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Phaedrus
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English Introduction · Branch 4 of 92
Key Words of the Dialogue
Phaedrus: Key Words of the Dialogue
p. 17Key Words of the Dialogue
Each entry says what the word meant in Athens, what the dialogue does with it, and how it is rendered. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they occur.
Love, be in love (erōs, Erōs; eran; ho erōn, ho mē erōn)
Erōs was the passion of desire, above all for a beautiful person, and Erōs the god of that passion, called in the poets the son of Aphrodite. The verb eran meant “to be in love”. In the Athenian custom the speeches assume, the older man in love was the erastēs, “lover”, and the boy he loved the erōmenos, “beloved”, or his paidika, “darling”. Lysias’ paradox turns on a participle: a boy should gratify ho mē erōn, “the one who is not in love”, rather than ho erōn, “the one in love” (227c). The English never makes this one word (“non-lover”), so that the reader can hear Lysias’ contrast and Socrates’ later use of it. Socrates’ first speech defines love as a desire that has mastered opinion “without reason” (238b–c); the palinode makes it the fourth divine madness (249d–e) and the beginning of the soul’s return. Burnet prints the god’s name with a capital, and so does the English: “Love” where the god is named, “love” for the passion. Erōs also stands behind Pterōs, the gods’ name for him in the verses Socrates ascribes to the Homeridae (252b), and behind anterōs, “counter-love” (255e). See Longing, yearning; counter-love.
Gratify (charizesthai)
Charizesthai meant “to do a favour”, and of a beloved it was the polite word for granting his favours to a lover; charis, “favour”, is the favour itself and the gratitude for it. Lysias’ speech is an argument about whom to gratify (227c, 231b–234c), and his “those who are in love” and “those who are not in love” are measured by the favours each will return. Socrates turns the word twice. In the palinode the beloved, at last, “would not refuse to gratify the one in love” (256a), and the pair who live in philosophy hold back. In the last part of the dialogue the one who has sense must practise gratifying “masters who are good and of the good”, the gods, and not his fellow slaves (273e–274a), and the question of writing is “how you will most gratify a god concerning speeches” (274b). The English renders charizesthai “gratify” throughout, charis “favour”, and charin eidenai “be grateful”.
Madness (mania; mainesthai)
Mania was madness of every kind: disease, frenzy, possession by a god. Lysias and Socrates’ first speech treat the lover’s madness as the disease the word suggests: the lover is “sick rather than temperate” (231d). The palinode reverses the judgement: “the greatest of goods come to us through madness—given, however, by divine gift” (244a). There are four such madnesses, of prophecy, rites, poetry and love, given by Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and Aphrodite with Love (244a–245a, 249d–e, 265b); the madness of love is “the best” (249e, 265b). Socrates’ etymology joins mania to mantikē, “divination”, by “throwing in the tau” (244c), a joke on a real kinship. In the second part madness is divided again, into the kind that comes “through human diseases” and the kind that comes “through a divine departure from the accustomed lawful things” (265a). The English renders mania “madness” and mainesthai “be mad” throughout, and enthousiazein, its companion, “be filled with the god”.
Soul (psychē)
Psychē was the life in a living thing and the self that survives death. The palinode proves that “All soul is immortal”, since it alone moves itself (245c–246a), and then gives the picture of soul by which the dialogue is best known: “the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer” (246a), with one horse beautiful and good and the other its opposite. The soul is the subject of the rest of the speech, its procession, fall and recollection; and in the second part it is the subject of rhetoric, since “the power of speech is in fact a leading of souls” (271c), and the rhetorician must divide the forms of soul and fit speeches to them (271a–d, 277b–c). The written speech has no soul; the speech of the one who knows is “living and ensouled” (276a). The English renders psychē “soul” everywhere, empsychos “ensouled” and apsychos “soulless”.
Wing (pteron)
Pteron was a feather or a wing. In the palinode the wing is the soul’s power to rise: “The power of the wing is naturally such as to lead what is heavy upward” (246d). The souls of the gods are winged and stay aloft; human souls lose their wings and fall (246c, 248c), and the speech of love is the story of their regrowth. Its vocabulary is precise: pterousthai, “grow wings” (249a, 249c); pterorruein, “lose its wings” (248c); pterōma, “plumage” (246e); kaulos, the “shaft” of a feather, which is also the stem of a plant (251b); pterophyein, “put forth wings” (251c). The growth of the wings is told in the words of growing things, roots and shoots, watered and warmed (251b–d), and the gods’ name for Love, Pterōs, is made from the word (252b). The English keeps one word for each, and “wing” for pteron throughout. See the Introduction, The growing of the wings.
