something of the kind. I had a similar thought and feared that I might become altogether blind in soul by looking at things with my eyes and trying to grasp them through each of the senses. So I thought I should take refuge in accounts and examine in them the truth of things that are."[1334]

15.5 · Testing agreement with a premise I.49.15.5

"Perhaps, then, the comparison I am making is in a way not quite apt. For I certainly do not concede that someone who examines things that are through accounts examines them in images any more than someone who does so through actual things. At any rate, this is the direction in which I set out. On each occasion I take as a premise the account I judge strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with it I set down as true, both about the cause and about everything else; whatever does not, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean, for I think you do not understand me yet."

"No, by Zeus," said Cebes, "not very well."[1335]

1334. The eclipse supplies an analogy between direct looking and the investigation of reality. Logoi is rendered "accounts," encompassing reasoned statements rather than words considered only as sounds. The next passage explicitly limits the analogy: Socrates does not concede that investigation through accounts deals more with images than investigation through actual things.

1335. The proposed account is a starting point for testing agreement, not a claim that any attractive statement establishes truth. Symphōnein, "agree," again has the sense of sounding together. Cebes' request for clarification is preserved, and the excerpt ends before Socrates supplies the fuller explanation. The next excerpt selected by Stobaeus begins later in the Phaedo.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.16.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾧ ἄν τι ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; - Ὧ ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. - Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; - Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. - Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥξει ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; - Ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη. - Πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; - Ἔστιν, ἔφη. - Τί; - Θάνατος. - Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μήποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; - Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.1 · Plato: soul brings life

I.49.16.1

In the same work.

“Answer me, then,” he said. “What must enter a body for it to be alive?”

“Soul,” he said.

“And is this always so?”

“Of course,” he said.

“Then whatever the soul itself takes possession of, it will always come to it bringing life?”

“It does indeed,” he said.

“Is there something contrary to life, or nothing?”

“There is,” he said.

“What?”

“Death.”

“Then soul will never admit the contrary of what it always brings with it, as has been agreed from what went before?”

“Most certainly,” said Cebes.[1336]

1336. Phaedo 105c-107a. This selection begins later than excerpt 15. Soul is introduced as what brings life to a body; the refusal to admit life’s contrary relies on an earlier agreement, which this excerpt recalls rather than proving again. “What must enter” renders the compressed opening question without changing its answer.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.2 I.49.16.2

Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν, τί νῦν δὴ ὀνομάζομεν; - Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. - Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; - Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. - Εἶεν· ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; - Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. - Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; - Οὔ. - Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή; - Ἀθάνατον. - Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν· ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; - Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.2 · What does not admit death I.49.16.2

“What, then, do we now call what does not admit the form of the even?”

“Uneven,” he said.

“And what does not admit the just, and what does not admit the musical?”

“Unmusical,” he said, “and the other unjust.”

“Very well. And what do we call what does not admit death?”

“Immortal,” he said.

“Then soul does not admit death?”

“No.”

“Then soul is immortal?”

“Immortal.”

“Very well,” he said. “Shall we say that this, at least, has been demonstrated? Or how does it seem to you?”

“Quite adequately indeed, Socrates.”[1337]

1337. The negative terms supply the pattern: anartion, not-even; amouson, unmusical; adikon, unjust; athanaton, not subject to death. The reply answers the musical example first and then the just, reversing their order in the question. Athanaton is rendered “immortal,” but indestructibility has yet to be established. The printed neuter with psychē is retained in the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.3 I.49.16.3

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; Εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ τρία ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; - Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; - Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγει, ὑπεξῄει ἂν ἡ χιὼν μένουσα ἄτηκτος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατ᾽ ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. - Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. - Ὡσαύτως, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπῄει, οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶον ἂν ἀπελθὸν ᾤχετο. - Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

16.4 I.49.16.4

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου <εἰπεῖν>; Εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γοῦν τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.3 · The examples of snow and fire

I.49.16.3

“What, then, Cebes?” he said. “If what is uneven had necessarily to be indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?”

“Of course.”

“Then, if the hot too had necessarily to be indestructible, whenever someone brings heat upon snow, the snow would withdraw, remaining unmelted. For it would not perish, nor would it remain and admit heat.”

“What you say is true,” he said.

“Likewise, I think, if the cold were indestructible, whenever something cold approached fire, the fire would never be extinguished or perish, but would go away intact.”

“Necessarily,” he said.[1338]

16.4 · The additional condition

I.49.16.4

“Then,” he said, “must we not also <say> this about what is immortal? If what is immortal is also indestructible, soul cannot perish when death approaches it. For, from what has already been said, it will not admit death or be dead, just as three, we said, will not be even, nor indeed will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor the heat in fire.”[1339]

1338. The scan prints to thermon, “the hot,” in the snow example and to psychron, “the cold,” in the fire example. These readings disrupt the parallel argument. The apparatus records Plato’s athermon, “what does not admit heat,” and apsykton, “what does not admit cooling”; these restore the expected subjects but are not silently substituted. Both examples remain conditional: what excludes a contrary must also be indestructible if its withdrawal rather than destruction is to follow.

1339. Wachsmuth supplies eipein, “say,” from Plato; the addition remains marked on both sides. The sentence distinguishes refusing death from surviving its approach. The further condition “also indestructible” is explicit and should not disappear in translation. The odd, fire, and heat retain their separate places in the comparison.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.5 I.49.16.5

Ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὡμολόγηται, ἀπολλομένου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; Τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα· ἢ οὔ; - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

16.6 I.49.16.6

Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. - Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.5 · Could one thing perish and another replace it? I.49.16.5

"But someone might say: 'What prevents the odd from not becoming even when the even approaches, as has been agreed, yet perishing, with something even coming to be in its place?' We could not insist against someone who said this that it does not perish. For what is uneven is not indestructible. If that had been agreed between us, we could readily insist that, when the even approaches, the odd and three go away in withdrawal. We could argue in the same way about fire and heat and the other things. Could we not?"

"Certainly."[1340]

16.6 · Is another argument needed? I.49.16.6

"Then in the present case too, concerning what is immortal, if we agree that it is also indestructible, soul would be indestructible as well as immortal. Otherwise, another argument would be needed."

"But none is needed on that account," he said. "For hardly anything else could refuse destruction if what is immortal, being everlasting, is to admit destruction."[1341]

1340. The objection distinguishes change into a contrary from replacement after destruction. Socrates grants that excluding the contrary does not, by itself, rule out the second possibility. The printed "is not indestructible" is retained; the following conditional makes clear why an additional agreement would change what can be argued.

1341. The conditional is followed by the interlocutor's assent, supported by treating the immortal as aidion, everlasting. The text thus states the further premise on which the conclusion depends. Scholēi here means "hardly," not leisure or slowness.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.7 I.49.16.7

Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. - Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. - Ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἢ εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; - Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

16.8 I.49.16.8

Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἀθάνατον σῶον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. - Φαίνεται. - Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 342-343

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

16.7 · God and the form of life

I.49.16.7

“God, I suppose,” said Socrates, “and the form of life itself, and anything else that is immortal, would be acknowledged by everyone never to perish.”

“By everyone indeed, by Zeus,” he said, “by human beings, certainly, and still more, I suppose, by gods.”

“Since, then, what is immortal is also imperishable, surely soul too, if it is immortal, would also be indestructible?”

“Entirely necessarily.”[1342]

16.8 · The soul’s departure

I.49.16.8

“Then when death approaches a human being, it seems that what is mortal in that person dies, while what is immortal goes away intact and imperishable, having withdrawn before death.”

“So it appears.”

“Then most certainly, Cebes,” he said, “our souls will be in Hades.”[1343]

1342. The form of life itself, auto to tēs zōēs eidos, is named separately from god and from any other immortal thing. The reply’s appeal to gods remains part of the dialogue. Adiaphthoron, “imperishable,” and anōlethros, “indestructible,” express the further property being joined to immortality; the unusual printed word order of the final question is retained in Greek.

1343. The concluding sentence is shorter here than in Plato as recorded in the apparatus: further words explicitly calling soul immortal and indestructible are absent from this excerpt and are not inserted. “In Hades” translates en Haidou, the conventional expression for the realm of the dead. The conclusion belongs to Socrates’ argument, with its preceding agreements.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 342-343

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

17 · Πορφυρίου I.49.17

Ἐκ τῶν Πορφυρίου Πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμῶν.

Ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ <τῆς> περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς οὐσίας μέσον τι· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀμέριστος οὐσία μόνον, τὰ δὲ σώματα μεριστὰ μόνον. Αἱ δὲ ποιότητες καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη περὶ τὰ σώματα <τὰ> μεριστά.

18 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.18

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ψυχὴ καταδεῖται πρὸς σῶμα τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ πάθη τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ λύεται διὰ τῆς ἀπαθείας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 343

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

17 · Porphyry: soul between indivisible and divisible I.49.17

From Porphyry's Points of Departure toward the Intelligibles.

Soul is something intermediate between indivisible substance and <the> substance divided among bodies. Intellect is simply indivisible substance, and bodies are simply divisible. Qualities and forms in matter concern bodies, <the> divisible things.[1344]

18 · Attachment to bodily affections I.49.18

In the same work.

Soul is bound to body by turning toward the affections that come from it, and is released through freedom from those affections.[1345]

1344. The title identifies the source of excerpts 17-23; subsequent headings say "In the same work." Nous is rendered "intellect," ousia "substance," and enyla eidē "forms in matter." The two articles supplied by Wachsmuth are marked in both languages. The final supplied article attaches "divisible" to bodies; the English preserves that construction.

1345. Epistrophē is a turning toward something; here its direction is toward bodily pathē, things undergone or affections. Apatheia names freedom from them, rather than indifference in the ordinary modern sense of "apathy." The sentence connects bondage with the soul's orientation toward bodily experience.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

19.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.19.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει μὲν πάντων τοὺς λόγους, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου εἰς τὴν προχείρισιν ἐκκαλουμένη ἢ ἑαυτὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐπιστρέφουσα εἰς τὸ εἴσω. Καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου μὲν ἐκκαλουμένη ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἔξω τὰς αἰσθήσεις <εἴσω> ἀποδίδωσιν· εἰς δὲ ἑαυτὴν εἰσιοῦσα πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσι γίγνεται· καὶ οὔτε αἴσθησις ἔξωθεν οὔτε νόησις <εἴσω> ἄλλῃ ποτέ.

19.2 I.49.19.2

Ὡς δὲ τῷ ζῴῳ οὐκ ἄνευ πάθους τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ὀργάνων αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ αἱ νοήσεις οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· ἵν᾽ ᾖ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς ὁ τύπος παρακολούθημα ζῴου αἰσθητικοῦ, οὕτως τὸ φάντασμα ψυχῆς ζῴου ἑπόμενον νοήσει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

19.1 · Turning outward and inward I.49.19.1

In the same work.

Soul possesses the rational principles of all things, but acts in accordance with them either when summoned by something else to bring them into use, or when it turns itself inward toward them. When summoned by something else in relation to things outside, it delivers perceptions <inward>. When it enters into itself toward intellect, it comes to be engaged in acts of intellection. And neither perception from outside nor intellection <within> ever occurs in any other way.[1346]

19.2 · Perception, image, and intellection I.49.19.2

Just as a living creature's perceptions do not occur without its sense organs being affected, so acts of intellection do not occur without imagination. The analogy is this: as the impression is an accompaniment of a perceiving living creature, so the image is an accompaniment of the living creature's soul, following intellection.[1347]

1346. Logoi here are rendered "rational principles," the contents by which soul operates, rather than the proposed "accounts" of Plato's preceding argument. Procheirisis is their bringing into use. The two inward-direction words are supplied by Usener in Wachsmuth's text. The compressed last clause uses the editor's adverb allēi, "in another way"; the English understands its omitted verb from the preceding sentence.

1347. Phantasia is the image-presenting activity, here "imagination," and phantasma the image. The final analogy is textually difficult: Wachsmuth questions psychēs, "of soul," and suggests changing the closing reference to intellection. Both printed words are retained. The English supplies the repeated "accompaniment" from the first half of the comparison; it does not claim that the difficult wording is settled.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 343-344

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

20 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.20

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἡ ψυχὴ οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἄυλος, ἄφθαρτος, ἐν ζωῇ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ ζῆν κεκτημένη τὸ εἶναι.

21.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.21.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἄλλο τὸ πάσχειν τῶν σωμάτων, ἄλλο τῶν ἀσωμάτων. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων σὺν τροπῇ τὸ πάσχειν· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς αἱ οἰκειώσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη ἐνέργειαι, οὐδὲν ἐοικυῖαι θερμάνσει καὶ ψύξει σωμάτων. Διὸ εἴπερ τὸ πάσχειν πάντως σὺν τροπῇ, ἀπαθῆ ῥητέον παντελῶς τὰ ἀσώματα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕλης κεχωρισμένα καὶ σωμάτων ἐνεργείαις ἦν τὰ αὐτά· τὰ δ᾽ ὕλῃ πλησιάζοντα καὶ σώμασιν αὐτὰ μὲν ἀπαθῆ, τὰ δὲ ἐφ᾽ ὧν θεωρεῖται πάσχει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

20 · A substance whose being is in life I.49.20

In the same work.

Soul is a substance without magnitude, immaterial and indestructible, possessing its being in a life that has its living from itself.[1348]

21.1 · How bodies and souls are affected I.49.21.1

In the same work.

Being affected is one thing for bodies and another for incorporeal things. For bodies, being affected involves alteration. But the soul's attachments and affections are activities, bearing no resemblance to the heating and cooling of bodies. So if being affected invariably involves alteration, incorporeal things must be called wholly unaffected. For those separated from matter and bodies were identical with activities; those that approach matter and bodies are themselves unaffected, while the things in which they are observed are affected.[1349]

1348. Amegethēs denies spatial magnitude. The dative participle echousēi, "having," agrees with life, while kektēmenē, "possessing," agrees with soul. The English preserves this distinction rather than flattening the whole sentence into a list of attributes of soul.

1349. The contrast depends on defining pathos through tropē, alteration. Oikeiōseis, rendered "attachments," can also mean acts of appropriation or making something one's own; these and the soul's affections are classified as activities. The printed past tense ēn is retained as "were." The final clause distinguishes incorporeal activity from the bodily subject in which it is observed.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

21.2 I.49.21.2

Ὅταν γὰρ τὸ ζῷον αἰσθάνηται, ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ μὲν ἁρμονίᾳ χωριστῇ, ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὰς χορδὰς κινούσῃ ἡρμοσμένας· * * ἁρμονίᾳ ἀχωρίστῳ· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τοῦ κινῆσαι τὸ ζῷον διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔμψυχον ἀνάλογον τῷ μουσικῷ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐναρμόνιον· τὰ δὲ πληγέντα σώματα διὰ πάθος αἰσθητικὸν ταῖς ἡρμοσμέναις χορδαῖς.

21.3 I.49.21.3

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἁρμονία πέπονθεν ἡ χωριστή, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ χορδή· καὶ κινεῖ μὲν ὁ μουσικὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἁρμονίαν, οὐ μὴν ἐκινήθη ἂν ἡ χορδὴ μουσικῶς, εἰ καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς ἐβούλετο, μὴ τῆς ἁρμονίας τοῦτο λεγούσης.

22 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.22

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἧς οὐσίας ἐν ζωῇ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἧς τὰ πάθη ζωή, ταύτης καὶ ὁ θάνατος ἐν ποιᾷ ζωῇ κεῖται, οὐκ ἐν ζωῆς καθάπαξ στερήσει, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ παθεῖν ἦν ὁδὸς εἰς τὴν παντελῆ ἀζωίαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 344-345

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

21.2 · A separate harmony I.49.21.2

For when a living creature perceives, its soul resembles a separate harmony that moves the tuned strings from itself; . . . . . an inseparable harmony. The cause that moves the living creature because it is ensouled is analogous to the musician because he is attuned; the bodies struck through an affection of sense are analogous to the tuned strings.[1350]

21.3 · The musician and the string I.49.21.3

For there too it is not the separate harmony that has been affected, but the string. The musician moves it according to the harmony within himself; yet the string would not have moved musically, even if the musician wished it, unless the harmony prescribed this.[1351]

22 · Death as a certain kind of life I.49.22

In the same work.

For a substance whose being is in life and whose affections are life, death too consists in a certain kind of life, not in the complete deprivation of life, since being affected was not, in its case, a path to utter lifelessness.[1352]

1350. The asterisks mark a gap in the source, retained as dots in English. Most of the parallel member ending “an inseparable harmony” is missing; the apparatus suggests a reference to perception itself, but no reconstruction is inserted. The next clause’s compressed “because it is ensouled” qualifies the living creature, and the musician’s attunement supplies the analogy. This separate, active harmony differs from the bodily resultant challenged in Plato’s earlier excerpt.

1351. The separate harmony is the ordering principle according to which the musician acts; the string undergoes the bodily change. The printed legousēs literally means “saying,” here rendered “prescribed.” The apparatus proposes the alternative verbs “willing” and “commanding”; the English does not silently replace the printed personification with either.

1352. The assertion follows the distinction between bodily alteration and the soul’s activities. “A certain kind of life” translates poiai zōēi; the passage does not specify that kind here. Azōia is lifelessness, which is expressly distinguished from the death predicated of this living substance. The editor’s corrected infinitive to pathein, “being affected,” is followed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 344-345

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.23.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Οὐ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων δεῖ νομίζειν πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν γενέσθαι, πρὸ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς καὶ μίαν, οὔτε τῆς μιᾶς ὅλης κωλυούσης τὰς πολλὰς ἐν ἑαυτῇ εἶναι οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὴν μίαν εἰς αὐτὰς μεριζουσῶν. Διέστησαν γὰρ οὐκ ἀποκοπεῖσαι οὐδ᾽ ἀποκερματίσασαι εἰς αὐτὰς τὴν ὅλην, καὶ πάρεισιν ἀλλήλαις οὐ συγκεχυμέναι οὐδὲ σωρὸν ποιοῦσαι τὴν ὅλην. Οὔτε γὰρ πέρασίν εἰσι διειλημμέναι οὔτε πάλιν ἀλλήλαις συγκεχυμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι συνεχύθησαν αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔγκεινται ὡς τὰ σώματα τῇ ψυχῇ ἑτεροουσίως, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ποιαὶ ἦσαν ἐνέργειαι.

23.2 I.49.23.2

Ἀπειροδύναμος ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸ τυχὸν αὐτῆς * * ψυχή, καὶ πᾶσαι μία, καὶ πάλιν ἡ ὅλη ἄλλη παρὰ πάσας. Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον τεμνόμενα οὐ καταλήγει εἰς ἀσώματα, κατ᾽ ὄγκον λαμβανόντων τῶν τμημάτων τὴν διαφοράν, οὕτως ψυχή, οὖσα ζωτικόν, ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον κατὰ τὰ εἴδη διείληπται, παραλλαγὰς ἔχουσα εἰδικάς, καὶ ἡ ὅλη σὺν ταύταις οὖσα καὶ ἄνευ τούτων. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς οἷον τομὴ ἑτερότης ἐστὶ μενούσης τῆς ταυτότητος.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 345-346

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.1 · Many souls and one soul I.49.23.1

In the same work.

We must not suppose that the plurality of souls arose because of the plurality of bodies. Before bodies, souls are both many and one: the one whole soul does not prevent the many from existing within it, nor do the many divide the one among themselves. For they stand apart without having been cut off or having broken the whole into fragments among themselves. They are present to one another without being confused together or making the whole a heap. They are neither divided by boundaries nor confused with one another, just as the many kinds of knowledge in one soul have not been confused together. Nor, again, do they reside in soul as bodies would, as something different in substance; rather, they were activities of the soul of certain kinds.[1353]

23.2 · Unlimited power and distinction by form I.49.23.2

The nature of soul has unlimited power, and in any given part of it . . . . . soul; all are one, and yet the whole is other than them all. For just as bodies, when divided without limit, do not end in incorporeal things, their portions acquiring their difference in respect of bulk, so soul, being something living, is distinguished without limit according to forms, with differences of form; the whole exists both with these and without them. For what is like division in its case is difference while identity remains.[1354]

1353. The many souls are distinguished without spatial partition, and the whole is not an aggregate or heap. The final sentences use kinds of knowledge as an analogy: their plurality need not introduce substances foreign to soul. The nearest subjects of “reside” and “were activities” are the kinds of knowledge; the English follows that connection.

1354. The gap after “of it” is printed by Wachsmuth, who suggests that words such as “form” or “whole” may have been lost; no conjecture is inserted. The bodily analogy concerns continued bodily character under division, while soul’s distinctions are eidikai, differences of form. The printed neuter zōtikon is represented by “something living.” Identity and difference remain simultaneous, not successive states.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.3 I.49.23.3

Εἰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἡ ἑτερότης ἐκράτει μᾶλλον τῆς ταυτότητος, οὐδὲν ἐπεισελθὸν ἀσώματον διέκοψε τὴν ἕνωσιν, μένει δὲ πάντα ἡνωμένα μὲν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ταῖς δὲ ποιότησι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσι διειλημμένα, τί χρὴ ὑπονοεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ἀσωμάτου ζωῆς, ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἡ ταυτότης μᾶλλον κεκρατήκει τῆς ἑτερότητος, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπόκειται ἀλλοῖον παρὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ ἑνότης, οὐδὲ σῶμα συμπεσὸν ἀποκόπτει τὴν ἕνωσιν, καίπερ πρὸς τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν πολλοῖς ἐμποδίζον;

23.4 I.49.23.4

Αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ ταυτότης αὐτῆς πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ εὑρίσκει διὰ τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον εἰδικῆς ἐνεργείας, τοῦ τυχόντος μέρους πάντα δυναμένου, ὅταν σωμάτων καθαρεύῃ, ὡς τὸ τυχὸν μέρος τοῦ σπέρματος τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σπέρματος ἔχει δύναμιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.3 · Unity despite bodily involvement I.49.23.3

If, in the case of bodies, where difference prevailed over identity, no intervening incorporeal thing severed their unity, and all remain united in substance though distinguished by qualities and other forms, what must we suppose of incorporeal life belonging to form? In it identity has prevailed over difference, and nothing other than form underlies it; from it bodies too receive their unity. Nor does a body joined to it cut off this unity, although it obstructs its activities in many respects.[1355]

23.4 · The power of the whole in each part I.49.23.4

Its identity itself, on account of itself, makes and discovers all things through its activity in forms extending without limit. Any given part is capable of all things when free of bodies, just as any given part of seed possesses the power of the whole seed.[1356]

1355. The English divides the long question for readability while retaining its comparison. Eidikē, "belonging to form," contrasts with differences of bodily bulk. The distinction at the end is between interrupting unity and obstructing activity: bodily involvement is allowed to do the latter without doing the former. The printed clause deriving bodily unity from this life is retained, although the apparatus records a proposal to delete it.

1356. The printed smooth-breathing αὐτήν is retained. "On account of itself" interprets the emphatic reference to identity in this awkward clause; the apparatus proposes alternative wording. The qualification "when free of bodies" is essential to the claim about the part's power. Seed supplies the passage's analogy for a whole productive capacity present in a part; this is the author's explanatory image, not a claim added from modern biology.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.5 I.49.23.5

Ὥσπερ δὲ κρατηθὲν ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ σπέρμα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ὧν ἠδύνατο λόγων ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης κρατεῖται, καὶ πάλιν συναχθὲν εἰς τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆς ἀΰλου τὸ ὡς μέρος ἐπινοούμενον τῆς πάσης ψυχῆς ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν.

23.6 I.49.23.6

Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὕλην ῥέψαν κεκράτηται μὲν καθ᾽ ὃ [εἶδος ῥέψαν] ἐπιτηδείως ἔσχε προσομιλεῖν ἐνύλῳ· ἔχει δὲ τὴν τῆς ὅλης δύναμιν ἤδη καὶ ἐντυγχάνει οὖσῃ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνύλου ἀποστὰν ἐν ἑαυτῷ γένηται.

23.7 I.49.23.7

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ὕλην ῥεπούσῃ ἀπορία ἁπάντων <ἦν> καὶ τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως κένωσις, εἰς δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἀναγομένη τὸ πλῆρες ἑαυτῆς κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τῆς πάσης ηὑρίσκετο, τὴν μὲν εἰκότως πενίαν τὴν δὲ κόρον οἱ τοῦτο πρῶτον γνόντες τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἠνίξαντο.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

23.5 · Seed in matter and immaterial soul

I.49.23.5

And just as seed, when held in matter, is confined within the parts of matter according to each of the rational principles of which it was capable, yet, when gathered again into the power of seed, possesses the full power in each of its parts, so too what is conceived as a part of immaterial soul possesses the power of the entire soul.[1357]

23.6 · Turning back from matter

I.49.23.6

What has inclined toward matter is held in so far as [form, having inclined] it was suited to associate with what is in matter. Yet it already possesses the power of the whole and encounters that power within itself when it stands apart from what is in matter and comes to be within itself.[1358]

23.7 · Poverty and fullness

I.49.23.7

Since, when it inclined toward matter, there <was> a lack of all things and an emptying of its own power, but when led up to intellect it was found to possess its own fullness in accordance with the power of the whole soul, those who first recognized this condition of soul fittingly hinted at the one as poverty and the other as fullness.[1359]

1357. Logoi are the principles of the seed's differentiated activity, and dynamis is its capacity or power. The repeated language of being held, krateisthai, presents material confinement; gathering reverses that dispersal in the analogy. "What is conceived as a part" preserves the caution of hōs meros epinooumenon: the soul's division is conceptual rather than the cutting of a body.

1358. Square brackets preserve words that Wachsmuth rejects, eidos rhepsan, literally "form, having inclined." The bracketed English preserves the disconnected words because they interrupt the construction. Read without them, the sentence contrasts a capacity constrained by association with matter with the full power already possessed and found again through inward return.

1359. The restored ēn, "was," remains marked. Penia is poverty or lack; koros is fullness or satiety, set against the emptying, kenōsis, of the preceding clause. The apparatus associates the closing language with Heraclitus; the excerpt itself leaves the earlier thinkers unnamed. No quotation or named attribution is added to the text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.1 · Πορφυρίου I.49.24.1

Ἐκ τῶν Πορφυρίου Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων.

Τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ὑπογράψαι πρόκειται καὶ πρότερόν γε ἐπεξελθεῖν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῇ τε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ τῇ ὕστερον ἐπικρίσει τῇ παρὰ τοῖς διδασκάλοις.

24.2 I.49.24.2

Ἀρίστων ἀντιληπτικὴν δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς θέμενος ταύτην διαιρεῖ εἰς δύο, τὸ μέν τι μέρος φάσκων μετά τινος τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ κινεῖσθαι, ὃ αἰσθητικὸν καλεῖ, ἀρχὴν καὶ πηγὴν ὑπάρχον τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεων, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ καὶ χωρὶς ὀργάνων, ὃ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων οὐκ ὠνομάσθαι (ἢ γὰρ ὅλως οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἢ τελέως ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμυδρὸν ἄγαν), ἐν δὲ τοῖς λογικοῖς, ἐν οἷς δὴ μάλιστα <ἢ> μόνοις φαίνεται, νοῦν προσαγορεύεσθαι. [Ἔφη ἄνευ ὀργάνων τὸν νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ μετ᾽ ὀργάνου.]

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.1 · Porphyry: On the Powers of the Soul I.49.24.1

From Porphyry's On the Powers of the Soul.

The task before us is to outline the powers of the soul, first reviewing the accounts found among the ancients and the later assessment made by the teachers.[1360]

24.2 · Ariston: apprehension with and without organs I.49.24.2

Ariston posits a power of apprehension in the soul and divides it in two. One part, he says, is generally set in motion together with one of the sense organs. He calls this the perceptive power, the source and fountain of the particular perceptions. The other always acts by itself and without organs. In irrational creatures, he says, this has no name, since it either does not exist in them at all or is altogether weak and exceedingly dim. In rational creatures, in which it is especially <or> exclusively evident, it is called intellect. [He said that intellect acts without organs, and that the perceptive power acts with an organ as well.][1361]

1360. Dynamis is a power or capacity; the distinction between a power and a part becomes a central question in excerpt 25a. Historia here concerns the survey of earlier accounts, followed by their later assessment, epikrisis. The opening announces a discussion of differing views, which should not all be attributed to Porphyry as his own conclusions.

1361. Antilēpsis is rendered "apprehension," broad enough to cover the two powers initially placed under it. Nous is intellect; aisthētikon the perceptive power. The supplied "or" keeps the alternatives "especially" and "exclusively" distinct. Wachsmuth brackets the final summary as a rejected addition, explaining in the apparatus that it had been a marginal note. Its words remain bracketed in both languages. Ariston is named without a further identifying description in this passage.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.3 I.49.24.3

Πῶς οὖν ἡ μετ᾽ ὀργάνου οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῷ νῷ, εἴγε ὑφ᾽ ἓν γένος, τὸ τῆς ἀντιληπτικῆς, τέτακται καὶ <τὸ> μετ᾽ ὀργάνου ἐνεργοῦν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἄνευ ὀργάνου; ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν τῆς μορφῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας; Αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐσίας οὐκ ἀντιληπτική, ἀλλὰ μορφῆς καὶ πλάσεως * *· ὅτι δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἵππος, ἄλλου ἡ ἀντίληψις.

24.4 I.49.24.4

Διάφορον οὖν τῆς ἀντιλήψεως κίνημα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυπουμένη ἔοικεν ἡ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ ἔξω ἑλκομένη ἐπὶ μορφήν, ἡ δὲ ἀφισταμένη τυπώσεως. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διῄρουν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνευ φαντασίας <ἢ αἰσθήσεως> διεξοδικόν, ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἠρτημένον διάνοιάν τε καὶ νοῦν προσηγόρευον, τὸ δὲ μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ αἰσθήσεως τὴν διέξοδον ἔχον δοξαστικόν. Οἱ δὲ μίαν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν λογικὴν ἐτίθεντο, διαφόρους δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 348-349

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.3 · Shape and essence I.49.24.3

How, then, will the power that acts with an organ differ from intellect, if both <the> part acting with an organ and the part acting without one have been placed under a single genus, that of the apprehensive power? Is it because the one apprehends the shape of things, the other their essence? For perception does not apprehend essence, but shape and configuration . . . . .; apprehending that something is a human being or a horse belongs to another power.[1362]

24.4 · Discursive thought and opinion I.49.24.4

The movement of apprehension is therefore different. The apprehension belonging to the perceptive power seems to receive an impression and to be drawn outward toward shape; the other stands apart from the receiving of impressions. Some accordingly made a division: what proceeds step by step without imagination <or perception>, dependent on intellect, they called both discursive thought and intellect; what proceeds with imagination or perception they called the power of opinion. Others posited a single rational substance but different activities.[1363]

1362. The opening question tests Ariston's classification. Morphē and plasis concern shape and configuration; ousia here concerns what something is, hence "essence." The supplied article remains marked. The scan marks a gap after plaseōs: the missing comparison is not reconstructed. The closing "another power" makes explicit the faculty understood with the Greek "of another."

1363. Dianoia is discursive thought: thinking that proceeds through a sequence, here expressed by diexodikon and diexodos. Doxastikon is the capacity for opinion. The passage reports competing ways of relating these activities, rather than introducing a settled classification. The printed feminine construction in the opening sentence is retained; the English understands "apprehension" as its subject. "Or perception" is supplied by the editor.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.5 I.49.24.5

Τοιαύτης δὲ οὔσης τῆς διαφορᾶς ὑφ᾽ ἓν τίθεσθαι τὰς <δύο> δυνάμεις μήποτε ἄτοπον ἦν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μιᾶς ἥ τε νόησις οὐσίας ὁρμᾶται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀντίληψιν εἴ τις λέγει τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν, ὁμωνύμως ἐρεῖ), καὶ ἔδει ἄλλην μὲν θέσθαι τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δύναμιν καὶ ἑτερογενῆ, μεθ᾽ ἣν τὴν τῆς διανοίας, πάντας τοὺς ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀθρόαν ἐνέργειαν τὴν δὲ ἐν διεξόδῳ·

24.6 I.49.24.6

ἄλλην δὲ πάντῃ τὴν αἰσθητικήν, ἧς τὸ μέν τι μετὰ προσχρήσεως ὀργάνων, τὸ δὲ <τι> ἄνευ προσχρήσεως, τοῦ μὲν μετ᾽ ὀργάνων αἰσθητικοῦ καλουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἄνευ τούτων φανταστικοῦ, τὸ δέ τι οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, ὑπερβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ διεξοδεύον, τὸ ἀθρόον τούτων, δοξαστικὸν καλούμενον, ἐπιστάσεως οὔσης, πότερον τῆς διανοίας εἶδος τὸ τοιοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἄλλο, τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς μὲν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ φανταστικόν, ὑποβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ νοητικόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

24.5 · Different kinds of apprehension I.49.24.5

With a difference of this kind, perhaps it was inappropriate to place the <two> powers under one heading. For intellection and perception do not start from a single substance; and if someone calls the activity of intellect "apprehension," the same name will have a different meaning. Everyone on either side should have posited the power of intellect as distinct and of another kind, with the power of discursive thought following it, but with the former an activity all at once and the latter an activity proceeding step by step;[1364]

24.6 · Perception, imagination, and opinion I.49.24.6

and the perceptive power as altogether different. One part of it makes use of organs, while <another> does not: the part with organs is called perceptive, the part without them imaginative. Yet another belongs no less to the same genus but goes beyond what proceeds step by step; this apprehends these things all at once and is called the power of opinion. A question remains whether this kind is a species of discursive thought or whether the other is, the one that stands above the perceptive and imaginative but below the intellective.[1365]

1364. Homōnymōs means that one name is used in different senses; it need not establish a common genus. Athroa, "all at once," contrasts with activity en diexodōi, "proceeding step by step." The wording pantas tous eph' hekateras is unsettled in the apparatus. This translation takes it as the postponed subject of "should have posited," "everyone on either side"; the referent of "either" remains uncertain. No conjectural repair is inserted. The supplied "two" remains marked.

1365. The classification uses aisthētikē broadly before distinguishing perception with organs from imagination without them. The difficult phrase to athroon toutōn is rendered "this apprehends these things all at once," with the activity understood from the context. The concluding alternatives are left open as printed: the referents of "this kind" and "the other" are not securely resolved by the wording. The supplied ti is represented by the marked "another."

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.25.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Νουμήνιος δὲ τὴν συγκαταθετικὴν δύναμιν παραδεκτικὴν ἐνεργειῶν φήσας εἶναι, σύμπτωμα αὐτῆς φησιν εἶναι τὸ φανταστικόν, οὐ μὴν ἔργον γε καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἀλλὰ παρακολούθημα· τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἱστάντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀναρτώντων ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως. Αἰσθητικὴ γὰρ φαντασία συγκατάθεσίς ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καθ᾽ ὁρμὴν οὔσης.

25.2 I.49.25.2

Λογγῖνος δὲ μηδ᾽ εἶναι ὅλως συγκαταθετικὴν δύναμιν ὑπονοεῖ. Κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τῆς <δι᾽> αἰσθητηρίου φαντασίας ψιλὴ τίθεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μέτοχος ἰδιώματος, ὅτι μηδὲ συγκαταθέσεως μέτοχος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25.1 · Numenius: assent and presentation I.49.25.1

In the same work.

Numenius, having said that the power of assent is receptive of activities, says that the imaginative power is incidental to it: not its work and product, but an accompaniment. The Stoics do not make perception consist in presentation alone, but make its very being depend on assent. For perception is a sensory presentation, an assent, with assent occurring in accordance with impulse.[1366]

25.2 · Longinus and the earlier accounts I.49.25.2

Longinus suspects that there is no power of assent at all. According to the earlier thinkers and those of the Academy, however, perception is taken as bare presentation <through> a sense organ. For that reason it does not, at the outset, share in a distinctive character, since it does not share in assent either.[1367]

1366. Synkatathesis, “assent,” is distinguished from phantasia, the presentation that appears to the soul, and hormē, “impulse.” The contrast between a product and an accompaniment is explicit in Numenius’s account. The final sentence is compressed: aisthētikē phantasia and synkatathesis are both nominative. The English juxtaposes “a sensory presentation, an assent” rather than silently changing the first into a dative, “assent to a sensory presentation.”

1367. Psilē, “bare,” excludes assent from this account of perception. The supplied preposition “through” remains marked. Idiōma is translated conservatively as “a distinctive character”: the sentence does not specify which character is intended. The apparatus records difficult alternative wording around “at the outset,” but the translation follows the edited text. Longinus’s doubt is reported as his position.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25.3 I.49.25.3

Κἂν ᾖ δὲ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως συγκατακειμένη φαντασία δι᾽ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ αἴσθησις, οὐ πάντως καὶ ἀρετῆς μέτοχος ἡ αἴσθησις ἔσται, εἰ μὴ συγκατάθεσις εἴη τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

25a.1 · Τοῦ αὐτοῦ I.49.25a.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Διαπεφώνηται δὲ οὐ τὰ περὶ τούτων μόνον τοῖς παλαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅλως τί τὸ μέρος καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τίνι ταῦτα διενήνοχεν.

Αὐτίκα οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν θέντες καὶ πέντε μὲν μέρη τὰ αἰσθητικὰ λαβόντες, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ ἕβδομον τὸ σπερματικόν, [καὶ] λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὡς ἂν ἄρχοντος χώραν ἔχειν ὑπετίθεντο, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μέρη ἐν ὑπηρέτου τάξει ἀπεδίδοσαν, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένων συνεστάναι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25.3 · Assent and what is in our control I.49.25.3

But even if perception is a presentation through a sense organ combined with assent, perception will not necessarily share in virtue as well, unless assent belongs among the things in our control.[1368]

25a.1 · Parts and powers: the Stoic division I.49.25a.1

By the same author.

The ancients disagreed not only about these matters, but also, from the outset, about the parts of the soul: in general, what a part is, what a power is, and how they differ.

For example, the Stoics posited a soul with eight parts. They counted five perceptive parts, a sixth concerned with voice, and a seventh with reproduction, [and] supposed that the remaining part, the ruling faculty, occupied the position of a ruler. They assigned the other parts the rank of a servant, so that the same soul consisted of ruler and ruled.[1369]

1368. The qualification links virtue, aretē, to what is eph' hēmin, "in our control" or "up to us." The printed aretēs is retained; the apparatus suggests haireseōs, "choice," as an alternative. The text therefore does not simply identify perception with a voluntary choice, and its conditional should be preserved.

1369. Wachsmuth numbers this excerpt 25a; that numbering is retained, while the further decimal subdivisions are modern comparison aids. The eightfold count comprises the five senses, voice, reproduction, and the hēgemonikon, the ruling faculty. The analogy is one of ruler and servants within a single soul. The bracketed kai, "and," is rejected in the edition and remains bracketed on both sides.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.2

I.49.25a.2

Παρὰ δὲ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς τριμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ κεκρατήκε τοῦτο παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀγνοοῦσιν ὡς ἡ διαίρεσις τῆς συστάσεως ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρετῶν παρείληπται· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς εἰς σύλληψιν πάντων τῶν μερῶν. Τὸ γὰρ φανταστικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ νοερὸν καὶ <τὸ> φυτικὸν οὐ δήπου ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει ταύτῃ περιληφθήσεται.

25a.3

I.49.25a.3

Ἄλλοι δέ, ὧν καὶ Νουμήνιος, οὐ τρία μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς, ἢ δύο γε, τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ δύο ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, τὴν μὲν λογικήν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον· ὧν πάλιν οἱ μὲν ἄμφω ἀθανάτους, οἱ δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἀθάνατον, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον οὐ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας μόνον ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ποιᾶς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν διαλύεσθαι. Τοῖς δὲ ἐδόκει δύο ψυχῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ συμπλακεισῶν ἀλλήλαις διπλασίας εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις, ὁμοιουμένων ἀλλήλαις ἐκ τοῦ ἀπολαύειν ἑκατέραν τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας παθημάτων κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.2 · The purpose of a threefold division

I.49.25a.2

In Plato and in Aristotle's ethical writings, the soul is said to have three parts. This view has prevailed among the many, who do not recognize that the division has been adopted for the purpose of establishing the virtues, rather than simply to encompass all the parts. For surely the imaginative, the perceptive, the intellective, and <the> nutritive powers will not be included in this division.[1370]

25a.3 · Two souls and their interaction

I.49.25a.3

Others, including Numenius, think that we possess not three parts of one soul, or even two, the rational and the irrational, but two souls, as we do other things: one rational and the other irrational. Among them, some consider both immortal; others consider the rational soul immortal, while the irrational not only ceases its characteristic motion in its activities, but is also dissolved in its substance. Others held that, when two souls are interwoven with each other in the same place, their movements are twofold: the souls become like one another because, in their union, each shares in what the other undergoes.[1371]

1370. This is Porphyry's report of a division used for an ethical purpose. It should not be expanded into a claim that every account in Plato or Aristotle recognizes only three functions. Phytikon, literally the plantlike or vegetative power, is rendered "nutritive," distinguishing it from perception and thought. The supplied article remains marked.

1371. The report distinguishes several views within a two-soul account. The contrast between ceasing an activity and being dissolved in substance is essential to the second view. "As we do other things" retains the elliptical hōsper kai alla; the apparatus explains "other things" by paired bodily organs, but that explanation is not inserted into the text. Pathēmata means what is experienced or undergone, not necessarily emotions alone.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.4

I.49.25a.4

Ῥητέον δὲ ὡς δύναμις μέρους διήνεγκεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μέρος ἐκβέβηκε κατὰ γένος τὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ στρέφονται γένος. Διὸ τὰ μὲν μέρη παρῃτεῖτο Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις οὐκέτι· τὸ γὰρ ἑτερομερὲς εὐθὺς ὑποκειμένου παραλλαγὴν εἰσάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἑτεροδύναμον καὶ περὶ ἓν ὑποκείμενον ἐνίστασθαι.

25a.5

I.49.25a.5

Λογγῖνος δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῷον πολυμερὲς εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερές, πολυδύναμον δέ, τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς σώμασι πολυμερῆ φάσκων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεσθαι, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἀμερῆ· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πολυμερής, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μονοδύναμος· ἐνδέχεσθαι γὰρ ἓν ἀμερὲς δυνάμεις πλείους ἔχειν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.4 · Parts require a different underlying subject I.49.25a.4

We must explain how a power differs from a part. A part differs in kind from the character of another part, whereas powers concern the same kind. That is why Aristotle rejected parts in the case of the soul, but did not reject powers: having different parts immediately introduces a difference in the underlying subject, whereas having different powers can occur in one underlying subject.[1372]

25a.5 · Longinus: one thing with many powers I.49.25a.5

Longinus holds that even the living creature does not have many parts, but is without parts while having many powers. He cites Plato's saying that soul becomes divided into many parts in bodies, although in itself it is without parts. Because it does not have many parts, it does not follow that it has only one power: a single thing without parts can have several powers.[1373]

1372. Hypokeimenon is the underlying subject or bearer of a property. The distinction here permits a single bearer to have several capacities without requiring several distinct constituents. The statement about Aristotle continues Porphyry's interpretation; it is kept distinct from the earlier report of an ethically motivated division.

1373. The opening prints to zōion, "the living creature," although the following account concerns soul. That wording is retained, without replacing it by psychē. Ameres, "without parts," and polydynamon, "having many powers," need not be opposites in this argument. The distinction concerns what a thing is in itself and how its activity appears in bodies.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.6

I.49.25a.6

Διακριτέον οὖν τάχα ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ ταράχου θέντας ὅρον γνώσεως μερικῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ ἀδιαφορίας καὶ πάλιν δυνάμεων πρὸς μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἶτ᾽ ἀνωτέρω οὐσιῶν εἰ καὶ πλείους ἐν ἑνὶ εἶεν. Ὡς ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γνώριμον ἔσται, εἰ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ζῴῳ οὖσα πολυμερὴς ἢ μόνον πολυδύναμος, καὶ πότερον συγχωρητέον τοῖς μίαν μὲν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατακλείουσι πολυμερῆ δὲ ταύτην, ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἢ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ λέγουσι γίγνεσθαι· ἢ πλειόνων ψυχῶν ἦν σύνοδος καὶ ἐῴκει ὁ ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα χορῷ συνᾴδοντι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἔχοντι τὸ ἓν κατὰ τὴν τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸ ὅλον συμφωνίαν, ἢ ἑνὸς ἦν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τὸ διάφορον πλῆθος.

25a.7

I.49.25a.7

Ῥητέον οὖν, ὡς δύναμις καὶ μέρος καὶ κατασκευὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτῃ διενήνοχε· μέρος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ καὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἄλλου μέρους διαφέρει· κατασκευὴ δὲ ἡ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε τῶν μερῶν οἰκεία ἐπιτηδειότης· δύναμις δὲ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἕξις ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἐνεργεῖν δύναται, καθ᾽ ὃ κατεσκεύασται ἕκαστον. Ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι κατασκευήν τε καὶ δύναμιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.6 · A criterion for distinguishing the accounts I.49.25a.6

Perhaps, then, we must sort out this great confusion by setting a criterion for recognizing difference and lack of difference in respect of parts; then for distinguishing powers from parts and from one another; and then, at a higher level, substances, asking whether several could exist in one. This will make it possible to know whether the soul in a living creature has many parts or only many powers. We can then decide whether to agree with those who confine one soul within the human being but say that it has many parts, either in itself or when it comes to be within that human being; or whether there was a conjunction of several souls, and the human being most resembled a choir singing together, possessing unity through the concord of those who make up the whole; or whether the differentiated plurality belonged to something one in substance.[1374]

25a.7 · Part, constitution, and power I.49.25a.7

We must therefore explain that power, part, and constitution differ in the case of soul as follows. A part is what differs from another part in its underlying subject, its form, and its activities. Constitution is the fitness proper to the parts for that to which they are naturally suited. Power is a state of that constitution enabling activity in accordance with the way each thing is constituted. Some, however, have said that constitution and power are the same.[1375]

1374. The inquiry distinguishes three possibilities: one soul with parts, several souls united like singers in a choir, or diverse powers belonging to one substance. The Greek moves awkwardly into past tenses, ēn and eōikei, in the second and third alternatives; these remain visible in the English. “At a higher level” renders the edited anōterō, introducing the further question about substances.

1375. Kataskeuē is rendered “constitution,” the way something is fitted for its function; epitēdeiotēs is its fitness or aptitude. Hexis, “state,” describes the condition that enables activity. These definitions distinguish the bearer, its fitness, and its ability to act, while also recording that some thinkers identify the last two.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.8

I.49.25a.8

Διαφέρει δὲ μέρους δύναμις· <αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις> ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου ὅλου πλείους θεωροῦνται, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ [ἐν] ἄλλῳ περατούμεναι τῷ ποσῷ τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἀπολαμβάνει ἑαυτοῖς ποσόν τι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περιγράφει ἀλλοῖόν τι μόριον αὐτῆς. Αὐτίκα τοῦ μήλου αἱ μὲν δυνάμεις πᾶσαι ἐν ἑνί, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἄλλα ἀλλαχοῦ κεχώρισται· ἐφάπτεται γὰρ ἡ μὲν τοῦ μέρους ἔννοια ποσοῦ, ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κατασκευὴν ὀλιγωτέραν ποσότητα ἀπολαμβάνον· ἡ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ ὅλου τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἀπείληφε. Διόπερ ἀμερεῖς μὲν αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ δι᾽ ὅλου κεχωρηκυῖαι, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἠλάττωται, μερικοῦ ἔχοντα ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅλου ποσότητα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.8 · An apple’s powers and its pieces

I.49.25a.8

A power differs from a part. <For powers> are observed in plurality throughout one and the same underlying whole, without being limited to one quantity and [in] another of the underlying substance. Parts, however, take for themselves a certain quantity of the substance and circumscribe a distinct portion of it. For example, an apple’s powers are all in one thing, whereas its parts are separated in different places. The concept of a part concerns quantity, since a part takes a smaller quantity in relation to the constitution of the whole; the concept of a power has taken in the conception of the whole. Hence powers are without parts and extend throughout the whole, whereas parts are lesser, having the quantity of a portion instead of that of the whole.[1376]

1376. The apple illustrates a difference between a power belonging throughout one bearer and a piece occupying only a limited quantity of it. No particular apple qualities are enumerated in the Greek. The supplied “For powers” and the rejected second en, “in,” remain marked; the latter deliberately interrupts the English construction. “Parts are lesser” renders ēlattōtai in the quantitative contrast, without suggesting a loss of the whole’s powers.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.9

I.49.25a.9

Πῶς οὖν ἀμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάλιν τριμερής; Οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀκούσαντες εἰκότως ἀποροῦσι, πῶς καὶ ἀμερὴς καὶ τριμερής, καὶ λύουσι φάσκοντες κατὰ μὲν ἴδιον λόγον καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ἀμερῆ, τριμερῆ δὲ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐν σώματι γενομένη μεριστῷ ὄντι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἐπέχει τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ <ἡ> αὐτὴ κεφαλὴν ἔχει καὶ θώρακα καὶ τοῦ ποτ᾽ ἦπαρ, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ διὰ τούτων διάφοροι ἐνέργειαι διαμεριστῶς καὶ μερῶν γιγνόμεναι διαφόρων τοῦ σώματος ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτῇ τῶν μερῶν μερισμὸν ἐπανέθεσαν.

25a.10

I.49.25a.10

Νικόλαος δὲ οὐκ ἠξίου τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν συμπληροῦται καὶ γίνεται ὡς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ἀντεξέτασιν πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ μικρότερον ἢ μεῖζον, προστιθεμένου μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου. Ψυχῆς δὲ <οὐχ> οὕτως λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τούτων συμπληροῦται, οὔτε γὰρ μέγεθός ἐστιν, οὔτε τι ἔχει πλῆθος), ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τέχνης μέρη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.9 · One soul, activities in different bodily regions I.49.25a.9

How, then, is soul without parts and yet threefold? Those who understand the soul's parts quantitatively are understandably puzzled about how it can be both without parts and threefold. They resolve the difficulty by saying that, according to its own account and in itself, it is without parts, but that it is threefold in so far as, coming to be in a divisible body, it occupies different parts of that body for its different activities. For it is certainly not <the> soul itself that possesses a head, a chest, and a liver; rather, the different activities occurring through these, distributed among different bodily parts, have transferred division back to the soul from those parts.[1377]

25a.10 · Nicolaus: qualitative divisions I.49.25a.10

Nicolaus did not think that the parts of the soul should be understood quantitatively, but rather qualitatively, like the parts of an art or of philosophy. In the case of quantity, the whole is completed from its parts and, in comparison with something else, becomes more or less, smaller or greater, when a part is added or removed. But we do <not> speak of parts of soul in this way. Its quantity is not completed by them, since it is neither a magnitude nor possessed of a plurality. We speak instead as we do of the parts of an art.[1378]

1377. The proposed solution locates division in the bodily sites of activity and then explains its attribution to soul. The supplied article is represented by "the" before the understood "soul." The words tou pot' before hēpar, "liver," are textually problematic: literally, "of the ... at some time." The English gives the recoverable anatomical list; it does not adopt the apparatus's conjecture "third, the liver." The edited phrase about activities occurring in bodily parts is also compressed.

1378. Poson, "quantity," concerns how much or how many; poion, "quality," concerns what kind. Divisions within an art or philosophy provide the analogy for a distinction that does not add pieces to a spatial whole. The restored negative "not" is essential and remains marked. The claim that soul has no plurality belongs to the quantitative contrast; it does not cancel the earlier claim that soul has many powers.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.11

I.49.25a.11

Διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τούτων· τέχνη μὲν γάρ, <ἂν> ἀπῇ τι μέρος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁλόκληρος οὐδὲ τελεία, ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα τελεία ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ζῷον οὐ κομισάμενον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τέλος ἀτελές ἐστιν.

25a.12

I.49.25a.12

Ἀκούει τοίνυν Νικόλαος τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς δυνάμεις τοῦ ἔχοντος· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἔμψυχον τῷ ψυχὴν ἔχειν πολλὰ δύναται, οἷον ζῆν, αἰσθάνεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, νοεῖν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ὧν πάντων αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ ψυχή. Ταύτας οὖν τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἔμψυχον ταῦτα δρᾶν ἢ πάσχειν, μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεται ὡς εἴρηται. Οὐδὲν <δὲ> κωλύει αὐτῆς ἀμεροῦς οὔσης μεριστῶς δέχεσθαι τὰς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐνδόσεις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.11 · The limit of the analogy with an art

I.49.25a.11

But soul differs from these as well. An art, <if> some part is absent, would not be whole or complete. Every soul, however, is complete, while every living creature that has not attained its natural end is incomplete.[1379]

25a.12 · Powers of the being that possesses soul

I.49.25a.12

Nicolaus therefore understands the parts of soul as powers of the being that possesses it. For a living creature, and in general anything ensouled, can do many things by possessing soul: live, perceive, move, think, and desire. Soul is the cause and source of all these. Accordingly, as has been said, he posits as parts of soul those powers by which the ensouled being is said to do or undergo these things. <But> nothing prevents the being from receiving in a divided manner the activities imparted by soul, although soul itself is without parts.[1380]

1379. The analogy with an art is qualified immediately: soul's completeness does not depend on assembling components. Teleia, "complete," and telos, "end," express the contrast with a creature's attainment of its natural completion. "If" represents the supplied conditional particle an. The sentence distinguishes the soul from the living creature whose development is not yet complete.

1380. The bearer of the powers is the ensouled being; soul is their cause and source. Endoseis denotes the imparting of activities, not the cutting of soul into pieces. The recipient in the last sentence is understood from the preceding "ensouled being," since the Greek leaves it unexpressed. The supplied de, "but," remains marked.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.13 I.49.25a.13

Μεριστὸν οὖν τὸ ζῷον, εἰς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος παραλαμβανομένου, ἀφ᾽ οὗ αἱ ζωτικαὶ ἐνέργειαι κατὰ ψυχῆς ἔνδοσιν δεχόμεναι τὴν εἰς μέρη τῶν διαφόρων ἐνεργειῶν κατάταξιν καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέρη ἔχειν προσανέθεσαν. Καὶ μήποτε διττῶς ἐπινοουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐχούσης τὴν ζωήν, τήν τε καθ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ σχέσιν, ἐν τῇ κατὰ σχέσιν ζωῇ ὑφίσταται τὰ μέρη. Ὡς γὰρ πυρῷ σπαρέντι ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν σχέσει ὑφίσταται τὰ μέρη, τοῦ στάχυος τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ὄντος μεριστοῦ ἐν δὲ μεριστῷ θεωρουμένου, ἀφ᾽ οὗ πάλιν ἐπάνεισιν εἰς τὸ ἀμέριστον, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῇ ἀμερίστῳ οὔσῃ ἐν τῇ σπορᾷ παρυφίσταται τὰ μέρη.

26 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.26

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

* * συμβαλλόμενον ἑξῆς <ἂν> εἴη ἐπισκέψασθαι πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι τίνες διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ζῷα προβέβληνται ὡς δι᾽ αὐτήν, καὶ τίνες διὰ τὴν μετ᾽ αὐτήν, καὶ τίνες διὰ τὸ ζῷον. Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ αἱ ὑποστάσεις πρόδηλοι καὶ τίνες αἱ ἀνάγκαι εἰς τὴν καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐπάνοδον ἔσονται τῶν ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος μέρη ψυχῆς κατακλειόντων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

25a.13 · Life in itself and life in relation

I.49.25a.13

The living creature is therefore divisible, since body too is included in its conception. From this, the vital activities, imparted by soul and receiving their distribution as different activities among parts, have attributed the possession of parts to soul as well. Perhaps, then, since soul is conceived in two ways and possesses life both in itself and in relation, the parts subsist in its relational life. For when a grain of wheat is sown, its parts come to subsist in its relation to generation: the whole ear is not divisible but is contemplated in what is divisible, from which it returns again to the indivisible. So too, although soul is indivisible, parts arise alongside it in its sowing.[1381]

26 · A damaged fragment on the sources of life

I.49.26

In the same work.

. . . . . It <would> next be helpful to examine, in order to know, which have been brought forth as living creatures through soul, as through soul itself, and which through the one that comes after it, and which through the living creature. For in this way the modes of subsistence will be evident, and it will be clear what necessities require those who confine parts of soul within a part of the body to return to soul in itself.[1382]

1381. The tentative mēpote, “perhaps,” is retained. Life kath’ hautēn is life considered in itself; life kata schesin is life in relation, here to bodily existence. The wheat analogy distinguishes the whole ear as contemplated from its realization in divisible material; the Greek’s claim that the whole ear is not divisible is retained, not rewritten as a modern botanical statement. “Sowing” is then transferred to soul.

1382. The edition marks missing text at the opening. The surviving construction is difficult: the referents of “which” and “the one that comes after it” are not securely recoverable. This provisional rendering retains zōia, “living creatures,” and takes it predicatively with “brought forth”; it supplies no lost list of powers. The apparatus suggests “through participation” for “through the one that comes after it,” and “separations” for “modes of subsistence”; neither is adopted. The closing “return to soul in itself” is read as a return in the account being given of soul. The supplied an is represented by “would.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.1 · Αἰσάρας I.49.27.1

Αἰσάρας Πυθαγορείου Λευκανᾶς ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ἀνθρώπω φύσιος.

Φύσις ἀνθρώπω κανών μοι δοκεῖ νόμω τε καὶ δίκας ἦμεν καὶ οἴκω τε καὶ πόλιος. Ἴχνια γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ στιβαζόμενος εὕροιτό κά τις καὶ μαστευόμενος· νόμος γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δίκα ἀ τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἐστι διακόσμασις. Τριχθαδία γὰρ ὑπάρχοισα ἐπὶ τριχθαδίοις ἔργοις συνέστακε· γνώμαν καὶ φρόνασιν ἐργαζόμενος <ὁ νόος> καὶ ἀλκὰν καὶ <ὁρμὰν ἀ> θύμωσις καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ φιλοφροσύναν ἀ ἐπιθυμία.

27.2 I.49.27.2

Καὶ οὕτω συντέτακται ταῦτα ποτ᾽ ἄλλαλα πάντα, ὥστε αὐτᾶς τὸ μὲν κράτιστον ἀγέεσθαι, τὸ δὲ χέρειον ἄρχεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέσον μέσαν ἐπέχεν τάξιν, καὶ ἄρχεν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. Ταῦτα δ᾽ οὕτως ἐμάσατο κατὰ λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἔν τε ἐκτυπώσι καὶ ἐξεργασίᾳ τῶ ἀνθρωπίνω σκάνεος, ὅτι μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἐνοάσατο νόμω τε καὶ δίκας ἐπιδέκτορα γενέσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τῶν θνατῶν ζῴων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.1 · Aesara: human nature and justice I.49.27.1

From On Human Nature by Aesara, the Pythagorean woman of Lucania.[1383]

Human nature seems to me to be the standard of law and justice, for both household and city. By tracking and seeking within the human being, one could discover their traces; for the ordering of the soul within the human being is law and justice. Being threefold, the soul is constituted for threefold functions: judgment and prudence are produced by <intellect>; strength and <impulse, by the> spirited power; and love and goodwill, by desire.[1384]

27.2 · The order of the soul's powers I.49.27.2

All these are so ordered in relation to one another that the soul's best element leads, the inferior is ruled, and the middle occupies a middle rank, both ruling and being ruled. God devised these things in this rational order when shaping and fashioning the human frame, because he intended the human being alone, and no other mortal creature, to be receptive of law and justice.[1385]

1383. The edited heading identifies a woman from Lucania; Wachsmuth discusses the attribution and its variant forms in the apparatus. The translation follows that heading without adding a date or biography. Doric forms such as anthrōpō, "of a human being," hēmen, "to be," and psychas, "of the soul," are retained in Greek, with ordinary modern English opposite.

1384. Kanōn is a standard or measure. The argument looks for law and justice in the soul's own ordering, diakosmāsis. Noos, "intellect," thymōsis, the spirited power, and epithymia, "desire," have distinct functions. The edition supplies "intellect" and the words "impulse, the"; the corresponding English remains marked, with "by" making the parallel construction readable.

1385. The hierarchy concerns the soul's functions: intellect leads, the spirited power occupies the middle, and desire is governed. "Leads" follows the intended sense of the unusual printed ageesthai; the apparatus questions that form while retaining it. Skanos, "frame," denotes the bodily structure. The claim about human beings alone receiving law and justice belongs to the excerpt's argument.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.3 I.49.27.3

Οὔτε <γὰρ> ἐξ ἑνὸς σύσταμα κοινωνίας γένοιτό κα, οὔτε μὰν ἐκ πλειόνων, ὁμοίων δὲ τούτων (ἀνάγκα γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὰ πράγματα διαφέροντά ἐντι, καὶ τὰς ἐν ἁμῖν μοίρας τᾶς ψυχᾶς διαφόρως ἦμεν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶ σώματος <ἄψιος ὄργανα καὶ> ὁράσιος καὶ ἀκοᾶς καὶ γεύσιος καὶ ὀσφράσιος, οὐ γὰρ πάντα ποτὶ πάντα τὰν αὐτὰν ἔχει συναρμογάν),

27.4 I.49.27.4

οὔτε μὰν ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν καὶ ἀνομοίων, τῶν τυχόντων μέντοι γε, ἀλλὰ τῶν ποττὰν τῶ ὅλω συστάματος ἐκπλάρωσιν καὶ σύνταξιν καὶ συναρμογὰν τευχθέντων· οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων καὶ ἀνομοίων καὶ τῶν ἐς τὸ ὅλον καὶ τέλεον τευχθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐκ εἰκαίως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε συνταχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μετά τινος νόμω καὶ ἔμφρονος ἐπιστασίας.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.3 · A community requires different members I.49.27.3

<For> a community cannot be constituted from one member, nor indeed from several if they are alike. Since their tasks differ, the portions of soul within us must also differ, as with the body's <organs of touch and> sight, hearing, taste, and smell; for not everything is equally fitted to everything.[1386]

27.4 · Fitness, law, and intelligent oversight I.49.27.4

Nor can it be constituted from several unlike members taken at random, but only from those fashioned for the completion, ordering, and fitting together of the whole structure. And it requires not merely several unlike members fashioned to form the complete whole, but also that these very members be arranged with some law and intelligent oversight, rather than casually and at random.[1387]

1386. Koinōnia is a community or association, here used to explain cooperation within soul. Difference of function, rather than mere number, makes that cooperation possible. The supplied "for" and "organs of touch and" remain marked. The Greek's parenthetical explanation runs across the source-page break; the English turns it into a sentence without omitting its causal connection.

1387. The argument adds two conditions to plurality and difference: the members must be fitted to a whole, and their arrangement must be governed intelligently. Synarmoga, "fitting together," preserves the image of coordinated construction. Epistasia is oversight or direction; "law" here governs the arrangement of the soul's powers.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.5 I.49.27.5

Αἵ τε γὰρ τὰν ἴσαν ἐφέρετο μοῖραν καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τιμᾶς, ἀνόμοια ἐόντα καὶ τὰ μὲν χερείονα τὰ δὲ κάρρονα τὰ δὲ μέσα, οὔ κα ἐδύνατο ἁ κατὰ ψυχὰν τῶν μερέων κοινωνία συναρμοσθῆμεν· αἵ τε ἀνίσας, μὴ τὰ κάρρονα δὲ τὰν μείζονα μοῖραν ἐφέρετο, ἀλλὰ τὰ χερείονα, πολλὰ <κα> ἀφροσύνα καὶ ἀταξία περὶ τὰν ψυχὰν ὑπάρχεν·

27.6 I.49.27.6

αἵ τε τὰ κάρρονα μὲν τὰν μείζονα, τὰ χερείονα δὲ τὰν μείονα, μὴ ποτὶ λόγον δὲ ἕκαστον τούτων, οὔ κα ἐδύνατο ὁμόνοια καὶ φιλία καὶ δικαιότας ἦμεν περὶ τὰν ψυχάν, ἐπεὶ ὧ ἕκαστον ἓν ποτὶ λόγον συντέτακται τὸν ἁρμόσδοντα, τὸ τοιοῦτον φαμὶ ἐγὼ δικαιότατα ἦμεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.5 · Equal shares and inverted rule

I.49.27.5

For if the members received an equal share of both power and honor, despite being unlike, some inferior, some superior, and some intermediate, the community of parts within the soul could not be fitted together. And if their shares were unequal, but the inferior members received the larger share instead of the superior, much folly and disorder <would> prevail in the soul;[1388]

27.6 · Justice requires fitting proportion

I.49.27.6

and if the superior received the larger share and the inferior the smaller, but each without due proportion, there could be no concord, friendship, or justice within the soul. For I call that condition justice whose every single part has been arranged according to its fitting proportion.[1389]

1388. These are conditions concerning the internal powers of soul. The passage rejects both identical shares for unlike functions and an allocation that lets the inferior govern the superior. Dynamis here concerns power in the arrangement, while timā is honor or standing. The supplied Doric modal particle ka is represented by “would.”

1389. Simply giving the better part more is insufficient: each share must fit the function of its recipient. Logos here is proportion. The printed hō is interpreted as a genitive relative, “whose,” as the apparatus explains, and hekaston hen as “every single part.” Dikaiotās and its accusative dikaiotata are dialectal forms for justice, not an English comparative or superlative.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.7 I.49.27.7

Καὶ μὰν ὁμόνοιά τις καὶ ὁμοφροσύνα ὀπαδέει τᾷ τοιαύτᾳ διατάξι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον δικαίως κα λέγοιτο εὐνομία ἦμεν τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ἅτις ἐκ τῶ ἄρχεν μὲν τὸ κάρρον, ἄρχεσθαι δὲ τὸ χέρειον κράτος ἐπιφέροιτο τᾶς ἀρετᾶς. Καὶ φιλία δὲ καὶ ἔρως καὶ φιλοφροσύνα σύμφυλος καὶ συγγενὴς ἐκ τούτων ἐξεβλάστασε τῶν μερέων. Συμπείθει μὲν γὰρ ὁ νόος ὀραυγούμενος, ἔραται δὲ ἁ ἐπιθυμία, ἁ δὲ θύμωσις ἐμπιπλαμένα μένεος, ἔχθρᾳ ζέοισα φίλα γίνεται τᾷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

27.8 I.49.27.8

Ἀρμόξας γὰρ ὁ νόος τὸ ἀδὺ τῷ λυπηρῷ συγκατακρεόμενος καὶ τὸ σύντονον καὶ σφοδρὸν τῷ κούφῳ μέρει τᾶς ψυχᾶς καὶ διαχυτικῷ· ἕκαστόν τε ἑκάστω πράγματος τὰν σύμφυλον καὶ συγγενέα προμάθειαν διαμεμέρισται,

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.7 · Concord, friendship, and goodwill I.49.27.7

A certain concord and agreement of mind follow such an arrangement. This might rightly be called good order in the soul, bringing the mastery of virtue through the superior ruling and the inferior being ruled. Friendship, love, and a goodwill that is native and akin to them have also sprung from these parts. For intellect persuades through its investigation, desire loves, and the spirited power, filled with vigor and boiling with hostility, becomes friendly to desire.[1390]

27.8 · Blending pleasure and effort I.49.27.8

For intellect has harmonized them by blending the pleasant with the painful, and what is strenuous and intense with the light and expansive part of soul. Each has also been allotted, for its respective task, the foresight native and akin to it;[1391]

1390. Eunomia is good order under law; the image of civic order continues within the soul. The final clause preserves the striking coexistence of “boiling with hostility” and “friendly to desire.” It describes the spirited power’s force becoming allied with desire within the proposed arrangement; no unprinted negation is introduced to remove the tension.

1391. The syntax is unsettled: “having harmonized” and “blending” lead into a change of construction with “has been allotted.” The English gives the first clause a finite verb and understands “each” as each part. Promatheia is foresight or forethought, distinguished from the subsequent investigation and the force needed to carry it into action. The apparatus offers repairs to the blending clause; the printed wording remains in Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.9 I.49.27.9

ὁ μὲν νόος ὀραυγούμενος καὶ στιβαζόμενος τὰ πράγματα, ἁ δὲ θύμωσις ὁρμὰν καὶ ἀλκὰν ποτιφερομένα τοῖς ὀραυγαθεῖσιν· ἁ δὲ ἐπιθυμία φιλοστοργίᾳ συγγενὴς ἐᾶσα ἐφαρμόσδει τῷ νόῳ ἴδιον περιποιουμένα τὸ ἁδὺ καὶ τὸ σύννοον ἀποδιδοῖσα τῷ συννόῳ μέρει τᾶς ψυχᾶς.

27.10 I.49.27.10

Ὥνπερ ἕκατι δοκεῖ μοι καὶ ὁ βίος ὁ κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπως ἄριστος ἦμεν, ὅκκα τὸ ἁδὺ τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγκατακραθῇ καὶ <ἁ> ἀδονὰ τᾷ ἀρετᾷ. Ποθαρμόξασθαι δ᾽ αὐτὰ ὁ νόος δύναται, παιδεύσιος καὶ ἀρετᾶς ἐπήρατος γενόμενος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

27.9 · The contribution of each power

I.49.27.9

intellect investigates and tracks the matters at hand, while the spirited power brings impulse and strength to what has been investigated. Desire, being akin to affectionate attachment, fits in with intellect, securing pleasure as its own and assigning thoughtfulness to the thoughtful part of soul.[1392]

27.10 · Pleasure joined to virtue

I.49.27.10

For these reasons, it seems to me that human life is best when the pleasant is blended with the serious, and <the> pleasure with virtue. Intellect can fit them together when it has become beloved of education and virtue.[1393]

1392. The repeated language of tracking recalls the opening search within human nature. Philostorgia is affectionate attachment. The printed synnoon and synnoōi are difficult; “thoughtfulness” and “thoughtful” preserve their verbal relationship in a provisional rendering. The apparatus questions the former reading. Desire’s own province remains pleasure, distinguished from the activity assigned to intellect.

1393. Spoudaion is the serious or morally worthy. The conclusion seeks a fitting union of pleasure and virtue, not pleasure alone. The supplied article remains marked. The last word, epēratos, ordinarily means lovely or beloved, but the apparatus judges it corrupt here and suggests alternatives implying experience or attainment. “Beloved of education and virtue” deliberately preserves the difficult printed wording as provisional.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.1 · Πλάτωνος Τιμαίου I.49.28.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι ὁ θεὸς πρεσβύτερον ἀπὸ νεωτέρου συνέξας εἴασεν· ἀλλά πως ἡμεῖς πολὺ μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ ταύτῃ πῃ καὶ λέγομεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ <προτέραν> καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου ξυνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδέ τε καὶ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ.

28.2 I.49.28.2

Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.1 · Plato: soul's priority to body I.49.28.1

From Plato's Timaeus.

Although we are now attempting to speak of soul after body, god did not accordingly devise it as younger. For god, having bound them together, would not have allowed the older to be ruled by the younger. We, however, share greatly in chance and heedlessness, and so speak in much the same fashion. He constituted soul as <prior> to body and older both in origin and in excellence, as its mistress and ruler, with body to be ruled. He made it from the following ingredients and in the following way.[1394]

28.2 · Being, sameness, and difference I.49.28.2

From the indivisible being that always remains the same and the divisible being that comes to be in connection with bodies, he blended a third kind of being, intermediate between the two. Likewise, in the case of the nature of the same and that of the different, he constituted them in the same way, intermediate between their indivisible aspect and the aspect divided in connection with bodies.[1395]

1394. The heading's references identify Timaeus 34b-35b and 36e-37c. The order of exposition is distinguished from the priority attributed to soul. Genesei concerns origin or coming-to-be; aretēi concerns excellence. The supplied proteran, "prior," is restored from Plato and remains marked. The subject is the soul of the cosmos, as the later reference to heaven makes explicit.

1395. Ousia is rendered "being" in this construction of the world-soul. The same and the different name constituents alongside being; they are not merely descriptions of identical or different bodies. The sentence forms an intermediate in each case before the three are blended together. This provides context for the later excerpts' language of soul between indivisible and divisible.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.3 I.49.28.3

Καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ. Μιγνὺς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκε διένειμεν, ἑκάστην δὲ ἔκ τε ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμιγμένην. -

28.4 I.49.28.4

Καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.3 · A single mixture, divided into portions I.49.28.3

Taking these three, he blended them all into a single form, forcibly fitting the nature of the different, which was hard to mix, into the same. Mixing them with being and making one out of three, he then divided this whole into as many portions as were fitting, each blended from the same, the different, and being. -[1396]

28.4 · The invisible soul of heaven I.49.28.4

The body of heaven has come to be visible, while soul itself is invisible, yet shares in reasoning and harmony. Brought into being by the best of intelligible and everlasting beings, it is the best of things that have been generated.[1397]

1396. The mixture retains all three constituents in every portion. The closing dash reproduces the edition's break between the two selected stretches of the Timaeus. The intervening account is not translated as though present in Stobaeus's excerpt. The English "into the same" preserves the wording eis tauton without resolving it exclusively as "into sameness" or "into one whole."

1397. The genitive "of intelligible and everlasting beings" qualifies "the best" who makes soul; "of things generated" qualifies soul as the best product. The English preserves the two groups. The passage joins soul's invisibility with its participation in reasoning and harmony, in contrast to the visible heavenly body.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.5 I.49.28.5

Ἅτε οὖν ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἔκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκραθεῖσα μοιρῶν, καὶ ἀνάλογον μερισθεῖσα καὶ ξυνδεθεῖσα, αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς ἑαυτήν, ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς κινουμένη, ὅτῳ τ᾽ ἄν τι ταὐτὸν ᾖ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅ τι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε ξυμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστά τε εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί·

28.6 I.49.28.6

λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀληθὴς γιγνόμενος, περί τε θάτερον <ὢν> καὶ περὶ τὸ ταὐτόν, ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ <ὁ> τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ὅταν δὲ αὖ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾖ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος εὔτροχος ὢν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται. Τούτω δὲ ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἄν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχὴν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

28.5 · Knowing the same and the different I.49.28.5

Since it is blended from these three constituents, the nature of the same, that of the different, and being, and has been divided and bound together in proportion, it revolves upon itself. Whenever it comes into contact with something whose being is dispersed, or with something whose being is indivisible, it declares, moving throughout itself, what a thing is the same as and what it differs from; and especially in relation to what, in what respect, how, and when each thing is or is affected in relation to each other thing, both among things that come to be and in relation to those that always remain the same;[1398]

28.6 · Opinion, understanding, and knowledge I.49.28.6

and the account that becomes true in the same manner, <being> concerned with the different and the same, is carried without voice or sound within what moves itself. When it concerns what is perceptible, and <the> circle of the different, being correct, reports throughout its entire soul, opinions and beliefs become firm and true. When, in turn, it concerns what is rational, and the smoothly revolving circle of the same declares these things, understanding and knowledge necessarily result. If anyone should ever call that being in which these two arise anything other than soul, he will say anything but the truth.[1399]

1398. The long sentence relates soul's composition to its ability to distinguish identity, difference, and relations. Skedastē ousia is dispersed being; ameristos is indivisible. "In proportion" renders analogon. The repeated qualifications concerning relation, respect, manner, and time are retained, as is the distinction between things that come to be and things that remain the same.

1399. Logos here is an account or inward statement, explicitly without audible sound. The text connects perception with the circle of the different and understanding with the circle of the same. Printed logistikon is rendered "what is rational"; it is not silently replaced by "intelligible." Both supplied words remain marked. Printed αὐτοῦ in the motion clause is understood reflexively in the English. The closing dual refers to nous and epistēmē, understanding and knowledge.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

29.1 · Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ι′ I.49.29.1

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ι′.

Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι· εἰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον. - Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. - Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω.

29.2 I.49.29.2

Εἰ δ᾽ ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα. - Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

29.1 · Plato: what no evil destroys I.49.29.1

From Plato’s Republic, Book X.

“Then, when it is destroyed by no evil at all, whether its own or another’s, it clearly must exist always; and if it exists always, it is immortal.”

“Necessarily,” he said.

“Then let that stand so,” I said.[1400]

29.2 · The number of souls I.49.29.2

“And if it does, you realize that the souls would always be the same. They could not become fewer, since none is destroyed, nor again more numerous. For if anything immortal increased in number, you know that it would arise from what is mortal, and in the end everything would be immortal.”

“What you say is true.”[1401]

1400. Republic 610e-611b, as identified in the source heading. The excerpt begins within an argument: “it” refers to soul, whose destruction by its own or an alien evil has already been considered. This selection gives the resulting inference rather than the entire preceding demonstration. The first-person speaker is Socrates.

1401. “The souls” makes explicit the feminine plural understood in hai autai, “the same.” The immediate argument concerns their number: no loss through destruction and no increase from mortal things. “In the end” renders teleutōnta; it does not mean that dying itself makes each thing immortal.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

29.3 I.49.29.3

Ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο οἰώμεθα, ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει, μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτό. - Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. - Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀΐδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή. - Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. - Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

29.3 · Immortality and the soul's true nature I.49.29.3

"But," I said, "let us believe neither that, since the argument will not allow it, nor that soul in its truest nature is such as to be full of great diversity, unlikeness, and difference within itself."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"It is not easy," I said, "for something to be everlasting if it is compounded of many things and has not been put together in the finest way, as soul has now appeared to us."

"Certainly not likely."

"That soul is immortal, then, both the argument just given and the others would compel us to accept."[1402]

1402. The qualification "in its truest nature" matters: the argument questions whether the soul's present appearance reveals what it ultimately is. The objection concerns a compound that is not composed in the finest way, not every possible composition without qualification. Printed neuter forms with psychē remain in Greek; the English follows the intended reference to soul.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.1 · Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας δ′ I.49.30.1

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας δ′.

Τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἕκαστα πράττομεν, ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν δ᾽ αὖ τρίτῳ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, ἢ ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν. Ταῦτ᾽ ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου. - Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.1 · Plato: one power or several? I.49.30.1

From Plato’s Republic, Book IV.

“The difficult question is whether we perform each action with this same thing, or, since there are three, one action with one and another with another: whether we learn with one of the things within us, become angry with another, and desire the pleasures of food, reproduction, and related things with a third; or whether we act with the whole soul in each of these cases whenever we are moved to act. These will be the difficult distinctions to establish adequately.”

“So it seems to me too,” he said.[1403]

1403. The heading identifies Republic 436a-b and 439a-440a: the excerpt joins two separated passages. The next unit begins the later passage, without supplying the intervening discussion. The question is whether learning, anger, and appetite belong to distinct principles within soul or to the whole soul acting in each case.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.2 I.49.30.2

Τοῦ διψῶντος ἡ ψυχή, καθ᾽ ὅσον διψῇ, οὐ βούλεται ἄλλο τι ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ. - Δῆλον δή. - Οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερόν τι ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; Οὐ γὰρ δή, φαμέν, τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τἀναντία πράττοι. - Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. - Ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ προσαγομένη. - Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.2 · Thirst, resistance, and the archer I.49.30.2

“The soul of someone who is thirsty, in so far as it is thirsty, wants only to drink, desires this, and is impelled toward it.”

“Clearly.”

“Then if something ever pulls it back when it is thirsty, there would be something in it different from the thirsty element that drives it like a beast toward drinking. For, we say, the same thing cannot at the same time do contrary things with the same part of itself in relation to the same object.”

“Indeed not.”

“Just as, I think, it is inaccurate to say that an archer’s hands push the bow away and pull it toward him at the same time. One should say that one hand pushes it away and another draws it toward him.”

“Quite so,” he said.[1404]

1404. The restriction “in so far as it is thirsty” isolates thirst as the source of the impulse. The principle concerning opposites includes three qualifications: the same part, the same object, and the same time. The archer shows why apparently contrary actions need not belong to the same acting part.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.3 I.49.30.3

Πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν; - Καὶ μάλα γε, ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις. - Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος; - Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. - Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγένηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται; - Φαίνεται.

30.4 I.49.30.4

Οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον. - Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθ᾽ ἄν οὕτως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.3 · What urges drinking and what restrains it I.49.30.3

“Do we say, then, that some people are at times thirsty but unwilling to drink?”

“Certainly,” he said, “many people, and often.”

“What, then,” I said, “might one say about them? That their soul contains something commanding them to drink, but also something preventing it, which is different from and masters what commands?”

“So it seems to me,” he said.

“Does not what prevents such acts, when it arises, arise from reasoning, while what drives and pulls comes through affections and illnesses?”

“So it appears.”[1405]

30.4 · Reason and appetite distinguished I.49.30.4

“Then we shall not be unreasonable,” I said, “in judging them to be two and different from one another. We call that with which the soul reasons its rational element, and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and flutters about other desires its unreasoning and appetitive element, the companion of certain satisfactions and pleasures.”

“No,” he said, “we would reasonably regard them in that way.”[1406]

1405. The opposition is internal: both the impulse and the restraint occur within the same person. Logismos is reasoning; pathēmata are affections or things undergone, and nosēmata illnesses. The wording is the dialogue’s explanation of the conflicting impulses, not a modern medical account.

1406. Logistikon names what reasons; alogiston what does not reason; epithymētikon what desires. “Flutters about” preserves the image in eptoētai, which can suggest excited or agitated movement. Plērōseis are fillings or satisfactions. The passage distinguishes two elements at this stage; the spirited element is the next question.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.5 I.49.30.5

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὡρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον <τρίτον>, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές; - Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἑτέρῳ <τῷ> ἐπιθυμητικῷ.

30.6 I.49.30.6

Ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιέως ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοίη, ἅμα δὲ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτο καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατούμενος δ᾽ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν, ἔφη, ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος. - Ἤκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός. - Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ. - Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

30.5 · Is spirit a third element? I.49.30.5

“Let these, then,” I said, “be distinguished for us as two kinds present in soul. But what belongs to spirit, that with which we become angry: is it a <third>, or would it be of the same nature as one of these?”

“Perhaps,” he said, “as the other, <the> appetitive element.”[1407]

30.6 · Leontius and the conflict of impulses I.49.30.6

“But,” I said, “I once heard a story that I believe. Leontius, son of Aglaion, was coming up from the Piraeus, outside the northern wall, when he noticed corpses lying beside the public executioner. He wanted to look, yet at the same time felt disgust and turned himself away. For a while he struggled and covered his face; but, overcome by desire, he pulled his eyes open, ran toward the corpses, and said: ‘There you are, you wretches! Fill yourselves with the lovely sight!’”

“I have heard it too,” he said.

“This story,” I said, “shows that anger sometimes makes war on desires, as one thing against another.”

“It does,” he said.[1408]

1407. Thymos is rendered “spirit,” with “become angry” for the related verb thymoumetha. It names the capacity whose relation to reason and appetite is being tested. Both “third” and the article before “appetitive” are supplied from Plato in the edition and remain marked on both sides.

1408. Leontius addresses his own eyes; “the lovely sight” is bitterly ironic. The story supplies a case in which anger opposes appetite, supporting their distinction. It does not yet establish that spirit differs from reason: that further question follows in excerpt 31. The physical details and the location beside the executioner are retained without embellishment.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

31.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.31.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἕτερον ὂν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικόν τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἴδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυνεῖχεν αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ; - Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον. - Ναί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἄν γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὄν.

31.2 I.49.31.2

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτο [οὖ] ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δὲ ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτέ γε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. - Ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες. Ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἴπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει, τὸ

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

31.1 · Spirit as the natural ally of reason

I.49.31.1

In the same work.

“Is it, then, different from this too, or is it a kind of rational element, so that there are not three kinds in soul but two, the rational and the appetitive? Or, just as three classes held the city together, the money-making, the auxiliary, and the deliberative, is this spirited element likewise a third in soul, naturally an ally of the rational, unless corrupted by a bad upbringing?”

“It must be a third,” he said.

“Yes,” I said, “if it is indeed different from the rational element, just as it has been shown to differ from the appetitive.”[1409]

31.2 · Children and animals

I.49.31.2

“But that is not difficult to show,” he said. “One could see it even in children [not]: from birth they are full of spirit, while some, it seems to me, never partake of reasoning, and most do so only late.”

“Yes, by Zeus,” I said, “well said. One could also see in animals that what you say is so. In addition, the words of Homer that we quoted somewhere above will bear witness:[1410]

1409. Republic 440e-441c, as identified in the source heading. The civic comparison distinguishes those who earn, those who defend, and those who deliberate. Epikouron, “ally,” links spirit to the city’s auxiliary class. The claim is qualified twice: bad upbringing can corrupt the alliance, and spirit must still be shown to differ from reason.

1410. The contrast concerns spirit present before developed reasoning, and spirit observable in animals. The rejected ou remains bracketed in both languages; its “not” disrupts the construction if read as part of the sentence. The apparatus records differing forms of this particle; no alternative is inserted. The quoted verse follows as its own comparison unit.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

31.3 · Ὅμηρος I.49.31.3

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ

31.4 I.49.31.4

ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ. - Κομιδῇ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

31.3 · Homer: rebuking the heart I.49.31.3

He struck his breast and rebuked his heart with words.[1411]

31.4 · Reason rebukes unreasoning anger I.49.31.4

“For here Homer has clearly made what reasons about better and worse rebuke what is unreasonably angry, as one thing rebuking another.”

“What you say is entirely correct,” he said.[1412]

1411. Odyssey 20.17, identified by the source’s υ 17. The line is preserved as verse. In the dialogue’s use of it, rebuking one’s own heart is evidence for a distinction between the reasoning voice and the spirited response it addresses; the interpretation is made explicit immediately afterward.

1412. The inference rests on the opposition between deliberation about better and worse and anger acting without reasoning. It completes this excerpt’s distinction of spirit from reason, following the preceding distinction of spirit from appetite. The verse is treated as supporting testimony within the dialogue, not as an independent demonstration of the whole account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.1 · <Ἰαμβλίχου> I.49.32.1

<Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς.>

Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦντα τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν εἰς τρία τὰ κυριώτατα γένη ἀναγαγών, κίνησίν τε καὶ γνῶσιν καὶ λεπτότητα οὐσίας, ἣν ἐνίοτε καὶ ἀσώματον ὑπόστασιν ἐπονομάζει, ἐς ταῦτα τὰ τρία τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα διωρισμένας ἐπαναφέρει δόξας, πέρας τῶν ἀπείρων ἀνευρὼν οὕτω καὶ σαφῆ καὶ σύντομον περίληψιν.

32.2 I.49.32.2

Ἐγὼ δὲ ὁρῶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις πολὺ μὲν τὸ ὁμώνυμον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως αἱ κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ αἱ κατὰ ζωὴν θεωροῦνται κινήσεις, ἢ αἱ μορφωτικαὶ καὶ <αἱ> ἄμορφοι γνώσεις, ἢ αἱ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ αἱ τῶν καθ᾽ αὐτὰ ἀσωμάτων καθαρότητες τῆς οὐσίας,) πολὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνδεές· οὐ γὰρ ἔνεστι πάντα περιλαβεῖν τὰ γένη τῶν δοξῶν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις ὅροις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.1 · <Iamblichus>: Aristotle's classification I.49.32.1

<From Iamblichus's On the Soul.>[1413]

Aristotle, then, reduces the attributes most generally thought to belong to soul to three principal classes: motion, cognition, and fineness of substance, which he sometimes also calls incorporeal subsistence. To these three he refers the various specifically defined opinions, thus finding a limit to their boundless variety and a clear, concise summary.[1414]

32.2 · Ambiguity and incompleteness I.49.32.2

But I see much ambiguity and confusion in these terms. Motions involving change and motions belonging to life are not understood in the same way; nor are cognitions that give form and <those> without form, nor the purity of substance belonging to air and that belonging to things incorporeal in themselves. I also see much that is incomplete and deficient in them: these three terms cannot encompass every class of opinion.[1415]

1413. The entire attribution is supplied by Wachsmuth and remains marked. His apparatus notes the heading's absence from the principal witnesses, apart from an attribution to Aristotle in one, and discusses Canter's conjectural assignment to Iamblichus. The first-person judgments below belong to the author of this excerpt; the restored heading identifies him as Iamblichus.

1414. The source cites Aristotle, On the Soul I.2, 405b10. This is a report and criticism of Aristotle's classification, not a continuous quotation of Aristotle. Gnōsis is cognition or knowing; leptotēs is fineness or subtlety. Hypostasis, rendered "subsistence," concerns a mode of being.

1415. Homōnymon points to one name being applied in different senses. The three contrasts challenge the uniform meaning of motion, cognition, and purity or subtlety. Morphōtikai means formative or form-producing; the particular kind of form involved is not specified here. The supplied article remains marked. The final objection concerns the classification's coverage as well as its ambiguity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.3 I.49.32.3

Τινὲς εἰς τὰς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἀρχὰς τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαναφέρουσιν. Εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα σώματα ἄτομα, πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων στοιχειωδέστερα· εἰλικρινῆ δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ πεπληρωμένα πάντῃ καθαρᾶς πρώτης οὐσίας μὴ δέχεσθαι μηδ᾽ ὁποσονοῦν εἰς αὐτὰ διαίρεσιν. Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἄπειρα ἔχειν σχήματα, ἓν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ σφαιροειδές, ἀπὸ δὴ τῶν σφαιροειδῶν ἀτόμων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν.

32.4 I.49.32.4

Ὡς δὲ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν τινες ὑφηγοῦνται, εἶδός ἐστι τὸ περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ ποιότης ἁπλῆ ἀσώματος ἢ ποιότης οὐσιώδης τελεία· ᾗ παράκειται δόξῃ οὐ παραδοθεῖσα μέν, δυναμένη δὲ πιθανῶς λέγεσθαι αἵρεσις, ἡ τὴν συνδρομὴν τῶν ὅλων ποιοτήτων καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῶν κεφάλαιον, εἴτε τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον ἢ τὸ προϋπάρχον, τιθεμένη τὴν ψυχήν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.3 · Soul composed of spherical atoms I.49.32.3

Some refer the substance of soul to the principles underlying the four elements. The primary bodies, they say, are indivisible, prior to the four elements and more elementary than they. Being unmixed and entirely filled with pure primary substance, they admit no division into themselves, however small. These bodies have infinitely many shapes, of which the spherical is one; and soul is composed of the spherical atoms.[1416]

32.4 · Form, quality, and their totality I.49.32.4

As some Aristotelians explain it, soul is the form associated with bodies, or a simple incorporeal quality, or a complete essential quality. Beside this opinion stands a position that has not been handed down but could plausibly be proposed: it makes soul the concurrence of all the qualities and the totality constituted from them, whether that which arises subsequently or that which exists beforehand.[1417]

1416. The apparatus associates this account with Leucippus and Democritus and compares Aristotle, On the Soul I.2. Atoma means indivisible bodies, hence “atoms.” The report distinguishes these primary bodies from the four elements whose principles they are; it does not make soul a mixture of those four elements.

1417. The first alternatives are reported as Aristotelian explanations. The following position is explicitly a possible proposal, not an attested teaching assigned to a named philosopher. Kephalaion here is a total or summation. The contrast between what arises subsequently and what preexists is retained rather than resolved in favor of either alternative. The unusual printed peri tois sōmasin is kept in Greek. The phrase en autōn is also irregular: “totality constituted from them” gives the contextual sense provisionally, without changing the printed preposition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.5 I.49.32.5

Μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰς μαθηματικὴν οὐσίαν ἐντιθέντας τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταλέγω διευκρινημένως. Ἔστι δὴ γένος ἕν τι αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆμα, πέρας ὂν διαστάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ <ἡ> διάστασις. Ἐν αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τούτοις Σεβῆρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς αὐτὴν ἀφωρίσατο, ἐν ἰδέᾳ δὲ τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ Σπεύσιππος· ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ ἤτοι ἑνώσει τούτων ἄλλος ἄν τις καθαρώτερον αὐτὴν προστήσαιτο τελεώτατα.

32.6 I.49.32.6

Πάλιν τοίνυν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἑτέρῳ γένει κεῖται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον ἁπλῶς μὲν οὕτως ἔνιοι τῶν Πυθαγορείων τῇ ψυχῇ συναρμόζουσιν· ὡς δ᾽ αὐτοκίνητον Ξενοκράτης, ὡς δὲ <ἐν> λόγοις περιέχουσιν Μοδέρατος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, ὡς δὲ κριτικὸν κοσμουργοῦ θεοῦ ὄργανον Ἵππασος, ὁ ἀκουσματικὸς τῶν Πυθαγορείων·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.5 · Geometrical definitions I.49.32.5

Next I set out distinctly those who place the substance of soul within mathematical substance. One kind of this is figure, the limit of extension, together with <the> extension itself. Severus the Platonist defined soul in terms of these very things, while Speusippus placed it in the form of that which is extended in every direction. Someone else might posit it more purely and most completely in their cause, that is, their unification.[1418]

32.6 · Number and its different interpretations I.49.32.6

Number, in turn, belongs to another class. Some Pythagoreans connect number with soul simply as it is; Xenocrates does so as self-moving number; Moderatus the Pythagorean, as number <in> encompassing rational principles; and Hippasus, the “hearer” among the Pythagoreans, as a discriminating instrument of the god who fashions the cosmos;[1419]

1418. The mathematical class includes figure and extension, then their form and their unifying cause. The supplied article is marked. The printed diastatou, “extended,” remains, despite the apparatus’s alternative “unextended.” The final clause is a hypothetical refinement. Its mixed comparative and superlative wording is retained in sense; the apparatus proposes changing the construction to refer to soul’s perfection.

1419. The object “number” continues through the abbreviated clauses. The difficult Moderatus clause is read with periechousin as a participle agreeing with logois, not as a plural finite verb; the supplied en remains marked. Logoi may convey rational principles or ratios here. Akousmatikos characterizes Hippasus through hearing or received teaching; no further biographical identification is imposed.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.7 I.49.32.7

ὡς δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ, Πλάτων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους <καὶ πλάτους> καὶ βάθους αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον προϋποτιθέμενος καὶ τὸ μὲν ἓν νοῦν, τὴν δὲ δυάδα ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμόν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ [τὴν] αἴσθησιν διοριζόμενος.

32.8 I.49.32.8

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἴδωμεν, οὐ τὴν ἐν σώμασιν ἐνιδρυμένην, ἀλλ᾽ ἥτις ἐστὶ μαθηματική. Ταύτην τοίνυν, ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, τὴν τὰ διαφέροντα ὁπωσοῦν σύμμετρα καὶ προσήγορα ἀπεργαζομένην ἀναφέρει εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν Μοδέρατος· τὴν δ᾽ ὡς ἐν οὐσίαις καὶ ζωαῖς καὶ γενέσει πάντων μεσότητα καὶ σύνδεσιν ὁ Τίμαιος αὐτῇ ἀνατίθησι,

32.9 I.49.32.9

τὴν δ᾽ ὡς ἐν λόγοις τοῖς κατ᾽ οὐσίαν προϋπάρχουσι Πλωτῖνος καὶ Πορφύριος καὶ Ἀμέλιος παραδεδώκασι, τὴν δὲ συνδιαπλεκομένην τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἀχώριστον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πολλοὶ δή τινες τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ Πυθαγορείων προκρίνουσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.7 · Plato's numerical account as reported by Aristotle I.49.32.7

and Plato, as Aristotle reports, by presupposing the living being itself as constituted from the form of the one and from primary length <and breadth> and depth, and by defining the one as intellect, the dyad as knowledge, the number of the plane as opinion, and that of the solid as [the] perception.[1420]

32.8 · Mathematical harmony I.49.32.8

Let us also consider harmony, not the harmony established in bodies, but mathematical harmony. In general terms, Moderatus refers to soul the harmony that makes things differing in any way commensurate and congenial. Timaeus attributes to it harmony as a mean and a bond in substances, lives, and the coming-to-be of all things;[1421]

32.9 · Harmony in principles and in the cosmos I.49.32.9

Plotinus, Porphyry, and Amelius have handed down harmony as residing in rational principles that preexist in substance. Many Platonists and Pythagoreans prefer the harmony interwoven with the cosmos and inseparable from heaven.[1422]

1420. The source cites Aristotle, On the Soul I.2, 404b18-24. The account is mediated through Aristotle and should not be treated as a direct quotation from a Platonic dialogue. The dimension "and breadth" is supplied; the article before perception is rejected. Both signs remain visible in the English. The sequence links numerical or dimensional terms with kinds of cognition.

1421. Harmonia is a fitting together. The passage explicitly shifts from bodily harmony to mathematical relation. "Commensurate and congenial" renders symmetra kai prosēgora. The source's reference identifies Timaeus of Locri, p. 99a and following, rather than simply naming Plato's Timaeus without distinction.

1422. These are further placements of harmony, continuing the preceding sentence. The first places it in antecedent logoi; the second associates it inseparably with the ordered universe. "Preexist in substance" preserves the qualification kat' ousian, rather than making the priority merely chronological.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.10 I.49.32.10

Ἴθι δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐπανίωμεν, διακρίνοντες καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐν τάξει τὰς περὶ ψυχῆς πάσας δόξας. Εἰσὶ δή τινες, οἳ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτῆς μέρει εἶναι τὰ ὅλα· οἵτινες καὶ ἐν τῇ μεριστῇ ψυχῇ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον καὶ θεοὺς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ πρεσβύτερα γένη αὐτῆς ἐνιδρύουσι καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως πάντα εἶναι ἀποφαίνονται, οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἑκάστοις.

32.11 I.49.32.11

Καὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀναμφισβητήτως μέν ἐστι Νουμήνιος, οὐ πάντῃ δὲ ὁμολογουμένως Πλωτῖνος, ἀστάτως δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ φέρεται Ἀμέλιος· Πορφύριος δὲ ἐνδοιάζει περὶ αὐτήν, πῇ μὲν διατεταμένως αὐτῆς ἀφιστάμενος, πῇ δὲ συνακολουθῶν αὐτῇ, ὡς παραδοθείσῃ ἄνωθεν. Κατὰ δὴ ταύτην νοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οὐδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ διενήνοχε κατά γε τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.10 · All incorporeal reality in every part I.49.32.10

Come, then, let us ascend to substance that is incorporeal in itself, distinguishing in order all the opinions about soul in this class too. Some declare that all such substance is homogeneous, identical, and one, so that the whole is present in any part of it. They establish within the divisible soul the intelligible cosmos, gods, divine spirits, the Good, and all the kinds prior to soul. They declare that all things are alike present in all, yet in each in a manner appropriate to its own substance.[1423]

32.11 · Differences among the named Platonists I.49.32.11

Numenius unquestionably holds this opinion; Plotinus does so without complete consistency, while Amelius moves unsteadily within it. Porphyry hesitates about it, at some points firmly withdrawing from it, at others following it as a teaching handed down from earlier authorities. On this view, soul differs in no respect from intellect, gods, and the higher kinds, at least as regards its substance as a whole.[1424]

1423. Homoiomerēs describes a whole whose parts have the same character. “Divine spirits” renders daimones without a Christian implication of evil. The final qualification matters: the claim that all is in all is modified by the mode appropriate to each recipient. “Prior” translates presbytera in the hierarchy of being, not simply as older in time.

1424. The assessments of these thinkers belong to the excerpt’s author. The differences in his report are preserved: Numenius is unqualifiedly assigned to the view; Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyry receive distinct qualifications. “From earlier authorities” interprets anōthen as transmission from predecessors; it need not imply a revelation from above. The conclusion is explicitly restricted to substance.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.12 I.49.32.12

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πρὸς ταύτην ἀνθισταμένη δόξα χωρίζει μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ἀπὸ νοῦ γενομένην δευτέραν καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ὑπόστασιν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ αὐτῆς ἐξηγεῖται ὡς ἐξηρτημένον ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ὑφεστηκέναι αὐτοτελῶς, χωρίζει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν ὅλων,

32.13 I.49.32.13

ἴδιον δὲ αὐτῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὅρον ἀπονέμει ἤτοι τὸ μέσον τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων <τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ ἀ>σωμάτων γενῶν, ἢ τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν καθόλου λόγων, ἢ τὴν μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς δημιουργίας, ἢ ζωὴν παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσαν τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ προελθοῦσαν, ἢ τὴν αὖ τῶν γενῶν ὅλου τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος πρόοδον εἰς ὑποδεεστέραν οὐσίαν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.12 · Soul as a distinct subsistence

I.49.32.12

The opposing opinion, however, distinguishes soul as having come from intellect, secondary to it and possessing a different subsistence. It explains soul's being with intellect as dependence upon intellect, together with a complete subsistence of its own. It also distinguishes soul from all the higher kinds;[1425]

32.13 · Definitions of soul's distinctive substance

I.49.32.13

and it assigns soul a distinctive definition of its substance: either the intermediate between the divisible and indivisible, <between the bodily and the in>corporeal kinds; or the fullness of universal rational principles; or the service of creation that follows the forms; or life that has its living from itself and has proceeded from the intelligible; or, again, the procession of the kinds belonging to the whole of true being into a lower substance.[1426]

1425. The contrast is between identity of substance and a distinct, dependent mode of being. "Being with intellect" follows meta nou in the edited text. Autotelōs means completely or with its own completeness; it does not cancel the stated dependence on intellect. The repeated chōrizei marks distinction or separation in this account, not a spatial distance.

1426. These alternatives elaborate the opposing account rather than five additional named schools. The supply on p. 366 ends inside asōmatōn: the printed sōmatōn becomes "incorporeal" by the supplied prefix. The English brackets likewise end within "incorporeal" to show its extent. Plērōma is fullness; proodos is procession or proceeding into a lower order. The reference to divisible and indivisible recalls the Timaeus selection in excerpt 28.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.14 I.49.32.14

Περὶ δὴ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ὅ τε Πλάτων αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὅ τε Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἀρχαῖοι πάντες, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ὑμνεῖται, τελέως ἐπιστρέφονται, εἴ τις αὐτῶν τὰς δόξας ἀνιχνεύοι μετ᾽ ἐπιστάσεως· ἡμεῖς τε περὶ αὐτὰς τὴν μετ᾽ ἀληθείας πραγματείαν πᾶσαν πειρασόμεθα ἐνστήσασθαι.

32.15 I.49.32.15

Τινὲς δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν σύνοδον τῶν ἐναντίων συννυφαίνουσιν, οἷον θερμοῦ καὶ <ψυχροῦ>, ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀναζεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀναψύχεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὠνομάσθαι ἀποφαίνονται, καὶ ἅμα ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων [ἢ] τὸν ἀναπνεόμενον ἀέρα ψυχὴν νομίζουσιν·

32.16 I.49.32.16

ὥσπερ Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσί φησι λέγεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν εἰσιέναι ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου ἀναπνεόντων ἡμῶν φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων· ἔοικέ γε μὴν αὐτὸς ὁ Ὀρφεὺς χωρὶς ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μίαν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς πολλὰς μὲν εἶναι διαιρέσεις, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἀμέσους ἐπιπνοίας καθήκειν ἐπὶ τὰς μεριστὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.14 · The author's preferred account I.49.32.14

Plato himself, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and all the ancients whose great names are celebrated for wisdom turn wholly toward these opinions, if one traces their views with careful attention. We too shall endeavor to establish our entire truthful investigation upon them.[1427]

32.15 · Heat, cooling, and breath I.49.32.15

Some natural philosophers weave soul together as a conjunction of opposites, such as hot and <cold>, dry and wet. They declare that living takes its name from boiling up under the action of heat, and soul from being cooled under the action of cold; and, in connection with both together, they regard [or] the air that is breathed as soul;[1428]

32.16 · Orphic verses and the one soul I.49.32.16

just as Aristotle says that, in the Orphic verses, soul is said to enter from the whole as we breathe, borne by the winds. Orpheus himself, however, seems to suppose that soul exists separately and as one: from it there are many divisions, and many immediate inspirations descend from the whole soul upon the individual souls.[1429]

1427. The author now declares his own allegiance. His claim that the named ancients converge on these opinions is part of his interpretation and is not an independent editorial judgment about all their works. Epistasis here is attentive consideration. The prospective "shall endeavor" is retained.

1428. The proposed word connections are zēn, "to live," with anazein, "to boil up," and psychē, "soul," with anapsychesthai, "to be cooled." They are the ancient account's explanations of the names. Supplied "cold" and rejected "or" remain marked. The construction "in connection with both" is kept without supplying a more specific mechanism of breathing.

1429. The source cites Aristotle, On the Soul I.5, 410b27 and following. The excerpt distinguishes Aristotle's report of Orphic verses from its own qualified interpretation of Orpheus: "seems" remains. Epipnoiai are breath-like inspirations or influences; "immediate" follows amesous. Meristai, literally divided or divisible, is rendered "individual" for the recipient souls.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.17 I.49.32.17

Τινὲς μὲν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν αἰθέριον σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται· ἕτεροι δὲ τελειότητα αὐτὴν ἀφορίζονται κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τοῦ θείου σώματος, ἣν ἐντελέχειαν καλεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὥσπερ δὴ ἐν ἐνίοις Θεόφραστος, ἢ τὸ ἀπογεννώμενον ἀπὸ τῶν θειοτέρων γενῶν ὅλων, ὥσπερ ἄν τις νεωτερίσειεν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις· ἢ τὸ συγκεκραμένον τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν·

32.18 I.49.32.18

ἢ τὸ τῇ φύσει συμμεμιγμένον ἢ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ὂν ὥσπερ τὸ ἐψυχῶσθαι, αὐτῇ δὴ μὴ παρὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ὥσπερ ὑπάρχειν, οἷα δὴ λέγεται περὶ ψυχῆς παρὰ Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

32.17 · Aether, actuality, and mixture

I.49.32.17

Some Aristotelians posit soul as an aetherial body. Others define it as the perfection in substance of the divine body, which Aristotle calls actuality, as Theophrastus does in some passages; or as what is generated from all the more divine kinds, as someone might propose by introducing a new conception; or as what is blended with bodies, as the Stoics say;[1430]

32.18 · Soul as a bodily condition

I.49.32.18

or what is mixed with nature; or what belongs to body, such as its being ensouled, without being present in soul itself as though subsisting there: such are the statements about soul found in Dicaearchus of Messene.[1431]

1430. Entelecheia is rendered “actuality,” alongside the text’s explanatory teleiotēs, “perfection.” The printed “divine body” is retained. The author expressly allows a new, hypothetical conception in the next alternative; the apparatus explains en tais epinoiais accordingly, rather than treating it as a book title. These reports and possibilities remain distinct.

1431. The closing construction is damaged or obscure. The English provisionally takes “being ensouled” as a condition belonging to body rather than something subsisting in soul itself. The apparatus questions the second hōsper and proposes hopōsoun, “in any way,” while recording more extensive repairs to the preceding wording. None is inserted into the Greek; the precise force of the clause remains uncertain.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 366-367

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.1 · Περὶ δυνάμεων ψυχῆς I.49.33.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ δυνάμεων ψυχῆς.

Πλάτων μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑτέρᾳ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνεῖναι ἡγεῖται, συμφύτους δ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν συνυφεστηκέναι λέγει διὰ τὴν ἀσύνθετον οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ὡσαύτως ἁπλῆν οὐσίαν, ἀσώματον, εἴδους τελεσιουργὸν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποθέμενος, οὐ ποιεῖ τὰς δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν συνθέτῳ τινὶ τῇ ψυχῇ παρούσας.

33.2 I.49.33.2

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νοοῦσι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασιν, ἐκ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων σύνθετον φύσιν ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνάγουσιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 367

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.1 · Powers within an uncompounded soul I.49.33.1

In the same work: on the powers of soul.

Plato, then, does not regard the powers as things distinct from soul, residing in soul as something distinct from them. He says instead that they are innate and subsist together under one form, because soul's substance is uncompounded. Aristotle likewise assumes the substance of soul to be simple, incorporeal, and perfective of form; he does not make its powers present in soul as though it were some composite.[1432]

33.2 · Powers as qualities of an underlying body I.49.33.2

The philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno, however, and all who conceive soul as a body, combine its powers as qualities in an underlying subject. They posit soul as a substance already underlying the powers, and from these two together they construct a composite nature made up of unlike constituents.[1433]

1432. The heading continues the work attributed to Iamblichus in excerpt 32. The account distinguishes powers native to a simple soul from qualities added to a separate underlying substance. Eidous telesiourgon is rendered "perfective of form"; this describes soul's completion of form in the report, rather than treating its powers as added components. The printed asyntheton, "uncompounded," is an editorial correction of the transmitted "composite."

1433. Hypokeimenon is the underlying subject or bearer of qualities. The two constituents in this explanation are the underlying soul-substance and its powers as qualities. The report attributes this analysis to the Stoic tradition and other corporealist accounts; it does not merge it with the preceding account of innate powers.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.3 I.49.33.3

Ταύτῃ τοίνυν αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἢ τοῦ ἔχοντος τοῦ κοινοῦ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος θεωρουμένου ζῴου, καθ᾽ οὓς μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ διττὴν ζωὴν ζῇ, καθ᾽ αὐτήν τε καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἄλλως μὲν πάρεισι τῇ ψυχῇ, ἄλλως δὲ τῷ κοινῷ ζῴῳ, <ὡς> κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν·

33.4 I.49.33.4

καθ᾽ οὓς δὲ μία ζωὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ συνθέτου, συγκεκραμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν, ἢ δούσης ὅλην τὴν ἑαυτῆς ζωὴν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ζῷον, ὡς οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ διισχυρίζονται, κατὰ τούτους εἶς ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος τῆς παρουσίας αὐτῶν ὁ ἐν τῷ μετέχεσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκρᾶσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ ζῴῳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.3 · Soul's own life and embodied life

I.49.33.3

Consider, then, the powers of soul itself in its own right, or those of the creature that possesses it, the living being considered jointly with body. According to those who hold that soul lives a twofold life, both in itself and with body, the powers are present in one way to soul and in another to the combined living being, <as> in the accounts of Plato and Pythagoras;[1434]

33.4 · Powers in a single composite life

I.49.33.4

but according to those who hold that soul has a single life, the life of the composite, there is one mode in which the powers are present. This may be because soul is blended with body, as the Stoics say, or because it gives its entire life to the combined living being, as the Peripatetics insist. On these accounts the powers are present by being participated in, or by being blended with the whole living being.[1435]

1434. The opening nominative construction is resumed by "are present." The English introduces it with "Consider" to make that structure readable, without treating the word as a printed supplement. Koinon zōion is the living being constituted jointly with body. The supplied hōs, "as," is marked. The distinction concerns two modes in which powers are present, corresponding to the twofold life attributed to soul.

1435. The pronoun autōn refers to the powers, as the apparatus emphasizes. The single mode of presence is contrasted with the preceding twofold account; the text nevertheless distinguishes participation from blending as explanations of that presence. Peripatetics here denotes the Aristotelian school.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 367-368

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.5 I.49.33.5

Πῶς οὖν διακρίνονται; Κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἔνια μὲν διαφορότητι <τῶν> ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων· πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὗτοι διατείνειν ἄλλα κατ᾽ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμούς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὦτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια· ἔνια δὲ ἰδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν ταὐτῷ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμήν, λόγον συνείληφε.

33.6 I.49.33.6

Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Ἀριστοτελικοὺς καὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἀμέριστον τὴν ψυχὴν διανοοῦνται κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν αἱ δυνάμεις, κατὰ δὲ εἴδη ὧν δύνανται ποιεῖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.5 · Different organs and different qualities I.49.33.5

How, then, are they distinguished? According to the Stoics, some are distinguished by the difference of <the> underlying bodies. They say that currents of vital breath extend from the ruling center in different directions: some to the eyes, others to the ears, and others to the remaining sense organs. Others are distinguished by a specific quality in the same underlying subject. Just as an apple has sweetness and fragrance in the same body, so the ruling center comprises presentation, assent, impulse, and reason in the same subject.[1436]

33.6 · Distinction by what the powers can do I.49.33.6

According to the Aristotelians and all who conceive soul as indivisible, the powers are undivided in substance, but distinguished according to the kinds of things they can do.[1437]

1436. Pneumata are streams or currents of pneuma, rendered “vital breath”; hēgemonikon is the ruling center. The two explanations distinguish bodily distribution from qualitative difference in a common bearer. The apple illustrates the latter. Phantasia is “presentation,” consistent with the earlier discussion of Stoic powers, rather than imagination alone. The supplied article remains marked.

1437. The printed sentence lacks the words needed to complete its contrast. “Are undivided” and “distinguished” supply the recoverable sense in English. The apparatus offers several repairs: Heeren explicitly adds indivisibility and division; Wachsmuth proposes “are not distinguished” after “the powers”; Usener proposes one power in substance and several by kinds of activity. The Greek remains unsupplemented as printed, and the English is provisional.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.7 I.49.33.7

Κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα ἄλλως μὲν λέγεται ἡ ψυχὴ τριμερής, ὡς ἐν ἑτέραις οὐσίαις τριπλῇ ζωῆς παραλλάττουσα, ἄλλως δὲ πολυδύναμος, οὐκέτι κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ζωῆς διαφέρουσα, ἐν ταὐτῷ δὲ πολλαῖς ἰδιότησι διακρινομένη.

33.8 I.49.33.8

Καὶ ὅλως μέρος δυνάμεως ταύτῃ διενήνοχεν, ᾗ τὸ μὲν μέρος οὐσίας ἑτερότητα, ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐν ταὐτῷ γεννητικὴν ἢ ποιητικὴν διάκρισιν παρίστησιν.

34.1 · Περὶ πλήθους δυνάμεων I.49.34.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ πλήθους δυνάμεων.

Οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν διαδοξάζουσι, περὶ <ἣν> τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, αἵσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας, συγκαταθέσεως, ὁρμῆς, λόγου.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

33.7 · Three parts and many powers I.49.33.7

In Plato's account, soul is called three-part in one sense, as varying threefold in life among distinct substances; in another sense it has many powers, no longer differing in the substance of life, but distinguished by many specific characteristics within the same subject.[1438]

33.8 · How a part differs from a power I.49.33.8

In general, a part differs from a power in this: a part signifies a difference of substance, while a power signifies a generative or productive distinction within the same subject.[1439]

34.1 · Eight parts and further powers I.49.34.1

In the same work: on the number of powers.

The followers of Zeno hold that soul has eight parts, with further powers belonging to <it>, such as those in the ruling center: presentation, assent, impulse, and reason.[1440]

1438. The construction triplēi zōēs in the printed text is awkward; the English interprets it as a threefold variation of life. The apparatus suggests a different case construction or deletion of "threefold," neither adopted here. The intended contrast distinguishes parts associated with difference of substance from powers differentiated within one subject. This is the excerpt's analysis of Plato.

1439. The distinction summarizes this account's terminology. Gennētikē and poiētikē concern generating and producing; the contrast is between a different constituent substance and a capacity differentiated by what it brings about. It should not be assumed that every earlier author quoted in the anthology uses "part" and "power" with this same precision.

1440. The text distinguishes the eightfold division of soul from the several capacities within its ruling center, already listed in excerpt 33. The opening verb diadoxazousi and the transition to the list are difficult; the apparatus discusses repairs. The English regularizes the construction while retaining all four powers and the supplied relative pronoun. It does not add a numerical total for every power.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

34.2 I.49.34.2

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχύτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ψυχὴν τριμερῆ ἀποφαίνονται, διαιροῦντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν σύστασιν.

34.3 I.49.34.3

Δυνάμεις δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναλογίζονται φύσιν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ δόξαν καὶ κινητικὴν σωμάτων διάνοιαν καὶ ὄρεξιν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν καὶ νοήσεις. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἰς πέντε αὐτὰς διαιρεῖ, φύσιν, αἴσθησιν, κίνησιν κατὰ τόπον, ὄρεξιν, διάνοιαν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

34.2 · The threefold division and virtue I.49.34.2

Plato's followers, Archytas, and the other Pythagoreans declare soul to have three parts, dividing it into reasoning, spirit, and desire; for these, they say, are useful for establishing the virtues.[1441]

34.3 · Enumerations of powers I.49.34.3

As powers of soul they reckon nature, presentation, perception, opinion, thought that moves bodies, desire for things beautiful and good, and acts of understanding. Aristotle divides them into five: nature, perception, movement from place to place, desire, and thought.[1442]

1441. The threefold division is linked here with the account of virtue, as in the earlier report in excerpt 25a. Logismos is reasoning, thymos spirit or the capacity for anger, and epithymia desire. The following list counts powers under another description and need not be forced into three items.

1442. The unusual phrase "thought that moves bodies" follows kinētikēn sōmatōn dianoian as printed; it is not silently split into two powers. Physis, "nature," remains the text's term in both lists, denoting natural life-functions in this context. Noēseis is plural, "acts of understanding." The source compares Aristotle, On the Soul II.3, 414a31, and 432a29.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

35.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.35.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν προστιθεμένων αὐτῇ δυνάμεων.

Πλωτῖνος αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεῖ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰς φαντασίας, τὰς μνήμας, τοὺς λογισμούς· μόνον δὲ τὸν καθαρὸν λογισμὸν εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀνατείνει, ὡς ἔχοντα συμφυῆ δύναμιν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἰδέαν.

35.2 I.49.35.2

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Δημόκριτον Πλατωνικοὶ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ εἴδη τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς συνάγουσιν.

Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ αὐτὰς ἑαυτῶν ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν ζῴων, καθ᾽ ἑκατέραν ζωὴν διοριζόμενος ἑκάτερον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

35.1 · Essential and added powers

I.49.35.1

In the same work: on powers belonging to soul's substance and powers added to it.

Plotinus removes from it the irrational powers, the perceptions, the representations, the memories, and the processes of reasoning. Only pure reasoning does he refer to its pure substance, as possessing a power naturally bound to the very form of that substance.[1443]

35.2 · Powers and two kinds of life

I.49.35.2

The Platonists around Democritus bring all these kinds of powers together within its substance.[1444]

Plato makes them belong both to themselves and to living beings, defining each relation according to the corresponding kind of life.[1445]

1443. "The same work" continues the work attributed, under the restored heading at I.49.32, to Iamblichus as On the Soul. This is the author's report of Plotinus, not a continuous quotation from him. Wachsmuth cites Enneads IV.3.18. The contrast between ordinary logismoi and pure logismos is retained; phantasiai are representations or appearances. The finite printed anateinei remains, despite the apparatus's suggested infinitive.

1444. The surprising designation "Platonists around Democritus" is the printed reading. The apparatus records Heeren's exclusion of "Platonists" and Meineke's replacement with "atomists," while Wachsmuth retains it and refers to Syrianus. The translation does not silently adopt either alteration.

1445. The wording kai autas heautōn is difficult; the apparatus asks whether the order should be autas kai heautōn. The English provisionally retains "themselves" rather than replacing it outright with "souls." The contextual contrast is between life belonging to soul itself and life shared with the living composite, developed explicitly in the next excerpt. "Relation" is an English clarification, not an additional Greek word.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

35.3 I.49.35.3

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πορφύριον καὶ Πλωτῖνον ἑκάστῳ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς τὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις προβάλλεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφαίνονται, καὶ ἀφίεσθαι μὲν καὶ μηκέτι εἶναι τὰς ζωὰς τὰς ὁπωσοῦν προβληθείσας [οἱ περὶ Πορφύριον καὶ Πλωτῖνον Πλατωνικοὶ] ἀφορίζονται παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ σπέρματος φυομένοις, ὁπόταν εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἀναδράμῃ τὸ σπέρμα·

35.4 I.49.35.4

εἶναι δὲ καὶ ταύτας ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ μὴ ἀπόλλυσθαι τάχα ἄν τις ἐπινοήσειε καινότερον, οὐκ ἀπιθάνως.

36.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.36.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῆς ψυχῆς.

Τίς οὖν ἀνήκοός ἐστι τῆς Περιπατητικῆς δόξης, ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκίνητον μὲν εἶναί φησιν, αἰτίαν δὲ κινήσεων; Εἰ δὴ καὶ ἀνενέργητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀκίνητον, ἔσται καὶ χορηγὸν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνενέργητον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

35.3 · Powers projected into the whole I.49.35.3

The followers of Porphyry and Plotinus declare that soul projects into each part of the whole the powers appropriate to it. They [the Platonists around Porphyry and Plotinus] determine that the lives projected in whatever way are relinquished and cease to exist, much as things growing from a seed do whenever the seed withdraws into itself;[1446]

35.4 · A possible alternative I.49.35.4

but someone might perhaps devise a more novel view, not implausibly: that these lives too remain in the whole and do not perish.[1447]

36.1 · Soul's activities: motion and rest I.49.36.1

In the same work: on the activities of soul.

Who, then, has not heard the Peripatetic opinion that soul is itself unmoved but is a cause of motions? If what is unmoved is also inactive, the inactivity of soul will also be the source that supplies its activities.[1448]

1446. Proballesthai describes soul's putting forth or projecting powers; the ensuing "lives" are their manifestations in the whole. The source refers back to excerpt 23 for Porphyry. The repeated subject is bracketed as rejected by Heeren and remains bracketed in English. The seed's withdrawal into itself is the text's analogy; no additional botanical process is supplied to explain it.

1447. This alternative is explicitly a possible new conception. It is not assigned to Porphyry or Plotinus, whose reported position precedes it. "These lives" refers to the projected lives, not to a newly introduced class of souls.

1448. The conditional argument distinguishes being unmoved, akinēton, from being inactive, anenergēton; it does not simply equate them as an established fact. "Peripatetic" names the Aristotelian position as the excerpt reports it. Energeia is rendered "activity," with the related sense of actuality becoming especially relevant in the next sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.2 I.49.36.2

Εἰ δ᾽, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, τέλος καὶ συνοχὴ καὶ ἕνωσις καὶ μόνιμος αἰτία τῶν κινήσεών ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ταύτην ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνείληφεν ἡ κατ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλην ἀκίνητος ἐντελέχεια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔσται ἀπὸ τῆς τελειοτάτης ἐνεργείας προϊοῦσα [ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς] ἡ ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν ζῴων ἔργοις ἀπεργασία.

36.3 I.49.36.3

Αὕτη τοίνυν κατά γε Πλάτωνα πολλοῦ δεῖ ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι τῇ συμφύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίᾳ καὶ ζωῇ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δίδοται μὲν εἰς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ μεταβολὴ καὶ διαίρεσις καὶ παράτασις περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ χρόνον καὶ τόπον διάστασις ἐπισυμπίπτει, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀσωμάτῳ ζωῇ, φανερὸν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γέγονεν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει κατὰ Πλάτωνα τῶν τοῦ συνθέτου ζῴου κινημάτων ἴδιον αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.2 · Activity as an abiding cause I.49.36.2

But if, as some say, activity is the end, cohesion, unification, and abiding cause of motions, and if the unmoved actuality of soul according to Aristotle comprehends this activity within itself, then the accomplishment of living beings' individual functions will proceed from the most complete activity [from soul].[1449]

36.3 · Activity in the living composite I.49.36.3

This accomplishment, at least according to Plato, is far from being identical with soul's inherent substance and life. Clearly it is imparted to the composite. But change, division, extension about the body, and separation in time and place accompany it; none of these belongs to life that is incorporeal in itself. Thus this too becomes clear: according to Plato, none of the motions of the composite living being belongs exclusively to soul itself.[1450]

1449. Entelecheia is actuality or fulfilled completeness; the sentence attributes an unmoved entelecheia to soul while making it contain activity as the abiding cause of motion. "From soul" is bracketed because the apparatus identifies it as a gloss rejected by Heeren. The conditional form and both descriptions of the source are preserved.

1450. "This accomplishment" takes up apergasia in the preceding sentence. To koinon, literally "what is common," is the shared living composite of soul and body. Idion means what belongs distinctively or exclusively to soul; denying that status to the composite's motions does not deny soul's causal role, which the next passage expressly maintains.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.4 I.49.36.4

Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ ζωὴ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἦν διττή, ἡ μὲν χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ κοινὴ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργήματα <τὰ> μὲν ἴδια ἔσται τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος. Καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς προκατάρχοντα, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων ἐγειρόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίσης ἀνακινούμενα· πάντα δὲ ὡς ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμημένα.

36.5 I.49.36.5

Ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ναῦν φορᾶς κοινῆς οὔσης πρὸς τὸν κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἄνεμον, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος τὴν κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν περιέχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τῆς φορᾶς, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτή τε ὅλῳ χρῆται τῷ σώματι καὶ τὰ ἔργα μεταχειρίζεται, ὡς ὄργανον ἢ ὄχημα τὸ σῶμα περιέχουσα·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.4 · Two lives and their operations I.49.36.4

Accordingly, just as life for him was twofold, one life separate from the body and the other shared with it, so too, among operations, <some> will belong to soul alone, while others will be shared also by that which possesses it. Of these, some originate first from soul; others are awakened by the body's affections; and others are stirred equally by both. Yet all have their impulse from soul as their cause.[1451]

36.5 · The helmsman, the wind, and the ship I.49.36.5

When the movement of a ship depends jointly on the helmsman and the wind, the other factors are such that motion cannot occur without them; but the helmsman and the wind contain within themselves its principal cause. So too soul itself both uses the entire body and carries out its functions, encompassing the body as an instrument or vehicle;[1452]

1451. The supplied article ta is represented by the marked "some" in the English some/others construction. "That which possesses it" retains the abbreviated tou echontos, referring contextually to the bearer of soul. The account distinguishes where an operation is first prompted from its causal dependence on soul, even when bodily affection occasions it.

1452. The analogy distinguishes indispensable conditions from the principal moving causes. "Encompassing" retains the printed periechousa. The apparatus says that a verb meaning "holding" would be expected and proposes peripherousa, "carrying around," as a possible repair. Neither conjecture is substituted in the Greek. The image of an instrument or vehicle states the body's subordinate role.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.6 I.49.36.6

ἔχει δὲ καὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν οἰκείας κινήσεις, ὅσαι τοῦ συνθέτου ζῴου ἀπολελυμέναι αὐταὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὰς [ἀπόλυτοι] τὰς κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ζωὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργοῦσιν, οἵαί δή εἰσιν αἱ τῶν ἐνθουσιασμῶν καὶ τῶν ἀΰλων νοήσεων καὶ συλλήβδην ἐκείνων, καθ᾽ ἃς τοῖς θεοῖς συναπτόμεθα.

36.7 I.49.36.7

Οὐ μὴν ἔτι γε τούτοις συγχωροῦσιν οἱ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οἷον οἱ Στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πλείονες· οὐδ᾽ ὅσοι συγκεκρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν οἴονται, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσικῶν· οὐδὲ ὅσοι βλάστημα αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ποιοῦσιν ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσαν. Πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι σωματοειδεῖς τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῇ ἀποδιδόασιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

36.6 · Motions proper to soul itself

I.49.36.6

but it also possesses motions proper to itself: those which, released from the composite living being, by themselves [unbound] put into activity the lives belonging to soul's substance. Such are the motions of divine inspiration and of immaterial acts of understanding, and, in general, those through which we are joined to the gods.[1453]

36.7 · Accounts that make soul bodily

I.49.36.7

Those who suppose soul to be a body, such as the Stoics and many others, no longer agree with these claims. Nor do those who think it blended into the realm of becoming, as most natural philosophers do; nor those who make it an outgrowth of bodies, existing in the form of a harmony. All these thinkers attribute motions of a bodily character to it.[1454]

1453. The bracketed apolytoi, "unbound," is rejected as a probable alternative reading associated with the earlier word for release. Its redundancy remains visible. Enthousiasmoi are states of divine inspiration. The union with the gods is a claim made by the excerpt's author. The printed smooth-breathed forms after kath' remain in Greek, with the reflexive sense required by the passage in English.

1454. Three positions are distinguished: soul as body, soul blended into becoming, and soul arising from bodies as their harmony. Genesis here concerns the realm or process of coming-to-be. The passage groups these positions by the bodily character of the motions they allow, without claiming that their definitions of soul are otherwise identical.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.37.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ψυχῆς.

Πότερον οὖν πασῶν τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ἔργα ἀποτελεῖται, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων τελεώτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἕκασται διειλήχασι τὴν προσήκουσαν ἑαυταῖς τάξιν; Ὡς μὲν οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν, εἷς τέ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πάντως διανόησις καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα ἴσα καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ τῶν τε μεριστῶν καὶ τῶν ὅλων·

37.2 I.49.37.2

καί που Πλωτῖνος καὶ Ἀμέλιος ἐπὶ ταύτης εἰσὶ τῆς δόξης (ἐνίοτε γὰρ <οὐχ> ὡς ἄλλην τὴν μεριστὴν ψυχὴν παρὰ τὴν ὅλην, μίαν δὲ αὐτὴν πρὸς ἐκείνην εἶναι ἀφορίζονται)· ὡς δ᾽ ἂν εἴποι Πορφύριος, πάντῃ κεχώρισται τὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς παρὰ τὴν μεριστὴν ἐνεργήματα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.1 · Soul's works: equality or difference I.49.37.1

In the same work: on the works of soul.

Are the same works accomplished by all souls, or are those of universal souls more complete, while those of other souls correspond to the rank each has received as its own? According to the Stoics, reason is one, thought is entirely the same, right actions are equal, and the virtues are the same in particular and universal souls alike;[1455]

37.2 · Divergent Platonic accounts I.49.37.2

and Plotinus and Amelius too seem to hold this opinion. At times they determine that the particular soul is <not> different from the universal soul, but one with it. As Porphyry would put it, however, the operations of the universal soul are entirely distinct from those of the particular soul.[1456]

1455. Erga are works, functions, or effects, here examined in relation to different orders of soul. "Universal" and "particular" render the contrast between holai and meristai, literally whole and divided souls. Katorthōmata are actions accomplished rightly. The statement is the author's report of the Stoics; the question is whether differences of rank entail differences in souls' works.

1456. The negative supplied by Usener is decisive: with it, the passage attributes identity, not difference, to Plotinus and Amelius. It is marked in both languages. The qualifiers "seem" and "at times" remain; they matter because the preceding excerpts have already distinguished shifting or qualified positions among these authors. Porphyry's position is framed as what he would say.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.3 I.49.37.3

Γένοιτο δὲ κἂν ἄλλη δόξα οὐκ ἀπόβλητος, ἡ κατὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη τῶν ψυχῶν ἄλλα μὲν τὰ τῶν ὅλων παντελῆ, ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τῶν θείων ψυχῶν ἄχραντα καὶ ἄϋλα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ τῶν δαιμονίων δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἡρωικῶν μεγάλα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θνητοειδῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἔργα διαιρουμένη. Τούτων δὴ διωρισμένων καὶ τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτων τὴν ὁμοίαν λήψεται διάκρισιν.

37.4 I.49.37.4

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πανταχοῦ ψυχὴν διατείνοντες ἤτοι γένει ἢ εἴδει, ὡς δοκεῖ Πλωτίνῳ, ἢ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, ὡς νεανιεύεται οὐκ ὀλιγάκις Ἀμέλιος, εἶναι αὐτὴν ἐροῦσιν ἅπερ ἐνεργεῖν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.3 · Works distinguished by orders of soul I.49.37.3

There could also be another opinion that should not be rejected: it would distinguish works according to the genera and species of souls. Those of universal souls would be complete in every respect; those of divine souls, undefiled and immaterial; those of divine spirits, active and effective; those of heroic souls, great; and those of souls in animals and human beings, of a mortal character. It would distinguish the remaining works in the same way. Once these distinctions are made, the matters that follow will receive a corresponding distinction.[1457]

37.4 · Identity of being and operation I.49.37.4

Those who insist that soul is everywhere one and the same, whether in genus or species, as Plotinus thinks, or even in number, as Amelius not infrequently ventures to assert, will say that soul is precisely what it does.[1458]

1457. The proposal classifies works by the order of soul producing them. Daimonia again refers to divine spirits, not necessarily evil beings. Drastēria emphasizes efficacy or active power. The designation “of a mortal character” describes the works of embodied souls here; it does not by itself declare the substance of those souls mortal.

1458. The source refers to Plotinus, Enneads IV.2.1. Identity in genus or species is distinguished from numerical identity. The author’s evaluative verb neanieuetai suggests a bold or venturesome claim. The final printed infinitive energein gives an awkward construction; the English gives the contextual sense provisionally. The apparatus considers Heeren’s finite energei possibly correct, comparing the following sentence, but the Greek retains the print.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.5 I.49.37.5

Οἱ δ᾽ ἀσφαλέστερον τούτων διαταττόμενοι καὶ προόδους πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας οὐσιῶν τῆς ψυχῆς διισχυριζόμενοι προχωρεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσσω, οἵους ἄν τις θείη τοὺς καινῶς μὲν ἀπταίστως δὲ ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν λόγων, τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων ψυχῶν καὶ θείων καὶ ἀΰλων ἐνεργήματα ἐροῦσιν οὗτοι πάντως δήπου καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν ἀποτελευτᾶν· τὰ δὲ τῶν μεριστῶν <καὶ> κρατουμένων ἐν ἑνὶ εἴδει καὶ διαιρουμένων περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν οὐδαμῶς συγχωρήσουσιν εὐθὺς εἶναι ταῦθ᾽ ἅπερ ἐνεργοῦσι.

37.6 I.49.37.6

Κατὰ δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον προΐτω καὶ ἡ συγγενὴς πρὸς ταύτην διαίρεσις. Λέγω δὴ προσπεφυκέναι μὲν ταῖς δυνάμεσι τὰ ἔργα ἐκείνων τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ μονοειδῶν καὶ χωριστῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ὡς ἂν φαίη ἡ νεωστὶ παρευρεθεῖσα ἥδε αἵρεσις, ἐοικέναι δὲ ταῖς τῶν καρπῶν ἀπογεννήσεσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ περὶ γῆν ἀπομεριζομένων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.5 · Successive processions of substance I.49.37.5

Others order matters more securely than these thinkers and maintain that first, second, and third processions of the substances of soul advance successively. Among them one might place those who grasp these accounts in a new yet unfailing way. They will certainly say that the operations of universal, divine, and immaterial souls reach their completion also in substance. But for particular souls, <and> those confined within a single form and divided in association with bodies, they will by no means concede that these are immediately what they do.[1459]

37.6 · Inherent works and the bearing of fruit I.49.37.6

Let the related distinction proceed by the same method. I mean that, as this newly devised position would say, the works of souls that are complete in themselves, uniform, and separate from matter are naturally attached to their powers. In the case of less complete souls, divided about the earth, their works resemble the production of fruits.[1460]

1459. The passage limits the identity of operation and substance instead of extending it to every soul. “Procession” renders proodos, an ordered derivation into subsequent levels; no merely spatial movement is implied. The supplied kai remains marked. The English resolves the compressed shift between operations and the souls that perform them; the Greek retains the unusual peri tois sōmasin. “New yet unfailing” is the author’s favorable assessment of this approach.

1460. The contrast is between works remaining naturally attached to powers and works resembling fruit produced from a source. The latter image implies a distinction between producer and product. The passage calls the position newly devised; it does not name a separate school or founder. Autoteleis means complete in themselves, while monoeideis emphasizes uniformity.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.7 I.49.37.7

Ἐπὶ δὴ τούτοις δεῖ νοεῖν ὡς οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ πάσας τῆς ὁποιασοῦν ψυχῆς τὰς ἐνεργείας συμμιγνύουσιν τοῖς διοικουμένοις καὶ ἀψύχοις, οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος οὐ πάσας. Εἶναι μὲν γάρ τινας δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς αἳ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ὕλης ἐφάπτονται, ὡς τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ὁρμητικήν, καθαρωτέρας δὲ τούτων τὰς μηδὲν σώματι προσχρωμένας, ὡς τὴν νοεράν.

37.8 I.49.37.8

Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σωματοειδῶν δυνάμεων ἔργα κατ᾽ οὐσίαν μὲν Πλάτων οὐ συνάπτει τοῖς σώμασιν, κατ᾽ ἐπιστροφὴν δὲ κοινωνεῖν φησί, τὰ δὲ τῶν χωριστῶν ἀπολύει πάντῃ τοῦ κατατείνεσθαι εἰς τὰ σώματα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.7 · Powers that engage with body I.49.37.7

Next we must understand that the Stoics mingle all the activities of any soul whatever with the things it governs and which are in themselves soulless; Plato's followers do not mingle all of them. For some powers of soul engage with body as their matter, such as the powers of perception and impulse. Purer than these are those that make no use of body at all, such as the intellectual power.[1461]

37.8 · Association through a turning toward I.49.37.8

Plato, then, does not connect the works of powers having a bodily character with bodies in respect of substance; he says that they share in them through a turning toward them. But he frees the works of separate powers entirely from being directed into bodies.[1462]

1461. "In themselves soulless" clarifies the things governed by soul, rather than suggesting that the governing soul has disappeared. The contrast between powers using body and the intellectual power depends in part on Canter's correction katharōteras de toutōn, "purer than these," adopted in the print. Hormētikē is the power of impulse, not simply bodily locomotion.

1462. Epistrophē is a turning or orientation. Here the surrounding contrast makes it an orientation toward bodies, as distinct from a substantial union with them. "Separate powers" refers back to powers independent of bodily use. The argument therefore distinguishes the mode of association as well as whether any association occurs.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.9 I.49.37.9

Ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων καὶ θειοτέρων ἔργα ἄμικτα εἶναι διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα αὐτῶν τῆς οὐσίας, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ μεριστῶν μηκέθ᾽ ὡσαύτως εἶναι ἄχραντα· καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνιουσῶν καὶ ἀπολυομένων τῆς γενέσεως ἀφίεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δὲ τῶν κατιουσῶν συμπλέκεσθαι αὐτοῖς πολυειδῶς καὶ συνυφαίνεσθαι.

37.10 I.49.37.10

Καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ἐποχουμένων τοῖς αὐγοειδέσι πνεύμασι καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν τιθεμένων εὐκόλως, ἅπερ ἂν θέλωσιν, ἄνωθεν ἀπραγμόνως ἐκφαίνειν τὰ σφῶν ἔργα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς στερεωτέροις σώμασιν ἐναπειρόμενα καὶ κατεχόμενα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναπίμπλασθαι ἀμωσγέπως τῆς τούτων φύσεως.

37.11 I.49.37.11

Καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτὰ τὰ διοικούμενα, τὰ δὲ τῶν διῃρημένων αὐτὰ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς ταῦτα ὧν ἐπιμελοῦνται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.9 · Ascent and descent

I.49.37.9

Accordingly, the works of universal and more divine souls are unmixed because of the purity of their substance; those of souls in matter and particular souls are no longer undefiled in the same way. The works of souls ascending and being released from becoming are henceforth freed from bodies, whereas those of descending souls are entangled and interwoven with them in many ways.[1463]

37.10 · Luminous vehicles and solid bodies

I.49.37.10

Souls borne upon luminous pneumas, and easily bringing about through them whatever they wish, manifest their own works from above without trouble. But the works inserted into more solid bodies and held within them become in some measure imbued with the nature of those bodies.[1464]

37.11 · What turns toward what

I.49.37.11

The works of universal souls turn the things they govern toward themselves, whereas those of divided souls are themselves turned toward the things of which they take care.[1465]

1463. The continuing infinitives develop the distinctions already under discussion. The passage now adds the direction of a soul's movement, ascent or descent, to its rank and relation to matter. The English repeats "works" to keep clear that the immediate subject is what souls do, even though the descriptions of ascent and descent belong to the souls themselves.

1464. Augoeidē pneumata are luminous or radiant pneumas, subtle vehicles upon which souls are carried. Pneuma retains the sense of breath or a subtle bodily medium. The opening Greek is compressed, beginning with the works and then speaking of manifesting "their own works"; the English makes the souls the subject of that first clause for clarity. The contrast with solid bodies is retained without adding a separate theory of these vehicles.

1465. The same verb, epistrephein, appears first actively and then in a passive or middle form. The contrast concerns the direction of dependence: the higher activity draws what it governs toward itself, while divided activity is directed toward its objects of care. The English keeps the works as the subject of this continuing sequence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.12 I.49.37.12

Κατ᾽ ἄλλην τοίνυν ἀρχὴν τῆς τῶν αὐτῶν διακρίσεως ἡ μὲν Περιπατητικὴ δόξα τοῦ ζῴου μόνως καὶ τοῦ συνθέτου τίθεται τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς. [Πλάτων δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὰ πρώτως προσάπτει, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δίδωσιν.]

37.13 I.49.37.13

Πλάτων δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόρας ὑπερφυῆ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς καὶ γεννητικὴν τῆς φύσεως προτάττοντες πρεσβύτερα αὐτῇ καὶ τιμιώτερα πρὸ τῆς φύσεως τὰ ἔργα διδόασιν· ἄρχεσθαί τε αὐτὴν οὐ ποιοῦσιν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, αὐτὴν δὲ ἀφ᾽ αὑτῆς καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐξηγεῖσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅσα τέ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κινήματα τῆς φύσεως ὑπερέχοντα καθ᾽ αὐτὰ ἐξαιροῦσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.12 · Functions of the composite

I.49.37.12

On another principle for distinguishing these same matters, the Peripatetic opinion assigns the works of soul solely to the living being, the composite. [Plato, however, attaches them primarily to soul and only then imparts them to the composite.][1466]

37.13 · Soul prior to nature

I.49.37.13

Plato and Pythagoras, by setting soul's substance above nature and making it generative of nature, give it works prior to and more honorable than nature. They do not make soul receive its rule from nature; they suppose that soul itself directs its own activities from itself and about itself. Whatever noble and excellent motions in it surpass nature, they set apart in their own right.[1467]

1466. The entire sentence about Plato is bracketed in the edition. The apparatus explains Usener's deletion of it as a learned reader's marginal summary of what follows. It is retained and translated within brackets, rather than silently treated as part of the undisputed text. To koinon again denotes the composite shared by soul and body.

1467. Hyperphyēs here means above nature within the stated ordering of soul and nature. Archesthai is taken as "be ruled," in contrast with exēgeisthai, "direct" or "lead," rather than simply "begin." The source prints rough-breathed contracted reflexives in "from itself" and "about itself," but a smooth-breathed form in the final kath' auta; those forms are preserved. Priority and honor concern rank in this account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.14 I.49.37.14

Ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς πολλοὶ διαστασιάζουσιν, οἱ μὲν εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὰ ἐνεργήματα συνάγοντες, ὥσπερ Πλωτῖνός τε καὶ Πορφύριος· οἱ δὲ εἰς μάχην ταῦτα κατατείνοντες, ὥσπερ Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ ἐκ μαχομένων αὐτὰ συναρμόζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Ἀττικὸν καὶ Πλούταρχον. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν προϋποκειμένων τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ πλημμελῶν κινημάτων ἐπεισιέναι φασὶν ὕστερα τὰ κατακοσμοῦντα αὐτὰ καὶ διατάττοντα καὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτως συννυφαίνουσι,

37.15 I.49.37.15

κατὰ μὲν Πλωτῖνον τῆς πρώτης ἑτερότητος, κατ᾽ Ἐμπεδοκλέα δὲ τῆς [πρώτης] ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φυγῆς, καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλεσθαι ἀναπαύλης, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Γνωστικοὺς παρανοίας ἢ παρεκβάσεως, κατ᾽ Ἀλβῖνον δὲ τῆς τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου διημαρτημένης κρίσεως αἰτίας γινομένης τῶν καταγωγῶν ἐνεργημάτων·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.14 · Unity, conflict, and harmony I.49.37.14

There are, moreover, many disagreements among the Platonists themselves. Some, such as Plotinus and Porphyry, bring the forms and parts of life and its operations into a single order and form. Others, such as Numenius, draw them into conflict. Others harmonize them out of conflicting elements, as do the followers of Atticus and Plutarch. These last say that disorderly and discordant motions exist beforehand, and that the motions which order and arrange them enter subsequently. In this way they weave concord from both;[1468]

37.15 · Causes of activities leading downward I.49.37.15

the cause of activities leading downward being, according to Plotinus, primary otherness; according to Empedocles, the [first] flight from the god; according to Heraclitus, rest in the midst of change; according to the Gnostics, derangement or deviation; and according to Albinus, the mistaken judgment of free choice.[1469]

1468. The report distinguishes three accounts: unity, conflict, and a harmony formed from prior conflict. “These last” refers to the group around Atticus and Plutarch. The source cites Numenius, fragment 49 in Thedinga’s edition; this is the edition’s reference system, not a newly verified modern numbering. The following causal catalogue begins with a loose grammatical transition.

1469. The English moves the causal phrase forward to make the series of genitives readable. The source compares Plotinus, Enneads IV.8.7, and gives older fragment references for Empedocles and Heraclitus; these are reported formulations, not newly introduced direct quotations. Wachsmuth rejects “first” before flight, and both languages retain the brackets. The unusual adjective katagōgōn is translated “leading downward”; its form was questioned by Heeren, but it remains in the print. Autexousion concerns self-determination or free choice.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.16 I.49.37.16

τῶν δ᾽ αὖ διισταμένων πρὸς τούτους καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσφυομένων προστιθέντων ὁπωσοῦν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κακόν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ὕλης Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου πολλάκις, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτῶν τούτων ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ Ἀρποκρατίωνος, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς Πλωτίνου καὶ Πορφυρίου ὡς τὰ πολλά.

37.17 I.49.37.17

Κατὰ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλην εἴδεσι ζωῆς καὶ ἄλλοις ὅροις ταῦτα χωρὶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων διακέκριται. Κατὰ δ᾽ αὖ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἀτελέστερα ἀεὶ ἀπομερίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς ζωῆς ἐνεργήματα καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν ᾖ προϊόντα προσωτέρω τῆς ἀλογίας, τοσῷδε μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀτελέστερον ἀποφέρεται τὰ καταδεέστερα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.16 · Evil arising from external attachments I.49.37.16

Others, in turn, disagree with these accounts and attach evil to soul in one way or another through things that adhere to it from outside: Numenius and Cronius often derive it from matter; these same thinkers, and Harpocration, sometimes derive it from bodies; Plotinus and Porphyry usually derive it from nature and irrational life.[1470]

37.17 · Human activities and degrees of imperfection I.49.37.17

According to Aristotle, these things are distinguished separately in the human sphere by forms of life and other defining criteria. According to the Stoics, such operations of life are apportioned in ever less complete forms; and the further they proceed into irrationality, the more the inferior operations are carried toward incompleteness in comparison with the prior ones.[1471]

1470. The unfinished genitive construction is made into an independent English sentence. Its contrast is with the preceding causes of downward activity. The qualifications “often,” “sometimes,” and “usually” are all retained: the author does not assign each thinker one invariable explanation. Matter, bodies, nature, and irrational life remain distinct proposed sources rather than interchangeable terms.

1471. The Aristotle sentence is compressed: “these things” resumes the activities and distinctions under discussion, without supplying a specific list. The Stoic comparison is also difficult. “Further into irrationality” gives the contextual sense of prosōterō tēs alogias provisionally; the genitive construction could otherwise suggest “beyond irrationality.” The repeated contrast between greater and lesser completeness guides the translation, while the Greek is left unchanged.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.18 I.49.37.18

Ὡς δ᾽ ἐγώ τινων ἀκήκοα Πλατωνικῶν, οἷον Πορφυρίου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, ἀφομοιοῦται ἀλλήλοις τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια τοῖς θηρείοις, τὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον πέφυκε τὰ διακεκριμένα καθ᾽ ἑτέρας οὐσίας ὁμοιοῦσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

37.18 · Human and animal resemblances I.49.37.18

But as I have heard from certain Platonists, such as Porphyry and many others, human operations become like those of beasts, and those of animals like human operations, to the extent that things distinguished by different substances are naturally capable of resembling one another.[1472]

1472. The first-person report belongs to the excerpt's author. It concerns a reciprocal resemblance of operations, qualified by the difference of the substances involved. It should therefore not be turned into an unqualified claim of identity between human and animal souls. The repeated "operations" in English supplies the noun understood from the preceding discussion.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.38.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ μέτρου ψυχῆς.

Οἱ μὲν δὴ μίαν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριθμῷ τιθέμενοι, πληθύουσαν δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς Ἀμέλιος οἴεται, σχέσεσι καὶ κατατάξεσιν, ἤ, ὡς οἱ Ὀρφικοὶ λέγουσιν, ἐπιπνοίαις ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης,

38.2 I.49.38.2

ἔπειτα ἀνασχέοντες ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῆς ὅλης ἐπὶ τὴν μίαν ψυχὴν ἀποθεμένην τὰς σχέσεις καὶ τὰς εἰς ἕτερον κατατάξεις καὶ ἀναλύοντες ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς τὰ μεταλαβόντα διαιρέσεως, ἀπολυομένης τῆς τῶν μετασχόντων διαλήψεως, τηροῦσιν αὐτὴν ὅλην πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτήν, μίαν οὐσίαν τε αὐτῇ διδόασι καθ᾽ ἓν πεπερασμένην.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.1 · The measure of soul: unity and plurality I.49.38.1

In the same work: on the measure of soul.

Some posit one substance of soul in number, yet hold that it becomes multiple through relations and assignments, as Amelius thinks, or through inspirations from the universal soul, as the Orphics say;[1473]

38.2 · Returning multiplicity to unity I.49.38.2

then, drawing back from the multiplicity of the whole to the one soul that has laid aside its relations and its assignments to another, and releasing it from division among its participants, as the distinction among those participants is dissolved, they preserve it whole and everywhere the same. They give it one substance, bounded by unity.[1474]

1473. The heading continues the work attributed to Iamblichus as On the Soul. “Measure” concerns the unity, number, and possible infinitude of souls. The text adopts Wachsmuth’s correction plēthyousan, making soul itself become multiple. Katataxeis are placements or assignments to an order; epipnoiai suggests inspirations or breathings into recipients. “Universal soul” renders hē holē, the whole soul, without adding a new named source.

1474. The participles continue the subject of the preceding unit. The difficult anascheontes is rendered provisionally “drawing back”: the apparatus expects the sense of restraining or contracting multiplicity and discusses several repairs, none adopted here. The printed apothemenēn agrees with soul. The argument removes divisions associated with participants while retaining the identity of the whole soul; it does not state that a spatially extended substance is being compressed.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.3 I.49.38.3

Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ἀπείροις κόσμοις, ὥσπερ δὴ οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον νομίζουσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπείρων ἀτόμων κατὰ συντυχίαν συνερχομένων * * συνίστασθαι ἀπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε στοιχείων τὰς ψυχὰς ἡγούμενοι ἀπείρους αὐτὰς εἶναι ἑπομένως ταῖς οἰκείαις ὑποθέσεσιν ἀποφαίνονται.

38.4 I.49.38.4

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐκ σπερμάτων αὐτὰς γεννῶντες ἑκάστου δυναμένου πολλὰ σπείρειν καὶ τοῦδε προϊόντος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἱσταμένου κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπολείπουσιν. Οἱ δὲ κατὰ μεταβολὴν ἐξ ἑνὸς ζῴου φθειρομένου πολλὰ ζῷα καὶ πολλὰς ζωὰς παράγοντες ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλειν συνεχῶς καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιλείπειν τὴν ἐκ τῆς μεταβολῆς διαδεχομένην ἀειγενεσίαν ταύτῃ τὸ ἀπέραντον πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν ἐπινοοῦσιν ἐν τῷ ἀεὶ πλεῖον γίγνεσθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.3 · Infinitely many worlds and souls I.49.38.3

Others think that, in infinitely many worlds, as the followers of Democritus and Epicurus suppose, from infinitely many atoms coming together by chance * * souls are constituted from elements of this kind. In accordance with their own premises, they declare the souls to be infinite in number.[1475]

38.4 · Endless generation and transformation I.49.38.4

Those who generate souls from seeds, each capable of sowing many more, leave infinity always in the process of coming-to-be, since this generative process goes on forever and nowhere stops. Those who produce many living beings and many lives by transformation from one living being that perishes conceive an unlimited multitude of souls through continuous transformation and the unceasing generation that succeeds it: the multitude always becomes greater.[1476]

1475. The asterisks preserve Wachsmuth's marked gap. His apparatus supposes that a participle referring to the worlds has been lost, unless the preceding participle should instead be changed. The English leaves the break visible and does not invent the missing clause. The repeated phrase "from elements of this kind" remains in the print although Heeren deleted it; it is retained in both languages.

1476. Two kinds of continuing increase are distinguished: generation from seeds and transformation following the destruction of a living being. The first explicitly locates infinity in an ongoing process. The second describes a multitude without a terminating limit. The final phrase about becoming ever greater is retained although the apparatus records Heeren's deletion of it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.5 I.49.38.5

Οἱ δὲ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ διακρίνοντες πάλιν δὴ καὶ οὗτοι κατὰ διαίρεσιν τὸ ἄπειρον τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι προσομολογοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν φυομένων δένδρων μεριζόμενον ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν ἴσων αὐτῷ φαίνεται γεννητικὸν εἶναι.

38.6 I.49.38.6

Οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους αὐτὰς προστησάμενοι ἑστάναι ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συμμετρίαν ἀφορίζονται, οὔτε γὰρ προστίθεσθαί τι αὐταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν μεθιστάμενον εἰς τὰ ἀπολλύμενα. Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μέτρον οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλωτῖνον εἰς τὸν τέλεον ἀριθμὸν ὡς οἰκεῖον προσβιβάζουσι.

39.1 · <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.49.39.1

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ διαφορᾶς καθόδου τῶν ψυχῶν.>

Πλωτῖνος μὲν καὶ Πορφύριος καὶ Ἀμέλιος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπὲρ τὸν οὐρανὸν ψυχῆς καὶ πάσας ἐπίσης εἰσοικίζουσιν εἰς τὰ σώματα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

38.5 · Division and the growth of trees

I.49.38.5

Those who do not distinguish soul from nature likewise acknowledge that the infinity of souls comes about through division. For each growing tree, when divided, is the same as the whole and appears capable of generating others like itself.[1477]

38.6 · An unchanging measure

I.49.38.6

Plato's followers, positing souls as ungenerated and imperishable, determine that they always remain in the same proportionate measure. Nothing is added to them through generation, nor is anything removed from them by passing into the things that perish. The followers of Plotinus relate this measure to the perfect number as appropriate to it.[1478]

39.1 · Differences in souls' descent

I.49.39.1

<In the same work: on differences in the descent of souls.>

Plotinus, Porphyry, and Amelius make all souls alike take up residence in bodies from the soul above heaven.[1479]

1477. The botanical comparison supports a view that does not separate soul from nature. "The same as the whole" describes the divided portion's character or generative capacity in this argument, not numerical identity between all trees. The translation preserves the report's "appears" rather than turning the example into an independent biological assertion.

1478. The contrast with the preceding accounts is an unchanging total measure, because souls neither originate nor perish. The passage names "the perfect number" but gives no numeral or calculation; none is supplied here. Symmetria is the fixed proportionate measure in this context. "Passing into the things that perish" is retained as the text's compressed explanation of subtraction.

1479. The whole heading is restored here. Wachsmuth relocates to this excerpt the heading transmitted before the next, because he judges its subject to belong here. "From the soul above heaven" retains the singular source from which the plural souls are said to enter bodies. The compressed kai pasas episēs emphasizes that all are treated alike in this report.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.2 I.49.39.2

Πολὺ δὲ διαφερόντως ἔοικεν ὁ Τίμαιος τὴν πρώτην ὑπόστασιν τῶν ψυχῶν ποιεῖν, τὸν δημιουργὸν διασπείροντα περὶ πάντα μὲν τὰ κρείττονα γένη, καθ᾽ ὅλον δὲ τὸν οὐρανόν, εἰς ὅλα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός.

39.3 I.49.39.3

Ἔσται δὴ οὖν καὶ ἡ σπορὰ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τῶν ψυχῶν διαιρουμένη παρὰ τὰς θείας δημιουργίας καὶ ἡ πρώτη τῶν ψυχῶν πρόοδος συνυφισταμένη, μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὰ δεξόμενα τὰς ψυχάς· ἡ μὲν ὅλη τὸν ὅλον κόσμον, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἐμφανῶν θεῶν τὰς κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν σφαίρας, αἱ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα μεθ᾽ ὧν καὶ ψυχαὶ συνεκληρώθησαν καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τοιαύτην λῆξιν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δὴ αἱ κάθοδοι γίγνονται τῶν ψυχῶν ἄλλαι ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων διακληρώσεων, ὡς βούλεται ἐνδείκνυσθαι σαφῶς ἡ τοῦ Τιμαίου διάταξις.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.2 · Different first allotments in the Timaeus I.49.39.2

The Timaeus, however, appears to give souls a markedly differentiated first subsistence, presenting the demiurge as sowing them among all the higher kinds, throughout the whole heaven, and into all the elements of the universe.[1480]

39.3 · Procession and its recipients I.49.39.3

Thus the creative sowing of souls will be differentiated according to the divine acts of creation, and souls' first procession will arise together with it, having with itself what is to receive them: the universal soul, the whole cosmos; the souls of the visible gods, the heavenly spheres; and those of the elements, the elements themselves, with which souls too were jointly allotted in each such assignment. From these allotments the descents of souls occur, different descents from different allocations, as the arrangement of the Timaeus clearly intends to indicate.[1481]

1480. The author is interpreting the Timaeus's account of the demiurge's distribution of souls. Hypostasis here denotes their first subsistence or establishment. The English supplies "presenting" to complete the abbreviated construction; it is not a marked restoration in the Greek. The three spheres of distribution, higher kinds, heaven, and elements, are preserved separately.

1481. The Greek moves from the singular "first procession" to an abbreviated list of souls and their recipients; the English makes that list explicit without replacing the printed wording. The language of allotment, lēxis and diaklērōsis, connects each descent to a prior assignment. "Jointly allotted" preserves the association of souls with the elements rather than identifying them with those elements.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.4 I.49.39.4

Ἄλλη τοίνυν αἵρεσις τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς δημιουργικοὺς κλήρους οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οἷον θεῶν, ἀγγέλων, δαιμόνων, ἡρώων, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς νομὰς τοῦ παντὸς διακρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερόντων τόπων καταβάσεις τῶν ψυχῶν· τιθεμένη δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι ἐν σώματι, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ καὶ ἄλλων, ἀπὸ σωμάτων αὐτὴν λεπτοτέρων εἰς τὰ ὀστρεώδη πάλιν εἰσοικίζει σώματα·

39.5 I.49.39.5

διατρίβειν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν εἰς μοῖράν τινα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, καθήκειν γε μὴν εἰς τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα ἄλλοτε ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων τοῦ παντὸς τόπων. Καὶ τούτους Ἡρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζειν περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ᾽ ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχάς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων ἀεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.4 · Souls always in some body I.49.39.4

Another Platonic position distinguishes souls' descents from different places neither by creative allotments, nor by the divisions of higher kinds such as gods, angels, divine spirits, and heroes, nor by the regions assigned within the universe. Positing soul as always in a body, as does the position of Eratosthenes, Ptolemy the Platonist, and others, it makes soul pass from subtler bodies to take up residence again in shell-like bodies;[1482]

39.5 · Places from which souls descend I.49.39.5

for it says that soul dwells in some portion of the sensible realm, but comes down into a solid body at different times from different places in the universe. Heraclides of Pontus locates these places around the Milky Way; others, throughout all the heavenly spheres, from which souls descend here. Some say that souls dwell around the moon or in the air beneath it and pass down from there into earthly becoming; others maintain that they always fall from solid bodies into other bodies.[1483]

1482. Ostreōdē literally means shell-like; the contrast is with the preceding subtler bodies. The epithet "the Platonist" belongs to Ptolemy in the source and is retained without identifying him with a different Ptolemy. Angels and divine spirits are separate members of the listed hierarchy. This account distinguishes changes of bodily habitation from a soul's first acquisition of any body whatever.

1483. The sequence surveys different locations and bodily transitions without reconciling them. The unusual eis moiran tina with "dwells" is retained in Greek and rendered by the contextual "in some portion." The last position is more restrictive than the subtler-body account: its point of departure is always a solid body.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.6 I.49.39.6

Ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ τοσούτων καὶ οὕτω διαφερόντων μερῶν γίγνεσθαι διαφερούσας τὰς τῇδε καθόδους, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς τρόπους διίστασθαι πολυειδῶς. Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας τίθεται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδόν τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω διαπορεύεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπείληφε καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένειν κάματον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλειν φέρειν ἀνάπαυσιν.

39.7 I.49.39.7

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ταῦρον Πλατωνικοὶ πέμπεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰς γῆν λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἑπομένως τῷ Τιμαίῳ παραδιδόντες ὅτι εἰς τελείωσιν τοῦ παντός, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τοσαῦτα ζῷα, ὅσα εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· οἱ δὲ εἰς θείας ζωῆς ἐπίδειξιν τὸ τέλος ἀναφέροντες τῆς καθόδου. ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν τῶν θεῶν, θεοὺς ἐκφαίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν· προέρχονται γὰρ εἰς τοὔμφανες οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαρᾶς καὶ ἀχράντου ζωῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.6 · Heraclitus: change and rest

I.49.39.6

Descents into this world thus differ because they begin from so many and such different regions; their very modes also differ in many ways. Heraclitus posits necessary exchanges between opposites. He has supposed that souls travel a road upward and downward, that remaining in the same conditions is weariness, and that change brings rest.[1484]

39.7 · Completing the cosmos and revealing the gods

I.49.39.7

The Platonists around Taurus say that souls are sent to earth by gods. Some, following the Timaeus, teach that this is for the completion of the universe, so that there may be as many living beings in the cosmos as there are in the intelligible realm. Others refer the purpose of descent to a manifestation of divine life. For this, they say, is the will of the gods: that gods should be revealed through souls. The gods come into manifestation and display themselves through the pure and undefiled life of souls.[1485]

1484. The account now moves from the places of descent to its modes. The source cites Heraclitus under Bywater's fragment 83 and compares Plotinus in its apparatus. The sentences remain a report of Heraclitus's position rather than a newly reconstructed direct quotation. The paradox of rest through change is preserved.

1485. Two purposes are reported, cosmic completeness and the manifestation of divine life; they are not collapsed into one. The edition adopts "divine life" in place of the transmitted reading and corrects the expression for coming into manifestation to eis toumphanes. The repeated explanation involving souls and the gods is retained: the apparatus notes that Heeren omitted part of it. These statements describe the position being reported.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 378-379

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.8 I.49.39.8

Κατ᾽ ἄλλην τοίνυν διαίρεσιν οἱ μὲν ἑκούσιοι τρόποι νοοῦνται τῆς καθόδου ἢ ἑλομένης αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν περὶ γῆν, ἢ πειθαρχούσης τοῖς κρείττοσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀκούσιοι βιαζομένης ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἕλκεσθαι.

40.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.40.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Οὐχ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι πασῶν τῶν ψυχῶν κοινωνία πρὸς τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὅλη, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλωτίνῳ δοκεῖ, προσιὸν ἑαυτῇ τὸ σῶμα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτὴ πρόσεισι τῷ σώματι, οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ· αἱ δὲ μερισταὶ προσέρχονται τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τῶν σωμάτων γίγνονται καὶ ἤδη κρατουμένων τῶν σωμάτων ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως εἰσοικίζονται εἰς αὐτά.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 379

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

39.8 · Voluntary and involuntary descent I.49.39.8

On another division, voluntary modes of descent are conceived either when soul itself chooses to administer earthly things or when it obeys higher beings. Involuntary modes occur when it is forced to be drawn toward what is worse.[1486]

40.1 · Universal and particular souls in bodies I.49.40.1

In the same work.

The association of souls with bodies is not the same for all. The universal soul, as Plotinus too thinks, contains within itself the body that approaches it; it does not itself approach the body, nor is it contained by it. Particular souls, however, approach bodies and come to belong to them, taking up residence in bodies already governed by the nature of the universe.[1487]

1486. The voluntary category includes both self-chosen administration and obedience to higher beings. The involuntary category adds compulsion toward an inferior condition. The text therefore does not identify every descent with a fall caused by wrongdoing.

1487. The contrast reverses the direction of containment: body is within universal soul, while particular souls enter bodies. “Come to belong to them” retains the force of tōn sōmatōn gignontai without equating soul’s substance with body. The universe’s nature already governs the bodies into which the particular souls enter. The descriptive heading transmitted here was relocated by Wachsmuth to excerpt 39.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 379

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.2 I.49.40.2

Καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν θεῶν θεῖα σώματα, νοῦν μιμούμενα, ἐπιστρέφουσι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν νοερὰν οὐσίαν· αἱ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θείων γενῶν, ὡς ἕκασται ἐτάχθησαν, οὕτω κατευθύνουσιν ἑαυτῶν τὰ ὀχήματα. Ἔτι γε μὴν αἱ καθαραὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ τέλειαι καθαρῶς εἰσοικίζονται εἰς τὰ σώματα ἄνευ παθημάτων καὶ τῆς στερήσεως τοῦ νοεῖν· αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι ἐναντίως.

40.3 I.49.40.3

Ἀττικῷ <δὲ> καὶ <ἄλλοις τισὶ> Πλατωνικοῖς οὐ συνδοκεῖ, καθ᾽ ἕνα δὲ τρόπον συντεύξεως τὰς ὅλας ψυχὰς τοῖς σώμασι συνάγουσιν, ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης ἐνσωματώσεως τῶν ψυχῶν προϋποτιθέντες τὴν ἄλογον καὶ πλημμελῆ καὶ ἔνυλον ψυχήν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ κατακοσμουμένῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς λογικῆς ἐπεισάγοντες.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.2 · Divine vehicles and pure souls I.49.40.2

The souls of gods turn divine bodies, which imitate intellect, toward their own intellectual substance. The souls of the other divine kinds direct their own vehicles in accordance with the rank assigned to each. Pure and complete souls, moreover, enter bodies purely, without affections and without being deprived of understanding; souls of the opposite character do the opposite.[1488]

40.3 · Atticus and a single mode of union I.49.40.3

Atticus, <however,> and <certain other> Platonists do not agree. They bring all souls into conjunction with bodies through one mode of union, always and in every embodiment alike presupposing an irrational, discordant soul immersed in matter, and subsequently introducing into it, as it is ordered, the association of rational soul.[1489]

1488. The divine bodies are the things described as imitating intellect. Ochēmata, “vehicles,” is the printed correction of a reading meaning shapes. The final contrast concerns whether bodily residence involves affections and the loss of understanding. Pathēmata can include what is undergone or suffered, not only emotions in the narrow modern sense.

1489. Both supplied phrases are marked in Greek and English. Here tas holas psychas is taken collectively as “all souls,” since the argument assigns a single mode to every embodiment, unlike the distinctions just made; the phrase can literally suggest souls in their entirety. The irrational soul is presupposed, while rational soul’s association is introduced subsequently. The English does not make the two identical.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 379-380

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.4 I.49.40.4

Οἶμαι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ τέλη διάφορα ὄντα καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς καθόδου τῶν ψυχῶν ποιεῖν διαφέροντας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ καθάρσει καὶ τελειότητι τῶν τῇδε κατιοῦσα ἄχραντον ποιεῖται καὶ τὴν κάθοδον· ἡ δὲ διὰ γυμνασίαν καὶ ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν οἰκείων ἠθῶν ἐπιστρεφομένη περὶ τὰ σώματα οὐκ ἀπαθής ἐστι παντελῶς, οὐδὲ ἀφεῖται ἀπόλυτος καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν· ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ δίκῃ καὶ κρίσει δεῦρο κατερχομένη συρομένῃ πως ἔοικε καὶ συνελαυνομένῃ.

40.5 I.49.40.5

<Τινὲς δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων οὐχ οὕτως> διακρίνουσιν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ σκοπὸν τῆς διαφορότητος εἰς ταὐτὸ συγχέουσι τὰς ἐνσωματώσεις τῶν ὅλων, κακάς τε εἶναι πάσας διισχυρίζονται καὶ διαφερόντως οἱ περὶ Κρόνιόν τε καὶ Νουμήνιον καὶ Ἀρποκρατίωνα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 380

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.4 · Different purposes, different descents I.49.40.4

I think that differences in purpose also make the modes of souls' descent different. A soul descending for the preservation, purification, and perfection of things here makes its descent undefiled as well. A soul turning toward bodies for the exercise and correction of its own character is not entirely free from affections, nor is it left released on its own. A soul coming down here for punishment and judgment seems in some way to be dragged and driven together with others.[1490]

40.5 · The view that every embodiment is bad I.49.40.5

<Some more recent thinkers do not make such> distinctions. Without attending to the differences, they merge everyone's embodiments into one and insist that all are bad, especially the followers of Cronius, Numenius, and Harpocration.[1491]

1490. The author expressly states his own judgment. The first purpose concerns the benefit of things here; the second concerns the soul's own training; the third is punitive. Sōtēria may mean preservation or salvation. The final participle synelaunomenē suggests being driven together; "with others" makes that force explicit, without identifying companions not named by the text.

1491. The substantial opening phrase is supplied by Heeren and remains fully marked in English. The criticism of undifferentiated embodiment belongs to the excerpt's author. Tōn holōn is interpreted collectively, in keeping with the assertion that all embodiments are bad. The source cites Numenius using Thedinga's older fragment numbering.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.6 I.49.40.6

Δεῖ δέ που καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν ψυχῶν κατανοεῖν πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς σῶμα, ὡς ἄρα καὶ οὗτοι πολλὴν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς διάστασιν· ἀπὸ δὲ διαφόρων τρόπων ζωῆς διάφορον ποιοῦνται ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὴν πρώτην σύνοδον. Οἵ τε γὰρ νεοτελεῖς καὶ πολυθεάμονες τῶν ὄντων, οἵ τε συνοπαδοὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς τῶν θεῶν, οἵ τε παντελεῖς καὶ ὁλόκληρα τὰ εἴδη τῆς ψυχῆς περιέχοντες, πάντες ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀκήρατοι ἐμφύονται πρώτως εἰς τὰ σώματα· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄδην ἀναπεπλησμένοι καὶ ἄλλων παθῶν μεστοὶ μετὰ παθῶν συνέρχονται πρώτως τοῖς σώμασι.

41.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.41.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Κατὰ δ᾽ Ἱπποκράτην, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ὅταν πλασθῇ τὸ σπέρμα (τότε γὰρ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν αὐτὸ μεταλαμβάνειν ζωῆς), κατὰ δὲ Πορφύριον ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἀπογεννήσει τοῦ τικτομένου πρώτως ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ζωοποιία καὶ παρουσία τῆς ψυχῆς φύεται.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 380-381

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

40.6 · Lives before embodiment I.49.40.6

We must also consider the lives of souls before they enter a body, since these lives too differ greatly among themselves. Their different modes of life make their first conjunction different as well. Those newly initiated and rich in contemplation of beings, those who accompany the gods and are akin to them, and those wholly perfected and containing the forms of soul in their entirety all first become implanted in bodies free from affections and undefiled. But those filled to satiety with desires and full of other passions first unite with bodies already attended by passions.[1492]

41.1 · When soul becomes present I.49.41.1

In the same work.

According to Hippocrates, the member of the Asclepiads, the actual imparting of life and presence of soul first arise when the seed is formed, for it is then suitably disposed to share in life; according to Porphyry, they arise at the newborn's first emergence in birth.[1493]

1492. The author explains differences at the first bodily conjunction by differences in prior lives. Neoteleis carries the language of initiation; polytheamones emphasizes extensive contemplation. The Greek shifts to masculine descriptions of those who enter bodies, which the English preserves with "those." Its last contrast explicitly allows passions before this conjunction, rather than deriving every passion solely from the present body.

1493. The final predicate serves both accounts in the compressed Greek. The contrast is between the formation of the seed and the newborn's emergence, with actual life-giving presence at issue. The passage reports these ancient positions; it does not supply a modern account of embryonic development. The identifying phrase about Hippocrates is retained as printed, without expanding it into a genealogy.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 380-381

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.2 I.49.41.2

Γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλη τις δόξα οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν ῥηθεῖσα, ἡ λέγουσα πλείονας μὲν εἶναι τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ καιροὺς δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλους, ᾗπερ ἂν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχῃ τὸ γιγνόμενον σῶμα, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως μεταλαμβάνειν, ἔπειτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, εἶτα τῆς ὁρμητικῆς ζωῆς καὶ τότε δὴ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τέλει τῆς νοερᾶς. Τοσαῦτα καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους συμφυομένη κοινωνία τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὰ σώματα δέχεται δοξάσματα.

41.3 I.49.41.3

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε τῷ τόπῳ τῆς εἰσόδου τῶν ψυχῶν, καθ᾽ ὃν ἐπιζητοῦμεν πῶς εἰσκρίνεται, μία μέν ἐστι τριπλῆ δόξα ἡ ἔλκουσα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ συλλήψει ἢ διὰ προθυμίαν τοῦ γεννῶντος διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἢ διὰ προθυμίαν τῆς ὑποδεχομένης [μήτρας], ὅταν αὕτη ἐπιτηδείως ἔχῃ πρὸς τὴν κράτησιν, ἢ διὰ συμπάθειαν ἀμφοῖν, ὅταν κοινῇ συμπνέοντα ἀμφότερα ἑλκτικὴν ἔχῃ τὴν ἰδιότητα συγκινουμένης καὶ τῆς φύσεως·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.2 · A possible sequence of powers I.49.41.2

There could also be another opinion, not yet stated even now: that soul has several powers and substances, and that at different times, according to the developing body's readiness, it shares first in nature, then in perception, then in impulsive life, and subsequently in rational soul, with intellectual soul at the end. Such are the opinions admitted by the association of souls with bodies as it develops over time.[1494]

41.3 · Drawing soul in from outside I.49.41.3

As for the topic of souls' entry, under which we inquire how soul is introduced, one opinion has three forms. It draws soul in from outside at what is called conception: either through the eagerness of the begetter, by means of breathing; or through the eagerness of the receiving [womb], when it is suitably disposed to retain it; or through the sympathy of both, when both, breathing together in common, possess an attractive property, nature also moving in concert;[1495]

1494. This is explicitly a possible further account, not a teaching attributed to Hippocrates or Porphyry. The unusual "not yet stated even now" follows the printed oudepō kai nyn rather than the apparatus's proposed revision. The body is understood as the subject of "shares." Nature, perception, impulse, rational soul, and intellectual soul remain five stages, with no ages or durations supplied.

1495. Topos, literally "place," is taken here as the topic under which the manner of entry is examined; the printed word is retained, not replaced by Heeren's tropos, "manner." The bracketed mētras, "womb," is rejected in the apparatus, while an alternative "mother" is proposed there; both text and translation preserve the rejected word. "Breathing" stays in its printed position with the first alternative. Sympathy denotes a shared responsiveness in the reported account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.4 I.49.41.4

ἡ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην εἰσδύνειν ποιεῖ <αὐ>τὴν αὐτοκίνητον εἰς τὸ ὀργανικὸν σῶμα ἤτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ παντός, ἢ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς, ἢ τῆς δημιουργίας πάσης.

41.5 I.49.41.5

Ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ σώματος πολλῆς δεῖται διακρίσεως. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ προσεοικέναι αὐτὴν λέγουσι νεὼς κυβερνήσει, ᾗς καὶ ἀπολελύσθαι χωρὶς δύναται ὁ κυβερνήτης· οἱ δὲ ὀχήματος ἐπιβάσει κοινὴν πορείαν καὶ διακομιδὴν ἡνιοχούσῃ προσοικειοῦσιν αὐτήν·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.4 · Entry under necessity I.49.41.4

another opinion makes <it>, self-moving, enter the organic body under a necessity deriving either from the universe, from the universal soul, or from creation as a whole.[1496]

41.5 · Using the body: helmsman and rider I.49.41.5

The use of the body, moreover, requires careful distinctions. Some say that it resembles the steering of a ship, from which the helmsman can also be released and stand apart. Others compare it to mounting a vehicle and guiding a journey and conveyance shared with it;[1497]

1496. The source supplies only the first two letters of autēn, correcting the transmitted article tēn into a pronoun referring to soul. English marks the resulting pronoun as a whole and records the partial-word restoration here. Both necessity and self-movement remain in the sentence; the translation does not remove their tension. Organikon means a body equipped with organs or instruments. The three alternatives are taken here as sources of the necessity; the compressed wording could also connect them with soul's entry.

1497. The analogies describe different degrees of association between soul as user and body as instrument or vehicle. The first stresses the helmsman's separability; the second stresses shared travel. The feminine participle "guiding" belongs grammatically to the act of mounting in the compressed Greek, which the English unfolds into coordinated actions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.6 I.49.41.6

οἱ δὲ ὡς μᾶλλον ἁρμόζουσαν συνεργείᾳ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσομοιρούσῃ, ἢ συννεύσει καὶ ῥοπῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἐπικρατεῖ τοῦ σώματος ἀποδιδόασιν αὐτῆς τὴν ὁμοιότητα· οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων συγχωροῦσιν, ὡς δὲ μέρος τὴν ψυχήν φασιν εἶναι ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ ζῴῳ, οἱ δὲ ὡς τέχνην ἐμπεφυκέναι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, ὥσπερ εἰ ἦν ἔμψυχος <ὁ> οἴαξ.

41.7 I.49.41.7

Οἱ δὲ καθαρώτεροι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, ὥσπερ δὴ οἱ περὶ Πλωτῖνον, ἄρχεσθαι μὲν τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ὀργανικὸν σῶμά φασιν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, δουλεῦον εἰς τὴν γέννησιν ταῖς χρωμέναις αὐτῷ δυνάμεσιν, αὐτὰς δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπολύτους εἶναι τῶν μεριστῶν σωμάτων διισχυρίζονται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

41.6 · Cooperation, inclination, part, and art

I.49.41.6

others offer what they consider a more fitting likeness: cooperation in which both contribute equal shares, or a leaning and inclination toward the body that exercises mastery over it. Others accept none of these accounts, but say that soul is a part within the whole living being; still others say that it is an art implanted in its instruments, as if <the> tiller were itself ensouled.[1498]

41.7 · Powers free of particular bodies

I.49.41.7

The purer of the Platonists, such as the followers of Plotinus, say that the organic body begins its movement from these parts, serving for generation the powers that use it. But they maintain that the powers themselves are free of particular bodies.[1499]

1498. The adjective epikratei, “exercising mastery,” follows Usener’s correction printed in the edition; it is not rendered as subjection to the body. The source transposes clauses in this passage to establish the printed sequence, which is followed here. The supplied article before “tiller” is marked. An ensouled tiller illustrates art internal to the instrument, contrasting with the separable helmsman.

1499. “Purer” is the author’s evaluation. The source cites Plotinus, Enneads IV.3.3 and 23, and places this sentence after the preceding analogies by transposition. “These parts” remains the printed, somewhat loose backward reference. The edition adopts gennēsin, “generation,” rather than the transmitted genesin. The final distinction is between bodily service and powers not bound to particular bodies.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

42.1 · <Ἐν ταὐτῷ> I.49.42.1

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ.>

Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν γέγονέ τις διαμφισβήτησις τῶν μὲν λεγόντων ἀδύνατον μίγνυσθαι θεοὺς ταῖς κατεχομέναις ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι, τῶν δὲ διατεινομένων μίαν εἶναι κοινὴν πολιτείαν τῶν καθαρῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διατρίβουσιν· οἱ δὲ μόνοις δαίμοσιν ἢ καὶ ἥρωσιν ὑποτιθέασιν αὐτὰς εἰς κοινὴν συνουσίαν.

42a.1 I.49.42a.1

* * ἄλλοι μὲν οἱ βελτίονες κρινόμενοι κατὰ Πλάτωνα καθάρσει καὶ ἀναγωγῇ καὶ τελειώσει τῆς ψυχῆς· ἄλλοι δὲ οἱ χείρονες τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων ἀντιδιαστελλόμενοι· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τῇ κοινωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ καλῷ τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἐξηρτημένῳ· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Περιπατητικοὺς τῇ κατὰ φύσιν τε συμμετρίᾳ καὶ τῇ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν νοερᾷ ζωῇ προτιμώμενοι·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

42.1 · Souls' association with the gods

I.49.42.1

<In the same work.>

There has been some dispute about souls' association with the gods. Some say that gods cannot mingle with souls confined in the body; others maintain that pure souls share a single common civic life with the gods, even while they dwell fully in bodies. Others assign souls to a shared association only with divine spirits, or with heroes as well.[1500]

42a.1 · Criteria for the better life

I.49.42a.1

* * some are the better, judged according to Plato by purification, elevation, and perfection of soul; others are the worse, distinguished in contrast by the opposites of these. According to the Stoics, the criterion is fellowship and the nobility dependent on nature. According to the Peripatetics, they are preferred for proportion in accordance with nature and for intellectual life above human nature;[1501]

1500. The short heading is supplied by Wachsmuth, who separates this material from the preceding passage. Politeia evokes citizenship or a common civic order; it is not merely the fact of occupying the same place. Three positions are kept distinct, including the restricted association with divine spirits and possibly heroes. The emphatic kai ei hoti malista is rendered "even while ... fully."

1501. The opening gap is marked by the edition, which establishes this as a separate excerpt numbered 42a. The antecedent of the masculine descriptions is lost; the English keeps "some" and "others," without inserting a definite class absent from the surviving text. "The criterion is" completes an elliptical English clause. Anagōgē is a leading or raising upward; kalon can signify nobility or moral beauty.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 382-383

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

42a.2 I.49.42a.2

κατὰ δὲ Ἥριλλον ἐπιστήμῃ· κατὰ δὲ Ἀρίστωνα ἀδιαφορίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ Δημόκριτον εὐσχημοσύνῃ· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μέρει τινὶ τοῦ καλοῦ· ἢ τῇ ἀοχλησίᾳ καθ᾽ Ἱερώνυμον ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶ τρόποις διαγωγῆς τὸ αἱρετὸν ἔχοντες, ἀφ᾽ ὧν οἱ κατὰ μέρος φύονται βίοι ἄπειροι περὶ τὴν γένεσιν διαιρούμενοι· περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖ πολυπραγμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτοὺς μεθιέντας χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

42a.2 · Further standards and countless lives I.49.42a.2

according to Herillus, for knowledge; according to Ariston, for indifference; according to Democritus, for decorum; and according to others, for some portion of nobility. Or they find what is choiceworthy in freedom from disturbance, according to Hieronymus, or in other modes of conduct. From these arise the particular lives, divided without limit within becoming. We need not investigate them busily, but may let them run on into infinity and bid them farewell.[1502]

1502. The printed euschēmosynē means decorum or propriety; Meineke's proposed euthymosynē, cheerfulness, is not substituted for it. Aochlēsia is freedom from disturbance or trouble. The apparatus questions the construction with echontes, "having," and the English completes its contextual sense provisionally as finding what is choiceworthy in the listed modes. The final dismissal of limitless particulars belongs to the excerpt's author.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.1 · Ἐν ταὐτῷ I.49.43.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ θανάτου.

Ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τὸν τῇδε βίον ἡ τελευτὴ συμπίπτῃ, τί ποτε συμβαῖνόν ἐστι; Πότερον ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γενέσει προϋπῆρχεν ἢ συνυφίστατο ἢ ὑστέρα πως ἐπεγίγνετο τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους αἱρέσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν προφθείρεται τοῦ σώματος ἢ συναπόλλυται αὐτῷ ἢ καὶ διαμένει καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἔξοδον; Τὸ μὲν οὖν πᾶν κεφάλαιον τοιοῦτον·

43.2 I.49.43.2

μέρη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὰ εἴδη διαίρεσις δέχεται πολλὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις· ἆρά γε πνιγμῷ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν ἀποκλειομένων τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐκτὸς πνεῦμα, ἢ ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παρειμένου, ἢ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐναποσβεννυμένου πως εἰς τὰ εἴσω τὰ ζῶντα πρότερον εἰσαῦθις ἀποθνῄσκει; Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτως γίγνεται ὁ θάνατος, προαναιρεῖται ἢ συναναιρεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ Κουρνοῦτος οἴεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.1 · On death: the central question I.49.43.1

In the same work: on death.

When death comes after life here, what is it that happens? Just as, according to the different schools, soul pre-existed bodies at their coming-to-be, came into existence along with them, or somehow arose in them afterward, does it likewise, in dying, perish before the body, perish together with it, or remain on its own after its departure from here? Such, then, is the question as a whole;[1503]

43.2 · Bodily processes and Cornutus I.49.43.2

its parts and division into kinds admit many disputes of this sort. Do things that previously lived then die through suffocation, when the air passages are prevented from receiving the breath outside; through the dissolution and slackening of tension; or through heat somehow being extinguished within? But if death occurs in this way, soul is destroyed before the body or together with it, as Cornutus thinks.[1504]

1503. The heading continues the work attributed to Iamblichus as On the Soul. The author sets accounts of soul's coming-to-be beside accounts of its fate at death, without declaring a strict one-to-one correspondence between the two lists. Haireseis here are philosophical schools or positions. The final clause introduces the more detailed subdivisions that follow.

1504. Arteriai is rendered "air passages" in this account of incoming breath, rather than automatically given the modern anatomical sense of arteries. Tonos is tension or sustaining tone. These are reported ancient explanations. The printed inward-extinguishing clause is compressed; the apparatus's proposal to add the onset of cold is not adopted. Cornutus' name is printed Kournoutos in Greek.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 383-384

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.3 I.49.43.3

Εἰ δὲ ὡς δύναμις ὑποκειμένου, ὥσπερ δὴ ἁρμονία λύρας ἢ τελειότης, προσαφίσταται τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἡ ψυχή, προφθείρεται μὲν οὐδαμῶς (οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ κινήσεως πρόεισιν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι), ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαίφνης εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι μεθίσταται ἀχράντως καὶ ἄνευ φθορᾶς, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἔστιν ἀθρόως οἷον ἀστραπῆς ἐκλαμπούσης.

43.4 I.49.43.4

Ἔσται δὴ οὖν τὸ μὲν ζῆν τὰ ζῷα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος· τὸ δὲ καλούμενον ἀποθνῄσκειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ ἔχεσθαι· ἧς παλαιοὶ Περιπατητικοὶ δόξης προεστήκασιν.

43.5 I.49.43.5

Εἰ δὲ παρέσπαρται μὲν καὶ ἔνεστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι καθαπερεὶ ἀσκῷ πνεῦμα, περιεχομένη ἢ συμμιγνυμένη πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγκινουμένη ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα διὰ τῶν θυρίδων φαινόμενα, δῆλόν που τοῦτο ὅτι ἔξεισιν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκβαίνειν διαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάννυται, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνονται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.3 · Sudden cessation without gradual decay I.49.43.3

But if soul departs from the body at death as a power of an underlying subject, like a lyre's attunement or a perfection, it does not perish beforehand at all, for it does not advance into non-being through a process of change. Instead, it passes suddenly into non-being, unaffected and without corruption, just as it also sometimes comes to be all at once, like a flash of lightning.[1505]

43.4 · Possessing or lacking the form of life I.49.43.4

Living beings will therefore live because they possess the form of life; what is called dying will result from its not being present or not being possessed. This is the view championed by the early Peripatetics.[1506]

43.5 · Departure and dispersal I.49.43.5

But if soul is scattered through and present in the body like breath in a skin bag, enclosed in it or mingled with it and moving within it like the motes in the air visible through windows, then this much is surely clear: it leaves the body, but in leaving it is dispersed and scattered, as Democritus and Epicurus declare.[1507]

1505. The comparison concerns a power dependent on a subject, not a separate object traveling elsewhere. The distinction is between gradual corruption and immediate cessation, not between mortality and immortality. "Unaffected" renders the printed achrantōs, literally unstained, Usener's correction of a transmitted reading meaning timelessly. The lightning comparison follows the printed correction eklampousēs.

1506. Eidos is the form of life in the reported account. The two negative descriptions are retained separately: absence of the form and failure to possess it. The attribution is to early Peripatetics collectively; the sentence does not name a particular author.

1507. The skin bag and airborne motes illustrate containment, mixture, and movement within a body. "Motes" translates xysmata, literally small scrapings or particles. Departure here is followed by dispersal; the author does not equate it with continued existence as an intact individual soul.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.6 I.49.43.6

* * τοὺς δὲ περὶ Πλωτῖνον τῆς στάσεως προϊσταμένους ἐκείνης τῆς χωριζούσης αὐτὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἢ καὶ ἀφιεῖσης εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούσης ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας, ἀφ᾽ ἧς πάλιν διττῆς δόξης γίγνεται διάκρισις.