Recollection, memory, reminding (anamnēsis; mnēmē; hypomnēsis)
Anamnēsis, “recollection”, is the calling to mind of what the soul once saw before its birth, a doctrine Plato also sets out in the Meno (81c–86b) and the Phaedo (72e–77a). In the palinode it is the way back: understanding “according to a form, going from many perceptions into one” is “recollection of those things our soul once saw” (249b–c), and the lover’s madness begins when one “seeing the beauty here and recollecting the true, grows wings” (249d). The charioteer is saved by memory, mnēmē: “his memory was carried to the nature of beauty” (254b). In the story of Theuth the same family returns, with a difference. Letters give “forgetfulness” (lēthē), and they are “not a drug of memory but of reminding” (275a): hypomnēsis, a reminder from outside, against recollection “from within, themselves by themselves”. The English keeps the three apart: anamimnēskesthai “recollect”, mnēmē “memory”, hypomnēsis “reminding”, hypomnēmata “reminders”.
Longing, yearning; counter-love (himeros; pothos; anterōs)
Himeros, “longing”, and pothos, “yearning”, were the poets’ words for desire; the Cratylus takes pothos to be desire for what is absent and himeros for what is present (420a), a distinction the Phaedrus does not keep. Socrates gives himeros an etymology of his own: the soul receives “particles that come and flow from there—which is why, indeed, they are called longing” (251c), as if from ienai, “come”, merē, “particles”, and rhein, “flow”; and he returns to it in the “spring of that stream which Zeus, in love with Ganymede, named longing” (255c). Pothos is yearning: for the things seen then (250c), for the beloved in his absence (251e), and at the sight of him, in “the goads of yearning” (253e–254a); and the beloved, in his turn, “yearns and is yearned for” (255d). Anterōs, “counter-love”, is the beloved’s love in return, “an image of love”, and “he calls it, and thinks it, not love but friendship” (255d–e). The English renders himeros “longing”, pothos and pothein “yearning”, “yearn”, and anterōs “counter-love”.
Beautiful, beauty (kalos; kallos)
Kalos was the word for beauty of body, of action and of speech alike, and also for what is fine or noble. The dialogue uses it in all these senses: the boy of Lysias’ speech is “one of the beautiful” (227c), Love is “overseer of beautiful boys” (265c), madness has its “beautiful works” (245b), and the question at the end is whether speaking and writing speeches “is beautiful or shameful” (277d). In the palinode beauty, kallos, has a place no other Form has: “beauty alone has got this portion, to be most manifest and most lovely” (250d–e), and so it is the sight of beauty that begins the wings’ regrowth. The prayer at the end asks Pan to “grant me to become beautiful within” (279b). The English renders kalos “beautiful” and kallos “beauty” throughout; and the adverb kalōs is “well”.
Temperance, temperate; sense (sōphrosynē, sōphrōn; nous)
Sōphrosynē was self-control, moderation and sound sense together, the virtue opposed to hybris, “insolence”. Lysias’ lover admits that he is “sick rather than temperate” (231d), and Socrates’ first speech defines temperance as the mastery of opinion over desire (237e). The palinode sets “the temperance that comes from human beings” below “the madness from a god” (244d), and calls the affinity from the one not in love “mixed with mortal temperance” (256e); yet in the lover’s soul it is beauty “standing with temperance on a hallowed pedestal” that his memory sees (254b), and the good horse is “a lover of honour with temperance and modesty” (253d). At the end Socrates prays for as much gold “as no one but the temperate man could either carry or lead off” (279c). Nous is “sense” in ordinary use (241a–c, 276b) and “intellect” where it is the soul’s pilot that beholds what really is (247c–d). The English renders sōphrosynē “temperance” and sōphrōn “temperate” throughout.