43.7 I.49.43.7

Ἤτοι γὰρ λύεται ἑκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἀπεμερίσθη, ἢ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μένει ἀμετάβλητος, ὥσπερ ἡγεῖται Πορφύριος· ἢ καὶ χωρισθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἡ ὅλη ἄλογος ζωὴ μένει καὶ αὐτὴ διασῳζομένη ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἱερέων ἀποφαίνονται.

43.8 I.49.43.8

Κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὴ οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν μέσων οὐσιῶν ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος πολὺ διαφερόντως διατάττονται. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τῷ ὀργανικῷ συνοικίζουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.6 · A broken report about irrational powers I.49.43.6

* * the followers of Plotinus, who champion that position which separates them from reason, or releases them into becoming, or removes them from thought. From this position there arises a further twofold distinction of opinion.[1508]

43.7 · Dissolution, persistence, and preservation I.49.43.7

For either each irrational power is dissolved into the universal life of the whole from which it was divided off, or it remains as unchanged as possible, as Porphyry thinks; or again, after being separated from thought, the entire irrational life itself remains, preserved within the cosmos, as the most ancient of the priests declare.[1509]

43.8 · Intermediate substances I.49.43.8

In the same way, then, they also give widely differing accounts of the substances intermediate between soul and body. Some place soul itself directly within the organic body itself, as most Platonists do;[1510]

1508. The asterisks mark a gap before the accusative “the followers of Plotinus”; the English leaves the opening fragmentary rather than inventing a governing verb. “Them” has no explicit antecedent in the surviving opening. The irrational powers named in the next sentence provide context, but are not silently inserted here. Logos and dianoia are distinguished as reason and thought.

1509. The printed sequence gives three clauses joined as alternatives, although the preceding sentence calls the distinction twofold. Both features are retained without forcing the catalogue into a revised count. The apparatus discusses the second conjunction and the wording “as ... as possible.” No identity is supplied for the unnamed ancient priests.

1510. The discussion now concerns mediation between soul and body. Organikon denotes a body equipped with organs or instruments. The emphatic “soul itself” remains as printed, despite Heeren’s omission of the pronoun in the apparatus. The following account introduces coverings or vehicles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.9 I.49.43.9

οἱ δὲ μεταξὺ τῆς τε ἀσωμάτου ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀγγελιώδους αἰθέρια καὶ οὐράνια καὶ πνευματικὰ περιβλήματα περιαμπέχοντα τὴν νοερὰν ζωὴν προβεβλῆσθαι μὲν αὐτῆς φρουρᾶς ἕνεκεν, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ αὐτῇ καθάπερ ὀχήματα, συμμέτρως δ᾽ αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα συμβιβάζειν μέσοις τισὶ κοινοῖς συνδέσμοις αὐτὴν συνάπτοντα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

43.9 · Coverings and vehicles

I.49.43.9

others place ethereal, heavenly, and pneumatic coverings between the incorporeal soul and the angelic soul. Enveloping intellectual life, these coverings have been projected for its protection, serve it as vehicles, and also bring it into a proportionate association with the solid body, joining it by certain intermediate bonds shared with both.[1511]

1511. The construction is difficult. The printed “between the incorporeal soul and the angelic” leaves the second soul understood, while the conclusion concerns association with solid body. That wording is retained rather than silently replaced by a simpler soul-body contrast. The apparatus suggests a missing verb of placing and a relative pronoun; English supplies the former sense. Pneumatic coverings are coverings of pneuma, breath or spirit, as conceived in this account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.1 · Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου I.49.44.1

Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς βίβλου <τῆς> ἐπικαλουμένης Κόρης κόσμου.

Ταῦτα εἰποῦσα Ἶσις ἐγχεῖ ποτὸν Ὥρῳ γλυκὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἀμβροσίας, ὃ αἱ ψυχαὶ λαμβάνειν ἔθος ἔχουσιν <ἀπὸ> θεῶν, καὶ οὕτως τοῦ ἱερωτάτου λόγου ἄρχεται [Ἶσις]·

44.2 I.49.44.2

“Ἐπικειμένου, τέκνον Ὧρε, τῇ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσει πάσῃ τοῦ πολυστεφοῦς οὐρανοῦ καὶ κατ᾽ οὐδένα τόπον στερουμένου τινὸς ὧν νῦν ὁ σύμπας ἔχει κόσμος, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων συγκεκοσμῆσθαι καὶ πεπληρῶσθαι φύσιν πᾶσαν τὴν ὑποκειμένην· οὐ γὰρ δήπου δυνατὰ κοσμῆσαι τὰ κάτω τὸν ὕπερθεν διάκοσμον. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῖς κρείττοσι μυστηρίοις εἴκειν τὰ ἐλάσσονα. Κρείσσων δὴ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἡ τῶν μετεώρων ἐστὶ διάταξις καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἀσφαλής τε καὶ θνητῶν οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσα διανοίᾳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.1 · Isis begins the sacred account I.49.44.1

From Hermes Trismegistus, from the sacred book, <the one> called Korē kosmou.

Having said this, Isis first pours Horus a sweet drink of ambrosia, which souls are accustomed to receive <from> gods. In this way [Isis] begins the most sacred account:[1512]

44.2 · The order above and the world below I.49.44.2

“My child Horus, since the many-crowned heaven stands over the whole nature of things below and nowhere lacks anything that the entire cosmos now possesses, it is altogether necessary that the whole nature below should have been ordered and filled by the things above. Surely the things below cannot order the arrangement above them. The lesser mysteries must therefore yield to the greater. The ordering of things aloft is superior to what lies below, wholly secure, and beyond the grasp of mortal understanding.[1513]

1512. This is a new source attribution and a new narrative voice. The title Korē kosmou is retained in transliteration; Isis speaks to Horus within the attributed work. The opening “Having said this” refers to material preceding the excerpt. The supplied article in the heading and supplied preposition in the narrative are marked. The repeated name Isis is rejected by the edition and remains bracketed. The printed correction glyky makes “sweet” agree with “drink.”

1513. The unusual printed polystephous is rendered “many-crowned,” keeping the image of wreaths or crowns; the apparatus offers Lobeck’s alternative polyasterou, “starry,” which is not adopted. Mystēria is retained as “mysteries” in the hierarchy being described. The final dative dianoia belongs with “falling under” or coming within understanding, not with the following sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.3 I.49.44.3

Ἔνθεν ἐστέναξε τὰ κάτω, φόβον ἔχοντα, τὴν περικαλλῆ καὶ εἰς ἀεὶ διαμονὴν τῶν ἐπικειμένων. Ἦν γὰρ ἄξιον θεωρίας ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀγωνίας ὁρᾶν οὐρανοῦ κάλλος θεῷ καταφανταζόμενον τῷ ἔτι ἀγνώστῳ πλουσίαν τε νυκτὸς σεμνότητα, ἐλάττονι μὲν ἡλίου ὀξεῖ δὲ προσφορουμένην φωτί, τῶν τε ἄλλων κατὰ μέρος κινουμένων ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίων τακταῖς χρόνων κινήσεσι καὶ περιόδοις διά τινων κρυπτῶν ἀπορροιῶν τὰ κάτω συγκοσμούντων καὶ συναυξόντων.

44.4 I.49.44.4

Καὶ οὗτος φόβος μὲν ἐπάλληλος ζητήσεις τε ἄληκτοι, καὶ ἕως ὁ τῶν συμπάντων οὐκ ἐβούλετο τεχνίτης ἀγνωσία κατεῖχε τὰ ξύμπαντα· ὅτε δὲ ἔκρινεν αὐτὸν ὅστις ἐστὶ δηλῶσαι, ἔρωτας ἐνθουσίασε θεοῖς καὶ αὐγὴν ἣν εἶχεν ἐν στέρνοις πλείονα ταῖς τούτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίαις· ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν, εἶτα ἐπιθυμήσωσιν εὑρεῖν, εἶτα καὶ κατορθῶσαι δυνηθῶσι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.3 · Wonder and fear before heaven I.49.44.3

Hence the things below groaned, fearful before the surpassingly beautiful and everlasting endurance of the things above. For it was a sight calling for contemplation and anguish alike: the beauty of heaven made manifest by the god still unknown; the rich majesty of night, presented in a light weaker than the sun's, yet keen; and the other mysteries, moving individually in heaven, which through ordered movements and cycles of time, by certain hidden outflows, helped order and increase the things below.[1514]

44.4 · The creator awakens the desire to know I.49.44.4

There was fear upon fear, and searching without end. As long as the craftsman of all things did not will otherwise, ignorance held everything in its grasp. But when he decided to reveal who he was, he inspired the gods with longings and bestowed more fully upon their minds the radiance he held within his breast, so that they might first wish to seek, then desire to find, and finally be able to succeed.[1515]

1514. The lower realm is personified as fearful. The dative "by the god" is taken as the agent of the manifestation; the god remains unknown at this point in Isis' story. The printed prosphoroumenēn in the clause about night's light is difficult, and the apparatus offers alternatives. "Presented" is provisional, retaining both weaker light and its keenness. The final participles are expanded into a relative clause without making the hidden outflows visible objects.

1515. Technitēs, "craftsman," is the creator within the narrative. The English supplies "otherwise" after the incomplete expression of his will. The rough-breathed reflexive hauton follows the printed correction. The three stages remain distinct: willingness to seek, desire to find, and successful attainment. Augē, radiance, follows the correction printed in the edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.5 I.49.44.5

Τοῦτο δ᾽ ἄν, ὦ τέκνον ἀξιοθαύμαστον Ὧρε, οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ θνητῆς σπορᾶς ἐγεγόνει, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέπω, ψυχῆς δὲ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἐχούσης τοῖς οὐρανοῦ μυστηρίοις· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ὁ πάντα γνοὺς Ἑρμῆς· ὃς καὶ εἶδε τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ ἰδὼν κατενόησε καὶ κατανοήσας ἴσχυσε δηλῶσαί τε καὶ δεῖξαι. Καὶ γὰρ ἃ ἐνόησεν ἐχάραξε· καὶ χαράξας ἔκρυψε τὰ πλεῖστα σιγήσας ἀσφαλῶς καὶ λαλήσας, ἵνα ζητῇ ταῦτα πᾶς αἰὼν ὁ μεταγενέστερος κόσμου· καὶ οὕτως τοὺς συγγενεῖς θεοὺς δορυφορεῖν <εἰπὼν> ἀνέβαινεν εἰς ἄστρα.

44.6 I.49.44.6

Ἀλλ᾽ ἦν αὐτῷ διάδοχος ὁ Τάτ, υἱὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ παραλήπτωρ τῶν μαθημάτων τούτου, οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸς ὁ Ἰμούθης, Πανὸς καὶ Ἡφαιστοβούλης, ἄλλοι τε ὅσοι τῆς οὐρανίου θεωρίας πιστὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἔμελλον βουλομένης τῆς πάντων βασιλίδος ἱστορῆσαι προνοίας. Ἑρμῆς μὲν οὖν ἀπελογεῖτο τῷ περιέχοντι, ὡς οὐδὲ τῷ παιδὶ παρέδωκεν ὁλοτελῆ θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἔτι τῆς ἡλικίας νεοειδές·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.5 · Hermes records and conceals his knowledge I.49.44.5

This, my wondrous child Horus, could not have happened among mortal offspring, for they did not yet exist, but in a soul having sympathy with heaven's mysteries. Such was Hermes, who knew all things. He saw everything, understood what he saw, and through understanding gained the power to make it known and show it. What he understood he also engraved; and after engraving it he hid most of it, keeping secure silence and also speaking, so that every later age of the cosmos might search for these things. Thus, <having told> the gods of his own kin to stand guard, he ascended to the stars.[1516]

44.6 · Successors and knowledge withheld I.49.44.6

But he had a successor in Tat, both his son and the recipient of his teachings; before long there were also Asclepius Imouthes, son of Pan and Hephaestoboule, and all the others destined to learn the trustworthy exactness of heavenly contemplation, by the will of Providence, queen of all. Hermes, then, explained to the encompassing heaven that he had not even imparted the complete vision to his son, because of the boy's still youthful age;[1517]

1516. The statement belongs to Isis' account, which places this knowledge before mortal offspring. The grammatical move from "a soul" to Hermes is unfolded in English. "Silence and also speaking" preserves the printed conjunction and the tension between concealment and disclosure. The supplied eipōn is marked; the object of the gods' guarding is not specified, so the translation does not insert books or Hermes as that object.

1517. "Son of Pan and Hephaestoboule" follows the printed genitives Panos kai Hēphaistoboulēs; the parentage is uncertain, since the apparatus records "by Hephaestus's counsels" as a variant. Providence is personified as queen. "Encompassing heaven" interprets tō periechonti, literally "what encompasses," from the celestial context. Apologeisthai means explaining or defending one's conduct, not necessarily expressing regret.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.7 I.49.44.7

ἐμοὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνατολῆς γενομένης τοῖς πάντα βλέπουσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς θεωρήσαντι ἀειδῆ καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι βραδέως μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἦλθεν ἡ ἀκριβὴς διάγνωσις πλησίον τῶν Ὀσίριδος κρυφίων <Ἑρμῆν> ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα. [Ἐπικατευξάμενος δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους τούσδε εἰπὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀπῆλθεν.]

44.8 I.49.44.8

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καθῆκον ἀτελῆ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, ὦ τέκνον, ταύτην με καταλεῖψαι, εἰπεῖν δ᾽ ὅσα τὰς βίβλους κατατιθέμενος ἐξεῖπεν Ἑρμῆς. Ἐξεῖπε γὰρ οὕτως· Ὦ ἱεραὶ βίβλοι, τῶν ἀφθάρτων αἳ τετεύχατέ μου χειρῶν, ἃς τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας φαρμάκῳ χρίσας ἐπικρατῶ, ἀσαπεῖς παντὸς αἰῶνος καὶ ἄφθαρτοι διαμείνατε χρόνοις, ἀθεώρητοι καὶ ἀνεύρετοι γιγνόμεναι παντὶ τῷ τὰ γῆς ταύτης παροδεύειν μέλλοντι πεδία, ἄχρις οὗ γέρων οὐρανὸς συστήματα ὑμῶν ἄξια τεχνώσεται, ἃς ψυχὰς ὁ δημιουργὸς προσηγόρευσε.’

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.7 · The hidden symbols near Osiris I.49.44.7

but when my rising came, and with all-seeing eyes I contemplated the unseen things of the rising and examined them, precise knowledge came to me, slowly indeed, but nevertheless: <Hermes> had deposited the sacred symbols of the cosmic elements near the hidden things of Osiris. [After pronouncing a prayer over them and speaking these words, he departed into heaven.][1518]

44.8 · Hermes addresses the sacred books I.49.44.8

But it is not fitting, my child, for me to leave this promise unfulfilled. I must tell what Hermes said as he deposited the books. He spoke as follows: ‘O sacred books, fashioned by my immortal hands, which I hold in my power after anointing them with the drug of incorruptibility: remain free from decay for all eternity and imperishable through time, unseen and undiscovered by everyone who is to traverse the plains of this earth, until aged heaven fashions beings worthy of you, those whom the creator called souls.’[1519]

1518. This passage is textually difficult. Anatolē is rendered “rising” in both places without deciding on a particular astral or initiatory event. The masculine participles remain in the Greek although Isis is the narrative speaker; English first-person wording does not resolve that discrepancy. “Hidden things” keeps kryphia broad. Wachsmuth supplies Hermes and rejects the entire bracketed sentence as a reader’s anticipatory summary. Both editorial decisions are visible.

1519. Isis resumes after the rejected sentence and quotes Hermes’ address. Pharmakon is a drug or preparation; no recipe is supplied. “Beings” renders systēmata, organized formations. The Greek moves from that neuter noun to a feminine relative anticipating psychas, souls; English makes the referent explicit. The phrase about anointing follows Meineke’s correction printed in the text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.9 I.49.44.9

Τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν τὰς βίβλους [καὶ] τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ κατευξάμενος ἔργοις ἰδίαις τεμενίζεται ζώναις.

44.10 I.49.44.10

Ἱκανὸς δὲ ὁ μέσος ἤργει χρόνος <καὶ> ἐκέκρυπτο· καὶ ἡ φύσις, ὦ τέκνον, ἐτύγχανε στεῖρα, ἕως αὐτοὶ οἱ ἤδη περιπολεῖν τὸν οὐρανὸν κελευσθέντες <θεοὶ> τῷ πάντων θεῷ βασιλεῖ προσελθόντες τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἡσυχίαν ἀπήγγειλαν, καὶ ὅτι δέον ἐστὶ συγκοσμηθῆναι τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑτέρου τινός ἐστιν ἔργον ἢ αὐτοῦ· ‘καὶ δεόμεθά σου’, ἔλεγον, ‘τὰ νῦν ὄντα καὶ ὧν <τὰ> ὕστερον ἔχει χρείαν διάσκεψαι’.

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44.9 · The books are set apart I.49.44.9

After saying this [and] pronouncing a blessing upon his own works, he sets the books apart in a sacred enclosure with bands of his own.[1520]

44.10 · The gods ask for an ordered world I.49.44.10

A considerable interval of time lay idle, <and> the books remained hidden. Nature, my child, was barren, until the very <gods> already commanded to patrol heaven approached the god who is king of all and reported the stillness of existing things: everything needed to be ordered, and this was the work of no one else but him. ‘We beg you,’ they said, ‘consider what now exists and what <the things> to come will need.’[1521]

1520. The printed temenizetai suggests marking off a sacred precinct; zōnai are bands or girdles. The image is retained provisionally. The apparatus proposes alternative verbs for binding or encircling, which are not substituted here. English moves the rejected conjunction with the participial phrase while preserving its brackets. The books are the object of the main verb; his works are the recipients of the prayer.

1521. The three printed supplements are marked. The opening shifts from time as the subject of “lay idle” to an unexpressed subject of “remained hidden”; English understands the books from the preceding sentence. The text calls nature barren before narrating the appearance of personified Nature, and this sequence is preserved. The final supplied article substantivizes “later” as later things.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.11

I.49.44.11

Ταῦτα εἰπόντων ἐμειδίασεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ εἶπε Φύσιν εἶναι καὶ θῆλυ πάγκαλον χρῆμα ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ προῆλθεν, ὃ καὶ θεωρήσαντες οἱ θεοὶ κατεπλάγησαν. Καὶ ταύτην Φύσεως ὀνόματι ἐτίμησεν ὁ θεὸς ὁ προπάτωρ καὶ αὐτῇ προσέταξεν εἶναι γεννητικὴν καὶ ταῦτα ἔτι εἰς τὸ περιέχον ἀτενίσας ἐφώνησεν· ‘ἔστω πεπληρωμένος ὁ οὐρανὸς ἅπασιν ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ’. Εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἦν.

44.12

I.49.44.12

Ἡ δὲ Φύσις ἑαυτῇ λαλήσασα ἔγνω ὡς μὴ δέον αὐτήν ἐστι παρακοῦσαι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐντολῆς καὶ καλὴν Πόνῳ συνελθοῦσα θυγατέρα ἐποίησεν, ἣν Εὕρεσιν ἐκάλεσε. Τῇ δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐχαρίσατο <τὸ> εἶναι καὶ χαρισάμενος διέκρινε τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα καὶ ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτὰ μυστηρίων καὶ τῇ Εὑρέσει [τούτων] τὸ κατὰ τούτων ἐχαρίσατο ἡγεμονικόν.

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44.11 · Nature comes forth from the divine voice I.49.44.11

When they had said this, the god smiled and said that Nature should exist. A wholly beautiful female being came forth from his voice, and the gods were struck with wonder when they beheld her. The god, the forefather, honored her with the name Nature and commanded her to be generative. Then, gazing into the encompassing expanse, he also proclaimed: ‘Let heaven, air, and ether be filled with all things.’ The god spoke, and it was so.[1522]

44.12 · Nature, Labor, and Discovery I.49.44.12

Nature spoke to herself and understood that she must not disobey her father’s command. Uniting with Labor, she produced a beautiful daughter, whom she called Discovery. To her the god granted <the gift of> being; having granted it, he differentiated the things already created and filled them with mysteries. To Discovery [of these things] he granted authority over them.[1523]

1522. The feminine personification is explicit, although chrēma, “being” or “thing,” is grammatically neuter. Physis is now her bestowed name. The text assigns her the capacity to generate and then commands the filling of heaven, air, and ether. The terse closing statement preserves the narrative’s correspondence between divine speech and actuality.

1523. Ponos and Heuresis are rendered as personified Labor and Discovery, preserving the relationship described in the story. The supplied Greek article before “being” is represented by the marked phrase “the gift of.” The rejected toutōn, “of these things,” remains bracketed; its rejection avoids a repetition before the following “over these things.” Authority translates hēgemonikon here, rather than importing a separate theory of a ruling faculty.

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44.13 I.49.44.13

Αὐτὸς δ᾽ οὐκέτι βουλόμενος ἀργὸν τὸν ὑπεράνω κόσμον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πνευμάτων πληρῶσαι δοκιμάσας τοῦτον ὡς μὴ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀκίνητα καὶ ἀργὰ μένῃ, οὕτως εἰς ταῦτα ἤρξατο, τεχνιτείαις οὔσαις πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἰδίου ἔργου γένεσιν χρησάμενος ἱεραῖς. Πνεῦμα γὰρ ὅσον ἀρκετὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου λαβὼν καὶ νοερῷ τοῦτο πυρὶ μίξας ἀγνώστοις τισὶν ἑτέραις ὕλαις ἐκέρασε·

44.14 I.49.44.14

καὶ ταῦτα ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ μετὰ τινων ἐπιφωνήσεων κρυπτῶν ἑνώσας τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εὖ μάλα διεκίνησε κρᾶμα, ἕως ἐπεγέλασέ τις ὕλη τῷ μίγματι λεπτοτέρα τε καὶ καθαρωτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ διαφανεστέρα ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, διειδὴς δὲ ἦν αὕτη, ἣν δὴ καὶ μόνος ὁ τεχνίτης ἑώρα.

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44.13 · Breath, intellectual fire, and hidden materials I.49.44.13

He himself no longer wished the world above to be idle, but resolved to fill it with spirits, so that its particular parts should not remain motionless and idle. Thus he began this work, using sacred arts for the production of his own creation. Taking a sufficient quantity of his own breath, he mixed it with intellectual fire and blended it with certain other, unknown materials;[1524]

44.14 · A subtler substance appears I.49.44.14

and, uniting each with the other amid certain secret invocations, he stirred the entire compound thoroughly, until a substance smiled forth upon the mixture, subtler, purer, and more transparent than the materials from which it arose. This substance was translucent, and the craftsman alone could see it.[1525]

1524. Pneumata is rendered “spirits” in the first clause and pneuma as “breath” in the mixture, retaining the shared word’s role across the passage. “Intellectual fire” follows the printed noerōi. The apparatus questions the repeated explanation about inactivity and the wording about sacred arts, but the print does not bracket those clauses; they remain. The other materials are explicitly unknown, and no ingredients are invented.

1525. The personifying “smiled forth” preserves epegelase rather than replacing it with a technical description of separation. Hylē denotes the resulting substance as well as the preceding materials. Transparency and visibility only to the craftsman are both stated in the narrative; the translation does not explain away their conjunction.

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44.15 I.49.44.15

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔτε ὡς ἐκ πυρὸς καιομένη διετήκετο, οὔτε μὴν ὡς ἐκ πνεύματος τελεσιουργηθεῖσα ἔψυχεν, ἀλλά τινα ἰδιογενῆ καὶ οἰκείαν εἶχε τὴν τοῦ κράματος σύστασιν ἰδιότυπόν τε καὶ ἰδιοσύγκριτον, ἐν<θεν> δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐφημοτέρου ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα ἐνεργείας ψύχωσιν ὁ θεὸς ἐκάλεσε τὴν σύστασιν.

44.16 I.49.44.16

Ἐξ οὗ δὴ ἐπιπάγου μυριάδας ψυχῶν ἱκανὰς ἐγενεσιούργησε, τὸ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κράματος ἐπανθοῦν πρὸς ὃ θέλει πλάσσων εὐτάκτως τε καὶ συμμέτρως, μετ᾽ ἐμπειρίας καὶ λόγου τοῦ καθήκοντος, ὡς μηδέ τι διαφέρειν αὐτὰς ἑαυτῶν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον,

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44.15 · The compound receives the name psychōsis I.49.44.15

Since it neither melted as though burning from fire nor brought coolness as though perfected from breath, but had a constitution of the mixture peculiar to itself and its own, with its own form and composition, <hence> the god named its constitution psychōsis, both from the more auspicious name and from its corresponding activity.[1526]

44.16 · The fashioning of many souls I.49.44.16

From this congealed substance he brought into being many myriads of souls, shaping what flowered forth from the compound itself toward what he wished, in order and due proportion, with experience and the fitting measure, so that it was necessary for them not to differ at all from one another;[1527]

1526. Psychōsis evokes both the making of soul, psychē, and the preceding verb psychein, to cool; the Greek name is retained so that the wordplay remains available. The active epsychen is rendered “brought coolness,” not made passive. Wachsmuth prints a partial-word restoration en<then>, “hence”; English marks the entire resulting word and records that difference here. The unusual comparison “more auspicious” is retained without supplying an unexpressed alternative name.

1527. Epipagos suggests a substance formed or set upon the mixture; “congealed substance” remains an interpretive rendering. The last clause is corrupt according to Wachsmuth: he suggests ēdē ti, “already in some respect,” for mēde ti, “not at all.” The English deliberately retains the printed negative, which conflicts with the differentiated products in the next sentence, rather than silently adopting that conjecture.

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44.17

I.49.44.17

ἐπειδήπερ τὸ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξατμιζόμενον ἄνθος οὐκ ἦν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον καὶ πληρέστερον ἦν τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῷ παντὶ καθαρώτερον, τὸ δεύτερον δὲ ἱκανῶς μὲν ἦν τοῦ πρώτου [τὸ] δεύτερον, πολλῷ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου [τὸ] μεῖζον. Καὶ οὕτως ἄχρι βαθμῶν ἑξήκοντα ὁ πᾶς ἀπήρτιστο ἀριθμός, πλὴν ὅτι γε πάσας ἀϊδίους εἶναι νομοθετήσας ἔταξεν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ μιᾶς οὐσίας, ἧς μόνος αὐτὸς εἴδη τελειοῖ.

44.18

I.49.44.18

Ταῖς δὲ καὶ τμήματα καὶ ταμιεῖα ἐν μεταρσίῳ διέταξε τῆς ἄνω φύσεως [οὐρανοῦ], ὅπως τόν τε κύλινδρον περιστροβῶσι τάξει τινὶ καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ καθηκούσῃ καὶ τὸν πατέρα τέρπωσιν.

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44.17 · Sixty degrees and a common immortality I.49.44.17

since the bloom rising as vapor through the god's stirring was not uniform: the first was greater and fuller than the second and altogether purer, while the second was decidedly [the] second in rank to the first, but far [the] greater than the third. In this way the total number was completed down to sixty degrees, except that he decreed and ordained them all to be everlasting, as coming from one substance, whose forms he alone brings to perfection.[1528]

44.18 · The souls' appointed regions I.49.44.18

He also assigned them divisions and chambers in the lofty region of the nature above [of heaven], so that they might keep the cylinder revolving in a certain order and with fitting administration, and give delight to their father.[1529]

1528. The graded production is retained in explicit tension with the preceding negative clause. "Sixty" counts degrees or ranks, not individual souls. Both articles rejected by Heeren remain bracketed; their deliberately awkward English counterparts make the editorial treatment visible. In the final clause, eidē is read as "forms," the object of the printed teleioi, "brings to perfection," rather than confused with a verb meaning knows. All souls share the stated everlasting status despite their ranks.

1529. Tamieia are chambers or repositories. The rejected gloss "of heaven" remains bracketed. Kylindros is literally a cylinder or roller; the cosmic object is left in that form rather than replaced by a sphere. Oikonomia denotes orderly administration here. The passage assigns souls a celestial function as well as a location.

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44.19 I.49.44.19

Οὕτως δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ περικαλλεῖ τοῦ αἰθέρος στάσει καὶ τὰς τῶν ἤδη ὄντων μεταπεμψάμενος φύσεις, ‘ὦ’, φησί, ‘πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καὶ μερίμνης ἐμῆς, ψυχαί, καλὰ τέκνα, ἃ ταῖς ἐμαυτοῦ μαιωσάμενος χερσὶν ἤδη τῷ ἐμῷ καθιερῶ κόσμῳ, λόγων ἐμῶν ὡς νόμων τούτων ἐπακούσατε καὶ τόπου μηδενὸς ἄλλου θίγητε πλὴν τοῦ διαταγέντος ὑμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης.

44.20 I.49.44.20

εὐσταθησάσαις μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν οὐρανός τε καταμένει πάλιν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ διαταγεὶς ἀστερισμὸς θρόνοι τε ἀρετῆς πεπληρωμένοι· εἰ δέ τι νεώτερον παρὰ τἀμὰ πράξετε βουλεύματα, ἱερὸν ὑμῖν ὀμνύω πνεῦμα καὶ κρᾶμα τοῦτ᾽ ἀφ᾽ οὗπερ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα ψυχοποιούς τε ταύτας μου τὰς χεῖρας, ὡς οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δεσμὸν καὶ κολάσεις ὑμῖν τεχνιτεύσω.’

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.19 · The creator addresses his children

I.49.44.19

Then, in the surpassingly beautiful station of ether, having summoned also the natures of things already in being, he said: ‘O souls, beautiful children of my breath and my care, whom I have brought to birth with my own hands and now consecrate to my cosmos: heed these words of mine as laws, and touch no other place than the one assigned to you by my judgment.[1530]

44.20 · The promise and the threatened bond

I.49.44.20

If you remain steadfast, heaven will continue for you just as before, together with your appointed constellation and thrones filled with excellence. But if you undertake some innovation contrary to my plans, I swear to you by the sacred breath, by this compound from which I begot you, and by these soul-making hands of mine, that before long I shall fashion a bond and punishments for you.’[1531]

1530. The address begins a speech by the creator within Isis’ account. Maiōsamenos uses the language of assisting a birth; the hands are the creator’s own. The apparatus questions whether “souls” should be deleted, but it remains unbracketed in the printed text and is retained here. The command restricts their places, preparing the conditional threat that follows.

1531. “Innovation” renders ti neōteron, a departure from the appointed order in this context. The oath invokes the breath, compound, and hands already described in the making of souls. The printed singular desmon, “a bond,” is retained rather than the apparatus’s plural variant. This closes the creator’s speech, but Isis’ narrative and excerpt 44 continue on the next source page.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.21

I.49.44.21

Τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ θεός, ὁ κἀμοῦ κύριος, τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν στοιχείων συγγενῆ μίξας, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, καί τινας ὁμοίως κρυπτοὺς ἐπειπὼν λόγους, δυνατοὺς μέν, οὐ τοῖς πρώτοις δ᾽ ὁμοίους, εὖ τε κινήσας καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἐνθουσιάσας τῷ κράματι ἐπιπλέοντα ὁμοίως ἐπίπαγον εὐβαφῆ τε καὶ εὐπαγῆ γενόμενον ἔλαβε καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ ἀνθρωποειδῆ τῶν ζῴων διέπλασε. Τὸ δὲ τοῦ μίγματος λείψανον ταῖς ἤδη προκοψάσαις ψυχαῖς ἔδωκε.

44.22

I.49.44.22

Ψυχαῖς δὲ ταύταις ταῖς εἰς χωρία θεῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐγγὺς ἄστρων τόπους καὶ ἱεροὺς δαίμονας μετακεκλημέναις “πλάσσετε”, λέγων, “ὦ τέκνα, τῆς ἐμῆς φύσεως γεννήματα, δέχεσθε τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τὰ λείψανα καὶ ἑκάστη τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει πλασσέτω τι παραπλήσιον· παραθήσομαι δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν παραδείγματα”,

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44.21 · The creator shapes humanlike forms

I.49.44.21

Having said this, the god, who is my lord as well, mixed the remaining kindred elements, water and earth, and pronounced further words, likewise secret: powerful, certainly, but unlike the first. He stirred the mixture well and breathed life-giving inspiration into it. He then took a film that likewise floated upon it, well imbued and firmly set, and from this fashioned the humanlike forms among living creatures. He gave the remainder of the mixture to the souls that had already advanced.[1532]

44.22 · The souls receive a task

I.49.44.22

To these souls, summoned into the regions of gods, the places near the stars, and among sacred divine spirits, he said: “Shape things, my children, offspring of my nature. Receive the remnants of my art, and let each of you fashion something resembling her own nature. I shall also set these before you as models.”[1533]

1532. Isis continues her account. The Greek leaves the object of “life-giving” unstated; “inspiration” expresses the action of enthousiasas rather than inserting pneuma into the transcription. Epipagos is the congealed surface film already encountered in the making of souls. Eubaphēs, rendered “well imbued,” concerns its saturation or taking of a dye; it is not silently replaced with “well formed.” These humanlike forms precede the later construction of human bodies in the narrative.

1533. The construction places “sacred divine spirits” beside regions and places as a destination; “among” makes the sense possible in English without adopting the apparatus’s proposed genitive. The printed command plassete, “shape,” is retained even though Wachsmuth questions it and considers “take” or deletion. The feminine “her” follows the grammatical gender of each soul; it does not establish a biological sex.

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44.23 I.49.44.23

καὶ λαβὼν εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὸν ζῳδιακὸν συμφώνως ταῖς ψυχικαῖς κινήσεσι διέταξε κόσμον, πρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρωποειδέσι τῶν ζῳδιακῶν τὰ ἐξῆς ἀπαρτίσας οἷον ζῳδίοις, καὶ τὰς πανούργους ἐχαρίσατο δυνάμεις καὶ πάντεχνον πνεῦμα γεννητικὸν τῶν εἰς ἀεὶ μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι καθολικῶς πάντων.

44.24 I.49.44.24

Καὶ ἀπέστη ὑποσχόμενος τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῶν τὸ ἀόρατον πνεῦμα ἐπιζεῦξαι οὐσίαν τε ὁμογονίας ἑκάστῳ, ὅπως αὐτῷ [αὐτοῖς] ἕτερα γεννᾷ ὅμοια αὐτά τε οὐκέτι ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν <ἢ> ἃ ἔφθησαν ἐργάσασθαι.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.23 · The zodiac and generative powers I.49.44.23

Taking the zodiacal order in hand, he arranged it well and beautifully in accordance with the movements of souls. Beside the humanlike zodiacal figures he completed the succeeding ones as figures of living creatures, and bestowed powers capable of every work, together with an all-skilled breath capable of generating absolutely everything that was ever to come into being.[1534]

44.24 · A promise of continuing generation I.49.44.24

He withdrew, promising to join invisible breath to their visible works, and to each a substance of common generation, so that it might beget others like itself [themselves], and they would no longer have any need to make anything other <than> what they had already produced."[1535]

1534. Kosmos here is the zodiacal arrangement or order. The difficult phrase about completing the succeeding figures is translated provisionally; the printed oion, "as" or "as it were," remains represented. Panourgos can mean unscrupulous in other contexts, but here stands beside pantechnos and describes comprehensive productive ability. Pneuma is rendered "breath"; the recipients of the gifts are not explicitly restated in the clause.

1535. The visible works and invisible breath follow the printed correction; the transmitted alternative reverses the latter adjective. Homogonia suggests shared origin or like generation, here linked to reproduction. The singular "it" and subsequent plural "they" follow the shifting construction; the printed neuter auta most naturally points to the works, although the activity of making might suggest their makers. The English keeps the plural without settling that difficulty. The rejected plural pronoun and the supplied comparative conjunction remain marked. This closes Isis' present speech before Horus asks a question.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.25 I.49.44.25

“Τί οὖν, ὦ τεκοῦσα, ἐποίησαν αἱ ψυχαί;”

Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Τὸ κεκερασμένον, ὦ τέκνον Ὧρε, τῆς ὕλης λαβόμεναι κατενόουν πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προσεκύνουν κρᾶμα καὶ ὀπόθεν ἦν συμπεπλεγμένον ἐπεζήτουν. Τὸ δὲ ἦν αὐταῖς οὐκ εὔπορον ἐπιγνῶναι. Ἔνθεν δὴ καὶ ὅτι ἐπεζήτησαν ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ τῷ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποπέσωσι χόλῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ προσταχθέντα ἐτράπησαν.

44.26 I.49.44.26

Ἔνθεν ἐκ μὲν τῆς ἀνωτέρω ὕλης τῆς ὑπερβολῇ κοῦφον ἐχούσης τὸν ἐπίπαγον τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων γένος ἐμόρφουν· ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ ἡμιπαγοῦς ἤδη τοῦ κράματος γενομένου καὶ ἤδη τὴν στερεὰν πῆξιν λαβόντος τὸ τῶν τετραπόδων γένος ἔπλασσον, τὸ θ᾽ ἧττον κοῦφον καὶ ἑτέρας ὑγρασίας δεόμενον εἰς διάνηξιν, τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ψυχροῦ δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ καὶ ἤδη καταφεροῦς ὑπάρχοντος τὴν τῶν ἑρπετῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ φύσιν ἐκαινούργουν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.25 · Horus asks what the souls did

I.49.44.25

“What, then, mother, did the souls do?”

Isis said: “My child Horus, when they had taken the blended material, they first examined it, worshipped their father’s mixture, and sought to discover from what it had been compounded. But it was not easy for them to learn this. Then, because they had even made the inquiry, they feared falling under their father’s wrath and turned to carrying out his commands.[1536]

44.26 · Birds, quadrupeds, fish, and creeping creatures

I.49.44.26

From the upper material, whose surface film was exceedingly light, they formed the race of birds. Meanwhile, as the mixture became half congealed and had already acquired a solid consistency, they fashioned the race of quadrupeds; and from what was less light and required another moist medium for swimming, the race of fish. As the remainder was cold and already tended downward, the souls devised the nature of creeping creatures.[1537]

1536. Tekousa literally addresses the one who gave birth to the speaker. The sequence distinguishes examining the mixture, reverencing it, and investigating its composition. Their fear attaches to the inquiry itself, not merely to a failure to obtain an answer. Isis’ answer continues into the subsequent account of the souls’ work and disobedience.

1537. The account associates kinds of animals with successive properties of the mixture. Its “half congealed” and “already ... solid” descriptions are both retained rather than reconciled into a modern physical process. The fish clause is elliptical: “from what” supplies its relation to the material, while the different moisture is the medium needed for swimming. Herpeta includes creeping or crawling creatures and is broader than the modern zoological category of reptiles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.27 I.49.44.27

Αὗται τε, ὦ τέκνον, ὡς τι πράξασαι ἤδη καὶ περίεργον ὡπλίζοντο τόλμαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ διατεταγμένα ἐποίουν καὶ ἤδη τῶν ἰδίων τμημάτων καὶ ταμιείων προήρχοντο καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς οὐκέτι ἤθελον τόπου μένειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐκινοῦντο καὶ τὸ [ἔτι] ἐπὶ μιᾶς μονῆς εἶναι θάνατον ἡγοῦντο.

44.28 I.49.44.28

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, φησίν, ὦ τέκνον, Ἑρμῆς, ὡς κἀμὲ [λέγων] καὶ τὸν τῶν ὅλων κύριον καὶ θεὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν ἃ πράσσουσιν, κόλασιν δὲ αὐταῖς ἐπεζήτει καὶ δεσμόν, ὃν τλημόνως ὑπομενοῦσι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔδοξε τῷ πάντων ἡγεμόνι καὶ δεσπότῃ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σύστημα τεχνήσασθαι, ὅπως ἐν τούτῳ τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν διαπαντὸς γένος κολάζηται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.27 · The souls leave their appointed places I.49.44.27

These souls, my child, as though they had now accomplished something, armed themselves with meddlesome boldness and acted contrary to the commands. They began to leave their own divisions and chambers, no longer wished to remain in one place, and kept moving, regarding existence [still] in a single abode as death.[1538]

44.28 · Human embodiment is devised as punishment I.49.44.28

Concerning this, my child, Hermes says: "Just as what they were doing did not escape me [saying], neither did it escape the lord and god of all things. He sought a punishment for them, and a bond they would endure in misery. The ruler and master of all therefore resolved to devise the human constitution, so that within it the race of souls might continually undergo punishment."[1539]

1538. The printed sequence around ti ... kai periergon is awkward. The translation takes the accomplishment as the ground for their boldness and periergon with tolman; another attachment could make the accomplishment itself meddlesome. The rejected eti, "still," remains bracketed. Their identification of staying in one abode with death belongs to the souls' perspective, not to a definition asserted by the translator.

1539. The opening report is grammatically rough and shifts into Hermes' first person, "me." English separates the report into sentences; the rejected legōn, "saying," is kept as a visible fragment. Systēma denotes the human composite or constitution, here the means of binding souls. Diapantos is rendered "continually"; the later promise of release should not be suppressed by turning this into an explicit claim that each individual is imprisoned forever.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.29

I.49.44.29

Τότε δὴ μεταπεμψάμενος ἐμέ, φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, εἶπεν· “Ὦ ψυχῆς ἐμῆς ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς ἱεροῦ ἐμοῦ νοῦ, ἄχρι ποῦ στυγνὴ φύσις ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁρᾶται; ἄχρι πότε τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα ἀργὰ μενεῖ καὶ ἀνεγκωμίαστα; ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δή μοι τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὺς πάντας ἤδη”, εἶπεν ὁ θεός, ὦ τέκνον, ὥς φησιν Ἑρμῆς. Οἱ δὲ <ὡς> ἦλθον πρὸς ἐπίταγμα, “ἀπίδετε”, εἶπεν, “εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ χαμαί”. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τάχει καὶ εἶδον καὶ ἐνόησαν ἃ ἐβούλετο ὁ δυνάστης. Καὶ εἰπόντι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως συνήδοντο, ὅτι παρ᾽ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τι δυνατός ἐστι παρασχεῖν τοῖς μέλλουσι γίγνεσθαι.

44.30

I.49.44.30

Ἔλεγεν Ἥλιος· “ἐπὶ πλέον λάμψω”. Ὑπισχνεῖτο Σελήνη τὸν μετὰ τὸν ἥλιον δρόμον φωτίσαι· ἔλεγε καὶ προπεπαιδοποιηκέναι Φόβον καὶ Σιγὴν καὶ Ὕπνον καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι πανωφελῆ Μνήμην. Κρόνος ἀπήγγειλεν ἤδη πατὴρ γεγονέναι καὶ Δίκης καὶ Ἀνάγκης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.29 · The gods assemble to prepare human life

I.49.44.29

"Then," says Hermes, "he summoned me and said: 'Soul of my soul, and mind of my sacred mind, how long is the nature of things below to be seen in gloom? How long will what has already come into being remain idle and unpraised? Come, bring me all the gods in heaven now.'" This is what the god said, my child, according to Hermes. <When> they came at his command, he said, "Look upon the earth and everything on the ground." They quickly saw and understood what the sovereign wished. When he spoke of the creation of human beings, they shared his pleasure, because he could provide those about to come into being with something from each one of them.[1540]

44.30 · Gifts of Sun, Moon, and Cronus

I.49.44.30

The Sun said, "I shall shine more brightly." The Moon promised to illuminate the course after the Sun; she also said that she had already brought forth Fear, Silence, Sleep, and Memory, which would be of universal benefit to them. Cronus announced that he had already become the father of both Justice and Necessity.[1541]

1540. Isis repeatedly identifies Hermes as her source, while quoting the creator within his report. The supplied hōs, "when," remains marked. The concluding construction has the sovereign as the understood subject of "could provide"; it does not explicitly say that each god can independently create the entire human being. The following speeches specify their several contributions.

1541. The heavenly bodies speak as divinities, and the named conditions or powers are personified offspring. The Moon's course is described relationally as following the Sun; the passage does not specify a modern orbital model. Panōphelē, "of universal benefit," follows the printed correction, against a transmitted reading meaning unprofitable. Necessity reappears with Love in the creator's reply to the souls.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.31

I.49.44.31

Ζεὺς ἔλεγεν· “ὡς μὴ παντάπασι πολεμήσαι τὸ φῦλον τὸ ἐσόμενον, ἤδη αὐτοῖς καὶ Τύχην καὶ Ἐλπίδα καὶ Εἰρήνην γεγέννηκα”. Ἄρης Ἀγωνίας ἔλεγεν ἤδη καὶ Ὀργῆς καὶ Ἔριδος πατὴρ εἶναι. Ἀφροδίτη οὐκ ἐμέλλησεν, ἀλλὰ εἶπεν· “ἐγὼ δὲ Πόθον αὐτοῖς, ὦ δέσποτα, καὶ Ἡδονὴν ἐπιζεύξω καὶ Γέλωτα· ὡς μὴ χαλεπωτάτην αἱ συγγενεῖς ψυχαὶ τὴν καταδίκην ὑπομένουσαι ἐπὶ πλέον κολάζωνται”.

44.32

I.49.44.32

Ἐτέρπετο, ὦ τέκνον, [ἐπὶ πλέον] Ἀφροδίτης ταῦτα λεγούσης. “Ἐγὼ δέ”, εἶπεν Ἑρμῆς, “καὶ ποιήσω τὴν <τῶν> ἀνθρώπων φύσιν εὐφυῆ καὶ σοφίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πειθὼ καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀναθήσω καὶ οὐ παύσομαι τῇ Εὑρέσει συνών, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ ζῳδίων τῶν ἐμῶν γινομένων ἀνθρώπων εἰσαεὶ τὸν θνητὸν βίον ὠφελήσω (ζῴδια γὰρ ἃ ἐμοὶ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ἔμφρονά γε καὶ νοερά) καὶ τότε πλέον, ὅταν ἡ ἐπικειμένη αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀστέρων κίνησις σύμφωνον ἔχῃ τὴν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν”.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.31 · Gifts of Zeus, Ares, and Aphrodite I.49.44.31

Zeus said, “So that the race to come may not be wholly at war, I have already brought forth Fortune, Hope, and Peace for them.” Ares said that he was already the father of Anguish, Anger, and Strife. Aphrodite did not delay, but said, “I shall join Longing, Pleasure, and Laughter to them, master, so that our kindred souls, enduring the harshest sentence, may not suffer still further punishment.”[1542]

44.32 · Hermes promises intelligence and discovery I.49.44.32

He took pleasure, my child, [still more] as Aphrodite said this. Hermes said: “I shall make the nature <of> human beings well endowed and bestow wisdom, self-control, persuasion, and truth upon them. I shall never cease to associate with Discovery. I shall also always benefit the mortal life of those born under my zodiacal signs, for the signs which the father and craftsman assigned to me are intelligent and endowed with mind. I shall do so still more when the movement of the stars above them brings the natural activity of each into accord.”[1543]

1542. Agōnia is rendered “Anguish,” while Eris remains the distinct power Strife. Aphrodite presents desire, pleasure, and laughter as relief for souls undergoing punishment. “Our” makes explicit the kinship implied by syngeneis in her speech; it is not an additional named group in the Greek. The sentence retains the severity of the sentence alongside her intention to alleviate suffering.

1543. The unnamed subject taking pleasure is understood as the god; the apparatus proposes making that subject explicit. The rejected repetition epi pleon remains bracketed. The supplied Greek article tōn is represented by the marked English “of.” Discovery is the personified Heuresis introduced earlier. The final astrological clause is compressed: “each” can concern the individual natural activities involved, and the translation avoids naming particular signs or supplying an astrological scheme absent from the text.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.33 I.49.44.33

Ἔχαιρεν ὁ θεός, ὁ δεσπότης κόσμου, ταῦτα ἀκούσας καὶ προσέταξε γίγνεσθαι φῦλον τὸ ἀνθρώπων. Ἐγὼ δέ, φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, ἐπεζήτουν ὕλῃ τίνι δέον ἐστὶ χρήσασθαι καὶ παρεκάλουν τὸν μόναρχον. Ὁ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς προσέταξε τοῦ κράματος τὸ λείψανον δοῦναι· καὶ λαβὼν εὖρον αὐτὸ παντελῶς ξηρόν. Ἔνθεν πολλῷ πλέονι τοῦ δέοντος ἐχρησάμην κατὰ μῖξιν ὕδατι [ὡς τὴν τῆς ὕλης σύστασιν νεαροποιήσασθαι], ὡς ἔκλυτον παντάπασιν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸ πλασσόμενον εἶναι, ὡς μὴ πρὸς τῷ συνετὸν εἶναι ἔτι καὶ δυνάμεως ᾗ πεπληρωμένον.

44.34 I.49.44.34

Ἔπλασα καὶ καλὸν ὑπῆρχε καὶ ἐτερπόμην βλέπων μου τὸ ἔργον καὶ κάτωθεν ἐπεκαλεσάμην τὸν μόναρχον θεωρῆσαι. Ὁ δὲ καὶ εἶδε καὶ ἐχάρη καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐκέλευσεν ἐνσωματισθῆναι. Αἱ δὲ τότε πρῶτον στυγνάσασαι <ἐστέναζον> κατακρίτους ἑαυτὰς μαθοῦσαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.33 · Hermes prepares the material for bodies I.49.44.33

The god, the master of the cosmos, rejoiced to hear this and commanded the human race to come into being. “I,” says Hermes, “sought to know what material I should use, and appealed to the sole ruler. He commanded the souls to give me the remainder of the mixture. When I received it, I found it completely dry. I therefore used far more water than was needed in the blending [so as to make the material’s consistency fresh again], so that what was being fashioned would be utterly slack, weak, and powerless, and would not, in addition to being intelligent, also be filled with strength.[1544]

44.34 · The souls learn that they are condemned I.49.44.34

I fashioned it, and it was beautiful. I took pleasure in seeing my work, and from below called upon the sole ruler to behold it. He saw it and rejoiced, and commanded the souls to enter bodies. Then for the first time they became dismayed and <groaned>, learning that they had been condemned.”[1545]

1544. The deliberately excessive water explains the weakness of the embodied creature in this narrative. The entire explanatory clause about refreshing the material is rejected in the edition and remains bracketed. Eklyton describes looseness or lack of tension; the translation preserves its distinction from weakness and lack of power. This is Hermes’ account of construction, not a statement of modern physiology.

1545. The creator’s pleasure in the work and the souls’ distress at embodiment are distinct responses. The main verb “groaned” is supplied by Wachsmuth and remains marked in both languages. The reported first-person account of Hermes ends here in the English punctuation; Isis next introduces the lament as a sacred teaching passed through a succession of recipients.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.35 I.49.44.35

Ἐθαύμασα οὖν καὶ τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν λόγους. Πρόσεχε, τέκνον Ὧρε, κρυπτῆς γὰρ ἐπακούεις θεωρίας, ἧς ὁ μὲν προπάτωρ Καμῆφις ἔτυχεν ἐπακούσας παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἔργων ὑπομνηματογράφου, <ἐγὼ δὲ> παρὰ τοῦ πάντων προγενεστέρου Καμήφεως, ὁπότ᾽ ἐμὲ καὶ τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι ἐτίμησε· νῦν δὲ αὐτὸς σὺ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

44.36 I.49.44.36

Ὅτε γάρ, ὦ θαυμαστὲ παῖ μεγαλόδοξε, ἔμελλον ἐγκατακλείεσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ μέν γε αὐτῶν αὐτὸ μόνον ὠδύροντο καὶ ἐστέναζον, καθ᾽ ὅνπερ τρόπον τῶν γεγονότων θηρίων τὰ ἐλεύθερα δουλοῦσθαι πονηρῶν μελήσει τῆς συνήθους τε καὶ φίλης ἀποσπώμενα ἐρημίας μάχεσθαι καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοεῖν πρὸς τοὺς κρατήσαντας αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ περιγενόμενα θανάτῳ παραδώσουσι τοὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβαλόντας·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.35 · The transmission of a secret teaching I.49.44.35

I marveled, then, also at the words of the souls. Attend, my child Horus, for you are hearing a secret teaching. The forefather Kamēphis received it from Hermes, the recorder of all deeds, <and I> from Kamēphis, who came before them all, when he also honored me with the perfect black ink. Now you yourself receive it from me.[1546]

44.36 · The souls resist like captive wild creatures I.49.44.36

For when they were about to be shut within bodies, my wondrous child of great renown, some of them did nothing but lament and groan. They were like free wild creatures, whom wicked people will take care to enslave: torn from their familiar and beloved solitude, they fight, rebel, and refuse agreement with their captors; and if they happen to gain the upper hand, they will even put to death those who laid hands upon them.[1547]

1546. The supplied “and I” clarifies the chain Hermes, Kamēphis, Isis, Horus. The Greek names Kamēphis and uses the genitive Kamēpheōs; no further identification is imposed. The expression teleion melan is literally “perfect black.” “Ink” follows Wachsmuth’s apparatus, which understands the ink used for Hermes’ secret books; the English does not turn the phrase into an independently attested ritual title. Theōria is the secret contemplation or teaching being transmitted.

1547. The comparison is badly disjointed in Greek, especially the sequence “to be enslaved ... it will be a concern ... to fight.” English gives its provisional sense in clauses while retaining capture, resistance, and possible killing of captors. The printed ponērōn is understood as wicked people, rather than silently adopting the apparatus’s proposed adverbs or an alternative adjective. No missing sentence is supplied to repair the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.37 I.49.44.37

αἱ δὲ πλέον ἔτριζον δίκην ἀσπίδων, ὀξὺ δὲ κώκυσασα ἑτέρα καὶ πρὸ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὰ κλαύσασα καὶ πολλάκις ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω τοὺς ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχουσα μεταφέρουσα ὀφθαλμούς·

44.38 I.49.44.38

“Οὐρανέ, τῆς ἡμετέρας”, εἶπεν, “ἀρχὴ γενέσεως, αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ τοῦ μονάρχου θεοῦ χεῖρές τε καὶ ἱερὸν πνεῦμα, περιλαμπῆ τε, ὀφθαλμοὶ θεῶν, ἄστρα καὶ φῶς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀκοπίαστον, τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς σύντροφα, ὧν ἁπάντων ἀποσπώμεναι ἄθλια πάσχομεν, πλέον δ᾽ ὅτι ἀπὸ μεγάλων τε καὶ λαμπρῶν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ περιχύματος καὶ πλουσίου πόλου καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας μετὰ θεῶν πολιτείας εἰς ἄτιμα καὶ ταπεινὰ οὕτως ἐγκατειρχθησόμεθα σκηνώματα· τί ταῖς δυστήνοις ἡμῖν ἀπρεπὲς οὕτως πέπρακται; τί τῶν κολάσεων τούτων ἄξιον;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.37 · One soul speaks after weeping

I.49.44.37

Others hissed all the more, like asps. Another wailed sharply, wept at length before speaking, and repeatedly turned upward and downward the eyes she happened to possess:[1548]

44.38 · The loss of the heavenly dwelling

I.49.44.38

“Heaven,” she said, “origin of our birth; ether and air; hands and sacred breath of the sole-ruling god; radiant stars, eyes of gods; tireless light of Sun and Moon, companions of our beginning: torn away from you all, we suffer miserably. Worse still, from things great and splendid, from the sacred surrounding expanse and rich vault of heaven, and from our blessed life with the gods, we shall be shut within dwellings so dishonored and low. What have we poor creatures done that is so unseemly? What deserves these punishments?[1549]

1548. The printed aspidōn supplies the comparison with asps; the hissing or creaking sense of etrizon suits it. The following eye clause remains awkward because these souls are not yet embodied. “The eyes she happened to possess” keeps that wording without inventing bodily organs or silently adopting the apparatus’s proposed relative-pronoun correction. The colon carries the suspended construction into her speech.

1549. The speaker invokes the places and powers associated with the souls’ origin. After “great and splendid,” the Greek has no noun; the apparatus proposes “thrones,” but that supplement is not printed and is not inserted here. Perichyma, a surrounding outpouring or expanse, is kept as an image rather than identified with an additional physical element. Politeia is their shared mode of life with the gods. Skēnōmata, “dwellings,” anticipates bodies.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.39 I.49.44.39

ὅσαι τὰς δειλαίας ἡμᾶς ἁμαρτίαι περιμένουσιν· ὅσα διὰ τὰ πονηρὰ τῶν ἐλπίδων πράξομεν, ἵνα τῷ ὑδαρεῖ καὶ ταχὺ διαλύτῳ σώματι πορίζωμεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια· ὀφθαλμοὶ τὰς οὐκέτι τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχὰς χωρήσουσιν ἄλογοι, καὶ παντελῶς μικρὸν τῷ ἐν τούτοις ὑγρῷ [καὶ] κύκλῳ τὸν ἑαυτῶν πρόγονον οὐρανὸν ὁρῶσαι στενάζομεν ἀεί, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ οὐ βλέψομεν [ἔνθεν Ὀρφεύς·

τῷ λαμπρῷ βλέπομεν, τοῖς δ᾽ ὄμμασιν οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν]·

44.40 I.49.44.40

ἄθλιαι γὰρ κατεκρίθημεν καὶ τὸ βλέπειν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀντικρὺς ἐχαρίσθη, ὅτι χωρὶς τοῦ φωτὸς ἡμῖν τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ ἐδόθη· πόροι τοίνυν καὶ οὐκέτι εἰσὶν ὀφθαλμοί. ὡς δὲ καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν φυσώντων ἐν ἀέρι πνευμάτων ἀκούουσαι τλημόνως οἴσομεν, ὅτι μὴ συμπνέομεν αὐτοῖς. οἶκος ἡμᾶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μεταρσίου κόσμου τούτου ὁ βραχὺς περιμένει καρδίας ὄγκος·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.39 · The lament over bodily sight

I.49.44.39

How many errors await us wretched creatures! How much we shall do because of the wickedness of our hopes, to procure necessities for the watery body that is so quickly dissolved! Unreasoning eyes will contain souls that no longer belong to the god. Seeing our own forefather, heaven, as exceedingly small through the moist [and] circle within those eyes, we groan forever; and sometimes we shall not see at all [hence Orpheus:

We see by the bright light, but with our eyes we see nothing].[1550]

44.40 · The narrow instruments of embodied life

I.49.44.40

For we have been condemned in misery, and sight has not been granted to us outright, since we have not been given the power to see without light. They are therefore passages, no longer eyes. And how painfully we shall bear hearing our kindred breaths blowing in the air, because we do not breathe together with them! Instead of this world aloft, the small bulk of a heart awaits us as our house.[1551]

1550. The soul's complaint speaks of anticipated bodily limitations as well as present grief. The printed "no longer the god's" is retained, rather than adopting proposed rearrangements. "As exceedingly small" takes mikron with heaven, describing its apparent size through the bodily eye; the moist circle is the eye's seeing part. Both the rejected conjunction and the entire rejected Orpheus quotation remain bracketed. Wachsmuth's parenthetical reference reads "fragm. monad. 10 p. 504 Herm."; this editorial bibliography is recorded here, outside the Greek speech.

1551. The distinction between sight and mere poroi, passages or channels, belongs to the lament: bodily vision depends on external light. The printed phusōntōn is retained as "blowing," without changing it to a proposed form. Pneumata can evoke both breaths and spirits; "kindred breaths" preserves its connection with "breathe together." The heart is described as the soul's cramped house in this account, without endorsement of a modern anatomical claim.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.41 I.49.44.41

ἀεὶ δὴ ἐπιλήσας ἡμᾶς ἀφ᾽ ὧν εἰς οἷα κατέβημεν, ἀπόλυε τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι, δέσποτα καὶ πάτερ καὶ ποιητά, εἰ ταχέως οὕτως σῶν ἔργων ἠμέλησας· <ἢ> διάταξον ἡμῖν τινας ὅρους, ἔτι κἂν βραχέων ἡμᾶς ἀξίωσον λόγων, ἕως ἔτι δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ περιφανοῦς ἔχομεν βλέπειν κόσμου.”

44.42 I.49.44.42

Ἐπέτυχον, τέκνον Ὧρε, αἱ ψυχαὶ τάδε εἰποῦσαι, παρῆν γὰρ καὶ <ὁ> μόναρχος καὶ τάδε ἐπὶ τοῦ τῆς Ἀληθείας καθίσας θρόνου ταῖς δεηθείσαις ἐφώνησεν·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.41 · A plea for relief or conditions of release I.49.44.41

Make us forget forever from what heights into what condition we have descended, and release us from grief, master, father, and maker, if you have so quickly neglected your works. <Or> lay down some conditions for us; grant us at least a few words more, while we can still see throughout the whole resplendent cosmos."[1552]

44.42 · The ruler answers from Truth's throne I.49.44.42

The souls succeeded in their petition when they said this, my child Horus, for <the> sole ruler was also present. Seated upon the throne of Truth, he addressed the suppliants as follows:[1553]

1552. The printed epilēsas is Wachsmuth's correction and is taken causatively, "having made us forget"; English coordinates it with the appeal for release. The surrounding phrase "from what ... into what" is also textually difficult. The supplied "or" separates the pleas. Horoi are limits or conditions; the following divine speech explains the conditions of future embodiment and return. The first-person plural lets one soul voice the group's lament.

1553. Isis resumes the narrative before quoting the creator. The supplied article before "sole ruler" remains marked. Truth is personified as the owner of the throne. The success of the petition here introduces an answer and stated conditions; it does not mean that the souls are immediately exempted from embodiment.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.43 I.49.44.43

“Ἔρως ὑμῶν, ψυχαί, δεσπόσει καὶ Ἀνάγκη, οἵδε γὰρ μετ᾽ ἐμὲ πάντων δεσπόται τε καὶ ταξίαρχοι. Ψυχαὶ δέ, ὅσαι τὴν ἀγήρατόν μου σκηπτουχίαν θεραπεύετε, ἴστε ὡς ἕως μὲν ἀναμάρτητοί ἐστε, τὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οἰκήσετε χωρία· εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα τις ὑμῶν τινος ἐγγίσει μέμψις, θνητοῖς καὶ αὐταὶ προσμεμοιρασμένον χῶρον σπλάγχνοις καταδικασθεῖσαι ἐνοικήσετε. κἂν μὲν ᾖ ὑμῶν μέτρια τὰ αἰτιάματα, τὸν ἐπίκαιρον τῶν σαρκῶν σύνδεσμον καταλιποῦσαι, πάλιν ἀστένακτοι τὸν ἑαυτῶν οὐρανὸν ἀσπάσεσθε·

44.44 I.49.44.44

εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα τινῶν μειζόνων ἁμαρτημάτων ἔσεσθε ποιητικαί, οὐ μετὰ τέλους καθήκοντος τῶν πλασμάτων ἀπελθοῦσαι, οὐρανὸν μὲν οὐκέτι οἰκήσετε, οὐδ᾽ αὖ σώματα ἀνθρώπων, ζῷα δ᾽ ἄλογα μεταπλανώμεναι λοιπὸν διατελέσετε.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.43 · Love, Necessity, and the prospect of return I.49.44.43

“Love and Necessity will rule you, souls, for after me these are the masters and commanders of all. Souls who serve my ageless sovereignty, know that so long as you are without fault, you will inhabit the regions of heaven. But if blame should come upon any one of you, you too will be condemned to dwell in a place assigned within mortal entrails. If the charges against you are moderate, you will leave behind the temporary bond of flesh and once more embrace your own heaven without groaning.[1554]

44.44 · Greater faults and animal embodiments I.49.44.44

But if you commit greater transgressions, you will depart from the fashioned bodies without the fitting completion; you will no longer dwell in heaven, nor again in human bodies, but will thereafter continue wandering into irrational animals.”[1555]

1554. The compressed expression about an allotted place in mortal splanchna is rendered as dwelling within bodily inward parts. The address shifts from the assembled souls’ punishment to a general statement about fault and embodiment; the translation retains that shift. Epikairos describes the fleshly bond as temporary. Release in the case of lesser faults is explicit, qualifying the earlier statement that the race of souls would continually undergo punishment.

1555. The departure clause is difficult. The translation retains the negative “without a fitting completion” and the printed apelthousai, “having departed,” rather than silently replacing them with a claim about a normal or appointed death. Plasmata are the fashioned bodies in context. The subsequent exclusion from both heaven and human bodies is explicit. The speech closes here; the creator speaks again immediately afterward in the continuing excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.45 I.49.44.45

Τάδε εἰπών, ὦ τέκνον Ὧρε, πάσαις αὐταῖς ἐχαρίσατο πνεύματα καὶ πάλιν ἐφώνησεν· “Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐνομοθέτησα τὰς μεταβολὰς ὑμῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἴ τι διαπράξετε ἄσχημον, οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴ τι βουλεύσεσθε τῆς ἑαυτῶν γενέσεως ἄξιον· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ οὔτις ἕτερος ἐπόπτης αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπίσκοπος ἔσομαι.

44.46 I.49.44.46

ἐπίγνωτε δὴ οὖν ὡς διὰ τὰ πρόσθεν πραχθέντα ὑμῖν κόλασιν ταύτην ὑπομένετε τὴν ἐνσωμάτωσιν. ἡ τοίνυν διαφορὰ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ὑμῖν ἔσται ἡ τῶν σωμάτων, ὡς ἔφην, διαφορά, εὐεργεσία δὲ καὶ <ἡ> πρόσθεν εὐδαιμονία * * ἡ διάλυσις. τυφλωθήσεται δ᾽ ὑμῶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἐάν τι ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ δόξητε πράσσειν, ὥστε φρονεῖν τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὴν μὲν κόλασιν ὡς εὐεργεσίαν ὑπομένειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὰ βελτίονα μεταβολὴν ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ὕβριν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.45 · The creator oversees the souls' changes I.49.44.45

Having said this, my child Horus, he bestowed breaths upon them all and spoke again: "I have not legislated your changes idly or at random. Just as they will be for the worse if you do something shameful, so they will be for the better if you resolve upon something worthy of your own origin. For I myself, and no other, shall be the observer and overseer.[1556]

44.46 · Rebirth, release, and distorted judgment I.49.44.46

Recognize, then, that you endure this punishment, embodiment, because of your earlier deeds. The difference in your rebirth will therefore be the difference of bodies, as I said; but release is a benefit and <the> former happiness * * . Your understanding will be blinded if you decide to do anything unworthy of me, so that you judge things contrariwise: you will undergo punishment as though it were a benefit, and regard a change for the better as dishonor and outrage.[1557]

1556. Isis introduces the creator's second reply. The printed plural pneumata is rendered "breaths," retaining the plurality rather than the apparatus's singular alternative. Metabolai, "changes," concerns the successive conditions or embodiments of souls. English supplies the verbal sense in the balanced clauses about worse and better; both actions and resolutions remain distinct. The following speech continues.

1557. Palingenesia is rebirth or renewed coming-to-be. The gap after "former happiness" remains visible. Wachsmuth suspects that words about dishonor and unhappiness have fallen out, but these are not inserted. English brings the printed subject "release" forward to make the surviving clause readable; the damaged relation of release, benefit, and former happiness remains provisional. The supplied article is marked. The reversal of judgment in the next sentence is explicit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.47 I.49.44.47

αἱ δικαιότεραι δ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον μεταβολὴν ἐκδεχόμεναι εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους βασιλεῖς δίκαιοι, φιλόσοφοι γνήσιοι, * * κτίσται καὶ νομοθέται, μάντεις [οἱ] ἀληθεῖς, ῥιζοτόμοι γνήσιοι, ἄριστοι προφῆται θεῶν, μουσικοὶ ἔμπειροι, ἀστρονόμοι νοεροί, οἰωνοσκόποι σαφεῖς, ἀκριβεῖς θῦται καὶ ὁπόσοι ἐστὲ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἄξιαι·

44.48 I.49.44.48

εἰς δὲ πτηνὰ ἀετοί, διότι οὐδὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν οὔτε ἐκσοβήσουσιν οὔτε θοινήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πλησίον τούτων ζῷον ἕτερον ἀσθενέστερόν τι αὐτοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀφεθήσεται, ἐνδικωτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀετῶν φύσις μετελεύσεται·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.47 · Human lives allotted to more just souls I.49.44.47

Those among you who are more just and await the change into the divine will, among human beings, be just kings, genuine philosophers, * * founders and lawgivers, [the] truthful diviners, genuine gatherers of medicinal roots, excellent prophets of gods, experienced musicians, intelligent astronomers, clear-sighted observers of birds, exact practitioners of sacrifice, and all of you who are worthy of noble and good things;[1558]

44.48 · Eagles and the protection of weaker creatures I.49.44.48

among winged creatures, eagles, because they will neither drive away nor feast upon any of their own kind. Nor will another animal near them be allowed to wrong anything weaker than itself, for the more just nature of eagles will pursue the offender;[1559]

1558. The Greek changes from feminine souls to masculine names of human roles and ends with a second-person feminine clause. These shifts remain evident in English. A gap before “founders” and the rejected article before “truthful” are preserved. Rhizotomoi are literally root-cutters, here practitioners who gather medicinal roots; oiōnoskopoi read bird signs. The printed este, “you are,” is retained instead of the apparatus’s conjectured future. The list of animal embodiments follows the semicolon.

1559. The animal behavior belongs to the creator’s promised order in this account. The reflexive hautou refers to the other animal, not to the eagle. The printed comparative endikōtera means “more just”; the apparatus notes an alternative connected with avenging. “The offender” supplies the unstated object of meteleusetai, which can express pursuit or the exaction of a penalty. The two acts against their own kind, driving away and eating, remain separate.

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44.49 I.49.44.49

εἰς δὲ τετράποδα λέοντες, ἰσχυρὸν γὰρ τὸ ζῷον καὶ φύσεως ἔτυχεν ἀκοιμήτου τρόπον τινὰ καὶ φθαρτῷ σώματι τὴν ἀθάνατον γυμναζόμενον φύσιν (οὔτε γὰρ κάμνουσιν οὔτε κοιμῶνται)· εἰς δὲ ἑρπετὰ δράκοντες, δυνατὸν ὅτι τὸ ζῷον καὶ μακρόβιον ἄκακόν τε καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ὀπωσιοῦν καὶ τιθασευθήσεται καὶ ἰὸν οὐχ ἕξει, νεάσει δὲ καὶ γηράσαν, καθάπερ φύσις ἡ θεῶν·

44.50 I.49.44.50

ἐν δὲ νήχουσι δελφῖνες, συμπαθήσουσι γὰρ καὶ τοῖς εἰς πέλαγος ἐμπίπτουσιν οὗτοι καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔμπνοα διακομιοῦσιν εἰς γῆν, τῶν δὲ τελευτησάντων οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ποτὲ ἅψονται, καίτοι φιλοβρωτάτου πάντων ἐσομένου τοῦ τῶν ἐνύδρων γένους”. Τοσαῦτα ὁ θεὸς εἰπὼν ἄφθαρτος νοῦς γίγνεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.49 · Lions and serpents

I.49.44.49

among quadrupeds, lions, for the creature is strong and has received a nature that is in a way sleepless, exercising its immortal nature in a perishable body, since lions neither grow weary nor sleep; among creeping creatures, serpents, because the creature is powerful, long-lived, harmless, and in some fashion friendly to human beings. It will also be tamed and have no venom, and even after growing old it will become young again, like the nature of the gods;[1560]

44.50 · Dolphins and the close of the divine speech

I.49.44.50

among swimming creatures, dolphins, for these will also show fellow-feeling toward those who fall into the sea. They will carry the living ashore and will never touch the dead at all, although the race of aquatic creatures will be the most voracious of all.” Having said this, the god becomes incorruptible mind.[1561]

1560. Drakontes are large serpents in this catalogue. The claims that lions do not sleep and that these serpents lack venom are preserved as features of the passage’s exemplary animals. “In some fashion” renders the printed hopōsioun without removing its qualification. The promise of renewed youth follows the printed neasei, supported in the apparatus by comparison with Aristotle; no account of how the renewal occurs is supplied here.

1561. The dolphin example completes the catalogue with rescue of the living and abstention from the dead. Philobrōtatou follows the edition’s correction, “most voracious.” The final sentence says that the god “becomes incorruptible mind.” Its wording is retained without explaining it away as merely falling silent, becoming invisible, or returning to a prior state. Isis’ outer narrative continues.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.51 I.49.44.51

Τούτων οὕτως γενομένων, τέκνον Ὧρε, ἰσχυρότατόν τι ἀπὸ γῆς ἀνίσταται πνεῦμα, ἀκατάληπτον μὲν περιοχῇ σώματος, δυνάμει δὲ φρονήσεως ὑπάρχον, ὃ καίπερ εἰδὸς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπυνθάνετο, τὸ σῶμα μὲν κατὰ τύπον ἀνδρὸς περικείμενον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σεμνοπρεπὲς ὄν, ὑπερβολῇ δὲ ἄγριον καὶ πλῆρες φόβου, τὸ δὲ παραυτίκα τὰς ψυχὰς εἰσιούσας εἰς τὰ πλάσματα θεωρῆσαν, “τίνες”, ἔλεγεν, “οὗτοι καλοῦνται, ὦ Ἑρμῆ, θεῶν ὑπομνηματογράφε;” Εἰπόντος δέ, “ἄνθρωποι, <ὦ Μῶμε>”,

44.52 I.49.44.52

“Ὦ Ἑρμῆ”, ἔφη, “τολμηρὸν ἔργον ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, περίεργον ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ λάλον γλώσσῃ, ἀκουστικὸν μέλλοντα εἶναι καὶ τῶν αὐτῷ μὴ προσηκόντων, λίχνον ὀσφρήσει καὶ μέχρι πάντων τῷ τῆς ἁφῆς ἁπτικῷ μέλλοντα καταχρᾶσθαι. τοῦτον ἀμέριμνον καταλεῖψαι κέκρικας, ὦ γενεσιουργέ, τὸν ὁρᾶν μέλλοντα τολμηρῶς τῆς φύσεως τὰ καλὰ μυστήρια; ἄλυπον ἐᾶσαι θέλεις τοῦτον καὶ μέχρι τῶν περάτων γῆς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ μελλήσοντα πέμπειν ἐπινοίας;

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.51 · Momus rises from the earth

I.49.44.51

When these things had happened, my child Horus, an exceedingly powerful spirit rose from the earth, beyond the grasp of bodily containment, yet existing as a power of understanding. Although it knew the matters about which it asked, it wore a body shaped like a man, beautiful and majestic, yet exceedingly wild and full of terror. Seeing the souls at that moment entering the fashioned bodies, it said, “What are these called, Hermes, recorder of the gods?” He replied, “Human beings, <Momus>.”[1562]

44.52 · Momus questions unchecked human curiosity

I.49.44.52

“Hermes,” he said, “it is a bold undertaking to make the human being: inquisitive with the eyes, talkative with the tongue, ready to listen even to things that do not concern him, greedy in smell, and ready to use the grasping power of touch upon everything. Have you resolved, maker of living things, to leave this creature free from care, when he will boldly look into nature’s beautiful mysteries? Do you wish to leave him without grief, when he will send his designs to the very ends of the earth?[1563]

1562. The printed ischyrotaton describes great power; the apparatus’s suggestion of an adjective meaning thin is not adopted. The construction moves awkwardly from a spirit beyond bodily containment to its wearing a body; both descriptions are retained. Eidos, “knowing,” and the participle for seeing follow printed corrections. The name Momus is supplied in Hermes’ reply and remains marked; the speaker is named explicitly later in the passage.

1563. Momus presents the senses as avenues of intrusive inquiry. The infinitive poiēsai is rendered as the undertaking of making a human; English does not silently change it into a past-tense accusation. The doubled language of touch, haphē and haptikon, is represented by “grasping power of touch.” Merimna and lypē remain distinct as care and grief. Epinoiai are designs, ideas, or inventions; the geographical reach is explicit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.53 I.49.44.53

ῥίζας φυτῶν ἀνασκάψουσιν ἄνθρωποι καὶ ποιότητα ἐξετάσουσι χυλῶν, λίθων φύσεις ἐπισκοπήσουσι καὶ διὰ μέσου ἀνατεμοῦσι τῶν ζῴων τὰ ἄλογα οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτούς, ὡς ἐγένοντο ἐξετάζειν θέλοντες, τολμηρὰς ἐκτενοῦσι χεῖρας καὶ μέχρι θαλάσσης καὶ τὰς αὐτοφυεῖς ὕλας τέμνοντες μέχρι καὶ τῶν πέραν διαπορθμεύσουσιν ἀλλήλους ἐπὶ ζήτησιν, καὶ τίς ἐνδοτέρω τῶν ἱερῶν ἀδύτων φύσις ὑπάρχει, τὰ μέχρις ἄνω διώξουσι, παρατηρῆσαι βουλόμενοι τίς οὐρανοῦ καθέστηκε κίνησις.

44.54 I.49.44.54

ἔτι μέτρια ταῦτα· λείπει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι πλὴν γῆς τόπος ἔσχατος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὴν ἐσχάτην τῷ θέλειν ἐρευνήσουσι νύκτα. μηδὲν οὖν ἐμπόδιον ἔχουσιν οὗτοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῆς ἀλυπίας ἀγαθῷ μυηθῶσι καὶ τοῖς χαλεποῖς μὴ βιασθέντες τοῦ φόβου κέντροις ἀμερίμνῳ βίῳ τρυφήσουσιν; εἶτα οὐ καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ περίεργον ὁπλισθήσονται τόλμαν οὗτοι; οὐκ ἀμερίμνους ἐκτενοῦσιν ἐπὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν;

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.53 · Plants, anatomy, navigation, and the heavens I.49.44.53

Human beings will dig up the roots of plants and examine the properties of their juices; they will investigate the natures of stones and cut open not only irrational animals but also themselves, wishing to examine how they came into being. They will stretch their daring hands even to the sea and, cutting naturally grown timber, ferry one another across to the lands beyond in pursuit of discovery. And what nature lies within the sacred inner sanctuaries: they will pursue things even to the heights, wishing to observe what movement has been established in heaven.[1564]

44.54 · The danger of a life without fear I.49.44.54

These things are still moderate, for nothing remains but earth's furthest place. Yet by sheer willing they will investigate even the uttermost night of these things. Do they then have no obstacle, but are to be initiated into the good of freedom from grief and, uncoerced by the harsh goads of fear, luxuriate in a life without care? Will they not then arm themselves with meddlesome boldness reaching even to heaven? Will they not stretch out their carefree souls even toward the elements?[1565]

1564. The list connects the examination of plants and stones, dissection, sea travel, and celestial observation. The phrase about the nature within sacred sanctuaries interrupts the construction; English preserves it as a suspended inquiry. Wachsmuth considers moving it earlier, after "wishing," but no such transposition is made here. Hylai are rendered as timber in the shipbuilding context. The text says "themselves," without specifying whether the human bodies dissected are living or dead.

1565. The sentence about "the uttermost night of these things" is difficult. The printed toutōn and tōi thelein are retained rather than replaced by the apparatus's suggestions about a terminus or poles. The clause does not securely identify a particular region or journey. The following questions express Momus's fear that painless human life would encourage encroachment. The grammatical shift between indicative and subjunctive is smoothed in English, with its warning preserved.

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44.55

I.49.44.55

δίδαξον ἐντεῦθεν ἐρᾶν τοῦ τι βουλεύεσθαι [ἵνα ἔχωσι καὶ τῆς ἀποτυχίας τὸ χαλεπὸν φοβηθῆναι], ἵνα τῷ τῆς λύπης δακνηρῷ δαμασθῶσι τῶν ἐλπιζομένων ἀποτυχόντες. χρεωκοπείσθω τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν τὸ περίεργον ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἐλπίσι πλάνοις.

44.56

I.49.44.56

ἐπάλληλοι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἔρωτες νεμέσθωσαν, ἐλπίδες, ποικίλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ποτὲ μὲν ἐπιτυγχάνουσαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀτευκτοῦσαι, ἵνα αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτυχίας ἠδὺ δέλεαρ ᾖ εἰς ἄθλησιν τελειοτέρων κακῶν· βαρείτω πυρετὸς αὐτοῖς, ἵνα ἐκκαήσαντες κολάσωσι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.”

44.57

I.49.44.57

Λυπῇ, τέκνον Ὦρε, τάδε ἑρμηνευούσης σοι τῆς τεκούσης; Οὐ θαυμάζεις, οὐ καταπλήσσῃ, πῶς ὁ τάλας ἄνθρωπος ἐβαρήθη; Τὸ δεινότερον ἐπάκουσον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.55 · Desire and disappointment as restraints I.49.44.55

Teach them, then, to long to form some design [so that they may also have the hardship of failure to fear], so that, failing to obtain what they hope for, they may be subdued by the biting force of grief. Let the inquisitiveness of their souls be brought to bankruptcy by desires, fears, griefs, and deceptive hopes.[1566]

44.56 · Success as a lure to further suffering I.49.44.56

Let successive longings, hopes, and varied desires feed upon their souls, sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing, so that even success may be a sweet lure drawing them into a contest with more fully developed evils. Let fever weigh upon them, so that, burned through, they may chastise desire."[1567]

44.57 · Isis asks Horus to consider the burden I.49.44.57

Are you grieved, my child Horus, as your mother explains these things to you? Do you not marvel, are you not appalled, at how the wretched human being was burdened? Hear what is more terrible still.[1568]

1566. The infinitival phrase "to long to form some design" is compressed; the translation keeps longing and planning together. Wachsmuth rejects the first purpose clause as a repetition of the next, and it remains bracketed in both languages. Chreōkopeisthō uses the metaphor of bankruptcy or exhaustion by debt. Planois, "deceptive" or "wandering," follows the printed correction and qualifies hopes.

1567. Nemesthōsan can suggest feeding or ranging over something; "feed upon" keeps the destructive image. The contrast between success and failure follows the printed ateuktousai correction. Athlēsis is an ordeal or contest, and teleioterōn makes the evils more complete or developed. The final burning is connected with fever in the speech; no specific therapeutic procedure is named. This closes Momus's proposal.

1568. Isis interrupts the reported dialogue to address Horus directly. The rhetorical questions register the weight of the restrictions just proposed. Her announcement of something more terrible introduces Hermes' response and the institution of oversight; it does not begin a new Stobaean excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.58 I.49.44.58

Ἐτέρπετο Μώμου ταῦτα λέγοντος Ἑρμῆς, ἐλέγετο γὰρ οἰκείως αὐτῷ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ταῦτα ἔπραττεν, ὅσα περ εἰρήκει, λέγων· “Μῶμε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐναργὴς γενήσεται πνεύματος θείου φύσις ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος; εἶπε γὰρ εἶναί με ταμίαν καὶ προνοητὴν ὁ τῶν συμπάντων δεσπότης.

44.59 I.49.44.59

ἐπόπτειρα τοίνυν ταγῆς ἔσται τῶν ὅλων ὀξυδερκὴς θεὸς Ἀδράστεια καί τι κρυπτὸν ὄργανον ἐγὼ τεχνάσομαι, ἁπλανοῦς καὶ ἀπαραβάτου θεωρίας ἐχόμενον, ᾧ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναγκαίως δουλαγωγηθήσεται πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι φθορᾶς ἐσχάτης, ἔχον τὴν <τῶν> ἀποτελουμένων πῆξιν· πεισθήσεται δὲ τῷ ὀργάνῳ τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἄλλα πάντα.” Εἶπεν Ἑρμῆς [ἐγὼ] δὴ ταῦτα τῷ Μώμῳ καὶ ἤδη τὸ ὄργανον ἐκινεῖτο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.58 · Hermes accepts Momus's proposal

I.49.44.58

Hermes took pleasure as Momus said this, for what had been said accorded with his own disposition, and he carried out everything Momus had proposed. He said: "Momus, will not the encompassing realm's nature of divine breath become manifest? For the master of all things has declared me to be steward and provident guardian.[1569]

44.59 · Adrasteia and the hidden instrument

I.49.44.59

Therefore the keen-sighted goddess Adrasteia will watch over the ordering of the whole, and I shall fashion a hidden instrument, possessing unerring and inviolable oversight. By it everything on earth, from coming-to-be to final dissolution, will necessarily be brought into servitude. It will hold the fixed arrangement <of the things> brought to completion; and everything else on earth will also obey this instrument." Hermes [I] said these things to Momus, and already the instrument was in motion.[1570]

1569. The repeated verbs of saying leave the subject of "had proposed" implicit; Momus is understood from the preceding speech. The question about divine breath and the encompassing realm is syntactically compressed. English retains both genitive expressions without deciding that the realm is simply identical with Hermes. The question mark follows Wachsmuth's punctuation. Tamias and pronoētēs express stewardship and forethought.

1570. The printed tagēs is ordering or arrangement. The instrument is not named or described mechanically; its oversight, compulsion, and fixed outcomes are the stated features. Pēxis can mean fixing or consolidation, and the clause remains provisional. The supplied article tōn is represented by "of the things." The rejected egō, "I," reflects a disturbed shift of speaker and remains bracketed. Hermes' instrument begins moving before further explanation is given.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.60 I.49.44.60

Ταῦτα δὲ ὡς ἐγένετο καὶ ἐνεσωματίσθησαν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἐπαίνου ὑπὲρ τῶν γενομένων αὐτὸς ἔτυχεν, πάλιν ὁ μόναρχος σύγκλητον τῶν θεῶν ἐποίησε συνέδριον καὶ οἱ θεοὶ παρῆσαν καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταῦτα οὕτως ἐφώνησε·

44.61 I.49.44.61

“Θεοί,” λέγων “ὅσοι τῆς κορυφαίας, ὅσοι καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως τετεύχατε, οἱ τὸν μέγαν αἰῶνα διέπειν ἐς ἀεὶ κεκλήρωσθε, οἷς αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς ἀντιπαραδιδόντα οὐδέποτε κοπιάσει τὰ σύμπαντα, μέχρι πότε τῆς ἀνεπιγνώστου ταύτης δεσπόσομεν ἡγεμονίας; μέχρι πότε ἀθεώρητα γενήσεται ταῦτα ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ; ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ γεννάτω· ἀπαλείψωμεν τῷ δύνασθαι τὴν ἔτι ἀργὴν σύστασιν ταύτην· ἄπιστος τοῖς μεταγενεστέροις μῦθος δὴ δοξάτω χάος εἶναι· ἔργων ἅπτεσθε μεγάλων, ἐγὼ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄρξομαι πρῶτος”.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.60 · The creator summons the gods again

I.49.44.60

When these things had happened, the souls had entered bodies, and he himself had received praise for what had been accomplished, the sole ruler again convened an assembly of the gods. The gods were present, and he once more spoke as follows:[1571]

44.61 · The gods are called to bring forth

I.49.44.61

“Gods,” he said, “you who have obtained the highest, imperishable nature, who have been allotted the governance of the great age forever, for whom all things will never tire of handing themselves over to one another: how long shall we hold mastery over this unrecognized dominion? How long will these things remain unseen by Sun and Moon? Let each of us bring forth on his own part. Let us use our power to erase this still idle condition. Let chaos come to seem an incredible tale to those who come after. Set your hands to great works; I myself shall begin first.”[1572]

1571. The first “he himself” is most naturally Hermes, who has just acted; the sole ruler is then named as the convener. The pronoun’s referent is not explicitly supplied in the Greek. The narrative now returns to a divine assembly and the ordering of the visible world after already describing embodiment; its sequence is preserved.

1572. The clause about things handing themselves over to one another is difficult; the printed auta heautois is retained rather than simplified by deleting a pronoun. Aiōn is rendered “age,” with its perpetuity separately expressed. “Unrecognized dominion” preserves anepignōstou hēgemonias. The command uses “each of us,” as printed, although an alternative has “you.” The passage calls for the disappearance of an idle condition and for chaos to become a story of the past.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.62 I.49.44.62

Εἶπε καὶ εὐθέως κοσμικῆς τῆς ἔτι μελαίνης ἑνώσεως διάστασις ἐγένετο· καὶ ἐφάνη μὲν οὐρανὸς ἄνω, συγκεκοσμημένος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μυστηρίοις πᾶσι· κραδαινομένη ἔτι γῆ ἡλίου λάμψαντος ἐπάγη καὶ ἐφάνη πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν συγκεκοσμημένη καλοῖς. Καλὰ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὰ θνητοῖς εἶναι νομιζόμενα φαῦλα, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ νόμοις δουλεύειν ἐποιήθη.

44.63 I.49.44.63

Ἔχαιρε δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὁρῶν ἤδη ἑαυτοῦ τὰ ἔργα κινούμενα· πληρώσας δὲ τὰς ἰσοστασίους χεῖρας τῷ περιέχοντι τῶν ἐκ τῆς φύσεως ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τὰς δράκας καρτερῶς σφίγξας “λάβε,” εἶπεν “ὦ ἱερὰ γῆ, λάβε, πάντιμε καὶ εἶναι γενέτειρα μέλλουσα πάντων, καὶ μηδενὶ ἐντεῦθεν λείπεσθαι δόκει.” Εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὰς χεῖρας, οἵας δεῖ θεὸν ἔχειν, ἁπλώσας πάντα ἀφῆκεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων συστάσει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.62 · Heaven appears and earth takes form

I.49.44.62

He spoke, and immediately the still-dark unity of the cosmos was divided. Heaven appeared above, adorned with all its own mysteries. Earth, still quivering, became firm when the Sun shone and appeared adorned with all the beautiful things surrounding her. For even what mortals consider mean is beautiful to the god, because it was made to serve the god's laws.[1573]

44.63 · The creator gives to earth

I.49.44.63

The god rejoiced to see his works now moving. Filling his hands, equal in extent to the encompassing space, with the things arising from nature, and clenching his fists firmly, he said, "Receive, sacred earth; receive, all-honored one, who are to become the mother of all. Henceforth consider yourself inferior to none." The god spoke and, opening hands such as a god must have, released everything into the constitution of existing things.[1574]

1573. Diastasis is separation from a prior unity. The earth's quivering and subsequent setting are both retained. The printed participle "adorned" agrees with earth; the apparatus's proposed change of agreement is not adopted. The final sentence explicitly distinguishes divine and mortal assessments of what is beautiful or mean, grounding the former in obedience to divine laws.

1574. Isostasious, "equal," follows the printed correction and takes tōi periechonti as its comparison: the hands match the encompassing space. "In extent" makes this spatial comparison explicit. The genitive "of the things arising from nature" supplies the contents of the hands with "filling"; the surrounding space is not itself the material. The qualification about hands fitting a god is explicit in the source. "Inferior to none" interprets the comparative sense of leipesthai in the command to earth.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.64 I.49.44.64

Καὶ ἀγνωσία μὲν ἦν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς παντάπασι. Νεωστὶ γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ καθειρχθεῖσαι καὶ τὴν ἀτιμίαν μὴ φέρουσαι τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς ἐφιλονείκουν τῆς ἑαυτῶν εὐγενείας περικρατοῦσαι καὶ ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι, ὡς καὶ αὐταὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτυχον δημιουργοῦ, ἐστασίαζον καὶ τοῖς λειπομένοις ἀνθρώποις ὀργάνοις χρώμεναι, ἐποίουν αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ ἀντιτάσσεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλους.

44.65 I.49.44.65

Καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν ἰσχὺς κατὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας μέγα ἠδύνατο, ὥστε οἱ ἰσχυροὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους καὶ ἔκαιον καὶ ἐφόνευον καὶ [κατὰ τῶν ἱερῶν] τοῦτο μὲν ζῶντας τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νεκροὺς ἔρριπτον κατὰ τῶν ἀδύτων, ἕως ἀγανακτήσαντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τῷ μονάρχῳ θεῷ ἐντυχεῖν ἐδοκίμαζον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγρίου πολιτείας. Πολλοῦ δὲ ἤδη γενομένου τοῦ κακοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτὰ τῷ θεῷ προσελθάντα τοιούτοις λόγοις ὑπὲρ μέμψεως ἐχρήσαντο. Καὶ δὴ καὶ εἶχε τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἐξουσίαν τὸ πῦρ πρῶτον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.64 · The embodied souls stir human conflict I.49.44.64

At first there was complete ignorance. For the souls, newly confined and unable to bear the dishonor, contended with the gods in heaven, holding fast to their own noble origin and insisting that they too had the same craftsman. They rebelled and, using the remaining human beings as instruments, made them attack one another, oppose one another, and wage war upon one another.[1575]

44.65 · Violence drives the elements to petition I.49.44.65

Thus strength exercised great power against weakness: the strong burned and murdered the powerless and hurled them down, sometimes living and sometimes dead, [from the sacred places] from the inner sanctuaries. At last the outraged elements resolved to petition the sole-ruling god concerning humanity's savage way of life. When the evil had grown great, the elements approached the god who had made them and voiced their complaint in these words. Fire was first given leave to speak.[1576]

1575. The return to initial ignorance is part of the narrative as transmitted. The printed leipomenois, "remaining," qualifies human beings, although the apparatus offers a form meaning "left." The relation between souls as instigators and human beings as their instruments is left as stated. Their claim of a common craftsman motivates the rebellion in this passage; it is not an additional assertion made by the translator.

1576. The burning, killing, and casting down from sanctuaries explain the elements' appeal. Kata with the genitive is rendered "down from"; the buildings' arrangement is unspecified. The rejected phrase "from the sacred places" remains bracketed; the apparatus treats it as redundant beside "from the inner sanctuaries." Politeia again denotes a way of life or social conduct. The elements now become speaking petitioners in turn, beginning with Fire.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.66 I.49.44.66

“Δέσποτα” δὲ ἔλεγε “καὶ τοῦ καινοῦ τούτου κόσμου τεχνῖτα καὶ κρυπτὸν ἐν θεοῖς καὶ σεβαστὸν ὄνομα μέχρι νῦν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, μέχρι πότε, ὦ δαῖμον, ἄθεον καταλεῖψαι τὸν θνητῶν βίον προαίρεσιν ἔχεις; ἀνάτειλον ἤδη σεαυτὸν χρηματίζοντι τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῦ βίου τὸ ἄγριον μύησον εἰρήνῃ· χάρισαι νόμους τῷ βίῳ, χάρισαι νυκτὶ χρησμούς· πλήρωσον καλῶν ἐλπίδων πάντα·

44.67 I.49.44.67

φοβείσθωσαν ἄνθρωποι τὴν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐκδικίαν καὶ οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτήσει· ἐπαξίους ἁμαρτημάτων μισθοὺς ἂν ἀπολάβωσι, φυλάξονται οἱ λοιποὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, φοβηθήσονται ὅρκους καὶ οὐδὲ εἷς ἔτι ἀνόσιον φρονήσει· μαθέτωσαν εὐεργετηθέντες εὐχαριστῆσαι, ἵνα χαῖρον παρὰ λοιβαῖς [παρὰ θυσίαις] ὑπηρετήσω [τὸ πῦρ], ἵν᾽ εὐώδεις ἀτμοὺς ἀπ᾽ ἐσχάρας προπέμψω σοι. μιαίνομαι γάρ, ὦ δέσποτα, μέχρι νῦν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων ἀθέου τόλμης σάρκας ἀναγκάζομαι αἴκειν, οὐκ ἐῶσί τε μένειν εἰς ὃ πέφυκα, παραχαράσσοντες οὐ καθηκόντως τὸ ἄφθαρτον.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.66 · Fire asks for divine presence and laws I.49.44.66

“Master,” Fire said, “craftsman of this new cosmos, a name hidden among gods and revered until now by all human beings: how long, divine spirit, do you intend to leave mortal life without a god? Reveal yourself now like a rising light to the existing cosmos, and initiate the savagery of life into peace. Grant laws to life; grant oracles to night; fill everything with good hopes.[1577]

44.67 · Fire asks to serve gratitude rather than cruelty I.49.44.67

Let human beings fear retribution from the gods, and no one will transgress. If they receive recompense worthy of their offenses, the rest will guard against wrongdoing, fear oaths, and no longer entertain an impious thought. Let those who receive benefits learn gratitude, so that I may gladly serve at libations [at sacrifices], [Fire], and send fragrant vapors up to you from the hearth. For until now, master, I am polluted; the godless boldness of the humans who have come into being forces me to torture flesh. They do not let me remain in the state for which I was born, but improperly debase what is incorruptible.”[1578]

1577. The text calls the divine name hidden among gods and revered by humans, yet immediately describes mortal life as godless. Wachsmuth considers exchanging “hidden” and “revered”; the printed order is retained. Anateilon uses the image of rising, expressed in English by the simile of light. The unusual request for oracles “to night” remains, though the apparatus questions nykti. No particular form of nocturnal divination is supplied.

1578. The rejected sacrificial phrase and the rejected identification “Fire” remain marked; the latter is an intrusive gloss on the speaker in the edition’s account. “Fear oaths” retains the printed object instead of replacing it with perjury. The final verb paracharassontes evokes the defacement or debasement of coinage and is used here of an incorruptible element. The contrast within Fire’s plea is between grateful ritual service and its coercion into harming flesh.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.68 I.49.44.68

Ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ “καὶ αὐτὸς θολοῦμαι, δέσποτα,” ἔλεγε “καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν σωμάτων ἀναθυμιάσεως νοσώδης τέ εἰμι καὶ ὑγιεινὸς οὐκέτι, ἐφορῶ τε ἄνωθεν ὅσα μὴ θέμις ὁρᾶν”.

44.69 I.49.44.69

Ὕδωρ ἐξῆς, ὦ παῖ μεγαλόψυχε, τὴν τοῦ λέγειν εἶχεν ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἔλεγεν οὕτως· “Πάτερ καὶ θαυμαστὲ ποιητὰ πάντων, αὐτόγονε δαῖμον καὶ τῆς διὰ σὲ πάντα γεννώσης ποιητὰ φύσεως, ἤδη ποτέ, ὦ δαῖμον, ἀεὶ ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν καθαρὰ πρόσταξον εἶναι· ἢ γὰρ ἀπολούουσι ποταμοὶ καὶ θάλασσαι τοὺς φονεύσαντας, ἢ δέχονται τοὺς φονευθέντας.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.68 · Air complains of pollution

I.49.44.68

Air said, “I too am fouled, master, and the exhalation from dead bodies makes me diseased and no longer healthful. From above I see things that it is not lawful to behold.”[1579]

44.69 · Water asks for clean rivers

I.49.44.69

Water next had leave to speak, my noble-hearted child, and said: “Father and wondrous maker of all things, self-born divine spirit and maker of Nature, who through you brings forth everything: at last, divine spirit, command the streams of rivers to remain forever clean. For rivers and seas either wash the murderers or receive the murdered.”[1580]

1579. The opening “I too” follows the edition’s placement within Air’s speech. The complaint links the bodily exhalation below with Air’s polluted condition and elevated viewpoint. Themis concerns what is permitted by divine or customary order, here the horrors Air is compelled to witness.

1580. Isis’ address to Horus interrupts the narrative before Water’s speech. “Maker” is repeated as printed, although the apparatus suspects the first occurrence. Autogone means self-born. The final balance distinguishes the murderers washed by the waters from the victims received into them, bringing together bodily pollution and moral complaint.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.70

I.49.44.70

Γῆ παρῆν περίλυπος ἐξῆς καὶ † τάξομαι τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων, ὦ παῖ μεγαλόδοξε, οὕτως λέγειν ἤρξατο· “Βασιλεῦ καὶ τῶν οὐρανίων πρύτανι καὶ δέσποτα ἀψίδων, στοιχείων ἡμῶν ἡγεμὼν <καὶ> πάτερ τῶν σοι παρεστώτων, ἐξ ὧν αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὰ πάντα, εἰς ἃ καὶ πάλιν καταλήγοντα ἀναγκαίως ὀφειλόμενον τέλος ἔχει, ἀλόγιστος, ὦ πολυτίμητε, καὶ ἄθεος [ἀπ᾽] ἀνθρώπων ἐπ᾽ ἐμὲ χορὸς ἔπεισι. χωρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ φύσιν πάντων· αὐτὴ γάρ, ὡς σὺ προσέταξας, καὶ φέρω πάντα καὶ τὰ φονευθέντα δέχομαι. ἀτιμοῦμαι δὲ ἤδη ὑπὸ πάντων· ὁ ἐπιχθόνιός σοι κόσμος πεπληρωμένος θεὸν οὐκ ἔχει. πάντα γάρ, ὃ φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες, παρανομοῦσι καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμῶν, ὦ κύριε, τενόντων πάσῃ πονηρᾷ τέχνῃ καταπίπτουσι. καταβρέχομαι δὲ πᾶσα διαφθειρομένη σωμάτων χυλοῖς.

44.71

I.49.44.71

ἐντεῦθεν, κύριε, καὶ τοὺς οὐκ ἀξίους ἀναγκάζομαι χωρεῖν. χωρῆσαι θέλω μεθ᾽ ὧν φέρω πάντων καὶ θεόν. χάρισαι τῇ γῇ κἂν οὐ σεαυτόν, οὐ γάρ σε χωρεῖν ὑπομένω, σαυτοῦ <γέ> τινα ἱερὰν ἀπόρροιαν. στοιχείων τιμιωτέραν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν γῆν μεταποίησον. μόνην γὰρ αὐχεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ σοῦ πρέπει τὰ πάντα παρεχούσῃ.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.70 · Earth's grief and the godless throng

I.49.44.70

Earth was next present, deeply grieved, and † taking her turn to speak, my child of great renown, she began as follows: "King, governor of heavenly beings, master of the vaults, leader of us elements <and> father of those standing before you, from whom all things derive the principle of growth and decrease, and into whom they return to reach their necessarily owed end: an unreasoning, godless throng of [from] human beings assails me, much-honored one. Yet I contain the nature of all things. For I myself, as you commanded, bear everything and receive the murdered. Now everyone dishonors me. Your earthly world is full, but it has no god. Having nothing to fear, they break every law and fall from my ridges, lord, through every wicked contrivance. I am drenched everywhere, corrupted by the fluids of bodies.[1581]

44.71 · Earth asks for a sacred outflow

I.49.44.71

And so, lord, I am forced to contain even the unworthy. I wish to contain a god as well, together with everything I bear. Grant earth, if not yourself, for I cannot endure containing you, <at least> some sacred outflow of yourself. Make earth more honored than the other elements. For it is fitting that she alone should boast of what comes from you, since she provides everything."[1582]

1581. The dagger marks a corrupt clause before Earth's speech. Its printed taxomai is first person, "I shall be placed" or "take my place," and the following words do not yield a secure construction. "Taking her turn to speak" gives only the likely narrative function, not a certain restoration; the dagger flags that provisional rendering. The supplied "and" and rejected "from" remain marked. Tenontōn, literally "sinews," here denotes Earth's ridges (LSJ, tenōn II). The clause describes people falling from them through wicked contrivance; it does not specify the particular acts involved.

1582. Chōrein is repeated through Earth's complaint as containing or making room for something. The supplied ge is represented by "at least." Aporrhoia is an outflow or emanation; Earth requests one because she cannot contain the god himself. The final feminine forms shift the speech from Earth's "I" to a statement about what befits her. The comparative honor requested is explicitly relative to the other elements.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.72 I.49.44.72

Τοσαῦτα μὲν τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶπεν· ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἱερᾶς ἐν τῷ λέγειν φωνῆς τὰ σύμπαντα πληρώσας, “Πορεύεσθε”, εἶπεν, “ἱερὰ καὶ μεγάλου πατρὸς ἄξια τέκνα, καὶ κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον νεωτερίζειν ἐπιχειρεῖτε μηδὲ ἀργὸν τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑπηρεσίας τὸν σύμπαντά μου κόσμον καταλείπετε. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν τις ἤδη τῆς ἐμῆς ἀπόρροια φύσεως, ὃς δὴ καὶ ὅσιος ἔσται τῶν πραττομένων ἐπόπτης καὶ ζώντων μὲν κριτὴς ἀμεθόδευτος, φρικτὸς δ᾽ οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμωρὸς τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν τύραννος. καὶ ἑκάστῳ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκολουθήσει διὰ γένους μισθὸς ἐπάξιος.”

44.73 I.49.44.73

Καὶ οὕτως ἐπαύσατο τῆς ἐντυχίας τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ δεσπότου κελεύσαντος καὶ ἐχεμυθίαν εἶχον· καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας ἐκράτει καὶ ἐδέσποζε.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.72 · The creator promises judgment and recompense I.49.44.72

The elements said this. The god, filling all things with his sacred voice as he spoke, said: “Depart, sacred children worthy of a great father. Do not attempt any innovation, and do not leave my whole cosmos idle, deprived of the service that comes from you. For another outflow of my nature is already among you. He will be a holy observer of deeds and an undeceivable judge of the living, and a ruler of those beneath the earth who is not only fearsome but also punitive. Fitting recompense will follow each human being through the race.”[1583]

44.73 · The elements return to their duties I.49.44.73

Thus, at the master’s command, the elements ceased their petition and kept silence; each retained control and mastery over its own domain.”[1584]

1583. The printed reflexive hautōn is interpreted contextually as the elements’ own service. The antecedent “outflow” is feminine, but the relative pronoun is masculine; English preserves the shift to “he.” The agent is not named in this speech. Amethodeutos describes a judge who cannot be circumvented by contrivance. Dia genous, “through the race,” is retained as a difficult expression concerning human continuance or generations; the apparatus’s conjecture “through an age” is not adopted.

1584. Entychia is the petition or audience with the god. Echemythia is reserve or the keeping of silence. The conclusion restores each element’s own authority without saying that their complaints were withdrawn as false. This closes Isis’ present speech. Horus asks how earth obtained the divine outflow in the next sentence, where the continuing excerpt will resume.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.74 I.49.44.74

Καὶ ἐκ τούτου εἶπεν Ὧρος· “Ὦ τεκοῦσα, πῶς οὖν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπόρροιαν ἔχειν εὐτύχησεν ἡ γῆ;” Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Παραιτοῦμαι γένεσιν ἱστορεῖν· οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν σῆς σπορᾶς καταλέγειν ἀρχήν, ὦ μεγαλοσθενὲς Ὧρε, ὡς μήποτε ὕστερον εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀθανάτων ἔλθῃ γένεσις θεῶν·

44.75 I.49.44.75

πλὴν ὅτι γε ὁ μόναρχος θεός, ὁ τῶν συμπάντων κοσμοποιητὴς καὶ τεχνίτης, [τὶ] τὸν μέγιστόν σου πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐχαρίσατο πατέρα Ὄσιριν καὶ τὴν μεγίστην θεὰν Ἶσιν, ἵνα τῶν πάντων δεομένῳ κόσμῳ βοηθοὶ γένωνται. Οὗτοι βίου τὸν βίον ἐπλήρωσαν· οὗτοι τὸ τῆς ἀλληλοφονίας ἔπαυσαν ἄγριον· τεμένη προγόνοις θεοῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ θυσίας καθιέρωσαν· νόμους οὗτοι καὶ τροφὰς θνητοῖς καὶ σκέπην ἐχαρίσαντο·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.74 · Horus asks about the divine outflow I.49.44.74

After this Horus said, “Mother, how, then, did earth have the good fortune to receive the god’s outflow?” Isis replied: “I decline to recount the birth. For it is not lawful to relate the origin of your begetting, mighty Horus, lest the birth of immortal gods should later become known among human beings.[1585]

44.75 · Osiris and Isis come to help the world I.49.44.75

I will say only that the sole-ruling god, the maker and craftsman of the universe, [something] bestowed for a little while your most great father Osiris and the greatest goddess Isis, so that they might help a world in need of everything. They filled life with the means of living; they ended the savagery of mutual slaughter. They consecrated precincts and sacrifices to the ancestral gods; they bestowed laws, nourishment, and shelter upon mortals.[1586]

1585. Aporrhoia continues the preceding exchange about the divine outflow or emanation. Isis connects Horus’s question with his own begetting but withholds the account. “Become known among” interprets the expression “come to human beings” in its context of disclosure. The refusal does not supply a missing genealogy. Her answer continues.

1586. The rejected ti has no secure place in the sentence and is retained as the bracketed fragment “something.” Pros oligon is understood temporally, “for a little while.” The repeated bios permits the distinction between life and livelihood or means of living. Isis speaks of herself in the third person alongside Osiris before returning to “Osiris and I” below.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.76 I.49.44.76

“οὗτοι τὰ κρυπτά”, φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, “τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιγνώσονται γραμμάτων πάντα καὶ διακρινοῦσι καὶ τινὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ κατασχώσιν, ἃ δὲ καὶ πρὸς εὐεργεσίας θνητῶν φθάνει, στήλαις καὶ ὀβελίσκοις χαράξουσιν·”

44.77 I.49.44.77

οὗτοι πρῶτοι δείξαντες δικαστήρια εὐνομίας τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐπλήρωσαν· οὗτοι δεξιᾶς καὶ πίστεως ἀρχηγέται γενόμενοι καὶ τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν Ὅρκον εἰσηγάγοντο εἰς τὸν βίον· οὗτοι τοὺς παυσαμένους τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς δέον ἐστίν, ἐδίδαξαν περιστέλλειν·

44.78 I.49.44.78

οὗτοι τὸ τοῦ θανάτου ζητήσαντες ἄγριον ἔγνωσαν, ὡς τοῦ ἔξωθεν πνεύματος φιλυποστρόφου τυγχάνοντος εἰς τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλάσματα, ἐὰν ὑστερήσῃ ποτέ, ἀνάκτησιν οὐκ ἔχον ἐργάζεται λειποθυμίας·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.76 · Hermes' writings and their disclosure I.49.44.76

"They," Hermes says, "will come to know all the secrets of my writings and distinguish among them. Some they will keep to themselves; whatever extends to the benefit of mortals they will engrave upon stelae and obelisks."[1587]

44.77 · Justice, trust, and care for the dead I.49.44.77

They were the first to establish courts of judgment and filled all things with good order and justice. They originated the pledge of the right hand and trust, and introduced the very great god Oath into human life. They taught people to lay out those who had ceased to live in the proper manner;[1588]

44.78 · The breath's return and irreversible collapse I.49.44.78

They investigated the cruelty of death and understood that the breath from outside, being disposed to return into the fashioned human bodies, if it should ever fail to arrive in time, produces fainting without recovery;[1589]

1587. Isis introduces a quotation from Hermes inside her own speech. The Greek shifts to future forms and includes the subjunctive kataschōsin, "may retain"; English makes the coordinated prediction readable without changing the Greek. The division concerns what is kept secret and what is made available for human benefit. Stelae are inscribed standing monuments.

1588. Dexia, the right hand, expresses the hand given as a pledge; pistis denotes trust or good faith. Oath is personified and explicitly called a god. Peristellein concerns attending to and laying out the dead. The wording alone does not specify a complete embalming procedure. The following sentence gives the passage's own account of death.

1589. Philypostrophos describes a disposition to return. The neuter "not having recovery" agrees with pneuma in the printed text, while "fainting" is plural. English transfers the qualification to the resulting collapse to convey the likely sense; this is an interpretation of a compressed construction. The distinction between this failure of returning breath and recoverable fainting is not developed here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.79 I.49.44.79

οὗτοι τὸ περιέχον ὅτι δαιμόνων ἐπληρώθη παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες, κρυπταῖς στήλαις ἐχάραξαν· οὗτοι μόνοι τὰς κρυπτὰς νομοθεσίας τοῦ θεοῦ παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἁπάντων εἰσηγηταὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο καὶ νομοθέται· οὗτοι παρ᾽ Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες ὡς τὰ κάτω συμπαθεῖν τοῖς ἄνω ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ διετάγη, τὰς προσκαθέτους τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιίας ἀνέστησαν ἐν γῇ·

44.80 I.49.44.80

οὗτοι τὸ φθόριμον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιγνόντες τὸ ἐν ἅπασι τέλειον τῶν προφητῶν ἐτεχνάσαντο, ὡς μήποτε ὁ μέλλων θεοῖς προσάγειν χεῖρας προφήτης ἀγνοῇ τι τῶν ὄντων· ἵνα φιλοσοφία μὲν καὶ μαγεία ψυχὴν τρέφῃ, σῴζῃ δ᾽ ὅταν τι πάσχῃ ἰατρικὴ σῶμα.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.79 · Hidden laws and rites on earth

I.49.44.79

They learned from Hermes that the surrounding realm was filled with daimons and engraved this upon hidden stelae. They alone learned the god's hidden ordinances from Hermes and became the introducers and lawgivers of all arts, sciences, and pursuits among human beings. They learned from Hermes that the creator had ordained the things below to share in the affections of those above, and established on earth sacred rites corresponding to the mysteries in heaven;[1590]

44.80 · The complete training of prophets

I.49.44.80

They recognized the perishability of bodies and devised the prophets' completeness in every field, so that the prophet who is to raise his hands to the gods should be ignorant of none of the things that exist: philosophy and magic are to nourish the soul, and medicine to preserve the body whenever it suffers.[1591]

1590. Daimons are the intermediate divine beings named in the passage, not necessarily evil spirits. Sympathein describes the correspondence or shared affections of lower and upper things. Proskathetos literally suggests a perpendicular relation; "corresponding" conveys the alignment of earthly rites with heavenly mysteries without supplying a further ritual system.

1591. Wachsmuth notes that something is disturbed in this sequence. "The prophets' completeness in every field" renders the abstract phrase to en hapasi teleion tōn prophētōn provisionally, as comprehensive formation of the sacred practitioner. The Greek names philosophy, mageia, and medicine separately; it does not identify one with another. "Raise his hands" interprets the approach to the gods expressed by prosagein cheiras.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.81

I.49.44.81

Ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσαντες, ὦ τέκνον, Ὄσιρίς τε κἀγώ, τὸν κόσμον πληρέστατον ἰδόντες ἀπῃτούμεθα λοιπὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν κατοικούντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἀνελθεῖν, πρὶν ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὸν μόναρχον, ἵνα δὴ καὶ τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης πλῆρες τὸ περιέχον γένηται αὐτοί τε εὐπαράδεκτον εὐτυχήσωμεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. * * χαίρει γὰρ ὕμνοις ὁ θεός.”

44.82

I.49.44.82

“Ὦ τεκοῦσα”, εἶπεν Ὧρος, “κἀμοὶ χάρισαι τὴν τοῦ ὕμνου ἐπίγνωσιν, ὡς μὴ ἀμαθὴς ὑπάρχω”. Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Πρόσεχε, παῖ”.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

44.81 · The invocation before ascent

I.49.44.81

After doing all these things, my child, Osiris and I, seeing the world filled to the utmost, were at last being summoned back by those who dwell in heaven. But it was not possible to ascend before invoking the sole ruler, so that the surrounding realm might be filled with this contemplation too, and we ourselves might have the good fortune of an ascent graciously received. * * For the god delights in hymns."[1592]

44.82 · Horus asks to learn the hymn

I.49.44.82

"Mother," Horus said, "grant me too the knowledge of the hymn, so that I may not remain ignorant." And Isis said, "Attend, my child."[1593]

1592. Isis returns to the first person. Apēitoumetha suggests being required or called back by the heavenly inhabitants. Theōria may denote contemplation or the sacred spectacle involved in the invocation; neither the hymn's words nor a complete ritual are supplied. Wachsmuth marks a gap before the statement about hymns. The gap remains, and the statement stays in Isis's speech rather than being reassigned to Horus.

1593. This is the end of Stobaeus's excerpt 44. The hymn requested by Horus is not supplied here. The following excerpt is introduced as coming from the same work, but begins with an invitation to ask another question. The comparison subdivisions 44.74-82, like the earlier suffixes, are modern reading aids rather than source section numbers.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.1 I.49.45.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

“Σὺ δέ, ὦ παῖ μεγαλόψυχε, εἴ τι θέλεις ἕτερον, ἐπερώτα.” Καὶ εἶπεν Ὧρος· “Ὦ πολυτίμητε μῆτερ, εἰδῆσαι θέλω, πῶς γίγνονται βασιλικαὶ ψυχαί;” Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Ἡ γιγνομένη, τέκνον Ὧρε, περὶ τὰς βασιλικὰς ψυχὰς διαφορὰ τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν.

45.2 I.49.45.2

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τόποι τέσσαρές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ οἵτινες ἀπαραβάτῳ νόμῳ καὶ προστασίᾳ ὑποπίπτουσιν, ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ <ὁ> αἰθὴρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ἡ ἱερωτάτη γῆ, [καὶ] ἄνω μέν, ὦ τέκνον, ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὶ κατοικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄρχει μετὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός· ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰθέρι ἀστέρες, ὧν ἄρχει ὁ μέγας φωστὴρ ἥλιος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ψυχαὶ δαιμόνιαι, ὧν ἄρχει σελήνη· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γῆς ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα, ὧν ἄρχει ὁ κατὰ καιρὸν γενόμενος βασιλεύς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.1 · From the same work: royal souls I.49.45.1

From the same work.

“And you, child of great spirit, if there is anything else you wish, ask.” Horus said, “Mother held in great honor, I wish to know: how do souls become royal?” Isis replied: “The distinction that arises concerning royal souls, my child Horus, is something of this kind.[1594]

45.2 · The four regions and their rulers I.49.45.2

For there are four regions in the universe subject to inviolable law and governance: heaven, <the> aether, air, and most sacred earth. [And] above, my child, gods dwell in heaven; the maker of the whole rules them, together with all other things. In the aether are stars, ruled by the great luminary, the Sun. In the air are daimonic souls, ruled by the Moon. Upon earth are human beings and the other animals, ruled by the king who comes to power at the appointed time.[1595]

1594. The source heading En tautōi refers back to the Hermetic work quoted in excerpt 44. Wachsmuth numbers this new extract 45 and gives the older references 41 in Heeren and p. 32b in Patrizi. Those editorial references belong in this note rather than the Greek dialogue. The invitation is understood as Isis’s; Horus and Isis are then explicitly named. Further numbered suffixes are modern comparison divisions.

1595. The fourfold hierarchy distinguishes heaven from aether and aether from air. Daimonic souls occupy the region of air; the adjective follows the printed correction of a divided reading. The supplied article before aether and rejected conjunction remain marked. Kata kairon can also mean “at the particular time”; it need not assert a fixed chronological cycle of kingship.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.3 I.49.45.3

Γεννῶσι γάρ, ὦ τέκνον, βασιλεῖς οἱ θεοὶ ἐπαξίους τῆς ἐπιγείου γονῆς καὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπόρροιαι, ὧν ὁ μᾶλλον ἐκείνῳ πλησίον οὗτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βασιλικώτερος. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος, καθὸ ἐγγύον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆς σελήνης ἐπιμείζων καὶ δυναμικώτερος, ᾧ δευτερεύει ἡ σελήνη καὶ κατὰ τάξιν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.

45.4 I.49.45.4

Καὶ ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστιν ἔσχατος, πρῶτος δὲ ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μέχρις ὅτου ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστι, τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς θειότητος ἀπήλλακται, ἔχει δὲ ἐξαίρετόν τι παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, ὃ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ θεῷ. Ἡ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸν καταπεμπομένη ψυχὴ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐστὶ τοῦ χωρίου ὃ ὑπεράνω κεῖται ἐκείνων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους καταπέμπονται ἀνθρώπους.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.3 · Rulers as divine outflows I.49.45.3

For the gods, my child, beget kings worthy of the earthly race, and the rulers are outflows of the King. Among them, the one nearer to him is more royal than the others. Thus the Sun, inasmuch as it is nearer to the god, is greater and more powerful than the Moon; the Moon is second to it both in rank and in power.[1596]

45.4 · The king between gods and human beings I.49.45.4

The king is last in relation to the other gods, but first among human beings. As long as he is upon earth, he is separated from true divinity; yet he possesses something exceptional beyond other human beings, something like the god. For the soul sent down into him comes from that region which lies above those from which souls are sent down into other human beings.[1597]

1596. Gonē is the earthly stock or race to which the kings are appointed; the wording does not make earthly birth itself their merit. The capitalized “King” marks the supreme ruler implied by the sequence. Aporrhoiai, “outflows,” continues the preceding excerpt’s language of divine derivation. The hierarchy concerns proximity, rank, and power, not merely the visible size of the luminaries.

1597. The account places the earthly king at a boundary: ranked with gods, yet without their full divinity during earthly life. English supplies “souls” as the understood subject in the final clause. The asserted superiority is explained through the soul’s region of origin. This is the dialogue’s theory of royal status, not an identification of a particular historical king.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.5 I.49.45.5

Καταπέμπονται δὲ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ βασιλεύειν διὰ δύο ταῦτα αἱ ψυχαί, ὦ τέκνον. Αἱ γὰρ καλῶς καὶ ἀμέμπτως δραμοῦσαι τὸν ἴδιον αἰῶνα καὶ μέλλουσαι ἀποθεοῦσθαι, ἵνα κἂν τῷ βασιλεύειν τὴν τῶν θεῶν προγυμνασθῶσιν ἐξουσίαν· αἱ <δὲ> θεῖαί τινες ἤδη οὖσαι καὶ ἐπὶ μικρῷ τινι παραθεμιστεύσασαι τὸν ἔνθεον γνώμονα, ἵνα [μὴ] κόλασιν μὲν ἐν τῷ σεσωματῶσθαι ὑπομένωσι, δι᾽ ἀδοξίαν <δὲ> καὶ φύσιν μηδὲν ὅμοιον ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσχωσιν ἐνσωματισθεῖσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εἶχον λελυμέναι, τοῦτο καὶ δεθεῖσαι ἔχωσιν.

45.6 I.49.45.6

Αἱ μέντοι περὶ τὰ ἤθη τῶν βασιλευόντων γιγνόμεναι διαφοραὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κρίσει κρίνονται, πᾶσαι γὰρ θεῖαι· ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ τῶν δορυφορησάντων αὐτὴν καταστάσει ἀγγέλων καὶ δαιμόνων. Αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται καὶ ἐπὶ <τὰ> τοιαῦτα κατερχόμεναι δίχα προπομπῆς καὶ δορυφορίας οὐ κατέρχονται. Οἶδε γὰρ ἡ ἄνω Δίκη τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῃ νέμειν, κἂν ἐκ τῆς εὐημερούσης χώρας ἀπωθῶνται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.5 · Two reasons for a royal embodiment I.49.45.5

Souls are sent down from there to kingship for these two reasons, my child. Those that have run their own course well and blamelessly and are about to be made divine are sent so that, through ruling as kings, they may at least train beforehand in the authority of the gods. <But> some, already divine, have in some small matter transgressed the divine rule: they are sent so that they may [not] endure punishment in being embodied, <but>, as regards dishonor and natural condition, suffer nothing like the other souls when embodied; instead, what they possessed when free they may also possess when bound.[1598]

45.6 · The escort of a royal soul I.49.45.6

The differences that arise in the characters of reigning kings, however, are not determined by a distinction between their souls, for all these souls are divine, but by the disposition of the angels and daimons that have escorted it. Souls of this kind, descending to <such> tasks, do not descend without an advance escort and a guard. For Justice above knows how to allot each its due honor, even when they are driven from the region of blessedness.[1599]

1598. The two classes are souls preparing for divinization and divine souls punished for a minor fault. Aiōn here is their own course or span, not explicitly cosmic eternity. The rejected “not” would reverse the punishment clause and remains bracketed. Both supplied conjunctions are marked. “As regards dishonor and natural condition” gives a provisional sense to the difficult dia phrase; its causal wording is strained. The concluding claim is that royal souls retain a privilege even in bodily bonds.

1599. Krisis and krinontai repeat the language of distinguishing or deciding. The contrast concerns a distinction between the royal souls, all divine, and the differing dispositions of their escorts. English renders the generic singular “the soul” as “their souls.” Angeloi and daimones name the attending beings. The supplied article is represented by marking “such” in English. Doryphoria is attendance by spear-bearers, hence a guard. Justice is personified.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.7 I.49.45.7

Ὅταν οὖν οἱ κατάγοντες αὐτὴν ἄγγελοι καὶ δαίμονες, τέκνον Ὧρε, πολεμικοὶ ὦσι, τούτων περικρατεῖν τῆς γνώμης ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιλαθομένη τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἔργων, μᾶλλον δὲ μεμνημένη τούτων μέχρι τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας συνοδίας προσγεγονότων·

45.8 I.49.45.8

ὅταν δὲ εἰρηνικοί, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ τὸν ἴδιον δρόμον εἰρηνοποιεῖται· ὅταν δὲ δικαστικοί, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ δικάζει· ὅταν δὲ μουσικοί, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ ᾄδει· ὅταν δὲ φιλαλήθεις, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ φιλοσοφεῖ. Ὡς γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ ψυχαὶ αὗται τῆς τῶν καταγόντων περικρατοῦσι γνώμης, πίπτουσαι γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα τῆς μὲν ἰδίας φύσεως ἐπιλαθόμεναι καὶ παρόσον μακρὰν αὐτῆς ἀπέστησαν, μέμνηνται δὲ τῆς τῶν κατακλεισάντων αὐτὰς διαθέσεως.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.7 · The influence of a warlike escort I.49.45.7

When, then, the angels and daimons bringing her down are warlike, my child Horus, the soul holds fast to their disposition, having forgotten her own deeds, or rather remembering them only as far as what has accrued from the other company;[1600]

45.8 · Peace, justice, music, and philosophy I.49.45.8

when they are peaceful, she too makes her own course peaceful; when they are judicial, she too judges; when they are musical, she too sings; when they love truth, she too pursues philosophy. For these souls cling, as though of necessity, to the disposition of those who bring them down. Falling into humanity, they forget their own nature, insofar as they have departed far from it, but remember the disposition of those who have confined them.”[1601]

1600. The construction with perikratein and the genitive is unusual. “Holds fast to their disposition” interprets it through the next examples and the similar phrase about clinging to nobility at p. 403. The correction from forgetting to remembering and the phrase about the other company are especially difficult. They remain in their printed order; no conjectural transposition is adopted. The precise relation between the soul’s earlier deeds and this company is unresolved.

1601. The repeated perikratousi is rendered consistently with the preceding unit. The examples make the soul’s character correspond to its escort’s character. Philalētheis, “lovers of truth,” leads to philosophy. The compressed relation of forgetting and distance is rendered with “insofar as.” In the final participle, “those who confined,” the facing Greek reduces the scan’s apparent duplicated klei across a line break to one syllable.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.9 I.49.45.9

“Καλῶς”, εἶπεν Ὧρος, “ἅπαντά μοι, ὦ τεκοῦσα, πῶς δὲ εὐγενεῖς γίγνονται ψυχαί, οὐδέπω μοι διηγήσω”. “Ὃν τρόπον ἐπὶ γῆς, ὦ τέκνον Ὧρε, εἰσί τινες πολιτεῖαι διαφέρουσαι ἀλλήλων, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐστι. Καὶ αὗται γὰρ τόπους ἔχουσιν ὅθεν ὁρμῶσι, καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδοξοτέρου τόπου ὡρμηκυῖα εὐγενεστέρα ἐστὶ τῆς μὴ οὕτως ἐχούσης.

45.10 I.49.45.10

Ὅνπερ γὰρ τρόπον ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώποις ὁ ἐλεύθερος εὐγενέστερος εἶναι δοκεῖ δούλου (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑπερέχον καὶ βασιλικὸν δουλοποιεῖ τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης), οὕτω δή, ὦ τέκνον, καὶ <ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐστιν>.”

45.11 I.49.45.11

“<Πῶς δέ, ὦ τεκοῦσα,> ἀρρενικαὶ καὶ θηλυκαὶ γίγνονται ψυχαί;” “Αἱ ψυχαί, <ὦ> τέκνον Ὧρε, ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσιν ἑαυταῖς, καθάπερ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὖσαι χωρίου, ἐν ᾧ αὐτὰς διατυποῦται ὁ δημιουργός, καὶ οὔτε εἰσιν ἄρρενες οὔτε θήλειαι. Ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐπὶ σωμάτων γίγνεται καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀσωμάτων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.9 · How souls become noble

I.49.45.9

“All is well explained to me, mother,” Horus said, “but you have not yet told me how souls become noble.” “Just as upon earth, my child Horus, there are communities differing from one another, so it is with souls. They too have places from which they set out, and the soul that has set out from a more illustrious place is nobler than one whose situation is otherwise.[1602]

45.10 · Free and enslaved as an analogy

I.49.45.10

For just as among human beings the free person is considered nobler than the enslaved person, since what is superior and royal in souls necessarily enslaves what is inferior, so indeed, my child, <it is also with souls>.”[1603]

45.11 · Souls themselves are neither male nor female

I.49.45.11

“<And how, mother,> do souls become male and female?” “Souls, <O> my child Horus, share the same nature, since they come from a single region in which the creator gives them form, and they are neither male nor female. For such a condition arises in bodies, not in incorporeal things.[1604]

1602. Horus’s opening lacks an expressed verb; “explained” supplies the sense without adding a verb to the Greek. Politeiai can denote civic communities or their constitutions. The answer locates eugeneia, nobility or good birth, in the relative distinction of the souls’ originating places. The comparison with earthly status continues in the next sentence.

1603. The passage uses social slavery as an analogy and asserts that superiority entails domination. Dokei, “is considered,” belongs to the comparison between free and enslaved people; it does not qualify away the following assertion. The translation preserves this ancient hierarchy without converting it into a claim about modern personal worth. Wachsmuth supplies the concluding clause, marked in both languages.

1604. The opening address and the vocative particle in the answer are supplements in the edition. Homophyeis means sharing a nature or origin. The statement distinguishes souls in themselves from their bodily conditions; the following explanation assigns sex-related differences to embodiment. The one common region is not explicitly reconciled here with the preceding hierarchy of places.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.12 I.49.45.12

Ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ τοῦ τὰς μὲν βριμωδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς δὲ εὐαφεῖς ὁ ἀήρ ἐστι, τέκνον Ὧρε, ἐν ᾧ πάντα γίγνεται. Ἀὴρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ὃ περιβέβληται, ὅπερ στοιχείων ἐστὶ φύραμα, γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός.

45.13 I.49.45.13

Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὲν τῶν θηλειῶν σύγκριμα πλεονάζει μὲν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, λείπεται δὲ τῷ ξηρῷ καὶ θερμῷ, παρὰ τοῦτο ἡ εἰς τοιοῦτον πλάσμα συγκλειομένη ψυχὴ δίυγρος γίγνεται καὶ τρυφερά, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρένων τὸ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ γιγνόμενον εὑρεῖν. Ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτοις πλεονάζει μὲν τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ [τὸ] θερμόν, λείπεται δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν· διὰ τοῦτο αἱ ἐν τοιούτοις σώμασι ψυχαὶ τραχεῖαι καὶ ἐργατικώτεραί εἰσιν.

45.14 I.49.45.14

“Πῶς γίγνονται αἱ ψυχαὶ συνεταί, ᾧ τεκοῦσα;” Καὶ ἀπεκρίθη Ἶσις· “Τὸ ὁρατικόν, ᾧ τέκνον, περιβέβληται χιτῶσιν. Ὅταν οὗτοι οἱ χιτῶνες πυκνοὶ ὦσι καὶ παχεῖς, ἀμβλυωπεῖ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, ἐὰν δὲ ἀραιοὶ καὶ λεπτοί, τότε ὀξυωπέστατα βλέπει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.12 · The body as the soul's surrounding air I.49.45.12

The cause of the difference whereby some are more forceful and others gentle is the air, my child Horus, in which everything comes to be. The soul's air is the very body with which it is clothed, a mixture of the elements: earth, water, air, and fire.[1605]

45.13 · Bodily mixtures and temperament I.49.45.13

Since the female compound has an excess of moisture and cold but a deficiency of dryness and heat, the soul enclosed in such a fashioned body becomes moist through and through and tender. In males one finds the opposite occurring. In them dryness and [the] heat are in excess, while cold and moisture are deficient; therefore souls in such bodies are rough and more active.[1606]

45.14 · The eye as an analogy for understanding I.49.45.14

"How do souls become intelligent, mother?" Isis answered: "The organ of sight, my child, is clothed in coverings. When these coverings are dense and thick, the eye sees dimly; when they are loose in texture and thin, it sees with the greatest sharpness.[1607]

1605. Brimōdesterai suggests greater force or fierceness; euapheis literally evokes softness to the touch and here a gentler disposition. The unusual equation of the soul's "air" with the body is retained. It should not be silently replaced with a claim that the body consists only of air: the next clause explicitly names four elements.

1606. The explanation uses four qualities, moist, cold, dry, and hot, to account for bodily and temperamental differences. These are the dialogue's physiological assumptions, not established observations about women and men. Diugros intensifies moisture; ergatikōterai concerns greater activity or readiness for work. The rejected article before "heat" remains bracketed.

1607. To horatikon denotes what has the power of sight, here the eye or its seeing part. Chitōnes, literally tunics, refers to its coverings. The dimness in the first case follows the printed correction amblyōpei; the transmitted readings in the apparatus would disturb the contrast. The analogy prepares the explanation of the soul's coverings.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.15 I.49.45.15

Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἔχει γὰρ καὶ αὕτη ἴδια περιβόλαια ἀσώματα, καθὸ καὶ αὐτὴ ἀσώματός ἐστι. Τὰ δὲ περιβόλαια ταῦτα ἀέρες εἰσίν, οἱ ἐν ἡμῖν. Ὅταν οὖτοι ὦσι λεπτοὶ καὶ ἀραιοὶ καὶ διαυγεῖς, τότε συνετὴ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ τοὐναντίον πυκνοὶ καὶ παχεῖς καὶ τεθολωμένοι, τότε ὡς ἐν χειμῶνι ἐπὶ μακρὸν οὐ βλέπει, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὅσα παρὰ ποσὶ κεῖται.”

45.16 I.49.45.16

Καὶ εἶπεν Ὧρος· “Διὰ τίνα οὖν αἰτίαν, ὦ τεκοῦσα, οἱ ἔξω τῆς ἱερωτάτης ἡμῶν χώρας ἄνθρωποι ταῖς διανοίαις οὐκ ὄντως εἰσὶ συνετοί, ὡς οἱ ἡμέτεροι;” Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Ἡ γῆ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς ὑπτία κεῖται καὶ κεῖται ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος οὐρανὸν βλέπουσα, μεμερισμένη δὲ καθ᾽ ὅσα μέρη ὁ ἄνθρωπος μελίζεται· ἐμβλέπει δ᾽ οὐρανῷ καθάπερ πατρὶ ἰδίῳ, ὅπως ταῖς ἐκείνου μεταβολαῖς καὶ αὐτὴ τὰ ἴδια συμμεταβάλλῃ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.15 · The soul's airy coverings

I.49.45.15

So it is with the soul. She too has her own incorporeal coverings, since she herself is incorporeal. These coverings are the airs within us. When they are thin, loose in texture, and clear, the soul is intelligent; when, on the contrary, they are dense, thick, and clouded, she cannot see far, as in a storm, but only what lies at her feet."[1608]

45.16 · Horus asks about Egypt's understanding

I.49.45.16

Horus said, "For what reason, then, mother, are the people outside our most sacred country not truly intelligent in their thinking, as our own people are?" Isis replied: "Earth lies upon her back at the center of the universe, lying like a human being with her gaze upon heaven, divided into as many parts as the human being is divided. She looks upon heaven as upon her own father, so that, as he changes, she too may change her own conditions in concert.[1609]

1608. The text calls the coverings incorporeal and then identifies them as the airs within us; the translation preserves both descriptions. The plural aeres is not replaced with a single technical "spirit." The comparison extends the eye's clarity and obscurity to understanding. Cheimōn can denote stormy or wintry weather; the close-at-hand objects contrast with long-range vision.

1609. The most sacred country is Egypt within this dialogue of Isis and Horus. Horus's question asserts the intellectual superiority of its inhabitants; Isis's answer develops that claim through a symbolic geography. The printed ontōs means "truly," retained rather than the apparatus's proposed houtōs, "so." The repeated "lies" and the corrected clause about bodily divisions remain represented. These are claims within the text, not comparative findings about peoples.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.17 I.49.45.17

Καὶ πρὸς μὲν τῷ νότῳ τοῦ παντὸς κειμένην ἔχει τὴν κεφαλήν, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀπηλιώτῃ <τὸν> δεξιὸν ὦμον, <πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιβὶ τὸν εὐώνυμον>, ὑπὸ τῆς ἄρκτου τοὺς πόδας, <τὸν μὲν δεξιὸν ὑπὸ τὴν οὐράν,> τὸν δὲ εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου· τοὺς δὲ μηροὺς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὴν ἄρκτον· τὰ δὲ μέσα ἐν τοῖς μέσοις.

45.18 I.49.45.18

Καὶ τούτου σημεῖόν ἐστι τὸ τοὺς μὲν νοτιαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ κορυφῇ οἰκοῦντας εὐκορύφους καὶ καλλίτριχας, τοὺς δὲ ἀπηλιωτικοὺς πρὸς μάχην προχείρους εἶναι καὶ τοξικούς (αἰτία γὰρ τούτων ἡ δεξιὰ χείρ ἐστι)· τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λιβὶ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι [καὶ] ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀριστερομάχους καὶ ὅσον ἄλλοι τῷ δεξιῷ μέρει ἐνεργοῦσιν αὐτοὺς τῷ εὐωνύμῳ προστιθεμένους·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.17 · Earth's limbs and the directions I.49.45.17

She has her head lying toward the south of the universe, <her> right shoulder toward the east, <and her left toward the southwest>; her feet are beneath the Bear, <the right beneath its tail,> and the left beneath its head. Her thighs lie in the regions next after the Bear, and her middle parts in the middle regions.[1610]

45.18 · The peoples at the head and shoulders I.49.45.18

A sign of this is that the southerners, who dwell at the crown of the head, have fine heads and beautiful hair, while the eastern peoples are ready for battle and skilled in archery, the right hand being the cause of these qualities. Those in the southwest are steadfast [and], for the most part, fight with the left hand; whatever others accomplish with the right side, they apply themselves to with the left;[1611]

1610. The Greek names the directions through Notos, Apēliōtēs, and Lips; Lips is rendered "southwest," although the sequence sets it opposite the east. The Bear is the northern celestial marker. Three supplements restore an article and details of the left shoulder and right foot; they remain marked. The description is a bodily scheme of regions rather than a geometrically precise map.

1611. The descriptions derive human traits from the body part assigned to each region. Eukoryphous is rendered "having fine heads," retaining its connection with koryphē, the crown. Asphaleis may suggest firmness or security; "steadfast" remains provisional. The rejected conjunction is visible. These regional characterizations serve the passage's analogy and should not be mistaken for demonstrated traits of populations.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.19 I.49.45.19

τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν ἄρκτον πρωτεύοντας τοὺς πόδας καὶ ἄλλους εὐκνήμους· τοὺς δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ μικρῷ πόρρω τὸ νῦν Ἰταλικὸν κλίμα <κατοικοῦντας> καὶ τὸ Ἑλλαδικόν, πάντας δὴ τούτους καλλιμήρους εἶναι καὶ εὐπυγοτέρους, ὥστε τῇ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν μερῶν τούτων ὑπερβολῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρώπους καταβαίνειν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν. Πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀργὰ ὄντα ἀργοτέρους ἤνεγκε καὶ τοὺς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους.

45.20 I.49.45.20

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς γῆς κεῖται ἡ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν ἱερωτάτη χώρα, τὸ δὲ μέσον τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος μόνης τῆς καρδίας ἐστὶ σηκός, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμητήριόν ἐστι καρδία, παρὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὦ τέκνον, <οἱ> ἐνταῦθα ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχουσιν οὐχ ἧττον ὅσα καὶ πάντες, ἐξαίρετον δὲ τῶν πάντων νοεροί εἰσι καὶ σώφρονες, ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ καρδίας γενόμενοι καὶ τραφέντες.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.19 · The northern legs and the regions of the thighs I.49.45.19

those beneath the Bear excel in their feet, and others have fine lower legs. Those next after them, a little farther away, <inhabiting> what is now the Italian region and the Greek region, all have beautiful thighs and especially fine buttocks, so that the surpassing beauty of these parts leads the people there even to intercourse with males. All these parts, being inactive in comparison with the others, have also produced more inactive inhabitants.[1612]

45.20 · Egypt as the earth's heart I.49.45.20

But our ancestors' most sacred country lies in the middle of the earth. The middle of the human body is the enclosure of the heart alone, and the heart is the soul's starting place. For this reason, my child, <the> people here possess no less of all the other qualities than everyone else, but are exceptionally intelligent and temperate above them all, having been born and brought up at the heart.[1613]

1612. The accusative construction continues through the Italian and Greek regions. The supplied "inhabiting" and printed corrections for fine thighs and buttocks are retained. The text connects these regions with male sexual intercourse and inactivity as part of its bodily analogy. The wording is translated directly without assigning a modern sexual identity to its inhabitants or treating the geographical claim as evidence about them.

1613. The heart completes the preceding distribution of body parts among regions. Sēkos means an enclosure and can carry sacred associations; hormētērion is a point of departure or base of activity. The supplied article remains marked. The claim of exceptional Egyptian intelligence and moderation is the conclusion of Isis's symbolic argument, not a geographical measurement or a modern comparison of abilities.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.21

I.49.45.21

Ἄλλως τε ὁ μὲν νότος, ὦ παῖ, δεκτικὸς ὢν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος συνισταμένων νεφῶν * * (αὐτίκα γοῦν καὶ διὰ τὴν οὕτως αὐτῶν γενομένην ἐκεῖ κατακομιδὴν ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖν λέγουσιν καὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον πο<ταμὸν> λυομένης ἐκεῖ τῆς πάχνης)· ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν ἐμπέσῃ νεφέλη, τὸν ἐπικείμενον ἤχλυσεν ἀέρα καὶ τρόπον τινὰ καπνοῦ κατεκόμισε, καπνὸς δὲ ἡ ἀχλὺς οὐ μόνον ὀμμάτων ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ.

45.22

I.49.45.22

Ὁ δὲ ἀπηλιώτης, ὦ μεγαλόδοξε Ὥρε, τῇ συνεχεῖ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνατολῇ θορυβούμενος καὶ ἐκθερμαινόμενος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀντικείμενος τούτῳ λὶψ μετέχων τῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ δυσμὰς οὐδεμίαν εἰλικρινῆ ἐπίστασιν ποιοῦνται τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἀνθρώπων. Ὁ δὲ βορέας τῇ συμφώνῳ ψυχρίᾳ ἀποπήσσει μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.21 · Southern clouds and obscured understanding I.49.45.21

Moreover, the south, my child, being receptive to the clouds that gather from the surrounding atmosphere * * (indeed, because they are thus carried down there, people say that our <river> too flows from there as the frost melts there). Wherever a cloud descends, it makes the overlying air misty and brings down, in a fashion, something of smoke. Mist is smoke, an obstacle not only to the eyes but also to the mind.[1614]

45.22 · East, west, and north I.49.45.22

The east, Horus of great renown, is continually disturbed and heated by the rising of the Sun; likewise the southwest opposite it shares the same effects at sunset. They provide no clear mental attention in the human beings born in their regions. The north, with its corresponding cold, freezes the minds of those beneath it along with their bodies.[1615]

1614. The gap after “clouds” remains. Wachsmuth restores part of potamon, “river”; English marks the whole word because an equivalent partial-word restoration is impractical. The river is understood as the Nile, but the name is not inserted into the Greek. The melting frost is part of the reported explanation. The phrase with “smoke” is grammatically awkward; the translation leaves its analogy provisional rather than adopting an unprinted supplement. Obscured air is linked back to obscured understanding.

1615. The Greek moves from separate singular descriptions of the directions to a plural verb. Epistasis can denote attention or application of mind; its construction with “the people born there” is difficult, and the English interpretation is provisional. The contrasting effects of heat and cold support the account’s praise of the middle region. The directional term Lips remains “southwest,” even though it is treated as opposite the sunrise.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.23 I.49.45.23

Τὸ δὲ μέσον τούτων εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ ἀτάραχον καὶ αὐτὸ προέχει καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσι. Τῇ γὰρ συνεχεῖ ἀμεριμνίᾳ γεννᾷ καὶ κοσμεῖ καὶ παιδεύει καὶ μόνον τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐρίζει καὶ νικᾷ καὶ ἐπισταμένως τὴν ἰδίαν νίκην ὥσπερ σατράπης ἀγαθὸς τοῖς νενικημένοις καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.23 · The middle region shares its victory I.49.45.23

The region between them, being clear and undisturbed, excels both in itself and in all its inhabitants. Through its continual freedom from care it brings them forth, orders them, and educates them; it competes and conquers only by such means, and skillfully shares its own victory with the conquered, like a good satrap."[1616]

1616. The printed proechei, "excels," and the accompanying pronouns are editorial corrections. English supplies the inhabitants as the objects of begetting, ordering, and educating from the preceding sentence. A satrap is a provincial governor; here the image concerns the generous administration of victory. This closes Isis's present explanation. Horus's next question concerns impairment of speech, reasoning, and soul during prolonged illness.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.24 I.49.45.24

“Καὶ τοῦτό μοι, κυρία μῆτερ, ἔκθου· παρὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν ἔτι ζώντων ἀνθρώπων ἐν ταῖς μακραῖς νόσοις καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λογισμὸς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε βλάπτεται;”

45.25 I.49.45.25

Καὶ ἀπεκρίθη Ἶσις· “Τῶν ζώντων, ὦ τέκνον, τὰ μὲν ᾠκείωται πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἀέρα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς γῆν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τούτων δύο ἢ τρία, τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα. Πάλιν αὖ τὰ μὲν ἀπηλλοτρίωται τοῦ πυρός, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος, τὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, τὰ δὲ δύο τούτων, τὰ δὲ τριῶν, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὅλων.

45.26 I.49.45.26

Οἷον ἀκρὶς μέν, ὦ τέκνον, καὶ πᾶσα μυῖα φεύγει τὸ πῦρ· ἀετὸς καὶ κίρκος καὶ ὅσα ὑψιπετέστερά ἐστιν τῶν ὀρνέων φεύγει τὸ ὕδωρ· ἰχθύες ἀέρα καὶ γῆν· ὄφις τὸν ἀέρα τὸν εἰλικρινῆ ἀποστρέφεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.24 · Illness and the soul

I.49.45.24

“Explain this to me too, lady mother: for what reason, while people are still alive, are speech, reasoning itself, and the soul itself sometimes impaired in prolonged illnesses?”[1617]

45.25 · Affinity and aversion to the elements

I.49.45.25

Isis answered: “Among living things, my child, some have an affinity with fire, others with water, others with air, others with earth; some with two or three of these, and some with all of them. Conversely, some are averse to fire, others to water, others to earth, others to air; some to two of these, some to three, and some to all of them.[1618]

45.26 · Animals and the elements they avoid

I.49.45.26

For example, my child, the locust and every fly avoid fire. The eagle, the hawk, and those birds that fly higher avoid water; fish avoid air and earth; the snake turns away from pure air.[1619]

1617. Horus’s question resumes the dialogue after Isis’s praise of Egypt’s middle position. Logos is rendered “speech” beside logismos, “reasoning”; the two words can overlap, but the repeated wording is retained. The question concerns impairment during embodied life, not the destruction of the soul. The numbered suffixes remain modern comparison aids.

1618. The paired verbs oikeiōsthai and apēllotriōsthai express affinity and estrangement. The printed zōntōn means living things; the apparatus proposes zōiōn, animals, but the facing Greek retains the printed text. The four elements supply the framework for the subsequent explanation of bodily and mental disturbance.

1619. Isis offers examples of aversion before naming affinities. Eilikrinēs, “pure,” describes unmixed or clear air. The assertions belong to the dialogue’s elemental explanation; they should not be expanded into a modern account of animal physiology. Kirkos is rendered by the general bird-name “hawk,” without a more specific species identification.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.27 I.49.45.27

Φιλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν γῆν οἱ ὄφεις καὶ ὅσα ἕρπει· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ τὰ νηκτὰ πάντα· τὸν δὲ ἀέρα τὰ πτηνά, ἐν οἷς καὶ πολιτεύεται, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ὅσα ὑπερπετῆ ἐστι καὶ ἐγγὺς <ἔχει> τὴν δίαιταν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τινα τῶν ζῴων φιλεῖ τὸ πῦρ· οἷον αἱ σαλαμάνδραι, ἐν γὰρ τῷ πυρὶ καὶ φωλεύουσιν.

45.28 I.49.45.28

Ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων περιβολή ἐστι τῶν σωμάτων. Πᾶσα οὖν ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὖσα βαρεῖται καὶ θλίβεται τοῖς τέτταρσι τούτοις. Καὶ γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι καὶ ταύτην τισὶ μὲν τούτων τέρπεσθαι, τισὶ δὲ ἄχθεσθαι. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ ἔχει αὕτη τὴν ἀκροτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν φύσει θεία οὖσα, κἂν τούτοις οὖσα μάχεται καὶ νοεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅσα ἂν ἐνόησεν ἀσύνδετος οὖσα σωμάτων.

45.29 I.49.45.29

Ἐὰν μέντοι καὶ ταῦτα σάλον λάβῃ καὶ ταραχὴν ἤτοι ἀπὸ νόσου ἢ φόβου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ ὡσπερεὶ βυθῷ ἀνθέρικος ἐπικυμαίνεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑσταμένον φέρει.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

45.27 · Habitats and the fire-loving salamander I.49.45.27

Snakes and all creeping things love earth; all swimming creatures love water; winged creatures love air, in which they also live; and those that fly very high and <have> their dwelling nearby love fire. Indeed, some animals also love fire: salamanders, for example, even make their lairs in fire.[1620]

45.28 · The embodied soul's restricted happiness I.49.45.28

For each element is an enclosure for bodies. Every soul, then, while in the body, is weighed down and pressed upon by these four. It is reasonable that the soul too should take pleasure in some of them and be troubled by others. For this reason it does not possess the highest happiness. Yet, being divine by nature, even among these it struggles and thinks, though not as much as it would have thought if unbound from bodies.[1621]

45.29 · The soul tossed like a stalk I.49.45.29

But if these too are shaken and disturbed, whether by illness or by fear, then the soul itself is tossed upon the waves like a stalk upon the deep, and maintains nothing steady."[1622]

1620. The phrase en hois kai politeuetai is disturbed: the plural "in which" sits awkwardly beside singular air. English gives its likely contextual sense, while retaining the printed Greek. Wachsmuth discusses deletion or correction in the apparatus but does not mark either in his text. The supplied verb "have" remains marked. The fire-dwelling salamander is a claim made by the ancient speaker, not a zoological observation adopted here.

1621. Peribolē denotes an enclosing covering or surrounding. The passage carries the affinities of animals over to the soul's relation to the elements. The soul remains divine and capable of thought, although its embodied condition restricts that activity. "Happiness" renders eudaimonia, here the soul's fullest well-being.

1622. This closes excerpt 45. "These" looks back to the bodily elements or the bodily conditions they constitute. Antherikos, "stalk," is the printed correction of a transmitted word meaning "human being." The image explains instability through the disturbance of the soul's surroundings. It does not say that the soul becomes mortal.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

46.1 I.49.46.1

Περὶ τῆς τῶν ψυχῶν διαγωγῆς μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔξοδον· χρησμός.

Σῶμα λυθὲν ψυχήν τε λιπὸν καὶ <γαῖ>α γενηθὲν
οὐκέτι πως βιότοιο παλίνδρομον οἶδε κέλευθον,
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λυθέν ἐστι κενὴ <κόνι>ς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αἴθρην
σκίδναται, ὁππόθεν ἦλθε, μετήορος εἰς αἰθέρ᾽ ἁπλοῦν.
Ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου γεννώμενος ἠδ᾽ ἀναβλαστὼν
ψυχοῦται γονίμου φύσεως ἀροτρεύμασι καινοῖς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

46.1 · An oracle on the soul’s departure

I.49.46.1

On the souls’ manner of life after leaving the body: an oracle.

A body dissolved, having left the soul and become <earth>,
no longer knows any path that leads back to life.
What has dissolved is empty <dust>; the soul scatters
toward the clear sky whence it came, aloft into simple aether.
But one born from another and sprouting anew
is given soul by fertile nature’s fresh tillings.[1623]

1623. The heading names an oracle without identifying its god or source. Wachsmuth supplies parts of gaia and konis; English marks the complete words “earth” and “dust.” The final phrase of line 4 is textually uncertain, as the apparatus’s alternatives show; “simple aether” provisionally follows the printed wording. The final singular verb means “is ensouled,” not “grows cold.” The return of this dissolved body is denied, while fresh generation is affirmed.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 414

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.1 I.49.47.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Ἀξιόχου.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερον βούλει λόγον ἀκοῦσαι, ὃν ἐμοὶ ἤγγειλε Γωβρίης, ἀνὴρ μάγος, [ὃς] ἔφη κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασιν τὸν πάππον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμώνυμον πεμφθέντα εἰς Δῆλον, ὅπως τηρήσειε τὴν νῆσον ἄσυλον ἐν ᾗ <οἱ> δύο θεοὶ ἐγένοντο, ἔκ τινων χαλκέων δέλτων, ἃς <ἐξ> Ὑπερβορέων ἐκόμισαν Ὦπις καὶ Ἑκάεργος, ἐκμεμαθηκέναι [τε]

47.2 I.49.47.2

μετὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος λύσιν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸν ἄδηλον χωρεῖν τόπον καὶ τὴν ὑπόγειον οἴκησιν, ἐν ᾗ βασίλεια Πλούτωνος οὐχ ἧττω τῶν Διός, ἅτε τῆς γῆς μὲν ἐχούσης τὰ μέσα τοῦ κόσμου, τοῦ πόλου δὲ ὄντος σφαιροειδοῦς· οὗ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἡμισφαίριον θεοὶ ἔλαχον οἱ οὐράνιοι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οἱ ὑπένερθεν, οἱ μὲν ἀδελφοὶ ὄντες, οἱ δὲ ἀδελφῶν παῖδες.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.1 · Axiochus: the account of Gobryas

I.49.47.1

Plato, from the Axiochus.

And if you wish to hear another account, which Gobryas, a Magus, reported to me: [who] said that, at the time of Xerxes' crossing, his grandfather and namesake was sent to Delos to keep inviolate the island where <the> two gods were born. From certain bronze tablets, which Opis and Hecaergos brought <from> the Hyperboreans, he had learned [also][1624]

47.2 · The two hemispheres of the gods

I.49.47.2

that after the body's dissolution the soul travels to the unseen region and the dwelling beneath the earth. There Pluto has a palace no less grand than Zeus's, since earth occupies the center of the universe and the heavens are spherical. Of their two hemispheres the heavenly gods received one, and the gods below the other, some being brothers, others children of brothers.[1625]

1624. The heading is reproduced as Stobaeus transmits it; it is an attribution, not an independent judgment of authorship. Wachsmuth locates the extract at Axiochus 371A-372A. Magos identifies a Persian religious figure. The sentence begins conditionally and shifts into reported speech; the English colon makes that transition readable. Both rejected connectives and supplied words remain marked. Hecaergos follows this text, although the apparatus gives Hecaerge in the parallel tradition.

1625. The reported teaching continues from the preceding unit. Basileia means a royal dwelling or palace. The familial relationship of the gods supports the comparison of their realms. The passage presents a mythical geography with a spherical heaven and a central earth; its language does not supply dimensions or an astronomical demonstration.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 414-415

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.3 I.49.47.3

Τὰ δὲ προπύλαια τῆς εἰς Πλούτωνος ὁδοῦ σιδηροῖς τείχεσι καὶ κλεισὶ διωχύρωται. Ταῦτα δὲ ἀνοίξαντα ποταμὸς Ἀχέρων ἐκδέχεται, μεθ᾽ ὃν Κωκυτός· οὓς χρὴ πορθμευθέντας ἀχθῆναι ἐπὶ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν ἐν πεδίῳ ᾧ κλήζεται ἀληθείας.

47.4 I.49.47.4

Καθέζονται δὲ δικασταὶ ἀνακρίνοντες τῶν ἀφικνουμένων ἕκαστον, τίνα βίον βεβίωκε καὶ τίσιν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐνῳκίσθη τῷ σώματι. Ψεύσασθαι δὲ ἀμήχανον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.3 · The gates and rivers of the underworld I.49.47.3

The entrance to the road leading to Pluto's dwelling is fortified with iron walls and bars. Once a person has opened these, the river Acheron receives him, and after it Cocytus. Having been ferried across them, one must be brought before Minos and Rhadamanthys, in a plain called the Plain of Truth.[1626]

47.4 · Judgment without concealment I.49.47.4

They sit as judges, examining each arrival about the life he has lived and the pursuits with which he dwelt in the body. It is impossible to lie.[1627]

1626. The Greek shifts from a singular arrival at the river to a plural construction for those ferried across. English uses "a person" and "one" to carry the sequence. Minos and Rhadamanthys serve as the judges named in the following sentence. The rivers are treated again, through interpretations of their names, in excerpt 50.

1627. Enōikisthē expresses residence in the body. The inquiry concerns both the whole course of life and its particular practices, epitēdeumata. The impossibility of lying gives the Plain of Truth its immediate narrative force.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.5 I.49.47.5

Οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δαίμων ἀγαθὸς ἐπέπνευσεν, εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐσεβῶν χῶρον λογίζονται, ἔνθα ἄφθονοι μὲν ὧραι παγκάρπου γονῆς βρύουσι, πηγαὶ δὲ ὑδάτων καθαρῶν, παντοῖοι δὲ λειμῶνες εὐάνθεσι ποικίλοις ἐαριζόμενοι, διατριβαὶ δὲ ποιητῶν καὶ θέατρα φιλοσόφων καὶ ἐγκύκλιοι χοροὶ καὶ μουσικὰ ἀκούσματα, συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ καὶ εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα δίαιτα.

47.6 I.49.47.6

Οὔτε γὰρ χεῖμα σφοδρὸν οὔτε θάλπος ἐγγίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ εὔκρατος ἀὴρ χεῖται ἁπαλαῖσιν ἀκτῖσιν ἡλίου ἀνακιρνάμενος· καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μεμυημένοις ἐστί τις προεδρία· καὶ τὰς ὁσίους ἁγιστείας κἀκεῖ συντελοῦσιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.5 · The region of the pious

I.49.47.5

Those upon whom a good daimon breathed during life are reckoned among the inhabitants of the region of the pious. There the seasons abound in crops of every kind; there are springs of pure water, meadows of every sort in spring bloom with varied lovely flowers, gatherings of poets and theaters of philosophers, circular dances and musical performances, melodious drinking parties and feasts that provide themselves, unspoiled freedom from pain and a pleasant way of life.[1628]

47.6 · Temperate air and the initiates' privilege

I.49.47.6

For neither severe winter nor burning heat occurs there; temperate air flows around, mingled with the gentle rays of the Sun. In this place the initiated have a certain precedence, and there too they perform their holy rites.[1629]

1628. Daimōn agathos is a beneficent divine power or attendant spirit. "Are reckoned among the inhabitants" follows logizontai rather than substituting the parallel reading "are settled." Wachsmuth's text has gatherings of poets and theaters of philosophers; the apparatus reports the opposite pairing in the parallel text. Eumelē, "melodious," and the self-providing feasts are likewise retained.

1629. Proedria literally suggests a place in the front seats and here conveys privileged standing. The repeated "there" carries earthly initiation and observance into the blessed region. The rites themselves are not described.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 415-416

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.7 I.49.47.7

Πῶς οὖν οὐ σοι πρώτῳ μέτεστι τῆς τιμῆς, ὄντι γεννήτῃ τῶν θεῶν; καὶ γὰρ τοὺς περὶ Ἡρακλέα καὶ Διόνυσον κατιόντας εἰς Ἅιδην πρότερον ἐνθάδε λόγος μυηθῆναι καὶ τὸ θάρσος τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας παρὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας ἐναύσασθαι.

47.8 I.49.47.8

Ὅσοις δὲ τὸ ζῆν διὰ κακουργημάτων ἠλάθη, ἄγονται πρὸς Ἐρινυῶν εἰς ἔρεβος καὶ χάος διὰ ταρτάρου, ἔνθα χῶρος ἀσεβῶν καὶ Δαναΐδων ὑδρεῖαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ Ταντάλου δίψος καὶ Τιτυοῦ σπλάγχνα αἰωνίως ἐσθιόμενα καὶ γεννώμενα καὶ Σισύφου πέτρος ἀνήνυτος· οὗ τὰ τέρματα αὖθις ἄρχεται [τῶν] πόνων· ἔνθα θηρσὶ περιλιχμώμενοι καὶ δασὶν ἐπιμόνως πυρούμενοι Ποινῶν καὶ πᾶσαν αἰκίαν αἰκιζόμενοι ἀιδίοις τιμωρίαις τρύχονται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

47.7 · Divine kinship and the Eleusinian goddess I.49.47.7

How, then, should you not have the first share in this honor, being a kinsman of the gods? For Heracles and Dionysus, when descending to Hades, are said to have been initiated here beforehand and to have kindled their courage for the journey there from the Eleusinian goddess.[1630]

47.8 · The punishments of the impious I.49.47.8

But those whose lives were driven through wrongdoing are led by the Erinyes into gloom and chaos through Tartarus. There is the region of the impious, the Danaids' uncompleted water-carrying, Tantalus's thirst, Tityus's entrails forever eaten and regenerated, and Sisyphus's unending labor with the stone: there the ends [of the] toils begin again. There, licked all over by wild beasts, persistently burned by the torches of the Punishments, and tormented with every torment, they waste away under everlasting penalties.[1631]

1630. Gennētēs denotes a member of the same kin or clan; it is not translated as "begetter" of the gods. The address now applies the reported account to the dialogue's addressee. "Kindled" preserves the image in enausasthai. The Greek calls the goddess "the Eleusinian" without giving her name.

1631. The Erinyes are avenging divine powers; Poinai, capitalized here as "Punishments," are personified agents of requital. The difficult clause about ends beginning again is retained, with its rejected article represented by "[of the]." "Wild beasts" follows thērsi rather than a variant involving fire. The perpetual eating and regeneration of Tityus's entrails appears in Stobaeus's text even though the apparatus reports its absence from the parallel Axiochus. Excerpt 47 ends here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

48.1 I.49.48.1

Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ.

Οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς γενικοῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς, τῆς τοῦ παντός, πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαί εἰσιν αὗται, <αἱ> ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ κυλινδούμεναι, ὥσπερ ἀπονενεμημέναι; Τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ψυχῶν πολλαὶ αἱ μεταβολαί, τῶν μὲν εἰς τὸ εὐτυχέστερον, τῶν δ᾽ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον.

48.2 I.49.48.2

Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑρπετώδεις οὖσαι εἰς ἔνυδρα μεταβάλλουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔνυδροι εἰς χερσαῖα, αἱ δὲ χερσαῖαι εἰς πετεινά, αἱ δὲ ἀέριαι εἰς ἀνθρώπους, αἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπιναι ἀρχὴν ἀθανασίας ἴσχουσαι εἰς δαίμονας μεταβάλλουσιν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως εἰς τὸν τῶν θεῶν χορόν· χοροὶ δὲ δύο θεῶν, ὁ μὲν τῶν πλανωμένων, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀπλανῶν. Καὶ αὕτη ψυχῆς ἡ τελειοτάτη δόξα. Ψυχὴ δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐλθοῦσα ἐὰν κακὴ μείνῃ, οὔποτε τεύξεται ἀθανασίας, παλίσσυτος δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑποστρέψει τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἑρπετά. Καὶ αὕτη καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

48.1 · Hermes to Tat: one soul and many souls I.49.48.1

Hermes, from the writings addressed to Tat.

Have you not heard in the general teachings that all these souls come from one soul, the soul of the whole, <those> that roll about throughout the universe as though distributed into portions? These souls, then, undergo many changes, some toward a more fortunate condition, others toward its opposite.[1632]

48.2 · Ascent and reversal through living forms I.49.48.2

For souls in creeping creatures change into aquatic creatures; aquatic souls into land animals; terrestrial souls into birds; aerial souls into human beings. Human souls, attaining a beginning of immortality, change into daimons, and then in this way enter the company of the gods. There are two companies of gods, the wandering and the fixed. This is the soul's most perfect glory. But a soul that has entered human beings, if it remains evil, will never attain immortality; driven backward, it will retrace the road toward creeping creatures. This is the condemnation of an evil soul.[1633]

1632. The source heading identifies Hermes and Tat; Wachsmuth adds locators in Patrizi, p. 10, and Parthey, p. 71, line 7. "General teachings" renders ta genika without inventing the full title of a lost work. The supplied article is represented by "those." Hōsper, "as though," qualifies the distribution of souls and is retained.

1633. Choros is a chorus, dance, or ordered company; the two divine companies evoke wandering and fixed celestial bodies. The sequence includes both ascent and reversal into animal forms. The phrase "a beginning of immortality" is retained rather than assimilated to other Hermetic formulations. Excerpt 49 will expressly forbid a human soul's entry into an irrational animal: the anthology places different accounts beside one another.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

48.3 I.49.48.3

Κακία δὲ ψυχῆς ἀγνωσία. Ψυχὴ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐπιγνοῦσα τῶν ὄντων μηδὲ τὴν τούτων φύσιν μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τυφλώττουσα δὲ ἐντινάσσεται τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἡ κακοδαίμων ἀγνοήσασα ἑαυτὴν δουλεύει σώμασιν ἀλλοκότοις καὶ μοχθηροῖς ὥσπερ φορτίον βαστάζουσα τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἄρχουσα ἀλλ᾽ ἀρχομένη. Αὕτη κακία ψυχῆς.

49.1 I.49.49.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ψυχὴ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη <οὐ> πᾶσα μέν, ἡ δ᾽ εὐσεβὴς δαιμονία τίς ἐστι καὶ θεία. Καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ σώματος τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀγῶνα ἀγωνισαμένη (ἀγὼν δὲ εὐσεβείας τὸ γνῶναι τὸ θεῖον καὶ μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ἀδικῆσαι), ὅλη νοῦς γίγνεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

48.3 · Ignorance as the soul's evil

I.49.48.3

The soul's evil is ignorance. For a soul that has come to know none of the things that exist, neither their nature nor the good, is blind and is tossed about amid bodily affections. Unhappy in its ignorance of itself, it is enslaved to strange and wretched bodies, carrying the body like a burden and no longer ruling but being ruled. This is the soul's evil.[1634]

49.1 · The pious soul becomes wholly mind

I.49.49.1

By the same author.

A human soul, <not> every one, but the pious soul, is something daimonic and divine. Such a soul, after it has been released from the body and has fought the contest of piety (the contest of piety is to know the divine and to wrong no human being), becomes wholly mind.[1635]

1634. Agnōsia is lack of knowledge or recognition. The explanation moves from ignorance of reality and the good to ignorance of oneself. "Affections" translates pathē broadly, allowing both bodily experiences and passions. The antithesis between ruling and being ruled closes excerpt 48.

1635. The heading refers to Hermes; Wachsmuth's locators are Patrizi p. 11b and Parthey p. 79, line 13. The supplied negation restricts the statement to the pious soul. Greek compresses the temporal clause and the completed contest into one construction; it does not clearly specify a new contest after death. "Wholly mind" preserves the emphatic holē nous. Piety combines knowledge of the divine with justice toward other people.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

49.2

I.49.49.2

Ἡ δὲ ἀσεβὴς ψυχὴ μένει ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς κολαζομένη καὶ γήινον σῶμα ζητοῦσα εἰσελθεῖν, [εἰς] ἀνθρώπινον δέ· ἄλλο γὰρ σῶμα οὐ χωρεῖ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχήν, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν εἰς ἀλόγου ζῴου σῶμα ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην καταπεσεῖν· θεοῦ γὰρ νόμος οὗτος φυλάσσειν ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕβρεως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

49.2 · Human souls and human bodies I.49.49.2

But the impious soul remains in its own substance, punished by itself and seeking an earthly body to enter, [into] a human one, however. For no other body can contain a human soul, nor is it lawful for a human soul to fall into the body of an irrational animal. This is God's law: to preserve a human soul from such an outrage.[1636]

1636. The rejected preposition is retained in brackets. This passage limits renewed embodiment to human bodies, in contrast with the descent into creeping creatures in excerpt 48. No unexpressed reconciliation is inserted. Hybris here is the degradation or outrage that animal embodiment would constitute within this account. The self-inflicted punishment is asserted without a further description of its mechanism.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.1 I.49.50.1

Πορφυρίου ἐκ τῶν περὶ Στυγός.

Τοῦ δὲ Ἀπολλοδώρου ἐν τῷ εἰκοστῷ τοῦ περὶ τῶν θεῶν συγγράμματος, ὅ ἐστι περὶ τοῦ Ἅδου, τάδε περὶ τῆς Στυγὸς λεγόμενα εὕρομεν.

50.2 I.49.50.2

“Ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτων, τῆς τε ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων παρεμφάσεως οὐ καταφρονητέον. Ἐκ γὰρ τοιούτων ὁρμώμενοι πιθανῶς καὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἅδου νομιζομένους ποταμοὺς κατωνομάκασιν. Ἀχέροντα μὲν διὰ τὰ ἄχη, ὡς καὶ Μελανιππίδης ἐν Περσεφόνῃ·

50.3 I.49.50.3

καλεῖται δ᾽ ἐν κόλποισι γαίας
ἄχεα <βροτ>οῖσιν προχέων Ἀχέρων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.1 · Porphyry on Apollodorus's account of Hades I.49.50.1

Porphyry, from the writings On the Styx.

In the twentieth book of Apollodorus's work On the Gods, which deals with Hades, we found the following statements about the Styx.[1637]

50.2 · Interpreting the rivers' names I.49.50.2

"For we must begin with these matters, and we must not disregard the suggestion conveyed by the names. Starting from considerations of this sort, people have plausibly named even the rivers believed to exist in Hades: Acheron, for example, from achē, 'sorrows,' as Melanippides too says in Persephone:[1638]

50.3 · Melanippides on Acheron I.49.50.3

And in earth's hollows he is called Acheron,
pouring forth sorrows for <mortals>.[1639]

1637. The outer author is Porphyry, who introduces a quotation from Apollodorus. Wachsmuth cites the latter as fragment 10 in Müller, Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum I, p. 429, and Heyne I, p. 391. Those are editorial finding aids, not words in the ancient passage. The following explanation begins with Acheron before reaching Styx.

1638. The interpretive argument rests on similarities of sound: Acheron is connected with achē, "sorrows." These are the author's explanations of mythical names, not established linguistic derivations. Wachsmuth begins Apollodorus's quotation here, although the apparatus records proposals assigning the opening sentences to Porphyry. The facing text follows the printed quotation boundary.

1639. Wachsmuth cites Melanippides, fragment 3, Bergk, third edition, p. 1245. The restored letters form part of brotoisin, "for mortals"; the translation marks the complete word. Word order is adjusted across the two English lines to make the name's relation to the verb clear, while retaining the verse as two lines.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.4 I.49.50.4

Ἐπεὶ καὶ Λικύμνιός φησι·

μυρίαις παγαῖς δακρύων <Ἀχέρων> ἀχέων τε βρύει,
καὶ πάλιν·

Ἀχέρων ἄχεα πορθμεύει βροτοῖσιν·

50.5 I.49.50.5

Ἀχέρων δὲ καὶ Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ταὐτόν, ὡς καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Πολυξένῃ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως ψυχὴν εἰσάγει λέγουσαν·

Ἀκτὰς ἀπαίωνάς τε καὶ μελαμβαθεῖς
λιποῦσα λίμνης ἦλθον ἄρσενας χοὰς
Ἀχέροντος ὀξυπλῆγας ἠχούσας γόους,

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.4 · Licymnius: springs of tears

I.49.50.4

For Licymnius too says:

With countless springs of tears and sorrows <Acheron> brims,
and again:

Acheron ferries sorrows to mortals.[1640]

50.5 · Sophocles: the soul of Achilles

I.49.50.5

Acheron and the Acherusian lake are the same, as Sophocles too presents Achilles' soul saying in Polyxena:

Leaving the lake's shores without a paean, dark in their depths,
I have come, leaving the male streams
of Acheron that ring with sharply striking laments,[1641]

1640. The two citations are Licymnius fragments 1 and 2 in Bergk, third edition, p. 1251. In the first, the name Acheron is supplied and remains marked. Pagais is the poetic form of "springs." The second quotation turns the underworld crossing into an image of sorrows ferried to human beings.

1641. Wachsmuth cites Sophocles, fragment 478 in Nauck. The speaker is Achilles' soul, hence the feminine participle lipousa. The Greek delays the object "male streams" after "I have come"; English repeats "leaving" to convey that construction. The unusual adjectives are interpreted by the following prose. The printed verse reflects editorial corrections and a transposition recorded in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.6 I.49.50.6

<ἀπαίωνας ἀκτάς> τὰς τῶν νεκρῶν λέγων παιῶν᾽ οὐκ ἐχούσας, ἄρσενας δὲ <χοὰς> τὰς οὐδὲν ἐκφερούσας. Θήλεα μὲν γὰρ τὰ καρποφόρα, ἄρσενα δὲ τὰ ἄγονα ἔλεγον τῷ τὸν μὲν τὸ σπέρμα παρέχειν μόνον, τὴν δὲ καὶ ἐκτρέφειν· ὅθεν καὶ ‘θῆλυς ἐέρση’ ἡ πολύγονος καὶ τροφίμη.

50.7 I.49.50.7

Διαπεραιοῦσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπογενομένων τὸν Ἀχέροντά φασιν εἰκότως· ὁ γὰρ μετηλλαχὼς πάντα τἄν τῷ ζῆν ἄχη σχεδὸν ὑπερέσχε καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἀπονίᾳ καὶ ἀλυπίᾳ πάσῃ. Γοργύραν δὲ τοῦ Ἀχέροντος γυναῖκα προσανέπλασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ γοργὰ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰ ἐν Ἅδου· καθὸ δὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου τιθήνην ὁ Σώφρων Μορμολύκαν ὠνόμασεν.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.6 · Unhealed shores and barren streams

I.49.50.6

By <“shores without a paean”> he means the shores of the dead, which have no healer; by male <“streams,”> those that bring forth nothing. For they called fruitful things female and barren things male, because the male supplies only the seed, while the female also nurtures. Hence “female dew” means dew that produces abundantly and nourishes.[1642]

50.7 · Leaving sorrow and naming Gorgyra

I.49.50.7

They reasonably say that Acheron is crossed by those who have departed: for one who has died has passed beyond almost all the sorrows of living and is in complete freedom from distress and pain. They also fashioned Gorgyra as Acheron’s wife because the things in Hades appear terrifying to most people. Accordingly, Sophron also called his very nurse Mormolyca.”[1643]

1642. The interpretation plays upon apaiōn, “without a paean,” and paiōn, a healer. Both supplied expressions remain marked. The male/female distinction is this commentator’s explanation of the imagery, not an added biological claim. “Female dew” is Homer, Odyssey 5.467, identified in Wachsmuth’s parenthesis. The phrase may be rendered “fertile dew,” but the literal adjective is retained to preserve the argument.

1643. The printed contraction t’an tōi zēn represents “the things in living.” The connection with sorrows makes crossing Acheron an escape from pain, despite the darker associations of the river’s name. Gorgyra is linked with gorga, “terrifying”; Mormolyca evokes a frightening bogey. “His” refers most naturally to Acheron. The quotation attributed to Apollodorus closes here before Porphyry introduces another.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.8 I.49.50.8

Ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν περὶ τοῦ Ἀχέροντος Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐπάγει περὶ τῆς Στυγὸς αὐταῖς λέξεσι τάδε· “Στύγα δὲ δεινήν τινα καὶ φοβερὰν ὑποστησάμενοι δαίμονα, θεῶν ὅρκον, ἐν Ἅιδου τε ταύτην κατῴκισαν καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ταύτης ἠξίωσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ στυγνάζειν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ στύγεσθαι τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου, ὅρκον δὲ τῶν θεῶν δι᾽ ἐναντιότητα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων τε καὶ ζώντων φθαρτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ὅσον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῇ, οἱ δὲ τῇ τε προαιρέσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ διεστήκασι.”

50.9 I.49.50.9

Τοσαῦτα περὶ τῆς Στυγὸς εἰπὼν ἐπάγει· “Κωκυτόν δὲ ποταμὸν ἀνέπλασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κωκύειν, ὅς ἐστι Στυγὸς καὶ στυγνάσεως ἀπορρώξ. Τοιούτου δέ ἐστι γένους καὶ ὁ Πυριφλεγέθων. Εἴρηται γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὶ φλέγεσθαι τοὺς τελευτῶντας, ὡς Ὅμηρός φησι·

50.10 I.49.50.10

Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο
δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κεν πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός,
ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠΰτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.8 · Styx and the gods' oath I.49.50.8

After saying this about Acheron, Apollodorus adds the following about Styx in these very words: "They conceived Styx as a terrible and fearsome divine power, the gods' oath. They settled her in Hades and deemed her worthy of this name because people are gloomy with grief and the things in Hades are hated. She is the gods' oath because of an opposition: she possesses, so far as lies in her, a power destructive of existing and living things, whereas the gods stand apart from this in both their purpose and their character."[1644]

50.9 · Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon I.49.50.9

Having said this much about Styx, he adds: "They fashioned the river Cocytus from wailing; it is a branch of Styx and gloom. Pyriphlegethon too is of this kind. For its name comes from the dead being burned with fire, as Homer says:[1645]

50.10 · Homer: the soul flies away like a dream I.49.50.10

For sinews no longer hold flesh and bones together;
the fierce force of blazing fire subdues them
as soon as life has left the white bones,
and the soul, flying away like a dream, flutters off.[1646]

1644. Porphyry explicitly introduces a verbatim quotation here. The name Styx is associated with stygnazein, "be gloomy," and stygesthai, "be hated." The opposition between her destructive power and the gods' character is the passage's explanation of the oath. It does not describe the ritual of swearing or a complete theory of divine punishment.

1645. Cocytus is connected with kōkyein, "wail"; aporrhōx is a branch or offshoot. Pyriphlegethon combines the language of fire, pyr, and burning, phlegesthai. The explanation interprets the mythical rivers through grief and funeral burning, continuing the preceding account of names.

1646. The quotation is Homer, Odyssey 11.218-221. Thymos is rendered "life" here to distinguish the animating force leaving the bones from psychē, the soul that flies away. The dream comparison will lead into the next paragraph's analogy of reflections. The four-line form is retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.11 I.49.50.11

Ὑποτίθεται γὰρ τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις φαινομένοις ὁμοίας καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑδάτων συνισταμένοις, ἃ καθάπαξ ἡμῖν ἐξείκασται καὶ τὰς κινήσεις μιμεῖται, στερεμνιώδη δ᾽ ὑπόστασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει εἰς ἀντίληψιν καὶ ἁφήν· ὅθεν αὐτὰς ‘βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων’ λέγει.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

50.11 · Souls as images without solidity

I.49.50.11

For he conceives souls as resembling the images that appear in mirrors and those formed in water. These are altogether like us and imitate our movements, but have no solid substance to be grasped and touched. Hence he calls them ‘images of mortals who have died.’”[1647]

1647. The final phrase is Homer, Odyssey 11.476; “who have died” interprets the poetic kamontōn, literally “who have grown weary.” The explanation belongs to the quoted account of Homer, not to a new statement by Stobaeus. “Solid substance” follows the printed steremniōdē hypostasin. The outer quotation closes at the end of excerpt 50.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

51.1 I.49.51.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἅπαντες δὲ ὕδωρ ἱστόρησαν τὴν Στύγα ἐπίγειον, φύσιν ἔχον ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς ὀμόσαι τολμήσαντας. Διαβόητον μὲν τοίνυν Στυγὸς ὕδωρ κατὰ τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν οἱ ἱστορικοὶ ἀναγεγράφασιν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Ἡρόδοτος, ὃς ἐν τῇ ἕκτῃ τὰ κατὰ Κλεομένην ἀφηγούμενος γράφει ταῦτα·

51.2 I.49.51.2

“Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν νεώτερα ἔπρησσε πράγματα, συνιστὰς τοὺς Ἀρκάδας ἐπὶ τῇ Σπάρτῃ, ἄλλους τε ὅρκους προσάγων καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Νώνακριν πόλιν πρόθυμος ἦν τῶν Ἀρκάδων τοὺς προεστῶτας ἀγινεῖν, ἐξορκῶν τὸ Στυγὸς ὕδωρ.”

51.3 I.49.51.3

Καλλίμαχος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νυμφῶν συγγράμματι καὶ τὸ ἰδίωμα τοῦ ὕδατος ἀφηγεῖται λέγων οὕτω· “Στὺξ ἐν Νωνακρίνῃ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ὕδωρ ἐστὶ τὸ διακόπτον πάντα τὰ ἀγγεῖα πλὴν τῶν κερατίνων.”

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

51.1 · The earthly water of Styx I.49.51.1

From the same work.

All have reported Styx to be water upon earth, with the natural power to avenge itself upon those who dare swear falsely by it. Historians have recorded the renowned water of Styx in Arcadia. Among them is Herodotus, who, recounting the affairs of Cleomenes in his sixth book, writes as follows:[1648]

51.2 · Cleomenes and the Arcadian oath I.49.51.2

“From there he came to Arcadia and set about revolutionary undertakings, uniting the Arcadians against Sparta. He brought other oaths to bear as well, and was especially eager to lead the Arcadian leaders to the city of Nonacris, binding them by an oath on the water of Styx.”[1649]

51.3 · Callimachus on water and horn vessels I.49.51.3

Callimachus, in his work On Nymphs, also describes the water’s peculiar property, saying: “Styx is water at Nonacrine in Arcadia which breaks every vessel except those made of horn.”[1650]

1648. The heading continues Porphyry’s On the Styx. The claim that all authorities describe an earthly water belongs to Porphyry’s report. The passage moves from interpretations of underworld names to a named place in Arcadia and the use of its water in oath-taking. Wachsmuth identifies the following quotation as Herodotus 6.74.

1649. Cleomenes is the subject carried over from Porphyry’s introduction. Neōtera prēgmata is the idiom for political upheaval, not merely “new things.” The last phrase is compressed: “them” is supplied from the leaders just mentioned. The apparatus records dialectal and other differences from Herodotus’s parallel text; the facing Greek follows the quotation as Wachsmuth prints it.

1650. The title On Nymphs follows the printed text; the apparatus records proposed corrections to that title. Wachsmuth cites Callimachus, fragment 100b.2 in Schneider, p. 290. Nonakrinē is the place-name form printed here after Nonakris in the preceding quotation. The claim about horn prepares the marvel narrated in excerpt 52, without establishing that the water has the reported destructive property.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

52.1 I.49.52.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἐπειδὴ περὶ τοῦ Στυγὸς ὕδατος ὁ λόγος ἐστί, δηλῶσαί σοι βούλομαι καὶ ἑτέραν ἱστορίαν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Φίλων γὰρ ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης ἐν τῷ Πρὸς Νύμφιν περὶ θαυμασίων ἐν Σκύθαις φησὶν ὄνους γίγνεσθαι κέρατα ἔχοντας, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ κέρατα δύνασθαι τοῦτο τὸ ὕδωρ διαφέρειν· καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Μακεδόνι ἐνεχθῆναι ὑπὸ Σωπάτρου κέρας τοιοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀνατεθῆναι ἐν Δελφοῖς, ἐφ᾽ οὗ καὶ ἐπιγεγράφθαι·

52.2 I.49.52.2

Σοὶ τόδ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος Μακεδὼν κέρας ἄνθετο, Παιάν,
κάνθωνος Σκυθικοῦ, χρῆμά τι δαιμόνιον·
ὃ Στυγὸς ἀχράντῳ Λουσηίδος οὐκ ἐδαμάσθη
ῥεύματι, βάσταξεν δ᾽ ὕδατος ἠνορέην.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

52.1 · Philo’s story of a Scythian horn

I.49.52.1

From the same work.

Since our discussion concerns the water of Styx, I wish to make known to you another account of it. Philo of Heraclea, in his work To Nymphis, On Marvels, says that among the Scythians asses are born with horns, and that these horns can withstand this water. He says that Sopatrus brought such a horn to Alexander the Macedonian, that it was dedicated at Delphi, and that the following was inscribed upon it:[1651]

52.2 · The dedicatory epigram

I.49.52.2

To you, Paean, Alexander the Macedonian dedicated this horn
of a Scythian ass, a thing of wondrous power.
It was not overcome by the untainted current
of Lousian Styx, but bore the water’s might.[1652]

1651. The new extract remains from Porphyry, now reporting Philo of Heraclea. Nymphis is the person addressed in the cited title, distinct from the nymphs of the preceding title. Diapherein is understood as withstanding or bearing the water, in light of the following epigram. The horned asses and dedication are a reported marvel; the excerpt alone does not independently authenticate the object or inscription.

1652. Paean is the divine addressee, understood here as Apollo at Delphi. Daimonion suggests something marvelous or charged with divine power. “Untainted” follows achrantōi, the printed correction noted in the apparatus. The adjective Lousian is retained as a local epithet rather than replaced by a more familiar place-name. Ēnoreē literally evokes manly force or prowess; “might” preserves its personification of the water. Excerpt 52 ends with these four verses.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.1 I.49.53.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Περὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν θεῶν εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. Λοιπὸν δὲ τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ὅπως Ὅμηρος διέταξε τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου διαλαβόντες καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν τιμωρουμένων ἀφηγησάμενοι συνάπτοιμεν ἂν τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὴν Στύγα, ἣν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων τετάχθαι δαιμόνων ὑπειλήφαμεν.

53.2 I.49.53.2

Πληρώσας γὰρ δὴ πάντα θεῶν καὶ τοῖς τόποις ἀφορίσας τὰς βασιλείας, πάλιν τῶν ψυχῶν ἃς ἀθανάτους εἶναι νενόμικε τόπους τρεῖς εἶναι ὑπείληφεν· ἕνα μὲν τὸν ἐπίγειον κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ταύτην, καθ᾽ ἣν τὰ ζῷα καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διατρίβουσιν· ἕτερον δὲ τοῖς δικαίοις ἀφωρισμένον παρὰ τὸν Ὠκεανόν, ὃν Ἠλύσιον καλεῖ πεδίον καὶ ζῶντας ἔτι εἰς αὐτὸν φησιν ἐκπέμπεσθαι. Δηλοῖ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μενελάου τὸ τοιοῦτο λέγων·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.1 · Porphyry: Homer's ordering of souls I.49.53.1

From the same work.

Let this suffice concerning the gods. Next, after examining how Homer ordered the souls in Hades and describing those who are punished, we may connect our discussion with Styx, whom we have understood Homer to appoint for the punishment of daimons that do wrong.[1653]

53.2 · Three regions for immortal souls I.49.53.2

For, having filled all things with gods and assigned their kingdoms by region, Homer also supposed there to be three regions for souls, which he held to be immortal. One is the earthly region, this inhabited world where animals and human beings live. Another, beside Ocean, is set apart for the just: he calls it the Elysian Plain and says that people are sent there while still alive. He makes this clear in the case of Menelaus, saying:[1654]

1653. The heading continues Porphyry's On the Styx. The first-person plural belongs to Porphyry's exposition. His arrangement of souls, rivers, and divine punishments is an interpretation of Homer; the following quotations serve as his evidence. Daimons are divine or intermediate beings, not necessarily evil spirits. The decimal suffixes are modern comparison divisions.

1654. "Filled" follows plērōsas, the printed reading, rather than an alternative involving allotment. The three regions are the living world, Elysium, and Hades; the third will be introduced after the quotation. The assertion that Homer regards souls as immortal is Porphyry's claim. Ocean is the named mythic boundary in the account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.3 I.49.53.3

Σοὶ δ᾽ οὐ θέσφατόν ἐστι, διοτρεφὲς ὦ Μενέλαε,
Ἄργει ἐν ἱπποβότῳ θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν·
ἀλλά σ᾽ Ἠλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης
ἀθάνατοι πέμψουσιν, ὅθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάμανθυς·
τῇ περ ῥηίστη βιοτὴ πέλει ἀνθρώποισιν,
οὐ νιφετὸς οὔτ᾽ ἄρ χειμὼν πολὺς οὔτε ποτ᾽ ὄμβρος·
ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ Ζεφύροιο λιγὺ πνείοντος ἀήτας
Ὠκεανὸς ἀνίησιν, ἀναψύχειν <ἀνθρώπους>.