Craft (technē)
Technē was any skilled practice with rules that can be taught, from carpentry and medicine to speaking. The handbooks of rhetoric were themselves called technai, “crafts”. The second part of the dialogue asks whether rhetoric is a craft at all, or, as the arguments that come forward protest, “not a craft but a craftless knack” (260e); and “a genuine craft of speaking,” says the Laconian, “without laying hold of truth, there neither is nor shall ever come to be hereafter” (260e). What the handbooks teach is “the studies necessary before” the craft (269b); the craft itself, like medicine, divides a nature, and the rhetorician must know the soul (270b–272b). The family is rendered one word to one: technē “craft”, technēi “by craft”, atechnos “craftless”, entechnos “with craft”, technikos “master of the craft” (with “masterly” at 271c, 273b and 274e); tribē is “knack” and empeiria “routine”, as in the Gorgias (462c, 463b).
Speech, account, argument, reason (logos)
Logos meant a word, a speech, an account or story, an argument, a reckoning and the power of reason. The dialogue is about logoi in all these senses, and the English cannot give them one word. It renders logos “speech” where a speech is meant, which is most often (227c, 258d, 271c, 276a); “account” for a story or saying (229d, 270c, 272b–c); “arguments” for the logoi that come forward to testify against rhetoric (260e–261a), with a note; “reason” for the faculty by which opinion leads and which desire defies in Socrates’ first speech (237e–238c), and again in the palinode (256a); and “talk” for a conversation (230a, 254d, 255b, 272d). Rhēma is “expression”, onoma “name” or “word”. The second part plays on the range of the word: a speech must be put together “like an animal” (264c), the written speech is the image of “the speech of the one who knows, living and ensouled” (276a), and the speeches the dialectician sows have seed (277a).
Rhetoric, rhetorician, orator; speech-writer (rhētorikē; rhētorikos; rhētōr; logographos)
Rhētorikē was the art of public speaking; the word itself may be no older than Plato, and the Gorgias is the first work to use it at length. The Phaedrus asks what rhetoric would be if it were a craft: “a kind of leading of souls through speeches” (261a), whose practitioner must know the truth and the kinds of soul. Logographos, “speech-writer”, was one who wrote speeches for others to deliver in the courts, for pay, as Lysias did; a politician meant it as an insult (257c), and Socrates answers that the shame is not in writing but in writing badly (258d). The English renders rhētorikē “rhetoric”, rhētorikos “rhetorician” of a person (“rhetorical” of a thing, 235a, 266c), rhētōr “orator”, logographos “speech-writer” and logographia “speech-writing”.
Leading of souls (psychagōgia)
Psychagōgia was the calling up of the souls of the dead by a necromancer, and, in Plato’s time, the “winning of souls” by speech or poetry. Socrates uses it to define rhetoric: “a kind of leading of souls through speeches, not only in law-courts … but in private ones too” (261a), and he returns to it when he says that “the power of speech is in fact a leading of souls” (271c). The image, if not the word, ties the two parts of the dialogue, on one reading: the lovers “lead him into that god’s way of life and figure” (253b), and the rhetorician, if he is a master of the craft, leads souls by knowing them. The English renders it “leading of souls” in both places, with a note at the first.
Form, figure; collection, division; dialectician (eidos, idea; synagōgē, diairesis; dialektikos)
Eidos and idea both meant the look or shape of a thing, and so its kind; Plato used them for the Forms. The dialogue uses both in its account of method. “Seeing together and leading into one figure the things scattered in many places” is collection (265d); “being able, again, to cut it up by forms, at the joints, as it is by nature” is division (265e); “Of these, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover, of the divisions and collections” (266b), and those who can do this are “dialecticians” (266c). The rhetorician must divide the forms of soul and of speeches (271a–d), and the summary at the end recalls the method: one must define each thing and “cut it again by forms down to the uncuttable” (277b). The English renders eidos “form” and idea “figure” throughout, so that the reader can tell the two words apart, synagōgē “collection”, diairesis “division”, dialektikos “dialectician” and hē dialektikē technē “the dialectical craft” (276e).
The likely (to eikos; ta eikota)
To eikos, “the likely”, was the probable, and in the law-courts the argument from probability, which the early teachers of rhetoric made their own. Tisias of Syracuse and Gorgias, Socrates says, “saw that likelihoods are more to be honoured than the truths” (267a). The defence of the likely is the wolf’s part that Socrates speaks for them: in the courts “the truth of these things matters to nobody”, “but what is persuasive does; and this is the likely” (272d–e); Tisias’ example of the weak man and the strong is the likely at work (273b–c). Socrates makes Tisias own that the likely is nothing other than “what the multitude thinks” (273a–b), and answers that it comes about in the many “through similarity to the truth”, and that “the one who knows the truth knows best how to find the similarities” (273d). The English renders to eikos “the likely”, ta eikota “likelihoods” and the adverb eikotōs “as is likely” (“in a likely way” at 272e).