53.4 I.49.53.4

Τούτοις μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ σώματα παρεῖναι. Τρίτον δὲ τόπον λέγει ὃν ψυχῶν τοῦ σώματος τούτου ἀπολυθεισῶν ὑπείληφεν εἶναι τὸν ἐν Ἅιδου, ταύτας δὲ εὐθὺς μὲν χωρεῖν εἰς Ἅιδου, διατρίβειν δὲ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἀτάφων ἔξω τοῦ Ἀχέροντος κατὰ τὰ ἄλση καὶ τὸν λειμῶνα τῆς Περσεφόνης, ἔσω περάσαι κωλυομένας· τὰς δὲ τῶν ταφέντων χωρεῖν ἐντός, εἰ μὴ εἶεν κολάσεως ἄξιαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ταφῇ τὰ σώματα, ὁμοίως εἴργεσθαι τοῦ ἔνδον.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.3 · Menelaus and the Elysian Plain

I.49.53.3

For you, Menelaus nurtured by Zeus, it is not ordained
to die in horse-pasturing Argos and meet your doom.
The immortals will send you to the Elysian Plain,
to earth's boundaries, where fair-haired Rhadamanthys dwells.
There human beings have the easiest life:
no snow, no great winter storm, and never rain;
Ocean always sends up breezes of the clear-blowing
West Wind, to refresh <human beings>.[1655]

53.4 · Burial and the crossing of Acheron

I.49.53.4

These, then, have their bodies with them too. He speaks of a third region, the one in Hades, which he supposed to belong to souls released from this body. They go at once to Hades, but the souls of the unburied remain outside Acheron, among Persephone's groves and meadow, prevented from crossing within. Those of the buried pass inside, unless they deserve punishment; otherwise, even if their bodies are buried, they are likewise excluded from the interior.[1656]

1655. Homer, Odyssey 4.561-568, as quoted here. The final word is supplied from the Homeric text and remains marked. The printed genitive pneiontos describes the West Wind; the apparatus records a different construction in Homer. English carries the sense across the final two verse lines. Elysium's mild climate is part of the promised destination, and Porphyry emphasizes that Menelaus goes there alive.

1656. "These" refers to those sent to Elysium. Porphyry now divides Hades itself by the river Acheron: burial permits entry, but deserved punishment can still prevent it. "Outside" and "inside" describe the two sides of the river within his interpretive geography. The compressed sequence of infinitives is rendered as a continuous report of Homer's supposed teaching.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.5 I.49.53.5

Τὰς τοίνυν ἐκτὸς μνήμης μετέχειν τῶν αὐταῖς βεβιωμένων· τὰς δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν ὑπερβαινούσας ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι τῶν λογισμῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα μεθείσας. Διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὰ κολαστήρια διὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τῆς μνήμης τῶν βεβιωμένων τὰς κολάσεις ἐχόντων.

53.6 I.49.53.6

Φαντασίας γὰρ λαμβάνειν τῶν δεινῶν ὅσα ἐν τῷ βίῳ δεδράκασι καὶ κολάζεσθαι, τῆς ἁμαρτίας παρεστώσης αὐτοῖς κατὰ λογισμὸν καὶ τιμωρούσης διὰ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις κολάσεων, ὅθεν τὰς μέν τινας τῶν ψυχῶν λίθους βαστάζειν δοκούσας καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θλίβεσθαι τιμωρεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ δίψης καὶ λιμοῦ αἰωνίου φαντασίας λαμβανούσας, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν τῷ θνητῷ βίῳ ἐπεφρίκεσαν.

53.7 I.49.53.7

Εἶναι γὰρ καὶ κριτὴν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ διατρίβοντα, Μίνω, ὃν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κολάζειν, τοῖς μὲν τὸν ἔξω τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπον ἀφορίσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν δίκην, τοῖς δὲ περάσαι τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπιτρέψαντα, ὃς ἀνάπαυσις ἦν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνηνύτων κακῶν διὰ τὴν λήθην.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.5 · Memory on the outer bank I.49.53.5

The souls outside retain memory of the lives they have lived; those crossing the river forget, having relinquished their thoughts about human affairs. For this reason the places of punishment for the unjust are outside: their punishments come through thought and the memory of their lives.[1657]

53.6 · Punishment through fearful images I.49.53.6

For they receive images of the terrible deeds they committed in life and are punished: their wrongdoing stands before them in thought and exacts punishment through the penalties assigned to their wrongs. Thus some souls imagine that they carry stones and are punished by being crushed; others receive images of everlasting thirst and hunger; others of something else they shuddered at in mortal life.[1658]

53.7 · Minos and release from suffering I.49.53.7

For there is also a judge dwelling outside the river, Minos, who punishes in proportion to the offenses. To some he assigns the region outside the river for their penalty; others he permits to cross the river, which, through forgetfulness, provides souls with rest from their unending woes.[1659]

1657. The placement of the punishments is now explained psychologically. Logismos here concerns thought about earthly experience, while mnēmē is its retained memory. The Greek construction around “forget” is compressed; English understands what is forgotten from the preceding reference to the lives the souls have lived. The text does not name this river Lethe.

1658. Phantasiai are presentations or images in the soul. Porphyry interprets the traditional burdens, hunger, and thirst through these images; this does not make the suffering unreal within his account. The wrongdoing is personified as present to thought and administering its own corresponding punishment.

1659. Minos supplies a judicial framework for the preceding account of memory and punishment. The relative pronoun most naturally refers to the river, whose crossing gives rest through forgetfulness. The juxtaposition of “unending” woes and permission to cross remains; the passage does not provide a timetable for release.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.8 I.49.53.8

Τιμωρεῖσθαι δὲ ἐκτὸς ὄντα καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τοὺς ἀδίκους, φαντασίας φοβερὰς ἐμποιοῦντα τοῦ βάλλοντος καὶ τοξεύοντος, ὥσπερ ζῶν ἠμύνετο, ἀμυνομένου καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου τοὺς ἀξίους κολάσεως· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ οὗτος τῶν κολαζομένων ἐστίν, ὡς Ἀριστάρχῳ ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ τῶν κολαζόντων.

53.9 I.49.53.9

Τῶν δ᾽ ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ ἀφῃρημένων τὸν λογισμὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον μόνος ὁ Τειρεσίας καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει παρόντα· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀλλήλους μὲν γιγνώσκουσι κατ᾽ ἰδιότητα φρονήσεως ἣν ἐν Ἅιδου κέκτηνται, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους οὐκέτι· οὐδ᾽ ἂν φθέγξαιντο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῖς ζῶσιν ἔτι ἀνθρώποις, εἰ μὴ ἀτμοῦ μεταλάβοιεν αἵματος καὶ τούτῳ φρενωθεῖεν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ἃ δὴ οἱ ἔξω καὶ μὴ πιόντες τοῦ αἵματος φρονοῦσι, κατάστασιν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐξ αἱμοποσίας τῶν θνητῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γιγνομένης γνωρίσεως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.8 · Heracles as a punisher

I.49.53.8

Heracles too, dwelling outside, punishes the unjust by producing fearful images of himself striking and shooting arrows. Just as he defended himself while alive, so in Hades he resists those deserving punishment. For he too belongs among those who punish, not among those punished, as Aristarchus thought.[1660]

53.9 · Tiresias and the other souls

I.49.53.9

Among those inside the river, deprived of human reasoning, Tiresias alone retains this too. The others recognize one another through a distinctive understanding they possess in Hades, but no longer recognize human beings. Nor would they speak about human affairs to people still alive unless they partook of the vapor of blood and thereby recovered understanding of human matters. Those outside understand these things even without drinking blood, possessing the condition of recognition of mortal things that drinking blood produces in souls.[1661]

1660. Porphyry explicitly contests an interpretation attributed to Aristarchus. The infinitive timōreisthai is taken here in the active middle sense of exacting punishment, as its object “the unjust” and the final contrast require. The change of construction around amynomenou is smoothed in English. No independent account of Aristarchus’s reasoning survives within this extract.

1661. The text distinguishes recognition among the dead from recognition of the living. It also moves between partaking of blood’s vapor and drinking blood; both expressions are retained. The phrase “condition of recognition” follows the difficult katastasin construction provisionally. Tiresias retains human reasoning as an exception, but the next sentence limits what he can foretell before drinking.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.10 I.49.53.10

Τειρεσίας δὲ ἔχει μὲν λογισμὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, μαντεύεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν εἱμαρμένων τοῖς ζῶσι πρὶν πιεῖν τοῦ αἵματος. Οἴεται γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρος, [καθὰ καὶ πλεῖστοι τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπέλαβον], ἐν τῷ αἵματι εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ τὰ θνητὰ φρόνησιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτὸν πολλοὶ τοῦτο πιστοῦνται δεικνύντες ὅτι καὶ ὑπερθερμανθὲν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ καὶ χολῆς ἀφραίνειν ποιεῖ καὶ ἀνοηταίνειν.

53.11 I.49.53.11

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε οὕτω φαίνεται ὡς ὀργάνου πρὸς σύνεσιν τοῦ αἵματος ὄντος λέγειν·

αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀντιθορόντος,
τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν,
αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 424

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.10 · Blood and understanding

I.49.53.10

Tiresias does have reasoning about human affairs, but even he does not prophesy what is destined for the living before drinking the blood. For Homer too thinks, [as most of those after him also supposed], that human understanding of mortal things resides in blood. Many after him confirm this by showing that blood, overheated by fever and bile, causes derangement and loss of understanding.[1662]

53.11 · Empedocles on thought and heart-blood

I.49.53.11

Empedocles too appears to speak of blood as an instrument of understanding:

Nourished in seas of blood that rushes back,
where especially thought revolves for human beings;
for humans, blood around the heart is thought.[1663]

1662. The bracketed repetition is rejected in Wachsmuth's text and remains visibly bracketed in English. The claim about blood is Porphyry's reading of Homer, supported here by an ancient physiological explanation. "Overheated" follows the printed correction hyperthermanthen. The passage distinguishes retention of human reasoning from the ability to prophesy for the living.

1663. Wachsmuth cites Empedocles, verses 327-329 in Stein. The first line begins with a feminine participle whose noun is not expressed in this quotation; the apparatus relates it to the heart. English retains the fragmentary opening rather than inserting an unmarked noun. Antithorontos, "rushing back," and kyklisketai, "revolves," follow the printed corrections.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.12 I.49.53.12

Τῶν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸν ποταμὸν διατριβουσῶν ψυχῶν πρῶται γυναῖκές εἰσι τεταγμέναι (λέγω δὲ πρώτας <τὰς> πλησιαζούσας τοῖς ἔξω), ἐνδοτάτω δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ λοιπὸν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἅιδην θεοί. Διὸ καὶ πρῶται αἱ γυναῖκες πέμπονται, εἶθ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες καὶ τούτων οἱ τίμιοι ὕστεροι.

53.13 I.49.53.13

Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὕτως αὐτῷ διατέτακται· ὑποθέμενος δὲ τοὺς κοσμικοὺς θεούς, ὧν τὰ γένη διηριθμήκαμεν, οὐ πάντῃ ἀπαθεῖς, <θεοὺς> καλέσας κατὰ παλαιὰν συνήθειαν [ὧν τὰ γένη ἐξεθήκαμεν], κατ᾽ αὐτὸν μεγάλου δαίμονος ὄντος, ὃν καλεῖ Δία καὶ οἷον ἄρχοντος τῶν ἄχρις οὐρανοῦ φθανόντων,

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.12 · The order of souls beyond the river

I.49.53.12

Among the souls dwelling beyond the river, women are stationed first (by "first" I mean <those> nearest the ones outside); the souls of men are furthest within, and beyond them are the gods around Hades. For this reason women are sent first, then men, and among these the honored ones last.[1664]

53.13 · The cosmic gods and their ruler

I.49.53.13

This, then, is how he has ordered human affairs. He supposed the cosmic gods, whose classes we have enumerated, not to be entirely free from passions, calling them <gods> according to ancient usage [whose classes we have set out]. In his account there is a great daimon, whom he calls Zeus, acting as a kind of ruler over those extending as far as heaven.[1665]

1664. The supplied article is rendered "those." "First" describes proximity to the outer bank before it describes the order in which souls are sent to appear. The hierarchy of women, men, and gods belongs to Porphyry's interpretation and is stated directly. The purpose and sender of these appearances become explicit in excerpt 54.

1665. The supplied "gods" and the rejected repetition remain marked. The long Greek construction resumes in the next unit; English closes a sentence here for readability. "Not entirely free from passions" preserves the qualification: these cosmic gods can undergo affection and emotion. Zeus is called a great daimon within this account, without implying an evil being.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 424-425

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.14 I.49.53.14

Ὑποθέμενος οὖν τούτους, καθάπερ καὶ λέγονται, ἐμπαθεῖς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπιθυμίας μετέχοντας καὶ ὀργῆς καὶ μίσους καὶ ἔχθρας καὶ ὑφ᾽ εἱμαρμένην ὄντας, εἰκότως καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν οἴεται καὶ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ὀμνύναι καὶ εὐορκεῖν ἢ τοὐναντίον τινὰς πλημμελεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὅρκους. Διὸ καὶ τούτων κολάσεις ὑποτίθεται, οὐ μέντοι ἀναμεμιγμένας τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις κολαστηρίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἅτε μείζονας ὄντας, μείζονος καὶ τιμωρίας πειρᾶσθαι ἀδικήσαντας.

53.15 I.49.53.15

Διὸ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν ἐν Ἅιδου τὰ κολαστήρια· τῶν δ᾽ εἰρημένων θεῶν ὑπὸ τὸν Ἅιδην ἐν τῇ Κρόνου ἐπικρατείᾳ κατὰ τὸν Τάρταρον. Διὸ καὶ τῶν Τιτάνων χῶρος οὗτος κέκληται ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τίσιν διδόντων θεῶν παρὰ τοῖς τιμωροῖς θεοῖς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.14 · Divine wrongdoing and punishment I.49.53.14

Supposing these beings, then, to be subject to passions, as they are indeed said to be, and therefore to share in desire, anger, hatred, and enmity, and to be under fate, he reasonably thinks that they also do wrong, lie, swear oaths, and keep them, or that some, conversely, offend against their oaths. He therefore supposes punishments for them too, though not mingled with the places where human beings are punished. Since they are greater beings, they also experience greater punishment when they do wrong.[1666]

53.15 · Tartarus and the Titans I.49.53.15

Accordingly, the places of punishment for human souls are in Hades, while those for the gods just mentioned lie beneath Hades, in Cronus's domain, in Tartarus. Hence this has also been called the region of the Titans, after the gods who pay a penalty there before the avenging gods.[1667]

1666. "Reasonably" expresses Porphyry's inference from the Homeric gods' susceptibility to passions and fate. The passage explicitly includes both keeping and violating oaths. Its comparison of greater beings and greater punishment prepares the distinction between human Hades and the deeper divine prison of Tartarus.

1667. The proposed connection between Titans and tisis, "penalty" or "retribution," is the author's interpretation of the name. English cannot reproduce the similarity of sound. The gods receiving punishment and the gods exacting it are distinguished; Cronus's domain lies beneath the human region of Hades.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.16 I.49.53.16

Ἔνθα ὑποτίθεται καὶ τὴν Στύγα αὐτήν τε τὴν δαίμονα καὶ τὴν πηγὴν τῶν ὑδάτων αὐτῆς. Τὸν γὰρ Κωκυτόν καὶ τὸν Τιταρήσιον <Στυγὸς> ἀπορροὴν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πηγήν. Εἶναι δὲ ταύτην ἐπὶ τιμωριῶν ἀπαραίτητον ἔχουσαν δύναμιν καὶ φοβερωτάτην· καὶ ὅλως ὅπερ ἡ Ἐρινὺς ταῖς ἀδίκοις ψυχαῖς, τοῦτο τὴν Στύγα τοῖς ἀδικήσασι δαίμοσιν.

53.17 I.49.53.17

Ὅτι δ᾽ οἱ ἄταφοι ἔξω τοῦ ποταμοῦ διατρίβουσιν εἴδωλον φέροντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἱματίων τοῦ σώματος, δηλοῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ᾽ εἰκυῖα,
καὶ φωνήν· καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.16 · Styx and divine retribution I.49.53.16

There he also places Styx, both the divine being herself and the source of her waters. For Cocytus and Titaresius are an outflow <of Styx>, not her source. In matters of punishment she possesses a power that cannot be appeased and is most fearsome. In general, what the Erinys is to unjust souls, Styx is to daimons that have done wrong.[1668]

53.17 · Patroclus's recognizable apparition I.49.53.17

That the unburied remain outside the river, bearing an image of their body and of the body's clothing, is shown by passages such as these:

The soul of unhappy Patroclus came to him,
in all things like him, in stature and lovely eyes
and voice; and it wore the same clothes upon its skin.[1669]

1668. The supplemented name Styx remains marked. Titaresius is the river named here, distinct from the Titans in the preceding sentence. Styx is considered both as a divine person and as water. The Erinys is an avenging power; the analogy assigns Styx a corresponding role in punishment of divine beings.

1669. Homer, Iliad 23.65-67. The prose follows the printed correction himatiōn, "clothing," rather than the transmitted hamartēmatōn, "sins," reported in the apparatus. The recognizable body and clothing support Porphyry's account of an image retained by an unburied soul. "To him" refers to Achilles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.18 I.49.53.18

Εἶτα λέγει·

θάπτε με, ὅττι τάχιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο περήσω.
Εἴρηται δέ, ὅτι τὰ ἔνδον τοῦ ποταμοῦ Ἅιδα προσαγορεύει· καλεῖται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔξω ποταμοῦ, ὡς ἐδείκνυμεν, [ἐν] Ἅιδου δόμοι·

ἀλλ᾽ αὔτως ἀλάλημαι ἀν᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄιδος δῶ.

53.19 I.49.53.19

Τί οὖν πάσχουσι, φησίν·

<τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων,>
οὐδέ μέ πως μίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐῶσι.

53.20 I.49.53.20

Ὅτι δὲ ὑπερβᾶσαι τὸν ποταμὸν οὔτε γνωρίζουσι τοὺς ζῶντας, οὔτε ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσι τούτοις ἐπιφαίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ πεμφθῶσιν, ἐπάγει·

καί μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ᾽, ὀλοφύρομαι, οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ αὖτις
νίσομαι ἐξ Ἀίδαο, ἐπὴν με πυρὸς λελάχητε.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.18 · Burial and the halls of Hades I.49.53.18

Then he says:

Bury me, that I may pass the gates of Hades as soon as possible.
It has been said that he calls the region inside the river Hades; but the region outside the river too, as we showed, is called [in] the halls of Hades:

Instead I wander aimlessly through Hades' wide-gated house.[1670]

53.19 · Exclusion from the crossing I.49.53.19

He says, then, what they suffer:

<The souls keep me far away, images of those who have toiled,>
and will not let me join them beyond the river.[1671]

53.20 · The farewell to Achilles I.49.53.20

That, after crossing the river, souls neither recognize the living nor have permission to appear to them unless sent, he adds:

And give me your hand, I beseech you; for never again
shall I return from Hades once you have given me my share of fire.[1672]

1670. Homer, Iliad 23.71 and 74, quoted in this order. The singular imperative "bury me" follows thapte in the supplied edition. The rejected preposition en is visibly retained in brackets; reading without it gives "is called the halls of Hades." Porphyry allows the same name to describe regions on both sides of the river.

1671. Homer, Iliad 23.72-73. Wachsmuth supplies the whole first verse, which therefore remains enclosed in angle brackets in both languages. The order of these quotations follows Porphyry's argument, not the continuous order of the Iliad. "Those who have toiled" renders the Homeric designation of the dead.

1672. Homer, Iliad 23.75-76. Patroclus asks for Achilles' hand before his cremation. "My share of fire" retains the wording for receiving the funeral fire. The broader claims about loss of recognition and authorized appearances are Porphyry's interpretation of the farewell, rather than additional words in the Homeric quotation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.21 I.49.53.21

Φαίνεται οὖν ἡ ἄταφος μεμνημένη τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ γλιχομένη αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ὀδυρομένη· οὕτω δεινὴ ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὕτω δι᾽ αἰῶνος κολαζομένοις· οὕτω καὶ Ἐλπήνωρ·

ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ὕπνος.

53.22 I.49.53.22

Καὶ εἰπὼν ἃ πέπονθεν ἀξιοῖ ταφῆναι, ἱκετεύων καὶ δεόμενος·

νῦν δέ σε τῶν ὄπιθεν γουνάζομαι οὐ παρεόντων,
μή μ᾽ ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν,
νοσφισθείς, μήτοι τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

53.21 · Memory and the unburied Elpenor I.49.53.21

The unburied soul thus appears remembering the things of its life, longing for that life, and grieving for this reason. So terrible is the punishment for those punished in this way forever. So too Elpenor says:

A daimon's evil dispensation and boundless sleep brought me to ruin.[1673]

53.22 · Elpenor's plea for burial I.49.53.22

After telling what happened to him, he asks to be buried, imploring and pleading:

Now I beseech you by those left behind, who are not here,
not to go and leave me behind unwept and unburied,
turning away, lest I become a cause of the gods' wrath against you.[1674]

1673. Homer, Odyssey 11.61, as quoted in this edition. The printed word is hypnos, "sleep," whereas the familiar Homeric line has oinos, "wine." The translation retains the supplied text rather than substituting wine. Porphyry links the unburied soul's grief to its continuing memory and attachment to life.

1674. Homer, Odyssey 11.66, 72, and 73. The quotation joins separated verses; the intervening lines have not been silently supplied. The absent people invoked in the first line are the hearer's loved ones. The final warning presents neglect of burial as a possible cause of divine anger. This closes excerpt 53.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.1 I.49.54.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀνθρώπεια καὶ ὅλως τοὺς ζῶντας ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἀλλήλους δὲ ἴσασιν. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο εἶχον, πῶς ἂν ἦλθον σὺν Ἀγαμέμνονι πάντες οἱ ἅμα ἀνῃρημένοι; Πῶς δὲ συνελάλει Πάτροκλος καὶ Αἴας καὶ Ἀντίλοχος; Πῶς δ᾽ εἴργουσι τοὺς ἀτάφους μὴ πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διελθεῖν; Λέγει δέ·

τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων.

54.2 I.49.54.2

Συναποτέθειται δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἅμα τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τὰ γνωρίσματα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα οἰκείων, ὃ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ φαντασίας τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα δείκνυσι. Διὰ γὰρ μνήμης ἡ φαντασία, ὡς Πλάτων ἐν Φιλήβῳ φησί· μνήμης δὲ ἀφῃρημένης ἦρται καὶ τὸ φαντασιούμενον, οὗ συνεκλιπόντος καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς συνεξῆρται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.1 · Recognition among the dead I.49.54.1

From the same work.

They are ignorant, then, of human affairs and, in general, of the living, but know one another. For if they did not possess this knowledge, how could all those killed together have come with Agamemnon? How could Patroclus, Ajax, and Antilochus converse? How could they prevent the unburied from passing beyond the river? He says:

The souls keep me far away, images of those who have toiled.[1675]

54.2 · Memory, imagination, and bodily affections I.49.54.2

Along with memory they have also laid aside the recognizable features of what belongs to the body. This too makes clear that it is through imagination that the things associated with the body are displayed. For imagination works through memory, as Plato says in the Philebus. When memory is removed, what is imagined is removed too; when that likewise disappears, the soul's affections concerning the body are also taken away.[1676]

1675. Porphyry continues On the Styx. His questions defend mutual recognition among the dead while denying recognition of the living. "Converse" follows the printed synelalei, distinguished in the apparatus from a reading meaning "summoned." The final verse is Iliad 23.72, here printed without the supplement brackets required at its earlier occurrence.

1676. The printed synapotetheitai means "has been laid aside along with." The edition locates the reference to Plato at Philebus 39A. "Memory" here must be read in light of the preceding distinction between earthly recognition and recognition among the dead. Phantasia is the presentation of images; pathē includes experiences or affections of the soul associated with the body.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.3 I.49.54.3

Τούτων δὲ ἐκλελοιπότων καὶ ἡ κόλασις τῆς ψυχῆς πέπαυται, νοερᾶς μόνον οὔσης περὶ αὐτὴν καταστάσεως καὶ παρὰ τῷ φρονίμῳ θεῷ διατριβούσης.

54.4 I.49.54.4

Πρὸς δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἴσως ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε, πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἀλλήλας ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἔφη·

ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.
Πρὸς ὃ ῥητέον, ὅτι σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι πρὸς τούτους [πρὸς] ὧν καὶ τὴν μνήμην ἀφῄρηνται. Πρὸς οὖν τὰ θνητά εἰσι σκιαὶ διὰ τὴν ἀσωματίαν καὶ ἀμνημοσύνην αὐτῶν, ὥς που καὶ πρὸς τὴν παχύτητα τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ παραβαλλομένη καπνῷ ὠμοίωται·

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠΰτε καπνὸς
ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.3 · The cessation of punishment I.49.54.3

When these have disappeared, the soul's punishment too has ceased. Only an intellectual condition remains about it, and it dwells beside the wise god.[1677]

54.4 · Shadows in relation to the living I.49.54.4

Someone might perhaps raise a difficulty about what has been said: if they are not ignorant of one another, why did he say:

The others flit as shadows?

The answer is that they flit as shadows in relation to those [toward] of whom they have also been deprived of memory. In relation to mortal things, then, they are shadows because of their incorporeality and their lack of memory of those things. In the same way, when compared with the body's density, the soul is likened to smoke:

The soul, like smoke,
went away with a shrill cry.[1678]

1677. "These" refers to the bodily affections just discussed. The cessation of punishment follows from the removal of the images through which the soul suffered. Noeros, "intellectual," distinguishes this condition from bodily sensation and imagination. The god is not named in this sentence; the translation does not add an identification.

1678. The first quotation is Odyssey 10.495; the final two lines abbreviate Iliad 23.100-101. The rejected second pros, "toward," remains bracketed in the explanation. Without it the English reads "those of whom." Porphyry makes shadowhood relational: souls appear as shadows to the living, while retaining their own understanding. The smoke comparison concerns bodily density.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.5 I.49.54.5

Εἰ δὴ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐντυγχάνοντες οὔτε ὁρῶσιν αὐτοὺς οὔτε προσδιαλέγονται, ἀνενέργητοι δέ εἰσιν αἰσθητικὴν ἐνέργειαν, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐοικότες εἶεν <ἂν> ταῖς σκιαῖς· ἡ γοῦν Ἀντίκλεια

ἡ δ᾽ ἀκέουσ᾽ ἧσται σχεδὸν αἵματος, οὐδὲ ὃν υἱὸν
ἔτλη ἐσάντα ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ προτιμυθήσασθαι.

54.6 I.49.54.6

Τὸ δ᾽ αἷμα, ὡς ἔφημεν, ὁλκὸν Ὅμηρος ἡγεῖται τῆς φανταστικῆς καὶ μνημονικῆς ψυχῆς, ἧς καὶ ὁ λογισμός, συναγερμὸς ὢν μνήμης διὰ φαντασιῶν εἰς τὰ καθόλου κρίματα κεφαλαιουμένης. Ἄλλο δ᾽ ἦν τὸ διανοητικόν, εἰς ὃ ἀνατρέχει <ἡ> ψυχὴ ἔσω τοῦ Ἀχέροντος γενομένη, ὃν Κωκυτός πληροῖ καὶ Πυριφλεγέθων, ἐκ πέτρας ῥέοντες καὶ Στυγείων φόβων ἀπόρροιαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.5 · Anticlea before drinking the blood I.49.54.5

If, then, on meeting their own people, they neither see them nor converse with them, but are inactive in respect of sensory activity, they <would> resemble shadows in relation to those people. Anticlea, for example:

She sits silent near the blood, and did not dare
to look her own son in the face or speak to him.[1679]

54.6 · Blood, reasoning, and intellect I.49.54.6

Blood, as we said, Homer regards as attracting the imaginative and remembering soul. Reasoning too belongs to this soul, being a gathering of memory that is summed up through images into universal judgments. The intellectual faculty was something different: <the> soul returns to it once inside Acheron, which Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon fill, flowing from a rock and being outflows of Stygian terrors.[1680]

1679. Homer, Odyssey 11.142-143. Anticlea is Odysseus's mother; the quotation describes her before she drinks the sacrificial blood. The supplied potential particle an is represented by the marked "would." The redundant-sounding "inactive in respect of sensory activity" preserves the distinction between a soul's existence and its exercise of perception.

1680. Logismos is rendered "reasoning," while to dianoētikon is "the intellectual faculty," preserving the contrast made here. The account of memory and universal judgments belongs to Porphyry's philosophical interpretation. The supplied article before "soul" remains marked. The river description recalls Odyssey 10.513-515 and extends the earlier interpretation of Styx through terror.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.7 I.49.54.7

Ἀποστέλλονται δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἀτμοὺς τοῦ αἵματος ὑπὸ Περσεφόνης· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐλθεῖν χωρὶς τοῦ πεμφθῆναι πρὸς τῶν ἐφεστώτων. Διὸ καὶ ἐπεύχεται ἰφθίμῳ τ᾽ Ἀίδῃ καὶ ἐπαινῇ Περσεφονείῃ.

54.8 I.49.54.8

Ἡ δὲ ἀποστέλλει πρώτας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὡς ἂν πλησίον οἰκούσας τοῦ Ἀχέροντος καὶ ἠττωμένας τῶν ἀνδρικῶν ψυχῶν. Αἱ γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν τῷ ἀκραιφνεῖ σκότῳ διάγουσι, πόρρω τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τῶν κολαζομένων οὖσαι. Ὧν πάντων πολλῆς θεοσοφίας γεμόντων ἡμεῖς ἐπιτρέχομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ νῦν περὶ τούτων εἶναι τὴν πρόθεσιν, χάριν δὲ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν Στύγα ἐξηγήσεως ἀναγκαίως παρειλῆφθαι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

54.7 · Souls sent by Persephone I.49.54.7

They are sent to the vapors of the blood by Persephone, for it is impossible for them to come without being sent by those who preside over them. For this reason he also prays

to mighty Hades and dread Persephone.[1681]

54.8 · The order of appearances and the argument's limit I.49.54.8

She sends the women first, since they dwell near Acheron and are inferior to the souls of men. For the souls of men dwell in unmixed darkness, far from the river and from those being punished. All these matters are full of divine wisdom, but we pass over them quickly: they are not our present subject, and have necessarily been brought in for the sake of the interpretation of Styx.[1682]

1681. Homer, Odyssey 11.47. The person praying is Odysseus. "Those who preside" renders the Greek without adding an unprinted noun. The epithet epainē is rendered "dread," its force in this formula. Persephone's sending of the souls explains the restriction on appearances stated earlier.

1682. The hierarchy of women's and men's souls is stated as Porphyry presents it. The men's "unmixed darkness" is not described as punishment: their position is expressly far from the punished souls. Theosophia means divine wisdom here, without reference to the later modern movement bearing that name. This closes excerpt 54 and the present extracts from On the Styx.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 428-429

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.1 I.49.55.1

Πορφυρίου ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμῶν.

Ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῇ ἐστι, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν ὡς τὰ σώματα, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει, οὕτω καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου εἶναί ἐστι ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκῃ εἰδώλου φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκοτει<νὴν> δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ ὁ Ἅιδης ὑπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινός, ἡ ψυχὴ καίπερ οὐκ ἀποσπωμένη τοῦ ὄντος ἐν Ἅιδου γίγνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἴδωλον.

55.2 I.49.55.2

Ἐξελθούσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος τὸ πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα προσπαθείας τὸν λόγον ἔχουσα τὸν μερικὸν προβεβλημένον, καθ᾽ ὃν σχέσιν ἔσχε πρὸς τὸ ποιὸν σῶμα ἐν τῷ βιοῦν, ἐκ τῆς προσπαθείας ἐναπομόργνυται τύπος τῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ οὕτως ἐφέλκεται τὸ εἴδωλον. Ἐν Ἅιδου δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι τῆς ἀειδοῦς φύσεως ἐτύγχανε τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ σκοτεινῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.1 · Porphyry: the soul and its image I.49.55.1

Porphyry, from Starting Points toward the Intelligible.

Just as, for a soul, being on earth means not treading the earth as bodies do, but presiding over a body that treads the earth, so too a soul is in Hades when it presides over an image whose nature allows it to be in a place, but whose substance is <dark>. Thus, since Hades is a dark place underground, the soul comes to be in Hades by drawing the image along with it, although it is not severed from being.[1683]

55.2 · The imprint upon the accompanying breath I.49.55.2

For when the soul leaves the solid body, the breath accompanies it, which it gathered from the spheres. Through attachment to the body, it has projected the particular formative principle by which it was related during life to a body of a certain kind. Through this attachment an imprint of imagination is impressed upon the breath, and in this way the soul draws the image along with it. It is said to be in Hades because the breath was of an invisible and dark nature.[1684]

1683. The heading names a different work by Porphyry. The edition cites page 76 of Holstenius. “Dark” marks a supplement affecting part of the Greek word skoteinēn. The soul’s presence in a place is explained through its relation to a body or image, not through bodily extension of the soul itself. “Being” denotes the reality from which the soul is not detached.

1684. Pneuma, “breath,” is the subtle accompaniment or vehicle of the soul in this account; it is distinct from both the soul and its solid body. The spheres are the cosmic spheres. “Particular formative principle” provisionally renders logos merikos, here a principle of bodily relation rather than ordinary reasoning. The Greek shifts from a participle referring to the soul to “an imprint” as subject; English divides the construction without hiding that difficulty.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 429

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.3 I.49.55.3

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα καὶ ἔνυγρον ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ ἄυλος οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων τόπους μεταβαίνειν καὶ εἰληχέναι τόπον σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται, δεχομένων αὐτὴν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιτηδειότητας τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων ἐκ τῆς κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ποιᾶς διαθέσεως· ὡς γὰρ ἂν διατεθῇ, εὑρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον.

55.4 I.49.55.4

Διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένῃ σύμφυτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀΰλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον· προελθούσῃ δὲ ἐκ λόγου εἰς φαντασίας προβολὴν σύμφυτον τὸ ἡλιοειδές· θηλυνθείσῃ δὲ καὶ παθαινομένῃ πρὸς τὸ εἶδος παράκειται τὸ σεληνοειδές· πεσούσης δὲ εἰς σώματα, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ αὐτῆς ἄμορφον στῇ εἶδος ἐξ ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιάσεων συνεστηκότα, ἄγνοια ἕπεται τοῦ ὄντος τελεία καὶ σκότωσις καὶ νηπιότης.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 429-430

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.3 · How an immaterial soul is said to move I.49.55.3

Since the heavy, moist breath extends as far as the regions underground, the soul itself too is said to pass beneath the earth. This does not mean that an immaterial substance changes places and comes to be in places, but that it assumes relations to bodies naturally capable of changing places and occupying a place. Such bodies receive it according to their capacities, in consequence of the soul's own particular disposition. For whatever its disposition, it finds a body defined by its rank and its proper characteristics.[1685]

55.4 · Aetherial, sunlike, and moonlike bodies I.49.55.4

Accordingly, when its disposition is purer, a body close to the immaterial is congenial to it, namely the aetherial body. When it proceeds from reason to the projection of imagination, the sunlike body is congenial to it. When it has become feminine and is affected with passion toward form, the moonlike body lies beside it. But when it falls into bodies constituted from moist exhalations, whenever it settles in accordance with its own formless form, complete ignorance of being follows, together with darkness and childishness.[1686]

1685. The distinction between literal movement of bodies and the soul's relations to them is central. The compressed clause concerning the bodies' capacities and the soul's disposition is translated provisionally: the condition of the soul determines the kind of body suited to receive it. "Proper characteristics" supplies the sense of the substantival tois oikeiois, whose noun is not expressed.

1686. The sequence associates different dispositions with aetherial, sunlike, moonlike, and moist bodies. Thēlyntheisē is literally "having become feminine"; its gendered valuation is retained. The final Greek construction is difficult: "constituted" agrees with "bodies" across an intervening clause. English brings those words together, but retains the unresolved expression "its own formless form" rather than silently repairing it. This sentence remains provisional.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 429-430

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.5 I.49.55.5

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξόδῳ ἔτι κατὰ τὴν δίυγρον ἀναθυμίασιν τὸ πνεῦμα ἔχουσα τεθολωμένον, σκιὰν ἐφέλκεται καὶ βαρεῖται, χωρεῖν σπεύδοντος τοῦ τοιούτου πνεύματος εἰς μυχὸν τῆς γῆς φύσει, ἂν μὴ ἄλλη τις αὐτὸ αἰτία ἀνθέλκῃ. Ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ γεῶδες ὄστρεον περικειμένῃ ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνίσχεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ὑγρὸν πνεῦμα ἐφελκομένῃ εἴδωλον περικεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη.

55.6 I.49.55.6

Ὑγρὸν δὲ ἐφέλκεται, ὅταν συνεχῶς μελετήσῃ ὁμιλεῖν τῇ φύσει, ἧς ἐν ὑγρῷ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὑπόγειον μᾶλλον.

55.7 I.49.55.7

Ὅταν δὲ μελετήσῃ ἀφίστασθαι φύσεως, αὐγὴ ξηρὰ γίγνεται, ἄσκιος καὶ ἀνέφελος. Ὑγρότης γὰρ ἐν ἀέρι νέφος συνίστησι· ξηρότης δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀτμίδος αὐγὴν ξηρὰν ὑφίστησιν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 430

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

55.5 · The weight of the lingering shadow I.49.55.5

Indeed, even at its departure, if its breath is still clouded by the thoroughly moist exhalation, the soul draws a shadow along with it and is weighed down. Such breath naturally hastens into the earth's depths, unless some other cause draws it in the opposite direction. Just as a soul clothed in the earthen shell must be held upon the earth, so a soul drawing moist breath along with it must be clothed in an image.[1687]

55.6 · Habitual attachment to nature I.49.55.6

It draws moist breath along with it when it has continually practiced consorting with nature, whose activity is in moisture and rather beneath the earth.[1688]

55.7 · Dry radiance I.49.55.7

But when it has practiced withdrawing from nature, it becomes a dry radiance, without shadow or cloud. For moisture forms a cloud in air, while dryness brings forth a dry radiance from the vapor.[1689]

1687. "Departure" is the soul's exit from the solid body. The "earthen shell" is a bodily covering; the comparison explains how a subtler image can also accompany and burden the soul. The qualification concerning another counteracting cause remains unspecified. The descent belongs literally to the accompanying breath, consistently with the distinction made above.

1688. The adjective "moist" stands without its noun in Greek; "breath" is understood from the preceding sentences. Meletan conveys practice or habitual exercise, here directed toward association with nature. The final "rather beneath the earth" follows the compressed printed wording and does not add an unexpressed comparison.

1689. The final contrast is between moist cloudiness and dry radiance. It completes the account of the soul's accompanying condition as shaped by its practice and attachment. "From the vapor" follows apo tēs atmidos; the translation leaves the ancient physical imagery intact rather than recasting it as a modern explanation. Excerpt 55 ends here; Plato's Phaedo follows in excerpt 56.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 430

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

56.1 I.49.56.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δέ, εὖ ἴστε, παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην· τὸ μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.

56.2 I.49.56.2

Ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλὰ εὐελπίς εἰμι, <εἶναί τι> τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι· καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

56.1 · Plato: Socrates' hope after death

I.49.56.1

Plato, from the Phaedo.

"For my part," he said, "Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I would go first to other gods, wise and good, and then to dead human beings better than those here, I would be wrong not to resent death. But as things are, be assured that I hope to reach good men. On this point I would not insist very strongly. Yet as for going to gods who are thoroughly good masters, be assured that, if I would insist on anything else of this kind, I would insist on this too."[1690]

56.2 · A better prospect for the good

I.49.56.2

"For these reasons I do not resent death in the same way, but have good hope that <there is something> for those who have died, and, as has indeed long been said, something far better for the good than for the bad."[1691]

1690. The edition identifies the extract as Plato, Phaedo 63B-C. Socrates speaks to Simmias and Cebes. His expectation of meeting good dead people is expressly less firmly asserted than his expectation of good divine rulers; the translation preserves that difference. "Other gods" follows the printed allous. The decimal suffixes are modern comparison divisions.

1691. The words einai ti, "there is something," are supplied in Wachsmuth's edition from the parallel Phaedo text and remain marked. The phrase leaves the prospect general rather than naming a particular reward. This closes excerpt 56.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 430-431

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.1 I.49.57.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι;

57.2 I.49.57.2

Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδε ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ μελέτη θανάτου;

Παντάπασί γε.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.1 · The invisible soul and its destination I.49.57.1

From the same work.

“The soul, then, the invisible thing that departs to another place of the same kind, noble, pure, and invisible, to Hades in the true sense, to the good and wise god, where, god willing, my own soul must shortly go: is this soul, of such a character and nature, immediately blown apart and destroyed when it leaves the body, as most people say?”[1692]

57.2 · Philosophy as practice for death I.49.57.2

“Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. The case is much more like this: suppose it departs pure, drawing nothing bodily along with it, because during life it had no willing association with the body, but fled it and gathered itself into itself, always practicing this. This means nothing other than practicing philosophy rightly and truly practicing being dead with ease. Would this not be the practice of death?”

“Certainly.”[1693]

1692. The heading continues the Phaedo; Wachsmuth gives 80D-82C for excerpt 57. “Invisible” renders aeides, whose sound is linked here with Hades. “In the true sense” makes that interpretive connection explicit in the Greek. The opening question contrasts the soul’s described nature and destination with the popular fear that it disperses at death.

1693. The repeated meletan, “practice,” connects a way of living with readiness for separation from the body. The wording “itself into itself” remains in the supplied text, although the apparatus notes its absence from most witnesses to the parallel Plato passage. “Being dead” follows the perfect infinitive tethnanai. The argument’s consequence follows in the next unit.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 431

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.3 I.49.57.3

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ λοιπὸν μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; Οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

Οὕτω νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

57.4 I.49.57.4

Ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;

Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 431-432

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.3 · The pure soul's blessed condition I.49.57.3

"Then, in this condition, it goes to what resembles it, the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise. On arriving there it may be happy, freed from wandering, folly, fears, savage desires, and the other human evils, and, as is said of those who have been initiated, truly spending the rest of its existence with gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or something else?"

"This, by Zeus," Cebes said.[1694]

57.4 · A soul enthralled by the body I.49.57.4

"But suppose, I think, it leaves the body polluted and impure, because it has always associated with the body, served it, loved it, and been bewitched by it through desires and pleasures. It thinks nothing real except what is bodily, something one could touch, see, drink, eat, or use for sexual pleasure; but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, yet intelligible and attainable through philosophy, it has become accustomed to hate, tremble at, and flee. Do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure, itself by itself?"

"Not in any way," he said.[1695]

1694. The soul's destination is characterized by likeness to its own purified condition. The language of initiation is used as a comparison; the extract does not identify a particular mystery rite. "Happy" renders eudaimōn, a flourishing or blessed condition, not merely a passing feeling.

1695. Sōmatoeides is "what is bodily" or bodylike, contrasted with what is accessible to intellect. "Real" renders alēthes in the soul's judgment about what exists. Haireton is taken as "attainable" through philosophy. The passage treats repeated attachment as forming the soul's condition; it does not merely list isolated sensations.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.5 I.49.57.5

Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον;

Πάνυ γε.

57.6 I.49.57.6

Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη [καὶ] ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φάσματα, οἷα περιέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι· διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 432

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.5 · Bodily character becomes ingrained I.49.57.5

“Rather, I think, it will be permeated by what is bodily, which its association and intercourse with the body have made ingrained in it through constant companionship and much practice?”

“Certainly.”[1696]

57.6 · Apparitions around graves I.49.57.6

“We must suppose this bodily character, my friend, to be weighty, heavy, earthy, and visible. Possessing it, such a soul is weighed down and drawn back into the visible region through fear of the invisible and of Hades. As the story goes, it rolls about among memorials and graves, around which certain shadowlike apparitions of souls have [also] been seen: images of the kind in which such souls are wrapped, souls released without purity and still sharing in the visible. That is why they are seen.”

“That is likely, Socrates.”[1697]

1696. Dieilēmmenēn suggests the soul being penetrated or pervaded by the bodily character, while xymphuton describes that character as grown into it. The claim concerns a disposition produced through habitual association, preparing the account of the soul’s resulting weight and visibility.

1697. The rejected kai remains bracketed as “also.” The printed periechontai is understood as souls being wrapped in images; the apparatus records parechontai in the parallel Plato text, a different construction involving their presenting such images. The reported apparitions serve this argument about bodily attachment and are not independently authenticated here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.7 I.49.57.7

Εἰκὸς μέντοι [γε], ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι <τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται,> ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

57.8 I.49.57.8

Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖα ἄττ᾽ <ἂν> καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβουμένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· ἢ οὐχ οἴει;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.7 · Wandering and renewed embodiment I.49.57.7

“It is likely [indeed], Cebes. These are certainly not the souls of good people but of the base, compelled to wander around such places, paying the penalty <for their former bad nurture. And they continue wandering> until, through desire for the bodily character that accompanies them, they are bound once more into a body.”[1698]

57.8 · Gluttony and animal embodiment I.49.57.8

“They enter, as is natural, characters like those they <may> have happened to practice in life.”

“What sorts do you mean, Socrates?”

“For example, those who have practiced gluttony, wantonness, and love of drinking, without taking precautions, are likely to enter the kinds of asses and similar beasts. Do you not think so?”

“What you say is indeed very likely.”[1699]

1698. The rejected ge and the substantial supplement from the parallel Phaedo remain marked. Trophē, “nurture,” includes the formation of habits during life. Renewed embodiment is explained through the desire still accompanying the soul, rather than as a movement undertaken by a completely purified soul.

1699. The supplied an is represented by the marked “may.” Ēthē means characters or dispositions; the following examples connect those dispositions with kinds of animals. Hybreis is rendered “wantonness,” retaining a sense of uncontrolled excess. The animal assignments are part of the argument as stated, not zoological descriptions.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 432-433

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.9 I.49.57.9

Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἔρεις πάσας προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.

57.10 I.49.57.10

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι κατὰ τὰς [τῶν] αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;

Δῆλον δή, ἔφη· πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

57.11 I.49.57.11

Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πῇ δὴ εὐδαιμονέστατοι;

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.9 · Violence and predatory kinds

I.49.57.9

“And those who have preferred injustice, tyranny, and every kind of strife enter the kinds of wolves, hawks, and kites. Where else should we say such souls go?”

“Certainly,” Cebes said, “into such kinds.”[1700]

57.10 · Habit and likeness

I.49.57.10

“Then,” he said, “the other cases too are clear: where each would go according to [the] similarities of their habits?”

“Clearly,” he said. “How could it be otherwise?”[1701]

57.11 · Ordinary civic virtue

I.49.57.11

“Then,” he said, “the happiest among these, and those going to the best destination, are those who have practiced the ordinary civic virtue that people call moderation and justice, produced by habit and practice without philosophy and understanding?”

“In what way are they the happiest?”[1702]

1700. The printed ereis pasas, “every kind of strife,” is retained. The apparatus records harpagas, “acts of plunder,” in the parallel Plato passage; that reading has not been substituted. Kites are the predatory birds named by iktinoi. The association rests on a likeness of habitual conduct.

1701. The rejected genitive article tōn remains visible in English as a bracketed article, although its grammatical position cannot be reproduced word for word. The sentence generalizes the preceding examples: the soul’s practiced disposition determines the kind with which it has an affinity. “Each” leaves the Greek’s general reference unexpanded.

1702. Dēmotikē and politikē characterize virtue available in ordinary communal and civic life. Sōphrosynē is moderation or self-command; nous here adds understanding to the contrasting philosophical condition. The praise is explicitly relative, “among these,” and does not yet place its possessors among the gods.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.12 I.49.57.12

Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήχων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκός.

57.13 I.49.57.13

Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 433-434

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

57.12 · Social creatures and decent human lives I.49.57.12

“Because they are likely to return to a social and gentle kind of this sort, perhaps bees, wasps, or ants, or even back to the very same human kind, and from them decent men come to be.”

“Likely.”[1703]

57.13 · The lover of learning and the gods I.49.57.13

“But one may not enter the race of the gods without having practiced philosophy and departing wholly pure. This is permitted to no one other than the lover of learning.”[1704]

1703. Politikon now means living in an organized community, applied to insects as well as people. The listed wasps remain in the text despite the potentially surprising description “gentle.” Metrios denotes a moderate or decent person. The account links ordinary civic habits with a corresponding communal life.

1704. The condensed Greek joins the requirements of philosophy and complete purity, then restricts the destination to the philomathēs, the lover of learning. Themis expresses what is permitted or sanctioned. This final sentence distinguishes philosophical purification from the ordinary civic virtue just praised and closes excerpt 57.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.1 I.49.58.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.

58.2 I.49.58.2

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἔρμαιον <ἂν> ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.

58.3 I.49.58.3

Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ λέγεται μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.1 · Care for the soul beyond this life I.49.58.1

From the same work.

“But this at least,” he said, “my friends, it is right to consider: if the soul is immortal, it needs care, not only for this period that we call living, but for all time. And now the danger would indeed seem terrible if anyone were to neglect it.”[1705]

58.2 · Death would otherwise be a windfall I.49.58.2

“For if death were release from everything, it <would> be a windfall for bad people when they died to be rid at once of the body and, along with the soul, of their own wickedness. But as things are, since the soul appears to be immortal, it could have no other escape from evils and no salvation except to become as good and wise as possible.”[1706]

58.3 · What the soul carries with it I.49.58.3

“For the soul comes to Hades with nothing else in its possession except its education and nurture. These, it is said, bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead person from the very beginning of the journey there.”[1707]

1705. The heading again refers to Plato’s Phaedo. The edition locates the whole of excerpt 58 at 107B-114D. The conditional “if the soul is immortal” introduces a practical consequence: care for it must extend beyond the duration of one embodied life.

1706. The supplied an remains marked as “would.” Hermaion is a welcome piece of unexpected good fortune, here “windfall.” The hypothetical destruction of the soul would remove the bearer of wickedness itself; the alternative is the soul’s improvement. “Appears to be immortal” preserves the wording phainetai ousa rather than strengthening it into an unqualified assertion.

1707. Paideia and trophē, “education and nurture,” distinguish instruction or cultivation from the broader formation received through upbringing and habitual life. The claim concerns what remains with the soul after death. “It is said” introduces the reported account that the following units develop.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.4 I.49.58.4

Λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὕτως ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις·

58.5 I.49.58.5

Ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ᾽ οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ πού τις ἂν ἁμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς οὔσης ὁδοῦ. Νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.4 · The guides of the dead

I.49.58.4

“The account goes as follows. When each person dies, the daimon assigned to that person in life thus undertakes to lead the dead person to a certain place. Those gathered there must undergo judgment and travel to Hades with the guide appointed to conduct people from here to there. After they have received there what they must receive and stayed the necessary time, another guide brings them back here again over many long periods of time.”[1708]

58.5 · More than one road to Hades

I.49.58.5

“The journey, however, is not as Aeschylus’ Telephus describes it. He says that a simple path leads to Hades, but to me it seems neither simple nor single. Otherwise there would be no need for guides: surely no one could go astray anywhere if there were only one road. As things are, it seems to have many forks and winding routes. I say this by inference from the sacrifices and customary observances practiced here.”[1709]

1708. A daimon is a divine or intermediate being, not necessarily an evil spirit. The personal daimon, the appointed guide to Hades, and the guide of return have distinct roles. The printed hosper, “who,” is retained, as is houtōs, “thus,” where the apparatus records houtos, “this one,” in the parallel Plato text. The long temporal cycles are not assigned a numerical duration here.

1709. The edition identifies the reference to Aeschylus as fragment 235 in Nauck’s numbering. The passage reports Telephus’s statement in prose rather than presenting a complete verse. Socrates explicitly calls his claim about branching paths an inference from ritual practice; the rites themselves are not described in this extract.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.6 I.49.58.6

Ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, ἄλλα ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόλις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.

58.7 I.49.58.7

Ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθι περ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἠμμένην ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑποκρύπτεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.6 · A willing soul and a resistant soul

I.49.58.6

“The orderly and wise soul follows and understands its present circumstances. But the soul that desires the body, as I said earlier, remains for a long time in a flutter around it and around the visible region. After resisting in other ways and suffering much, it is led away by force and with difficulty by the appointed daimon.”[1710]

58.7 · The polluted soul is shunned

I.49.58.7

“When it arrives where the other souls are, everyone flees and hides from the impure soul that has done some such deed: either it has engaged in unjust killings, or it has committed other acts of that sort, akin to these and the works of kindred souls. No one is willing to become its fellow traveler or guide.”[1711]

1710. The earlier description of bodily attachment is included in excerpt 57. Eptoēmenē conveys agitated attachment or excitement, rendered “in a flutter.” The supplied edition prints alla, “other things,” before “resisting,” rather than the polla, “much,” of the parallel Plato passage. “In other ways” is a provisional rendering of this difficult wording, not a correction of the Greek.

1711. The participial construction beginning “when it arrives” is brought into ordinary English sentence order. “Hides” follows the printed hypokryptetai. The repeated language of kinship concerns likeness in wrongdoing and in the character of souls; it does not describe biological relatives. The absence of companions intensifies the isolation described next.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.8 I.49.58.8

Αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ, ἕως ἄν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα ᾤκησε τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστῃ τόπον προσήκοντα.

58.9 I.49.58.9

Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι· καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό [δέ] τινος πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν <ἂν> ἀκούσαιμι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.8 · Wandering and fitting destinations I.49.58.8

“It wanders by itself, gripped by complete helplessness, until certain periods of time have elapsed. When they have passed, it is carried by necessity to the dwelling fitting for it. But the soul that has passed through life purely and moderately, and has obtained gods as fellow travelers and guides, came to dwell in the place appropriate to each such soul.”[1712]

58.9 · Simmias asks about the earth I.49.58.9

“There are many marvelous places in the earth. The earth itself is neither of the kind nor of the size supposed by those accustomed to speak about it, as I have been persuaded by [but] someone.”

And Simmias said, “What do you mean by this, Socrates? I too have heard a great deal about the earth, though not the things that convince you. So I <would> gladly hear them.”[1713]

1712. Aporia is literally a lack of a way through, fitting the imagery of a journey as well as the soul’s helpless condition. The passage contrasts enforced movement with divine companionship. The printed aorist ōikēse, “came to dwell,” is retained in the report. Both destinations are described as corresponding to the soul’s character.

1713. The rejected de remains as the bracketed “but”; its awkward position reflects the rejected Greek wording. Removing it leaves the sentence straightforward. The person who persuaded Socrates is not named. Simmias’s supplied an is marked as “would.” This exchange introduces the account of the earth’s character, size, and inhabited regions.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.10 I.49.58.10

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ τε ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. Τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς, οἵαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με λέγειν κωλύει.

Ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

58.11 I.49.58.11

Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν γῆ ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν <ἰσορροπίαν>·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.10 · Telling the account and proving it true

I.49.58.10

“Yet, Simmias, to relate what these things are does not seem to me to require Glaucus’s skill. But to show that they are true seems to me beyond even Glaucus’s skill. For one thing, perhaps I would not be capable of it; for another, even if I knew how, my own life, Simmias, would not, I think, suffice for its length. Still, nothing prevents me from describing the form of the earth as I am convinced it is, and its regions.”

“That will suffice,” Simmias said.[1714]

58.11 · The earth at the center

I.49.58.11

“Well then,” he said, “I am convinced, first, that the earth is round and lies in the center of the heavens. It has no need of air to keep it from falling, nor of any other such constraint. The uniformity of the heavens with themselves in every direction, together with the earth’s own <equilibrium>, is sufficient to hold it in place.”[1715]

1714. The contrast itself makes “Glaucus’s skill” an expression for exceptional expertise; the extract gives no account of Glaucus. The Greek “that they are true” is elliptical, and English supplies “to show.” The printed ha te estin is retained. Socrates distinguishes describing his conviction from establishing its truth, and limits what he can undertake in his remaining life.

1715. The supplied isorropia, “equilibrium” or equal balance, remains marked. The printed gē estin states the earth’s central position directly; the apparatus records a conditional reading in the parallel Plato text. This is the physical model offered within Socrates’ account: central balance makes an external support unnecessary.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.12 I.49.58.12

Ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μένει. Πρῶτον μέν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

58.13 I.49.58.13

Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό· καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν μικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν.

58.14 I.49.58.14

Εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρυηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ ξυρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.12 · Equal balance prevents a fall I.49.58.12

“For an evenly balanced thing placed in the center of something uniform will have no greater or lesser tendency to incline in any direction. Being equally situated, it remains without tilting. This,” he said, “is my first conviction.”

“And rightly so,” Simmias said.[1716]

58.13 · Like ants or frogs at a pond I.49.58.13

“Furthermore,” he said, “it is something immensely large. We who live from the Phasis as far as the Pillars of Heracles inhabit only a small part, dwelling around the sea like ants or frogs at a pond; and many other people live elsewhere in many such places.”[1717]

58.14 · Hollows below the pure earth I.49.58.14

“For everywhere around the earth there are many hollows, of every sort in shape and size, into which water, mist, and air have flowed together. But the earth itself lies pure in the pure heaven where the stars are, which most people accustomed to discuss these matters call aether. These other things are its sediment and continually flow together into the earth’s hollows.”[1718]

1716. The argument explains why the earth, in the model just described, has no privileged direction in which to fall. English expands “will have no more or less to incline” into “no greater or lesser tendency” to make the compressed construction readable. Simmias’s assent belongs to the dialogue, not to an independent verification of the model.

1717. The named limits frame the speaker’s inhabited region; the comparison then reduces that region to the scale of a pond beside the much larger earth. The supplied edition’s epi telma is retained as “at a pond,” rather than replacing it with the parallel Plato wording. The many other inhabited places are asserted within the account, without being individually located.

1718. Aithēr, “aether,” is distinguished from the aēr, “air,” collected in the hollows. Hypostathmē is sediment or dregs. The account places our familiar water, mist, and air below a purer region; the next analogy explains why inhabitants of the hollows might mistake their own level for the earth’s upper surface.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.15 I.49.58.15

Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτο ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδύτητά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἴη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσον καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὼς εἴη τοῦ ἑωρακότος.

58.16 I.49.58.16

Ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ὑπ᾽ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδύτητος οὐχ οἵους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατον ἀέρα·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.15 · The imagined inhabitant of the seabed

I.49.58.15

“We live in its hollows without realizing it, and think that we live above, on the earth. It is as if someone living deep on the seabed thought he lived on the sea’s surface and, seeing the sun and the other stars through the water, supposed the sea to be heaven. Through sluggishness and weakness he had never reached the sea’s upper limit; he had never emerged and lifted his head out of the sea into our region to see how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own, nor had he heard of it from anyone else who had seen it.”[1719]

58.16 · Our own mistaken position

I.49.58.16

“This very same thing has happened to us. Living in a hollow of the earth, we think that we live upon its upper surface, and we call the air heaven, supposing that the stars travel through it as through heaven. The reality is the same: through weakness and sluggishness we are unable to pass through to the outermost air.”[1720]

1719. The imagined underwater observer mistakes the medium through which he sees the stars for heaven itself. His limitation is both bodily and informational: he has neither ascended nor heard an eyewitness. The analogy concerns the relation between levels of habitation, rather than denying that he really sees the sun and stars.

1720. The printed to de einai tauton is retained as “the reality is the same,” understood provisionally as returning to the situation in the preceding analogy. The construction is compressed. The participle describing the stars’ movement is rendered as a finite clause in English. Neither difficulty is silently repaired in the Greek.

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58.17 I.49.58.17

Ἐπεί, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ [οἱ] ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν· καί, εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ ἦν ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ.

58.18 I.49.58.18

Ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶ καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης· καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν ἡ γῆ ᾖ· καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν <κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν> πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.17 · Rising to see the true earth I.49.58.17

“For if someone reached its upper limit or grew wings and flew up, he would lift his head and look out. Just as [the] fish here lift their heads out of the sea and see what is here, so someone would see what is there. And if his constitution were strong enough to endure the sight, he would recognize that there are the true heaven, the true light, and the earth in truth.”[1721]

58.18 · Our region is worn and corroded I.49.58.18

“For this earth, its stones, and the whole region here are spoiled and eaten away, as things in the sea are eaten away by brine. Nothing worth speaking of grows in the sea, and practically nothing is perfect there; there are caverns, sand, endless clay, and mud wherever there is earth. And beside the things in our region, <they are not at all worthy of comparison in beauty; while those things above, in turn, beside the things in our region,> would appear finer by a still far greater degree.”[1722]

1721. The rejected first hoi is represented by a bracketed article; Greek retains a second article in its fuller construction. The comparison imagines a viewer emerging from air as a fish emerges from water. Physis here is the viewer’s constitution or natural capacity to endure the vision, and the account expressly makes that capacity a condition.

1722. The substantial supplement restores the two stages of comparison: our region surpasses the seabed, and the upper region surpasses ours still more. Its scope is marked in both languages, with English word order adjusted. Sēranges is rendered “caverns.” The statements about the sea’s impoverished condition belong to this illustrative account, including its qualification “practically.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.19 I.49.58.19

Εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

58.20 I.49.58.20

Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, ἤ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων·

58.21 I.49.58.21

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων <καὶ> καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.19 · An invitation to a beautiful story

I.49.58.19

“For if we should also tell a beautiful story, Simmias, it is worth hearing what the things upon the earth beneath heaven are like.”

“Indeed, Socrates,” Simmias said, “we would gladly hear this story.”[1723]

58.20 · A many-colored globe

I.49.58.20

“Well then, my friend,” he said, “the account is that, first, the earth itself looks like this, if someone were to view it from above: like balls made of twelve pieces of hide, variegated and divided into colors. The colors here, which painters use, belong to these colors; but there the whole earth consists of such colors, and of colors far brighter and purer still.”[1724]

58.21 · Purple, gold, and radiant white

I.49.58.21

“One part is purple and marvelous in beauty; another is golden; and whatever part is white is whiter than gypsum or snow. In the same way it is made up of the other colors too, more numerous <and> more beautiful than any we have seen.”[1725]

1723. Mythos is rendered “story,” retaining the speaker’s explicit characterization of the account. The invitation follows his earlier distinction between describing his conviction and proving it true. The adjective kalon, “beautiful,” belongs to the printed text and is retained; the apparatus notes variation in the parallel tradition.

1724. The scan prints ē tis, not ei tis; “if someone” is a provisional rendering of the viewing clause in light of the conditional alternative recorded in the apparatus. The printed Greek is retained. The twelve pieces describe the compared balls without specifying a geometrical solid. The parallel phrase “like samples,” reported in the apparatus after “colors,” is absent here and has not been inserted.

1725. The supplied kai remains marked as “and.” Halourgēs denotes purple, while chrysoeidēs means goldlike. The comparisons use familiar substances to suggest a brilliance exceeding familiar experience. “Part” is understood from the successive feminine articles referring to regions of the earth.

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58.22 I.49.58.22

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρὰ τὸ εἶδος παρέχεται στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἕν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι.

58.23 I.49.58.23

Ἐν δὲ τοιαύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαῦτα ἀνάλογον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τελειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα <τὰ> ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω.

58.24 I.49.58.24

Τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι καθαροί εἰσι καὶ οὐ κατεδηδομένοι οὔτε διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων, <ἃ> καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.22 · The hollows contribute to the whole

I.49.58.22

“For these very hollows of the earth, filled with water and air, contribute a certain appearance of color alongside the form, glittering amid the variety of the other colors. Thus a single continuous, variegated appearance of the earth presents itself.”[1726]

58.23 · Plants, mountains, and precious stones

I.49.58.23

“On an earth of this kind the growing things grow correspondingly: trees, flowers, and fruits. Likewise its mountains and stones have a correspondingly finer perfection, translucence, and color. The small stones here, <the> ones we prize, are fragments of those: carnelians, jaspers, emeralds, and all such stones. There, nothing is unlike these, and everything is more beautiful still.”[1727]

58.24 · Purity and the causes of decay

I.49.58.24

“The reason is that those stones are pure, neither eaten away nor spoiled like those here by decay and brine, by the things that have flowed together into this region, <which> bring ugliness and disease upon stones, earth, and the other things, both animals and plants.”[1728]

1726. The difficult phrase para to eidos, absent from the parallel Plato text according to the apparatus, is retained provisionally as “alongside the form.” It may relate the hollows’ contribution to the earth’s overall appearance. The plural “glittering” describes the hollows. The concluding contrast joins continuity of the whole with variety of color.

1727. The supplied article before “prized” is marked in English. Diaphaneia is rendered “translucence,” following the printed word. The ordinary valued stones are described as fragments of the finer material above. The familiar English gemstone names serve as translations of the ancient names; the argument concerns their beauty and relative perfection.

1728. The supplied relative ha is marked as “which.” The repeated hypo, “by,” is retained, connecting corruption with the substances collected in our lower region. The claim extends damage and disease across the listed kinds of things. Its explanation belongs to the account’s contrast between the pure upper earth and the hollows.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.25 I.49.58.25

Τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς· ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.25 · Treasures openly displayed I.49.58.25

“The earth itself is adorned with all these things, and also with gold, silver, and the other materials of that kind. They occur openly, abundant in number, large, and in many places on the earth, so that to see it is a sight for the blessed.”[1729]

1729. The printed expression is theama eudaimonōn, “a sight for the blessed.” The apparatus reports an additional word for “spectators” in the parallel Plato text; it is not added to the Greek here. The account next turns to the living creatures and human inhabitants of that earth.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.26 I.49.58.26

Ζῷα δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν [πρὸς] τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα.

58.27 I.49.58.27

Τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ᾗπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκε καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα.

58.28 I.49.58.28

Καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.26 · The inhabitants of the true earth

I.49.58.26

"There are many other living creatures upon it, and human beings: some live inland, others beside the air as we live beside the sea, and others on islands near the mainland, around which [toward] the air flows. In a word, what water and the sea are to us for our use, air is there; and what air is to us, aether is to them."[1730]

58.27 · A purer climate and stronger faculties

I.49.58.27

"Their seasons have such a temperate mixture that they are free from disease and live much longer than people here. In sight, hearing, understanding, and all such faculties they stand as far beyond us as air surpasses water, and aether air, in purity."[1731]

58.28 · The presence of the gods

I.49.58.28

"They also have groves and sanctuaries of gods, in which gods truly dwell. They receive divine utterances and oracles, perceive the gods, and have such communion with them. They see the sun, moon, and stars as they really are, and their happiness in other respects is in keeping with these things."[1732]

1730. This continues Socrates' description in Plato's Phaedo, source excerpt 58. The inhabited world above repeats familiar geographical relationships with a different surrounding medium. The rejected pros remains as the bracketed "toward"; removing it leaves the English sentence grammatical. Aether remains distinct from the air beneath it. The decimal suffixes are modern comparison divisions.

1731. Krāsis is a mixture or tempering, here the condition of the seasons. The comparison extends the account's successive levels of purity to the inhabitants' health, longevity, and faculties. Phronēsis is rendered "understanding." These qualities describe the people of the upper earth within the story.

1732. The passage distinguishes sacred places from the gods' actual habitation in them. Phēmai is rendered "divine utterances" in this setting, while manteiai denotes oracles. Aisthēseis adds perception of the gods themselves. Their unobstructed view of the heavenly bodies completes the earlier analogy of emerging above our ordinary air.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.29 I.49.58.29

Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ᾽ οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους·

58.30 I.49.58.30

Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῇ, καὶ <κα>τὰ στενώτερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν· ᾗ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀεννάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν·

58.31 I.49.58.31

Πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλὰ δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ, ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ ἑκάστοτε περιρροὴ γιγνομένη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.29 · The earth's hollows differ in shape

I.49.58.29

"Such is the nature of the whole earth and of what surrounds it. But within it there are many regions in its hollows, all around it: some deeper and more widely opened than the one we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than our region, and still others shallower than ours and wider."[1733]

58.30 · Passages connecting the hollows

I.49.58.30

"All these regions are connected underground by many openings, <through> narrower and wider passages, and have channels by which much water flows from one into another as into mixing bowls. Beneath the earth are immeasurably great perennial rivers, of hot waters as well as cold."[1734]

58.31 · Fire and streams of mud

I.49.58.31

"There is much fire and there are great rivers of fire, and large quantities of liquid clay, some purer and some muddier, like the rivers of clay that flow before the fiery stream in Sicily, and the fiery stream itself. Each region is filled with these substances according to the surrounding flow that happens to reach it on each occasion."[1735]

1733. The account now turns from the earth's upper surface to its cavities. Depth and breadth vary independently: a deeper hollow need not have a wider opening. Chasma is rendered "opening" here and "chasm" where the following passage describes the great channel through the earth.

1734. The supplement affects the first two letters of kata; English marks the whole corresponding preposition "through." Kratēres are mixing bowls or basins, supplying an image of connected receptacles. The passage describes the channels and waters of the story's subterranean system, not separate named rivers yet.

1735. Rhyax can denote a rushing stream; the association with Sicily and fire gives the sense of a volcanic flow here. "Liquid clay" preserves pēlos, alongside the muddier material. The final hōs an construction follows Wachsmuth's printed text, describing how each region is filled as a flow reaches it.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.32 I.49.58.32

Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. Ἔν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι᾽ ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό·

τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·
ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν.

58.33 I.49.58.33

Εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέουσι· γίγνονται δ᾽ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι᾽ οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. Ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.32 · Tartarus and the earth's oscillation I.49.58.32

"Something like a swing within the earth moves all these things up and down. This oscillation arises from a natural arrangement of the following kind. One of the earth's chasms is both the greatest and bored straight through the entire earth. Homer spoke of it when he said:

Far away, where the deepest gulf lies beneath the earth.
Elsewhere both he and many other poets have called it Tartarus."[1736]

58.33 · All rivers enter and leave the chasm I.49.58.33

"For all the rivers flow together into this chasm, and all flow out of it again. Each takes on the character of the earth through which it flows. The reason all the streams flow out from here and back into it is that this fluid has neither a bottom nor a supporting base."[1737]

1736. The quoted verse is Homer, Iliad 8.14. The printed correction tēle mal', "far away," is retained. Aiōra names a swing or oscillation; the following sentences explain it through a throughgoing chasm and the movement of fluid. The English makes the swing the subject of "moves," retaining the relationship expressed by the infinitive construction.

1737. The rivers' differing properties are connected with the ground through which they pass. The absence of a bottom or base belongs to the central body of fluid in the chasm. This prepares the oscillation described next, in which movement toward either side displaces water and air.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.34 I.49.58.34

Αἰωρεῖται δὲ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα ῥέον, <οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρουμένων τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα> δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν.

58.35 I.49.58.35

Ὅταν δὲ οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολίπῃ, δεῦρο δὴ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἑκάστοις ὁδοποιεῖται, θάλαττάν τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.34 · The earth's movement resembles breathing I.49.58.34

"It sways and surges up and down, and the air and the breath around it do the same. For it accompanies the fluid both when it rushes toward the far side of the earth and when it rushes toward this side. Just as in breathing creatures the flowing breath continually passes out and in, <so there too the breath, swaying together with the fluid,> produces terrible winds of immense force as it enters and leaves."[1738]

58.35 · The alternating filling of the channels I.49.58.35

"When the water withdraws into the region called below, it flows into the streams in those parts of the earth and fills them, as though people were pouring water into them. When it leaves there again and rushes this way, it fills the channels here in turn. What has filled them flows through the conduits and through the earth, each portion reaching the places to which a way has been made for it, and forms sea, lakes, rivers, and springs."[1739]

1738. The substantial supplement remains marked. Within it the edition prints xynaiōroumenōn, a genitive plural that does not agree with the singular pneuma; the English provisionally renders the intended joint swaying without changing the Greek. "Breath" preserves pneuma and the analogy with respiration. The surrounding pronouns are compressed; "the fluid" makes the understood reference explicit.

1739. The Greek shifts to the plural participle epantlountes, "pouring water upon," without an expressed subject. English supplies the human comparison rather than altering that form. The printed construction around the streams is compressed, and the interpretation remains provisional. Thalattan is singular, "sea," as in this edition.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.36 I.49.58.36

Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. Καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ᾗ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος·

58.37 I.49.58.37

Ἔστι δὲ ἃ παντάπασι κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. Δυνατὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ᾽ οὔ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.36 · The waters return by different routes

I.49.58.36

“From there, back beneath the earth, some waters travel through longer and more numerous regions, others through fewer and shorter ones, and discharge again into Tartarus. Some enter much lower than the place from which they were poured out, others only a little lower; all enter below their outflow. Some return directly opposite the place where they emerged, others on the same side.”[1740]

58.37 · Winding streams and the central limit

I.49.58.37

“Some go all the way around, winding once or several times around the earth like snakes, and descend as far as possible before discharging again. From either side they can descend as far as the center, but no farther, for the region on the other side becomes uphill for each of the two flows.”[1741]

1740. The account distinguishes length of route, level of return, and side of the chasm. The final Greek omits a repeated verb; English supplies “return” from the preceding movement. The word katantikry, “directly opposite,” will recur in the arrangement of the four named rivers.

1741. The center sets a limit to downward movement from either side. “Uphill” renders anantes and explains why neither flow continues descending past the middle. The snake comparison concerns the winding routes. It is separate from the description of the fluid’s oscillation through the central chasm.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.38 I.49.58.38

Τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δὲ ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρα ῥεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον τὰ περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστι, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς διʼ ἐρήμων τε τόπων ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερονσιάδα οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας εἱμαρμένους <χρόνους> μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, <αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους,> πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.

58.39 I.49.58.39

Τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καιόμενον καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρʼ ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρʼ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσίας λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.38 · Ocean and Acheron

I.49.58.38

“The other streams are many, great, and of every kind. Among these many there are four in particular. The greatest, flowing farthest out around the circumference, is called Ocean. Opposite it, and flowing in the contrary direction, is Acheron. It flows through various deserted regions and then, passing underground, reaches the Acherusian lake. There the souls of most of the dead arrive and remain for certain allotted <periods>, some longer, <others shorter,> before being sent out again into the births of living creatures.”[1742]

58.39 · The fiery river and its boiling lake

I.49.58.39

“A third river issues between these two and, near its outlet, falls into a great region burning with much fire. It forms a lake larger than the sea in our region, seething with water and clay. From there it proceeds in a circuit, turbid and muddy, winding through the earth to various places and to the edge of the Acherusian lake, without mixing with its water.”[1743]

1742. The supplied “periods” and “others shorter” remain marked. The phrase ta peri kyklōi is compressed and rendered as the outer circuit of Ocean. Acheron is distinguished from the lake it reaches. The souls’ return is to births of living creatures generally; the wording does not restrict it to human births.

1743. Kata meson is taken as a position between the two rivers already named. The third river forms a separate boiling lake before reaching the vicinity of the Acherusian lake. Its contact with that lake is explicitly qualified: the waters do not mix. The river receives its name in the next unit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.40 I.49.58.40

Περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσι Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς.

58.41 I.49.58.41

Τούτου δ᾽ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα ἔχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα·

58.42 I.49.58.42

Ὁ δ᾽ ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσίᾳ λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Κωκυτός.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.40 · Pyriphlegethon and the volcanic streams

I.49.58.40

“After winding many times beneath the earth, it discharges farther down in Tartarus. This is the river called Pyriphlegethon, fragments of which the volcanic streams blow up wherever they happen to occur upon the earth.”[1744]

58.41 · The Stygian region and its lake

I.49.58.41

“Opposite this, in turn, the fourth river first falls into a region that is terrible and savage, as the story goes, colored throughout like dark blue pigment. They call the region Stygian, and the lake the river forms by flowing into it they call Styx.”[1745]

58.42 · Cocytus flows in the opposite direction

I.49.58.42

“After falling into this lake and acquiring terrible powers in its water, the river sinks beneath the earth and winds along in the direction opposite to Pyriphlegethon, meeting it at the Acherusian lake from the other side. Its water too mixes with nothing else. It likewise completes a circuit and discharges into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus.”[1746]

1744. The name Pyriphlegethon identifies the fiery river. Katōterō tou Tartarou is understood provisionally as a lower part of Tartarus, in keeping with the preceding description of rivers returning at lower levels; the Greek genitive is retained. The volcanic streams are described as expelling portions of this subterranean river.

1745. Kyanos is rendered by its dark blue color, without assigning a precise modern material. The region is Stygian, while the lake is Styx. The Greek construction after “Stygian” is elliptical; English repeats “they call” to convey the naming of the lake without adding a word to the facing Greek.

1746. The fourth river is distinct from the lake of Styx through which it passes. The repeated references to opposition place its movement and return in relation to Pyriphlegethon. “Meeting it” makes explicit the preceding river as the understood counterpart; the stated lack of mixing remains intact.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.43 I.49.58.43

Τούτων δὲ οὕτω πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή.

58.44 I.49.58.44

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τις τι ἠδίκησε, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος·

58.45 I.49.58.45

Οἱ δ᾽ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασάμενοι, ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ <ἡ> προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.43 · Judgment of the dead

I.49.58.43

“With this arrangement established, when the dead arrive at the place to which the daimon brings each one, first both those who have lived well and reverently and those who have not undergo judgment.”[1747]

58.44 · The souls whose lives were intermediate

I.49.58.44

“Those judged to have lived an intermediate life go to Acheron, board the conveyances provided for them, and on these reach the lake. They dwell there and, through purification and payment of penalties, are absolved of their wrongdoings, if any have done wrong. For their good deeds each receives honors according to desert.”[1748]

58.45 · Those judged incurable

I.49.58.45

“But those judged incurable because of the enormity of their offenses, having committed many great acts of temple robbery, many unjust and unlawful killings, or other deeds of that kind, are cast by <the> fate appropriate to them into Tartarus, from which they never emerge.”[1749]

1747. The account returns from geography to the soul’s fate. The printed aorist diedikasanto occurs within a general description of what happens on arrival; English uses the present to express that general sequence. Hosiōs, “reverently,” concerns conduct toward divine or sacred obligations alongside living well.

1748. Mesōs describes lives falling between the extremes that follow. Ochēmata means conveyances or vehicles; the text does not specify their construction. Release is here connected with purification and satisfaction for wrongdoing, while beneficial actions receive corresponding honors. This differs from the irreversible punishment in the next unit.

1749. The supplied article before “appropriate fate” remains marked. Hierosyliai are acts of robbing sacred property, rendered “temple robbery.” The decisive qualification is the judgment of incurability; the next group has also committed serious wrongs but is distinguished as capable of remedy. “Never” is explicit in the Greek.

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58.46 I.49.58.46

Οἱ δ᾽ ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ ῥεῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα·

58.47 I.49.58.47

Ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δὲ ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἀποβαίνουσι καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς·

58.48 I.49.58.48

Καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν. Αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.46 · Serious wrongs capable of remedy I.49.58.46

“Those judged to have committed great but remediable offenses, for example, people who in anger have done violence to a father or mother and spend the rest of their lives regretting it, or who become killers in some other comparable way, must fall into Tartarus. But after they have fallen in and spent a year there, the current casts them out: the killers along Cocytus, and those who struck their fathers and mothers along Pyriphlegethon.”[1750]

58.47 · Appealing to those they harmed I.49.58.47

“When the currents carry them to the Acherusian lake, they cry out and call, some to those they killed, others to those they abused. Calling them, they supplicate and beg them to allow them to come out into the lake and to receive them. If they persuade them, they come out and their sufferings end. If not, they are carried back into Tartarus and from there into the rivers again.”[1751]

58.48 · The sentence continues until persuasion succeeds I.49.58.48

“They do not cease undergoing these sufferings until they persuade those they wronged. For this is the sentence the judges imposed upon them.”[1752]

1750. The printed correction hyp’ orgēs, “in anger,” is retained. The account expressly includes subsequent regret in the example of parental violence. Patraloiai and mētraloiai name those who strike or abuse parents, not necessarily those who kill them. The one-year stay precedes a further condition of release, explained next; it does not itself end the punishment.

1751. Release now depends on the response of the people harmed. The verbs describe calling, supplication, and persuasion; the passage does not use a separate word for forgiveness. English makes “the currents” explicit from the preceding sentence. The destination requested is the lake, rather than an immediate ascent to the upper earth.

1752. The condition of release is repeated as the judges’ sentence. This distinguishes remediable punishment, whose duration depends on persuasion, from the preceding one-year stage and from the permanent confinement of those judged incurable. The Greek provides no further timetable.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.49 I.49.58.49

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι.

58.50 I.49.58.50

Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.

58.51 I.49.58.51

Ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν χρὴ ἕνεκα ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.49 · Release to the pure dwelling

I.49.58.49

“Those judged outstanding in living reverently are the ones released and freed from these regions within the earth as from prisons. They go upward to the pure dwelling and settle upon the earth’s surface.”[1753]

58.50 · Those sufficiently purified by philosophy

I.49.58.50

“Among these, those who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live altogether without bodies for the time to come and reach dwellings more beautiful still. These are neither easy to describe, nor is there enough time at present.”[1754]

58.51 · The prize and the hope

I.49.58.51

“But for the sake of what we have discussed, Simmias, we must do everything we can to share in virtue and understanding during life. For the prize is noble, and the hope is great.”[1755]

1753. The Greek opening is elliptical; English understands “outstanding” from diapherontōs, “exceptionally.” The edition’s desmōtēriōn, “prisons,” is retained. The surface here is the true earth described earlier, distinguished from the hollows where ordinary human life takes place.

1754. The passage distinguishes the pure upper dwelling from the still finer destination of those purified by philosophy. Their future life is explicitly without bodies. Socrates declines to describe the further dwellings, so no additional geography has been supplied here.

1755. The story returns to its practical purpose: cultivating aretē and phronēsis, “virtue and understanding.” Athlon is the prize of a contest. The assertion of a great hope leads directly to the qualification about certainty in the next sentence.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.52

I.49.58.52

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

58.52 · A noble risk, without a claim to certainty I.49.58.52

“To insist that these things are exactly as I have described them would not be fitting for a person of sense. But that either these things or something of this kind are true of our souls and their dwellings, since the soul appears to be immortal, seems to me both a fitting belief and a risk worth taking in believing it so. For the risk is noble, and one should, as it were, chant such things to oneself.”[1756]

1756. Socrates expressly distinguishes the exact details of his account from the more general hope it supports. “Appears to be immortal” retains the qualification in the printed Greek. Epāidein evokes chanting an incantation; the phrase “as it were” makes this a comparison. This closes source excerpt 58 at printed p. 444 line 29.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

59.1 I.49.59.1

Πορφυρίου.

Ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς διαμονὴ καὶ ἀιδιότης ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν Πυθαγόρου δογμάτων γνώριμόν ἐστι πᾶσι καὶ περιβόητον, ὅνγε πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα δόξαι κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἰδεῖν τεθνεῶτα τὸν πατέρα, φασὶν εἰπεῖν, “οὐκ ἔδοξας, ἀλλ᾽ εἶδες”·

59.2 I.49.59.2

Τῶν δὲ παραγγελμάτων ἓν εἶναι “συνδεῖν ὀσημέραι τὸ στρωματόδεσμον”, ὡς ἀποδημίαν οὖσαν τὴν τελευτὴν καὶ δεῖν ἀεὶ συνεσκευασμένους ἡμᾶς τὸν καιρὸν περιμένειν τῆς ἐκεῖ<σε> πορείας·

59.3 I.49.59.3

Τὸν δὲ ἀναιροῦντα δικαίως πρὸς τὸ ἀποθνῄσκον τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔχειν, ὃν ὁ γεννῶν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ γεννώμενον. Ἑκατέραν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς μεταβολήν, τὴν μὲν εἰς σῶμα γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος θάνατον προσαγορευομένην.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

59.1 · Porphyry: the soul's enduring existence I.49.59.1

Porphyry.

The soul's continued existence and eternity are among the teachings of Pythagoras most familiar to everyone and most widely celebrated. They say that, when someone told him he thought he had seen his dead father in a dream, Pythagoras replied, "You did not merely think so: you saw him."[1757]

59.2 · Keep the bedding packed for departure I.49.59.2

One of his precepts, they say, is "to tie up the bedding every day," since death is a journey abroad, and we must always keep our belongings packed as we await the time for the journey <there>.[1758]

59.3 · Birth and death as changes of the soul I.49.59.3

The person who justly puts someone to death bears to the one dying the same relation that a parent bears to the one being born. For each is a change of the soul: its passage into a body is called birth, and its passage out of a body death.[1759]

1757. The heading names Porphyry without naming a work. The printed Pythagorou and doxai follow corrections recorded in the apparatus. The anecdote is presented as a report about Pythagoras, introduced by "they say." His reply contrasts seeming with seeing; it is not converted here into independent evidence of the dream's object.

1758. The bedding precept is interpreted as readiness for departure. Strōmatodesmon follows the edition's correction and denotes the bundle of bedding. The supplement supplies the ending of ekeise, the directional word "there"; English marks the whole word. The reported teaching concerns preparedness for the appointed time of death.

1759. Dikaiōs, "justly," is taken with putting to death; the qualification remains explicit. Logos here means a relation, not a spoken account. The comparison treats birth and death as opposite changes in the soul's relation to a body. This completes excerpt 59 at printed p. 445 line 13; Porphyry's interpretation of Circe follows in excerpt 60.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.1 I.49.60.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ Ὁμήρου περὶ τῆς Κίρκης λεγόμενα θαυμαστὴν ἔχει τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν θεωρίαν. Λέγεται γὰρ οὕτως·

οἱ δὲ συῶν μὲν ἔχον κεφαλὰς φωνήν τε τρίχας τε
καὶ δέμας· αὐτὰρ νοῦς ἦν ἔμπεδος ὡς τὸ πάρος περ.

60.2 I.49.60.2

Ἔστι τοίνυν ὁ μῦθος αἴνιγμα τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπό τε Πυθαγόρου λεγομένων καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὡς ἄφθαρτος οὖσα τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἀίδιος, οὔ τι μὴν ἀπαθὴς οὐδὲ ἀμετάβλητος, ἐν ταῖς λεγομέναις φθοραῖς καὶ τελευταῖς μεταβολὴν ἴσχει καὶ μετακόσμησιν εἰς ἕτερα σωμάτων εἴδη, καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν διώκουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον ὁμοιότητι καὶ συνηθείᾳ βίου διαίτης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.1 · Porphyry: Circe and the unchanged mind I.49.60.1

By the same author.

What Homer says about Circe offers a remarkable contemplation of matters concerning the soul. For he says:

They had the heads, the voices, and the bristles of swine,
and their bodies; but their mind remained steadfast, just as before.[1760]

60.2 · An enduring soul in changing bodies I.49.60.2

The myth, then, is a riddle expressing what Pythagoras and Plato say about the soul: that although it is imperishable by nature and eternal, it is certainly neither unaffected nor unchanging. In what are called destructions and deaths, it undergoes change and a rearrangement into other forms of bodies, pursuing, in accordance with pleasure, what suits it and is akin to it through similarity and familiarity of its manner of life.[1761]

1760. The heading continues the attribution to Porphyry. The verses are Odyssey 10.239-240, describing the companions transformed by Circe. The survival of their mind within altered bodies provides the starting point for the allegory. The decimal suffixes are modern comparison divisions.

1761. Ainigma marks an interpretation beneath the narrative. The distinction is between continued existence and freedom from all change or affection; the former does not imply the latter. Metakosmēsis denotes a rearrangement into another bodily form. The difficult accumulation biou diaitēs is conveyed as manner of life.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.3 I.49.60.3

Ἔνθα δῆ<λον> τὸ μετὰ παιδείας ἑκάστῳ καὶ φιλοσοφίας ὄφελος, ἂν μνημονεύουσα τῶν καλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ δυσχεραίνουσα τὰς αἰσχρὰς καὶ παρανόμους ἡδονὰς δύνηται κρατεῖν καὶ προσέχειν αὐτῇ καὶ φυλάττειν, μὴ λάθῃ θηρίον γενομένη καὶ στέρξασα σώματος οὐκ εὐφυοῦς οὐδὲ καθαροῦ πρὸς ἀρετήν, φύσιν ἄμουσον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ θυμούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φρόνιμον αὔξοντος καὶ τρέφοντος.

60.4 I.49.60.4

Αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς μετακοσμήσεως εἱμαρμένη καὶ φύσις ὑπὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμων ἀνηγόρευται,

σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι,
καὶ μεταμπίσχουσα τὰς ψυχάς.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.3 · Education guards against a bestial life

I.49.60.3

Here the benefit that comes to each person with education and philosophy is <clear>, if the soul, remembering noble things and recoiling from shameful and unlawful pleasures, can maintain control, attend to itself, and keep watch, lest it unknowingly become a beast and embrace the nature of a body ill-suited and impure in relation to virtue: an uncultivated and irrational nature, fostering and nourishing desire and anger rather than understanding.[1762]

60.4 · The soul changes its garment

I.49.60.4

For the fate and nature of this very rearrangement has been proclaimed a daimon by Empedocles,

wrapping them in an unfamiliar tunic of flesh,
and clothing the souls afresh.[1763]

1762. The supplement completes dēlon; English marks the whole word clear. The printed conditional an and dynētai are retained rather than replaced by the alternative wording recorded in the apparatus. The long sentence makes education a means of guarding the soul's dispositions. The attachment of physin to the preceding genitive construction is compressed; the English interpretation remains provisional.

1763. The edition identifies the verse as Empedocles, line 402 in Stein's numbering. The unusual printed allognōti is retained, provisionally rendered unfamiliar; the apparatus records competing readings involving a differently colored garment. The Greek does not print an object within the verse; English supplies them from the souls in the next clause. Daimōn is not equated here with an evil spirit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.5 I.49.60.5

Ὅμηρος δὲ τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ περίοδον καὶ περιφορὰν παλιγγενεσίας Κίρκην προσηγόρευκεν, Ἡλίου παῖδα τοῦ πᾶσαν φθορὰν γενέσει καὶ γένεσιν αὖ πάλιν φθορᾷ συνάπτοντος ἀεὶ καὶ συνείροντος.

60.6 I.49.60.6

Αἰαίη δὲ νῆσος ἡ δεχομένη τὸν ἀποθνῄσκοντα μοῖρα καὶ χώρα τοῦ περιέχοντος, εἰς ἣν ἐμπεσοῦσαι πρῶτον αἱ ψυχαὶ πλανῶνται καὶ ξενοπαθοῦσι καὶ ὀλοφύρονται καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν,

ὅπῃ ζόφος,
οὐδ᾽ ὅπῃ ἠέλιος φαεσίμβροτος εἶσ᾽ ὑπὸ γαῖαν.

60.7 I.49.60.7

Ποθοῦσαι δὲ καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τὴν συνήθη καὶ σύντροφον ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ μετὰ σαρκὸς δίαιταν ἐμπίπτουσιν αὖθις εἰς τὸν κυκεῶνα τῆς γενέσεως μιγνύσης εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κυκώσης ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀίδια καὶ θνητὰ καὶ φρόνιμα καὶ παθητὰ καὶ ὀλύμπια καὶ γηγενῆ, θελγόμεναι καὶ μαλασσόμεναι ταῖς ἀγούσαις αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἡδοναῖς,

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.5 · Circe as the circuit of rebirth I.49.60.5

Homer has called the circular course and revolution of rebirth Circe, the daughter of the Sun, who continually joins and links every destruction to birth, and birth in turn to destruction.[1764]

60.6 · Aeaea and the bewildered souls I.49.60.6

The island Aeaea is the portion and region of the surrounding expanse that receives the dying person. When souls first fall into it, they wander, experience unfamiliar things, lament, and do not know

where the darkness lies,
nor where the sun that shines for mortals goes beneath the earth.[1765]

60.7 · The mixture of embodied existence I.49.60.7

Longing, through their pleasures, for the familiar way of life in and with flesh in which they were reared, they fall once more into the mixed draught of coming-to-be. It mixes together and truly stirs into one things eternal and mortal, intelligent and subject to affections, Olympian and earthborn. The souls are enchanted and softened by the pleasures that lead them back into birth.[1766]

1764. The identification of Circe with a circuit belongs to Porphyry's allegorical reading. Palingenesia means renewed birth. The Sun's continual linking of birth and destruction explains Circe's parentage within that interpretation; it is not a separate statement by Homer in the verses quoted above.

1765. To periechon is the encompassing region, left unspecified here. Porphyry applies Odyssey 10.190-191 to the souls' initial disorientation. The quotation begins with only part of the first Homeric line; the omitted words have not been supplied. The source's eīs' is retained in the second line.

1766. Kykeōn is a stirred mixture or drink, here also an image of the mingling involved in embodiment. The verb kykōsa reinforces that image. The three paired contrasts have been retained separately. The participles enchanted and softened describe the souls, following the edition's corrections; the sentence continues into the next unit.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.8 I.49.60.8

Ἐν ᾧ δὴ μάλιστα πολλῆς μὲν εὐτυχίας αἱ ψυχαὶ δέονται πολλῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης, ὅπως μὴ τοῖς κακίστοις ἐπισπόμεναι καὶ συνενδοῦσαι μέρεσιν ἢ πάθεσιν αὐτῶν κακοδαίμονα καὶ θηριώδη βίον ἀμείψωσιν.

60.9 I.49.60.9

Ἡ γὰρ λεγομένη καὶ νομιζομένη τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου τρίοδος ἐνταῦθά που τέτακται περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σχιζόμενα μέρη, τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ὧν ἕκαστον ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ῥοπὴν ἐπὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἐνδίδωσι. Καὶ οὐκέτι ταῦτα μῦθος οὐδὲ ποίησις, ἀλλὰ ἀλήθεια καὶ φυσικὸς λόγος.

60.10 I.49.60.10

Ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ μεταβολῇ καὶ γενέσει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐξανθοῦν ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ δυναστεύει, τούτοις εἰς νωθῆ [καὶ] σώματα καὶ βίους θολεροὺς καὶ ἀκαθάρτους ὑπὸ φιληδονίας καὶ γαστριμαργίας φησὶ γενέσθαι τὴν μεταβολήν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.8 · Fortune and self-control at the transition

I.49.60.8

At this point especially, souls need much good fortune and much self-control, so that they do not follow and yield to the worst parts or affections of themselves and exchange their life for a miserable and bestial one.[1767]

60.9 · The crossroads as the soul's three parts

I.49.60.9

For the crossroads spoken of and believed to exist in Hades is situated somewhere here, at the divisions of the soul: the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. Each supplies from itself an impulse and an inclination toward its own kind of life. These things are no longer myth or poetry, but truth and an account of nature.[1768]

60.10 · When appetite rules

I.49.60.10

For those in whom the appetitive part flourishes, prevails, and rules at the change into birth undergo, he says, a transformation into sluggish [and] bodies and lives made turbid and impure by love of pleasure and gluttony.[1769]

1767. The printed eutychia means good fortune; the apparatus's alternative eupsychia, courage, is not adopted. Sōphrosynē is self-control or moderation. The prospect of a bestial life concerns the soul's dispositions as it enters another embodiment, not a claim that its enduring nature is destroyed.

1768. The three roads are interpreted through the three parts of the soul. Thymoeides is the spirited part, associated with anger in the next example; it is distinguished from appetite. The assertion that the account is true and natural is Porphyry's claim within this interpretation.

1769. The edition prints nōthē, sluggish, followed by rejected kai, preserved as the bracketed and. Removing it leaves the intended English construction. The apparatus offers alternatives and a possible additional adjective; these have not been inserted. The subject of he says is not restated, so English leaves the reference open.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.11 I.49.60.11

Ὅταν δὲ φιλονεικίαις σκληραῖς καὶ φονικαῖς ὠμότησιν ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς ἢ δυσμενείας ἐξηγριωμένον ἔχουσα παντάπασιν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ θυμοειδὲς εἰς δευτέραν γένεσιν ἀφίκηται, πλήρης οὖσα προσφάτου πικρίας καὶ βαρυφρόνης, ἔρριψεν ἑαυτὴν εἰς λύκου φύσιν ἢ λέοντος, ὥσπερ ὄργανον ἀμυντικὸν τὸ σῶμα τῷ κρατοῦντι προϊεμένη πάθει καὶ περιαρμόσασα.

60.12 I.49.60.12

Διὸ δεῖ μάλιστα περὶ τὸν θάνατον, ὥσπερ ἐν τελετῇ, καθαρεύοντα παντὸς ἀπέχειν πάθους φαύλου τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν χαλεπὴν κοιμήσαντα καὶ φθόνους καὶ δυσμενείας καὶ ὀργὰς ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενον τοῦ φρονοῦντος ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ σώματος.

60.13 I.49.60.13

Οὕτως ὁ χρυσόρραπις Ἑρμῆς ἀληθῶς ὁ λόγος ἐντυγχάνων καὶ δεικνύων ἐναργῶς τὸ καλόν, ἢ παντάπασιν εἴργει καὶ ἀπέχει τοῦ κυκεῶνος, ἢ πιοῦσαν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ καὶ ἤθει διαφυλάττει πλεῖστον χρόνον, ὡς ἀνυστόν ἐστι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

60.11 · Anger seeks the body of a predator I.49.60.11

But when a soul arrives at a second birth with its spirited part utterly brutalized by harsh rivalries and murderous cruelties arising from some quarrel or hostility, full of recent bitterness and resentfulness, it casts itself into the nature of a wolf or lion. It offers its body to the ruling passion as an instrument of retaliation and fits it around that passion.[1770]

60.12 · Purification at the approach of death I.49.60.12

Therefore, especially at the approach of death, one must, as in an initiation, keep oneself pure and hold the soul apart from every base passion. Having lulled every violent desire to sleep and placed envy, hostility, and anger as far as possible from the faculty of understanding, one must leave the body.[1771]

60.13 · Hermes as guiding reason I.49.60.13

In this way Hermes of the golden wand, who is in truth reason, meets the soul and clearly shows it what is noble. He either bars it entirely and keeps it away from the mixed draught, or, if it has drunk, preserves it in a human life and character for the longest time possible.[1772]

1770. The printed phonikais, murderous, follows a correction in the apparatus. Baryphronēs is unusual, rendered provisionally resentfulness; the apparatus gives baryphrosynēs as an alternative. The aorist erripsen occurs within a general conditional description and is conveyed by the present. The body is treated as the instrument fitted to the prevailing disposition.

1771. Teletē is an initiation or rite; the edition retains it rather than the variant meaning death. The difficult tou phronountos is taken with as far as possible, meaning away from that which understands. This interpretation preserves the printed genitive and remains provisional; the apparatus records attempts to alter the construction.

1772. The soul is the understood object, made explicit in English; no additional noun is inserted into the Greek. Logos is now identified with Hermes as guiding reason. The edition cites Odyssey 10.227 here; that printed locator does not accompany a complete quoted verse. Piousan, the printed participle meaning having drunk, connects the conclusion to the earlier mixed draught.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

61.1 I.49.61.1

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Πάλιν αἰνιττόμενος, ὅτι ταῖς τῶν εὐσεβῶς βεβιωκότων ψυχαῖς μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν οἰκεῖός ἐστι τόπος ὁ περὶ τὴν σελήνην, ὑπεδήλωσεν εἰπών·

ἀλλά σ᾽ ἐς ἠλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης
ἀθάνατοι πέμψουσιν, ὅθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάμανθυς,

61.2 I.49.61.2

Ἠλύσιον μὲν πεδίον εἰκότως προσειπὼν τὴν τῆς σελήνης ἐπιφάνειαν ὑπὸ ἡλίου καταλαμπομένην, “ὅτ᾽ ἀέξεται ἀλίου αὐγαῖς”, ὡς φησι Τιμόθεος·

61.3 I.49.61.3

Πέρατα δὲ γῆς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς νυκτός, ἣν σκιὰν τῆς γῆς εἶναι λέγουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ πολλάκις ἐπιψαύουσαν τῆς σελήνης, ὡς τοῦτο τῆς γῆς πέρας ἐχούσης οὗ τῇ σκιᾷ μακρότερον οὐκ ἐξικνεῖται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

61.1 · Porphyry: Elysium and the moon

I.49.61.1

By the same author.

Again, hinting that the region about the moon is the fitting place after death for the souls of those who have lived reverently, he intimated it by saying:

But to the Elysian plain and the limits of the earth
the immortals will send you, where fair-haired Rhadamanthys dwells.[1773]

61.2 · The moon's sunlit surface

I.49.61.2

He appropriately called the surface of the moon illuminated by the sun the Elysian plain, "when it waxes in the sun's rays," as Timotheus says.[1774]

61.3 · The earth's shadow as its limit

I.49.61.3

By the limits of the earth he meant the farthest reaches of night, which the mathematical astronomers say is the earth's shadow, often touching the moon. On this account, the earth has as its limit that point beyond which its shadow does not extend.[1775]

1773. The heading still attributes the interpretation to Porphyry; the poet understood as he is Homer. The verses are Odyssey 4.563-564. The lunar identification belongs to the interpretation, rather than to the words of the verses themselves. English supplies dwells to complete their elliptical final clause.

1774. The edition identifies the short quotation as Timotheus, fragment 3 in the collection it cites. Aexetai is the printed correction; aliou is the poetic form for of the sun. The explanation links the name of Elysium to the moon's illuminated surface. The brief quotation remains embedded in prose as in the source.

1775. Mathēmatikoi here concerns those giving a mathematical account of the heavens. Porphyry makes the reach of the earth's shadow explain the poetic limits of the earth. This reports his cosmological interpretation; it should not be read as a modern measurement of the shadow's extent. The printed relative hou and following negative are both retained.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

62.1 I.49.62.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Πρῶτον μὲν [οὖν] αἴσθησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἴη μίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων σύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον ἔρωτα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φόβον τε καὶ θυμὸν ὅσα τε ἑπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα·

62.2 I.49.62.2

Ὧν εἰ μὲν κρατήσοιεν, δίκῃ βιώσοιντο, κρατηθέντες δὲ ἀδικίᾳ. Καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ξυννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα ἔξοι·

62.3 I.49.62.3

Σφαλεὶς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβάλοι· μὴ παυόμενός τε ἐν τούτοις ἔτι κακίας τρόπον ὃν κακύνοιτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως εἷς τινα τοιαύτην ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοι θήρειον φύσιν,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

62.1 · Plato: sensation and the passions

I.49.62.1

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“First, [then,] it would be necessary for sensation to arise naturally in them all as one common faculty from forceful impressions; second, desire mingled with pleasure and pain; and, in addition, fear and anger, whatever follows upon them, and whatever by nature stands opposed to them.”[1776]

62.2 · Mastery and the return to a star

I.49.62.2

“If they mastered these things, they would live justly; if mastered by them, unjustly. The one who lived well for the appointed span would return to the dwelling of the star assigned as his companion and would have a happy life.”[1777]

62.3 · The sequence of further births

I.49.62.3

“But if he failed in these things, he would change into a woman’s nature at his second birth. If even then he did not cease from wickedness, he would continually change into some corresponding bestial nature, according to the likeness between the kind of wickedness he practiced and the kind of birth it produced.”[1778]

1776. The edition locates excerpt 62 at Timaeus 42A-D. The passage begins within an account of souls entering embodied life; no missing introductory speech is invented. Rejected oun remains bracketed. Pathēmata here means impressions or affections acting upon the embodied being; erōs is rendered desire, with its pleasure and pain both explicit.

1777. The opposition between controlling the passions and being controlled by them determines the ethical outcome. The companion star renders xynnomou astrou, preserving the personal association in the Greek. The English does not add familiar to happy, although that addition is recorded for another text in the apparatus.

1778. The order of male, female, and animal embodiments reflects the hierarchy in this ancient account; it is retained as part of the text. The compressed wording around kakias tropon and geneseōs is interpreted as matching habitual vice with the resulting embodiment. This syntactical interpretation remains provisional; the Greek has not been rearranged.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

62.4

I.49.62.4

Ἀλλάττων τε οὐ πρότερον πόνων λήξοι, πρὶν τῇ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ξυνεπισπόμενος τὸν πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ ὕστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα λόγῳ κρατήσας, εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

62.4 · Reason restores the original condition I.49.62.4

“And in passing through these changes he would not cease from his troubles until, following the revolution of the same and similar within him, he mastered by reason the great throng that had subsequently grown upon him from fire, water, air, and earth, noisy and irrational as it was, and reached the form of his first and best condition.”[1779]

1779. The internal revolution belongs to the account’s description of rational order. The noisy throng arises from the four bodily elements and is mastered by logos, reason. The text’s distinction between the original condition and what subsequently accrued is preserved. This closes excerpt 62 at printed p. 449 line 9.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.1 I.49.63.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Γοργίου.

Ἄκουε δή, φησί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν.

63.2 I.49.63.2

Ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον.

63.3 I.49.63.3

Ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.1 · Plato: a story offered as true

I.49.63.1

Plato, from the Gorgias.

“Listen, then,” he says, “to a very fine account, which you will regard as a myth, I suppose, but I as an account. For I shall tell you what I am about to say as something true.”[1780]

63.2 · The division of divine rule

I.49.63.2

“For, as Homer says, Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided sovereignty among themselves after receiving it from their father.”[1781]

63.3 · The law governing the dead

I.49.63.3

“Under Cronus, then, this law concerning human beings existed, and it has always remained among the gods, even now: whoever has passed through life justly and reverently shall, when he dies, go to the Isles of the Blessed and dwell in complete happiness, free from evils; whoever has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the prison of requital and punishment that they call Tartarus.”[1782]

1780. The edition locates excerpt 63 at Gorgias 523A-524A. The speaker is Socrates. His contrast turns on mythos and logos; account is repeated to preserve that verbal contrast, with the claim to truth stated in the next sentence. This is a different framing from his qualification at the end of the Phaedo extract.

1781. This is a prose reference to Homer, rather than a verse quotation. Pluto names the ruler of the underworld. The succession from the father prepares the contrast between judgment under Cronus and its later reform under Zeus; the excerpt itself supplies that sequence.

1782. The law itself remains constant; the procedure for judging people will change. Hosiōs and atheōs concern reverence and impiety in conduct. The latter is not used here as a precise label for a modern philosophical position. Tisis and dikē retain their paired senses of requital and punishment.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.4 I.49.63.4

Τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. Κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο· ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῷέν σφισιν ἄνθρωποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι.

63.5 I.49.63.5

Εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς· ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται· ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται. Πολλοὶ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν·

63.6 I.49.63.6

Οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. Ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἔμπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιάσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.4 · Living judges make mistaken decisions I.49.63.4

“Under Cronus, and while Zeus was still newly in power, living people judged the living, giving judgment on the day when those being judged were about to die. The cases were therefore wrongly decided. Pluto and the guardians coming from the Isles of the Blessed told Zeus that people undeserving of their destinations were arriving in both places.”[1783]

63.5 · The misleading clothing of appearances I.49.63.5

“Zeus therefore said: ‘I will put a stop to this. For now the cases are wrongly judged: those undergoing judgment,’ he said, ‘are judged while clothed. Many people,’ he continued, ‘have wicked souls but are dressed in beautiful bodies, noble lineages, and riches. When their judgment takes place, many witnesses come forward for them to testify that they have lived justly.’”[1784]

63.6 · The judges are also clothed I.49.63.6

“‘The judges are overawed by these things; at the same time they themselves judge while clothed, with eyes, ears, and the whole body placed as a covering before their own soul. All these things stand in their way, both their own coverings and those of the people being judged.’”[1785]

1783. The day of expected death belongs to those undergoing judgment. The complaint concerns inappropriate arrivals at both destinations, without saying that every judgment was mistaken. Epimelētai is rendered guardians; the text does not further define their offices.

1784. The clothing metaphor includes body, ancestry, and wealth, not simply garments. Zeus speaks within Socrates’ narrative. The apparatus records an additional explanatory sentence in Plato’s parallel text after are judged; it has not been added to Stobaeus’s excerpt.

1785. The impediment is double: the apparent advantages of those judged and the judges’ own bodily means of apprehension. The printed reflexives hautōn are retained. Amphiasmata extends the same clothing image; it does not introduce a second kind of formal judicial attire.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.7 I.49.63.7

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν.

63.8 I.49.63.8

Ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. Καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ.

63.9 I.49.63.9

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ᾽ εἰς Τάρταρον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.7 · Foreknowledge of death must cease I.49.63.7

“‘First, then,’ he said, ‘they must cease to know their death in advance; for now they do know it beforehand. Prometheus has already been instructed to put an end to this knowledge among them.’”[1786]

63.8 · Soul judges soul without coverings I.49.63.8

“‘Next, they must be judged stripped of all these things, for they must be judged after death. The judge too must be stripped and dead, contemplating with the soul itself the soul itself of each person who has suddenly died, bereft of all relatives and having left all that adornment upon the earth, so that the judgment may be just.’”[1787]

63.9 · Three sons appointed as judges I.49.63.9

“‘Recognizing this before you did, I appointed sons of my own as judges: two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthys, and one from Europe, Aeacus. When they die, they will judge in the meadow, at the crossroads from which the two roads lead, one to the Isles of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus.’”[1788]

1786. The object understood with put an end is the foreknowledge just described. Prometheus is assigned this particular task within Zeus’s reform. The passage supplies no further account of how it is accomplished.

1787. The repeated itself emphasizes direct examination without the earlier coverings. The printed construction shifts from the genitive phrase each person who has died to accusative expressions describing the person stripped of relatives and adornment; English preserves the intended relation without altering the Greek. Kosmos here is adornment, not the universe.

1788. The two outgoing roads are expressed by the Greek dual, phereton tō hodō, retained in the transcription. Together with the approach they form the crossroads. Asia and Europe belong to the story’s allocation of judges, and the appointment is expressly to take effect after those judges die.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.10 I.49.63.10

Καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπόρητόν τι ᾖ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

63.10 · Minos settles the difficult cases

I.49.63.10

"'Rhadamanthys will judge those from Asia, and Aeacus those from Europe. To Minos I shall grant the privilege of seniority, to decide further whenever either of the others has a case he cannot resolve, so that the judgment concerning the journey assigned to human beings may be as just as possible.'"[1789]

1789. The scan prints aporēton with a single rho, interpreted as a matter that presents difficulty; the apparatus distinguishes this from the reading with doubled rho. Presbeia conveys the prerogative of seniority. English supplies may be in the final clause, where the printed excerpt leaves the verb unexpressed. Excerpt 63 ends at p. 451 line 2; the story of Er follows in excerpt 64.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.1 I.49.64.1

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ι'.

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μέντοι σοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμένων, ὑγιὴς μὲν ἀνηρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ᾽ οἴκαδε, μέλλων θάπτεσθαι, δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ᾽ ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι.

64.2 I.49.64.2

Ἔφη δέ· ἐπειδὴ οὖ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δύο εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα κατ᾽ ἀντικρύ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.1 · Plato: Er returns to life

I.49.64.1

Plato, Republic, Book X.

“Yet I shall not tell you a tale of Alcinous,” I said, “but one of a valiant man, Er son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He once died in war. When the bodies were gathered on the tenth day, already decaying, his was taken up intact. He was brought home for burial, and on the twelfth day, as he lay on the funeral pyre, he returned to life. Having revived, he told what he had seen in the other world.”[1790]

64.2 · The four openings

I.49.64.2

He said that when his soul left him, it journeyed with many others, and they reached a certain supernatural place. There were two openings in the earth beside one another, and two others in the heaven above, directly opposite them.[1791]

1790. The edition locates this excerpt at Republic 614B-616C. The opening plays on Alkinou, of Alcinous, and alkimou, valiant. English adds in the other world to clarify the literal there. The account is presented through the dialogue’s narrator and Er’s report; the decimal subdivisions are modern comparison divisions.

1791. Daimonion describes the character of the place, without identifying a particular god or daimon. The printed hou is the pronoun referring to Er, not the alternative oun, then, recorded in the apparatus. The paired openings establish separate routes into and out of each region.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.3 I.49.64.3

Δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὓς ἐπειδὴ δικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν.

64.4 I.49.64.4

Ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ.

64.5 I.49.64.5

Ὁρᾶν δὴ ταύτῃ μὲν καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθείη, κατὰ δὲ τὠ ἑτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταβαίνειν ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαράς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.3 · The judges and the signs of judgment I.49.64.3

Judges sat between these openings. After passing judgment, they ordered the just to travel along the road to the right and upward through heaven, with signs of the judgments attached in front. The unjust were to take the road to the left and downward, also bearing signs, but behind them, of everything they had done.[1792]

64.4 · A messenger to the living I.49.64.4

When he himself approached, they said that he must become a messenger to human beings concerning what happened there. They instructed him to listen to and observe everything in the place.[1793]

64.5 · Souls leaving and returning I.49.64.5

He saw souls departing there through the respective openings of heaven and earth after judgment had been passed on them. Through the other two openings, souls came up from the earth covered with grime and dust, while others descended from heaven clean.[1794]

1792. The Greek leaves road understood after the feminine article. The signs distinguish the decision displayed on the front of the just from the record of deeds displayed behind the unjust. The participial construction concerning attachment is compressed; English does not assign an agent beyond what the passage requires.

1793. Angelos here means messenger. Er receives an assignment to report rather than an order to enter one of the routes. Listening as well as seeing matters because his narrative includes accounts given by other souls.

1794. The returning souls' condition gives visible expression to the contrast between their journeys. Auchmos conveys dirt or squalor here and is distinguished from the dust named alongside it. The Greek dual marks the two remaining openings.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.6 I.49.64.6

Καὶ τὰς ἀεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἥκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνοῦσθαι, καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γνώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τάς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ <καὶ> τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ᾽ ἐκείναις.

64.7 I.49.64.7

Διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαίουσας, ἀναμιμνῃσκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ (εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλίετιν), τὰς δ᾽ αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος.

64.8 I.49.64.8

Τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Γλαύκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι· τὸ δ᾽ οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστος, ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις· τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὶ ἔκτισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.6 · Meeting in the meadow

I.49.64.6

Each arriving company seemed to have returned from a long journey. They gladly went into the meadow and made camp as though at a festival gathering. Those who knew one another exchanged greetings. The souls arriving from the earth asked the others about what happened above, <and> those from heaven asked about what had happened below.[1795]

64.7 · Two accounts of the journey

I.49.64.7

They told one another their stories. Some lamented and wept as they remembered all the terrible things they had suffered and seen on their journey beneath the earth, a journey lasting a thousand years. Those from heaven, in turn, described their blessed experiences and sights of unimaginable beauty.[1796]

64.8 · Tenfold repayment

I.49.64.8

To recount the greater part, Glaucon, would take a long time. But he said that the chief point was this: for every wrong they had ever done anyone, and for every person each had wronged, they had paid the penalty in turn, ten times for each offense. Each repayment occupied a hundred years, on the assumption that this was the length of a human life, so that they would pay a tenfold recompense for the wrong.[1797]

1795. The editor supplies kai, and, from the parallel Plato text; the addition remains marked on both sides. The two places are literally there and among those others. English uses above and below to keep the exchange clear. Panēgyris suggests a general festival assembly.

1796. The thousand years belong expressly to the journey described. Eupatheiai denotes good or happy experiences, in contrast to the suffering recalled by the other company. The contrast concerns both what the souls underwent and what they witnessed.

1797. The direct address to Glaucon briefly brings the dialogue's narrator forward. The hundred-year life is an assumption within the narrative's scheme of repayment. The English separates the condensed Greek references to wrongs and persons wronged while preserving both.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.9 I.49.64.9

Καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλοῖς θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες, ἤ τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας κομίσαιντο·

64.10 I.49.64.10

Καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο. Τῶν δ᾽ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων πέρι ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης.

64.11 I.49.64.11

Εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρας φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.9 · Wrongdoing on a large scale

I.49.64.9

For example, if any had caused the deaths of many, betrayed cities or armies and delivered people into slavery, or shared responsibility for some other maltreatment, they would receive tenfold suffering for all these acts.[1798]

64.10 · Good deeds and very short lives

I.49.64.10

And again, if they had performed good deeds and had been just and reverent, they received their due on the same terms. About those newly born who had lived only a short time, he said other things that need not be recalled.[1799]

64.11 · Greater recompenses

I.49.64.11

He described still greater recompenses for irreverence and reverence toward gods and parents, and for killing committed with one's own hand.[1800]

1798. The scan prints kakouchias, maltreatment, retained here. The examples extend responsibility beyond the person who directly acts: metaitioi includes those sharing in the cause. The omitted object of delivered into slavery is made explicit as people, without narrowing it to one of the preceding groups.

1799. The corresponding recompense for good deeds follows the same general scheme. The narrator expressly declines to recount the treatment of very short lives; the missing detail is not supplied. Hosioi conveys religious or sacred propriety as well as moral conduct.

1800. The printed autocheiras phonou is grammatically difficult and is retained. English provisionally takes it as personal responsibility for homicide; it does not impose the narrower meaning suicide. Misthoi, recompenses, covers both favorable and unfavorable outcomes in this context.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.12 I.49.64.12

Ἔφη γὰρ δὴ καὶ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου, ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἔν τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἤδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἔλεγεν. Ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν· “οὐχ ἥκει”, φάναι, “οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο”.

64.13 I.49.64.13

Ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων. Ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεπονθότες, ἐκεῖνον τότε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων. Οὓς οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμυκᾶτο, ὁπότε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροίη ἀνιέναι.

64.14 I.49.64.14

Ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ θέμα, τοὺς μὲν ἰδίᾳ λαβόντες ἦγον,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.12 · Ardiaeus the tyrant

I.49.64.12

For he said that he had been present when one person asked another where Ardiaeus the Great was. This Ardiaeus had been tyrant of a city in Pamphylia a thousand years before that time. He had killed his elderly father and his elder brother and committed many other impious deeds, according to the account. The person questioned replied, he said: “He has not come, nor will he come here.”[1801]

64.13 · The opening refuses passage

I.49.64.13

“For among the terrible sights we witnessed was this. When we were near the mouth of the opening, about to ascend after enduring everything else, we suddenly saw him and others, almost all of them tyrants. There were also some private individuals who had committed great wrongs. They thought they were now going to ascend, but the opening would not admit them. It bellowed whenever anyone incurably wicked in this way, or anyone who had not paid a sufficient penalty, attempted to go up.”[1802]

64.14 · The fiery guards

I.49.64.14

“Then,” he said, “savage men, fiery to look upon, who stood nearby and observed the scene, seized some of them separately and led them away.”[1803]

1801. The great is the designation used in the narrative, not an endorsement. Er now reports another soul’s testimony about Ardiaeus. The printed an hēxei combines the particle an with a future indicative; English conveys the emphatic exclusion without silently altering the Greek.

1802. The testimony distinguishes incurable wickedness from a penalty not yet sufficiently paid. Idiōtai are private persons, contrasted with rulers, not people deficient in intelligence. The printed houtōs, in this way, and the personified bellowing of the opening are retained.

1803. The edition prints thema, scene or spectacle; the apparatus records phthengma, sound, in the parallel Plato text. English follows the printed reading. Diapyroi idein describes the men’s fiery appearance without specifying their substance. The sentence continues with the treatment of Ardiaeus.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 452-453

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.15 I.49.64.15

Τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἶλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ᾽ ἀσπαλάθων κνάμπτοντες, καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες, ὧν ἕνεκά τι, καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο.

64.16 I.49.64.16

Ἔνθα δὴ φόβων πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι, καὶ ἀσμενέστατα σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι. Καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους·

64.17 I.49.64.17

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύεσθαι καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους, ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύς, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ Ἴριδι προσφερῆ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 453-454

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.15 · Dragged toward Tartarus

I.49.64.15

“But they bound Ardiaeus and others hand, foot, and head, threw them down and flayed them, and dragged them off beside the road, scraping them over thorn bushes. They indicated to everyone passing by the reasons for this, and that they were being led away to be cast into Tartarus.”[1804]

64.16 · The fear of hearing the roar

I.49.64.16

Of the many and varied fears they had experienced there, this surpassed them all: that the sound might come for each of them as he ascended. They went up with the greatest relief when the opening remained silent. Such, then, were the penalties and punishments, while the benefits corresponded to them on the opposite side.[1805]

64.17 · The column of light

I.49.64.17

When each company had spent seven days in the meadow, they had to rise and set out on the eighth. On the fourth day of their journey they reached a place from which they could see a light extending straight from above through all heaven and earth, like a column. It most resembled a rainbow, but was brighter and purer.[1806]

1804. Knamptontes evokes carding or scraping, here against the thorns of aspalathos. The printed hōn heneka ti is compressed and irregular; reasons for this is a provisional rendering. No fuller wording from a parallel text has been inserted. The violent punishment belongs to the reported vision.

1805. The narration returns to indirect report. Unlike thema in 64.14, phthengma here expressly means a sound. The final contrast restores the favorable side of the account after the description of punishment; the benefits are corresponding reversals, not further penalties.

1806. The two time counts refer respectively to the stay in the meadow and the ensuing journey. Iris is rendered rainbow in the visual comparison. The printed phōs euthys is retained, with euthys understood adverbially as straight; the Greek has not been regularized to a neuter adjective.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 453-454

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.18 I.49.64.18

Εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι προελθόντες ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

64.18 · The bonds of heaven

I.49.64.18

After traveling another day's journey, they reached the light. There, in its midst, they saw the ends of heaven's bonds stretched out from heaven.[1807]

1807. The reference of autou is taken to be heaven: the bonds belong to it. The excerpt ends here, at printed p. 454 line 9. This completes Stobaeus's excerpt of the story, not the whole story of Er in the Republic; its later narrative has not been added.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 454

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.1 I.49.65.1

<Ἰαμβλίχου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς.>

Πλωτῖνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγνώσεων, δόξης τε πάσης ὑπεροψίαν [τε] καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων διανοήσεων ἀπόστασιν, πλήρωσίν τε ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ἀφομοίωσίν τε τοῦ κατανοουμένου πρὸς τὸ κατανοοῦν τὴν τελεωτάτην κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.

65.2 I.49.65.2

Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τούτων πολλάκις ἀποφαίνονται περὶ τὴν ἄλογον ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν δοξαστικὸν λόγον ἐμφύεσθαι τὴν κάθαρσιν· τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὸν τὸν οὐσιώδη καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀεὶ ὑπερέχειν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ συνῆφθαι τοῖς νοητοῖς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδέποτε δεῖσθαι τελειώσεως καὶ ἀπολύσεως τῶν περιττῶν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.1 · Iamblichus: accounts of purification

I.49.65.1

<Iamblichus, from On the Soul.>

Plotinus and most of the Platonists regard the most complete purification as the putting away of affections and form-producing discriminations, disregard for all opinion [and] and withdrawal from thoughts bound up with matter, fulfillment from intellect and being, and assimilation of what is contemplated to that which contemplates.[1808]

65.2 · A higher faculty that needs no purification

I.49.65.2

Some of these thinkers also frequently declare that purification arises in the irrational soul and in the reasoning faculty concerned with opinion. But the essential rational principle itself and the soul's intellect always stand above the cosmos; that intellect is joined to intelligible realities and never needs perfecting or release from what is superfluous.[1809]

1808. The attribution and title are supplied by the editor after Canter. The rejected te remains bracketed; removing its English and removes the doubled conjunction. Morphōtikai diagnōseis is provisionally form-producing discriminations. The direction of assimilation follows the printed Greek, from the contemplated to the contemplator, and has not been reversed.

1809. The passage contrasts opinion-forming reasoning with the essential rational principle and intellect. The singular auton is taken to refer to the immediately preceding intellect. Intellectual union is reported as the view of some of the thinkers under discussion, not imposed as the position of every author in the anthology.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.3 I.49.65.3

Ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διελώμεθα, ὑπὸ τίνων ἕκαστα τούτων ἐπιτελεῖται, τὸ τῆς κρίσεως λέγω, τὸ τῆς δίκης ἔργον, τὸ τῆς καθάρσεως. Ὡς μὲν δὴ οἱ πλεῖστοι Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλατωνικοὶ λέγουσιν, ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν μεριστῶν ψυχῶν·

65.4 I.49.65.4

Ὡς δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὑπὸ τῶν καθολικωτέρων καὶ τελειοτέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ ὅλης ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς τάξεως τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ βασιλεύοντος καὶ τῆς ὅλης διακοσμήσεως·

65.5 I.49.65.5

Ὡς δ᾽ οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι διατείνονται, <ὑπὸ> τῶν ἐμφανῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ πάντων ἡλίου, τῶν τε δημιουργικῶν αἰτιῶν τῶν ἀφανῶν, τῶν τε κρειττόνων γενῶν πάντων, ἡρώων φημὶ καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἀγγέλων καὶ θεῶν, ἐξηγουμένων αὐτῶν τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 454-455

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.3 · Who carries out the three processes? I.49.65.3

Let us next distinguish by whom each of these things is accomplished: I mean the work of judgment, of punishment, and of purification. According to most Pythagoreans and Platonists, it is accomplished by the individual souls themselves.[1810]

65.4 · More universal sources of action I.49.65.4

According to the more exact thinkers among them, it is accomplished by souls that are more universal and more perfect, by the one soul that is a whole, by the order of the universe, by the intellect that rules even over the entire cosmic arrangement.[1811]

65.5 · The gods and the higher kinds I.49.65.5

According to what the more ancient thinkers maintain, it is accomplished <by> the visible gods, and above all by the Sun, by the invisible creative causes, and by all the higher kinds: I mean heroes, daimons, angels, and gods, who preside over the entire constitution of things.[1812]

1810. Three processes organize the following discussion: krisis, judgment; dikē, punishment or requital; and katharsis, purification. Meristai psychai are particular or individual souls, contrasted in the next unit with more comprehensive souls. The excerpt begins within a larger discussion, so these things need not refer only to the preceding sentences.

1811. The more exact thinkers is the author's evaluation. The final genitive is taken with basileuontos, rules over; kai has the force of even. This makes the cosmic arrangement the sphere of intellect's rule. Taking kai as another and would instead extend the list of agencies; the governing construction is preferred here.

1812. The supplied hypo, by, follows the supplement credited to Heeren. Visible and invisible distinguish two sets of divine causes; the list of higher kinds is kept in its printed order. Angeloi is angels here within that hierarchy, unlike Er's ordinary role as a messenger in 64.4.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.6 I.49.65.6

Τί ποτε οὖν αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα πρώτως [αὐτῶν] ὑφεστήκασι; Κρίσεως μὲν ἄμικτος καθαρότης τῶν ἀγαθῶν, χωριστή τε αὐτῶν τῶν καλῶν τελεότης, ἀφεστηκυῖα τὸ παράπαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτελῶν, ὑπερβολή τε ἐξῃρημένη τῶν κρειττόνων αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ, πρὸς ἣν οὐδὲν δύναται συντάττεσθαι τῶν χειρόνων οὐδέποτε.

65.7 I.49.65.7

Καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς παλαιοτέροις ἀρέσκει τὰ κεφάλαια αὐτῆς, ἄλλοις δ᾽ ἂν ἴσως εὐταξία καὶ διάστασις τοῦ χείρονος ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι κυριώτερα τῆς ὠφελείας αὐτῆς αἴτια.

65.8 I.49.65.8

Δίκης δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ τέλεον ἐν τῷ τὰ βελτίονα τῶν χειρόνων ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ τὸ κακὸν κολούειν καὶ ἀνατρέπειν καὶ ἀφανίζειν τὸ παράπαν καὶ ἐν τῷ τὴν ἀνάλογον καὶ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ἰσότητα τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.6 · The end of judgment I.49.65.6

What, then, is their end, for the sake of which they first came to subsist [of them]? The end of judgment is the unmixed purity of good things, the separate perfection of noble things themselves, standing wholly apart from what is imperfect, and the transcendent preeminence of superior things, itself by itself, alongside which nothing inferior can ever be ranked.[1813]

65.7 · Other views of judgment's benefit I.49.65.7

These are the principal points concerning judgment accepted by the older thinkers. Others, perhaps, would regard good order, the separation of the inferior from the better, and similar things as more decisive causes of its benefit.[1814]

65.8 · The perfection of punishment I.49.65.8

The perfection of punishment would consist in the better prevailing over the worse, in restraining evil, overturning it, and utterly abolishing it, and in establishing for all an equality proportionate to their worth.[1815]

1813. The rejected autōn is retained as the deliberately awkward bracketed of them; it is not silently absorbed into the question. Telos is the goal or purpose of each process. The emphatic separation of superior from inferior is presented as a positive end of judgment, not merely the act of assigning a sentence.

1814. The author keeps the two accounts distinct even though both involve separation. The first stresses the independent perfection of what is superior; the second emphasizes order and differentiation as sources of benefit. Perhaps preserves the qualification in the Greek.

1815. The printed correction to teleon, perfection or completion, is followed. Equality is expressly proportional and according to worth; it does not mean identical treatment of every case. The three verbs concerning evil move from restraint through overthrow to complete removal.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.9 I.49.65.9

Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα δοκοῦντα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις οἱ μὲν τὴν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἰσότητα ἢ πολλαπλασίωσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀντιπάσχειν τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ οἱ δράσαντες προηδίκησαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῆς κακίας, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ὑποτίθενται ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, καὶ περὶ ταύτας τὰς αἱρέσεις ἐλίσσονται οἱ πολλοὶ Πλατωνικοὶ καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι.

65.10 I.49.65.10

Καὶ μὴν τῆς γε καθάρσεως ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀπόδοσις τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, τελειότης, ἀποπλήρωσις, αὐτάρκεια, ἄνοδος ἐπὶ τὴν γεννησαμένην αἰτίαν, συναφὴ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα τῶν μερῶν, δόσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων εἰς τὰ μεριστὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νοείσθω ὡς πάντων χρησιμώτατα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.9 · Competing accounts of punishment I.49.65.9

In relation to these views of the older thinkers, some posit numerical equality or multiplication as the benefit derived from punishment; others, suffering in return the very wrongs that the perpetrators previously inflicted; others, release from vice; and others, something else of that kind. Most Platonists and Pythagoreans revolve around these positions.[1816]

65.10 · The fullest benefits of purification I.49.65.10

As for purification, let the following be understood as its most beneficial results: removal of what is foreign, restoration of one's proper essence, perfection, fulfillment, self-sufficiency, ascent to the cause that brought one forth, conjunction of the parts with the wholes, and the bestowal of power, life, and activity from the wholes upon particular things, together with other results of this kind.[1817]

1816. The alternatives distinguish a numerical measure, reciprocal suffering, and moral correction. Multiplication recalls the kind of multiplied recompense described in the preceding Platonic excerpt, but this sentence does not name that passage. Haireseis here means positions or schools of thought, not heresies.

1817. The list gives purification both a return toward its originating cause and a reception of life and power from more comprehensive realities. Oikeia ousia is one's own or proper essence. Energeia is activity or actuality; activity fits its place beside power and life here.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.11 I.49.65.11

Οἱ δὲ οὐ πείθονται τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις ταῦτα προστησαμένοις αὐτῆς τὰ ὄντως συμφέροντα, λύσιν δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν καταδέσμων καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλευθέρωσιν καὶ γενέσεως ἄφεσιν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σμικρὰ τέλη προΐστανται αὐτῆς, ὡς τὰ προέχοντα τῶν ὅλων, ἐν οἷς εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ Πλατωνικοὶ καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι, ἄλλοι κατ᾽ ἄλλας αἱρέσεις διεστηκότες.

65.12 I.49.65.12

Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πέρατα τῶν τριῶν τούτων διελώμεθα, μέχρι πόσου δή τινος ἀποτελευτᾷ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον. Κρίνονται μὲν δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε αἱ ψυχαί, μέχρις ὅσου συντάττονται εἰς τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ἀφίστανται καὶ συμμίγνυνταί πως πρὸς τὰ διαφέροντα·

65.13 I.49.65.13

Αἱ δὲ ἀφειμέναι ἀπόλυτοι καὶ ἀμιγεῖς καὶ ἀδέσποτοι παντελῶς καὶ αὐταὶ ἑαυτῶν οὖσαι καὶ πεπληρωμέναι τῶν θεῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ τῆς κρίσεως παντάπασιν ἀπελύθησαν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.11 · Purification understood as release

I.49.65.11

Others do not accept the more ancient thinkers who set these forth as purification's truly beneficial results. Instead, they place before it such lesser ends as release from the body, escape from bonds, liberation from decay, and discharge from coming-to-be, as though these surpassed the more comprehensive ends. Among them are most Platonists and Pythagoreans, divided among different positions.[1818]

65.12 · The limits of judgment

I.49.65.12

Let us further distinguish the limits of these three processes, determining how far each extends. Souls are subject to judgment up to this point: so long as they are assigned to coming-to-be, have not withdrawn from the universe, and remain in some way mixed with things different from themselves.[1819]

65.13 · Souls released from judgment

I.49.65.13

But souls that have been set free, unbound and unmixed, wholly subject to no master, belonging to themselves and filled with the gods, have at the same time been entirely released from judgment.[1820]

1818. Lesser is the author's assessment. Proechonta tōn holōn compares these limited aims with the more comprehensive ends listed above; tōn holōn is the standard they are said to surpass. Genesis retains the broader sense coming-to-be. The contrast concerns release from bodily conditions versus restoration and participation in greater realities.

1819. The new question concerns the range of application, following the earlier questions of agency and purpose. The printed mechris hosou is retained. Things different from themselves interprets ta diapheronta in relation to the souls; the Greek does not expressly name the things involved.

1820. The text places freedom from mastery alongside being filled with the gods; both descriptions are retained. Theōn is gods, not the apparatus's proposed theiōn, divine things. Apolytoi, unbound, remains in the text although the apparatus asks whether it should be excluded.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.14 I.49.65.14

Οὐ μὴν ἔτι γε τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις περὶ τούδε συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι, πάσας δὲ αὐτὰς ὑπάγουσιν ὑπὸ τὴν κρίσιν.

65.15 I.49.65.15

Ὡσαύτως δὴ οὖν καὶ περὶ τῆς δίκης οἱ μὲν παλαιότεροι τὰς ἀχράντους ψυχὰς καὶ τὰς ὁμονοητικῶς συναφθείσας τοῖς θεοῖς ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη τοῖς θεοῖς ἐντιθέασι καὶ ἐκβαινούσας τῶν σωμάτων ἄνευ τῆς δίκης ἀνάγουσιν εἰς τοὺς θεούς·

65.16 I.49.65.16

Οἱ δὲ Πλατωνικοὶ πάσας μετὰ τὴν δίκην εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπολύουσι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.14 · A disagreement over exemption

I.49.65.14

On this point, however, the Platonists and Pythagoreans no longer agree with the more ancient thinkers: they subject all souls to judgment.[1821]

65.15 · Souls raised without punishment

I.49.65.15

Similarly, concerning punishment, the older thinkers place undefiled souls, and those joined to the gods in a shared act of understanding, among the gods already here. When these souls leave their bodies, they raise them to the gods without punishment.[1822]

65.16 · Release after punishment

I.49.65.16

The Platonists, however, release all souls from coming-to-be into being after punishment.[1823]

1821. The disagreement concerns whether any souls are exempt from judgment. The author's broad school labels are preserved as his own classification; the sentence does not provide names or establish uniform agreement among every member of either tradition.

1822. Homonoētikōs is provisionally rendered in a shared act of understanding, indicating an intellectual conjunction. Already here places the first association with the gods before bodily departure. The printed entitheasi is understood as place among; the following ascent is separately retained.

1823. The opposition of genesis and ousia is rendered coming-to-be and being. The contrast with the preceding position concerns passage through punishment before release. This is the author's summary of the view he assigns to the Platonists.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.17 I.49.65.17

Γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ περὶ τῆς καθάρσεως ἡ αὐτὴ ἀμφισβήτησις, <εἰ> οἱ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες καὶ ταύτης ὑπερέχειν φασὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὅσαι θεοῖς συνέπονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πάλιν οἱ μὲν περιόδους τῆς ψυχῆς περικοσμίους καθάρσεως εἶναι διατάττονται, ὥσπερ τινὲς Πλατωνικοί, οἱ δὲ καὶ τούτων αὐτὴν ὑπερέχουσαν προτάττουσιν, ὥσπερ δὴ λέγει Πλωτῖνος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

65.17 · Purification and the soul’s cosmic circuits

I.49.65.17

The same dispute might arise concerning purification, <if> these same men say that souls accompanying the gods stand above purification too, while, among the others, some maintain that the soul’s circuits around the cosmos are circuits of purification, as certain Platonists do, whereas others place the soul above even these circuits, as Plotinus says.[1824]

1824. The supplied ei, if, follows Usener. The printed genitive katharseōs is retained and interpreted as circuits of purification. Autēn is taken to mean the soul; that reference is made explicit in English. These interpretations remain provisional. Excerpt 65 ends at p. 457 line 6; the edition next prints excerpt 67, with no separate 66.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.1 I.49.67.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Περὶ τῆς ἐπικαρπίας τῶν ψυχῶν, ἣν κομίζονται εἰσαῦθις, ἐπειδὰν ἐξέλθωσι τοῦ σώματος *, ἰσαγγέλους δὲ καὶ ἀγγελικὰς ψυχὰς *, τὸ ὅλον δὴ τοῦτο οἱ πρεσβύτεροι *.

67.2 I.49.67.2

Καὶ τηροῦσι μὲν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας τάξεως Πλούταρχος καὶ Πορφύριος καὶ οἱ παλαιότεροι· Πλωτῖνος δὲ πάντων τούτων αὐτὴν ἀφίστησιν.

67.3 I.49.67.3

Οἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαιότεροι παραπλησίαν τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ νοῦν διάθεσιν ἀγαθοειδῆ καὶ προστασίαν τῶν τῇδε αὐτῇ ἀπονέμουσι καλῶς, Πορφύριος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεῖ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.1 · Iamblichus: the soul's reward

I.49.67.1

In the same work.

Concerning the reward of souls, which they receive hereafter when they leave the body *, and souls equal to angels and angelic souls *, this whole matter, then, the older thinkers *.[1825]

67.2 · The soul's own rank

I.49.67.2

Plutarch, Porphyry, and the older thinkers preserve it in its proper rank; Plotinus, however, removes it from all these.[1826]

67.3 · Intellect and care for the world

I.49.67.3

The more ancient thinkers rightly assign to it a disposition of intellect resembling that of the gods and bearing the form of the good, together with oversight of things here. Porphyry, however, takes this too away from it.[1827]

1825. The heading continues Iamblichus's On the Soul. The editor marks three gaps in this damaged opening; the surviving fragments are not joined by invented clauses. Epikarpia is the fruit or benefit received. Isangelous follows the printed correction. The source moves directly from excerpt 65 to 67. Decimal subdivisions are modern comparison divisions.

1826. The feminine singular it is understood as the soul, but the damaged opening leaves its precise antecedent unstated. All these is likewise not fully specified. The contrast is preserved without filling the preceding gaps or identifying Plutarch more closely than this excerpt permits.

1827. Rightly expresses Iamblichus's approval of the older account. Agathoeidēs describes a likeness to the good; prostasia denotes oversight or protective governance. The author contrasts a godlike intellectual condition accompanied by worldly responsibility with the removal of that responsibility.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.4 I.49.67.4

Τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ὑπερέχειν μὲν αὐτὴν λογισμοῦ φασι, τὰ δὲ ἔργα αὐτῆς οὕτω διηκριβωμένα ἀφορίζονται, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι τῶν λογισμῶν ὁ καθαρὸς καὶ τελειότατος.

67.5 I.49.67.5

Πορφύριος δὲ αὐτὰς ἀφαιρεῖ παντάπασιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδεσπότου ζωῆς, ὡς οὔσας συμφυεῖς τῇ γενέσει καὶ πρὸς ἐπικουρίαν δοθείσας τοῖς συνθέτοις ζῴοις.

67.6 I.49.67.6

Ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Τίμαιος ᾗπερ ἐσπάρησαν διαφερόντως ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἄλλαι μὲν εἰς ἥλιον, ἄλλαι δὲ εἰς γῆν, ταύτῃ καὶ τὴν ἄνοδον αὐτὰς ἀνάγει, μὴ ὑπερβαινούσας τὸν ὅρον τῆς οἰκείας ἑκάστην πρόσθεν δημιουργικῆς καταβολῆς.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 457-458

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.4 · Activity beyond reasoning I.49.67.4

Some of the older thinkers say that it stands above reasoning, yet describe its activities as so exact that even the purest and most perfect reasoning could not discover their like.[1828]

67.5 · What belongs to embodied life I.49.67.5

Porphyry, however, removes them altogether from the life that is free from mastery, on the ground that they are naturally bound up with coming-to-be and were given to composite living beings for their assistance.[1829]

67.6 · Return to the original station I.49.67.6

Timaeus in Plato leads the souls back in their ascent to the places where the creator originally sowed them in different ways, some into the Sun and others into the earth. Each remains within the boundary of its own previous creative establishment.[1830]

1828. Logismos is reasoning or calculation, contrasted with a higher mode of activity. Their like supplies the comparison implicit in the final clause. The point is that activity without discursive reasoning need not be less exact than reasoned activity.

1829. The feminine plural autas, them, has an uncertain antecedent in this excerpt. The English leaves it as a pronoun rather than silently supplying souls, activities, or faculties. Adespotos describes a life subject to no master; composite living beings are the recipients of the assistance mentioned.

1830. Timaeus is the speaker within Plato's work. The local relative hēiper and the corresponding tautē connect ascent to the original distribution. The edition's prosthen, previous, is retained. Creative establishment renders dēmiourgikē katabolē, the initial placement by the creator; it does not imply creation from nothing.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 457-458

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.7 I.49.67.7

Ἕνωσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταυτότητα ἀδιάκριτον τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῆς ἀρχὰς πρεσβεύειν φαίνεται Νουμήνιος, σύμφυσιν δὲ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν οὐσίαν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι διασῴζουσι.

67.8 I.49.67.8

Καὶ ἀναλύσει μὲν ἐκεῖνοι, συντάξει δὲ οὗτοι προσεοίκασι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀδιορίστῳ συναφῇ, οἱ δὲ διωρισμένῃ χρῶνται.

67.9 I.49.67.9

Οὐ μέντοι κρατεῖται ὁ διορισμὸς αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ κατέχεται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ὑπειλήφασιν· ἀνεῖται δὲ πάντῃ ἀφ᾽ ὅλων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀχωρίστων οὐσιῶν τουτὶ νοοῦμεν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 458

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.7 · Union and distinct existence I.49.67.7

Numenius, then, appears to champion union and undifferentiated identity of the soul with its own principles. The older thinkers, however, preserve a growing-together in which its essence remains distinct.[1831]

67.8 · Dissolution or ordered conjunction I.49.67.8

The former position resembles dissolution, the latter an ordered conjunction. The former thinkers employ an undifferentiated connection, the latter one that preserves distinctions.[1832]

67.9 · Distinction without cosmic confinement I.49.67.9

Their distinctness, however, is neither ruled by the cosmos nor confined by nature, as some Platonists have supposed. It is wholly released from all things, just as we understand this in the case of inseparable essences.[1833]

1831. The edition identifies the Numenius passage as fragment 51, page 70, in Thedinga's numbering. Symphysis conveys growing together or natural conjunction. The contrast is between identity without distinction and conjunction preserving a different essence; appears retains the author's qualification.

1832. The apparatus calls proseoikasi corrupt. The printed verb is nevertheless retained and the first sentence is provisional; position supplies a subject suitable to the comparison. Analysis suggests dissolution or resolution, while syntaxis suggests arrangement together. The second sentence makes the contrast in differentiation explicit.

1833. The printed achōristōn means inseparable and has not been replaced by a term meaning incorporeal or separate. Its application here is difficult. The passage affirms that retaining distinction need not entail subjection to the cosmos; the exact reference of their remains dependent on the preceding contrast.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.10 I.49.67.10

Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πορφύριον ἄχρι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βίων * *· τὸ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τούτου ψυχῶν ἄλλο εἶδος τὸ ἀλόγιστον ὑποτίθενται.

67.11 I.49.67.11

Ἔτι τοίνυν Πορφύριος μὲν ἀφομοιοῖ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πᾶσι, μένουσαν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἥτις ἐστίν. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πλατωνικοὺς ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν ἀψύχων.

67.12 I.49.67.12

Ἀπολυθεῖσαι δὲ τῆς γενέσεως κατὰ μὲν τοὺς παλαιοὺς συνδιοικοῦσι τοῖς θεοῖς τὰ ὅλα, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πλατωνικοὺς θεωροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν τάξιν· καὶ ἀγγέλοις ὡσαύτως κατ᾽ ἐκείνους μὲν συνδημιουργοῦσι τὰ ὅλα, κατὰ δὲ τούτους συμπεριπολοῦσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

67.10 · The boundary of human lives

I.49.67.10

Those around Porphyry, as far as human lives * *; beyond this they posit another kind of soul, the non-rational.[1834]

67.11 · Assimilation while remaining itself

I.49.67.11

Further, Porphyry assimilates the soul to all things while it remains, in itself, what it is. According to the Platonists, souls care for things without soul.[1835]

67.12 · Participation and contemplation

I.49.67.12

Once released from coming-to-be, souls, according to the ancients, govern the whole together with the gods; according to the Platonists, they contemplate the gods' order. Similarly, according to the former, they join angels in fashioning the whole; according to the latter, they accompany them in their circuits.[1836]

1834. The printed gap after human lives removes the first clause's completion; no verb has been supplied. Beyond this is a provisional interpretation of to apo toutou. The surviving second clause distinguishes another kind of soul rather than explicitly explaining the missing transition.

1835. The Greek shifts from the singular soul to an unexpressed plural subject; souls is made explicit in English. Apsycha are things without soul, not souls deprived of life. The apparatus's proposed additional kai is not inserted into the text.

1836. Autōn, their, is taken to refer to the gods. Souls either share in the gods' governance or contemplate their order; the parallel clause contrasts working with angels and accompanying them. The printed theōrousin, contemplate, is retained rather than the apparatus's alternative tērousin. Excerpt 67 ends at printed p. 458 line 21.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.1 I.49.68.1

Ἑρμοῦ λόγος Ἴσιδος πρὸς Ὧρον.

“Θαυμαστῶς”, εἶπεν Ὧρος, “ἕκαστά μοι διηγήσω, ὦ μέγα δυναμένη τεκοῦσα Ἶσι, ὑπὲρ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ψυχοποιίας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ θαυμάζων διατελῶ· οὔπω δέ μοι ἀπήγγειλας ποῦ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθεῖσαι χωροῦσιν αἱ ψυχαί. Βούλομαι οὖν καὶ τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης μύστης γενόμενος εὐχαριστῆσαί σοι μόνῃ, ἀθάνατε μῆτερ.”

68.2 I.49.68.2

Καὶ εἶπεν Ἶσις· “Πρόσεχε, παῖ· ἀναγκαιοτάτη γὰρ ζήτησις αὕτη· ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε γὰρ ἐρεῖ λόγος ἐμός. Τὸ συνεστὸς καὶ μὴ ἀφανιζόμενον χῶρον ἔχει.

68.3 I.49.68.3

Οὐ γάρ, ὦ θαυμαστὲ καὶ μεγάλου πατρὸς Ὀσίρεως μέγα τέκνον, ἀκρίτως καὶ ὁρμηδὸν τῶν σωμάτων προελθοῦσαι εἰς ἀέρα ἀναχύνονταί τε καὶ διασκεδάννυνται μετὰ τοῦ ἄλλου ἀπείρου πνεύματος, ὥστε οὐκέτι δύνασθαι πάλιν τὰς αὐτὰς οὔσας εἰς σώματα παλινδρομῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἔτι τὸν χῶρον [εἶναι], ὅθεν ἦλθον τὸ πρότερον, ἀναστρέφειν·

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 458-459

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.1 · Hermes: Horus asks where souls go

I.49.68.1

Hermes: a discourse of Isis to Horus.

“You have wonderfully explained each matter to me,” said Horus, “mighty Isis who bore me, concerning the god’s marvelous making of souls, and I remain filled with wonder. But you have not yet told me where souls go when released from their bodies. I wish, then, to be initiated into this contemplation too, and to give thanks to you alone, immortal mother.”[1837]

68.2 · What persists has a place

I.49.68.2

Isis said: “Attend, my child, for this inquiry is most necessary. My account will proceed in this way: that which has an established existence and does not vanish has a place.”[1838]

68.3 · Souls are not scattered into the air

I.49.68.3

“For, wondrous and mighty child of the mighty father Osiris, souls do not rush indiscriminately out of their bodies and pour into the air, scattering among the rest of the boundless breath, so as to be unable, while remaining the same souls, to return into bodies, or even to return again to the place [to be] from which they came before.”[1839]

1837. The heading attributes the discourse to Hermes while identifying Isis and Horus as its speakers. The edition gives page 34b of Patrizi as a locator. Mystēs introduces the language of initiation. Monēi is taken with to you, following the printed dative, rather than as a separate description of mother.

1838. The editor transposes the clause introducing Isis’s account to its present position; that printed order is followed. Synestos denotes something constituted or subsisting. The proposition supplies the basis for assigning souls places rather than imagining them wholly dispersed.

1839. The rejected einai is retained as bracketed to be; removing it restores the English construction. The denial concerns a dispersal that would destroy the soul’s continuing identity and prevent return. Pneuma is rendered breath, distinct from the aēr, air, into which such dispersal is imagined.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.4 I.49.68.4

Καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ λαμβανόμενον ἐκ τῶν κάτω ἀγγείων ὕδωρ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἐπέχειν ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ παραντίκα λαμβανόμενον καὶ χεόμενον τὴν ἰδίαν λαμβάνει χώραν, πλὴν ἀναμίγνυται τῷ παντὶ τοῦ ὕδατος χύματι. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως, ὦ μεγαλόφρων Ὧρε.

68.5 I.49.68.5

Μύστης δὲ ὥσπερ τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως καὐτὴ τυγχάνουσα καὶ ἀδευκυῖα διὰ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς Ἀληθείας διεξελεύσομαί σοι τῶν ὄντων τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνό σοι φήσασα πρῶτον,

68.6 I.49.68.6

Ὡς δὴ τὸ ὕδωρ σῶμά ἐστιν ἄλογον, ἐκ πολλῶν συγκριμάτων παρατεθλιμμένον εἰς χύσιν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ πρᾶγμα ἰδιοφυές, τέκνον, καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ ἔργον τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χειρῶν τε καὶ νοῦ, αὐτό θ᾽ ἑαυτῷ εἰς νοῦν ὁδηγούμενον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.4 · The comparison with poured water

I.49.68.4

“Water taken from vessels here below cannot still occupy the very places from which it was taken. Even when it is immediately taken up and poured out, it does not recover its own place, but mingles with the whole mass of water. Yet the soul’s case is not like this, high-minded Horus.”[1840]

68.5 · The Plain of Truth

I.49.68.5

“Being myself, as it were, an initiate into the immortal nature, and having passed through the Plain of Truth, I shall explain existing things to you one by one, beginning by telling you this:”[1841]

68.6 · The soul’s distinctive nature

I.49.68.6

“Water is a body without reason, pressed out of many compounds into a fluid mass. The soul, however, my child, is a thing of distinctive nature and royal character, a work of the god’s hands and intellect, itself guiding itself toward intellect.”[1842]

1840. The soul’s case makes the final contrast explicit. This water comparison illustrates the dispersal just denied, rather than a process that Isis attributes to souls. The printed epechein, occupy, and lambanei, takes or receives, are retained without adopting alternative verbs in the apparatus.

1841. The Plain of Truth belongs to Isis’s claim of privileged knowledge within the dialogue. The printed hōsper is conveyed as as it were. Adeukyia is the printed participle, understood as having traveled through; the promise continues directly into the following contrast between water and soul.

1842. Idiophyes stresses the soul’s own distinctive nature. The unusual paratethlimmenon is provisionally pressed out, preserving the contrast between a compound fluid and the soul. The final passive participle with a reflexive dative is rendered itself guiding itself; its construction remains difficult.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.7 I.49.68.7

Τὸ τοίνυν ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου ἀδύνατον ἑτέρῳ ἀναμιγῆναι· ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς σύνοδον ἁρμονίαν θεοῦ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης γενομένην εἶναι.

68.8 I.49.68.8

Ὅτι δὲ οὔτε εἰς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον χυδαίως, οὔτε εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ ἑκάστη ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναπέμπεται χώραν, φανερὸν καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι οὖσα καὶ τῷ πλάσματι πάσχει [γὰρ] παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν πεπαχυμμένη.

68.9 I.49.68.9

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόσχες, ὦ περιπόθητε Ὥρε, τῷ λεγομένῳ ὁμοιώματι. Φέρε γὰρ εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συσχετήριον ἐγκεκλεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ ἀετοὺς καὶ περιστερὰς καὶ κύκνους καὶ ἱέρακας καὶ χελιδόνας καὶ στρουθοὺς καὶ μυίας καὶ ὄφεις καὶ λέοντας καὶ παρδάλεις καὶ λύκους καὶ κύνας καὶ λαγωοὺς καὶ βόας καὶ ποίμνια καὶ τινα τῶν τῆς κοινότητος ἐχομένων ζῴων, οἱονεὶ φώκας καὶ ἐνύδρεις καὶ χελώνας καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους κροκοδείλους·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.7 · Its union with the body I.49.68.7

“What comes from one source and not from another cannot be mingled with something different. Its conjunction with the body must therefore be an arrangement made by the god under necessity.”[1843]

68.8 · Each soul returns to its own region I.49.68.8

“That souls are not sent up indiscriminately to one and the same place, nor at random and as chance directs, but each to its own region, is evident even from what a soul experiences [for] while still in the body and its molded form, thickened contrary to its own nature.”[1844]

68.9 · An enclosure containing many creatures I.49.68.9

“Attend also, dearly loved Horus, to the comparison I am about to give. Imagine human beings, eagles, doves, swans, hawks, swallows, sparrows, flies, snakes, lions, leopards, wolves, dogs, hares, oxen, and sheep shut in one and the same enclosure, together with some creatures that share both environments, such as seals, otters, turtles, and our crocodiles.”[1845]

1843. The compressed phrase ex henos kai ouk ex allou is rendered without naming the one source more precisely. Harmonia is a fitting together or arrangement. The argument distinguishes conjunction with a body from the kind of mixture that would abolish the soul’s identity.

1844. The rejected gar remains as bracketed for. Pepachymmenē, thickened, describes the soul in embodiment. Plasma is the molded bodily form. Isis proposes that the soul’s behavior even in this condition provides evidence of an ordered destination after release.

1845. The full catalogue is retained. Creatures that share both environments interprets the difficult koinotēs as participation in land and water, in light of the examples and 68.13. This is a functional grouping within the comparison, not a modern zoological classification. Our keeps the speaker’s relation to the crocodiles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.10 I.49.68.10

Ἔπειτα τούτους, ὦ τέκνον, ὑπὸ μίαν ῥοπὴν ἀπολυθῆναι τοῦ συσχετηρίου, <οὐ> πάντως τραπήσονται ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος εἵς τε ἀγορὰς καὶ στέγας; ὁ δὲ ἀετὸς εἰς τὸν αἰθέρα, ὅπου καὶ φύσιν ἔχει διαιτᾶσθαι; αἱ δὲ περιστεραὶ εἰς τὸν πλησίον ἀέρα; οἱ δὲ ἱέρακες ὑπεράνω τούτων;

68.11 I.49.68.11

Αἱ δὲ χελιδόνες οὐχὶ ὅπου ἂν οἰκῶσιν ἄνθρωποι; οἱ δὲ στρουθοὶ περὶ τὰ καρποφόρα τῶν δένδρων; οἱ δὲ κύκνοι ὅπου ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς ᾄδειν, αἱ δὲ μυῖαι περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν, τοσοῦτον αὐτῆς ἀπέχουσαι ὅσον ἀναβῆναι δύνανται ἀνθρώπων τῇ ὀσμῇ (ἀνθρωπόλιχνον γὰρ ἰδίως, ὦ τέκνον, ἐστὶν ἡ μυῖα καὶ χαμαιπετές);

68.12 I.49.68.12

Οἱ δὲ λέοντες καὶ παρδάλεις οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη; οἱ δὲ λύκοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἐρημίας; οἱ δὲ κύνες κατ᾽ ἴχνος ἀνθρώπων; <οἱ> λαγωοὶ δὲ <εἰς> δρυμοὺς καὶ <οἱ> βόες <εἰς> αὐλιστήρια καὶ πεδία; καὶ εἰς τὰς νομὰς τὰ ποίμνια; οἱ δὲ ὄφεις εἰς τὰ μύχια τῆς γῆς;

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.10 · Release to their accustomed places

I.49.68.10

“Then suppose, my child, that they are released from the enclosure at a single stroke. Will they <not> surely turn to their places: the human being to marketplaces and houses; the eagle to the upper air, where it is naturally fitted to live; the doves to the air nearby; and the hawks above them?”[1846]

68.11 · Swallows, sparrows, swans, and flies

I.49.68.11

“Will the swallows not go wherever people live; the sparrows among the fruit-bearing trees; the swans wherever they can sing; and the flies close to the earth itself, rising only as far above it as they can in pursuit of the smell of human beings? For the fly, my child, is especially greedy for human beings and flies low.”[1847]

68.12 · The land animals

I.49.68.12

“Will lions and leopards not go to the mountains, wolves to deserted places, and dogs in the tracks of human beings? Will <the> hares go <to> the woods, and <the> oxen <to> their stalls and fields, and the sheep to their pastures, and the snakes to the earth’s recesses?”[1848]

1846. The supplemental ou, not, is credited to Meineke. The questions expect agreement that released creatures seek fitting places. Aithēr, upper air, is distinguished from the nearby aēr. The word places in the question makes the direction of the ensuing list explicit.

1847. The difficult dative tēi osmēi is provisionally taken to explain what draws the flies upward. The apparatus questions the wording; its alternative is not adopted. Anthrōpolichnon conveys a greedy appetite for human beings; the English keeps that force. Chamaipetes denotes low flight.

1848. Four supplied words in the Greek remain marked in the corresponding English positions. The repeated motion verbs are understood from the preceding question. Aulistēria are resting or sheltering places, here stalls for the oxen. The animal catalogue continues the analogy of destinations fitted to nature.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.13 I.49.68.13

<Αἱ> φῶκαι δὲ καὶ χελώναι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων εἰς βάθη καὶ νάματα, ὡς μὴ πεδιάδος γῆς στεροῖντο μηδὲ τοῦ συγγενοῦς ἀπολειφθεῖεν ὕδατος, ἑκάστου εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔνδον κριτηρίου ἀνατρεπομένου;

68.14 I.49.68.14

Οὕτως ἑκάστη ψυχὴ καὶ ἀνθρωπευομένη καὶ ἄλλως ἐπιγειΐζουσα οἶδεν ὅπου πορευτέον αὐτῇ ἐστι, πλὴν εἰ μή τις τῶν Τυφωνίων, ὦ τέκνον, παρελθὼν λέγοι, ὅτι δυνατὸν ταῦρον μὲν ἐν βυθῷ, ἐν δὲ ἀέρι χελώνην διαζῆν.

68.15 I.49.68.15

Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάσχουσι σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι βεβαπτισμέναι, ὡς μηδὲν παρὰ τάξιν πράσσειν κἂν κολάζωνται (κόλασις γὰρ αὐταῖς ἡ ἐνσωμάτωσις), πόσου πλέον βαπτισμοῦ καὶ κολάσεως * * καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἰδίας μετασχοῦσαι; Ἔχει δὲ ἡ διάταξις ἡ ἱερωτάτη οὕτως.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.13 · Creatures of land and water

I.49.68.13

“And <the> seals and turtles, with creatures like them, to deep waters and streams, so that they are neither deprived of level ground nor separated from their kindred water, each being turned back to its proper region by its inner faculty of judgment?”[1849]

68.14 · The soul knows its destination

I.49.68.14

“In the same way, every soul, whether living as a human being or leading some other earthly life, knows where it must go. Unless, my child, one of the Typhonian company should step forward and say that a bull can live in the depths of the sea and a turtle in the air!”[1850]

68.15 · Embodiment and release

I.49.68.15

“If this is their condition while immersed in flesh and blood, so that they do nothing contrary to order even while punished, for embodiment is their punishment, how much more when, from immersion and punishment * *, they have partaken of their own freedom? The most sacred arrangement is as follows.”[1851]

1849. The supplied article is preserved. The criterion within is an internal discriminating or directing faculty; it has not been recast as a modern biological mechanism. The clause about both land and water clarifies the shared environments mentioned earlier in the comparison.

1850. The Typhonians appear here as imagined opponents asserting a reversal of the creatures’ fitting places. The text’s unusual epigeiizousa is conveyed as leading an earthly life. The claim belongs to Isis’s analogy; no missing account of the opposing group has been invented.

1851. The printed gap remains at the point where a participle expressing release is expected. English retains from as a provisional indication of the genitives without restoring the missing verb. Baptismos here continues the image of immersion in flesh and blood. The printed posou pleon means how much more here; its genitive form is retained. Embodiment as punishment is explicit in the dialogue.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.16 I.49.68.16

Ἤδη ποτὲ ἄνω, μεγαλοφυέστατε παῖ, βλέπε ψυχῶν διατάξεις· τὸ ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ κορυφῆς μέχρι σελήνης θεοῖς καὶ ἄστροις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ προνοίᾳ σχολάζει· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ σελήνης, ὦ τέκνον, ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ψυχῶν ἐστιν οἰκητήριον.

68.17 I.49.68.17

Ἔχει μέντοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁδὸν ὁ τοσοῦτος ἀήρ, ὃν ἄνεμον καλεῖν ἔθος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, ἴδιον μέγεθος ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται πρὸς ἀνάψυξιν τῶν ἐπιγείων, ὃ δὴ καὶ ὕστερον ἐρῶ·

68.18 I.49.68.18

Κατ᾽ οὐδένα μέντοι τρόπον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κινούμενος ἐμπόδιον γίγνεται ψυχαῖς· κινουμένου γὰρ τούτου ἐξὸν ψυχαῖς ἀναΐσσειν καὶ καταΐσσειν, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ, ἀδιακωλύτως. Ῥέουσι γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀμιγῶς καὶ ἀκολλητί, ὡς δι᾽ ἐλαίου ὕδωρ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.16 · The regions above and below the moon I.49.68.16

“Look upward now, child of noblest nature, and behold the stations of souls. The region from heaven’s summit to the moon is reserved for gods, stars, and the other workings of providence. The region from the moon down to us, my child, is the dwelling place of souls.”[1852]

68.17 · Air and wind have their own course I.49.68.17

“This great expanse of air, which we customarily call wind, has within itself a course, a space of its own in which it moves to refresh earthly things, as I shall explain later.”[1853]

68.18 · Souls pass through without mixing I.49.68.18

“Yet its movement within itself in no way obstructs souls. While it moves, souls may dart upward and downward, as occasion brings, without hindrance. They flow through it without mixing or adhering, as water passes through oil.”[1854]

1852. The division at the moon distinguishes the upper divine region from the dwelling assigned to souls. Workings of providence interprets the condensed tēi allēi pronoiai, literally the other providence. The arrangement is being described by Isis within the dialogue.

1853. The printed idion megethos is called corrupt in the apparatus. A space of its own is a provisional rendering, preserving the text rather than substituting the proposed keleuthon, path. The relative hon grammatically refers to air. The sentence’s promised later explanation is not supplied here.

1854. The source includes both upward and downward movement, although the apparatus records omission of the latter in some witnesses. Akollēti, without adhering, supplements the denial of mixture. The water-and-oil comparison now illustrates distinctness, whereas the earlier water comparison illustrated loss of separate position.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.19 I.49.68.19

Τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο, ᾧ τέκνον Ὧρε, μοιρῶν μέν ἐστι γενικῶν τεσσάρων [εἰδικῶν δὲ χωρῶν ἑξήκοντα]. Ὧν ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ γῆς ἄνω χωρῶν ἐστι τεσσάρων, ὡς τὴν γῆν κατά τινας λόφους καὶ ἀκρωρείας ἀνατεῖναι καὶ φθάνειν ἄχρι τοσούτου· ὑπὲρ γὰρ ταύτας αὐτὴν ἀναβῆναι τὸ ὕψος οὐκ ἔχει φύσιν.

68.20 I.49.68.20

Ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ταύτης δευτέρα ἐστὶ χωρῶν ὀκτὼ [ἐν αἷς γίγνονται ἀνέμων κινήσεις] (πρόσεχε, παῖ, ἀρρήτων γὰρ ἐπακούεις μυστηρίων γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μέσου ἱεροῦ πνεύματος), ὅπου ἡ τοῦ ἀνέμου κίνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀρνέων πτῆσις· ὑπὲρ γὰρ ταύτης οὔτε ἀὴρ κινεῖται οὔτε ζῷον βαστάζει.

68.21 I.49.68.21

Ἔχει μέντοι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὁ ἀὴρ οὗτος, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὀκτὼ χώραις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῆς γῆς τέτταρσι περιπολεῖν μεθ᾽ ὧν ἔχει ζῴων, τῆς γῆς εἰς τὰς αὐτοῦ ἐπαναβῆναι <μὴ> δυναμένης.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.19 · Four broad divisions

I.49.68.19

“This interval, my child Horus, consists of four broad divisions [and sixty particular regions]. The first, extending upward from the earth, contains four regions, since the earth rises in certain hills and mountain summits and reaches that far. Its height does not naturally allow it to ascend beyond these.”[1855]

68.20 · The second division and its mysteries

I.49.68.20

“The second division above this contains eight regions [in which the movements of winds occur]. Attend, child, for you are hearing secret mysteries of earth and heaven and all the sacred breath between them. Here are the movement of wind and the flight of birds, for above this division air neither moves nor supports a living creature.”[1856]

68.21 · The reach of the lower air

I.49.68.21

“This air has by nature the power to circulate, together with the living creatures it contains, both in its own eight regions and in the earth’s four, while the earth is <not> able to rise into its regions.”[1857]

1855. The editor rejects the bracketed statement of sixty particular regions here, although the total is retained later. The four broad divisions contain progressively more regions. The final Greek construction is compressed; English provisionally makes the earth’s height the subject, without adopting an apparatus emendation.

1856. The rejected phrase about wind remains bracketed. The subsequent statement about wind is retained, so the repetition can be assessed. Arrhēta mystēria are mysteries not to be divulged. The claims about motion and living creatures describe the dialogue’s layered cosmology; the passage soon assigns finer air to higher divisions.

1857. The supplied mē, not, is credited in the apparatus to Heeren with Canter’s interpretation. It establishes the asymmetry: this air enters the earth’s regions, but earth does not reach into the air’s own eight regions. The numbers four and eight remain separate.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.22 I.49.68.22

Ἡ δὲ τρίτη χωρῶν ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα, ἀέρος λεπτοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ πλήρης. Ἡ δὲ τετάρτη ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα, ἐν αἷς ἐστι λεπτότατος καὶ εἰλικρινέστατος ἀὴρ καὶ διαυγής, διορίζων ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἄνω οὐρανούς, ἐκπύρους ὄντας τὴν φύσιν.

68.23 I.49.68.23

Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ διάταξις αὕτη κατ᾽ εὐθυτενῆ γραμμὴν ἄνωθεν κάτω ἀκολλητὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὡς εἶναι μοίρας γενικὰς μὲν τέσσαρας, διαστηματικὰς δὲ δώδεκα, χώρας δὲ ἑξήκοντα.

68.24 I.49.68.24

Ἐν δὲ ταῖς χώραις ταύταις, ἑξήκοντα οὔσαις τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἰκοῦσιν αἱ ψυχαί, ἑκάστη πρὸς ἣν ἔχει φύσιν, μιᾶς μὲν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συστάσεως οὖσαι, οὐκέτι δὲ τιμῆς. Ὅσῳ γὰρ ἑκάστη τῶν χωρῶν ἀπὸ γῆς ὑπερβέβηκε τῆς ἑτέρας, τοσούτῳ καὶ <αἱ> ἐν αὐταῖς ψυχαὶ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν λείπει, ὦ τέκνον, χώρᾳ καὶ τύχῃ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.22 · The third and fourth divisions I.49.68.22

“The third contains sixteen regions, filled with fine and pure air. The fourth contains thirty-two, in which the air is finest, purest, and transparent, itself marking the boundary of the heavens above, whose nature is fiery.”[1858]

68.23 · The arrangement in numbers I.49.68.23

“This arrangement extends in a straight line from above downward, its parts naturally without adhesion: there are four broad divisions, twelve spatial divisions, and sixty regions.”[1859]

68.24 · The same constitution, different standing I.49.68.24

“In these regions, sixty in number, souls dwell, each according to its nature. They have one and the same constitution, but not the same standing. For by as much as each region rises farther from the earth than another, by so much do <the> souls within them leave one another behind in superiority, my child, in place and condition.”[1860]

1858. The corrected diaugēs, transparent, is followed. Eph’ heautou is retained and provisionally rendered itself rather than silently changed to the apparatus’s aph’ heautou. The sequence of regions doubles: four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two. The fiery heavens are distinguished from the fine air beneath them.

1859. The sixty regions equal the sum four plus eight plus sixteen plus thirty-two. The twelve diastēmatikai divisions are retained as a distinct count; their precise relation to the other divisions is not fully explained here. The first two groups together contain twelve regions, but the text does not expressly equate the two counts.

1860. The article supplied at p. 463 is marked. The Greek shifts from plural souls to singular one soul and leaves; English regularizes the agreement while retaining the comparison. Chōrai kai tychēi follows the printed correction, place and condition or fortune. The soul’s common constitution is distinguished from its rank.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.25 I.49.68.25

Τίνες μὲν οὖν εἰς ἑκάτερα τούτων ἀναλύουσι ψυχαί, ἐντεῦθέν σοι πάλιν, ὦ μεγαλόδοξε Ὦρε, καταλέγειν ἄρξομαι, ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσγεια τὴν τάξιν ποιουμένη.”

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

68.25 · From the higher regions downward

I.49.68.25

“I shall now begin to recount to you, greatly renowned Horus, which souls return to each of these regions, proceeding in order from above down toward the earth.”[1861]

1861. The printed hekatera, ordinarily referring to either of two, is interpreted more broadly as each of the regions just described. The feminine poioumenē keeps Isis as speaker. Excerpt 68 ends at line 6; the following numbered excerpt 69 continues this same discourse, as the editor explains in its apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.1 I.49.69.1

[περὶ ἐμψυχώσεως καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως].

“Τὸ μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ κεχώρισται, τέκνον Ὧρε, πρὸς μέτρον καὶ ἁρμονίαν. Αἱ δὲ χῶραι αὗται ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων καλοῦνται ὑφ᾽ ὧν μὲν ζῶναι, ὑφ᾽ ὧν δὲ στερεώματα, ὑπὸ δὲ ἑτέρων πτυχαί.”

69.2 I.49.69.2

Ἐν δὲ ταύταις φοιτῶσιν αἵ τε ἀπολελυμέναι τῶν σωμάτων ψυχαὶ αἵ τε μηδέπω ἐνσωματισθεῖσαι. Ἑκάστη δὲ τούτων, ὦ τέκνον, κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν καὶ χώραν ἔχει ὥστε τὰς μὲν θείας καὶ βασιλικὰς ἐν τῇ ὑπεράνω πάντων κατοικεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἐλαχίστας κατὰ τιμὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι εἰσὶ χαμαιπετεῖς ἐν τῇ ὑποκάτω πάντων, τὰς δὲ μέσας <ἐν> τῇ μέσῃ.

69.3 I.49.69.3

Αἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν καταπεμπόμεναι, ὦ τέκνον Ὧρε, ἐκ τῶν ὑπεράνω ζωνῶν καταπέμπονται, αἳ καὶ λυθεῖσαι εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς ἢ καὶ ἔτι ὑπεράνω ἀνέρχονται, πλὴν εἰ μή τινές τι εἶεν <παρὰ> τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς ἑαυτῶν φύσεως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θείου νόμου παραγγελίαν πεπραχυῖαι·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.1 · Regions between earth and heaven I.49.69.1

[On ensoulment and transmigration].

“The space between earth and heaven, my child Horus, has been divided according to measure and harmony. Our ancestors call these regions by different names: some call them zones, others firmaments, and others folds.”[1862]

69.2 · A place suited to each soul I.49.69.2

“These are frequented both by souls released from bodies and by those not yet embodied. Each, my child, has a region corresponding to its worth: divine and royal souls dwell in the region above all the others; those lowest in honor, and all the others that cling to the ground, in the region below all; and those between, <in> the middle region.”[1863]

69.3 · The return of ruling souls I.49.69.3

“Souls sent down to rule, my child Horus, are sent from the higher zones. When released, they ascend to those same zones, or even higher, unless some have done something <contrary to> the worth of their own nature and the command of divine law.”[1864]

1862. The editor rejects the heading because this excerpt continues the preceding Isis-Horus discourse; its brackets are retained in both languages. Ensoulment is the entry of soul into a body, and transmigration its passage into another. The edition gives Patrizi p. 35b as a locator. Decimal subdivisions are modern comparison divisions.

1863. The text distinguishes souls returning from embodiment from souls not yet embodied. The supplied en, in, is marked. Chamaipeteis literally suggests falling or flying close to the ground, here describing souls of low standing rather than a separate species of animal.

1864. The supplied para is marked. Release is understood from bodily life. The return to a former or higher region is conditional upon conduct; royal origin alone does not remove the possibility of a fall. The printed ti, something, follows the correction recorded in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.4 I.49.69.4

ἅσπερ ἡ ἄνω πρόνοια πρὸς μέτρον τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἰς τὰς ὑποκάτω χώρας ἐξορίζει, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ὑποδεεστέρας δυνάμει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ * * ἐκ γὰρ κατωτέρων ἐπὶ μείζονας καὶ ὑψηλοτέρας ἀνάγει.

69.5 I.49.69.5

Εἰσὶ γὰρ ἄνωθεν οἱ δορυφόροι <δύο> ὄντες τῆς καθόλου προνοίας, ὧν ὁ μὲν ψυχοταμίας, ὁ δὲ ψυχοπομπός· καὶ ὁ μὲν ψυχοταμίας ψυχῶν * *, ὁ δὲ ψυχοπομπὸς ἀποστολεὺς τε καὶ διατάκτης τῶν ἐνσεσωματωμένων ψυχῶν. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τηρεῖ, ὁ δὲ προΐησι κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ.

69.6 I.49.69.6

Τῷ οὖν λόγῳ τούτῳ, ὦ παῖ, καὶ τῇ ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξαλλαγῇ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστιν ἡ Φύσις· πλάστρια γὰρ οὖσα καὶ σκηνοποιὸς ἀγγείῳ εἰσβάλλει τὰς ψυχάς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.4 · Demotion and advancement

I.49.69.4

“Such souls providence above banishes to lower regions in proportion to their offenses, just as it also deals with those inferior in power and worth * * for it leads them up from lower regions to greater and higher ones.”[1865]

69.5 · The steward and guide of souls

I.49.69.5

“For above there are <two> attendants of universal providence, one the steward of souls, the other their guide. The steward of souls * *, while the guide sends forth and assigns the embodied souls. The one keeps them, the other sends them onward according to the god’s purpose.”[1866]

69.6 · Nature fashions a dwelling

I.49.69.6

“Corresponding to this account, my child, and to the changes in things above, Nature is present on earth also. As a fashioner and maker of a dwelling, she puts souls into a vessel.”[1867]

1865. The source marks a gap after worth. Deals with supplies only a neutral English connection for the incomplete comparison; the missing action is not reconstructed. The surviving next clause describes ascent, while the earlier clause describes punishment. The text does not fully preserve their transition.

1866. Psychotamias combines soul with steward or custodian; psychopompos is a conductor of souls. The supplied two and the gap in the steward’s description remain visible. The apparatus proposes a fuller restoration of the missing description, but it has not been inserted. The printed ensesōmatōmenōn is embodied, not the different form proposed in the apparatus.

1867. The first sentence is compressed and its construction uncertain; the apparatus considers a possible omission. The English is provisional. Skēnopoios evokes the making of a tent or dwelling, and angeiōi treats the body as a vessel. No unprinted verb or additional gap has been inserted into the Greek.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.7 I.49.69.7

Παρεστᾶσι δὲ δύο ἐνέργειαι καὶ αὐτῇ, μνήμη καὶ ἐμπειρία· καὶ ἡ μὲν μνήμη ἔργον ἔχει τοῦτο, ὅπως ἡ Φύσις τηρῇ καὶ περικρατῇ τοῦ τε ἑκάστου τύπου ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένου καὶ τοῦ φυράματος τοῦ ἄνω γίγνηται *·

69.8 I.49.69.8

ἡ δὲ ἐμπειρία, ὅπως πρὸς ἀνάλογον ἑκάστης τῶν καταβαινουσῶν ψυχῶν εἰς τὸ σωματισθῆναι καὶ τὸ πλάσμα [ἐνεργῆ καὶ] γένηται, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ὀξέσι τῶν ψυχῶν ὀξέα γένηται καὶ τὰ σώματα, ταῖς δὲ βραδέσι βραδέα, ταῖς δὲ ἐνεργέσιν ἐνεργῆ καὶ ταῖς νωθραῖς νωθρὰ καὶ ταῖς δυναταῖς δυνατὰ καὶ ταῖς δολίαις δόλια, καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἑκάσταις κατὰ τὸ εἰκός.

69.9 I.49.69.9

Οὐ γὰρ ἀσκόπως πτηνὰ μὲν ἐπτίλωσε, λογικὰ δὲ περισσαῖς καὶ ἀκριβεστέραις αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκόσμησε, τετραπόδων δὲ τὰ μὲν κέρασι, τὰ δὲ ὀδοῦσι, τὰ δὲ ὄνυξι καὶ ὁπλαῖς ἐκαρτέρωσε, τὰ δὲ ἑρπετὰ εὐχαίτοις σώμασι καὶ εὐυποχωρήτοις ἐμαλάκυνε,

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.7 · Memory and the original pattern

I.49.69.7

“Two powers attend her also, memory and experience. Memory has this task: that Nature should preserve and keep hold of the pattern originally established for each, and become, of the mixture above *.”[1868]

69.8 · Experience fits body to soul

I.49.69.8

“Experience ensures that the fashioned body too should be [active and] proportioned to each soul descending into embodiment: for keen souls the bodies too become keen; for slow souls, slow; for active souls, active; for sluggish souls, sluggish; for strong souls, strong; for deceitful souls, deceitful; and, in a word, for each as is fitting.”[1869]

69.9 · The equipment of living creatures

I.49.69.9

“For Nature did not act without purpose when she feathered flying creatures, furnished rational creatures with abundant and more exact senses, strengthened some quadrupeds with horns, others with teeth, and others with claws and hooves, and softened creeping creatures with well-haired and readily yielding bodies.”[1870]

1868. The clause after pattern is damaged: the genitive tou phyramatos, of the mixture, lacks a satisfactory completion with gignētai, become. The printed single-asterisk gap remains, and the awkward English deliberately leaves this fragment incomplete. Suggested additions such as image or likeness are not introduced into the text.

1869. The rejected energē kai, active and, remains bracketed. The printed account gives memory the task of preserving the pattern and experience the task of adapting the fashioned body to the descending soul. Every member of the sequence of corresponding qualities is retained.

1870. The printed euchaitois literally suggests well-haired, but the apparatus marks it corrupt in this context and considers alternatives, including flexible. The English retains the difficult wording rather than silently adopting an emendation. Herpeta, creeping creatures, is broader than a precise modern zoological category.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.10 I.49.69.10

καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρότης τέλεον ἀσθενὴς διαμένῃ, ὧν μὲν τὰ στόματα καὶ τοῖς ὀδοῦσιν ἐχαράκωσεν ὧν δὲ τοὺς ὄγκους ὀξύνας δύναμιν περιέθηκεν (οὕτως τὰ μὲν τῇ τοῦ θανάτου εὐλαβείᾳ ἰσχυρότερα τῶν ἄλλων)·

69.11 I.49.69.11

τὰ δὲ νηκτά, δειλὰ ὄντα, ἐνοικεῖν ἔδωκε στοιχείῳ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φῶς οὐδετέραν ὧν ἔχει δυνάμεων ἐνεργεῖν ἰσχύει (ἐν γὰρ ὕδατι τὸ πῦρ οὔτε φαίνει οὔτε καίει)·

69.12 I.49.69.12

ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἢ φολίσιν ἢ ἀκάνθαις ἐν ὕδατι νηχόμενον φεύγει ὅπῃ ἂν θέλῃ, τὴν ἰδίαν περιβεβλημένον δειλίαν καὶ σκεπαστήριον ἔχον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὕδωρ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.10 · Defenses of soft bodies

I.49.69.10

“And so that bodily moisture should not remain wholly defenseless, she fortified the mouths of some with teeth as well, while to others she gave strength by sharpening their bodily projections (thus some are stronger than others in guarding against death).”[1871]

69.11 · Water as refuge

I.49.69.11

“Swimming creatures, being timid, she allowed to dwell in an element where light cannot exercise either of its powers (for in water fire neither shines nor burns).”[1872]

69.12 · Scales, spines, and concealment

I.49.69.12

“Each of them, with scales or spines, swims in water and escapes wherever it wishes, wrapped in its own timidity and having the water as a covering to keep it from being seen.”[1873]

1871. Onkoi, masses or protuberances, is provisionally bodily projections here. The masculine participle oxynas sits awkwardly with Nature as subject; the English follows the surrounding account. The apparatus considers the parenthesis either incomplete or interpolated. It remains in the text, with its uncertain sense rendered provisionally.

1872. The text first names light, phōs, and then fire, pyr, assigning the powers of shining and burning to the latter. Both terms are retained. The account presents water as the refuge appropriate to timidity; this is the dialogue’s elemental explanation.

1873. The datives scales or spines have no explicit verb of covering; the apparatus suggests supplying one. The English uses with and leaves the Greek unsupplemented. Wrapped in its own timidity is the printed image, distinct from the water’s literal concealment.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.13 I.49.69.13

Εἰς γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων τούτων καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα ἐγκλείονται αἱ ψυχαί, ὥστε εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους χωρεῖν τὰς κριτικάς, εἰς δὲ πτηνὰ τὰς ἀπανθρώπους, εἰς δὲ τετράποδα <τὰς> ἀκρίτους (νόμος γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἡ ἰσχύς),

69.14 I.49.69.14

εἰς δὲ ἑρπετὰ τὰς δολίας (οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἐναντίου ἐπεξέρχεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λοχήσαντα δὲ καταβάλλει), εἰς δὲ [τὰ] νηκτὰ τὰς δειλὰς καὶ ὅσα τῶν λοιπῶν στοιχείων ἀπολαύειν ἀνάξια τυγχάνει.

69.15 I.49.69.15

Γίγνεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ <εἴδει> εὑρεῖν ζῷον τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει μὴ καταχρώμενον.

“Πῶς πάλιν, ὦ τεκοῦσα;” εἶπεν Ὧρος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.13 · Souls and corresponding bodies I.49.69.13

“Souls are enclosed in each of these bodies according to likeness: those capable of judgment enter human beings; those alien to human company enter flying creatures; and <those> without judgment enter quadrupeds (for strength is their law).”[1874]

69.14 · Deceitful and timid souls I.49.69.14

“Deceitful souls enter creeping creatures (for none of them attacks human beings openly, but they strike them down from ambush); timid souls enter [the] swimming creatures, as do all that are unworthy of enjoying the other elements.”[1875]

69.15 · Exceptions within each kind I.49.69.15

“It is possible, however, to find in each <kind> a creature that does not follow its own nature.”

“How so, mother?” said Horus.[1876]

1874. Kritikai and akritoi contrast possession and absence of judgment. Apanthrōpoi is provisionally alien to human company; it can also carry the stronger sense inhuman. The printed reading is retained instead of the apparatus’s alternative anedrastoi, unsettled. The supplied article is marked.

1875. The rejected article ta remains bracketed. The Greek changes from feminine souls to neuter hosa, all that; the English does not restrict this latter expression to a more precise category than the text gives. The claims about animal conduct belong to the speaker’s analogy between disposition and bodily form.

1876. The supplied eidei is marked. Katachrōmenon means making use of or acting according to something; here the following examples support does not follow its own nature. Palin belongs to Horus’s question in the printed text, rather than being moved to said.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.16 I.49.69.16

Καὶ ἀπεκρίθη Ἶσις· “Ὥστε ἄνθρωπον μέν, ὦ τέκνον, τὸ κριτικὸν ὑπερβῆναι, τετράπουν δὲ τὴν ἀνάγκην παραλλάξαι, ἑρπετὸν δὲ τὸ δόλιον ἀπολέσαι, καὶ νηκτὸν τῆς δειλίας καταφρονῆσαι, καὶ πτηνὸν τῆς ἀπανθρωπίας ἐκπεσεῖν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἄνω καὶ τῆς καταβάσεως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς σωματουργίας τοσαῦτα.”

69.17 I.49.69.17

Συμβαίνει δέ, ὦ τέκνον, ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει εὑρίσκεσθαι καὶ γένει τῶν προκειμένων βασιλικάς τινας ψυχάς, καταβαίνειν δὲ καὶ ἄλλας ἀλλοίους, τὰς μὲν διαπύρους, τὰς δὲ ψυχράς, τὰς δὲ ὑπερηφάνους, τὰς δὲ πραείας, <τὰς δὲ ἐλευθερίους,> τὰς δὲ βαναύσους, τὰς δὲ ἐμπείρους, τὰς δὲ ἀπείρους, τὰς δὲ ἀργάς, τὰς δὲ ἐνεργεῖς, τὰς δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλας οὔσας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.16 · Departure from an assigned nature

I.49.69.16

Isis answered: “A human being, my child, may pass beyond the exercise of judgment; a quadruped may depart from its constraint; a creeping creature may lose its deceitfulness; a swimming creature may disregard timidity; and a flying creature may fall away from its estrangement from human company. So much for the disposition of those above, their descent, and the making of bodies.”[1877]

69.17 · Varieties of descending souls

I.49.69.17

“It happens, my child, that certain royal souls are found in each of the kinds and classes just described. Others descend with differing qualities: some fiery, some cold; some proud, some gentle; <some liberal,> some servile; some experienced, some inexperienced; some idle, some active; and some different at different times.”[1878]

1877. The examples describe departures from the earlier categories, without saying that all such departures are improvements. To kritikon is the capacity for judgment; anankē, constraint or necessity, refers back to the quadrupeds’ rule of strength. Those above is understood as the souls under discussion.

1878. The supplied liberal souls remain marked, completing the contrast with banausoi, a term associated with mechanical occupations and here with a supposedly servile character. This reflects the dialogue’s hierarchy of qualities. The irregular masculine alloious after feminine allas is retained in Greek; the English follows the list’s clear referent.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.18 I.49.69.18

Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων θέσιν, ὅθεν εἰς τὸ ἐνσωματισθῆναι καθάλλονται αἱ ψυχαί. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος καταπηδῶσι τῆς ὁμοιοπαθοῦς βασιλικῆς τύχης. Πολλαὶ γὰρ εἰσι βασιλεῖαι· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι ψυχῶν, αἱ δὲ σωμάτων, αἱ δὲ τέχνης, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμης, αἱ δὲ αὖ τῶν καὶ τῶν.

69.19 I.49.69.19

“Πῶς πάλιν;” εἶπεν Ὧρος.

“Οἷον, ὦ τέκνον Ὧρε, ἀπογεγονότων ἤδη ψυχῶν μὲν Ὄσιρις, ὁ πατήρ σου· σωμάτων δὲ ὁ ἑκάστου ἔθνους ἡγεμών· βουλῆς δὲ ὁ πατὴρ πάντων καὶ καθηγητὴς ὁ τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμῆς·”

69.20 I.49.69.20

ἰατρικῆς δὲ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς ὁ Ἡφαίστου· ἰσχύος δὲ καὶ ῥώμης πάλιν Ὄσιρις, μεθ᾽ ὃν, ὦ τέκνον, αὐτὸς σύ· φιλοσοφίας δὲ Ἀρνεβεσχῆνις, ποιητικῆς δὲ πάλιν ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς <ὁ> Ἰμούθης.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.18 · Regions and forms of kingship I.49.69.18

“This happens because of the position of the places from which souls leap down into embodiment. Those from a royal zone leap down into a royal condition of corresponding character. For there are many forms of kingship: some over souls, some over bodies, some over art, some over knowledge, and others over this or that.”[1879]

69.19 · Rulers of souls, bodies, and counsel I.49.69.19

“How so?” said Horus.

“For example, my child Horus: over the souls of those who have already departed rules Osiris, your father; over bodies, the ruler of each nation; over counsel, the father and guide of all, thrice-greatest Hermes.”[1880]

69.20 · Medicine, strength, and the arts I.49.69.20

“Over medicine rules Asclepius, the son of Hephaestus; over strength and vigor, again Osiris, after whom, my child, you yourself; over philosophy, Arnebeschenis; and over the art of making, again Asclepius, <the one called> Imouthes.”[1881]

1879. The construction with the genitive tēs homoiopathous basilikēs tychēs is difficult; into a royal condition gives a provisional sense without altering the Greek. Diazōma is a belt or zone. The final tōn kai tōn is an indefinite expression, this or that, following the editor’s arrangement of displaced words.

1880. Rules is supplied in English from the preceding discussion of kingship. Apogegonotōn is taken of those who have departed life. Trismegistos is translated thrice-greatest; the title and the description father and guide of all belong to this speech.