Write, writing, letters (graphein; graphē; grammata; syngramma)
Graphein meant to scratch, draw or paint, and so to write; graphē was writing and also painting, and grammata were letters, both the signs and literature. The second part of the dialogue begins by asking whether writing speeches is shameful (257c–258d) and ends with a judgement on writing itself (274b–278b). Letters were found by Theuth (274c–d); written speeches are like painting, zōgraphia, literally “drawing of living things” (275d); the written speech is the image of the speech “written with knowledge in the soul of the learner” (276a). A syngramma, “written work”, was a written composition, and the politicians’ “written works” are their decrees and laws (258a–c, 278c). The English renders graphein and syngraphein “write”, graphē “writing”, grammata “letters”, syngramma “written work” and syngrapheus “writer”.
Play, earnestness (paidia, paizein; spoudē, spoudazein)
Paidia was child’s play and amusement, from pais, “child”, and spoudē earnestness and serious effort. The pair runs through the dialogue. Phaedrus asks whether Socrates means to play, and Socrates asks whether he thinks him “playing and not in earnest” (234d); of Socrates’ two speeches, apart from two forms of method, he says afterwards that “the rest has in reality been played in play” (265c); the man who knows will write his gardens in letters “for the sake of play”, and keep his earnestness for the speeches he sows in a soul (276b–e); and at the end “let the matter of speeches now have been played by us moderately” (278b). The English renders paidia and paizein “play” and spoudē, spoudazein “earnestness”, “be in earnest” throughout, so that the theme can be followed.
Drug (pharmakon)
Pharmakon was any substance that changes the body, a remedy or a poison, and also a charm or spell. Socrates calls the book Phaedrus holds out to him “the drug to get me out” of town (230d), and says the first speech was spoken through his mouth “drugged by you” (242e). The word returns at the end, when Theuth offers letters as “a drug of memory and of wisdom”, and the king answers that they are “not a drug of memory but of reminding” (274e–275a). The English renders it “drug” in every place, so that the return can be seen, and Pharmakeia, the nymph of 229c whose name is the Greek for the use of drugs or spells, keeps her name.
Lover of wisdom, philosophy (philosophos; philosophia; philosophein)
Philosophos meant “lover of wisdom”, and Plato often uses the word with its parts in view. The palinode’s first life is that of “a lover of wisdom or a lover of the beautiful” (248d), and its swiftest return is for “one who has loved wisdom without guile, or been a pederast together with philosophy” (249a); “only the mind of the lover of wisdom grows wings” (249c). At the end the title “wise” is “becoming to a god alone”, “but either lover of wisdom or some such thing” suits the man who knows (278d), and Socrates finds “a certain philosophy” in Isocrates (279a). The English renders philosophos “lover of wisdom”, philosophein “love wisdom” and philosophia “philosophy”, as in the Symposium.
Daimonic; the sign (daimonios; to daimonion; sēmeion)
A daimōn was a divine power, lesser than a god or not distinguished from one, and daimonios meant “of a daimon”, and so “marvellous”, often in irony. Socrates calls Phaedrus “you daimonic man” (235c, 268a) and caps his “prodigiously” with “Daimonically” (234d). To daimonion, “the daimonic”, is Socrates’ own sign, a voice that only ever holds him back: “the daimonic and the sign that customarily comes to me came” when he was about to cross the river, and kept him until he had made expiation for his speech (242b–c). The English renders daimōn “daimon”, daimonios “daimonic” and sēmeion “sign”, as in the Symposium, where Love is “a great daimon” (202d).
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete Phaedrus, 227a–279c: outside the walls of Athens, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss love, the soul, rhetoric, and writing. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, later readings of the winged soul, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Phaedrus, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901; second edition, 1910), in the later Johnson/Milford impression issued no earlier than January 1935 described by the supplied edition. Its Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against photographs of that impression; Burnet’s readings and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.
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