1881. The proper names follow the printed forms. Son of renders the patronymic genitive of Hephaestus. The supplied article before Imouthes is marked. Poiētikē may mean productive art or poetry; art of making is provisional. The text does not explain the relation between its two descriptions of Asclepius.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.21 I.49.69.21

Καθόλου γάρ, ὦ τέκνον, εὑρήσεις, ἐὰν ἐξετάζῃς, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλῶν ἄρχοντας καὶ πολλοὺς πολλῶν βασιλεύοντας. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν πάντων κρατῶν, τέκνον, ἐκ τῆς ὑπεράνω χώρας ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκείνην ἔσχε τάξιν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ τόπου ἐστίν·

69.22 I.49.69.22

βασιλικωτέραν <μὲν . . . . . τοῦ βασιλικοῦ> διαζώματος τετευχότες·

69.23 I.49.69.23

<οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρώδους> πυρὸς ἐργάται γίγνονται καὶ τροφεῖς· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἐν ὑγροῖς διαζῶσιν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ <τοῦ> ἐπιστημονικοῦ καὶ τεχνιτικοῦ περὶ ἐπιστήμας καταγίγνονται καὶ τέχνας· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ <τοῦ> ἀργοῦ ἀργῶς καὶ ἐπιρρεμβῶς διαζῶσι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.21 · Universal and particular rule

I.49.69.21

“In general, my child, if you examine the matter, you will find many rulers over many things, and many holding kingship over many. But the one who rules all, my child, comes from the region above; the one who rules particular things has the rank of the place from which he comes.”[1882]

69.22 · The damaged royal comparison

I.49.69.22

“More royal <indeed . . . . . of the royal> zone, having obtained it.”[1883]

69.23 · Origins and occupations

I.49.69.23

“<Those from the fiery region> become workers and tenders of fire; those from the moist region live among moist things; those from <the> region of knowledge and craft occupy themselves with sciences and arts; those from <the> idle region live idly and aimlessly.”[1884]

1882. The distinction is between a ruler of all and rulers with limited domains. Taxin, rank, follows the printed correction. The English preserves the somewhat repetitive many rulers over many things rather than adopting the alternative construction suggested in the apparatus.

1883. This clause is damaged. The feminine accusative basilikōteran lacks its noun or construction, while the surviving participle is masculine plural. The editor prints a partial supplement surrounding six points of omission. Both the supplied words and those points are retained; it is not possible to make a complete English sentence without further conjecture.

1884. The initial clause and the two supplied articles are marked. Region is understood from the preceding account. Tropheis, tenders or nourishers, follows the printed correction and refers to maintaining fire. Epirrembōs suggests wandering or drifting without settled purpose.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.24 I.49.69.24

Πάντων γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, ὦ τέκνον, διὰ λόγου καὶ ἔργου πραγμάτων ἄνω εἰσὶν αἱ πηγαί, μέτρῳ καὶ σταθμῷ ἐπιχύνουσαι ἡμῖν τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ μὴ ἄνωθεν καταβέβηκε καὶ πάλιν ἀνέρχεται ἵνα καταβῇ.

69.25 I.49.69.25

“Πῶς πάλιν λέγεις τοῦτο, ὦ τεκοῦσα, παράδειξον.”

Καὶ ἀπεκρίθη Ἶσις πάλιν· “Τῆς παλινδρομίας ἐναργὲς τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῖς ζῴοις ἐνέθηκεν ἡ ἱερωτάτη φύσις· τοῦτο γὰρ ὃ σπῶμεν ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀέρος πνεῦμα, τοῦτο πάλιν ἄνω πέμπομεν ἵνα λάβωμεν·”

69.26 I.49.69.26

καὶ εἰσίν, ὦ τέκνον, τούτου τοῦ ἐνεργήματος τεχνίτιδες ἐν ἡμῖν ῥῖναι, αἳ ἐπειδὰν μύσωσι τὰ δεκτικὰ ἑαυτῶν τοῦ πνεύματος στόματα, τότε ἡμεῖς οὐκέτι ὧδέ ἐσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναβεβήκαμεν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.24 · The sources above

I.49.69.24

“The sources of all things carried out on earth through speech and action, my child, are above. They pour their substances down upon us by measure and weight. There is nothing that has not descended from above and does not ascend again in order to descend.”[1885]

69.25 · Breathing as an illustration

I.49.69.25

“How, again, do you mean this, mother? Give me an example.”

Isis answered again: “Most holy Nature has placed this clear sign of the returning movement in living beings: the breath we draw down from the air above is the very breath we send upward again, so that we may receive it.”[1886]

69.26 · The closing of the nostrils

I.49.69.26

“The nostrils within us, my child, are the artisans of this activity. When they close their own openings that receive the breath, we are no longer here: we have ascended.”[1887]

1885. Logos is rendered speech here because it is paired with ergon, action: the familiar combination of word and deed favors this sense. Ousiai is substances, the things or realities supplied by the sources. The repeated movement upward and downward is the point Horus asks Isis to illustrate next.

1886. Palindromia is movement back or return. The printed ho spōmen, which we draw, follows the editor’s correction. Pneuma here is breath in the example of inhalation and exhalation; later in this discourse the same word also denotes an airy element.

1887. Technitides personifies the nostrils as skilled workers. The passage takes the cessation of breath as a sign of departure from life and uses the same upward language as the preceding cosmological account. The Greek perfect anabebēkamen is have ascended.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.27 I.49.69.27

Προσεπιγίγνεται δέ, ὦ παῖ μεγαλόδοξε, καὶ ἕτερά τινα ἡμῖν ἐκτὸς <τῆς> τοῦ φυράματος συσταθμίας.

“Τί δέ ἐστιν”, Ὧρος εἶπε, “τὸ φύραμα τοῦτο, ὦ τεκοῦσα;”

69.28 I.49.69.28

Σύνοδός ἐστι καὶ κρᾶσις τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἐξ ἧς κράσεως καὶ συνόδου ἀναθυμιᾶταί τις ἀτμός, ὃς περιειλεῖται μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ, διατρέχει δὲ ἐν <τῷ> σώματι, ἀμφοτέροις μεταδιδοὺς [τουτέστι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ] τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος· καὶ οὕτως αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἐναλλοιώσεων γίγνονται.

69.29 I.49.69.29

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν διάταξιν πλεονάσειε τὸ πῦρ, τὸ τηνικαῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχουσα καὶ ἕτερον θερμὸν προσλαβοῦσα, ἐκπυρωδεστέρα γενομένη, ποιεῖ τὸ ζῷον ἐνεργότερον καὶ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὀξὺ καὶ εὐκίνητον·

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.27 · A question about the mixture

I.49.69.27

“Other things also accrue to us, greatly renowned child, beyond <the> balanced composition of the mixture.”

“What is this mixture, mother?” Horus asked.[1888]

69.28 · The vapor linking soul and body

I.49.69.28

“It is the conjunction and blending of the four elements. From this blending and conjunction a vapor rises, which wraps itself around the soul and courses through <the> body, imparting its own quality to both [that is, to the body and the soul]. In this way arise the differences in the changes of soul and body.”[1889]

69.29 · An excess of fire

I.49.69.29

“If fire predominates in the bodily arrangement, the soul, being hot by nature and taking on further heat, becomes more fiery: it makes the creature more active and spirited, and the body keen and readily moved.”[1890]

1888. The supplied article is marked. Phyrama is a mixture or kneaded compound; systathmia suggests a proportioning or balancing together. The meaning of additions from outside becomes clearer in the later account of changes to the original elemental blend.

1889. The supplied article and rejected explanatory gloss are marked. Atmos is vapor, and anathymiasis or its related verb describes exhalation from a mixture. The passage makes this vapor a carrier of qualities between the elemental blend, the soul, and the body.

1890. The explanation begins from the premise that soul is naturally hot. Thymikon can indicate spirit, anger, or strong impulse; spirited preserves that range. The account distinguishes the temperament of the living creature from the quickness and mobility of its body.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.30 I.49.69.30

εἰ δὲ πλεονάσειεν ὁ ἀήρ, τὸ τηνικαῦτα καὶ κοῦφον καὶ πηδητικὸν καὶ ἀνέδραστον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι.

69.31 I.49.69.31

Εἰ δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ πλεονάσειε, τὸ τηνικαῦτα καὶ τὸ ζῷον τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ γίνεται εὔρουν τε καὶ εὐφυὲς καὶ εὐπερίχυτον ἱκανῶς τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιπεσεῖν καὶ κολληθῆναι δυνάμενον, διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἑνωτικὸν καὶ κοινωνικὸν τοῦ ὕδατος· ἐφιζάνει γὰρ πᾶσι, καὶ πολὺ μὲν ὂν εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἀναλύει καὶ περιλαμβάνει, ὀλίγον δ᾽ ὑπάρχον καὶ καταδῦσαν, ἐκεῖνο γίνεται ᾧ ἐμίγη.

69.32 I.49.69.32

τὰ μέντοι σώματα ὑπὸ πλαδαρότητος καὶ χαυνότητος εἰς περίσφιγξιν οὐκ ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ μικρᾷ τινι νόσου ἀφορμῇ λύεται, καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου συνδέσμου κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐκπίπτει.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.30 · An excess of air

I.49.69.30

“If air predominates, the creature becomes light, prone to leap, and unsettled, in both soul and body.”[1891]

69.31 · An excess of water

I.49.69.31

“If water predominates, the creature becomes, in soul, fluid, adaptable, and readily diffused, well able to come upon other things and adhere to them, because water unites and associates with other things. It settles upon everything: in large quantity it dissolves and encompasses things within itself; in small quantity, sinking into them, it becomes that with which it was mixed.”[1892]

69.32 · The weakness of watery bodies

I.49.69.32

“The bodies, however, because of their flabbiness and looseness, do not achieve firm cohesion. At some slight onset of disease they come apart and gradually lose their own binding structure.”[1893]

1891. Anedraston is without a fixed seat or resting place, hence unsettled. This description links the mobility assigned to air with both psychological and bodily movement; it does not introduce a separate argument about the soul’s origin.

1892. Euphyes, naturally well disposed or apt, is rendered adaptable in this comparison. The corrected euroun, flowing freely, is retained. The irregular katadysan, sinking, follows the printed text. The explanation contrasts the effects of a large and a small quantity of water.

1893. The printed negative ouk is retained; the apparatus records variation here. Perisphinxis is tight binding or compression. The explanation contrasts the soul’s adaptability in the preceding passage with the bodily weakness attributed to the same predominance of water.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.33 I.49.69.33

Εἰ δὲ τὸ γεῶδες πλεονάσειε, τὸ τηνικαῦτα ἀμβλεῖα μὲν τοῦ ζῴου ἡ ψυχὴ γίνεται, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν σωματικὴν ἀραιότητα εὔλυτον οὐδὲ τὸ δι᾽ οὗ πηδήσεται, πεπαχυμμένων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν μερῶν, ἀλλὰ ἔνδον μένει παρ᾽ ἑαυτῇ ὑπὸ βάρους καὶ πυκνότητος πεδηθεῖσα, τὸ δὲ σῶμα στερεὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ ἀργὸν καὶ βαρὺ καὶ μετὰ βίας ὑπὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως μετακινούμενον.

69.34 I.49.69.34

Εἰ δὲ σύμμετρος γένοιτο ἡ πάντων σύστασις, τότε τὸ ζῷον θερμὸν εἰς πρᾶξιν, κοῦφον δὲ εἰς κίνησιν, εὔκρατον δὲ εἰς ἀφήν, γενναῖον δὲ εἰς πῆξιν κατασκευάζεται.

69.35 I.49.69.35

Ὅσα οὖν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ κεκοινώνηκε πλείονος μὲν πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος, ταῦτα ἀπωρνέωται καὶ ἄνω παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις πολιτεύεται τοῖς στοιχείοις, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐγένετο. Ὅσα δὲ πλείονος μὲν πυρός, ὀλίγου δὲ πνεύματος, ὕδατος δὲ καὶ γῆς ἴσης, ταῦτα ἀπηνθρώπισται, καὶ τῷ ζῴῳ τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς σύνεσιν ἐτράπη· ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς θερμόν τι χρῆμά ἐστιν, ὃ καίειν μὲν οὐκ οἶδε, διαδύνειν δὲ κατὰ πάντων [καὶ] ἐπίσταται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.33 · An excess of earth

I.49.69.33

“If the earthy element predominates, the creature’s soul becomes dull. It lacks a bodily openness easily released, or a passage through which to spring forth, since the organs of perception have thickened. It remains within itself, fettered by weight and density. The body is solid, but inactive and heavy, moved by deliberate choice only with effort.”[1894]

69.34 · A balanced constitution

I.49.69.34

“If the constitution of all the elements is proportionate, the creature is formed warm for action, light for movement, well tempered to the touch, and strong in its solidity.”[1895]

69.35 · Birds, human beings, and intellect

I.49.69.35

“According to this account, creatures sharing in more fire and breath have become birds and live above among the elements from which they came. Those sharing in more fire, little breath, and equal portions of water and earth have become human beings; in them the excess of heat has turned into understanding. For the intellect in us is a kind of heat: it does not know how to burn, but [also] knows how to penetrate everything.”[1896]

1894. The phrase sōmatikē araiotēs eulytos is difficult: bodily openness easily released is provisional, suggesting a loose or porous bodily medium. A passage supplies the sense of to di’ hou, that through which. The printed sensory parts and the contrast between solidity and sluggishness are retained.

1895. The printed pēxis is solidity or consolidation, not one of the alternative readings in the apparatus. Each quality corresponds to the earlier elemental account: heat, lightness, tempering, and firmness. Symmetros is proportionate, not necessarily equal in numerical quantity.

1896. The unusual verbs apōrneōtai and apēnthrōpistai describe formation as birds and human beings. Pneuma is the airy component here. Equal portions interprets the compressed water and equal earth. The rejected kai is marked. Intellect’s heat is distinguished from ordinary burning fire.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.36 I.49.69.36

Ὅσα δὲ πλείονος μὲν ὕδατος, πλείονος δὲ γῆς, μετρίου δὲ πνεύματος, [καὶ] ὀλίγου δὲ πυρός, ταῦτ᾽ ἀποτεθηρίωται, τῇ δὲ τοῦ θερμοῦ περιουσίᾳ ἀλκιμώτερα γέγονε τῶν ἄλλων.

69.37 I.49.69.37

Ὅσα δὲ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἴσων κεκοινώνηκε, ταῦτα ἀφηρπέτωται καὶ τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς στερήσει ἄτολμα γέγονε καὶ ἀπαρρησίαστα, τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος κοινωνίᾳ ψυχρὰ ἐγένετο, τῇ δὲ τῆς γῆς βαρέα καὶ νωθρά, τῇ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος εὐκίνητα, εἰ <ἐν> προαιρέσει τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

69.38 I.49.69.38

Ὅσα δὲ πλείονος μὲν ὑγροῦ, ὀλίγου δὲ ξηροῦ, ταῦτα ἀπιχθύωται καὶ τῇ μὲν τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀέρος στερήσει δειλά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ περιουσίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ γεώδους παρουσίᾳ ἐν λελυμένῃ γῇ καὶ ὕδατι διὰ τὸ συγγενὲς κατοικεῖ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.36 · The composition of wild beasts

I.49.69.36

"Those sharing in more water, more earth, a moderate amount of breath, [and] little fire have become wild beasts; through their surplus of heat they have become more vigorous than the others."[1897]

69.37 · The composition of creeping creatures

I.49.69.37

"Those sharing equally in earth and water have become creeping creatures. Through lack of fire they have become timid and without boldness; through their share of water, cold; through their share of earth, heavy and sluggish; and through their share of breath, readily moved, if movement lies <within> their choice."[1898]

69.38 · The composition of fish

I.49.69.38

"Those sharing in more moisture and little dryness have become fish. Through lack of heat and air they too are timid; through their abundance of moisture and the presence of earth, they dwell in dissolved earth and water because of their kinship with them."[1899]

1897. The rejected kai is retained in brackets. The text speaks of little fire and then a surplus of heat, without specifying the comparison in the latter phrase. Both statements are preserved rather than harmonized by altering the quantities.

1898. Aphērpetōtai is the printed correction for becoming creeping creatures. Aparrēsiasta literally lacks frankness or freedom of speech and is applied figuratively here. Eukinēta, readily moved, is retained, despite the apparatus's alternative difficult to move. The supplied en is marked.

1899. The text contrasts moist and dry here rather than simply repeating the four elemental names. It distinguishes periousia, abundance, from parousia, presence, following the printed correction. Dissolved earth and water is retained as the description of the fish's congenial dwelling.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.39 I.49.69.39

Καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἑκάστου στοιχείου μοῖραν καὶ τῆς μοίρας τὴν περιοχήν καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡλικιάζεται· καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγομετρίαν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα μεμετροποίηται, πρὸς ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἑκάστῳ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσιομετρίαν.

69.40 I.49.69.40

Καὶ ἔτι, ὦ παῖ περιπόθητε, λέγω, ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης οὕτω συστάσεως ἡ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνοδον γενομένη κρᾶσις καὶ ὁ ἐκ ταύτης ἀναθυμιώμενος ἀτμὸς ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τὴν ἰδίαν τηρήσουσιν ἰδιότητα, ὥστε τὸ μὲν θερμὸν ἕτερον μὴ λαβεῖν θερμόν, μηδὲ τὸ ἀερῶδες πνεῦμα ἕτερον, μηδὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἑτέραν ὑγρασίαν, μηδὲ τὸ γεῶδες ἑτέραν πυκνότητα, τὸ τηνικαῦτα τὸ ζῷον ὑγιαίνει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.39 · Quantity and bodily development

I.49.69.39

“Bodies too develop in age and size according to the portion of each element and the extent of that portion; the other living creatures have been fashioned to measure according to the smallness of their proportions, with regard to the activity corresponding to the measure of substance in each element.”[1900]

69.40 · Health and the original blend

I.49.69.40

“Further, much-loved child, I say that, from a constitution formed in this way, so long as the blend produced at the first conjunction and the vapor exhaled from it preserve their own character, the creature is healthy: the hot element must receive no further heat, the airy no additional breath, the moist no additional moisture, and the earthy no additional density.”[1901]

1900. The editor explicitly leaves these lines unexplained; this English is provisional. Hēlikiazetai suggests growth in age or stature, while the unusual metropoiein and ousiometria concern measuring or proportioning. The syntax of the final phrase is uncertain, and the translation should not be treated as a settled reconstruction.

1901. The printed phrase ek tautēs houtō systaseōs is awkward and is rendered provisionally. In to aerōdes pneuma heteron, the airy is the subject and additional breath the object, as the apparatus explains. The account defines health as preservation of the initial mixture’s qualities.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.41 I.49.69.41

Ἐπὰν γὰρ μὴ οὕτως μένῃ, ὦ τέκνον, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔσχεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέτροις, ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι πλεονάσῃ ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγω <τῇ> κατὰ περιοχήν οὐδὲ τῇ κατ᾽ αὔξησιν γινομένῃ μεταβολῇ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὡς προέφαμεν συστατικῇ τῶν στοιχείων κράσει, ὥστε τὸ μὲν θερμὸν ἐπὶ πλέον αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐλαττωθῆναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, <τὸ> τηνικαῦτα [οὕτως] νοσεῖ τὸ ζῷον.

69.42 I.49.69.42

Ἐπὰν γὰρ οὕτως διατεθῇ τό τε θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ἀερῶδες, ἃ δὴ σύσκηνά ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τότε ἐν ἀλληγορίαις καὶ ἐκστάσεσι γίγνεται τὸ ζῷον· πεπύκνωται γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα, δι᾽ ὧν διαφθείρεται τὰ σώματα.

69.43 I.49.69.43

Αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ γεῶδές ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ σώματος πῆξις, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν εἰς συμπαγίαν περίχυσις, τὸ δὲ ἀερῶδές ἐστι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων πάντων διεγερτικὸν τὸ πῦρ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.41 · Alteration of the blend and illness

I.49.69.41

“For when it no longer remains within the measures it had at first, my child, but these increase, I mean not through <the> activity affecting extent, nor through the change of kind and bodies that occurs with growth, but through the constitutive blend of the elements, as we said before, so that heat increases too much or diminishes too much, and the other elements likewise, <at> that time [in this way] the creature becomes ill.”[1902]

69.42 · Disturbance of soul and body

I.49.69.42

“When the hot and airy elements, which share the soul’s dwelling, are affected in this way, the creature falls into confused utterances and states of derangement; for the elements have become dense, and through them bodies are damaged.”[1903]

69.43 · The work of each element

I.49.69.43

“The earthy element itself is the body’s consolidation; the moist is the fluid spread within it to hold it together; the airy is the source of movement in us; and fire awakens all these.”[1904]

1902. The two supplements and the rejected houtōs are marked. The contrast between activity affecting extent, growth, and the constitutive blend is difficult; the English follows the printed words provisionally. The clause initially speaks of increase but then explicitly includes excessive diminution as well.

1903. Allēgoriai usually means figurative or indirect expressions; confused utterances is a provisional contextual rendering alongside ekstaseis, states of displacement or derangement. The Greek is retained without substituting a medical term. Syskēna literally describes sharing a tent or dwelling with the soul.

1904. This recapitulates the four elements’ functions. Pēxis again means consolidation or solidity, and sympagia cohesion. Perichysis is a pouring or spreading around. The text assigns movement specifically to the airy element and general stimulation to fire.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.44 I.49.69.44

Τοιγαροῦν ὁ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συνόδου καὶ κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων γιγνόμενος ἀτμὸς καὶ ὠσανεὶ ἔξαψις καὶ ἀναθυμίασις[, ὁποῖος ἂν ᾖ,] παραμιγεὶς τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγει αὐτὴν εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἂν ἔχῃ φύσεως, εἴτε σπουδαίως, εἴτε μή.

69.45 I.49.69.45

Τῇ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν οἰκειότητι καὶ συντροφίᾳ ἐπιμένουσα ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν τάξιν διατηρεῖ.

69.46 I.49.69.46

Ὅταν δὲ ἐπιπροσγένηται ἤτοι τῷ ὅλῳ συγκράματι ἢ καὶ μέρεσιν ἢ μέρει αὐτοῦ ἔξωθέν τις πλείων μοῖρα τοῦ προκαταβεβλημένου, τότε καὶ ὁ ἐντεῦθεν μεταλλοιούμενος ἀτμὸς μεταλλοιοῖ ἤτοι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν ἢ τὴν τοῦ σώματος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.44 · The vapor draws the soul to itself

I.49.69.44

“Accordingly, the vapor produced from the first conjunction and blending of the elements, a kind of kindling and exhalation[, whatever its character,], mixes with the soul and draws it toward itself according to its own natural condition, whether good or otherwise.”[1905]

69.45 · Preserving the original relation

I.49.69.45

“For by remaining in its original affinity and shared nurture with that vapor, the soul preserves its proper order.”[1906]

69.46 · Additions from outside

I.49.69.46

“But when a further quantity beyond what was originally established is added from outside, whether to the entire compound, to several of its parts, or to one part, the vapor altered in consequence changes either the condition of the soul or that of the body.”[1907]

1905. The rejected phrase remains bracketed, including the source’s adjacent punctuation. Exapsis suggests kindling or ignition and is qualified by as it were. Autēn refers to the soul, while heauton refers to the vapor. The vapor’s character is the provisional subject of the final qualification.

1906. Oikeiotēs is affinity or a familiar relationship; syntrophia is being brought up or nourished together. The masculine auton points back to the vapor. Proper makes explicit the orderly condition implied by maintaining the taxis, without adding a new region to the earlier cosmology.

1907. The alternatives whole compound, several parts, and one part are all retained. The phrase pleiōn moira tou prokatabeblēmenou is taken comparatively, a greater quantity than the original amount. The source says either soul or body, rather than the and found in some witnesses.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.47 I.49.69.47

Τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀνωφερῆ ὄντα, ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ὁμοιόχωρον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχουσαν, ἀνατρέχει· τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ γεῶδες, κατωφερῆ ὄντα, τῷ σώματι, ὁμοιέδρῳ ὄντι, ἐφιζάνει.

BOOK I CHAPTER 49

69.47 · Upward and downward affinities I.49.69.47

“For fire and breath, tending upward, rise toward the soul, which shares their region; moisture and earth, tending downward, settle upon the body, which shares their seat.”[1908]

1908. Homoiochōron and homoiedron describe a common region and seat respectively. The elemental directions explain why an altered mixture can affect soul or body. This completes excerpt 69 and chapter 49 at printed p. 472 line 2; chapter 50 begins on the same page.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

Κεφάλαιον Ν′ I.50.heading

Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις.

1 I.50.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Ἐπίκουρος· τό <τε> μόριόν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἥτις ἐστί<ν ἡ> δύναμις, καὶ τὸ ἐπαίσθημα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε διχῶς παρ᾽ αὐτῷ λέγεσθαι αἴσθησιν μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸ ἐνέργημα.

2a I.50.2a

<Ἀετίου.>

Πλάτων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποφαίνεται ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον σώματος, ἄμφω δὲ διὰ φαντασίας ἀντιληπτικὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

Chapter 50 · On perception

I.50.heading

On perception, perceptible things, and whether perceptions are true.[1909]

1 · Capacity and activity

I.50.1

<Aëtius.>

Epicurus: perception is <both> the part, which is <the> capacity, and the perceptual experience, which is the activity. Thus he uses the term in two ways, calling both the capacity and the activity perception.[1910]

2a · Soul and body in partnership

I.50.2a

<Aëtius.>

Plato declares perception to be a partnership of soul and body directed toward external things. For the capacity belongs to the soul, the instrument to the body, and both apprehend external things through an impression.[1911]

1909. The editor restores this heading from Photius and the Laurentian table of contents; it is absent from the three witnesses designated FPL. Aisthēsis can mean the capacity for perception, an act of perceiving, or a particular sense. The chapter collects differing accounts, without requiring agreement among them. Decimal subdivisions within longer excerpts are modern comparison divisions.

1910. The supplied attribution is printed in Latin, with the locator Aëtius IV.8.2, Diels p. 394. The compressed wording identifies perception with a part, morion, and with its experienced activity; part is retained rather than silently replaced by organ. The two textual supplements are marked; the second includes a Greek final n as well as the article translated the.

1911. The editor supplies Aëtius IV.8.3, Diels p. 394. Koinōnia is participation or partnership; the report assigns different functions to soul and body. Phantasia is here impression or presentation, without the implication that its object is imaginary. The printed numbering 2a and 2b is preserved.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

2b I.50.2b

Λέγει δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ ὧδε·

“Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοιο ἄν;

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.”

3 I.50.3

<Ἀετίου.>

Κατὰ τοὺς Περιπατητικοὺς τετραχῶς· ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, δι᾽ οὗ τὸ ὄργανον καὶ αἰσθητήριον, καθ᾽ ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ <οὗ> ἕνεκα τὸ αἰσθητόν.

4 I.50.4

Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἑτεροιώσεις εἶναι τοῦ σώματος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

2b · A shared movement I.50.2b

And he says as follows in the Philebus:

“When soul and body come together in a single affection and are also moved together, would you not speak appropriately in calling this movement perception?”

“What you say is entirely true.”[1912]

3 · Four aspects of perception I.50.3

<Aëtius.>

According to the Peripatetics, it is understood in four ways: that from which it proceeds, the ruling part; that through which it occurs, the instrument and sense organ; that in accordance with which it occurs, the activity; and that <for whose> sake it occurs, the perceptible object.[1913]

4 · Changes of the body I.50.4

Leucippus and Democritus hold that perceptions and acts of thought are alterations of the body.[1914]

1912. The edition identifies Philebus 34a. Pathos means an affection or something undergone, not necessarily an emotion or suffering. The English untangles the compressed infinitive construction while retaining both shared affection and shared movement. The change of speaker is shown by a new paragraph.

1913. The supplied group attribution covers excerpts 3-6: Aëtius IV.8.4-7, Diels p. 394. The Greek gives four compressed relations rather than four complete definitions. Hēgemonikon is the ruling or governing part. The supplied hou completes the final relation, for whose sake; its counterpart is marked in English.

1914. Heteroiōseis are changes or alterations. The report places both sensing and thinking in the same bodily category; it does not here describe the mechanism of that change. A fuller account through incoming images follows in excerpt 12.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

5.1 I.50.5.1

Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσιν αἰσθητοῦ καὶ μεσότητα· κοινὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν τὴν τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη <φαντασίας>, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου εἰς ἕτερον οἷον σχήματος <καὶ> κινήσεως σώματος,

5.2 I.50.5.2

ἐν μεθορίῳ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, μνήμης καὶ νοῦ μετέχουσα, διατείνουσα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, καθὸ ποσὴν διανοίας ἀναλογίαν ἔχει· κοινὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὄψεως μὲν καὶ ἁφῆς σχῆμα, ὄψεως δὲ καὶ ἀκοῆς διάστημα, πασῶν δὲ κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός.

6 I.50.6

<Οἱ> Στωικοὶ τήνδε τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ἐντὸς ἀφὴν προσαγορεύουσι, καθ᾽ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

5.1 · The common sense

I.50.5.1

Aristotle holds that perception is an alteration of what is perceptible and a mean; and that common perception is the faculty that judges composite forms. To it all the simple senses contribute, each its own <impressions>, and in it resides the capacity to pass from one thing to another, for example between a body's shape <and> movement.[1915]

5.2 · Objects shared by the senses

I.50.5.2

It lies on the boundary between the rational and the nonrational, sharing in memory and intellect, and extends also to nonrational animals insofar as it possesses a certain analogy to thought. Shape is common to sight and touch; distance to sight and hearing; and movement, magnitude, and number to all the senses.[1916]

6 · An inward touch

I.50.6

<The> Stoics call this common perception an inward touch, by which we apprehend ourselves as well.[1917]

1915. Common perception, often called the common sense, here combines and judges what the individual senses supply. It does not mean ordinary practical good judgment. The difficult genitive aisthētou is retained as of what is perceptible, and mesotēs as a mean. Both printed supplements are marked; no gap is added after mean.

1916. The participles continue to describe common perception. The phrase posēn dianoias analogian indicates some resemblance to thought, without identifying animal perception with fully rational thinking. Every shared object in the printed list is retained; the account is the excerpt's own classification.

1917. The supplied article is retained. Inward touch translates entos haphēn: the report uses tactile language for awareness directed within, including awareness of oneself. This closes the group of excerpts attributed to Aëtius IV.8.4-7.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

7 I.50.7

<Ἀετίου.>

†πελλῆς πλείους αἰσθήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα.

8 I.50.8

<Ἀετίου.>

Δημόκριτος πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἀναλογίζειν τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῷ πλήθει λανθάνειν.

9 I.50.9

Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι παρίσους.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

7 · An uncertain attribution I.50.7

<Aëtius.>

†Pellēs holds that there are more senses in nonrational animals.[1918]

8 · Senses without corresponding objects I.50.8

<Aëtius.>

Democritus holds that the senses are more numerous than perceptible objects, but go unnoticed because the perceptible objects do not correspond to them in number.[1919]

9 · Equal numbers I.50.9

The others hold that they are equal in number.[1920]

1918. The name is corrupt: the single printed dagger is retained, and Pellēs merely transliterates the surviving letters. The apparatus discusses Aristotle and tentatively Empedocles, but neither is installed in the text. More lacks an explicit comparison. The editor supplies Aëtius IV.10.3, Diels p. 399; alternative interpretations of the sentence remain unresolved.

1919. The supplied attribution covers excerpts 8-9: Aëtius IV.10.5-6, Diels p. 399. The construction is compressed; the English provisionally takes the senses as the subject of go unnoticed. It retains the printed comparison and does not reverse it to make the objects more numerous. The force of analogizein, correspond, is uncertain.

1920. The sentence supplies only the contrast others and the adjective equal. Its two terms are understood from excerpt 8: senses and perceptible objects. The report does not identify these other thinkers individually.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

10 I.50.10

<Ἀετίου.>

Οἱ Στωικοὶ σωμάτων τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

11 I.50.11

Οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτων λόγων ἅπερ ἤδη σχήματα προσαγορεύουσι.

12 I.50.12

Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

10 · Perception of bodies I.50.10

<Aëtius.>

The Stoics hold that perceptions are of bodies.[1921]

11 · Incorporeal structures I.50.11

The followers of the ancients hold that perceptions are of the incorporeal structures associated with bodies, which they call shapes.[1922]

12 · Images arriving from outside I.50.12

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus hold that perception and thought arise through images approaching from outside. For neither engages with anything without something impinging upon it.[1923]

1921. The supplied group attribution covers excerpts 10-16: Aëtius IV.8.8-14, Diels p. 395. The genitive sōmatōn identifies the objects of perception as bodies; it does not by itself say that the perceptions are bodies. The following report offers a different account of what is perceived.

1922. Logoi is provisionally structures, a term broad enough to include formal relations or configurations. The verb and perceptions are understood from excerpt 10. The printed reference to the ancients is retained. The neuter relative haper does not agree straightforwardly with masculine logōn, and the compressed construction remains difficult.

1923. Eidōla are images; in this report they arrive from outside and occasion both perception and thought. The final phrase leaves the impinging thing unnamed. Image would fit the context, but it is not added to the Greek. Neither refers to the two activities just named.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

13 I.50.13

Οἱ ἄλλοι εἰδῶν ἢ σχημάτων ἑτεροιώσει <ἢ> ἐν ψυχῇ τυπώσει, ἀπορροίαις πάντως μᾶλλον ἢ εἰδώλοις.

14 I.50.14

Οἱ Στωικοὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ κατάληψιν.

15 I.50.15

Οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ μὴ εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις μήτε καταλήψεις μήτε συγκαταθέσεις.

16 I.50.16

Οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν συγκαταθέσεως τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οὐ μέντοι συγκαταθέσεις.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

13 · Alteration or impression I.50.13

Others hold that these arise through an alteration of forms or shapes <or> an imprint in the soul, at any rate through effluences rather than images.[1924]

14 · Assent and apprehension I.50.14

The Stoics hold that every perception is an assent and an apprehension.[1925]

15 · Neither apprehension nor assent I.50.15

The Academics hold that perceptions are neither apprehensions nor assents.[1926]

16 · Accompanied by assent I.50.16

The Peripatetics hold that perceptions do not occur without assent, but are not themselves assents.[1927]

1924. The omitted subjects, perception and thought, continue from excerpt 12. The supplied or separates alteration from imprinting in the soul. The relation of the final phrase to these alternatives is compressed and provisionally rendered. Effluences translates aporrhoiai, things flowing away from a source; the Greek distinguishes them here from eidōla, images.

1925. Synkatathesis is assent, acceptance of what is presented; katalēpsis is apprehension or a cognitive grasp. Both are predicated of every perception in this compressed report. The next two excerpts distinguish alternative relations between perception and assent.

1926. This is a denial that perception itself is either of the two things asserted in excerpt 14. It does not here deny that perception occurs. Academics names members of the Academy collectively; no particular thinker or period is specified.

1927. The distinction is between accompaniment and identity. On this report, assent is necessary to perception, yet perception and assent are not the same activity. The three reports in excerpts 14-16 are retained in their sharply contrasting form.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

17 I.50.17

<Ἀετίου.>

Πυθαγόρας, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ξενοφάνης, Παρμενίδης, Ζήνων, Μέλισσος, Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Μητρόδωρος, Πρωταγόρας, Πλάτων ψευδεῖς εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

18 I.50.18

Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ὑγιεῖς μέν, ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε λαβεῖν ἀληθεῖς φαντασίας, οὐ μὴν ἀκριβεῖς.

19 I.50.19

Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αἴσθησιν μὴ πλανᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ ἴδιον, περὶ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός.

20 I.50.20

Οἱ Στωικοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

17 · Perceptions called false I.50.17

<Aëtius.>

Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Metrodorus, Protagoras, and Plato hold that perceptions are false.[1928]

18 · Sound but not exact I.50.18

Those of the Academy hold that perceptions are sound, since through them it is possible to receive true impressions, but that they are not exact.[1929]

19 · Proper and incidental objects I.50.19

Aristotle holds that perception does not err concerning its proper object, but does err concerning what is incidental.[1930]

20 · Perception and impression distinguished I.50.20

The Stoics hold that perceptions are true, but that some impressions are true and others false.[1931]

1928. The supplied attribution covers excerpts 17-24: Aëtius IV.9.1-8, Diels p. 396 and following. All eleven names are retained. This exceptionally compressed grouping does not preserve the qualifications of each thinker's position. It should be read as the collector's report, not as a substitute for the more extended arguments quoted later in the chapter.

1929. Hygiēs, literally healthy, is rendered sound; akribēs is exact or precise. The distinction allows perception to yield true impressions without giving it unqualified accuracy. The report speaks of possibility, not of every impression being true.

1930. The proper object, to idion, belongs specifically to the sense in question; the incidental, to symbebēkos, is something associated with what is sensed. The report distinguishes their reliability rather than declaring every judgment prompted by a sense infallible.

1931. The distinction depends on treating aisthēseis and phantasiai as different categories. Impression is broader here than a particular act of sensing. The report's categorical assertion about perceptions remains alongside the qualifications applied to impressions.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

21.1 I.50.21.1

Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ, τῶν δὲ δοξῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς.

21.2 I.50.21.2

Καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μοναχῶς ψευδοποιεῖται κατὰ νοητά, ἡ δὲ φαντασία διχῶς [νοεῖται]· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν.

22 I.50.22

Παρμενίδης, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος, Ἡρακλείδης παρὰ τὰς συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων τὰς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι τοῦ οἰκείου, τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστου ἑκάστῃ ἐναρμόττοντος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

21.1 · Epicurus on perception and belief I.50.21.1

Epicurus holds that every perception and every impression is true, but that some beliefs are true and others false.[1932]

21.2 · A difficult explanatory addition I.50.21.2

And perception is made false in one way, in relation to objects of thought, whereas impression [is understood] in two ways; for there is an impression both of perceptible things and of objects of thought.[1933]

22 · The fit between object and passage I.50.22

Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heraclides hold that the particular senses perceive their appropriate objects through the commensurability of the passages, each perceptible object fitting its corresponding sense.[1934]

1932. Doxai, beliefs or opinions, form the fallible category in this report. The words every perception and every impression are explicit and are both retained. The next sentence creates a difficulty for this claim; its textual status is discussed in the following note.

1933. The sense and attachment of this sentence are uncertain. The apparatus records Usener's view that it is a gloss belonging to the preceding Stoic report. Wachsmuth prints it here, rejecting only noeîtai, is understood; those brackets are preserved. The verb after whereas remains elliptical when the rejected words are removed. The English is provisional and does not conceal the tension with the preceding assertion.

1934. Poroi are pores or passages, and symmetriai are correspondences of measure or proportion. The mechanism is explained through a fit between the object and the receptive passage. The report groups six names together without giving each thinker a separate version of this account.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

23 I.50.23

Οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ παρὰ τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν αἰσθητηρίων.

24.1 I.50.24.1

Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φύσει τὰ αἰσθητά, Λεύκιππος δέ, Δημόκριτος καὶ Διογένης νόμῳ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ δόξῃ καὶ πάθει τοῖς ἡμετέροις·

24.2 I.50.24.2

μηδὲν δ᾽ εἶναι ἀληθὲς μηδὲ καταληπτὸν ἐκτὸς τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, ἀτόμων καὶ κενοῦ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι μόνα φύσει, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, θέσει καὶ τάξει καὶ σχήματι διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων, συμβεβηκότα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

23 · The faculties of the sense organs I.50.23

The Peripatetics hold that this occurs through the faculties of the sense organs.[1935]

24.1 · Nature and convention I.50.24.1

Others hold that perceptible things exist by nature; Leucippus, Democritus, and Diogenes that they exist by convention, that is, through our own opinion and affection.[1936]

24.2 · Atoms, void, and compounds I.50.24.2

Nothing is true or apprehensible except the primary elements, atoms and void. For these alone exist by nature, while the things composed of them, differing from one another in position, arrangement, and shape, are incidental.[1937]

1935. This occurs supplies the activity stated in excerpt 22, the particular senses' perception of their appropriate objects. The brief contrast shifts the explanation from proportional passages to the capacities belonging to the organs themselves.

1936. Nomōi is convention, here immediately explained through our opinion and what we undergo. The English retains this explanatory gloss rather than treating convention solely as an agreed social rule. Perceptible things is the printed expression, though the contrast concerns the status of what appears to our senses.

1937. The claim continues the account attributed to the three named thinkers in excerpt 24.1. Position, arrangement, and shape are distinct terms in the source and remain distinct here. Symbebēkota is rendered incidental, retaining the contrast with what exists by nature rather than supplying an unprinted account of compounds as unreal.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

25 I.50.25

<Ἀετίου.>

Παρμενίδης, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐλλείψει τροφῆς τὴν ὄρεξιν.

26 I.50.26

<Ἀετίου.>

Οἱ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ οἱ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἀμερῆ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα πάντ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀναμεμίχθαι καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν εἰλικρινὲς ὑπάρχειν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπικρατείας ὀνομάζεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον καὶ παρὰ τὴν πολυαύγειαν.

27 I.50.27

Πυθαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων καθαρὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἑκάστου στοιχείου προερχόμενον. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν ὅρασιν τὸ αἰθερῶδες πεφυκέναι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὸ πνευματικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν τὸ πυρῶδες, πρὸς δὲ τὴν γεῦσιν τὸ ὑγρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν τὸ γεῶδες.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

25 · Appetite and deficiency I.50.25

<Aëtius.>

Parmenides and Empedocles hold that appetite arises from a lack of nourishment.[1938]

26 · Mixture and predominance I.50.26

<Aëtius.>

Those who posit atoms, those who posit things with like parts, and those who posit partless things and minima hold that all perceptible things are mixed in all things and none is unmixed. Each is called this or that according to what predominates and according to its abundance of radiance.[1939]

27 · Senses and elements I.50.27

Pythagoras and Plato hold that each perceptible thing is pure, proceeding from its respective element. The ethereal is naturally suited to sight, the pneumatic to hearing, the fiery to smell, the moist to taste, and the earthy to touch.[1940]

1938. The editor supplies Aëtius IV.9.14, Diels p. 399. Orexis is appetite or desire directed toward something; here the lack of nourishment specifies its setting. No missing text is marked after this brief sentence, although an earlier editor had proposed a gap there.

1939. The supplied attribution covers excerpts 26-30: Aëtius IV.9.9-13, Diels p. 397 and following. Posit supplies the verb understood with the opening groups, as the apparatus explains. Homoiomerē means things with like parts. The final polyaugeia literally suggests abundant radiance or brightness; its precise role here is unclear, and the translation is provisional.

1940. This report contrasts pure elemental sources with the mixtures of excerpt 26. Pneumatic means pertaining to breath or pneuma. All five printed correspondences are retained, including the ethereal with sight and the fiery with smell; they have not been exchanged to fit another elemental scheme.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

28 I.50.28

Ἐπίκουρος τῶν αἰσθητῶν <τὰς> ἡδονὰς ἤδη καὶ τὰς λύπας.

29 I.50.29

Οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν νοητῶν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ἡδέα τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καθάπερ λευκά τε καὶ μέλανα.

30 I.50.30

Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπῖπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

28 · Pleasures and pains as perceptible I.50.28

Epicurus counts <the> pleasures, and pains as well, among perceptible things.[1941]

29 · Pleasures and pains as objects of thought I.50.29

The Peripatetics count them among objects of thought; for the same things do not appear pleasant and painful to everyone, as they do white and black.[1942]

30 · Pleasure in general and in particular I.50.30

Chrysippus holds that the pleasant in general is an object of thought, but the particular pleasant thing that impinges upon us is perceptible.[1943]

1941. The supplied article is marked. The brief report classifies pleasure and pain by the way they are apprehended. The following two excerpts distinguish objects of thought from particular sensible experiences.

1942. Them refers to pleasures and pains. The argument contrasts variability in what gives pleasure or pain with the assumed agreement about white and black. That assumption belongs to this short report and should not be imposed upon the later Plato passage examining variation in appearances.

1943. The printed attribution is Chrysippus; the apparatus records a different name in the manuscript. Genikon and eidikon distinguish the general from the specific or particular. Prospipton stresses the immediate occurrence or impact of the particular experience.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

31 I.50.31

<Ἀετίου.>

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰς ἡδονὰς γίνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ὁμοίοις [τῶν ὁμοίων], κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν, ὥστε τῷ ἐλλείποντι ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὰς δ᾽ ἀλγηδόνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἠλλοτριῶσθαι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὅσα διαφέρει κατά τε τὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ τὴν τῶν στοιχείων κρᾶσιν.

32 I.50.32

Ἀναξαγόρας πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν μετὰ πόνου.

33 I.50.33

Οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἤτοι ἡδονὴν ἢ πόνον οὐδὲ συμπεφυκέναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

31 · Pleasure through likeness and replenishment I.50.31

<Aëtius.>

Empedocles holds that pleasures arise with like things [of like things] and, where something is deficient, in relation to replenishment, so that what is deficient has an appetite for what is like it. Pains arise with opposites; for things differing in composition and in the blending of their elements are alien to one another.[1944]

32 · Perception accompanied by pain I.50.32

Anaxagoras holds that every perception is accompanied by pain.[1945]

33 · Pleasure or pain added afterward I.50.33

Others hold that either pleasure or pain supervenes and is not inherent from the outset.[1946]

1944. The supplied attribution covers excerpts 31-35: Aëtius IV.9.15-20, Diels p. 398 and following, as printed. The rejected tōn homoiōn, of like things, remains bracketed. The opening syntax is compressed and provisionally translated. Synkrisis is composition or combination; krasis is blending. The account links affinity with pleasure and unlike composition with pain.

1945. Ponos can denote pain, distress, or exertion. Pain fits the contrast with pleasure in the adjoining reports. The sentence asserts accompaniment, not that pain and perception are identical.

1946. Epigignesthai means to come upon or be added afterward; sympephykenai suggests having grown together by nature. The printed correction distinguishes an added accompaniment from an inseparable original feature. The unnamed others contrast with Anaxagoras in excerpt 32.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

34 I.50.34

Οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν σοφὸν αἰσθήσει καταληπτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τεκμηριωδῶς· οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ λόγῳ γνώριμον· Ἐπίκουρος σοφῷ μόνῳ τὸν σοφόν.

35 I.50.35

Δημόκριτος τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι.

36.1 I.50.36.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικεν εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω δύ᾽ ὄντε·

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

34 · Recognizing the wise person I.50.34

The Stoics hold that the wise person can be apprehended by perception, inferentially from appearance; the Academics that the wise person is known by reason; Epicurus that the wise person is known only to a wise person.[1947]

35 · Perception in dead bodies I.50.35

Democritus holds that dead bodies perceive.[1948]

36.1 · Pleasure and pain joined together I.50.36.1

From Plato's Phaedo.

"How strange, gentlemen," he said, "this thing that people call pleasant seems to be! How remarkably it is related to what is thought to be its opposite, the painful: the two refuse to visit a person together, yet if someone pursues and obtains one, he is almost always compelled to obtain the other as well, as though they were two creatures attached to a single head."[1949]

1947. Tekmēriōdōs indicates recognition by evidence or signs, qualifying the Stoic appeal to visible appearance. The final known is understood from the Academic clause, as the editor explains; no gap or new Greek verb is inserted. The three claims concern recognition of wisdom, not merely recognition of a person's bodily identity.

1948. The terse report gives neither explanation nor qualification. The Greek says that dead bodies perceive; it does not specify which senses or how long such perception would persist. This closes the sequence of short reports before the extended quotations from Plato.

1949. The edition identifies Phaedo 60b-c. The speaker's bodily experience is disclosed at the end of the excerpt. The Greek dual forms make pleasure and pain a pair; the imagined creatures and joined head personify their close succession, despite their refusal to be present together.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

36.2 I.50.36.2

κἀμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτῶν τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον.

36.3 I.50.36.3

Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

37.1 I.50.37.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Θεαιτήτου.

Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις· οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. . . . .

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

36.2 · An imagined fable of Aesop

I.50.36.2

“And I think,” he said, “that if Aesop had thought of them, he would have composed a fable: the god wanted to reconcile them in their quarrel, but, unable to do so, fastened their heads together; and for this reason, whenever one visits someone, the other follows afterward.”[1950]

36.3 · Relief after the fetter

I.50.36.3

“That seems to be what has happened to me too: because the fetter caused pain in my leg, pleasure now seems to have arrived in its wake.”[1951]

37.1 · Appearance and perception

I.50.37.1

From Plato’s Theaetetus.

“Appearance and perception, then, are the same in the case of hot things and all such things; for as each person perceives them, so they seem likely to be for that person. . . . .”[1952]

1950. This is an imagined fable that Aesop might have composed, not an assertion that he actually wrote one. The conditional form is preserved. The joining of heads supplies a playful explanation for the succession of pleasure and pain described in the preceding paragraph.

1951. The personal example explains the preceding reflection: release from the painful fetter brings a pleasant bodily sensation. The source prints to algein, the experiencing of pain, rather than the alternative adjective recorded in the apparatus. The English retains the sequence rather than treating pleasure and pain as simultaneous.

1952. The edition gives Theaetetus 152c and 153d-154b: the five printed points mark the omission between the two selections. Phantasia is rendered appearance here because the argument concerns how things appear to each perceiver. The passage explores a position in dialogue; it should not simply be labeled Plato’s final conclusion.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

37.2 I.50.37.2

Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐτωσὶ καὶ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον· ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν᾽ αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τέ ἄν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

37.3 I.50.37.3

Ἐποίμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

37.2 · Where is the color? I.50.37.2

“Consider the eyes first in this way, my excellent friend: what you call the color white is not itself a separate thing outside your eyes, nor is it in the eyes. Do not assign it a place; for then it would occupy a position and remain there, and would not be coming into being.”

“But how, then?”[1953]

37.3 · Color arising in the encounter I.50.37.3

“Let us follow the argument just given, assuming that nothing is one thing by itself. In this way black, white, and any other color will appear to us to have arisen from the eyes’ encounter with the corresponding motion. What we call each color will be neither what strikes nor what is struck, but something that has arisen between them, peculiar to each perceiver.”[1954]

1953. The proposed account contrasts a fixed location and enduring state with becoming. The question introduces the explanation in the next unit. The awkward repeated an in the printed Greek is retained; the English expresses its potential force without reproducing the repetition mechanically.

1954. The explanation treats color as arising in an encounter, not as located wholly in either participant. Prosēkousan phoran is rendered corresponding motion, stressing the fit between the eyes and the motion. The final each means each perceiver. The printed optative epoimetha is retained, rather than replaced by the alternative form noted from Plato.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

37.4 I.50.37.4

ἢ σὺ διισχυρίσαι᾽ ἂν ὡς οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτῳοῦν ζῴῳ;

Μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν, ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

Τοῦτο μᾶλλον δοκεῖ μοι ἢ ἐκεῖνο.

37.5 I.50.37.5

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα, ἢ οἷ ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ τὸ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἤ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἂν ἄλλο ἐγένετο.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

37.4 · Different perceivers and changing appearances I.50.37.4

“Or would you insist that each color appears to a dog or any other animal just as it appears to you?”

“By Zeus, I certainly would not.”

“Well, are you firmly convinced that anything appears the same to another person as to you? Or is it much more the case that it does not appear the same even to you, since you yourself are never in exactly the same condition?”

“The latter seems more likely to me than the former.”[1955]

37.5 · Qualities and changing relations I.50.37.5

“Then if that against which we measure ourselves, or which we touch, were large or white or hot, it would never have become something different by encountering something else while itself undergoing no change. And if, in turn, the thing measuring itself or doing the touching were any of these, it would not itself become different without undergoing anything merely because something else approached or was affected in some way.”[1956]

1955. The argument moves from differences between species to differences between people and then to changes within one perceiver. The oath and each exchange are retained. The question concerns certainty about sameness of appearance; the answer is comparative, favoring one account over the other.

1956. The two halves examine both participants in the relation. The argument tests whether a quality belongs to either participant in itself, when its appearance can change with the other participant. The construction of parametroumenon is provisionally taken in the middle sense, measuring itself against something, in parallel with doing the touching.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

38.1 I.50.38.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ. Λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. Οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆειμεν λόγον, ὥστε παντὸς μᾶλλον ἂν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

38.2 I.50.38.2

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται;

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

38.1 · Dreams and mistaken perceptions I.50.38.1

In the same work.

“Let us not leave out what remains of the account. There remain dreams, other illnesses, madness, and everything called mishearing, misseeing, or some other mistaken perception. You surely know that all these are generally thought to refute the argument we have just been going through: in such cases our perceptions would above all be false, and it is far from true that the things appearing to each person actually are so. Quite the reverse: none of what appears is so.”[1957]

38.2 · The challenge to perception as knowledge I.50.38.2

“What you say is entirely true, Socrates.”

“What argument, then, my boy, remains for someone who maintains that perception is knowledge, and that what appears to each person is so for the person to whom it appears?”[1958]

1957. The edition identifies Theaetetus 157c. The passage introduces an objection to the position being examined. The series of compounds beginning para- marks hearing, sight, and other perception going astray. Its examples belong to the ancient philosophical argument; no modern diagnostic classification is implied.

1958. The response names Socrates as the questioner. Two connected claims are challenged: the identification of perception with knowledge, and the truth for each perceiver of what appears to that perceiver. The excerpt ends with the question; no subsequent answer is supplied here.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 50

39.1 I.50.39.1

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι. . . . .

39.2 I.50.39.2

Πολλαχῇ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη μὴ πᾶσαν πάντως ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς.

40 I.50.40

Ἐν ταὐτῷ.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

39.1 · Expertise and the measure I.50.39.1

In the same work.

“We shall then have made a measured case against your teacher: he must admit both that one person is wiser than another and that such a person is a measure, whereas there is no necessity whatever for me, lacking knowledge, to become a measure. . . . .”[1959]

39.2 · Present experiences are harder to refute I.50.39.2

“In many other ways too, Theodorus, the position could be caught out to this extent: not every belief is invariably true. But concerning each person’s present affection, from which perceptions and the corresponding beliefs arise, it is harder to establish that these are not true.”[1960]

40 · A conclusion still withheld I.50.40

In the same work.

“Then, Theodorus, we have finished with your companion, and we do not yet concede to him that every person is the measure of all things.”[1961]

1959. The edition identifies Theaetetus 179a-b and c; the five points mark an omission between selections. The contrast is between a knowledgeable person’s authority and an unqualified appeal to anyone as a measure. The Greek deliberately associates metriōs, measured or moderate, with metron, measure.

1960. The verbs haloíē and helein evoke catching or convicting a claim. The English makes explicit the force of mē pāsan: the conclusion is that not every belief is true. The passage distinguishes that general result from the harder question about current perceptual experiences and beliefs based on them.

1961. The edition identifies Theaetetus 183b. Oupō is not yet, retaining the provisional force of the conclusion. The formula every person the measure of all things is the claim under examination. The excerpt neither names the companion here nor supplies the intervening argument between this and the preceding selection.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 480

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

41.1 I.50.41.1

Πλάτωνος ἐν Τιμαίῳ.

Λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταὐτὸν γιγνόμενος, περί τε θάτερον ὢν καὶ περὶ τὸ ταὐτόν, ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰὼν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς·

41.2 I.50.41.2

ὅταν δὲ αὖ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾖ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος εὔτροχος ὢν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται,

41.3 I.50.41.3

τούτω δὲ ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἄν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἄλλο πλὴν ψυχὴν εἴπῃ, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθὲς <ἐρεῖ>.

BOOK I CHAPTER 50

41.1 · True beliefs about perceptible things

I.50.41.1

Plato, in the Timaeus.

“Discourse proceeding in the same way, concerning both Difference and Sameness, and borne without voice or sound in that which moves itself, produces firm and true opinions and convictions when it concerns what is perceptible and the circle of Difference, moving correctly, reports throughout its entire soul.”[1962]

41.2 · Intellect and knowledge

I.50.41.2

“But when it concerns what is accessible to reasoning, and the circle of Sameness, turning smoothly, announces these things, intellect and knowledge necessarily result.”[1963]

41.3 · The soul as their seat

I.50.41.3

“Whatever existing thing these two arise in, if anyone ever calls it anything other than soul, he <will say> anything but the truth.”[1964]

1962. The edition identifies Timaeus 37b. Logos here is an inward discourse without audible speech. Difference and Sameness name the two principles whose circles are described in this excerpt; its larger setting is not reproduced. The printed reflexive hautou, itself, is retained. The passage explicitly allows firm, true beliefs about perceptible things.

1963. The printed logistikon is retained and provisionally rendered what is accessible to reasoning; it is not silently changed to noēton, intelligible. Eutrochos describes a circle running or turning well. Intellect and knowledge are distinguished from the opinions and convictions of the preceding clause.

1964. The dual toutō, these two, is taken here with the nearest pair, intellect and knowledge. Another interpretation refers to the two kinds of cognition just contrasted: opinion and conviction, and intellect and knowledge. Archer-Hind discusses both readings at Timaeus 37c and favors the former. The dual verb remains; supplied erei, will say, is marked in both languages. Chapter 50 ends at printed p. 480 line 25.

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

Κεφάλαιον ΝΑ′ I.51.heading

Πόσαι εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ποίας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστη.

1 I.51.1

Σιμύλου.

Πέντ᾽ εἰσιν ἃς ἄνθρωπος αἰσθήσεις ἔχει·
[ἀφὴν ὅρασιν ἀκοὴν γεῦσιν ὄσφρησιν]
τούτων ἁπασῶν κυριωτάτη μία
ἀκοή· φαγὼν γὰρ οὐδὲ εἷς ἔφυ σοφός
οὐδ᾽ ἁψ<άμενος οὐδ᾽ ὀσφρ>όμενος οὐδ᾽ εἰσιδὼν
τὸ λυσιτελές . . . . . .
ἐκ τοῦ δ᾽ ἀκούειν μανθάνειν τε τἀγαθὰ
πολλοὶ φρόνιμοι γεγόνασι· ταύτην γὰρ μίαν
ὁ νοῦς ἑαυτῷ κατέλιπεν διδάσκαλον·
. . . . . .
ὥσπερ δικαστὴν ἢ κριτὴν ἢ κύριον.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 481

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

Chapter 51 · The senses

I.51.heading

How many senses there are, and the substance and activity of each.[1965]

1 · Hearing as the teacher of the mind

I.51.1

Simylus.

Five are the senses that a human being has:
[touch, sight, hearing, taste, smell].
Of all these one has the greatest authority,
hearing: no one grew wise by eating,
nor by <touching, nor smelling>, nor by seeing
what is beneficial . . . . . .
But through hearing and learning good things
many have become wise; for this alone
the mind has kept as its own teacher:
. . . . . .
as a judge, an arbiter, or a master.[1966]

1965. The editor restores this heading from Photius p. 112b30 and the Laurentian table of contents; it is absent from the witnesses FPL. Ousia concerns what each sense is or consists in, energeia its activity. Decimal subdivisions in longer excerpts are modern comparison divisions.

1966. The poem privileges hearing as the means of instruction. The five-sense list is rejected by the editor and remains in square brackets. The angle brackets mark a restoration within the Greek words for touching and smelling, represented by the corresponding English phrase. Both printed gaps are retained, with ten and thirteen points. The last line has lost its governing construction: the apparatus explains that the senses should acknowledge the mind as judge, not the mind acknowledge hearing as judge. No missing verse is invented.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 481

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

2 I.51.2

<Ἀετίου.>

Οἱ Στωικοὶ πέντε τὰς εἰδικὰς αἰσθήσεις· ὅρασιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἁφήν.

3 I.51.3

Ἀριστοτέλης ἕκτην μὲν οὐ λέγει, κοινὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν <τὴν> τῶν συνθέτων εἰδῶν κριτικήν, εἰς ἣν πᾶσαι συμβάλλουσιν αἱ ἁπλαῖ τὰς ἰδίας ἑκάστη φαντασίας, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μεταβατικὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον, οἱονεὶ σχήματος καὶ κινήσεως.

4 I.51.4

<Ἀετίου.>

Δημόκριτος πλείους εἶναι αἰσθήσεις περὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

2 · Five specific senses I.51.2

<Aëtius.>

The Stoics hold that the specific senses are five: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch.[1967]

3 · Common perception I.51.3

Aristotle does not speak of a sixth sense, but of a common perception, <the faculty> that judges composite forms. To it all the simple senses contribute, each its own impressions; in it resides the capacity to pass from one thing to another, for example between shape and movement.[1968]

4 · More senses I.51.4

<Aëtius.>

Democritus holds that there are more senses in nonrational animals, in the wise, and in the gods.[1969]

1967. The supplied attribution is printed in Latin and covers excerpts 2-3: Aëtius IV.10.1-2, Diels p. 399. Specific senses translates eidikas; the list distinguishes their separate functions. The different order from the preceding poem is retained.

1968. Common perception coordinates the contributions of the separate senses; it does not mean ordinary practical judgment. The supplied article makes the judging faculty explicit. Compare I.50.5. This shorter report is preserved independently: the apparatus criticizes an earlier editor for combining the two passages.

1969. The editor supplies Aëtius IV.10.4, Diels p. 399. The compressed report says more, without specifying a number or naming additional senses. Its three classes are kept distinct. Compare the report about nonrational animals in I.50.7.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 481-482

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

5.1 I.51.5.1

<Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλους. Τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ δὴ κοινῶς ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων ἴδιον (αἰσθήσει γὰρ διαφέρειν τὸ ζῷον τοῦ φυτοῦ), πενταπλοῦν ἐοικέναι. Τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅρασιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκοήν, τὸ δ᾽ ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δὲ γεῦσιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἁφήν.

5.2 I.51.5.2

Ὑπάρχειν δέ τινα καὶ σύνθετον αἴσθησιν, ἐν ᾗ τό τε φανταστικὸν πᾶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ <τὸ> μνημονευτικὸν καὶ τὸ δοξαστικόν, ὅπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἄμοιρον τοῦ νοῦ τυγχάνειν. Αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ ἡμᾶς παθούσης τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

5.1 · The fivefold perceptive capacity I.51.5.1

<Didymus.>

Aristotle. The perceptive capacity, which is the characteristic shared by all animals (for perception distinguishes an animal from a plant), appears to be fivefold. One part of it is sight, another hearing, another smell, another taste, another touch.[1970]

5.2 · Imagination, memory, and belief I.51.5.2

There is also a certain composite perception, in which the whole capacity for forming images arises, together with <the> capacity for memory and the capacity for belief; the latter is therefore not without a share in intellect. We perceive when the perceptive faculty undergoes some affection.[1971]

1970. The Latin editorial attribution identifies Didymus, Epitome of Physics, fragment 15, Diels p. 455; the Greek heading names Aristotle as the authority reported. The repeated infinitives belong to indirect discourse. The claim distinguishes the animal from the plant by perception, while the fivefold classification concerns the perceptive capacity.

1971. Phantastikon concerns the formation of images or presentations, not necessarily invention. The English takes the relative hoper as referring most immediately to the capacity for belief; the compressed wording also allows a broader reference to the composite faculty. The article before the capacity for memory is supplied in the edition. An affection is something undergone by the faculty.

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

6 I.51.6

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Φαίδωνος.

Ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.

7 I.51.7

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

Γαίᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 51

6 · From perception to knowledge I.51.6

Plato, from the Phaedo.

“The brain is what provides the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and smelling; from these memory and belief would arise, and from memory and belief, once they have attained stability, knowledge would arise in accordance with these.”[1972]

7 · Like perceived by like I.51.7

Empedocles.

For with earth we have seen earth, with water water,
with aether divine aether, and with fire destructive fire.[1973]

1972. The edition identifies Phaedo 96b. The passage reports a proposed sequence from the brain and perception to stable knowledge. Its shifts from a finite statement to an optative and then an infinitive are smoothed in English without presenting the sequence as an unqualified final doctrine of Plato. The printed kata tauta, in accordance with these, is retained.

1973. The edition cites verses 333-334 in Stein. The elemental pairings express perception of like through like. Aïdēlon describes fire as destructive or consuming. Only these two verses occur here; no continuation from another source is added. This completes chapter 51.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

Κεφάλαιον ΝΒ′ I.52.heading

Περὶ ὁράσεως καὶ κατοπτρικῶν ἐμφάσεων.

1 I.52.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος κατὰ εἰδώλων εἴσκρισιν οἴονται τὸ ὁρατικὸν συμβαίνειν πάθος.

[Καὶ κατὰ τινων ἀκτίνων ἔκκρισιν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔνστασιν πάλιν ὑποστρεφουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν.]

2 I.52.2

<Ἀετίου.>

Τιμαγόρας, εἷς τῶν παραχαραξάντων ἐν συγγραφαῖς τὴν Ἐπικούρειον αἵρεσιν, ἀντὶ τῶν εἰδώλων ταῖς ἀπορροίαις χρῆται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

Chapter 52 · Sight and mirrors

I.52.heading

On sight and images in mirrors.[1974]

1 · Incoming images and a rejected addition

I.52.1

<Aëtius.>

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus think that visual experience occurs through the entry of images.

[And through the emission of certain rays which, after meeting the object, return again to the eye.][1975]

2 · Effluences

I.52.2

<Aëtius.>

Timagoras, one of those who distorted the Epicurean school's doctrine in their writings, employs effluences in place of images.[1976]

1974. The heading is absent from FPL and was restored by Heeren from Photius p. 112b31-32. Emphaseis are appearances or reflected images. The chapter juxtaposes incoming images, outgoing rays, and accounts involving the intervening medium; their differences are preserved.

1975. The supplied locator is Aëtius IV.13.1 and 2a, Diels p. 403. Eidōla are images entering the perceiver. The outgoing-ray explanation is bracketed as an addition imported into the Laurentian collection from the work cited as Plutarch, Placita IV.13. It is not silently combined with the three named thinkers' account. Compare excerpt 10.

1976. The supplied group attribution covers excerpts 2-8: Aëtius IV.13.6-12, Diels p. 403. Paracharassein literally evokes altering a stamp or counterfeiting; distorted retains the report's critical tone. Aporroiai are streams or emanations flowing from objects, here distinguished from images.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

3 I.52.3

Στράτων χρώματά φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι συγχρῷζοντ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν μεταξὺ ἀέρα.

4 I.52.4

Ἀρίσταρχος σχήματα συνδιατυποῦντά πως αὐτοῖς τὸν ἀέρα.

5 I.52.5

Ἵππαρχος ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρου φησὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀποτεινομένας <ἀκτῖνας> τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν, οἱονεὶ χειρῶν ἐπαφαῖς, περικαθαπτούσας τοῖς ἐκτὸς σώμασι τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρατικὸν ἀναδιδόναι.

6 I.52.6

Ἔνιοι καὶ Πυθαγόραν τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ συνεπιγράφουσιν, ἅτε δὴ βεβαιωτὴν τῶν μαθημάτων· καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ Παρμενίδην ἐμφαίνοντα τοῦτο διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

3 · The air takes on colors I.52.3

Strato says that colors travel from bodies, coloring the intervening air to match them.[1977]

4 · The air takes on shapes I.52.4

Aristarchus holds that shapes somehow impress a corresponding form on the air.[1978]

5 · Rays like reaching hands I.52.5

Hipparchus says that <rays> extending from each eye grasp external bodies with their extremities, as though by the touch of hands, and transmit the apprehension of those bodies to the visual faculty.[1979]

6 · Pythagoras and Parmenides I.52.6

Some also enroll Pythagoras among the adherents of this view, as an establisher of the mathematical sciences; and, in addition, Parmenides, who indicates it in his poems.[1980]

1977. The air between object and perceiver participates in the explanation. Synchrōizein means to color alike or give a corresponding color; the English takes autois as referring to the bodies. The report describes transmission of color, without supplying an account of the eye itself.

1978. The statement is elliptical, continuing the preceding discussion. Pōs, somehow, marks the report's qualification. The name follows the corrected main text; no identification with a particular otherwise known Aristarchus is imposed by this excerpt.

1979. The noun rays is supplied in the edition. The simile treats vision as reaching out and touching, then conveying the resulting apprehension back to the perceiver. Both eyes and the extremities of the rays belong to the printed explanation.

1980. The attribution is explicitly qualified by some. Bebaiōtēs suggests someone who establishes or gives firm support to a discipline; it need not mean its sole inventor. The excerpt reports an interpretation of Parmenides' poetry without quoting the relevant verses.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 483-484

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

7 I.52.7

Πλάτων συναύγειαν τοῦ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν φωτὸς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀπορρέοντος εἰς τὸν ὁμογενῆ ἀέρα, τοῦ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἀντιφερομένου, τοῦ δὲ περὶ τὸν μεταξὺ ἀέρα, εὐδιάχυτον ὄντα καὶ εὔτρεπτον, συντεινομένου τῷ πυρώδει τῆς ὄψεως. αὕτη λέγεται Πλάτωνι ἡ συναύγεια.

8 I.52.8

Ἀλκμαίων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἀντίληψιν.

9.1 I.52.9.1

<Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς κατὰ κίνησιν τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς· διαφανὲς δὲ οὐ μόνον εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καί τινα τῶν συνισταμένων ποθέν, οἷον ὕαλον καὶ κρύσταλλον καί τινας τῶν λαμπρῶν λίθων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

7 · A conjunction of light I.52.7

Plato explains sight by a conjunction of light: light flows some distance from the eyes into air of like nature; light from bodies travels to meet it; and light in the intervening air, which readily spreads and changes, is drawn into tension with the fiery element of vision. This is what Plato calls the conjunction of light.[1981]

8 · The transparent I.52.8

Alcmaeon explains sight through apprehension of the transparent.[1982]

9.1 · The transparent medium I.52.9.1

<Didymus.>

Aristotle. We see through a movement of what is actually transparent. The transparent is not only air but also water and certain things formed by combination from some source, such as glass, crystal, and some bright stones.[1983]

1981. Synaugeia is a shining together or conjunction of radiance. The threefold account involves eye, object, and intervening air. The English provisionally takes the adjectives readily spreading and changeable with the air, as the printed construction suggests. The closing sentence is retained. Compare the longer Timaeus extract in excerpt 19.

1982. The brief report prints antilēpsis, apprehension. The apparatus records the proposal antilampsis, an answering flash or reflection, but that reading is not adopted. The precise role of the transparent remains unspecified in the surviving phrase.

1983. The Latin editorial attribution identifies Didymus, Epitome of Physics, fragment 17, Diels p. 456; the Greek heading names Aristotle. Actually transparent renders kat’ energeian, distinguishing active transparency from mere capacity. The awkward pothen, from some source, is retained rather than replaced with an unprinted classification of solids.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

9.2 I.52.9.2

Ἀκούειν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τοῦ μεταξὺ διηχοῦς· διηχὲς δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καί τινα τῶν συγκριμάτων.

10 I.52.10

<Ἀετίου.>

Τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν τινες κατά τινων <ἀκτίνων> ἔκχυσιν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔνστασιν πάλιν ὑποστρεφουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν.

11 I.52.11

Ποσειδώνιος <αὐ>γῶν αὐτὴν σύμφυσιν ὀνομάζει.

12 I.52.12

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ τῶν εἰδώλων ἐκδοχὰς παρέχεται· πλείους δὲ πρὸς <τὸ> δεύτερον· τὰς γὰρ ἀπορροίας ἀποδέχεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

9.2 · The medium of sound I.52.9.2

We hear through the activity of the intervening medium that transmits sound. Air, fire, water, and certain compounds can transmit sound.[1984]

10 · Rays returning to the eye I.52.10

<Aëtius.>

Some of the Academics explain sight through an outpouring of certain <rays> which, after meeting the object, return again to the eye.[1985]

11 · Rays growing together I.52.11

Posidonius calls it a growing together of <rays>.[1986]

12 · Two interpretations of Empedocles I.52.12

Empedocles provides grounds for interpreting sight both through rays and through images, but more for <the> second interpretation, since he accepts effluences.[1987]

1984. Diēches describes what carries sound through itself, in parallel with diaphanes, what lets light through. The inclusion of fire follows the printed report. Synkrimata are compounds or things formed by aggregation; the text does not identify the particular compounds here.

1985. The supplied group attribution covers excerpts 10-13: Aëtius IV.13.2b-5, Diels p. 403. The noun rays is also supplied. The claim is attributed to some Academics, not to the entire school; compare the rejected addition attached to excerpt 1.

1986. Symphysis is a growing together or coalescence. Only the opening letters au- of augōn, rays, are supplied in Greek; the corresponding whole English word is marked because a matching fragment would not convey the restoration. The pronoun refers to the visual process under discussion.

1987. The report acknowledges competing interpretations rather than simply assigning a single mechanism to Empedocles. Ekdochai are ways of taking or interpreting his account. The supplied article is marked, and the explanatory appeal to effluences is retained.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 484-485

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

13 I.52.13

Ἑστιαῖος ὁ Περίνθιος τοῖς εἰδώλοις τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἀνέμιξε, προσαγορεύσας τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀκτινείδωλον.

14 I.52.14

<Ἀετίου.>

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κατ᾽ ἀπορροίας τὰς συνισταμένας μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ κατόπτρου, πιλουμένας δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκκρινομένου ἐκ τοῦ κατόπτρου πυρώδους καὶ τὸν προκείμενον ἀέρα, εἰς ὃν φέρεται τὰ ῥεύματα, συμμεταφέροντος.

15 I.52.15

Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος τὰς κατοπτρικὰς ἐμφάσεις γίνεσθαι κατ᾽ εἰδώλων ἐμφάσεις, ἅ τινα φέρεσθαι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν, συνίστασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατόπτρου κατ᾽ ἀντιπεριστροπήν.

Wachsmuth 1884, vol. I, printed pp. 485

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

13 · The ray-image

I.52.13

Hestiaeus of Perinthus mixed rays with images, calling the result a ray-image.[1988]

14 · Effluences at a mirror

I.52.14

<Aëtius.>

Empedocles explains mirror images through effluences that collect on the mirror's surface and are compacted by the fiery element emitted from the mirror, which also carries along the air in front of it, into which the streams travel.[1989]

15 · Images turned about

I.52.15

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus hold that appearances in mirrors arise through appearances of images, which travel from us and collect on the mirror with a turning about in the opposite direction.[1990]

1988. The compound aktineidōlon joins aktis, ray, and eidōlon, image. The unusual English compound reproduces this deliberate fusion of the two explanatory terms. The name follows the main text's corrected reading.

1989. The supplied group attribution covers excerpts 14-16: Aëtius IV.14.1-4, Diels p. 405 and following. Pileisthai suggests being pressed or felted together. The English takes the fiery element as both compacting the effluences and carrying the air, following the linked participles of the printed construction.

1990. The repeated emphaseis, appearances, follows the printed text, though the apparatus discusses several alternatives for the second occurrence. Antiperistrophē describes an opposite turning or reversal; the excerpt does not explain the precise geometry. The mirror image is traced to images traveling from the viewer.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

16.1 I.52.16.1

<Οἱ> ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν κατ᾽ ἀνάκλασιν τῆς ὄψεως. Φέρεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν τεταμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν χαλκόν, ἐντυχοῦσαν δὲ πυκνῷ καὶ λείῳ πληχθεῖσαν ὑποστρέφειν αὐτὴν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτήν, ὁμοῖόν τι πάσχουσαν τῇ ἐκτάσει τῆς χειρὸς καὶ τῇ ἐπὶ τὸν ὦμον ἀντεπιστροφῇ.

16.2 I.52.16.2

[Δύναται δέ τις πᾶσι τούτοις τοῖς κεφαλαίοις χρῆσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ πῶς ὁρῶμεν.]

17.1 I.52.17.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωικὸς ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ σκότος, ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ὁράσεως προχεῖσθαί τινα εἰς αὐτὸ αὐγήν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

16.1 · Reflection of the visual stream I.52.16.1

<The followers> of Pythagoras and of the mathematicians explain it through reflection of the visual stream. For the visual stream travels taut toward the bronze; on encountering a dense, smooth surface it is struck and turns back upon itself, undergoing something like the extension of the hand and its return toward the shoulder.[1991]

16.2 · A rejected cross-reference I.52.16.2

[One may also use all these summaries in considering how we see.][1992]

17.1 · Seeing darkness I.52.17.1

<Aëtius.>

Sphaerus the Stoic holds that darkness is visible, since a certain radiance pours into it from sight.[1993]

1991. The supplied article identifies the adherents whose opinion is reported. Opsis here denotes sight conceived as something extending outward. Chalkos, bronze, supplies the reflecting surface. The hand-and-shoulder comparison explains the proposed reversal by a bodily movement.

1992. The sentence is bracketed in the edition as a likely old gloss. It relates the preceding explanations of mirror images to vision more generally. It remains in its printed position rather than becoming an instruction from the translator.

1993. The supplied attribution is Aëtius IV.15.1-3, Diels p. 405 and following, covering the reports through excerpt 18 and the intervening rejected paragraph. The paradox depends on an outgoing light associated with vision itself.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

17.2 I.52.17.2

[Οἱ Στωικοὶ ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ σκότος· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ὁράσεως προχεῖσθαί τινα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ αὐγήν. Καὶ οὐ ψεύδεται ἡ ὅρασις, βλέπεται γὰρ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὅτι ἐστι σκότος.]

18 I.52.18

Χρύσιππος κατὰ συνέντασιν [τὰ ὄντα] τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀέρος ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς, νυγέντος μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀπτικοῦ πνεύματος, ὅπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῆς κόρης διήκει, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν περικείμενον ἀέρα ἐπιβολὴν ἐντείνοντος αὐτὸν κωνοειδῶς, ὅταν ᾖ ὁμογενὴς ὁ ἀήρ· προχέονται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως ἀκτῖνες πύριναι, οὐχὶ μέλαιναι καὶ ὁμιχλώδεις· διόπερ ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ σκότος.

19.1 I.52.19.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Τῶν δὲ ὀργάνων πρῶτον μὲν φωσφόρα συνετεκτήναντο ὄμματα, τοιᾷδε ἐνδήσαντες αἰτίᾳ· τοῦ πυρὸς ὅσον τὸ μὲν καίειν οὐκ ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἥμερον, οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας, σῶμα ἐμηχανήσαντο γίγνεσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

17.2 · A rejected parallel report I.52.17.2

[The Stoics hold that darkness is visible, since a certain radiance pours onto it from sight. Nor is sight mistaken, for one truly sees that there is darkness.][1994]

18 · The visual cone I.52.18

Chrysippus holds that we see [existing things] through a joint tension of the intervening air. The air is struck by the visual breath, which extends from the ruling part to the pupil and, when directed upon the surrounding air, draws it taut in the shape of a cone, provided the air is uniform in nature. Fiery rays pour from the eye, not dark and misty ones; hence darkness is visible.[1995]

19.1 · The making of the eyes I.52.19.1

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“Among the organs, they first fashioned eyes that carry light, binding them to the following cause. They contrived that the portion of fire which possessed no power to burn, but provided a gentle light akin to each day’s light, should become a body.”[1996]

1994. The entire paragraph is rejected as material imported into the Laurentian collection from the parallel Placita tradition. The old reference 17 L. is apparatus numbering, not an additional Stobaean excerpt number. The argument distinguishes correctly seeing darkness from an erroneous visual report.

1995. Synentasis is a shared tension between the visual pneuma and the air. Hēgemonikon denotes the ruling part; no anatomical seat is added. The rejected words ta onta, existing things, remain bracketed but are moved to their natural English position. The account makes the air’s uniform nature a condition of the visual cone.

1996. The edition identifies Timaeus 45b-46b. The makers are subsequently called gods within this excerpt. Phōsphora means light-bearing, expressing the account’s conception of the eyes. Gentle renders hēmeron; the apparatus distinguishes it from hēmerinon, of the day. The source’s phrase each day is retained.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

19.2 I.52.19.2

Τὸ γὰρ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸν ὂν τούτου πῦρ εἰλικρινὲς ἐποίησαν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ῥεῖν λεῖον καὶ πυκνὸν ὅλον μέν, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ μέσον ξυμπιλήσαντες τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ὅσον παχύτερον στέγειν πᾶν, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ μόνον αὐτὸ καθαρὸν διηθεῖν.

19.3 I.52.19.3

Ὅταν οὖν μεθημερινὸν ᾖ φῶς περὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ῥεῦμα, τότε ἐκπῖπτον ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, συμπαγὲς γενόμενον, ἓν σῶμα οἰκειωθὲν συνέστη κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων εὐθυωρίαν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδῃ τὸ προσπῖπτον ἔνδοθεν πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω συνέπεσεν.

19.4 I.52.19.4

Ὁμοιοπαθὲς δὴ δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα πᾶν γενόμενον, ὅτου τε ἂν αὐτό ποτε ἐφάπτηται, καὶ ὃ ἂν ἄλλο ἐκείνου, τούτων τὰς κινήσεις διαδιδὸν εἰς ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς αἴσθησιν παρέσχετο ταύτην, ᾗ δὴ ὁρᾶν φαμεν. Ἀπελθόντος δὲ εἰς νύκτα τοῦ ξυγγενοῦς πυρὸς ἀποτέτμηται· πρὸς γὰρ ἀνόμοιον ἐξιὸν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε αὐτὸ καὶ κατασβέννυται, ξυμφυὲς οὐκέτι τῷ πλησίον ἀέρι γιγνόμενον, ἅτε πῦρ οὐκ ἔχοντι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

19.2 · The inner fire filtered through the eyes I.52.19.2

“For they made the pure fire within us, which is akin to this fire, flow through the eyes in a smooth, compact stream. They compressed the entire eye, especially its center, so that it would hold back all the other, coarser material and filter through only this pure fire.”[1997]

19.3 · Inner and outer light join I.52.19.3

“When daylight surrounds the stream of vision, like then issues toward like; joining firmly with it, it forms one kindred body along the eyes’ direct line of sight, wherever what strikes from within presses against what it encounters outside.”[1998]

19.4 · Transmission to the soul and the coming of night I.52.19.4

“Because of its likeness, the whole body comes to share the same affections. Whatever it touches, and whatever else touches it, it transmits their movements throughout the body as far as the soul, producing the perception by which we say that we see. But when the kindred fire departs into night, the stream is cut off. For on issuing toward what is unlike itself, it is altered and extinguished, no longer growing together with the neighboring air, since that air contains no fire.”[1999]

1997. The printed sentence moves from the flowing fire to the compression of the eyes. The English supplies stream as an aid to following that transition. The filter comparison explains how the finer visual fire is separated from coarser material; no modern account of ocular anatomy is substituted.

1998. The visual stream and daylight form a continuous body through their likeness. The compressed last clause is rendered provisionally as contact between the outward stream and what meets it externally. Euthyōria is the direct line or direction of sight, not a claim that the whole surrounding field is uniformly seen.

1999. The movement travels through the joined visual body to the perceiver’s body and soul. The English makes the shifting references to body explicit. Night removes the external fire needed for continuity; this explains the interruption of sight within the passage’s physical model.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

19.5 I.52.19.5

Παύεταί τε οὖν ὁρῶν, ἔτι τε ἐπαγωγὸν ὕπνου γίγνεται· σωτηρίαν γὰρ ἣν οἱ θεοὶ τῆς ὄψεως ἕνεκα ἐμηχανήσαντο, τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν, ὅταν ταῦτα συμμύσῃ, καθείργνυσι τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐντὸς δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ διαχεῖται καὶ ὁμαλύνει τὰς ἐντὸς κινήσεις, ὁμαλυνθεισῶν δὲ ἡσυχία γίγνεται, γενομένης δὲ πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας βραχυόνειρος ὕπνος ξυμπίπτει,

19.6 I.52.19.6

καταλειφθεισῶν δέ τινων κινήσεων μειζόνων, οἷα καὶ ἐν οἵοις ἂν τόποις λίπωνται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα παρέσχον τὰ ἀφομοιωθέντα ἐντὸς ἔξωθέν τε ἐγερθεῖσιν ἀπομνημονευόμενα φαντάσματα.

19.7 I.52.19.7

Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν κατόπτρων εἰδωλοποιίαν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐμφανῆ καὶ λεῖα κατιδεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτι χαλεπόν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐντὸς ἐκτός τε τοῦ πυρὸς ἑκατέρου κοινωνίας ἀλλήλοις, ἑνός τε αὖ περὶ τὴν λειότητα ἑκάστοτε γενομένου καὶ πολλαχῇ μεταρρυθμισθέντος, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐμφαίνεται, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον πυρὸς τῷ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν πυρὶ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ξυμπαγεῖ γιγνομένῳ.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

19.5 · The eyelids and sleep

I.52.19.5

“The perceiver therefore ceases to see, and the condition also induces sleep. For when one closes the eyelids, that structure which the gods contrived to safeguard sight, it confines the power of the fire within. This power spreads out and smooths the internal movements. When they are smoothed, quiet arises; and when the quiet is great, sleep with few dreams follows.”[2000]

19.6 · Residual movements and dreams

I.52.19.6

“But if some stronger movements remain, then, according to their character and the places where they remain, they produce images corresponding in kind and number, formed as likenesses within and remembered by those awakened from outside.”[2001]

19.7 · Images on smooth surfaces

I.52.19.7

“It is no longer at all difficult to understand the production of images in mirrors and in all clear, smooth surfaces. For through the sharing of the inner and outer fires with one another, and their repeatedly becoming one at the smooth surface and being reshaped in many ways, all such appearances necessarily arise: the fire around the face joins firmly with the fire of vision as it forms at the smooth, bright surface.”[2002]

2000. The Greek shifts construction around the eyelids and their closure; the English makes the practical sequence explicit. Brachyoneiros means having few or slight dreams, not sleeping briefly. The account relates the degree of inner stillness to the character of sleep.

2001. The difficult printed construction is retained provisionally. The words exōthen te egertheisin are taken as by those awakened from outside; the apparatus records exō in the direct Platonic tradition, but it is not substituted. Phantasmata are the dream appearances produced by residual motions. Their correspondence concerns both character and number, toiauta kai tosauta.

2002. The explanation extends the joining of inner and outer fire to reflected images. Metarrythmisthen means rearranged or reshaped. The final participial construction is difficult; the English follows the printed dative xympagei gignomenōi, treating it as describing the visual fire at the surface, rather than replacing it with a different Platonic reading.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.1 I.52.20.1

<Ἐν ταὐτῷ.> [εἰς τὸ περὶ χρωμάτων].

Ἔστι γένος ἡμῖν αἰσθητικόν, ὃ διελέσθαι δεῖ συχνὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ποικίλματα κεκτημένον, ἃ ξύμπαντα μὲν χρόας ἐκαλέσαμεν, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὄψει σύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν· ὄψεως δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν αὐτὸ περὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῆς γενέσεως ἐρρήθη·

20.2 I.52.20.2

τῇδ᾽ οὖν τῶν χρωμάτων πέρι μάλιστα εἰκὸς πρέπει τ᾽ ἂν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, τὰ φερόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μόρια ἐμπίπτοντά τε εἰς τὴν ὄψιν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μείζω, τὰ δὲ ἴσα τῆς αὐτῆς ὄψεως μέρεσιν εἶναι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.1 · The class of colors

I.52.20.1

<In the same work.> [For the section on colors.]

“There is a perceptible class for us to distinguish, containing many varieties within it, all of which we have called colors: a flame flowing from each body, with particles proportioned to sight so as to be perceived. As for sight, the matter of the causes of its generation was discussed earlier.”[2003]

20.2 · Particles and the visual stream

I.52.20.2

“Accordingly, this is the most likely way to proceed concerning colors, and it would be fitting for a reasonable person to explain in words: the particles traveling from other things and striking the visual stream are some smaller, some larger, and some equal to the parts of that visual stream itself.”[2004]

2003. The edition identifies Timaeus 67c-68d. The work reference is supplied; the bracketed direction is rejected as an old reader’s cross-reference to I.16, where almost all this passage recurs. The present wording differs at several points, and is translated independently as printed. Aisthētikon is here provisionally perceptible, referring to the class being distinguished; the wording does not call it the fourth class as the earlier extract does.

2004. The printed ton epieikē logōi is grammatically awkward. The translation provisionally takes ton epieikē as a reasonable person and logōi as in words; the apparatus records epieikē logon, a reasonable account, in another reading, but it is not silently adopted. Opsis is rendered visual stream where the account treats it as composed of particles.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.3 I.52.20.3

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἴσα ἀναίσθητά τε δὴ διαφανῆ λέγομεν, τὰ δὲ μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω, τὰ μὲν συγκρίνοντα, τὰ δὲ διακρίνοντα αὐτὴν τοῖς περὶ τὴν σάρκα θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν στρυφνοῖς καὶ ὅσα θερμαντικὰ ὄντα δριμέα ἐκαλέσαμεν ἀδελφὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα εἴη ἂν τά τε λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα, ἐκείνων παθήματα γεγονότα ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ταὐτά, φανταζόμενα δὲ ἄλλα διὰ ταύτας αἰτίας.

20.4 I.52.20.4

Οὕτως οὖν αὐτὰ προσρητέον· τὸ μὲν διακριτικὸν τῆς ὄψεως λευκόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ μέλαν, τὴν δὲ ὀξυτέραν φορὰν καὶ γένους πυρὸς ἑτέρου προσπίπτουσαν καὶ διακρίνουσαν τὴν ὄψιν μέχρι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, αὐτάς τε τῶν ὀμμάτων τὰς διεξόδους βίᾳ διωθοῦσαν, πῦρ μὲν ἀθρόον καὶ ὕδωρ, ὃ δάκρυον καλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἐκχέουσαν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὖσαν πῦρ, ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαντῶσαν,

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.3 · Transparency, contraction, and expansion I.52.20.3

“The equal particles we call imperceptible and transparent. The larger and smaller ones, the former contracting the visual stream and the latter expanding it, are akin to the hot and cold acting on flesh, and to the astringent acting on the tongue and all the heating things we called pungent. These would be white and black: the same affections as those others, occurring in a different class, but appearing different for these reasons.”[2005]

20.4 · White, black, and a more violent fire I.52.20.4

“They should therefore be named as follows: what expands the visual stream is white, and its opposite black. A swifter motion, belonging to another kind of fire, strikes and expands the visual stream all the way to the eyes, forces its way through the eyes’ own passages, and pours from them a mass of fire and water, which we call a tear; itself fire, it meets this from the opposite direction.”[2006]

2005. The particle sizes are related to contraction and expansion of the visual stream, then compared with touch and taste. The list white and black need not follow the order of larger and smaller; the next sentence specifies which effect receives which name. Astringent renders stryphnon, the contracting taste.

2006. The incoming fire and the material driven out of the eye meet in opposite directions. The English takes the tear as the discharged combination of fire and water. Unlike the parallel text in I.16, this extract does not include the words and melting after forcing through; they are not imported.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.5 I.52.20.5

καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκπηδῶντος πυρὸς οἷον ἀπ᾽ ἀστραπῆς, τοῦ δ᾽ εἰσιόντος καὶ περὶ τὸ νοτερὸν κατασβεννυμένου, παντοδαπῶν ἐν τῇ κυκλήσει ταύτῃ γιγνομένων χρωμάτων, μαρμαρυγὰς μὲν τὸ πάθος προσείπαμεν, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον λαμπρόν τε καὶ στίλβον ἐπωνομάσαμεν.

20.6 I.52.20.6

Τὸ δὲ τούτων αὖ μεταξὺ πυρὸς γένος, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων ὑγρὸν ἀφικνούμενον καὶ κεραννύμενον αὐτῷ, στίλβον δὲ οὔ, τῇ δὲ διὰ τῆς νοτίδος αὐγῇ τοῦ πυρὸς μιγνυμένῃ χρῶμα ἔναιμον παρασχόν, τοὔνομα ἐρυθρὸν λέγομεν. Λαμπρὸν δὲ ἐρυθρῷ λευκῷ τε μιγνύμενον ξανθὸν γέγονε.

20.7 I.52.20.7

Τὸ δὲ ὅσον μέτρον ὅσον οὔ, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις εἰδείη, νοῦν ἔχει τὸ λέγειν, ὧν μήτε τινὰ ἀνάγκην μήτε τὸν εἰκότα λόγον καὶ μετρίως ἄν τις εἰπεῖν εἴη δυνατός.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.5 · Dazzling brightness I.52.20.5

“With one fire leaping out as though from lightning and the other entering and being quenched in the moisture, all sorts of colors arise in this circling motion. We have called the experience dazzling flashes, and have named what produces it bright and gleaming.”[2007]

20.6 · Red and golden yellow I.52.20.6

“The intermediate kind of fire reaches the moisture of the eyes and blends with it without gleaming. By giving a bloodlike color to the fire’s radiance as it mingles through the moisture, it receives the name red. Brightness mixed with red and white becomes golden yellow.”[2008]

20.7 · The limits of specifying proportions I.52.20.7

“As for how great the measure is and how great it is not, even if someone knew, it makes no sense to state it, when one could offer neither any necessary explanation nor even a moderately likely account of it.”[2009]

2007. The printed kyklēsis is a circling motion. The apparatus records kykēsis, a stirring or commotion, in Plato; the latter is not substituted here. Marmarygai are flashing or dazzling visual effects. Brightness is treated as a specific effect of the fiery interaction.

2008. The construction describing mingled radiance is compressed; the English follows its connection with the moisture and the bloodlike color. The color names follow the choices used in I.16: erythron, red, and xanthon, golden yellow. These are approximate English counterparts of ancient color terms.

2009. The difficult printed hoson metron hoson ou is preserved and translated closely; the apparatus records hosois in Plato. The sentence is provisionally understood as declining to specify exact mixing proportions whose rationale cannot adequately be explained. Its wording is not silently harmonized with the parallel in I.16.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.8 I.52.20.8

Ἐρυθρὸν δὲ δὴ μέλανι λευκῷ τε κραθὲν ἀλουργόν, ὄρφνινον δέ, ὅταν τούτοις μεμιγμένοις καυθεῖσί τε μᾶλλον συγκραθῇ μέλαν. Πυρρὸν δὲ ξανθοῦ καὶ φαιοῦ κράσει γίγνεται, φαιὸν δὲ λευκοῦ τε καὶ μέλανος, τὸ δὲ ὠχρὸν λευκοῦ ξανθῷ μιγνυμένου.

20.9 I.52.20.9

Λαμπρῷ τε λευκὸν συνελθὸν καὶ ἐς μέλαν κατακορὲς ἐμπεσὸν κυανοῦν χρῶμα ἀποτελεῖται, κυανοῦ δὲ λευκῷ κεραννυμένου γλαυκόν, πυρροῦ δὲ μέλανι πράσινον. Τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἀπὸ τούτων σχεδὸν δῆλα, αἷς ἂν ἀφομοιούμενα μίξεσι διασῴζοι τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.8 · Purple, dusky, flame red, gray, pale yellow I.52.20.8

“Red blended with black and white becomes purple, and becomes dusky when more black is blended with these after they have been mixed and burned. Flame red arises from a blending of golden yellow and gray, gray from white and black, and pale yellow from white mixed with golden yellow.”[2010]

20.9 · Blue and green mixtures I.52.20.9

“White combined with brightness and falling into deep black produces a dark blue color; dark blue blended with white produces pale blue, and flame red with black produces leek green. From these the others are fairly clear: one can infer the mixtures by which they would be reproduced while preserving the likely account.”[2011]

2010. The English preserves all ingredients and the reference to burning. It takes mallon with the greater admixture of black; its position also permits association with the burning. Halourgon is purple, orphninon dusky, pyrrhon flame red, phaion gray, and ōchron pale yellow. The labels maintain continuity with I.16 without implying exact modern color coordinates.

2011. Kyanoûn, glaukon, and prasinon are rendered dark blue, pale blue, and leek green, consistently with I.16. Ancient ranges need not match modern pigment names. The list belongs to the passage’s physical explanation, not a verified recipe for mixing paints. Eikōs mythos is a likely account or story.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.10 I.52.20.10

Εἰ δέ τις τούτων ἔργῳ σκοπούμενος βάσανον λαμβάνοι, τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ θείας φύσεως ἠγνοηκὼς ἂν εἴη διάφορον, ὅτι θεὸς μὲν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν [μὲν] συγκεραννύναι καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ διαλύειν ἱκανῶς ἐπιστάμενος ἅμα καὶ δυνατός, ἀνθρώπων δὲ οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερα τούτων ἱκανὸς οὔτ᾽ ἐστὶ νῦν, οὔτ᾽ εἰσαῦθίς ποτ᾽ ἔσται.

21.1 I.52.21.1

Ἀριστομβρότου Περὶ ὄψιος.

Ὄψις καὶ φάος καὶ ἀὴρ φυσικὰν ἔχει σύγκρασίν τε καὶ συγγένειαν ποτ᾽ ἄλλαλα * * λαμπρῶς ὁρᾷ· καὶ ἀὴρ πᾶς τῷ λαμπρῷ διορᾶται. συμβέβακε δὲ καὶ τὰν ὄψιν καὶ τὸν ἀέρα εἶμεν * * ἀλλὰ τὰν μὲν ὄψιν μέλαιναν καὶ ὑγράν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα μέλανα καὶ ἀραιόν·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

20.10 · Divine and human capacities I.52.20.10

“But if someone sought to test these matters by investigating them in practice, he would have failed to understand the difference between human and divine nature: a god both knows adequately and has the power to blend the many into one [indeed] and again dissolve the one into many; but no human being is capable of either of these, either now or at any time hereafter.”[2012]

21.1 · Sight, light, and air I.52.21.1

Aristombrotus, On Sight.

“Sight, light, and air have a natural commingling and kinship with one another * * sees clearly; and all air is seen through by means of brightness. Both sight and air happen to be * * but the eye is dark and moist, the air dark and rarefied.”[2013]

2012. This conclusion continues beyond the parallel selection in I.16. The rejected second men remains bracketed, represented loosely by indeed because the duplicated Greek particle has no natural independent English equivalent. The claim concerns the powers of combination and dissolution in this cosmological account; it is not expanded into a general statement about every kind of practical inquiry.

2013. The passage preserves Doric forms, including opsios, phaos, poti, and eimen. Both pairs of asterisks mark gaps in the edition. The subject of sees clearly is lost or uncertain and is not invented. Opsis moves between sight and the eye; the physical description favors eye in the final contrast. The apparatus proposes transparent in the second gap, but the proposal is not inserted.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 52

21.2 I.52.21.2

ἐννυπόκειται δὲ καὶ τᾷ ὄψι καὶ τῷ ἀέρι [καὶ] τὸ δυνάμι διαφανές, ἀλλὰ τᾷ μὲν ὄψι τὸ συγγενὲς φάος, τῷ δὲ ἀέρι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶ ἀλίου.

21.3 I.52.21.3

Ὅτι δὲ ἀ ὄψις ὑγρὰ ἔασσα φάος ἔχει συγγενές, δείξαιτό κά τις ἐκ τῶνδε· πρᾶτον μὲν τῷ διαφανέα καὶ λαμπρὰν εἶμεν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ λαμπρὸν οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς φάεος * * ἐκ τᾶς ὄψιος ἢ διά τινος παραθλίψιος ἢ καὶ παρατρίψιος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 52

21.2 · The eye's own light

I.52.21.2

"Underlying both the eye and the air is [also] what is potentially transparent; but in the eye there is its kindred light, and in the air the light from the sun."[2014]

21.3 · Pressure, rubbing, and light

I.52.21.3

"That the eye, though moist, possesses its own kindred light could be shown from the following: first, from its being transparent and bright; for everything transparent and bright is not without some light * * from the eye, either through some pressure upon it or through rubbing."[2015]

2014. The extra kai is rejected in the edition and remains marked. The contrast between potential transparency and the light associated with each medium is compressed and its precise syntax uncertain. The English preserves the printed order; it does not supply a missing explanation of how light actualizes transparency.

2015. The last gap is preserved. The apparatus suggests supplying a verb and a statement that rays issue forth, but no reconstruction is adopted. The surviving words appeal to pressure or rubbing in connection with light from the eye; they are translated as an ancient explanatory claim. Chapter 52 ends at printed p. 491 line 4; the next chapter concerns hearing.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 53

Κεφάλαιον ΝΓ′ I.53.heading

Περὶ ἀκοῆς.

1 I.53.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρόσπτωσιν πνεύματος τῷ χόνδρῳ, ὅνπερ φησὶν ἐξηρτῆσθαι ἐντὸς τοῦ ὠτός, κώδωνος δίκην αἰωρούμενον καὶ τυπτόμενον.

2 I.53.2

Ἀλκμαίων ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς τῷ κενῷ τῷ ἐντὸς τοῦ ὠτός· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι τὸ διηχοῦν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος εἰσβολήν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ κοῖλα ἠχεῖ.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 53

Chapter 53 · Hearing

I.53.heading

On hearing.[2016]

1 · Cartilage suspended like a bell

I.53.1

<Aëtius.>

Empedocles holds that hearing occurs when a current of air strikes the cartilage, which he says hangs inside the ear, swinging and being struck like a bell.[2017]

2 · The resonant hollow of the ear

I.53.2

Alcmaeon holds that we hear by means of the empty space inside the ear: this is what resounds when air enters, for all hollow things give out sound.[2018]

2016. The heading is absent from the witnesses FPL and supplied by the editor from Photius p. 112b32 and the Laurentian table of contents. The chapter brings together accounts of impact, resonance, and transmission. Decimal subdivisions within the longer excerpts are modern aids to comparison.

2017. The supplied Latin attribution covers excerpts 1-4: Aëtius IV.16.1-4, Diels p. 406, line 16. Pneuma here is a current or movement of air. The comparison is specifically to a suspended bell. Chondros is rendered cartilage without identifying it with a particular structure in modern anatomy.

2018. The explanation appeals to the resonance of a hollow space. Kenon here is the cavity within the ear; the following reference to entering air does not warrant treating it as an absolute vacuum. Diēchoun describes its sounding through or resounding.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 53

3 I.53.3

Διογένης τοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινουμένου.

4 I.53.4

Οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος πλήττεσθαι τὸν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρα, τοῦτον δ᾽ ἀνακλᾶσθαι εἰς τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ καὶ γίνεσθαι τῆς ἀκοῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν.

5.1 I.53.5.1

Πλάτωνος ἐν Τιμαίῳ.

Τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν μέρος ἐπιζητοῦσι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν, δι᾽ ἃς αἰτίας τὰ περὶ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει παθήματα, λεκτέον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 53

3 · Air within the head I.53.3

Diogenes holds that hearing occurs when the air in the head is struck and moved by sound.[2019]

4 · Transmission to the governing parts I.53.4

The followers of Plato hold that the air in the head is struck, then reflected back to the governing parts, and that the perception of hearing arises.[2020]

5.1 · The causes of hearing I.53.5.1

Plato, in the Timaeus.

“For those investigating the perceptive part in us concerned with hearing, we must state the causes of the affections that occur in it.”[2021]

2019. The Greek is an abbreviated report: hearing occurs is understood from the chapter’s subject. Phōnē can mean voice or sound; sound is used here because the mechanism is stated generally. No further account of the movement or its destination survives in this sentence.

2020. The attribution is to Plato’s followers. Anaklasthai suggests reflection or a bending back. The plural hēgemonika, governing parts, is retained rather than replaced with a single ruling faculty or a modern anatomical designation.

2021. The edition identifies Timaeus 67a-c. The printed opening to de, the part, and epizētousi, investigating, differ from the readings triton de, third, and episkopousi reported for Plato in the apparatus. The translation follows this printing and smooths its word order. Pathēmata are affections or experiences undergone by the perceptive part.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 53

5.2 I.53.5.2

Ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι᾽ ὤτων ὑπ᾽ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς κίνησιν ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς μὲν ἀρχομένην, τελευτῶσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος ἕδραν ἀκοήν·

5.3 I.53.5.3

ὅση δὲ αὐτῆς ταχεῖα, ὀξεῖαν, ὅση δὲ βραδυτέρα, βαρυτέραν· τὴν δὲ ὁμαλὴν λείαν· τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν τραχεῖαν· μεγάλην δὲ τὴν πολλήν, ὅση δ᾽ ἐναντία, σμικράν. Τὰ δὲ περὶ ξυμφωνίας αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον λεχθησομένοις ἀνάγκη ῥηθῆναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 53

5.2 · Sound and its movement through the body I.53.5.2

“In general, then, let us define sound as a blow delivered by air through the ears to the brain and blood and transmitted as far as the soul; and hearing as the movement caused by that blow, beginning in the head and ending around the seat of the liver.”[2022]

5.3 · Pitch, texture, and loudness I.53.5.3

“When this movement is swift, let us call the sound high-pitched; when slower, lower-pitched; when even, smooth; when the opposite, rough; when abundant, loud; and when the opposite, soft. Their concords must be discussed among the matters to be treated later.”[2023]

2022. The genitives brain and blood are taken as naming what receives the blow; air is its agent, and transmission reaches the soul. The report distinguishes the physical impact called sound from the resulting movement called hearing. The liver remains part of this ancient bodily account and is not replaced with a modern auditory destination.

2023. The English makes explicit the compressed connection between movement and the sound characterized by it. Oxys and barys concern pitch here; megas and smikros concern loudness. Symphōnia means concord or consonance. The closing promise of later treatment belongs to the quoted work. This completes chapter 53.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 54

Κεφάλαιον ΝΔ′ I.54.heading

Περὶ ὀσφρήσεως.

1 I.54.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Ἀλκμαίων ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν· τούτῳ οὖν ὀσφραίνεσθαι ἕλκοντι διὰ τῶν ἀναπνοῶν τὰς ὀσμάς.

2 I.54.2

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ταῖς ἀναπνοαῖς ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος συνεισκρίνεσθαι τὴν ὀσμήν· ὅταν γοῦν ἡ ἀναπνοὴ βαρεῖα γένηται, κατὰ τραχύτητα μὴ συναισθάνεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ῥευματιζομένων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 54

Chapter 54 · Smell

I.54.heading

On smell.[2024]

1 · The brain and inhaled odors

I.54.1

<Aëtius.>

Alcmaeon holds that the ruling faculty is in the brain; we therefore smell by means of this faculty as it draws in odors through inhalation.[2025]

2 · Smell and obstructed breathing

I.54.2

Empedocles holds that odor enters together with the inhalations of air. Thus, when breathing becomes labored, roughness prevents its being perceived at the same time, as happens to those suffering from a discharge.[2026]

2024. The editor supplies the heading from the Laurentian witness and Photius p. 112b32; it is absent from FP. The short reports concern the ruling faculty, inhalation, and the intervening medium. The longer Platonic excerpt asks how odors arise and why they resist a detailed classification.

2025. The supplied attribution covers excerpts 1-2: Aëtius IV.17.1-2, Diels p. 407, line 2. Hēgemonikon is singular here, unlike the governing parts in I.53.4. The English takes toutōi as referring to the ruling faculty located in the brain.

2026. The report connects odor with inhaled pneuma. Trachytēs is roughness, retained without supplying an unprinted anatomical explanation. Rheumatizomenoi are people affected by a flow or discharge, here in the context of impaired breathing and smell; the word is not the name of modern rheumatism.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 54

3 I.54.3

<Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ὀσφραίνεσθαι τοῦ μεταξὺ σώματος ἀναπιμπλαμένου τῶν ὀσφραντῶν.

4.1 I.54.4.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν μυκτήρων δύναμιν <εἴδη μὲν> οὐκ ἔνι. Τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὀσμῶν πᾶν ἠμιγενές, εἴδει δὲ οὐδενὶ συμβέβηκε συμμετρία πρὸς τὸ τινα ἔχειν ὀσμήν.

4.2 I.54.4.2

Ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῶν αἱ περὶ ταῦτα φλέβες πρὸς μὲν τὰ γῆς ὕδατός τε γένη στενώτεραι ξυνέστησαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ πυρὸς ἀέρος τε εὐρύτεραι. Διὸ τούτων οὐδεὶς οὐδενὸς ὀσμῆς πώποτε ᾔσθετό τινος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ βρεχομένων ἢ σηπομένων ἢ τηκομένων ἢ θυμιωμένων γίγνονταί τινων·

BOOK I CHAPTER 54

3 · The intervening medium I.54.3

<Didymus.>

Aristotle. We smell when the intervening body is filled with odorous matter.[2027]

4.1 · Why odors lack fixed kinds I.54.4.1

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“As for the power of the nostrils, there are no <distinct kinds>. For the whole realm of odors is half-formed, and no form has the appropriate proportion for possessing any odor.”[2028]

4.2 · The size of the nasal passages I.54.4.2

“Rather, our passages concerned with these things are too narrow for the kinds of earth and water, but too wide for those of fire and air. Hence no one has ever perceived any odor from any of these; odors arise only when certain things are soaked, decay, melt, or give off fumes.”[2029]

2027. The Latin editorial attribution identifies Didymus, Physics fragment 17, Diels p. 456; the Greek heading names Aristotle. The intervening body is the medium between the object and the perceiver. Osphranta means things perceptible to smell, rendered odorous matter in this compressed account.

2028. The edition identifies Timaeus 66d-67a and supplies eidē men from the Platonic text. The English marks distinct kinds for the supplied phrase; men is a connective particle without a separate equivalent. Half-formed renders hēmigenes: the following account places odors between water and air, rather than assigning a characteristic odor to each fully constituted elemental form.

2029. Phlebes is translated passages because the argument concerns channels admitting material to the organ of smell, not specifically blood vessels. The account relates passage size to elemental bodies. The four processes in the final clause are retained in their printed order; the basic elements themselves are said to lack perceptible odor.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 54

4.3 I.54.4.3

μεταβάλλοντος γὰρ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα ἀέρος τε εἰς ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων γεγόνασιν, εἰσί τε ὀσμαὶ ξύμπασαι καπνὸς ἢ ὀμίχλη. Τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ ἰὸν ὀμίχλη, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα καπνός. Ὅθεν λεπτότεραι μὲν ὕδατος, παχύτεραι δὲ ὀσμαὶ ξύμπασαι γεγόνασιν ἀέρος.

4.4 I.54.4.4

Δηλοῦται δέ, ὁπόταν τινὸς ἀντιφραχθέντος περὶ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν ἄγῃ τις βίᾳ τὸ πνεῦμα εἰς αὐτόν· τότε γὰρ ὀσμὴ μὲν οὐδεμία ξυνδιηθεῖται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τῶν ὀσμῶν ἐρημωθὲν αὐτὸ μόνον ἔπεται.

4.5 I.54.4.5

Δι᾽ οἷν ταῦτα ἀνώνυμα τούτων ποικίλματα γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν οὐδὲ ἁπλῶν εἰδῶν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ διχῇ τό τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτόθι μόνω διαφανῆ λέγεσθον,

BOOK I CHAPTER 54

4.3 · Smoke and mist

I.54.4.3

“For when water changes into air and air into water, odors arise between the two, and all odors are smoke or mist. Of these, what passes from air into water is mist, and what passes from water into air is smoke. Thus all odors are finer than water but coarser than air.”[2030]

4.4 · Air passing through a barrier

I.54.4.4

“This becomes evident when something has been placed as a barrier to breathing and someone forcibly draws air into himself: then no odor is filtered through with it, but the air alone follows, stripped of odors.”[2031]

4.5 · Two clear distinctions

I.54.4.5

“For these reasons their varieties have remained unnamed, since they are not made up of many forms or of simple ones; instead, let only the pleasant and the painful be clearly distinguished here as a pair:”[2032]

2030. The distinctions between smoke and mist, and the opposite directions of change, follow the printed text. Finer and coarser render comparative thickness or fineness in this physical model. Smoke is the passage’s term for the transition from water toward air, not a modern chemical classification.

2031. The passage appeals to a filtering comparison. It does not specify the material placed across the breathing passage. The statement is translated as part of the ancient argument; no particular modern filter or experimental procedure is introduced.

2032. The difficult phrase ouk ek pollōn oude haplōn eidōn is retained: not made up of many forms or of simple ones. The precise force of this denial is uncertain and the Greek is not rewritten to remove the difficulty. The dual forms monō and legesthon identify the two broad effects, pleasant and painful, rather than a list of individually named odors.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 54

4.6 I.54.4.6

τὸ μὲν τραχῦνόν τε καὶ βιαζόμενον τὸ κύτος ἅπαν, ὅσον ἡμῶν μεταξὺ κορυφῆς τοῦ τε ὀμφαλοῦ κεῖται, τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καταπραῦνον καὶ πάλιν ᾗ πέφυκεν ἀγαπητῶς ἀποδιδόν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 54

4.6 · Painful and pleasant odors I.54.4.6

“the one roughening and violently affecting the whole cavity in us between the crown of the head and the navel, the other soothing that same region and agreeably restoring it to its natural condition.”[2033]

2033. The description takes the painful odor first and the pleasant second, reversing the order in which the pair was just named. Kytos is the bodily cavity or hollow region. The claim concerns the effects of smell over the extent of the body specified by the text. This completes chapter 54.

BOOK I CHAPTER 55

Κεφάλαιον ΝΕ′ I.55.heading

Περὶ γεύσεως.

1 I.55.1

Διδύμου.

Ἀριστοτέλους. Γεύεσθαι διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ τῶν γευστῶν ὑγρῶν.

2.1 I.55.2.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Πρῶτον οὖν ὅσα τῶν χυμῶν πέρι λέγοντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀπελίπομεν, ἴδια ὄντα παθήματα περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν, ἐμφανιστέον εἰ δυνατόν. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ πολλά, διὰ συγκρίσεών τέ τινων καὶ διακρίσεων γίγνεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ αὐταῖς κεχρῆσθαι μᾶλλόν τι τῶν ἄλλων τραχύτησί τε καὶ λειότησιν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 55

Chapter 55 · Taste

I.55.heading

On taste.[2034]

1 · Taste and liquids

I.55.1

Didymus.

Aristotle. We taste through the intervening medium of the liquids that can be tasted.[2035]

2.1 · The tongue’s distinctive experiences

I.55.2.1

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“First, then, we must explain, if possible, what we left aside in our earlier discussion of flavors: the experiences peculiar to the tongue. These too, like most other things, appear to arise through certain contractions and expansions, and, in addition, to involve roughness and smoothness rather more than the others do.”[2036]

2034. The editor restores the heading from Photius p. 112b33 and the Laurentian table of contents; it is absent from FP. The principal excerpt explains tastes through bodily interaction, including contraction, cleansing, heat, and fermentation. The concluding passage connects the mouth’s role in nutrition with its role in speech.

2035. The Latin attribution names Didymus, Epitome of Physics, fragment 17, Diels p. 456, without angle brackets in this instance; the Greek heading names Aristotle. The compressed wording includes the plural genitive tōn geustōn hygrōn, the liquids that can be tasted. The relation of these liquids to the intervening medium is left close to the printed wording; saliva or a missing singular noun is not supplied.

2036. The edition identifies Timaeus 65c-66d. Chymoi are flavors or taste-bearing juices. Synkrisis and diakrisis here describe contraction and expansion, as the following account of the tongue’s small vessels makes clear. The printed ei dynaton, if possible, is retained, rather than the ēi dynaton recorded for Plato in the apparatus.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.2 I.55.2.2

Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ εἰσιόντα περὶ τὰ φλέβια, οἷόν περ δοκίμια τῆς γλώττης τεταμένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, εἰς τὰ νοτερὰ τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἁπαλὰ ἐμπίπτοντα γήινα μέρη κατατηκόμενα ξυνάγει τὰ φλέβια καὶ ἀποξηραίνει, τραχύτερα μὲν ὄντα στυφνά, ἧττον δὲ τραχύνοντα αὐστηρὰ φαίνεται.

2.3 I.55.2.3

Τὰ δὲ τούτων τε ῥυπτικὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν ἀποπλύνοντα πέρα μὲν τοῦ μετρίου τοῦτο δρῶντα καὶ προσεπιλαμβανόμενα, ὥστε ἀποτήκειν αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, οἷον ἡ τῶν νίτρων δύναμις, πικρὰ πάνθ᾽ οὕτως ὠνόμασται·

2.4 I.55.2.4

τὰ δ᾽ ὑποδεέστερα τῆς νιτρώδους ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὸ μέτριον τε τῇ ῥύψει χρώμενα ἁλυκὰ ἄνευ πικρότητος τραχείας καὶ φίλα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν φαντάζεται.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.2 · Astringent and austere tastes I.55.2.2

“For earthy particles entering around the little vessels, which are like testing instruments of the tongue stretched toward the heart, fall upon the moist, soft parts of the flesh and dissolve, drawing the little vessels together and drying them. When rougher, they seem astringent; when they roughen less, austere.”[2037]

2.3 · Bitter cleansing I.55.2.3

“Those that cleanse these parts and wash away everything around the tongue, when they do so beyond measure and attack further, so as to dissolve the tongue’s own substance, as does the power of natron, have all accordingly been called bitter.”[2038]

2.4 · Milder cleansing and saltiness I.55.2.4

“Those less powerful than the natron-like condition, using their cleansing action in moderation, appear salty without harsh bitterness, and more agreeable to us.”[2039]

2037. The passage itself describes the tongue’s small vessels as testing instruments directed toward the heart. Earthy particles are the subject of the actions. Styphna and austēra name stronger and weaker degrees of the drying, contracting effect, rendered astringent and austere; the latter word describes a taste, not a moral disposition.

2038. Rhyptika means cleansing or scouring. The explanation links bitterness with a cleansing action strong enough to affect the tongue’s own tissue. Nitra is rendered natron, an alkaline cleansing substance, without identifying it with a single pure modern compound. The example belongs to the ancient classification.

2039. The comparative contrast is between excessive and moderate cleansing. Halyka means salty. The English follows the printed nitrōdous, natron-like; the difference between this word and the spelling reported for Plato is orthographic, not an additional ingredient.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.5 I.55.2.5

Τὰ δὲ τοῦ στόματος θερμότητι κοινωνήσαντα καὶ λίαν μὲν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ συνεκπυρούμενα καὶ πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀντικάοντα τὸ διαθερμῆναν, φερόμενά τε ὑπὸ κουφότητος ἄνω πρὸς τὰς κεφαλῆς αἰσθήσεις, τέμνοντα πάνθ᾽ ὅσοις ἂν προσπίπτῃ, διὰ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις δριμέα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέχθη.

2.6 I.55.2.6

Τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν προλελεπτυσμένων μὲν ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος, εἰς δὲ τὰς στενὰς φλέβας ἐνδυομένων, καὶ τοῖς ἐνοῦσιν αὐτόθι μέρεσι γεώδεσι καὶ ὅσα ἀέρος ξυμμετρίαν ἔχοντα, ὥστε κινήσαντα περὶ ἄλληλα ποιεῖν κυκᾶσθαι, κυκώμενα δὲ περιπίπτειν τε, καὶ εἰς ἕτερα ἐνδυόμενα ἕτερα κοῖλα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, περιγιγνόμενα τοῖς εἰσιοῦσιν·

2.7 I.55.2.7

ἃ δὴ νοτίδος περὶ ἀέρα κοίλης περιταθείσης, τοτὲ μὲν γεώδους, τοτὲ δὲ καθαρᾶς, νοτερὰ ἀγγεῖα ἀέρος ὕδατα κοῖλα περιφερῆ τε γενέσθαι, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς καθαρᾶς διαφανεῖς περιστῆναι, κληθείσας ὄνομα πομφόλυγας,

BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.5 · Pungency and heat

I.55.2.5

“Those that share in the mouth’s heat and are intensely kindled along with it, then in turn burn what warmed them, and are carried upward by their lightness toward the senses of the head, cutting everything they encounter: all such things were called pungent because of these powers.”[2040]

2.6 · Decay, circulation, and enclosure

I.55.2.6

“Some of these same substances, refined beforehand by decay, enter the narrow passages and are proportioned to the earthy particles there and to whatever air is present. They set these in motion, making them circulate around one another; as they circulate, they collide, and, entering into one another, form hollows by enclosing what enters.”[2041]

2.7 · The formation of bubbles

I.55.2.7

“When moisture, sometimes earthy and sometimes pure, is stretched in a hollow shell around air, these become moist containers of air, hollow and rounded bodies of water. Those formed from pure moisture stand transparent around it and are given the name bubbles.”[2042]

2040. The printed kai lian men, and intensely, is retained; the apparatus records the different phrase kai leiainomena, and being smoothed, in Plato. The Greek’s unbalanced construction is smoothed in English without importing that reading. Drimea is pungent or acrid: the description combines reciprocal heating, upward movement, and cutting.

2041. The Greek shifts from genitive participles to other constructions; the English gives a provisional continuous account while retaining the actions in order. It takes the stated proportion as relating the entering substances to the earthy and airy contents of the passages. Perigignomena is read as enclosing, in preparation for the following account of moist walls around air. No missing Greek is supplied.

2042. The syntax continues the preceding difficult sentence. The English understands hydata koila peripherē as hollow, rounded bodies of water: the moisture surrounds the enclosed air. Pompholyges are bubbles. The distinction between pure and earthy moisture leads to the next contrast.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.8 I.55.2.8

τὰ δὲ τῆς γεώδους, ὁμοῦ κινουμένης τε καὶ ἀναιρουμένης, ζέσιν τε καὶ ζύμωσιν ἐπικληθῆναι· τὸ δὲ τούτων αἴτιον τῶν παθημάτων ὀξὺ προσορηθῆναι.

2.9 I.55.2.9

Ξύμπασι δὲ περὶ ταῦτα εἰρημένοις πάθος ἐναντίον ἀπ᾽ ἐναντίας ἐστὶ προφάσεως, ὁπόταν ἡ τῶν εἰσιόντων σύστασις ἐν ὑγροῖς, οἰκεία τῇ τῆς γλώττης ἕξει πεφυκυῖα, λειαίνῃ μὲν ἐπαλείφουσα τὰ τραχυνθέντα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα ἢ κεχυμένα τὰ μὲν συνάγῃ, τὰ δὲ χαλᾷ, καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα ἱδρύῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ἡδὺ καὶ προσφιλὲς πάντῃ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴαμα τῶν βιαίων παθημάτων γιγνόμενον, κέκληται γλυκύ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ταύτῃ ταῦτα.

BOOK I CHAPTER 55

2.8 · Fermentation and sourness I.55.2.8

“Those formed from earthy moisture, as it is stirred and lifted up together, are called seething and fermentation; the cause of these experiences is called sour.”[2043]

2.9 · Sweetness as restoration I.55.2.9

“An experience opposite to all those described in this connection arises from an opposite cause: whenever the constitution of what enters in liquid form is naturally suited to the tongue’s condition, it coats and smooths what has been roughened, gathers some parts and relaxes others among those unnaturally contracted or dispersed, and establishes everything as nearly as possible in its natural state. Every such remedy for violent affections, becoming pleasant and welcome in every way, has been called sweet. So much for these matters.”[2044]

2043. Zesis is seething or effervescence, zymōsis fermentation. The English takes anairoumenēs as being lifted up and retains the printed form; the apparatus reports airomenēs in Plato. Oxys here means sour, whereas the same adjective describes high pitch in I.53.5.3. The physical process and the resulting taste term remain distinct.

2044. The restoration of a natural condition explains sweetness. The printed wording first names contracted and dispersed parts, then gathering and relaxing; the English retains both pairs without forcing a one-to-one correspondence in the same order. The intended restorative contrast is clearer than the precise distribution of its demonstratives. The passage’s final sentence is included.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

3 I.55.3

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Τὴν δὲ δὴ τοῦ στόματος ἡμῶν δύναμιν ὀδοῦσι καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ χείλεσιν ἕνεκα τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ τῶν ἀρίστων διεκόσμησαν οἱ διακοσμοῦντες, ᾗ νῦν διατέτακται, τὴν μὲν εἴσοδον τῶν ἀναγκαίων μηχανώμενοι χάριν, τὴν δ᾽ ἔξοδον τῶν ἀρίστων· ἀναγκαῖον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ὅσον εἰσέρχεται τροφὴν διδὸν τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ λόγων νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον πάντων ναμάτων.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 55

3 · Food entering and speech going out I.55.3

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“Those who ordered us equipped the functioning of our mouth with teeth, tongue, and lips for the sake of what is necessary and what is best, arranging it as it is now: they devised its entrance for necessary things, its exit for the best. For everything that enters and gives nourishment to the body is necessary, while the stream of words flowing outward and serving understanding is the finest and best of all streams.”[2045]

2045. The edition identifies Timaeus 75d-e. The unnamed orderers remain unnamed in the excerpt. The physical entrance of food is paired with the outward stream of speech serving phronēsis, understanding or intelligence. The translation preserves the repeated stream image. This completes chapter 55.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 56

Κεφάλαιον ΝϚ′ I.56.heading

Περὶ ἀφῆς.

1.1 I.56.1.1

<Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἅπτεσθαι δὲ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ σώματος τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον <ἢ τὸν> ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ἐκ τούτων τι κοινόν.

1.2 I.56.1.2

Λανθάνειν δὲ ἐπί τε τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς διὰ τὸ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ γίγνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀκουστῶν καὶ ὀσφραντῶν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 56

Chapter 56 · Touch I.56.heading

On touch.[2046]

1.1 · The body between flesh and object I.56.1.1

<Didymus.>

Aristotle. We perceive by touch through the body between the flesh and what is touched. Such a body is <either> air or water, or something common to both.[2047]

1.2 · Why the medium goes unnoticed I.56.1.2

In taste and touch this goes unnoticed because the process does not occur over a long distance, as it does in the case of things seen, heard, and smelled.[2048]

2046. The heading is transmitted in the margin of F and in the text of P, and also occurs in the Laurentian collection. Unlike the preceding three chapter headings, it is not described here as an editorial restoration. The chapter contains one excerpt, whose final sentence turns from contact perception to the origin of bodily movement.

2047. The supplied attribution identifies Didymus, Physics fragment 17, Diels p. 456. The printed tou haptou, what is touched, is Diels's correction of the manuscript wording. Meineke supplied ē ton before air; either conveys the conjunction, while the Greek article needs no separate English word. The final alternative is left as something common to both, without specifying its composition.

2048. The intervening medium or its action is understood as what goes unnoticed. The explanation contrasts the short distance involved in touch and taste with the greater separation possible in the other three senses; it does not deny a medium in the former two.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 56

1.3 I.56.1.3

Τοῦ δὲ κινητικοῦ κατὰ τόπον ὃ δὴ προσείπομεν ὁρμητικόν, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἀκίνητον εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 56

1.3 · The first mover of bodily action I.56.1.3

As for the capacity for movement from place to place, which we called the impulsive capacity, its first mover is unmoved, both in us and in the other animals.[2049]

2049. Hormētikon denotes the capacity for impulse or impetus to action. The phrase which we called points back to a discussion outside this short excerpt. The statement concerns the source of animal locomotion; it is not expanded into a claim about a cosmic first mover. This completes chapter 56 at printed p. 496 line 23.

BOOK I CHAPTER 57

Κεφάλαιον ΝΖ′ I.57.heading

Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ φωνὴ καὶ <πόθεν αἰσθητικὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ> τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

1.1 I.57.1.1

<Ἀετίου.>

Πλάτων τὴν φωνὴν ὁρίζεται πνεῦμα διὰ στόματος ἀπὸ διανοίας καὶ πληγὴν ὑπ᾽ ἀέρος δι᾽ ὤτων καὶ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς διαδιδομένην.

1.2 I.57.1.2

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ καταχρηστικῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων φωνὴ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων, ὡς χρεμετισμοὶ καὶ ψόφοι. Κυρίως δὲ φωνὴ ἔναρθρός ἐστιν, ἔστι γὰρ φωτίζουσα τὸ νοούμενον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 57

Chapter 57 · Voice

I.57.heading

On voice, whether voice is incorporeal, <whence the soul has the power of perception, and> what its ruling part is.[2050]

1.1 · Breath and a transmitted blow

I.57.1.1

<Aëtius.>

Plato defines voice as breath passing through the mouth from thought, and as a blow delivered by air and transmitted through the ears, brain, and blood as far as the soul.[2051]

1.2 · Voice in the strict and extended senses

I.57.1.2

The word voice is also used in an extended sense of nonrational animals and of inanimate things, as with neighing and noises. Strictly speaking, however, voice is articulate, for it illuminates what is thought.[2052]

2050. The editor supplies the middle clause of this heading, referring to his Prolegomena. The heading announces more questions than the short surviving excerpt answers. The single excerpt has no printed number; 1 and its decimal subdivisions are modern comparison locators, as also in chapters 58 and 60.

2051. The supplied Latin attribution identifies Aëtius IV.19.11, Diels p. 407, line 13. This formulation differs from I.53.5.2: here ears, brain, and blood are explicitly linked under through. Phōnē is voice or sound; the first definition connects it with thought, while the second describes its physical transmission.

2052. Katachrēstikōs marks an extended or improper use of a word, contrasted with its strict use. The explanation associates phōnē with phōtizein, to illuminate: articulate speech makes thought clear. This is the passage's explanatory wordplay, not a claim about a securely established linguistic derivation. This completes chapter 57.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 58

Κεφάλαιον ΝΗ′ I.58.heading

Περὶ φαντασίας καὶ κριτηρίου.

1.1 I.58.1.1

<Διδύμου.>

Ἀριστοτέλους. Φαντασίαν δ᾽ εἶναι πάθος τι καὶ κίνησιν τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως. Ὠνομάσθαι δ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῆς ὁράσεως· τὸ <γὰρ> φαίνεσθαι παρὰ τὸ φάος ἔχειν τὴν ἐπίρρησιν.

1.2 I.58.1.2

τοῦτο δ᾽ οἰκεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὄψεως, διατείνειν δὲ <εἰς> πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοητικὰς κινήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ταύτας ὁμωνύμως λέγεσθαι φαντασίας.

BOOK I CHAPTER 58

Chapter 58 · Imagination and the criterion I.58.heading

On imagination and the criterion.[2053]

1.1 · Imagination and light I.58.1.1

<Didymus.>

Aristotle. Imagination is a certain affection and movement of perception in activity. It takes its name from one of the senses, sight; <for> appearing derives its designation from light.[2054]

1.2 · Extension beyond sight I.58.1.2

This belongs properly to sight, but extends <to> all the senses and the movements of thought; for these too are called imaginations by the same name.[2055]

2053. Heeren restored this heading from Photius p. 112b35; it is absent from FP. Phantasia denotes the experience or capacity of having appearances or images, rather than only creative invention. The criterion is the means of judging or distinguishing the objects of knowledge.

2054. The supplied attribution identifies Didymus, Epitome of Physics, fragment 16, Diels p. 456. The editor supplies gar, for. The report connects phantasia, imagination or appearance, with phainesthai, to appear, and phaos, light. The English states the ancient explanation without presenting it as an independently established etymology.

2055. The source supplies eis, to. This looks back to the connection with appearing and light; the compressed wording does not fully distinguish the name's origin from the capacity's range. Homōnymōs indicates use of the same name for the further cases. The translation retains the extension to thought as well as to the other senses.

BOOK I CHAPTER 58

1.3 I.58.1.3

Κριτήρια δ᾽ εἶναι τῆς τούτων γνώσεως τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸν μὲν τῶν νοητῶν, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Οὔτε γὰρ τὸ καθόλου δύναιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις ἐπικρίνειν οὔτε τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον νοῦς. Πάντα δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων συνεστάναι καὶ διὰ τούτων.

BOOK I CHAPTER 58

1.3 · Intellect and perception as criteria I.58.1.3

The criteria for knowledge of these things are intellect and perception: intellect for intelligible things, perception for perceptible things. For perception could not judge the universal, nor intellect the particular. Everything is constituted from these and through these.[2056]

2056. Nous is intellect; to katholou is the universal and to kath' hekaston the particular or individual case. The concluding everything is compressed and its scope is not made explicit. It is translated closely rather than expanded into a further theory of how perception and intellect cooperate. This completes chapter 58.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 59

Κεφάλαιον ΝΘ′ I.59.heading

Περὶ δόξης.

1.1 I.59.1.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ.

Τί δὲ δή; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται; Ὧδ᾽ εἴσει ῥᾷον, <ἂν> πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτά, τί ποτ᾽ ἔστι καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.

Δίδου μόνον.

BOOK I CHAPTER 59

Chapter 59 · Belief

I.59.heading

On belief.[2057]

1.1 · Truth and falsity in the soul

I.59.1.1

Plato, from the Sophist.

“What, then? As for thought, belief, and appearance, is it not already clear that all these arise in our souls as both false and true? You will understand this more easily <if> you first grasp what they are and how each differs from the others.”

“Just explain them.”[2058]

2057. The apparatus records the heading in the Laurentian table of contents. Doxa is belief or opinion, which may be true or false. The chapter contains three Platonic extracts. Dialogue exchanges are placed on separate lines on both facing pages; speaker names absent from this printing are not added.

2058. The edition identifies Sophist 263e-264b. It supplies an, represented here by if with the following conditional verb. The apparatus notes an additional question in Plato at the transition to You will understand; it is absent from this excerpt and is not imported. Phantasia is rendered appearance in this discussion of a belief arising through perception.

BOOK I CHAPTER 59

1.2 I.59.1.2

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τὸ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;

Ἀληθῆ.

1.3 I.59.1.3

Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὐτὸ ἴσμεν ἐνόν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

Ἴσμεν.

Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅ τι προσείπῃς αὐτό;

Καὶ πῶς;

BOOK I CHAPTER 59

1.2 · Thought as silent dialogue I.59.1.2

“Then thought and speech are the same, except that the dialogue occurring within the soul with itself, without voice, has been given precisely this name by us: thought?”

“Certainly.”

“And the stream from the soul that passes through the mouth with sound has been called speech?”

“True.”[2059]

1.3 · Assertion, denial, and belief I.59.1.3

“And we know that this is present in speech.”

“What?”

“Assertion and denial.”

“We do.”

“So when this occurs silently within the soul in thought, have you any name for it other than belief?”

“How could I?”[2060]

2059. Dianoia is thought, logos speech or discourse, and dialogos dialogue. Their relationship is explained through the contrast between silent conversation within the soul and its audible stream through the mouth. The stream image also occurs in the Timaeus excerpt at I.55.3.

2060. Phasis and apophasis are assertion and denial. The passage moves from what spoken discourse does to its silent counterpart in thought. The reply How could I? agrees that belief is the appropriate name; it does not ask for an alternative explanation.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 59

1.4 I.59.1.4

Τί δ᾽ ὅταν δόξα μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος, οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;

Οὐδέν.

1.5 I.59.1.5

Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων συγγενῶν ὄντων, ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι;

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

Κατανοεῖς οὖν, ὅτι πρότερον εὑρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος.

BOOK I CHAPTER 59

1.4 · Belief through perception I.59.1.4

“And when belief comes to someone, not by itself but through perception, can this sort of experience in turn rightly be called anything other than appearance?”

“Nothing else.”[2061]

1.5 · The related forms of discourse I.59.1.5

“Then, since speech could be true or false, and among these things thought proved to be the soul’s dialogue with itself, belief the completion of thought, and what we call ‘it appears’ a mixture of perception and belief, must not some of these too sometimes be false, since these forms of discourse are related?”

“How could it be otherwise?”

“You understand, then, that false belief and speech have been discovered first.”[2062]

2061. The source retains doxa, belief, where the apparatus reports its omission in Plato. Its presence makes the construction less regular: belief and this sort of experience both enter the clause. The English smooths their relationship without removing belief from the facing Greek. Appearance here combines a perceptual experience with belief.

2062. The printed phainetai, it appears, is retained as the expression being explained, rather than replaced in the Greek by phantasia. The source has tōn logōn, of the discourses, where the apparatus reports tōi logōi, to speech, in Plato. The English takes the printed plural as describing related forms of discourse. First points to the surrounding argument in the Sophist, beyond the limits of this excerpt.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 59

2 I.59.2

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Συμποσίου.

Ἤτοι τῆς διανοίας <ὅψις ἄρχεται> ὀξὺ βλέπειν, ὅταν ἡ τῶν ὀμμάτων τῆς ἀκμῆς λήγειν ἐπιχειρῇ.

3.1 I.59.3.1

Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας γ′.

Φαίνεταί μοι δόξα ἐξιέναι ἐκ διανοίας ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, ἑκουσίως μὲν ἡ ψευδὴς τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἡ ἀληθής.

Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἑκουσίου, ἔφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκουσίου [οὐ] δέομαι μαθεῖν.

BOOK I CHAPTER 59

2 · The mind’s sight I.59.2

Plato, from the Symposium.

“Indeed, the mind’s <sight begins> to see keenly when the sight of the eyes begins to lose its prime.”[2063]

3.1 · Losing a belief willingly or unwillingly I.59.3.1

Plato, Republic, Book III.

“It seems to me that a belief leaves the mind either willingly or unwillingly: a false belief willingly, when someone learns better, but every true belief unwillingly.”

“I understand the willing case,” he said, “but I do [not] need to learn about the unwilling one.”[2064]

2063. The edition identifies Symposium 219a and supplies opsis archetai, sight begins. The saying contrasts mental discernment with the waning acuity of bodily vision. Oxys, keen, is used metaphorically for the mind, unlike its applications to pitch or sour taste in the preceding chapters.

2064. The edition identifies Republic III, 412e-413a. The rejected ou, not, is retained in square brackets; the reply’s intended sense is that the speaker still needs the second case explained. Metamanthanein means learning differently or correcting one’s previous understanding. Willingly and unwillingly concern the person relinquishing the belief.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 59

3.2 I.59.3.2

Τί δαί; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἠγῇ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἑκουσίως; ἢ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

Ἀλλ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καί μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄκοντες ἀληθοῦς δόξης στερίσκεσθαι.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 59

3.2 · Truth as a good

I.59.3.2

“Well, then,” I said, “do you not also think that people are deprived of good things unwillingly, but of bad things willingly? Or is being deceived about the truth not bad, and holding to the truth good? Or does believing things as they are not seem to you to be holding to the truth?”

“Yes,” he said, “you are right; and it seems to me that people are deprived of true belief against their will.”[2065]

2065. The argument treats true belief as a good and error as an evil. The apparatus reports that the manuscripts reverse willingly and unwillingly in the first question; the editor’s printed correction follows Plato and the parallel excerpt in Book II. The English follows that corrected text. This completes chapter 59.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

Κεφάλαιον Ξ′ I.60.heading

Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ παθῶν.

1.1 I.60.1.1

Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου.

Πάλιν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἴδωμεν πάθος, αἷς χρώμενον αἰτίαις τοιοῦτον γέγονεν οἷόνπερ τὰ νῦν ἐστιν. Ὧδ᾽ οὖν. Ἐπειδὴ κενὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν, εἰς ὃ τῶν φερομένων δύναιτ᾽ ἂν εἰσελθεῖν τι, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα φέρεται παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἔξω, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη παντὶ δῆλον ὡς οὐκ εἰς κενόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλησίον ἐκ τῆς ἕδρας ὠθεῖ·

1.2 I.60.1.2

τὸ δ᾽ ὠθούμενον ἐξελαύνει τὸ πλησίον ἀεί, καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀνάγκην πᾶν περιελαυνόμενον εἰς τὴν ἕδραν, ὅθεν ἐξῆλθε τὸ πνεῦμα, εἰσιὸν ἐκεῖσε καὶ ἀναπληροῦν αὐτὴν ξυνέπεται τῷ πνεύματι, καὶ τοῦτο ἅμα πᾶν οἷον τροχοῦ περιαγομένου γίγνεται διὰ τὸ κενὸν μηδὲν εἶναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 60

Chapter 60 · Breathing and bodily processes

I.60.heading

On breathing and bodily processes.[2066]

1.1 · Breathing in a world without a void

I.60.1.1

Plato, from the Timaeus.

“Let us return to the process of breathing and consider the causes through which it has come to be as it now is. The account is this. Since there is no void into which any moving thing could enter, yet breath moves outward from us, what follows is already clear to everyone: it does not pass into a void, but pushes what is next to it out of its place.”[2067]

1.2 · A circuit of displacement

I.60.1.2

“What is pushed always drives out its neighbor in turn. Under this very necessity, the whole mass is driven around into the place from which the breath departed; entering there and filling it again, it follows the breath. All this happens together, as though a wheel were turning, because there is no void.”[2068]

2066. Heeren restored the heading from Photius p. 112b36; it is absent from FP. Pathē means affections or things undergone, here rendered bodily processes to suit the excerpt’s subject. The chapter ends Book I with a continuous Timaeus passage on breathing, related physical motions, and nourishment.

2067. The edition identifies Timaeus 79a-81a. The explanation begins from the denial of a void and describes reciprocal displacement. Pneuma is breath or moving air in this context. The argument belongs to the ancient physical model, whose assumptions are retained in the translation.

2068. The whole mass is the displaced air understood from the context. The wheel compares a continuous circuit in which departure from one place entails replacement from another. The claim that the events occur together is retained, as is the repetition of the no-void premise.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.3 I.60.1.3

Διὸ δὴ τῶν μὲν στηθῶν καὶ τοῦ πνεύμονος ἔξω μεθὲν τὸ πνεῦμα πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀέρος, εἴσω διὰ μανοῦ τῶν σαρκικῶν δυομένου καὶ περιελαυνομένου, γίγνεται πλῆρες·

1.4 I.60.1.4

αὖθις δὲ ἀποτρεπόμενος ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔξωθεν ἰὼν εἴσω τὴν ἀναπνοὴν περιωθεῖ κατὰ τὴν στόματος καὶ τὴν τῶν μυκτήρων δίοδον.

1.5 I.60.1.5

Τὴν δ᾽ αἰτίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν θετέον τήνδε. Πᾶν ζῷον αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐντὸς περὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὰς φλέβας θερμότατα ἔχει, οἷον ἐν αὐτῷ πηγήν τινα ἐνοῦσαν πυρός·

BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.3 · Refilling the chest and lung I.60.1.3

“Thus the region of the chest and lung, having let the breath out, is filled again by the air around the body, which penetrates inward through the porous parts of the flesh and is driven around.”[2069]

1.4 · The return movement of air I.60.1.4

“Then, turning back and passing through the body from outside, the air drives the breath inward through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils.”[2070]

1.5 · The source of bodily heat I.60.1.5

“We must give the following cause of their beginning. Every animal has its hottest parts within itself, around the blood and the vessels, as though there were a spring of fire inside it.”[2071]

2069. The printed construction lacks an explicit noun for the region that releases the breath and becomes full. The English supplies region to make the relation intelligible; the Greek is unchanged. The apparatus records to tōn stēthōn in Plato where this printing has tōn stēthōn. The account assumes that air can pass through the flesh.

2070. This printing has exōthen, from outside, where the apparatus records exō, outward, in Plato. The printed direction is retained even though it makes the reversal less easy to follow. Anapnoē here denotes the breath driven inward; the surrounding account distinguishes this from the outward phase.

2071. Their beginning refers to the motions just described. The spring or source of fire supplies the heat that will account for their alternation. Phlebes here are vessels associated with the blood. The comparison does not identify a discrete anatomical organ as the spring.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.6 I.60.1.6

ὃ δὴ καὶ προσεικάζομεν τῷ τοῦ κύρτου πλέγματι κατὰ μέσον διατεταμένον ἐκ πυρὸς πεπλέχθαι πᾶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἔξωθεν, ἀέρος. Τὸ θερμὸν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ χώραν ἔξω πρὸς τὸ ξυγγενὲς ὁμολογητέον ἰέναι.

1.7 I.60.1.7

Δυοῖν δὲ ταῖν διεξόδοιν οὔσαιν, τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἔξω, τῆς δὲ αὖ κατὰ στόμα καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁρμήσῃ, θάτερα περιωθεῖ· τὸ δὲ περιωσθὲν εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐμπῖπτον θερμαίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξιὸν ψύχεται.

1.8 I.60.1.8

Μεταβαλλούσης δὲ τῆς θερμότητος καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν ἔξοδον θερμοτέρων γιγνομένων πάλιν ἐκείνῃ ῥέπον αὖ τὸ θερμότερον μᾶλλον, πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν φερόμενον, περιωθεῖ τὸ κατὰ θάτερα· τὸ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχον καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀνταποδιδὸν ἀεί, κύκλον ἀεὶ σαλευόμενον, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἀπειργασμένον ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ ἐκπνοὴν γίγνεσθαι παρέχεται.

BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.6 · The mesh of fire and air

I.60.1.6

“We also liken this to the mesh of a fish trap: what is stretched through the middle is woven wholly of fire, while the other parts, outside, are of air. We must agree that what is hot naturally travels outward to its own region, toward what is akin to it.”[2072]

1.7 · Two outlets

I.60.1.7

“There are two outlets, one outward through the body, the other through the mouth and nostrils. Whenever the heat rushes toward one, it drives the air around by the other. What is driven around falls into the fire and is heated; what goes out is cooled.”[2073]

1.8 · Alternating inhalation and exhalation

I.60.1.8

“When the heat shifts and what lies by the other outlet grows hotter, the hotter part leans more in that direction in turn, moving toward its own nature, and drives around what lies by the opposite route. This continually undergoes the same effects and returns them in kind, producing a circle that is always being rocked to and fro by both movements, and so brings about inhalation and exhalation.”[2074]

2072. Kyrtos is a basket-like fish trap. The comparison recalls an earlier description in the Timaeus, outside this excerpt. The English smooths the compressed construction after liken while preserving the central fire and outer air. Movement toward what is akin explains why internal heat tends outward.

2073. The Greek uses dual forms for the two routes. Heat and air are made explicit in the English where the shifting subjects are understood from the preceding account. The contrast is between the bodily surface and the mouth and nostrils, with heating inward and cooling outward.

2074. The final construction is difficult. The English provisionally connects kyklon, circle, with the resulting oscillation produced by the two movements. The apparatus records kyklōi houtō, thus in a circle, for Plato in place of this printing’s kyklon aei. The printed wording is retained, including the distinction between anapnoē and ekpnoē at the end.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.9 I.60.1.9

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἰατρικὰς σικύας παθημάτων αἴτια καὶ τὰ τῆς πόσεως τά τε τῶν ῥιπτουμένων, ὅσα ἀφεθέντα μετέωρα καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ γῆς φέρεται, ταύτῃ διωκτέον,

1.10 I.60.1.10

καὶ ὅσοι φθόγγοι ταχεῖς καὶ βραδεῖς, ὀξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται, τοτὲ μὲν ἀνάρμοστοι φερόμενοι δι᾽ ἀνομοιότητα τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινήσεως· τοτὲ δὲ ξύμφωνοι δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα.

1.11 I.60.1.11

Τὰς γὰρ τῶν προτέρων καὶ θαττόνων οἱ βραδύτεροι κινήσεις ἀποπαυομένας ἤδη τε εἰς ὅμοιον ἐληλυθυίας, αἷς ὕστερον αὐτοὶ προσφερόμενοι κινοῦσιν ἐκείνας, καταλαμβάνουσι,

BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.9 · Cupping, drinking, and moving bodies I.60.1.9

“The causes of the effects associated with medical cupping vessels, of drinking, and of thrown objects that, once released, travel through the air or along the ground must also be investigated in this way.”[2075]

1.10 · Discord and concord I.60.1.10

“So too with sounds that appear swift or slow, high or low: sometimes they arrive in discord because of dissimilarity in the movement they cause within us, and sometimes in concord because of similarity.”[2076]

1.11 · The slower sounds catch the earlier movements I.60.1.11

“For the slower sounds catch the movements of the earlier, faster sounds when those movements are already subsiding and have become similar to the movements with which the slower sounds, approaching later, move them.”[2077]

2075. Iatrikai sikyai are cupping vessels used in ancient medicine. The argument extends reciprocal displacement to effects otherwise described in terms of suction or continued motion after release. The apparatus reports a different word connected with swallowing in Plato; the printed posis, drinking, is retained here.

2076. The explanation connects concord and discord with the movements that sounds produce in the perceiver. Swift and slow are retained as the text’s physical descriptions, alongside high and low pitch; they are not replaced with a modern account in terms of frequency. Compare I.53.5.3.

2077. The slower sounds are the grammatical subject, and the earlier movements the object of catch. The relative clause is compressed: the English takes ais as referring to the movements imparted by the later sounds, and ekeinas to the earlier movements. This interpretation retains the printed wording without supplying a missing Greek noun.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.12 I.60.1.12

καταλαμβάνοντες δὲ οὐκ ἄλλην ἐπεμβάλλοντες ἀνετάραξαν κίνησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρχὴν βραδυτέρας φορᾶς [καὶ] κατὰ <τὴν> τοῦ θάττονος, ἀπολειγούσης δὲ ὁμοιότητα προσάψαντες μίαν ἐξ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας συνεκεράσαντο πάθην·

1.13 I.60.1.13

ὅθεν ἡδονὴν μὲν τοῖς ἄφροσιν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἔμφροσι διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἁρμονίας κίνησιν ἐν θνηταῖς γενομένην φοραῖς παρέσχον.

1.14 I.60.1.14

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑδάτων πάντα ῥεύματα, ἔτι τε τὰ τῶν κεραυνῶν πτώματα καὶ τὰ θαυμαζόμενα ἠλέκτρων περὶ τῆς ἕλξεως καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλείων λίθων, πάντων τούτων ὁλκὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενί ποτε·

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.12 · A single experience from high and low I.60.1.12

“On catching them, they do not disturb them by imposing a different movement. Instead, they join on the beginning of a slower movement [and] in accordance with <the> likeness of the faster one as it dies away, and blend a single experience from high and low sound.”[2078]

1.13 · Pleasure and intelligent delight I.60.1.13

“Hence they provide pleasure to those without understanding, but gladness to those with understanding, through the movement of divine harmony arising in mortal motions.”[2079]

1.14 · Water, lightning, amber, and magnets I.60.1.14

“Moreover, all flows of water, the falls of thunderbolts, and the wonders associated with the attraction of amber and Heraclean stones: in none of these is there ever any pulling force.”[2080]

2078. The editor rejects kai, and, and supplies tēn, the. Both signs remain visible. The English provisionally takes kata … homoiotēta as according to the likeness, with the faster movement understood as the one now subsiding. The construction and printed punctuation are difficult; the note does not claim to settle them. Pathē is an experience or affection produced by the blended sounds.

2079. The contrast is between hēdonē, pleasure, and euphrosynē, gladness or intelligent delight. The printing reads kinēsis, movement, of divine harmony; the apparatus records mimēsis, imitation, in Plato. The translation deliberately retains movement. Mortal motions are the motions in embodied perceivers.

2080. Ēlektra here means pieces of amber; Heraclean stones are lodestones or magnets. The text names the apparent attraction and then denies holkē, a pulling force, as its explanation. The next sentence attributes the effects to displacement and the motions of separating and combining bodies within the no-void model.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.15 I.60.1.15

τὸ δὲ κενὸν εἶναι μηδὲν περιωθεῖν τε αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἰς ἄλληλα, [τὰ] τὸ δὲ διακρινόμενα καὶ συγκρινόμενα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν διαμειβόμενα ἕδραν ἕκαστα ἰέναι πάντα, τούτοις τοῖς παθήμασι πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλεχθεῖσι τεθαυματουργημένα τῷ κατὰ τρόπον φανήσεται ζητοῦντι.

1.16 I.60.1.16

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς (ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ὥρμησε) κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τούτων γέγονεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται, τέμνοντος μὲν τὰ σῖτα τοῦ πυρός, αἰωρουμένου δὲ ἐντὸς τῷ πνεύματι συνεπομένου, τὰς φλέβας δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας τῇ συναιωρήσει πληροῦντος τῷ τὰ τετμημένα αὐτόθεν ἐπαντλεῖν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καθ᾽ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ τῆς τροφῆς νάματα οὕτως ἐπίρρυτα γεγονέναι.

BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.15 · How the apparent marvels arise I.60.1.15

“The absence of any void, their driving one another around, and [the] fact that, as they separate and combine, all of them exchange places and travel each to its own seat: through these processes interwoven with one another, the apparent marvels will prove to have been produced, to anyone who investigates properly.”[2081]

1.16 · Breathing and the distribution of nourishment I.60.1.16

“Breathing too, from which our account began, has come about in the same manner and through these processes, as was said earlier. Fire cuts up the food and, swinging within, follows the breath; through this shared oscillation it fills the vessels from the belly by drawing up the cut particles from there. For these reasons, streams of nourishment have thus come to flow throughout the whole body in every animal.”[2082]

2081. The rejected ta is a redundant article, represented by bracketed the in English. The long sentence shifts construction; the translation gathers the stated processes into the explanation of the marvels. The language of working wonders describes the surprising effects, not an additional supernatural cause.

2082. Fire remains the subject of cutting, swinging, following, and filling. The belly or internal cavity supplies the cut material to the vessels. The passage links the earlier respiratory model with digestion and distribution of nourishment; it does not describe circulation in the modern anatomical sense.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.17 I.60.1.17

Νεότμητα δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγγενῶν ὄντα, τὰ μὲν καρπῶν, τὰ δὲ χλόης, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐφύτευσεν, εἶναι τροφήν, παντοδαπὰ μὲν χρώματα ἔχει διὰ τὴν σύμμιξιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἐρυθρὰ πλείστη περὶ αὐτὰ χρόα διαθεῖ, τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς τομῆς τε καὶ ἐξομόρξεως ἐν ὑγρῷ δεδημιουργημένη φύσις.

1.18 I.60.1.18

Ὅθεν τοῦ κατὰ σῶμα ῥέοντος τὸ χρῶμα ἔσχεν οἵαν ὄψιν διεληλύθαμεν, ὃ καλοῦμεν αἷμα, νομὴν σαρκῶν καὶ ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὅθεν ὑδρευόμενα ἕκαστα πληροῖ τὴν τοῦ κενουμένου βάσιν.

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BOOK I CHAPTER 60

1.17 · The origin of the red color I.60.1.17

“Freshly cut and derived from kindred things, some from fruits and others from green growth, which the god planted for us for this very purpose, to be food, these particles have all sorts of colors through their mixture. But red is the color most widely spread through them, a character produced by fire’s cutting and wiping its imprint into moisture.”[2083]

1.18 · Blood as nourishment for the body I.60.1.18

“Hence the color of what flows through the body has acquired the appearance we have described. We call it blood, the pasture of the flesh and of the whole body, from which each part draws its water and fills the seat of what is being depleted.”[2084]

2083. The freshly cut particles are understood from the preceding sentence. Exomorxis is wiping off or impressing a quality onto something; the marginal explanation reported in the apparatus describes fire’s depositing its own quality and power. The English uses imprint to convey this image. The redness is explained within the passage’s account of fire acting in moisture.

2084. Nomē is pasture or nourishment, here paired with the image of drawing water. The final basis, base or seat, is rendered seat; its precise reference is compressed, and the English provisionally understands replenishment of the part being depleted. This completes the excerpt and Book I at printed p. 502 line 17. The apparatus records a manuscript colophon identifying the end of the first book; it is not added to the running Greek.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

Βιβλίον Α′ Contents.I.heading

Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει μὲν κεφάλαια ξ′· .... ταῦτα δέ εἰσι μετὰ τὸ

1. Περὶ θεοῦ διαλαβεῖν, ὅτι δημιουργὸς τῶν ὄντων καὶ διέπει τὸ ὅλον τῷ τῆς προνοίας λόγῳ.

2. δεύτερον· Περὶ τῶν νομιζόντων μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν καὶ ἑπομένας ταύτῃ θείας ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς διοικήσει δυνάμεις.

3. εἶτα· Περὶ δίκης παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμένης ἐποπτεύειν τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τιμωρὸν οὖσαν τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων.

4-10 Contents.I.4-10

4. καὶ· Περὶ ἀνάγκης θείας, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀπαραιτήτως τὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται βούλησιν.

5. Περὶ τε εἱμαρμένης καὶ τῆς τῶν γινομένων εὐταξίας.

6. Περὶ τε τύχης ἢ ταὐτομάτου.

7. καὶ· Ὅτι ἀλόγιστος ἡ φορὰ τῆς τύχης.

8. Περί τε χρόνου οὐσίας καὶ μερῶν καὶ πόσων εἴη αἴτιος.

9. καὶ· Περὶ Ἀφροδίτης οὐρανίας καὶ ἔρωτος θείου.

10. δέκατον· Περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ τοῦ παντός.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

Ancient contents · Book I

Contents.I.heading

The first book has sixty chapters ... Their sequence is, after

1. the discussion of God: that he is the maker of the things that are and governs the whole by the principle of providence;

2. second, on those who think there is no providence, nor divine powers attending it in the government of the whole;

3. then, on justice, appointed by God to watch over human actions and punish wrongdoers.[2085]

4-10 · Necessity, fortune, time, and principles

Contents.I.4-10

4. And on divine necessity, through which what accords with the will of God occurs inexorably.

5. And on fate and the orderly arrangement of events.

6. And on fortune or spontaneity.

7. And that the course of fortune cannot be calculated.

8. And on the nature of time, its parts, and how many things it is responsible for.

9. And on heavenly Aphrodite and divine love.

10. Tenth, on principles, elements, and the whole.[2086]

2085. This appendix translates the ancient outline preserved by Photius and printed by Wachsmuth on pp. 3-10. It surveys all four books, although the present volume contains Book I. The opening is compressed: “after discussing God ... second ...”. Its printed discontinuity is retained. Arabic numbers follow the editor’s chapter locators; connectors are placed with the entry they introduce. Latin cross-references are omitted. Chapter 2’s text is lost.

2086. Spontaneity renders to automaton, events occurring of themselves; it does not refer to machinery. The table links its subjects with and, then, and occasional ordinals. These words belong to the Greek account, even where the editor’s chapter numbers already indicate the sequence. Heavenly Aphrodite and divine love contrast with the bodily love named in the outline of IV.19.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

11-20 Contents.I.11-20

11. εἶτα· Περὶ ὕλης.

12. Περὶ ἰδέας.

13. Περὶ αἰτίων.

14. Περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς τούτων τομῆς καὶ περὶ ἐλαχίστου.

15. Περὶ σχημάτων.

16. Περὶ χρωμάτων.

17. Περὶ μίξεως καὶ κράσεως.

18. Περὶ κενοῦ καὶ τόπου καὶ χώρας.

19. Περὶ κινήσεως.

20. εἰκοστὸν δὲ· Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

11-20 · Matter, form, bodies, and change

Contents.I.11-20

11. Then, on matter.

12. On form.

13. On causes.

14. On bodies, their division, and the minimum.

15. On shapes.

16. On colors.

17. On mixture and blending.

18. On void, place, and space.

19. On motion.

20. Twentieth, on coming to be and passing away.[2087]

2087. Idea is form; elachiston is the minimum or smallest unit considered in the discussion of bodies and division. The outline distinguishes mixture from blending, and place from space. The table announces subjects without endorsing a single philosophical explanation of them.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

21-26 Contents.I.21-26

21. Περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰ ἔμψυχος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος καὶ ποῦ ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πόθεν τρέφεται.

22. Περὶ τάξεως τοῦ κόσμου· εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν.

23. Περὶ τῆς οὐρανοῦ οὐσίας καὶ διαιρέσεως.

24. Περὶ οὐσίας ἄστρων καὶ σχημάτων, κινήσεώς τε καὶ ἐπισημασίας.

25. Περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου καὶ μεγέθους, σχήματός τε καὶ τροπῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ σημείων καὶ κινήσεως.

26. Περὶ σελήνης οὐσίας μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος φωτισμῶν τε καὶ περὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ἐμφάσεως καὶ περὶ ἀποστημάτων καὶ σημείων.

27-32 Contents.I.27-32

27. Περὶ γάλακτος.

28. Περὶ κομητῶν καὶ διαττόντων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

29. Περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν πρηστήρων τυφώνων.

30. τριακοστὸν δὲ· Περὶ ἴριδος, περὶ ἅλω καὶ παρηλίου καὶ ῥάβδων.

31. καὶ δὴ καὶ· Περὶ νεφῶν ὁμίχλης ὑετῶν δρόσου χιόνος πάχνης χαλάζης.

32. Περὶ ἀνέμων.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

21-26 · The world and the heavenly bodies

Contents.I.21-26

21. On the world: whether it has a soul and is governed by providence, where it has its ruling part, and whence it receives nourishment.

22. On the order of the world; whether the whole is one.

23. On the substance and division of the heaven.

24. On the substance and shapes of the stars, their motion and significance.

25. On the sun’s substance, size, shape, turnings, eclipse, signs, and motion.

26. On the moon’s substance, size, shape, and illuminations; on its eclipse and appearance, and on its distances and signs.[2088]

27-32 · Celestial and atmospheric phenomena

Contents.I.27-32

27. On the Milky Way.

28. On comets, shooting stars, and such things.

29. On thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, fiery whirlwinds, and whirlwinds.

30. Thirtieth, on the rainbow, on the halo, mock sun, and rods.

31. And also on clouds, mist, rain, dew, snow, frost, and hail.

32. On winds.[2089]

2088. The ruling part, hēgemonikon, is the governing element of an ensouled whole. The stars’ significance concerns their role as signs; the sun’s turnings include its seasonal turning points. The lunar heading here prints the question of distances without the supplement signs found in the main chapter heading. The facing Greek follows this table’s wording.

2089. Gala, literally milk, names the Milky Way. Prēstēres and typhōnes are ancient categories of violent atmospheric events, rendered fiery whirlwinds and whirlwinds. The rods are streaks of light considered alongside halos and mock suns. These translations preserve the source’s categories without treating them as exact modern classifications.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

33-40 Contents.I.33-40

33. Περὶ γῆς, εἰ μία καὶ πεπερασμένη καὶ ποίου μεγέθους καὶ περὶ θέσεως αὐτῆς.

34. καὶ· Περὶ σχήματος γῆς.

35. καὶ· Πότερα μένει ἡ γῆ ἢ κινεῖται.

36. Περί τε σεισμῶν γῆς.

37. καὶ· Περὶ θαλάττης.

38. Πῶς ἄμπωτις καὶ πλημμῦραι γίνονται.

39. Περὶ ὑδάτων.

40. Περὶ τοῦ παντός.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

33-40 · Earth, sea, waters, and the whole Contents.I.33-40

33. On the earth: whether it is one and finite, what its size is, and on its position.

34. And on the shape of the earth.

35. And whether the earth remains at rest or moves.

36. And on earthquakes.

37. And on the sea.

38. How ebb and flood tides arise.

39. On waters.

40. On the whole.[2090]

2090. The outline preserves the subjects of lost chapters 33-35 and 37; their restored headings appear in the main translation with notices of loss. Chapter 38 has the plural plēmmyrai, flood tides. Chapter 40 is expressly headed On the whole in this table as well as in the running text.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

41-49 Contents.I.41-49

41. Περὶ φύσεως καὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐξ αὐτῆς αἰτίων.

42. Περὶ τῆς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεως καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.

43. Πόσα γένη ζῴων καὶ εἰ πάντα λογικὰ καὶ αἰσθητά.

44. Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ θανάτου.

45. Περὶ φυτῶν.

46. Περὶ τροφῆς καὶ ὀρέξεως τῶν ζῴων.

47. Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπων.

48. Περὶ νοῦ.

49. Περὶ ψυχῆς.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

41-49 · Nature, living beings, and the soul

Contents.I.41-49

41. On nature and the causes arising from it.

42. On the generation of living creatures and what follows.

43. How many kinds of living creatures there are, and whether all are rational and perceptible.

44. On sleep and death.

45. On plants.

46. On the nourishment and appetite of living creatures.

47. On human nature.

48. On intellect.

49. On the soul.[2091]

2091. What follows in chapter 42 abbreviates further topics; it is not an omission introduced by this translation. Chapters 44 and 46 are lost. In chapter 43 aisthēta means perceptible, rather than the usual word for possessing perception. The English preserves that distinction here, as in the main heading.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

50-56

Contents.I.50-56

50. Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις.

51. Πόσαι εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ποίας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστη.

52. Περὶ ὁράσεως καὶ κατοπτρικῶν ἐμφάσεων.

53. Περὶ ἀκοῆς.

54. Περὶ ὀσφρήσεως.

55. Περὶ γεύσεως.

56. Περὶ ἁφῆς.

57-60

Contents.I.57-60

57. Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ φωνὴ καὶ τί αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

58. Περὶ φαντασίας καὶ κριτηρίου.

59. καὶ νθ′· Περὶ δόξης.

60. καὶ ξ′· Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ παθῶν.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

50-56 · Perception and the senses

Contents.I.50-56

50. On perception and perceptible things, and whether the senses are truthful.

51. How many senses there are, and what substance and activity each has.

52. On sight and images in mirrors.

53. On hearing.

54. On smell.

55. On taste.

56. On touch.[2092]

57-60 · Voice, imagination, belief, and breathing

Contents.I.57-60

57. On voice, whether voice is incorporeal, and what its ruling part is.

58. On imagination and the criterion.

59. And fifty-ninth, on belief.

60. And sixtieth, on breathing and bodily processes.[2093]

2092. The outline distinguishes perception in general, its objects and reliability, the number and activities of the senses, and the individual senses. Emphaseis in the heading on sight denotes appearances or images in mirrors. The Greek title itself supplies this optical setting.

2093. Unlike the main heading of chapter 57, this table has no supplied clause about the soul's perceptive power. The pronoun its is therefore left as printed; its intended reference is not clarified by adding soul. Phantasia is imagination or appearance, kritērion a means of judging, and pathē the bodily processes discussed at the end of Book I.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

- Contents.I.preliminaries

Καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου κεφάλαια τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τούτων· .... ἐν μέντοι τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ, πρὸ τοῦ τοῖς εἰρημένοις κεφαλαίοις ἐπιβαλεῖν, περὶ δύο κεφαλαίων διαλαμβάνει ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔπαινός ἐστι φιλοσοφίας καὶ οὗτος ἐκ διαφόρων αὐτῷ συνυφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὴν συνεστηκυιῶν αἱρέσεων, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ μουσικῆς καὶ ἀριθμητικῆς δόξας παλαιὰς συναναγράφει.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK I

Two preliminary chapters

Contents.I.preliminaries

Such, then, are the number and subjects of the first book's chapters ... In this book, however, before undertaking the chapters just mentioned, he treats two preliminary chapters. The first is a praise of philosophy, which he weaves together from various authors; the second concerns the schools established within philosophy. In it he also records ancient opinions about geometry, music, and arithmetic.[2094]

2094. The Greek retrospectively adds two chapters before the sixty numbered subjects. Wachsmuth marks the praise of philosophy as lost. On Arithmetic is the surviving conclusion of this preliminary material and has already been translated near the beginning of this edition. The two preliminaries also explain the final total of 208 chapters for the collection.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

Βιβλίον Β′ Contents.II.heading

Τὸ δὲ δεύτερον βιβλίον συμπληροῦται μὲν κεφαλαίοις ς′ καὶ μ′. Διαλαμβάνει δὲ πρῶτον μὲν

1. Περὶ τῶν τὰ θεῖα ἑρμηνευόντων καὶ ὡς εἴη ἀνθρώποις ἀκατάληπτος ἡ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλήθεια.

2. εἶτα· Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς.

3. καὶ· Περὶ ῥητορικῆς.

4. καὶ· Περὶ λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων.

5. Περὶ ποιητικῆς.

6. Περὶ χαρακτῆρος τῶν παλαιῶν.

7-13 Contents.II.7-13

7. Περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἴδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

8. Περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

9. Ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός.

10. Ὁποῖον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν φιλόσοφον.

11. Ὅτι χρὴ σέβειν τὸ θεῖον.

12. Ὅτι τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ δικαίοις βοηθεῖ τὸ κρεῖττον.

13. Περὶ μαντικῆς.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

Ancient contents · Book II

Contents.II.heading

The second book comprises forty-six chapters. It discusses, first:

1. On those who interpret divine things, and how the truth of intelligible things in their substance is beyond human comprehension.

2. Then, on dialectic.

3. And on rhetoric.

4. And on speech and letters.

5. On the art of poetry.

6. On the character of the ancients.[2095]

7-13 · Ethics, agency, philosophy, and piety

Contents.II.7-13

7. On the ethical branch of philosophy.

8. On what is up to us.

9. That no one is willingly bad.

10. What a philosopher ought to be like.

11. That one should revere the divine.

12. That the higher power helps the pious and just.

13. On divination.[2096]

2095. The Greek gives the count as six and forty. Intelligible things are objects of understanding, contrasted in Book I with objects of sense perception. Letters can encompass written learning; charaktēr means a distinguishing character or style. The brief heading on the ancients leaves its precise scope unstated.

2096. What is up to us is a formulation of the question of agency and responsibility. To kreitton, literally what is stronger or better, denotes the higher divine power. Wachsmuth marks chapters 10-46 as missing from the books, while noting parallels for some subjects in other collections. The outline survives even where the corresponding text does not.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

14-20 Contents.II.14-20

14. Ὅτι χρὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίας, ἐκκλίνειν δὲ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους.

15. Περὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τῷ λόγῳ χρὴ κρίνειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τρόπῳ.

16. Ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοις ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἑαυτοὺς λανθάνουσι καταβλάπτοντες.

17. Περὶ εὐδοξίας.

18. Περὶ φήμης.

19. Ὅτι μέτρον ἄριστον.

20. Ὅτι δυσκατόρθωτον ἡ ἀρετή, εὐμεταχείριστον δὲ ἡ κακία.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

14-20 · Character, reputation, and virtue

Contents.II.14-20

14. That one should greatly value the company of the wise, but avoid the base and uneducated.

15. On seeming and being, and that one should judge a person by character, not by words.

16. That those who plot against others unwittingly harm themselves.

17. On good repute.

18. On report.

19. That moderation is best.

20. That virtue is difficult to attain, but vice easy to practice.[2097]

2097. Eudoxia is good repute; phēmē is report, what is said publicly, and may concern rumor or reputation. The adjacent headings keep these distinct. Metron means a measure or due limit, hence moderation. The claim about virtue and vice describes their relative difficulty; it is one of the propositions around which the collection was arranged.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

21-26 Contents.II.21-26

21. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀσυνέτων δοκιμασίας.

22. Ὅτι τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, τοῖς κεχρημένοις ἐπιβλαβῆ οὖσαν καὶ πρὸς οὓς γίνεται, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβλητέον.

23. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, φθόνου γὰρ καὶ διαβολῆς αἴτιον γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον.

24. Ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλημμελεῖ τις τὸ μεταμελεῖσθαι κάλλιστον.

25. Περὶ λοιδορίας, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

26. Ὅτι ἐν τῷ λοιδορεῖσθαι χρὴ σκοπεῖν, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιπεπτώκαμεν ἐλαττώμασι.

27-31 Contents.II.27-31

27. Περὶ ἀνάγκης τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον.

28. Ὅτι εὐκαίρως δεῖ πράττειν.

29. Περὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναβάλλεσθαι.

30. Ὅτι τὸ δυστυχῆσαι πολλάκις ἐπωφελὲς γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἄφροσι.

31. Περὶ ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

21-26 · Judgment, hypocrisy, and abuse

Contents.II.21-26

21. That one should disregard the judgment of those who lack understanding.

22. That hypocrisy should be banished from the soul, since it harms both those who practice it and those toward whom it is practiced.

23. That one should not meddle, for such conduct causes envy and slander.

24. That repentance for one's wrongdoing is best.

25. On abuse, and that it is not a good thing.

26. That in an exchange of abuse we should consider whether we ourselves have fallen into the same faults.[2098]

27-31 · Necessity, opportunity, and education

Contents.II.27-31

27. On necessity in life.

28. That one must act at the right time.

29. On wishing, and that one must not put things off at random.

30. That misfortune often proves beneficial, especially to the foolish.

31. On upbringing and education.[2099]

2098. Hypokrisis here is pretense or hypocrisy; polypragmonein is meddling in other people's affairs. Loidoreisthai can refer to exchanging abuse or being reviled. The English uses the broader exchange of abuse in chapter 26; the heading's point is to examine one's own possible faults. The missing excerpts cannot resolve the precise situation intended.

2099. Chapter 29 prints boulesthai, to wish or will, not bouleuesthai, to deliberate. The awkward connection between wishing and postponement is retained. Agōgē and paideia distinguish upbringing or training from education more broadly. The editor records a Laurentian parallel for the educational material despite its loss from the books.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

32-36 Contents.II.32-36

32. Ὅτι κάλλιστον ἡ φιλία τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

33. Ὅτι ἡ ὁμοιότης τῶν τρόπων φιλίαν ἀπεργάζεται.

34. Ὅτι χρὴ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις καὶ τοῖς κινδύνοις μὴ περιορᾶν τοὺς φίλους.

35. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ συναδικεῖν τοῖς φίλοις.

36. Περὶ γνησίων καὶ ἀβεβαίων φίλων.

37-41 Contents.II.37-41

37. Ὅτι χρὴ ταχείας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους διαλλαγάς, τὰ ἁμαρτήματα αὐτῶν ῥᾷον φέροντας μετὰ τῆς ἀμνηστίας.

38. Ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις τοὺς γνησίους τῶν φίλων διαγινώσκομεν.

39. Φιλικὰ παραγγέλματα.

40. Περὶ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ ὁποῖον τινα χρὴ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

41. Περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐστιν ἀπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν ὠφεληθῆναι.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

32-36 · Friendship and its limits Contents.II.32-36

32. That friendship among good people is a most beautiful thing.

33. That similarity of character produces friendship.

34. That one should not neglect friends in misfortune and danger.

35. That one should not join friends in wrongdoing.

36. On true and unreliable friends.[2100]

37-41 · Reconciliation, true friends, and enemies Contents.II.37-41

37. That one should be quick to reconcile with friends, bearing their faults more easily by forgetting past wrongs.

38. That in misfortune we recognize which of our friends are true.

39. Precepts on friendship.

40. On enmity and how one should behave toward enemies.

41. On how one can benefit from enemies.[2101]

2100. The sequence values good character and similarity in friendship, requires loyalty in danger, and limits that loyalty where friends act unjustly. Kalon, rendered beautiful in chapter 32, also carries the sense of morally fine or noble. Gnēsios marks a true or genuine friend, opposed here to one who cannot be relied upon.

2101. Amnēstia means forgetting past wrongs; it is used here of reconciliation between friends, not necessarily a formal public amnesty. Misfortune tests friendship, while the headings on enemies consider both one’s conduct toward them and the possibility of gaining some benefit from them.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

42-46 Contents.II.42-46

42. Περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν.

43. Ὅτι μείζων ἡ χάρις ἐν καιρῷ δοθεῖσα.

44. Περὶ τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν.

45. Ὅτι τοὺς πονηροὺς οὐ χρὴ εὖ ποιεῖν, οὐδὲ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

46. καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον· Περὶ ἀχαριστίας.

• Contents.II.conclusion

ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ τοῦ δευτέρου κεφάλαια.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK II

42-46 · Giving, repayment, and ingratitude

Contents.II.42-46

42. On conferring benefits.

43. That a favor is greater when given at the right time.

44. On returning benefits.

45. That one should neither benefit the wicked nor accept benefits from them.

46. And last, on ingratitude.[2102]

End of the second book's outline

Contents.II.conclusion

With these, the chapters of the second book also come to an end.[2103]

2102. Euergetein is doing good or conferring benefits, and anteuergetein is doing good in return. Charis can mean a favor or gratitude; in chapter 43 it is the favor given. These headings connect the value of a benefit with its timing, the recipient's character, and the response it receives.

2103. The short closing phrase has no expressed verb. Come to an end makes its function in the sequence explicit; the Greek is retained without supplementation.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

Βιβλίον Γ′

Contents.III.heading

Ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περιέχεται κεφάλαια μβ′· πρῶτον

1. Περὶ ἀρετῆς.
2. εἶτα· Περὶ κακίας.
3. Περὶ φρονήσεως.
4. Περὶ ἀφροσύνης.
5. Περὶ σωφροσύνης.
6. Περὶ ἀκολασίας.
7. Περὶ ἀνδρίας.
8. Περὶ δειλίας.
9. Περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
10. Περὶ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀδικίας.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

Ancient contents · Book III

Contents.III.heading

The third book contains forty-two chapters. First:

1. On virtue.

2. Then, on vice.

3. On practical wisdom.

4. On folly.

5. On temperance.

6. On intemperance.

7. On courage.

8. On cowardice.

9. On justice.

10. On greed and injustice.[2104]

2104. The third book's opening is arranged largely in contrasting pairs. Phronēsis is practical wisdom; sōphrosynē is temperance or sound restraint. Pleonexia is the desire to have more, often at others' expense. The English greed reflects that moral setting. These are the ancient subjects; the full text of Book III is outside this physical volume.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

11-20 Contents.III.11-20

11. Περὶ ἀληθείας.

12. Περὶ ψεύδους.

13. Περὶ παρρησίας.

14. Περὶ κολακείας.

15. Περὶ ἀσωτίας.

16. Περὶ φειδωλίας.

17. Περὶ ἐγκρατείας.

18. Περὶ ἀκρασίας.

19. Περὶ ἀνεξικακίας.

20. Περὶ ὀργῆς.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

11-20 · Truth, speech, expenditure, and restraint

11. On truth.

12. On falsehood.

13. On frank speech.

14. On flattery.

15. On prodigality.

16. On thrift.

17. On self-control.

18. On lack of self-control.

19. On forbearance.

20. On anger.[2105]

2105. Parrhēsia is open or frank speech, placed opposite flattery. Asōtia is wasteful or ruinous expenditure, contrasted with thrift. Enkrateia, self-control, and its absence are listed separately from the earlier pair temperance and intemperance. Anexikakia is endurance of wrong or forbearance, here set against anger.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

21-28 Contents.III.21-28

21. Περὶ τοῦ γνῶθι σαυτόν.

22. Περὶ ὑπεροψίας.

23. Περὶ φιλαυτίας.

24. Περὶ τοῦ συνειδότος.

25. Περὶ μνήμης.

26. Περὶ λήθης.

27. Περὶ ὅρκου.

28. Περὶ ἐπιορκίας.

29-35 Contents.III.29-35

29. Περὶ φιλοπονίας.

30. Περὶ ἀργίας.

31. Περὶ αἰδοῦς.

32. Περὶ ἀναιδείας.

33. Περὶ σιγῆς.

34. Περὶ τοῦ εὐκαίρως λέγειν.

35. Περὶ βραχυλογίας.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

21-28 · Self-knowledge, memory, and oaths Contents.III.21-28

21. On “Know yourself.”
22. On arrogance.
23. On self-love.
24. On conscience.
25. On memory.
26. On forgetfulness.
27. On an oath.
28. On perjury.[2106]

29-35 · Work, shame, and the use of speech Contents.III.29-35

29. On industry.
30. On idleness.
31. On a sense of shame.
32. On shamelessness.
33. On silence.
34. On speaking at the right time.
35. On brevity of speech.[2107]

2106. Know yourself is quoted as a saying within the heading. To syneidos, literally what one knows with oneself, is rendered conscience. Hyperopsia is looking down upon others, hence arrogance. The outline does not supply arguments about self-love or conscience; those cannot be reconstructed from the headings alone.

2107. Philoponia is a willingness or love of exertion, rendered industry without an economic sense. Aidōs includes shame, modest restraint, and respect for others. The following headings distinguish keeping silent, choosing the right occasion to speak, and speaking briefly.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

36-42 Contents.III.36-42

36. Περὶ ἀδολεσχίας.

37. Περὶ χρηστότητος.

38. Περὶ φθόνου.

39. Περὶ πατρίδος.

40. Περὶ ξένης.

41. Περὶ ἀπορρήτων.

42. καὶ μβ′· Περὶ διαβολῆς.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK III

36-42 · Character, homeland, and discretion Contents.III.36-42

36. On idle chatter.

37. On kindness.

38. On envy.

39. On one’s homeland.

40. On a foreign land.

41. On secrets.

42. And forty-second, on slander.[2108]

2108. Chrēstotēs can denote goodness or kindness. Xenē is the foreign land in contrast with one’s native country, and by extension life abroad. Aporrhēta, secrets, are things not to be disclosed. The final ordinal forty-second is written out in English while the Greek numeral remains visible on the facing page.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

Βιβλίον Δ′

Contents.IV.heading

Τὰ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου βιβλίου ἐστὶ ταῦτα· πρῶτον

1. Περὶ πολιτείας.

2. δεύτερον· Περὶ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν.

3. Περὶ δήμου.

4. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δυνατῶν.

5. Περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὁποῖον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα.

6. Ὅτι κάλλιστον ἡ μοναρχία.

7-13

Contents.IV.7-13

7. Ὑποθῆκαι περὶ βασιλείας.

8. Ψόγος τυραννίδος.

9. Περὶ πολέμου.

10. Περὶ τόλμης.

11. Περὶ νεότητος.

12. Περὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον χρειῶν ὑποθῆκαι.

13. Περὶ εἰρήνης.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

Ancient contents · Book IV Contents.IV.heading

The chapters of the fourth book are these. First:

1. On civic government.

2. Second, on laws and customs.

3. On the people.

4. On the powerful in cities.

5. On rule and on what a ruler ought to be like.

6. That monarchy is best.[2109]

7-13 · Kingship, war, and peace Contents.IV.7-13

7. Precepts on kingship.

8. Censure of tyranny.

9. On war.

10. On daring.

11. On youth.

12. On generals, and precepts concerning the requirements of war.

13. On peace.[2110]

2109. Politeia concerns civic organization or government; dēmos is the people as a civic body. Wachsmuth marks the chapter on the people as absent from the manuscripts, but his note argues that it stood in the copy behind the Photian inventory. That monarchy is best is the proposition of the ancient heading, placed beside other subjects of political discussion.

2110. The outline distinguishes kingship from tyranny, offering precepts for one and censure of the other. Tolma is boldness or daring, a different heading from courage in Book III. The heading on generals joins their role with practical requirements of war, before the sequence turns to peace.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

14-20 Contents.IV.14-20

14. Περὶ γεωργίας.

15. Περὶ ἡσυχίας.

16. Περὶ ναυτιλίας.

17. Περὶ τεχνῶν.

18. Περὶ δεσποτῶν καὶ δούλων.

19. Περὶ Ἀφροδίτης πανδήμου καὶ περὶ ἔρωτος τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν.

20. Περὶ κάλλους.

21-26 Contents.IV.21-26

21. Περὶ γάμου καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου.

22. Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα.

23. καὶ· Περὶ παίδων καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου.

24. καὶ· Ὅτι χρὴ τοὺς γονεῖς τῆς καθηκούσης τιμῆς καταξιοῦσθαι παρὰ τῶν τέκνων.

25. Ὁποίους χρὴ εἶναι τοὺς πατέρας περὶ τὰ τέκνα.

26. Ὅτι κάλλιστον ἡ φιλαδελφία καὶ ἡ περὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς διάθεσις.

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ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

14-20 · Livelihood, servitude, and bodily love Contents.IV.14-20

14. On agriculture.

15. On a quiet life.

16. On seafaring.

17. On crafts.

18. On masters and slaves.

19. On common Aphrodite and on love of bodily pleasures.

20. On beauty.[2111]

21-26 · Marriage, children, and kinship Contents.IV.21-26

21. On marriage and the further matters of this chapter.

22. Precepts for marriage.

23. And on children and the further matters of this chapter.

24. And that parents should be accorded due honor by their children.

25. How fathers should behave toward their children.

26. That affection between siblings and goodwill toward relatives are most beautiful.[2112]

2111. Technai are arts or skilled crafts. The pairing masters and slaves names a historical social relationship. Common Aphrodite renders Aphroditē pandēmos; its association here with bodily pleasure contrasts with the heavenly Aphrodite and divine love in the outline of I.9. The title itself makes that bodily emphasis explicit.

2112. The further matters of this chapter is the outline's own abbreviation of additional topics. It occurs here for marriage and children, and later for noble birth, wealth, and old age. Affection between siblings is followed by a phrase extending the favorable disposition to relatives more broadly.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

27-34 Contents.IV.27-34

27. Οἰκονομικός.

28. Περὶ εὐγενείας καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου.

29. Περὶ δυσγενείας.

30. Περὶ πλούτου καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου.

31. Περὶ πενίας.

32. Σύγκρισις πενίας καὶ πλούτου.

33. Ὅτι ὁ βίος βραχὺς καὶ φροντίδων ἀνάμεστος.

34. Περὶ λύπης ὅτι λίαν μοχθηρά.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

27-34 · Household, birth, wealth, and sorrow Contents.IV.27-34

27. Household management.

28. On noble birth and the further matters of this chapter.

29. On low birth.

30. On wealth and the further matters of this chapter.

31. On poverty.

32. A comparison of poverty and wealth.

33. That life is short and full of cares.

34. On sorrow, and that it is very harmful.[2113]

2113. Oikonomikos concerns management of a household. Noble and low birth render the social distinctions of eugeneia and dysgeneia. The outline places poverty and wealth in separate chapters and then compares them. Lypē can cover pain, distress, or sorrow; sorrow suits its place among the cares and misfortunes of life.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

35-42 Contents.IV.35-42

35. Περὶ νόσου καὶ ἰάσεως.

36. Περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ διαμονῆς αὐτῆς.

37. Περὶ ἰατρῶν.

38. Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας.

39. Περὶ κακοδαιμονίας.

40. Ὅτι ἀβέβαιος ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐπραξία.

41. Περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἀξίαν εὐτυχούντων.

42. Περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἀξίαν δυστυχούντων.

43-49 Contents.IV.43-49

43. Ὅτι δεῖ γενναίως φέρειν τὰ προσπίπτοντα.

44. Ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εὐτυχίας προφαίνειν, τὰς δὲ ἀτυχίας κρύπτειν.

45. Περὶ ἐλπίδος.

46. Περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα.

47. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἐπιχαίρειν τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσιν.

48. Ὅτι οἱ ἀτυχοῦντες χρῄζουσι τῶν συμπασχόντων.

49. <Ὅτι ῥᾷον ἄλλον παραινεῖν ἢ ἑαυτόν>.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

35-42 · Health, happiness, and fortune Contents.IV.35-42

35. On disease and healing.

36. On health and its preservation.

37. On physicians.

38. On happiness.

39. On unhappiness.

40. That human prosperity is unstable.

41. On those who enjoy good fortune beyond their deserts.

42. On those who suffer undeserved misfortune.[2114]

43-49 · Endurance, expectation, and sympathy Contents.IV.43-49

43. That one must bear bravely whatever befalls.

44. That one should display good fortune but conceal misfortune.

45. On hope.

46. On the unexpected.

47. That one should not rejoice at the misfortunes of others.

48. That the unfortunate need people who share their suffering.

49. <That it is easier to advise someone else than oneself>.[2115]

2114. Eudaimonia and kakodaimonia are happiness and its opposite, while eupraxia concerns doing well or prosperity. Good fortune and misfortune are then considered in relation to desert. The headings leave open the arguments by which their collected excerpts distinguish well-being from mere fortunate circumstances.

2115. Chapter 49 is supplied in its entirety by Wachsmuth: his note explicitly says that he added this heading. Angle brackets therefore appear on both facing pages. Sympaschontes are people who suffer with another, hence sympathizers. Para elpida means contrary to expectation and can include an unexpected outcome of either kind.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

50-58 Contents.IV.50-58

50. Περὶ γήρως καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς τοῦ κεφαλαίου τούτου.

51. Περὶ θανάτου.

52. Περὶ ζωῆς.

53. Σύγκρισις ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.

54. Περὶ πένθους.

55. Περὶ ταφῆς.

56. Παρηγορικά.

57. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ παροινεῖν εἰς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας.

58. Ὅτι τῶν πλείστων μετὰ θάνατον ἡ μνήμη διαρρεῖ ταχέως.

• Contents.IV.total

Ὁμοῦ τὰ κεφάλαια τοῦ τετάρτου νη'· τῶν δὲ τεσσάρων βιβλίων ση'.

ANCIENT CONTENTS - BOOK IV

50-58 · Old age, death, and remembrance Contents.IV.50-58

50. On old age and the further matters of this chapter.

51. On death.

52. On life.

53. A comparison of life and death.

54. On mourning.

55. On burial.

56. Consolations.

57. That one should not insult the dead.

58. That the memory of most people quickly fades after death.[2116]

The total number of chapters Contents.IV.total

The chapters of the fourth book total fifty-eight; those of all four books, two hundred and eight.[2117]

2116. Parēgorika is consolatory material. Paroinein can describe drunken or insolent abuse; the heading here is rendered insult without adding an explicit condition of drunkenness. The last title concerns the fading of remembrance after death, closing the sequence of subjects on mortal life.

2117. The printed numerals are 58 and 208. The numbered lists contain 60 + 46 + 42 + 58 = 206 chapters; adding the two preliminary chapters described after Book I gives 208. The count includes the heading supplied for IV.49. This completes the ancient outline printed in Volume I, not a translation of the full texts of Books II-IV.

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